The House of Tshatshu

Power, Politics and Chiefs North-West of the Great Kei River c 1818–2018

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This book has been independently peer-reviewed by academics who are experts in this field.

In memory of Yiliswa, queen of the Tambookies

and

Nosizwe Gungubele who followed in her footsteps

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List of maps and illustrations

Photographs by authors, unless otherwise stated.

Biographical notes on key players

Bawana, chief of the amaTshatshu, led his followers across the Great Kei River in 1823, thereby extending the territory occupied by the abaThembu whose *kumkani* (king or paramount chief) was in the Mbashe River area. The Moravian mission station at Shiloh was established in Bawana's territory.

Emma, Princess, daughter of Chief Sandile of the Rharhabe Xhosa, was educated at Zonnebloem College in Cape Town in the late 1860s and early 1870s where she lived in the household of Bishop Gray. After the failure of Gray's plan to have her married to Ngangelizwe, the Thembu *kumkani*, she became one of Stokwe Ndlela's wives.

Galela, minor chief of the amaGcina became embroiled in conflict with Bawana, chief of the amaTshatshu in the early 1820s in the Mbashe area. He continued the feud as they moved north-west of the Great Kei River and in 1835 was suspected of Bawana's murder.

Gungubele, chief of the amaTshatshu, was the son of Maphasa and Yiliswa. He was born on the north-eastern frontier and had his great place on the Gwatyu close to St Peter's, an outstation of St Marks Anglican Mission. He took up arms in the War of Ngcayechibi, the Ninth Frontier War (the last of the frontier wars), and was imprisoned on Robben Island until the chiefs were given amnesty in 1888. Gungubele went to live at Makwababa where he died in 1923.

Gungubele, khayalakhe, praise name Dumelusuthu, younger brother of Mncedisi who is known by his praise name Jongulundi. Khayalakhe married Noxolo in 1982 and became headman of Caba in 1994. He was recognised by the government as a chief and appointed head of the local traditional council in 2010.

Gungubele, Mondli, grandson of Dabulamanzi Gungubele, descendant of Gungubele Maphasa by a junior house, obtained a Bachelor of Commerce degree and worked as a trade unionist in the 1980s. He joined the African National Congress (ANC), became a Member of the Gauteng Legislature and served in various government departments before becoming mayor of Ekurhuleni in 2013. He became a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC in 2017 and Deputy Minister of Finance in President Cyril Ramaphosa's Cabinet in 2018.

Hebe, Simon Mthobeni of the amaNgxongo clan, was a businessman from Paarl who was allocated a farmstead in Zweledinga by his brother-in-law, Lennox Sebe, president of the Ciskei bantustan. He became a Member of the then Ciskei Parliament and was appointed chief of the Zweledinga district in 1980.

Hebe, Viwe, son of Mthobeni Hebe by Nosizwe, sister of Lennox Sebe. After his father died, his mother served as regent of the amaNgxongo until he was able to take over as chief of Zweledinga, the position that his father had been given by Lennox Sebe. His succession was contested.

Hemming, John, a colonial civil servant who promoted the interests of the white settlers, was appointed civil commissioner of Queenstown in 1876 and chair of the Thembuland Commission in 1882.

Jongulundi, Chief (Mncedisi Gungubele), heir to the Tshatshu chieftaincy, grew up in Caba in the Engcobo district and served in the Transkei army under Bantu Holomisa. He was installed as chief of the amaTshatshu at a ceremony held at the Gwatyu Great Place in April 2013. He was married to Nosizwe Gungubele who was killed in a motor car accident in 2016.

Judge, Edward, was appointed as a magistrate in Queenstown in 1870. He devised a plan to diminish the power of the chiefs, strengthen colonial governance, introduce taxes and promote individual land tenure in the Tambookie location.

Katsi, Reuben Makhebenge was appointed as headman of 13 small villages, collectively known as Rodana, in 1940. These villages were consolidated into the four large villages of Tshatshu, Rodana, Mtsalane and Mpothulo in 1966. In 1976, Reuben Katsi led an exodus of abaThembu from the Glen Grey district to the Zweledinga district. He fought for the restoration of the Tshatshu chieftaincy in Transkei and Ciskei. He died in 1980.

Katsi, Sabelo Prince, son of Reuben Makhebenge Katsi. He was awarded chieftainship of Zweledinga on 10 October 2013 by the premier of the Eastern Cape on the recommendation of the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims. This award was challenged by Viwe Hebe.

Manzezulu Mtirara, descendant of Mfanta by a junior house, was born in 1925 and appointed as a chief of the amaHala in the Lady Frere district by his cousin, Kaiser Daliwonga (KD) Matanzima in 1967. He held this position until his death in 2002.

Maphasa, chief of the amaTshatshu, moved north west of the Great Kei River with his father Bawana in the 1820s. After moving about the Tambookie frontier, he established his great place on the Swart Kei River. Once his father died, he became the most senior Thembu chief west of the Kei and signed

treaties with the British on behalf of the westerly abaThembu or Tambookies in the 1830s. He fought in the frontier wars of 1846–47 (War of the Axe) and 1850–53 (War of Mlanjeni) and died in 1852.

Maphasa, Obed Mawonga, praise name Jongisizwe, a descendant of Gungubele by a junior house, was headman of Makwababa from 1974 to 2018. Between 1987 and 1994 he also held a position in the Transkei ambassador's office in Port Elizabeth.

Matanzima, Kaiser Daliwonga (KD), was appointed chief of the amaHala clan in 1940 and in 1966 became paramount chief of the Emigrant Thembus (abaThembu base-Rhoda) under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959). When the Transkei was declared a self-governing state in 1963, he became the chief minister and on its independence in 1976, he was appointed prime minister. KD Matanzima was the state president of the Transkei from 1979 to 1986. He had five wives. In 2010, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (Nhlapho Commission) confirmed the status of the Matanzima house as no more than that of senior chief.

Mfanta, son of Mtirara Ngubengcuka, the Thembu *kumkani* by a junior house. Mfanta took up arms in the War of Ngcayecibi (1877–78) and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Breakwater Prison in Cape Town where he died. His date of death is unknown.

Mtirara, son of Ngubengcuka, the Thembu *kumkani*. Born in 1825, Mtirara was raised by Ngubengcuka's widow, who was the queen regent, Nonesi (not his biological mother). Mtirara was *kumkani* of the abaThembu from 1840 to 1849. He was the father of Ngangelizwe (Qeya) by the great house and of Raxoti Matanzima by the right-hand house.

Mvulani (Wilhelmine) Stompjes, interpreter and assistant to the missionaries at the Moravian mission station at Shiloh. Passionately critical of men's behaviour towards women, she confronted the chiefs and their councillors, insisting that they change their ways. Her life history is recorded in her memoir, *'Lebenslauf der Wilhelmine Stompjes Kaffer-Dolmetscherin und Nationalhelferin. Heimgegangen in Silo 9 Juli 1863'* ['Biography of Wilhelmine Stompjes, Indigenous-Interpreter and National Helper, passed away in Shilo on 9 July 1863'.]

Newton, Reverend John, Anglican missionary in charge of St Peter's on the Gwatyu, an outstation of St Marks near the Tshatshu Great Place on the Gwatyu.

Ngangelizwe, Chief (Qeya), *kumkani* of the abaThembu, 1863–1884. He sought British protection against his father-in-law, Sarhili, and ceded Thembuland to the British in 1883.

Nonesi, widow of Ngubengcuka, who was the mother of Mtirara, the Thembu *kumkani*, served as queen regent for the abaThembu and as representative of the Thembu great house on the north-eastern frontier from the mid-1840s to the mid-1860s. Known as the queen of the abaThembu, Nonesi lived on the Imvani River in the Tambookie location. Nonesi was banished to Mpondoland for refusing to move to Emigrant Thembuland in 1865.

Sarhili, son of Hintsa, was born in 1810. He served as chief of the Gcaleka Xhosa and as *kumkani* of the amaXhosa from 1835 to 1892. Sarhili had nine wives. He was a strong believer in the millenarian prophecies of Nongqawuse and had much of his land confiscated by the British for promoting them.

Somana, Aubrey Velile, a descendant of Somana, Gungubele's brother. He is a mining engineer, lives in Gauteng and works as a consultant. He is author of *AmaTshatshu: A Preliminary Study of the History of the Thembus of Western Thembuland* (Johannesburg: Nikel Kruse Publishers, n.d.).

Stokwe, son of Ndlela, minor chief of the amaGcina, a clan that became incorporated into the abaThembu. He moved across the Indwe River into Emigrant Thembuland in 1865 and married Princess Emma, daughter of the Xhosa chief, Sandile. He was killed in the Thembuland rebellion of 1880–1883.

Tshunungwa, Thembekile Enoch, was also known as umThemb' omkhulu. He was secretary-general of the Cape ANC in the late 1950s and early 1960s and was accused along with Nelson Mandela and others in the Treason Trial. Forced to give up his teaching job in Cape Town, he ran a trading store in Bolotwa. He became an advisor to KD Matanzima and was the deputy chairman of the Glen Grey Territorial Authority. He held various ministerial positions in KD Matanzima's Cabinet, including those of Welfare and Pensions, Education and Training, and Foreign Affairs. He was instrumental in the resuscitation of the Tshatshu chieftainship. Born in 1923, he died in 1999.

Warner, JC, was a Wesleyan missionary close to Nonesi, queen of the abaThembu. He was superintendent of the Tambookie location in the Queenstown district from 1853 to 1863.

Yiliswa, wife of Chief Maphasa (who died in 1852) and mother of Gungubele, lived on the Tambookie frontier in the Swart Kei valley. From 1852 to 1883, she lived on the Gwatyu in the Tambookie location. Yiliswa was known as queen of the Tambookies, the abaThembu north-west of the Great Kei River. In 1883, Yiliswa was removed to Makwababa, Qhitsi, where she died in 1888.

PREFACE: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION

If the politics of historical production are never simple, they are far less straightforward in a racially charged moment of postcolonial political transition. We began our collaboration as co-authors by putting our own respective histories on the table. We — Anne Kelk Mager (also known as Noluthando), a university-based historian, and Phiko Jeffrey Velelo, a serving member of the council of the amaTshatshu — came together from backgrounds that positioned us differently in relation to conquest, colonialism and the institution of the chieftaincy. Phiko Velelo's ancestors are amaTshatshu. Like his father and grandfather, he is a councillor to the Tshatshu chieftaincy, a duty he engages in alongside his work as an agricultural economist in the employ of government. He is also an ordained Anglican priest. He takes his pastoral duties seriously; as an agricultural economist he believes in good farming methods and as a councillor he believes that good chiefs can make a difference to people's lives.

Anne Mager spent her childhood on Maphasa Kraal, a commercial farm in the Swart Kei valley. Her search for the story of Maphasa began in earnest in 2010. With help from Jeff Peires, a veteran historian of the Eastern Cape, she approached the great house of Tshatshu for their blessing to write a history of their ancestor and his people. Initially sceptical, the chief and his advisers later became convinced that this was an opportunity worth pursuing. In 2011, Anne Mager first met Phiko Velelo at the installation of Mncedisi Gungubele (praise name: Aah! Jongulundi) as chief of the amaTshatshsu and then again in Bhisho at a court hearing on the contested chieftaincy at Zweledinga. Phiko had done the research for this case. When the court adjourned, we discussed the possibility of collaborating as authors.

Writing about people is a sensitive matter and implies that both writer and subjects take a risk. Collaborative writing also entails risks, but we believed that there was much to be gained from working together. Our goal was to produce a book that would be better than anything we could achieve alone. Successful collaboration would require understanding each other's expectations, accommodating disagreement, accepting difference and building a common approach. It meant taking joint responsibility. We recognised that while our personal histories placed us (albeit in different ways) in the history we wished to write, the story did not belong to us. We recognised that we brought different perspectives, skills and knowledges to the writing of this history and that for a credible account of this past to emerge, we would need to make the best use of

what each had to contribute. Phiko Velelo contributed most strongly to the later period, on which he had done a great deal of research, while Anne Mager spent many months poring over documents on the nineteenth century. When a key element of the story seemed to be missing from the material we had gathered, we went to the archives together or set out independently to talk to people in the Eastern Cape. We discussed every character, every issue and every snippet of writing as we went along.

The most important sources for this book were the materials housed in the archives. This is not to say that archives are a magic box from which we could pull the 'truth'. Archives are places where collections of documents are kept and where researchers can come to read them; they are institutions governed by rules. The archives are scattered. We consulted materials in the Cape Archives where documents pertaining to the colonial era, including correspondence and the reports of district commissioners, and court records, are kept. We found some documents pertaining to the former Transkei in Mthatha and to the former Ciskei in Bhisho, but most of the apartheid-era documents are in the National Archives in Pretoria which holds materials dating from 1910. The National Library of South Africa holds published materials, maps and photographs from the colonial period. Some of these archives are well organised and the process of retrieving documents is clear; at others we had great difficulty in accessing documents and we were concerned that these precious records were not adequately cared for. The safe keeping of materials that enable us to interrogate and write about the past is in the hands of the archivists responsible for these repositories.

Archives are not neutral; they are sites in and from which knowledge is produced. Official correspondence of colonial governors and administrators contain a great deal about conquest, dispossession and colonialism. In the language and spirit of the coloniser, these documents promote white heroes and disparage the Africans whom they seek to conquer; they exonerate atrocities of their own and demean the culture of those whom they colonise. However, these documents also enable the careful reader to figure out who was talking to whom, under what circumstances and in what tone; they indicate who was powerful and who was feared. This helps the researcher to form a picture of social relations and networks of power. Colonial records are often richly detailed while reports from the apartheid era are generally less so. Examples of these sources are reproduced in the appendices at the back of the book.

Researchers work with a critical mind. To retrieve an African history in these collections, researchers read against the grain of the self-serving colonial

narrative and with the grain to seek out who was where and what might have happened at which moment. We gather up these fragments, the partial accounts, the little bits of time, the glimpses of character and piece them together in a story. As historians, we arrange the bits and pieces in chronological order to create a sense of time, movement and process. Researching this book has taken years of close reading and sifting in the archives.

While we searched among the fragments left behind by those long gone, we also spoke to many living people and interviewed big men, women and poor rural people. The past was more important for some than for others. Whom and what individuals remembered was informed partly by where they were positioned in relation to people who had status, power or influence. For some, memory was informed by the issue of whether the past mattered for the politics of the present. Interviews too are sites of knowledge production. We have not removed differences in viewpoint and perspective but have searched for corroborations and hunted for evidence in the archives so that we might position these differences in our narrative. The interviewees are listed in the bibliography; we name here those who made it possible to get started.

Chiefs Jongixhanti Mtirara, a descendant of Chief Mfanta of the Tambookie location, and Ngangomhlaba Matanzima, a son of Emigrant Thembuland, talked with us about the meaning of western Thembuland. Velile Aubrey Somana, engineering consultant, mining magnate and author of *AmaTshatshu: A Preliminary Study of the History of the Thembus of Western Thembuland*, shared his passion for remembering this past and provided us with a valuable starting point for research into the house of Tshatshu.[1] Obed Mawonga (Jongisizwe) Maphasa, headman of Makwababa and a Member of the House of Traditional Leaders, shared with us his deep knowledge of the history of the amaTshatshu and their history and of their struggles, past and present. Mondli Gungubele, former trade unionist, ANC Member of Parliament, mayor of Ekurhuleni and member of the ANC National Executive Committee under President Cyril Ramaphosa, shared his views on democracy, corruption and leadership with us. Politicians Chief Phatekile Holomisa and former president of the Transkei, Bantu Holomisa, gave us their views on how the past affects the present. Many others, particularly the late Nosizwe Gungubele and her sisters-in-law, Tetelwa and Noxolo, excavated their memories for traces of the past as they shared their life stories with us.

1 A. V. Somana, *Amatshatshu: A Preliminary Study of the History of the Thembus of Western Thembuland* (Johannesburg: Nikel Kruse Publishers, n.d.).

From our initial meetings, we recognised that we had a lot in common. We were both passionate about a history that for nearly 200 years had been treated as forgotten by those in power; we recognised that the people themselves cared very much about where they came from and who they were in relation to others and to the past. We saw that for many people north west of the Great Kei River, history brought painful memories and conflicting reinterpretations. We believed that if we could set down what had gone before, we might enable people to interrogate that past.

The next step was to recognise our differences. This we did by interviewing each other in the hope that a formal exercise would help us to pose questions that ordinarily we might find impolite to raise. The transcript of this interview highlights our respective anxieties.

Anne: Ok, let's start, Phiko. What does 'fighting *ubukhosi*' mean?

Phiko: It means that there are elements in the community who are either fighting to destroy chieftainship and other elements who are fighting for recognition for their chieftainship.

Anne: If there are elements who oppose the chieftainship, what is the relevance of chiefs going forward?

Phiko: Ja, that is a very, very difficult question that we need to address. As you are aware, the chief is not appointed through a democratic process. Whether you are popular or unpopular, you are installed because of your bloodline. If you are born a chief, you are supposed to rule over your subjects whether you like it or not. And now with democracy, everyone has started to question those norms. If they are not happy with their leaders' performance, they vote them out of office. But it is not like that with the chieftainship. So that's why the institution of the chieftainship needs to transform. They need to look at themselves, to see what it is that they must do in order for the institution to be relevant now and in the future.

Anne: So, what do you think needs to be transformed? What must be changed?

Phiko: Ja, it's a tough one. My own thinking is that where the institution is doing well, and the chief is helping to lift up his subjects, they should learn from what makes it strong. There are some areas where there is a clash between the municipal structures and the chieftainship. They are not working together. But in some instances, they have a very good working relationship. There is also the issue of politics. Nowadays they say no, the chief must stay out of politics. He should be apolitical; he should not support any political organisation or party. This is a big

change. In the past, chiefs were very political although there were no political organisations in those days.

Anne: What about the allocation of land — you are an agricultural economist. Chiefs allocate land in accordance with communal tenure; is this the best way to utilise the land?

Phiko: There must be more land so that chiefs can give people in a particular community enough land to farm on a commercial basis, but there must be some land for people who are poorer – land that they can use. The chief can organise resources like tractors and ploughs through the form of a co-operative. Some can lease, some can sub-lease, others can do as the traditional council does and pull people together to create one big piece of land to farm as a co-operative. So, there are many forms of land ownership or land utilisation that you can put in place, but you must take into account the ability of those people to work the land with the skills and resources they have. The people in the rural areas are dependant more on remittance incomes and social grants and they get very little from agricultural production. In my area, livestock farming is doing better compared to crop farming because of low and erratic rainfall conditions. But the current big problem with livestock farming is stock theft; this has become rampant recently.

Anne: So you don't think it would be viable to move towards a system of freehold land in the near future?

Phiko: No, not so quickly. I do think that freehold land is an ideal situation where everyone could own their own land that you can do whatever with; and if you are tired of farming, you can sell it to one who needs the farm now. But for poorer communities it would be difficult. For poorer communities, freehold means that some people would never own (land) and would end up being labourers or workers for other people. That's why there should be a good mix. There must be freehold for those that can afford it and also lease arrangements and communal assistance for those who have less.

Anne: But the advanced capitalist countries all moved to freehold.Why is it a problem?

Phiko: The issue is that there is an exploitation in the process. In the urban areas it's better; there are more choices. But in the rural areas there are no choices. That's why at least if we want to sustain ourselves and have food for everyone, there must be a mixed economy in the rural areas. That's my view.

Anne: It seems that one of the most significant changes in rural Eastern Cape is that people no longer have a strong desire to be farmers and to use what resources they may have to invest in a rural livelihood. What is your view on this?

Phiko: Ja, you are right on that one. For example, my family background: our forefathers were four. All four of them had lands to plough. My own grandfather had sheep and few cattle. He was a sheep farmer; he sold wool. His first sibling kept goats and cattle. His second sibling was the most educated and worked as a clerk in the Bantu Administration or whatever; he also kept a few cattle and sheep. His third brother was a sangoma (*igqirha*); he also had cattle and sheep and owned an ox wagon nicknamed *Khothane*. He earned his living by hearing (*ukuvumisa*) and by hauling people's produce from the lands. These people would give (him) some bags of sorghum or maize at the end of the harvesting as payment for helping them, and the brothers would split the harvest between the four of them. If there was a drought in one year they would combine their cattle to assist each other. Each one was independent, it was good, but they also used to co-exist and complement one another. So they didn't like to go to work forever. They did this when they were young. Then they came back home and farmed. They didn't want to work forever as we do, you see. We are used to working and so we don't want to be independent now. Land is no longer available.

Anne: Thanks, Phiko. Then there is the gender question. The chieftaincy has ensured the perpetuation of primogeniture, the male line. This is also the basis of male domination, the rule of older men, senior men, that is described by some as patriarchy. So how can the chieftaincy treat men and women equally when there is primogeniture and patriarchy?

Phiko: That's where I think the institution of the chieftaincy most needs to reform in order to be relevant to the changing times. Like for example, I am coming from an Anglican background which used to be patriarchal. Before, we didn't have female preachers, female reverends, female bishops, but now it has opened up because gender activists are so vocal that we all know we cannot live in a man's world. So even in the chieftainship we need to reform this patriarchy of first-born male to be heir to the crown. Nonesi and Yiliswa (regents of the abaThembu in the nineteenth century) demonstrated that women are capable of strong leadership. What happens if the firstborn male is unfit for the job? Now we need to check with the children of that chief to see who

is most suitable, who has leadership qualities, who is more conversant with the affairs of that nation — regardless of whether it's an unmarried woman or a man. The difficulty comes when the girl gets married out of the family; then it may be that another one must be appointed. But as long as the unmarried woman is productive and clued up with the administration of justice and peace and what is needed for progress, then we must appoint that one to take over as chief.

Phiko Velelo interviewed Anne Mager, also known as Noluthando:

Phiko: Noluthando, can you give me your family background as far back as possible?

Anne: The Mager family was originally Danish. At some point they moved to England. In the 1870s, my great grandfather was recruited by the British colonial office to establish a pharmacy in Queenstown; and to supply western biomedicine to the hospital that was being built and to the white settlers living in the district and passing through Queenstown on their way to the gold mines. The colonial view was that in time, Africans would embrace western biomedicine.

Phiko: What role did your family play in the frontier wars?

Anne: My great grandfather had arrived in the settler town of Queenstown by the time of the 1877 Frontier War. Gungubele, Maphasa's son, was all over the *Queenstown Free Press* during that war. It is possible that my great grandfather knew him. But we have no record of this. He was a pharmacist who dispensed medicines. As a professional he served on the board of the Frontier Hospital, established in 1876, and was instrumental in setting up the Pharmaceutical Association of South Africa that sets the standards for the quality and registration of medicines. It is difficult to know what he thought of the (1877) Frontier War. He was not a soldier and he was not a farmer. Business people are often not visible in the frontier story. I assume that he saw western medicine as improving the quality of life of those who took advantage of it.

Phiko: Were they part and parcel of the oppressors or did they sympathise with the oppressed?

Anne: Look, they must have been sympathetic to the colonial project. All those who came out at that time believed in it, or at least the idea of British imperial power. And they benefitted from colonialism. In general, the only African people the colonists interacted with were those employed as their servants.

Phiko: How did you come to live on the farm Maphasa Kraal?

Anne: My father acquired the farm in 1947 when he returned to South Africa after fighting the Nazis in the Second World War. He had trained as a veterinary surgeon before the war but when he returned, he wanted to try farming. Maphasa Kraal was on the market at the time. As you know the Maphasa valley was turned into white farms in 1853. Nearly 100 years on, the farm had changed hands many times.

Phiko: Ja. Now as a white and a woman, do you think black people will give you credit for writing a book on chieftainship or will they just dismiss it?

Anne: I think, Phiko, that we are going to get all kinds of reactions. There will be those who completely dismiss the book, the effort and the initiative. That kind of response simply rejects any intellectual or social project that has a smattering of white scholarship. I believe that as a historian, to essentialise, to say that only white people can write about white people, only amaTshatshu can write about amaTshatshu, only black people can write about black people, is very dangerous and stands in the way of human development. I think we need multiple perspectives; the way we look at things makes the same events or ideas seem different and you need to get these differing perspectives. There is no essential understanding. As researchers, we 'get' some things and do not register other things. In the process of research, it may happen that a white scholar will be denied access to certain kinds of information. This can also happen to outsiders who are black. People manage your expectations; they control what it is that you can pick up and what you see. I am aware of that, but I don't think it negates the exercise. The process would perhaps be different if I were a black person. It might even be more difficult. But if research is carefully conducted, with integrity, what we gather will have some validity, some merit. I believe that it is better for history to be written than to wait for the perfect person to do the job. In this instance, I have the motivation because I am curious and have an attachment to this past. It is a challenge to write a history in which you are in some way implicated, in which you feel complicit. I want to confront that challenge. South African scholars tend to stick to what is politically acceptable or what fits comfortably with global agendas. I believe that all of us on both sides of the racial divide are complicit in the past and that political correctness may obscure our vision. We can't claim to be neutral about how we see the past.

Phiko: For sure. Emanating from your replies, is this the reason that you wanted a co-author?

Anne: Yes, that's right, Phiko. I could write on my own but there is the question of respect. I prefer to work with people. What I object to is having token authors who have nothing to do with the ideas, nothing to do with the process and you see their name there. Everyone knows this is a form of fronting. That I didn't want to do. From the get-go I wanted to have a co-author, but I was looking for someone who could pose hard questions and who could be part of the process of producing this knowledge. Of course, none of this prevents anyone else from writing this history at any time.

Phiko: From the African people you have interacted with, especially amaTshatshu, on a scale of one to ten, how much support have you got?

Anne: Gosh, Phiko, I don't know how to scale anything one to ten. But I can say that it was a process. At the beginning, I had to work hard to win people over to the idea of this history. Before I got anything at all I had to go the extra mile. I hosted Jongulundi and others in Cape Town so we could spend time together and visit Robben Island where Gungubele was imprisoned, and I visited the Eastern Cape as often as I could between teaching at university. I had to show openness. But in general, I have had a lot of support. Clearly people are worried that I mustn't run away with their story, I must not go and write my own thing that will work against what they want. So there are concerns, and perhaps some are still sceptical, but everyone has been warm, welcoming, extraordinarily generous and loving. That has been a fantastic experience for me, it really has. People have held back on their worries and given me the benefit of the doubt. I don't want to abuse that trust.

Phiko: Finally, did you acquire the name Noluthando when they started to now accept you and decided to give you an African name?

Anne: No, I was named Noluthando long before I met Jongulundi. I was given an isiXhosa name in the 1980s in the anti-apartheid struggle when I was very much an activist. Jongulundi was happy that I have this name. It is the only name he uses.

Exposing our scepticism, vulnerabilities and anxieties enabled us to trust each other and to collaborate as co-authors. By opening our respective histories, positions and perspectives to scrutiny and criticism, we began to understand each other. We had in common the desire to render visible and audible those

people who had been politically obliterated from the social and political landscape through conquest. The interview confirmed the possibility that we could reflect jointly and critically on this past.

As in all political arenas, contestation is central to chiefly politics. We knew that the people we encountered in our research might have different viewpoints, ideological positions and personal agendas. Our approach was to embrace civility as a mode of working while we located ourselves, as Kutz put it, in a 'world where individuals shape their lives with others, in love mixed with resentment, and in co-operation mixed with discord'.[2] Practically, this meant following up stories, tracing threads in the archives and consulting the historical scholarship so that we could weave a credible tale based on evidence.

Beyond our personal links to the area and to the House of Tshatshu, this story provides a way into the neglected history of the Tambookie (abaThembu) on the north-eastern frontier. While the processes of conquest and dispossession may be recognised widely, there is much that is unique to the experience of people in this locality who, at the height of apartheid, found themselves to be subjects of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima's ambitions. The amaTshatshu were the first to move north-westward over the Kei River and represented the most senior Thembu chieftaincy in the new territory in the 1820s. Firmly in the sights of imperialists and colonists, their chieftaincy was proscribed by the British in 1852 and not recognised by any government until 2003. Reduced to a fraction of their former number on the frontier and dispersed for nearly two centuries, the amaTshatshu began to reach out to one another and to inquire about their history.

Through this longitudinal study we develop a sense of how continuities and ruptures have brought the past into the present. If it is emblematic of countless others, it is also singular. The story of the amaTshatshu demonstrates how conquest weapons — un-naming, violence, political manoeuvring, magisterial treachery and racial duplicity — were deployed in repeated acts of dispossession. This arsenal was particularly intensely wielded against Maphasa's people, penetrating their sense of spiritual well-being and making their journey back from obscurity long and arduous. Their story invites reflection on the processes and meaning of restitution and the significance of chiefly politics in the era of postcolonial democracy. But this does not mean that the story is easily contained. Both on the frontier and in the colonial locations to which they were

2 C. Kutz, *Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.259.

relocated, the story of the amaTshatshu involves others and in some cases is entangled with that of others. We have had to unravel these entanglements and explore, at least to some extent, the histories of the people who embody them. This detail has made the book dense in parts but has added depth and enabled the thick description that we believe will make the effort worthwhile.

INTRODUCTION

'In Africa, the encounters of the past are very much part of the present'.[1]

This is a story of conquest, dispossession and un-naming. It begins in the mid-1820s when Bawana, descendant of the Thembu chief, Tshatshu, and a group of about 3 000 followers crossed westwards over the Tsomo River, the northern tributary of the Great Kei River, into Bushmanland. Their move was a planned migration from the Mbashe River where hordes of newcomers had led to congestion and conflict.[2] They were followed by several minor Thembu chiefs. Bushmanland offered a vast expanse of grazing; it was sparsely populated by the Khoesan who roved the area in hunting bands.[3] To the Khoesan, the abaThembu were known as the Tam'bou'ci. Unable to articulate the clicks, the trekboers pronounced it Tambookie and this form entered the written text. While there were no recognised boundaries, Bushmanland was understood to stretch from the Stormberg in the north to the Amathole mountains in the south, the boundary with the Cape Colony. To the west, isolated boers grazed their cattle on the upper reaches of the Fish River where the town of Cradock was established as a frontier stronghold in 1814. Over the next three decades, large numbers of abaThembu crossed into this territory and drove the Khoesan to the margins as they moved westward, thereby opening a new frontier for the expansion of Thembuland. Bushmanland became known as Tambookieland. In the 1830s, they came into conflict with the British as the territory became a frontier for colonial expansion. By the 1840s, the abaThembu west of the Tsomo River numbered over 40 000.[4]

1 F. Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History', *American Historical Review*, 99, 5 (1994), pp.1516–1545.

2 For discussion about the meaning of *Mfecane* as an inclusive concept beyond the effects of the Zulu wars, see C. Hamilton (ed), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995).

3 We follow Robert Ross's terminology set out in the front matter of R. Ross (ed), *These Oppressions Won't Cease: The Political Thought of the Cape Khoesan, 1777-1879 An Anthology* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2017), n.p.: Khoi (men) or Khoekhoe (men of men) referred to those who in precolonial times had cattle and sheep; San was an insult for hunter-gatherers who had no livestock. The term Khoesan refers to the collectivity of those with cattle and those without livestock. Khoesan is the more appropriate term since by the early nineteenth century, most groups north-west of the Great Kei River had become interested in cattle. Many had acquired livestock from the trekboers.

4 Report of Chairman of Select Committee on the Kafir Tribes. Cape of Good Hope. Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope relative to the Kafir Tribes, and the recent outbreak on the eastern frontier of the colony, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, page image 92.

We use the terms Tambookie frontier and north-eastern frontier interchangeably: Tambookie frontier indicates the westward expansion of the abaThembu into Bushmanland and the creation of an 'external' frontier that extended Thembuland. This westward move was countered by the British seeking to expand in a north-easterly direction from their colony south of the Amathole mountains. External frontiers occurred in African contexts when people moved outwards from the centre to get away from local problems or to take up new opportunities. In imperial discourse, the idea of frontier implied a boundary, a limiting zone that separated spaces and people from one another. Colonial frontiers were created in the process of conquest so that imperialists sitting in Britain and those sent to colonise the frontier might define and shape these spaces. They did this both by cartography (drawing physical maps) and by attempting to impose control over the social and political domains. Scholars prefer to see these colonial frontiers as zones of indeterminate, unstable authority and shifting boundaries. Across the frontier zone, the British used racial, cultural and gender markers to identify themselves as superior and to distance themselves from indigenous 'others'. Constantly challenged, this process of imposing supremacy was never complete, and the frontier zone remained highly unstable and politically volatile.[5]

From the 1830s, violent encounters characterised the Tambookie frontier. Most violent were the wars between colonists and Tambookies, but conflict occurred within and between groups of abaThembu as they sought out choice grazing and water points, settled scores and accumulated cattle in this new zone. This internal conflict or 'interstitial frontier conflict' as Igor Kopytoff calls it, was a feature of external frontiers and occurred between those connected by name, history and sometimes descent.[6] The degree of autonomy enjoyed by Thembu subgroups meant that they were accustomed to tensions, competition and shifting alliances. What was different on this frontier was that internal conflict was intertwined with colonial encounter, and with attacks against

5 For more on frontier expansion in Africa, see I. Kopytoff (ed), *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); for colonial frontiers, see N. Mostert, *Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People* (London: Pimlico, 1993); E.J.C. Wagenaar, *A Forgotten Frontier Zone — Settlements and Reactions in the Stormberg Area between 1820–1860*, Archives Year Book for South African History 45th year, Vol 2 (1982); M.C. Legassick, *The Politics of a South African Frontier: The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries 1780–1840* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2010); N. Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century* (Athens: Ohio University Press, Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005).

6 Kopytoff (ed), *The African Frontier*, Introduction, p.9.

the indigenous Khoesan. Violent clashes complicated Thembu politics and weakened anti-colonial resistance. It also compromised the leadership of the Tshatshu Thembu chief, Maphasa, who took over on the death of his pioneering father, Bawana.



Figure 0.1: Tambookie or north-eastern frontier c 1845.

In 1852, towards the end of the Eighth and bloodiest Frontier War, the colonial governor, Sir George Cathcart, issued a devastating proclamation against the amaTshatshu declaring that 'The name and independence of the tribe of Maphasa will cease … the remnants of his almost annihilated tribe will be dispersed among others'.[7] A few months later he gloated, 'I have broken up and banished his tribe, and forfeited his land … The wreck of his people have mixed and merged with other tribes.'[8] Over 3 000 standing men and their families, the largest group west of the Tsomo River had been cut down by colonial scheming and the flourish of the governor's pen. They were removed to the newly created Tambookie location where they resided alongside various smaller Thembu groups. A century and a half later, South Africa's democratically elected government revoked Cathcart's banning and recognised the House of Tshatshu (*ubuzwe bamaTshatshu*) as a sub-house of the Thembu nation (*isizwe sabaThembu*).

Their official namelessness and enforced obscurity came to an end in 2003.[9] But the political and personal consequences of an obliterated history cut deep, with the wounds appearing in later generations as scar tissue. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, young and old were clamouring to find out more about their past: Who are we? Where do we come from? What is our history? Questions came from cities and towns across South Africa and from the rural villages where Maphasa's followers had been 'mixed and merged' so long ago. In 2003, a group of amaTshatshu established a website so that those in search of their past might link up with one another. A few years later, Aubrey Velile Somana published a preliminary history of the amaTshatshu.[10]

7 Cathcart, G. *Correspondence of Lieut-General the Hon, Sir George Cathcart, K.C.B., relative to his Military Operations in Kaffraria, until the Termination of the Kafir War, and to his Measures for the future Maintenance of Peace on that Frontier and the Protection and Welfare of the People of South Africa.* Second Edition. (London: John Murray, 1857), Proclamation by His Excellency Lieutenant General the Hon George Cathcart Governor and Commander in Chief of the Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and of the Dependencies Thereof, Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, and her Majesty's High Commissioner for settling and adjustment of the Affairs of the territories in South Africa, adjacent and contiguous to the eastern and North-eastern Frontier of the said colony, &etc., pp.239–240. See Appendix 2 for full proclamation.

8 Cathcart Correspondence 1857. Extract from private letter, Grahamstown, 11 November 1853, p.354.

9 This ruling was made in terms of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act 41 0f 2003) by the Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, South Africa; the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, (Nhlapo Commission), Pretoria, 29 July 2010.

10 A.V. Somana, *AmaTshatshu: A Preliminary Study of the History of the Thembus of Western Thembuland* (Johannesburg: Nikel Kruse Publishers, n.d.).

Ethnicity-making was not their motivation. Rather, these leaders were informed by a deep sense that history creates a sense of belonging and that story-telling identifies who one is in relation to others, in the past and the present. They reached out for historical narratives that might tell about the past, facilitate its interpretation and provide an understanding of the way it had shaped the present. They were motivated by an awareness that people laid claim to power, resources and identities through their stories about the past; and that silencing people, and annihilating their ability to tell stories, put an end to the claims that they might make. Cathcart's decree was an act of epistemic violence; it ruptured their lives, scrambled the way they perceived themselves and proscribed the stories that they might tell in the making of their own history.[11]

While the amaTshatshu were the only group west of the Tsomo and north-west of the Great Kei to be proscribed in this way, their story needs to be told in relation to other groups and to changing power relations. Repeatedly dispossessed, removed and relocated, they were not removed from society but reinserted in disconcerting and uncomfortable ways alongside others. At the forefront of power and politics on the north-eastern frontier in the first half of the nineteenth century, their subsequent obscurity in the twentieth century is striking. As a result of their proscription, they were relegated to living on the margins of political and economic life from the mid-nineteenth century. Their struggle for restitution provides a window into the changing character of chiefly authority, power and politics — from colonialism to the present.

This book is concerned with what it means for people to have their name obliterated and with the struggle to regain dignity, identity and a sense of empowerment through its restoration. It also explores broader questions. Ending the proscription of the Tshatshu chieftaincy raises questions for real politics. What are the implications of recognising ethnic naming and hereditary chieftaincies in a young democracy? How did the idea of western Thembuland emerge; to what end was it constructed; who fits into the different versions of this concept and how? More broadly, it raises questions that go to the core of the postcolonial dilemma: What is to be done about chiefs and indigenous institutions distorted by the colonial past? What does it mean to be disfigured by colonialism? Can institutions marked by a cruel past be brought in line with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the foundations of South Africa's democracy? What if they are structurally unreceptive to reform?

11 I. Hofmeyr, *'We Spend Our Years as a Tale That Is Told': Oral Historical Narrative in a South African Chiefdom* (Portsmouth, London, Johannesburg: Heinemann, James Currey and Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), pp.3–9.

Naming and un-naming as instruments of power

The abaThembu were accustomed to conflict; they had experienced violent encounters with invading groups on the Mbashe River in Thembuland Proper in the early 1820s. They were also accustomed to defeat in battle on occasion. But humiliation of this magnitude amounted to an attack on their psychological well-being. Un-naming was an instrument of conquest, designed to destroy. It was entirely alien to the abaThembu.

Sir George Cathcart, the colonial governor who un-named the chief of the amaTshatshu in 1852, knew that a chief's name signified authority, power and ranking in the hierarchy of the Thembu nation. Followers and subject people derived their status, security and spiritual well-being from their chief. Then, as now, ancestors were collective and were accessed through communal ritual and belief. The chief's name provided a pathway for ancestral guidance. Depriving people of their name was a profound act of spiritual destruction. Of this the British were keenly aware and justified the frontier wars on the grounds that imperialism would free African people from the tyranny of their chiefs.[12] Repeated attacks, arrest, imprisonment and humiliation of chiefs were part of their conquest strategy. Proscribing an ethnic label at the height of conquest was a sign of their cruel targeting of the inner spirit, the psyche, of the people they chose to proscribe.

The need to have a name that conveys one's own identity has been explored by scholars of slavery. This scholarship depicts enslaved people enduring beatings, torture and maiming so that they might be recognised by their chosen names. Their work demonstrated that by denying individuals their chosen names, slave owners stripped them of their dignity and subjected them to shame. A sense of being voiceless and faceless dominated their relations with others. To have one's own name, says novelist Zora Neale Hurston, 'is to have a means of locating, extending and preserving oneself in a human community, so as to be able to answer the question "who?" with reference to ancestry, current status, and particular bearing, with reference to the full panoply of time.'[13]

Conquest differed from slavery in that it could not wipe the slate clean; the disruptions of colonialism failed to obliterate past identities. Rather, as Mondli Gungubele put it, people fought political and ideological battles to ensure that 'those in power cannot remove from people that which defines who they are and where they come from'. Without this knowledge, people experienced a

12 R. Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.235.

13 Z. N. Hurston, *Their Eyes Were Watching God*. First published 1937. E-book 2017.

sense of 'emptiness'.[14] While scholars interested in anti-colonialism have tended to prefer alternative social categories based on material status such as social class or racial classification, Thandabantu Nhlapho warns against an inclination to avoid issues of identity. 'No amount of academic analysis can obscure the fact that ordinary people going about their ordinary business invest a great deal of emotion in the belief that they belong in certain categories, that there are some things which make them "us" and the rest of the world "them"'.[15]

For scholars of colonial history, the issue of naming is caught up in debates about ethnicity. Those who adopt a hard approach believe that according significance to a name gives credence to ethnicity; naming creates an entity, a thing. Once acknowledged, this ethnically named entity may become an obstacle to modernity, to the acquisition of modern values of individualism and social systems built on merit. Ethnic identities, this argument goes, give rise to identity politics and its attendant problems of patronage, disregard of the common good, destruction of universal values and distortion of institutions of good governance. From this perspective, chiefs and the cultures they claimed to protect were so compromised by colonialism and apartheid that ethnic naming lacks all credibility.[16]

Scholars who adopt a softer approach claim that all social categories are unstable and subject to the continuous 'play of history, culture and power'.[17] Politics arising from interplay within and between categories is fragile and its effects are limited in scope. From this perspective, naming neither stabilises nor fixes but enables the identification of social patterns. These scholars recognise that for many rural people, ethnic identification is both personally and politically significant, but they deny that this renders ethnicity as static and unchanging. In their view, ethnic identity is created through historical and representational

14 Interview, Anne Mager with Mondli Gungubele, 2 February 2017.

15 T. Nhlapho, 'Culture and Women Abuse: Some South African starting points', *Agenda: Journal of Women and Culture*, 13, (1992), p.9.

16 M. Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture: Fear, Favour and Prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); L. Vail (ed), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983); idem, 'The invention of tradition revisited: the case of Africa' in T.Ranger and O.Vaughan (eds), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), pp.62–111.

17 S. Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora' in L. McDowell (ed) *Undoing Place? A Geographical Reader* (London and New York: Arnold, 1997), p.234.

processes. Ethnicity is a 'cultural work' that actively reflects on the past.[18] Naming contributes to this dynamism of ethnicity as history and representation; it neither stabilises an entity nor renders it fundamental. Modern identities may encompass widely contradictory elements as individuals embrace diverse ideas and ways of being in the world. People may choose to name themselves in more than one way; these self-ascriptions may be discordant within and between individuals claiming the same ethnic identity. Clashing between beliefs and behaviours and tracking between multiple identities is a feature of postcolonial ethnicities. New, fluid configurations of identity are constantly emerging and old means of anchoring them may not be useful.

While this perspective provides for inclusivity, it raises difficulties for an ethnic naming that remains rigidly tied to the genealogy of royal families. As the heads of royal houses, chiefs generally understand their role to be one of holding the hereditary line, a fundamental means of safeguarding ethnic identity. Popular acceptability of hereditary power has declined with urbanisation, the growth of a modern economy and in light of the new constitutional dispensation. Many chiefs appear resistant to this nationalist modernisation and ignore calls for the reform of traditional institutions. These postcolonial dilemmas remain unresolved.

What is to be done about the chiefs?

On the cross hairs of policy makers, chiefs on the north-eastern frontier were the targets of colonial destruction, neutralisation and subjugation. They bore the brunt of conquest in the nineteenth century and fought to defend their people, territories and way of life. At the forefront of negotiations and at the helm of battle, chiefs were the leaders of anti-colonial resistance. In the absence of a united front, chiefs regularly staved off opportunistic attacks from rivals as they engaged the colonisers. They were both elevated and confined under apartheid and they pushed their way into the negotiated settlement at the end of apartheid. Since the first moment of conquest on the eastern frontier, every regime has tussled with the question of what to do with the chiefs.

From the outset, the British adopted a three-pronged strategy aimed at destroying chiefly power: military defeat, humiliation and co-optation. They would defeat the chiefs militarily, strip them of their political and economic

18 J.D.Y. Peel, 'The cultural work of ethnogenesis', in E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds), *History and Ethnicity*, African Studies Association Monographs 27 (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.198–215.

independence and co-opt them into the colonial project. Governor Sir Harry Smith was a master of this strategy. He envisaged that without independent means, the chiefs would become dependent on government stipends and comply with their obligations in the administration of colonial law. Smith presented his plan as the liberation of the people from the oppression of their chiefs. He had no doubt that, as Jeff Peires puts it, 'Commoners, freed from the "oppression" of their chiefs "would ally with the benevolent British administration"'.[19] But the chiefs were far more resilient and the people more defensive of their way of life than the British had estimated. They were forced to impose colonial control in a piecemeal manner. It was only after the final violent encounter with the abaThembu in 1883 that chiefly rule was broken and the north-eastern frontier closed. Chiefs and their subjects were confined in rural locations and came under the jurisdiction of white magistrates. From the outset, magistrates were unable to do without these leaders whom they deployed to administer customary law as codified by the British. Under the aegis of the coloniser, customary law became 'the rules that governed colonial social, political and economic relations'.[20] Colonial magistrates relied on chiefs to offer up what John Comaroff called 'the subtleties of indigenous processes' on which successful governance depended.[21] Positioned in this way between their people and white magisterial rule, chiefs served as colonial interlocutors. In this role, they were not alone. A new generation of Africans was to find themselves caught between indigenous and colonial systems.[22]

By the 1920s, a new layer of mission-educated men and women saw themselves as equal if not superior to the chiefs. Some of these served as elected councillors alongside chiefs in the advisory council of the Transkei (the Bunga). This shifting of authority and hierarchies of respect posed difficulties for the chiefs. Wycliff Mlungisi Tsotsi, better known as WM Tsotsi, a graduate in law, claimed that most chiefs respected the educated elite. But mutuality was short-lived, scuppered by the apartheid regime's bolstering of the chieftaincy

19 J.B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa people in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), second impression, p.113.

20 T. Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits and Invention in British Colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, 44, 1 (2003), p.13.

21 J. L. Comaroff, 'Chiefship in a South African homeland: a case study of the Tshidi Chiefdom of Bophuthatswana', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1, 1 (October 1974), p.49.

22 S. P. Lekgoathi, 'Colonial experts, local interlocutors, informants and the making of an archive on the "Transvaal Ndebele" 1930–1989', *Journal of African History* 50, 1 (2009), pp.61–80; C. Hamilton, '"The Character and Objects of Chaka": A Reconsideration of the Making of Shaka as "Mfecane" Motor', *Journal of African History*, 33,1 (1992), pp.37–63.

and restraining of the elite. The institution of the chieftainship was a 'ghost' in comparison with its former standing in society, said Tsotsi, and was required to be 'artificially propped up by the white rulers'.[23] Following the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the regime would override hereditary principle in the appointment of compliant individuals as chiefs. WM Tsotsi labelled apartheid-era chiefs as 'creatures of government', created by government to carry out its bidding.[24] 'The chief is consequently the most heavily burdened, the most cruelly harassed and the most dangerously insecure civil servant in the country.' Bad pay, odious duties and a total loss of autonomy rendered the chief 'at once the most obsequious servant of his white masters, and the most extortionate ruler of his black subjects'; he was 'eminently suited for the role of traitor'.[25] The implication for Tsotsi, and those who followed in his footsteps, was that resistance to apartheid necessarily entailed opposition to the chieftainship. The difficulty with this structuralist formulation, one that influenced a generation of anti-apartheid scholars, was that it did not allow for the recognition of transgressive chiefly behaviour and clouded analysis of rural resistance led by bantustan headmen, many of them hereditary chiefs.

Significantly, Tsotsi did not condemn codified customary law as a corruption of indigenous customs. Rather, Tsotsi objected to the state's refusal to allow the development of customary law. He railed against the exclusion of lawyers from the bantu commissioner's courts and rejected the state's claim that customary law was a site of administration and not of legal debate. Justifying its stance, the apartheid government held that poor Africans could not afford lawyers.[26] Tsotsi rejected this argument; the issue of legal fees was a smokescreen. In his view, denying legal representation was intended to stifle the debate necessary for the development of jurisprudence in customary law. Tsotsi himself frequently defended 'poor peasants' in the criminal courts, using income from wealthier clients to subsidise those who could not pay. For him, the court was a platform from which the legal profession might engage both the state and the chiefs so that customary law might be rendered dynamic and receptive to the process of history. Legal debate would allow the sharpest minds

23 W.M. Tsotsi, Out of Court: Experiences of a Black Lawyer in Apartheid Society (Mimeo, 30 November 1974), p.29.

24 Tsotsi was president of the All African Convention (AAC) in the late 1950s and a member of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), organisations to the left of the African National Congress (ANC). AAC and NEUM activities were concentrated in the Xhalanga and Lady Frere areas of the Transkei.

25 Tsotsi, *Experiences of a Black Lawyer in Apartheid Society*, p.29.

26 Tsotsi, *Experiences of a Black Lawyer in Apartheid Society*, p.33.

to generate precedent and wrest customary law from colonial administrative control. Ultimately Tsotsi became frustrated by the limitations of the law as an engine of social change and turned increasingly to political activism. He was most influential in those parts of Glen Grey comprised of people from diverse backgrounds who had no allegiance to chiefs.

In many localities north west of the Great Kei, ethnologists in the employ of the state readily bent evidence to ensure conformity with the apartheid template. Bantu ethnologists opened pathways to power for those who served to bolster bantustan regimes and displaced those who opposed them. But to draw from this travesty the conclusion that tradition is merely a colonial invention is to build an argument to justify the removal of institutions whose history is far deeper than that of colonialism. As Thomas Spear has argued, this view assumes that conquest succeeded in wiping out the past.[27] It leads to justification of the demand that institutions which replaced those 'erased' by colonialism can now be swept away. It fails to recognise that tradition builds both consciously and unconsciously on myths and symbols and ignores the ways in which contemporary tradition and chiefly institutions are shaped by past struggles. It denies what Carolyn Hamilton calls 'subjugated knowledges' and fails to interrogate the history of the tradition itself. [28] By seeking to wipe out institutions, its proponents see no need for engagement with the challenges of reform. By labelling tradition as colonial, they discredit and dismiss much that is African and remain blind to the possibilities of congruence between their views and the belief that British rule would liberate African people from the tyranny of their chiefs.

Sociologist Mahmood Mamdani argues that in South Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, colonialism rendered the structure of the chieftainship unsuitable for democracy; in South Africa, chiefs and headmen were desperately holding on to the powers of 'decentralised despotism' acquired under the bantustan system. This structuralist approach and the pessimism it gave rise to also informed the work of Cherryl Walker who argued that chiefs were bent on locking down a system of 'official rural patriarchy' that was fundamentally incompatible with gender equality. Lungisile Ntsebeza claimed that chiefs 'vehemently' rejected the democratic principles on which the African National Congress (ANC)

27 Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism and the limits of invention', pp.3–27.

28 C. Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, 1998), 26–2; P. Harries, 'Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha and Zulu History', *History and Theory*, 32 (1993), pp.106–7.

planned to build local government and criticised the ANC for using chiefs as a shortcut to party political dominance in the rural areas.[29] Journalists also decried 'the ANC's turn to tradition' as inimical to democracy, a violation of human rights and of gender equity, with *Sunday Times* columnist Barney Mthombothi declaring, 'People in rural areas are still living under a feudal system that refuses to recognise that times have changed as activists campaigned for the promotion of the rights of the poor and the marginal.'[30]

Some scholars suggest that this disappointment may reflect an inability to recognise the complications of conquest. Across the continent, Fred Cooper observes, modern institutions and values were refracted both through the prism of African meaning systems and through the experience of conquest.[31] Postcolonial institutions reflected this layering of complexity and its animation of new forms of modernity. In this view, the disappointment of the modernist perspective exposes an inability to accept the complexities of a layered past; it reflects a failure to recognise that some Africans may be alienated from a modernist discourse of individual human rights that disparages group interests. In the view of Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, this inability to see 'being in relation to others', as part of a human rights discourse, is the myopia of the modernist position.[32]

In the early 1990s, national leaders sought to avoid a dichotomy between traditional and modern leadership. Albie Sachs, architect of South Africa's Constitution, asserted that 'Traditional leaders are entitled to a dignified and respected role which enables them to take their place in and make their contribution towards building a new democratic South Africa'.[33] Sachs saw the

29 M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.52–61; *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), pp.46–53; C. Walker, 'Women, "Tradition" and Reconstruction', *Review of African Political Economy* (1994), pp.347–358; L. Ntsebeza, 'Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas of Land Administration in Rural South Africa', *European Journal of Development Research* 16, 1 (Spring 2004), p.76; P. Serote, A. Mager and D. Budlender, 'Gender and Development in South Africa in the 1990s', in J. Coetzee, J. Graaff, F. Hendriks, G. Wood (eds), *Development Studies in South Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

30 B. Mthombothi, 'Government is siding with those running SA's new apartheid', *Sunday Times*, 31 May 2015, p.21; This revolution is not confined to post-apartheid South Africa. See C. R. Epp, *The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

31 F. Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History', *The American Historical Review*, 99, 5 (December 1994), pp.1516–1545.

32 P. Geschiere and F. Nyamnjoh, 'Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging', *Public Culture* 12 (2), pp.423–452.

33 A. Sachs, *Advancing Human Rights in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.77–78.

Constitution as providing a template for chiefly reform. For President Nelson Mandela, a chief in his own right, reform was not an issue of structure but a matter of doing what was right for the people; it emanated from the values and behaviour of individual chiefs. He repeatedly appealed to those in chiefly office to recognise that, as leaders, they were bound to make choices in the best interests of their people. Speaking in turbulent Natal soon after his release from prison, he celebrated those chiefs who had chosen to be a force for good in the darkest time of apartheid.

> There have been chiefs who have been good and honest leaders who have piloted their people through the dark days of oppression with skill. These are the chiefs who have looked after the interests of their people and who enjoy the support of their people. We salute these traditional leaders. But there have been many bad chiefs who have profited from apartheid and who have increased the burden on their people. We denounce this misuse of office in the strongest terms. There are also chiefs who have collaborated with the system but who have since seen the error of their ways. We commend their change of heart.

Mandela was drawing on his own experience — as a chief, he had made important choices to serve the people by joining the ANC, setting up its military wing and finally leading the organisation into negotiation with the apartheid regime. In seeking to rebuild South Africa as an inclusive nation, he was deliberately conciliatory towards whites and towards chiefs. He recognised that the historical moment of 1990 required a different perspective from that of WM Tsotsi's All African Convention in the 1960s. There would be a place for all in Mandela's South Africa. There would also be change. 'Chiefly office is not something that history has given to certain individuals to use or abuse as they see fit … Like all forms of leadership, it places specific responsibilities on its holders'. Reiterating the view of Chief Albert Luthuli, former leader of the ANC, he declared that a chief was 'primarily a servant of the people … the voice of his people.' For Mandela, the past was neither pure nor contaminated. Rather, 'The past is a rich resource on which we can draw in order to make decisions about the future, but it does not dictate our choices'.[34]

For the most part, chiefs found it difficult to follow Mandela's advice. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) claimed to articulate the aspirations of the chiefs and sought to carve out a privileged space

34 Address by Nelson Mandela to rally in Durban after release from prison 25 February 1990, Nelson Mandela Foundation.

for traditional leaders.[35] Their stance engendered hostility to chiefs and criticism of ANC support for CONTRALESA. Chiefs were denounced for seizing assets, robbing their people and dispossessing the women who worked the land.[36] Proponents of living customary law struggled to find a place for chiefs in their new South Africa.[37] In their condemnation, democracy became a whip with which to beat the chiefs for obstructing a modernising state. What is refused in this discourse, as Thandabantu Nhlapho points out, is the recognition that people need to belong, and to be different, and that African people reject the notion that their culture is delinquent, requiring correction by another, superior one. [38]

In South Africa as elsewhere, stories of bad chiefs are not difficult to find and these narratives draw to themselves other stories of politicians who make false promises, government officials who fail to do their jobs and tricksters who pose as developmental agents, taking unsuspecting people for a ride. The state's failure to provide leadership in the rural areas has reopened the debate on chiefly reform, on whether chiefs and modern development necessarily pull in different directions. Many chiefs favour change while holding onto the belief that dignity conferred through membership of a group is superior to individual rights; dignity is reciprocally created in and through conviviality; it is the vector along which belonging and identity are constructed.

Change is complicated by the difficulties created by the ANC government's failure to develop a clear strategy for democratic rural development. Outside of commercial farming, the rural economy of the country is a welfare economy. In

35 P. Holomisa, 'Balancing Law and Tradition: The TCB and its relation to African systems of Justice and Administration', *SA Crime Quarterly*, 35 March 2011, p.17; T. Maloka and D. Gordon, 'Chieftainship, Civil Society, and the Political Transition in South Africa', *Critical Sociology (*1996), pp.37–55.

36 R. Southall and Z. De Sas Kropiwnicki, 'Containing the chiefs: the ANC and Traditional Leaders in the Eastern Cape, South Africa', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 37, 1 (2003), pp.48–82; P. Mashele, 'Traditional Leadership in South Africa's New Democracy', *Review of African Political Economy*, 31, 100 (June 2004), pp.349–354; L. Ntsebeza, 'Democratisation and Traditional Authorities', the New South Africa', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 19, 1 (1999), pp.83–93; B. Oomen, '"We must now go back to our history" Retraditionalisation in a Northern Province Chieftaincy', *African Studies*, 59,1 (2000), pp.71–95; A. Claassens, 'Denying Ownership and Equal Citizenship: Continuities in the State's Use of Law and Custom', 1913–2–13, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40,4 (2014), pp.761–779.

37 A. Gouws, 'Multiculturalism in South Africa: Dislodging the Binary between Universal Human Rights and Culture/Tradition', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 40, 1 (2013), pp.35–55; J. Zimmerman, 'The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse', *Harvard Blackletter Journal*, 17, (2001), pp.197–228.

38 T. Nhlapho, 'Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate', *International Journal of Law and Family* 9 (1995), pp.213–215.

2017, 17 million people in South Africa were dependent on social grants, most of them living in the rural areas. Subsistence agriculture has collapsed and land reform has resulted largely in compensation in the form of cash rather than augmented resources for farming. Disputes, infighting and litigation abound; 'unknown' pretenders and members of royal families are installed as traditional leaders as easily as if they were getting married. Isabel Hofmeyr's observation that 'a coherent sense of chiefdom no longer pertains' is apt in many instances.[39] At the same time, the state's weakness as an instrument of governance has meant that regions such as the Eastern Cape have become spaces of 'ungovernance'.[40]

The question of what is to be done about the chiefs implies that the chiefs themselves have exercised little agency and that their fate has been in the hands of conquerors and opponents. But this ignores a significant counter narrative that may be termed the 'fight for *ubukhosi*' — a struggle by chiefs for the recognition of the institution of chieftainship and of chiefly power, a struggle that has been waged against colonial authorities and between individual chiefs since the moment of conquest.

Prior to conquest, power, and conflict over this power, emanated from the system of houses in polygamous society. Each of the chief's wives established her own house and the houses were ranked in a line of succession. The great wife was often not the first wife and was identified by the chief and his councillors after several years of marriage. Young men from different mothers often vied for power and fought over the issue of succession. A strong challenger from a minor house might unseat the heir or move off to found his own chieftaincy. Contestation and movement were the basis of fission and segmentation, leading to the expansion or subdivision of groups. Among the abaThembu, subgroups did not break away entirely but continued to pay allegiance to the founding great house, while at the same time enjoying considerable autonomy.[41]

Colonialism upset this system of expansion as the state confined people to fixed areas and intervened in the recognition and appointment of leaders. 'By favouring princes [men from junior houses] and promoting them into senior positions, the colonial government disturbed the hereditary line' explained Phatekile Holomisa, leader of CONTRALESA. It also generated competitive restlessness within and between chiefly houses. Subsequent power challenges

39 I. Hofmeyr, *'We Spend Our Years as a Tale That Is Told'*, p.15

40 C. Crais, 'Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa', *Journal of Social History*, 39, 3, Special Issue on the Future of Social History (Spring 2006), p.734.

41 J.B. Peires, 'The Rise of the "Right-Hand House" in the History and Historiography of the Xhosa', *History in Africa*, 2 (1975), pp.113–125.

were played out on a field mapped out by colonial rules monitored by the chief magistrate. Colonialism also brought a new path for advancement of status and power through education. The educated elite, and sometimes men with years of experience as migrant labourers, developed a more critical stance on chiefly power. Many objected to the way hereditary leaders served the apartheid system, accusing them of collaboration and forgetting about their people. Their outspoken criticism unsettled the institution of the chieftainship and devalued the offices of chief and headman.

In the early years of the post-apartheid democracy, CONTRALESA provided a terrain on which a renewed defence of the chieftaincy might be mounted. 'CONTRALESA won recognition for traditional leaders and restored their prestige; it secured money, privileges and benefits for chiefs and headmen and so traditional leaders started claiming their positions,' said Phatekile Holomisa.[42] But CONTRALESA did not have a free hand. At the same time as recognising the institution of traditional leadership, the state sought to reform and modernise rural governance, establishing municipalities alongside traditional leadership structures. Competition occurred within and between them — at the same time that municipal councillors and chiefs locked horns, individuals outside of these structures vied to gain entry to them. As controller of the budget, government retained the upper hand but as gatekeeper to their localities, chiefs and headmen could prevent access to the people. Over 20 years into democracy, these struggles have led to stalemate in many areas.

The history of the westerly abaThembu is bound up with this fight for recognition of chiefly authority (*ubukhosi*); its writing has entailed recognising that western Thembuland, the north-eastern colonial frontier of the mid-nineteenth century, has again taken on the form of an external African frontier where smaller groups of the larger Thembu paramountcy engage in endless churning politics that Kopytoff calls 'persistent cultural interaction'.[43] These groups compete over claims to land lost and authority shattered by their extrusion from the frontier in the late nineteenth century. Each group seeks to keep its narrative separate, while at the same time retaining ties with the larger Thembu polity of which it is a splinter. While they invoke a pan-identity as abaThembu, reproducing its patrimonialism of chieftainship and male primogeniture in inheritance, they do so in expedient and sometimes competing ways.

42 Interview, Anne Mager with Phatekile Holomisa, Cape Town 5 September 2017.
43 I. Kopytoff (ed), *The African Frontier*, Introduction, p.10.

The challenge for scholars in this environment is to try to make sense of the maladies of a complex and multi-layered past and the ways this past infuses the present. Africanist historian, Fred Cooper, spells out one way of approaching this complexity. In his view, scholars need:

> simultaneous awareness of how colonial regimes exercised power and the limits of that power, an appreciation of the intensity with which that power was confronted and the diversity of futures that people sought for themselves, an understanding of how and why some of those futures were excluded from the realm of the politically feasible, and an openness to possibilities for the future that can be imagined today.[44]

Recognising how settler colonialism exacerbated and amplified this complexity, and the deepening inequalities, dependencies and resentments, is an important addition to Cooper's methodological check list. It means scrutinising what Christopher Kutz calls the 'domain of complicity'; it requires examining the morally flawed world in which we live and the ways in which our lives are complicated by 'what other people do, and the harms that flow from our social, economic and political institutions'.[45] It pushes us to recognise that the modernism envisaged by liberals, Marxists, feminists and African nationalists has generated an array of social imaginings and responses — many unanticipated by the architects of post-apartheid South Africa. This postcolonial condition resonates with other parts of the African continent.[46] More than two decades since its adoption, we are struggling to uphold the Constitution, the principal official guide for imagining a new society. Fluid and sometimes irreverent responses to this modernist script and its applications obstruct its grounding in many environments.

44 Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection', p.1545.

45 C. Kutz, *Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.1

46 The Mozambican case is particularly instructive. See H. G. West and S. Kloeck-Jenson, 'Betwixt and between: "Traditional authority" and democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique', *African Affairs*, 98, 393 (October 1999), pp.455–484; B. de Sousa Santos, 'The Heterogenous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique', *Law and Society Review*, 40, 1 (March 2006), pp.39–75.

About this book

We explored three lines of enquiry and developed arguments along them: First, we wanted to understand what it meant to be a chief and who could become a chief. Our exploration took us into genealogies, oral histories, apartheid ethnologies, bantustan politics and contestations in the post-apartheid legal system. Far from pre-determined, we learned that the positions of traditional leadership were honed by multiple influences; they were often contested and subject to change over time. Secondly, we wanted to explore how approaches to power were shaped and reshaped over the 200 years that we followed the amaTshatshu. Scrutiny of the role that chiefs played in internal violence and anti-colonial resistance, at moments of compliance and complicity, suggested that a chief's councillors were often more powerful than the chief himself. We also saw that the authoritarianism which emerged in the bantustans was more opportunistic, more rigid and more resistant to reform following the demise of apartheid than chiefly recalcitrance in the earlier colonial era. We found that some of those engaged in chiefly resuscitation did so as a means of spiritual and emotional healing. For them, chiefs were a path to the ancestors, a proxy for dignity, placeholders for identity, reminders of the need to regenerate belonging and a means of asserting difference. Thirdly, we probed the meaning of land restitution for those who had suffered repeated dispossession and were left questioning the value of restoration in the absence of strong rights in land, security of tenure, individual title and dynamic government support for agriculture.

This story of power, politics and chiefs is set on the frontier where the westerly abaThembu encountered the Khoesan, came into conflict with each other and confronted the advance of the British. West of the Tsomo, the abaThembu who followed the amaTshatshu in the 1820s enjoyed a great deal of autonomy while retaining their allegiance to the *kumkani* in Thembuland proper. In the early nineteenth century, this territory was known as Bushmanland; following the westward move of some abaThembu in the 1820s, it became Tambookieland; and after 1835, it was referred to by the British as the Tambookie or north-eastern frontier.

Conquest on this frontier was sharpened by the British need to accommodate settler interests, particularly after their recruitment in 1820. Different from those colonists who served the empire in their formal capacity, the settlers desired land for themselves.[47] United in this desire, trekboers and

47 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.6.

British settlers fought together in the War of 1850, spurred on by the promise of land grants as reward. When Sir George Cathcart drew the north-eastern colonial boundary in 1853, he established a tight cordon of white farmers to retain it and he removed the Tambookie into a closed location. In 1865, the colonial secretary sought to move the boundary again, generating intense conflict within and between the abaThembu. He succeeded in enticing only five minor chiefs to move across the Indwe River to settle on land confiscated from the amaXhosa. This territory became Emigrant Thembuland. The amaTshatshu and a few others remained in the Tambookie location under the control of the Queenstown magistrate. Nonesi, the Thembu queen and representative of the Thembu great house, was banished and the powers of all remaining Thembu chiefs were curtailed. The colonial secretary's actions divided the Tambookies politically and geographically. When they rose up a final time in 1883, they were defeated. The Tambookie location was disbanded. Emigrant Thembuland, the last remaining piece of Tambookieland, continued under the supervision of magistrates and the chiefs who survived the uprising. One of these was Raxoti Matanzima.

In the 1950s, his grandson, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, made a bid to establish a separate Thembu kingdom west of the Tsomo River. Using the apartheid regime's Bantu Authorities Act he sought to map political jurisdiction onto geographical separation. His scheming built on the unfinished political business of the Tambookie frontier and hooked it onto the opportunities of the bantustan era. His ambitions were temporarily realised but by the late 1980s, Kaiser Matanzima had become a threat to the stability of the apartheid regime and he was compelled to give up his powers. In 2003, the postcolonial government's commission on chiefly disputes (Nhlapho Commission) ruled that the Matanzima house could claim no status above that of senior traditional leadership of the clan.

The complexities of the politics that played out between different Thembu groups, white settlers and successive governments shaped the fortunes and misfortunes of the amaTshatshu. We track their experience and its narrative representations, highlighting the ways in which the contours of the Tambookie frontier linger on. For the amaTshatshu, these traces are visible both in their traumatic entry into modernity through the portals of conquest and in their later obscurity. Their story disrupts the three-way model of settler colonialism that the historian, Veracini, sets out.[48]

48 Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, p.6.

This book is an exploration of the unstable, often beleaguered meaning of chiefly authority over nearly two centuries through the biography of a chiefly family whose large following, great prestige and considerable power were removed in repeated acts of conquest. It is a history that matters to the people who were stripped of their identity and resources and who, for a century and a half, struggled to regain materially and mentally what had been taken away from them.[49] This history also matters to many thousands of others who lived north west of the Great Kei and to the many millions — over 17 million in 2018 — who continue to live under chiefs in the rural areas of South Africa. It demonstrates how conquest destabilised chiefly authority, rendering the institution and its social meaning subject to the continuous play of history over nearly two centuries. It is this play that provides the narrative thread of the book.

Six chapters are set out roughly in chronological order. The first chapter begins in the early 1820s when Bawana, son of Tshatshu, left Thembuland and crossed westward over the Tsomo tributary of the Great Kei River in search of peace and grazing. His amaTshatshu and several smaller Thembu groups took over Bushmanland, displacing the Khoesan and unsettling the British who were anxious to protect their colony to the south. The new territory became known as Tambookieland, after the Khoesan name for the abaThembu, and by the 1830s had become a frontier for British imperialism. Chapter one explores the vulnerability of the Khoesan, internal conflict and colonial wars in this territory. It ends in 1852 when Sir George Cathcart, the governor, expelled and proscribed the amaTshatshu. The second chapter follows Maphasa's people and others into the Tambookie location where they lived under a colonial superintendent in localities identified with the regencies of Yiliswa, queen of the Tambookies, and Nonesi, queen of the abaThembu. It ends in 1865 with the imposition of magisterial rule and the banishment of the Thembu queen. The third chapter centres on Gungubele, heir to the Tshatshu chieftaincy. It explores colonial experimentation in the Tambookie location and the treachery that drew the amaTshatshu into the Ninth Frontier War (War of Ngcayecibi 1877–1878). It ends with Gungubele's incarceration on Robben Island, the crushing of the final Thembu uprising from 1880 to 1883 and the scattering of the amaTshatshu. This concludes the period of conquest.

In the fourth chapter, we explore chiefly politics north west of the Tsomo and Great Kei rivers after the end of conquest. We track the rise of Kaiser

49 Proclamation in Cathcart Correspondence 1857, pp.239–240.

Daliwonga Matanzima in Emigrant Thembuland (a territory between the Indwe and Tsomo rivers established by the colonial governor in 1865) in the apartheid era and explore the politics of genealogy, Bantu Authorities and headmanship. We also peep into the marginal locations where the once-powerful amaTshatshu were relegated. In chapter five, we move deeper into the politics of bantuisation, as we explore the processes of Transkei and Ciskei independence. We follow the rise of the right-hand house of Tshatshu and the emigration of amaTshatshu from villages in Glen Grey to Zweledinga in the Ciskei. In chapter six, we track the re-awakening of the great house of Tshatshu and their return to the territory from which they were removed in the late nineteenth century. We discuss the complex and overlapping claims to land and the absence of development in this area in the twenty-first century. We conclude with an account of the postcolonial imagining of western Thembuland.

CHAPTER 1

Bawana and Maphasa on the Tambookie frontier: colonial conquest and internal violence

West of the Great Kei River and stretching north of the Amathole mountains to the Stormberg (the source of the Kei River), lay Windvogel country, the territory roamed by the Khoesan of that name. This vast landscape, some 10 668 metres above sea level, was referred to as Bushmanland in the colonial literature. Mountainous and craggy, the terrain yielded numerous natural caverns that provided shelter for small bands of Khoesan. Ironstone cliffs along the river courses and pointed koppies jutting out across the plains afforded vantage points for hunting. Mud-brown rivers named by the Khoesan — Kei, Cacadu, Tsomo, Khomani — flowed into the Great Kei and down to the Indian Ocean. Open grasslands close to the Tsomo River gave way to mountainous terrain rising rapidly from the Cacadu River (White Kei River). On the high ground, sweet grasses, principally the nutritious *Themeda triandra* and numerous edible shrubs provided rich grazing for antelope. A thick covering of sweet thorn trees (*Acacia karroo*) offered shelter in the heat of the summer, cover from predators and food for cattle in times of drought. Elegant white stinkwood trees (*Celtis kraussiana*) and boer-bean trees (*Schotia*) provided comfortable shady spots while the ancient cycads (*Encephalartos villosus*) stood out as distinctive landmarks. Winter hillsides yellowed by frost were brightened with red aloes (*Aloe ferox*). Extreme temperatures made for a harsh physical environment, but people, animals and plants were well adapted to it.

In the early 1820s, the Khoesan inhabitants banded in groups were spread out across the territory, moving with the game and the seasons and settling temporarily in caves above the streams. Every habitable cavern was adorned with rock paintings which marked the landscape for the different groups. Madolo (also known as Captain Madoor) lived on the Upper Swart Kei in a cave decorated with the image of a python while some of his people lived on the banks of the Cacadu River. Fleet-footed Khoesan Captain Flux Lynx dominated the Windvogelberg and the Bontebok Flats (later, Cathcart and Happy Valley). The Khomani Khoesan lived in the hills above the Khomani River where the colonial town of Queenstown was later built. Koegelbeenkop towards the north took its name from a Khoesan captain who had a bullet lodged in his leg. Further west, towards Cradock, individual Khoesan might be

found in the employ of boers; they were known to the colonists as 'Winterberg Hottentot servants'.[1] To the east lay Thembuland, spreading outwards from the Mbashe River, near present-day Mthatha, as far as the Tsomo River in the west. Intermingling between the Khoesan and the abaThembu generated friendship, intermarriage and dialogue, evident in the linguistic influences such as the click sounds, which the abaThembu adopted. Contact also led to competition, conflict and violence as the Khoesan acquired an interest in cattle.

In the early 1800s, Tshatshu, a senior Thembu chief, served as regent for the *kumkani*, Ngubengcuka. Tshatshu descended from the right-hand house of the great Thembu chief, Dhlomo.[2] Our story begins with Tshatshu's son, Bawana, who was living to the west of the Mbashe River near the Tsomo. Travellers told of meeting him there in 1807. A senior Thembu chief, Bawana enjoyed a large following in the 1820s when the Mbashe area of Thembuland came under siege from Nguni people moving south-eastwards from Zululand. Restlessness and overcrowding sparked local conflicts. Bawana fought off predatory attacks from the amaBhaca who were encroaching on Thembu territory. Since Thembu chiefs enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, they did not feel obliged to join forces against a common foe and Bawana felt that too much of the burden of defending Thembu territory was being carried by his men.[3] Aggrieved, he and his amaTshatshu

1 British Parliamentary Papers 1334–'51, Correspondence re State of Kaffir Tribes, H. Calderwood to A. Smith, 4 November 1850, p.22; G. W. Stow, *The Native Races of South Africa: A History of the Intrusion of the Hottentots and Bantu into the Hunting Grounds of the Bushmen, the Aborigines of the Country*, (ed) G. McCall Theal (London and New York, 1905), pp.198–204; B. Le Cordeur and C. Saunders (eds), *The Kitchingman Papers: Missionary letters and journals 1817 to 1848 from the Brenthurst Collection Johannesburg* (Johannesburg: Brenthurst Press, 1976), p.190; C. Saunders, 'Madolo: a Bushman life', *African Studies*, 36, 2 (1977), pp.145–154. See letter of James Read junior in R. Ross, *These Oppressions Won't Cease: The Political Thought of the Cape Khoesan, 1777-1879 An Anthology* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2017) p.135.

2 See Appendix 7 for a genealogical chart of the abaThembu. Clifton Crais argues that the use of the term 'king' is inappropriate since there were hundreds of chiefs in this region; it is also evident that only six were leaders of separate polities. While the term 'king' might indicate recognition of this separation, it does not indicate that each leader was in control of a state. As authors we have chosen to use the ethnographic expressions 'paramount chief' and 'paramountcy' where colonial interference is evident and the Xhosa term *kumkani*, the designation used prior to conquest, for the six most senior leaders identified as king by the ANC government.

3 GH 19/4: Border Tribes Treaties miscellaneous papers, Colonial office, Cape of Good Hope, Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844. See also E.G. Sihele, 'Who are abaThembu and where do they come from?' Translated into English by N.C. Tisani, unpublished manuscript, Cory Library, Rhodes University, n.d. pp.33–42; E. van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work in the Eastern Cape Colony and Transkei, 1828–1928', *Moravians in the Eastern Cape 1828–1928*, translated F.R. Baudert edited T. Keegan (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society for the Publication of South African Historical Documents, Second Series, No 35, 2004), p.5 fn10, p20, fn 30. In August 1828, Major Dundas, supported by Thembu and Xhosa warriors, crushed Matiwane in a fierce battle at Mbolompho near the Umtata River; G. McCall Theal, *Records of the Cape Colony from February 1793 to April 1891*: Copied from the manuscript documents in the Public Records Office (London, 1905) Vol VII, pp.56–59; G. Thompson, *Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa 1* (London: Colburn, 1827), p.67.

and their followers determined to embark on a westward migration. This was a dramatic step.

Towards the end of 1823, Bawana and an estimated 3 000 men and their families crossed the Tsomo tributary of the Great Kei into Bushmanland where they hoped to found a new settlement.[4] They moved about in search of a suitable spot. Initially, Bawana encamped near Hangklip, present-day Lukhanji. From there he moved further west to the Klipplaat and then to the lower Swart Kei River. Bawana's people were followed by two smaller groups of abaThembu, led by Chief Qwesha of the amaNdungwana and Galela, a minor chief of the amaGcina who had also suffered attacks at the hands of the amaBhaca.[5] Relations between them were not entirely amicable. Qwesha was not on good terms with the Thembu regent, Fadana, and Galela had been feuding with Bawana for months prior to their move. Bawana's distrust stemmed at least in part from the way the amaGcina manipulated their relationship with the Thembu *kumkani*. The amaGcina became abaThembu through allegiance; they were not part of the Thembu lineage and in the conflict-ridden moment of the early nineteenth century, the Thembu *kumkani* needed their fighting forces. Wily Gcina chiefs claimed reward even when they had not participated in the fight, while the amaTshatshu felt they were insufficiently acknowledged for their efforts. These tensions contributed to conflict on the Mbashe River and to the haemorrhaging of refugees, which augmented Bawana's following.[6]

In Bushmanland the abaThembu became known as Tambookie, a term derived from the name 'Tam'bou'ci', given to them by the Khoesan living near the Tsomo River. The Tambookie and their large herds of cattle transformed the social and economic environment overnight. The Khoesan, constantly harassed by the new arrivals from the east and the trekboers they encountered in the west, moved deeper into the mountains or made their way to the mission stations in the Cape Colony.[7] Khoesan communities declined as their people

4 J.B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa people in the Days of Their Independence*, Second impression (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); E.J.C. Wagenaar, *A Forgotten Frontier Zone: Settlements and Reactions in the Stormberg Area between 1820–1860*', Archives Year Book for South African History 45th year, Vol 2 (1982), p.117

5 For Bhaca attacks on amaGcina see Sihele, 'Who are the abaThembu?' pp.76–77.

6 The amaGcina were descended from the abaMbo. R.T. Kawa, *Ibali lamaMfengu and Kunganjani Kusiyiwa eKapa?* First published by Lovedale Press, 1929. Facsimile reprint (Grahamstown: Cory Library, 2011); G. McCall Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation of European Settlement to Our Own Times 1834–1854*, Vol 4 (London, 1893), p.22.

7 In the early 19th century, the Khoesan tended to gravitate towards Enon, a Moravian mission station and Bethelsdorp, a station of the London Missionary Society, both near Port Elizabeth; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.111.

were hunted and chased away and Windvogel country, or Bushmanland, became Tambookieland, a westward extension of Thembuland. Within a short time, this frontier of Thembu expansion became the north-eastern frontier of British imperialism. Encounters between Khoesan, abaThembu, settlers and imperialists were characterised by violent political conflict. This chapter explores the contours of this interaction from the early 1820s to 1852.

Bawana, Maphasa and internal violence in Tambookieland

The primary vector of conflict throughout the 1820s was between the new arrivals. The British had not yet established a presence north of the Amathole mountains. Tensions between the numerically stronger and wealthier amaTshatshu and their amaNdungwana and amaGcina neighbours created an atmosphere of restlessness as predatory and punitive cattle-raiding dominated relations between them. On the Klaas Smits River, Bawana's people were constantly harassed by Galela (referred to as Mtyalela in some sources) the minor Gcina chief.[8] Anxious to avoid conflict, Bawana was slow to retaliate, a stance interpreted as weakness by his rivals whose attacks became more daring. The Tshatshu chief also took steps to strengthen his position by forging an alliance with Maqoma, son of Ngqika, the great chief of the amaXhosa near the Kat River.

Officials in the Cape Colony chastised Bawana, complaining that as senior chief he ought to exercise control over both his own people and those of the junior chiefs in his territory. Bawana responded that the British themselves should provide protection if they did not want him to lean on his ally Maqoma. He proposed that the governor set up a military post near him and put a stop to Galela's raiding. He also asked the magistrate at Somerset East to allow colonists to cross the border so that they might instruct his people in agriculture. Acting Governor Bourke did not want to establish a military post north of the Cape Colony at this time, nor did he want to give Bawana's followers the right to enter the Colony as they chose. He asked Andries Stockenström, commissioner general of the Eastern Cape, to apply his mind to Bawana's request for agricultural instruction for his people.[9]

Stockenström, the son of a Swedish missionary and a Khoe mother, believed that members of the Moravian Missionary Society were the most appropriate

8 Patho was the chief of the amaGcina. For Galela, see van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', p.21.

9 Van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', p.6 fn11.

people to teach new ways of farming to Bawana's people. Their mission station at Genadendal in the Colony was a model of industrious farming activity. Unlike the British missionaries, the Moravians valued practical agriculture as much as they did book learning. Their German origin also meant that they were less inclined to interfere in matters of British colonialism. Flattered that they had been recognised for their 'special aptitude for transforming a savage race of people into useful members of the community', the Moravians agreed to dispatch a group of missionaries to the Swart Kei to establish a station among Bawana's people. The small group set out in the new year of 1828.[10]

One member of the team, Wilhelmine Mvulani Stompjes, a Xhosa woman, was particularly influential.[11] Born to parents of the amaNgqika Xhosa south of the Amathole mountains, Mvulani acquired the name Wilhelmine at baptism and Stompjes on her marriage to Karl Stompjes, a Khoe man.[12] This was a second marriage for Mvulani, who had terminated her first with the son of a former boer outlaw when he acquired another wife. The Moravian records refer to Mvulani by her Christian name; we use Mvulani, the name given to her at birth so that we may highlight her Xhosa identity. Mvulani was employed as a cook and general helper but her fluency in isiXhosa, Dutch and German meant that she often served as interpreter for the missionaries. Mvulani's life story (a Moravian *Lebenslauf*, or life history) provides valuable insight into relations between the missionaries and the abaThembu in Tambookieland.[13] It also reveals that she was drawn to Moravianism very much for the space it provided for challenging male domination. She believed passionately that African men needed Christianity to help them change their attitudes towards women. The

10 GH 19/4 Border Tribes Treaties Miscellaneous Papers. Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope, 'Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844'; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.111; van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', p.6; B. Krüger, *The Pear Tree Blossoms: The History of the Moravian Mission Stations in South Africa 1737–1839* (Genadendal, 1966), pp.156–166.

11 For more on Wilhelmine Mvulani Stompjes see A. K. Mager, 'Does gender matter? Wilhelmine Stompjes, the Moravian missionaries and gendered power relations on the north eastern Cape frontier' in I. Pesa and J.B. Gewald (eds), *Magnifying Perspectives: Contributions to History. A festschrift for Robert Ross* (African Studies Centre, Leiden, 2017), pp.32–49.

12 While it is usual to adopt the Christian name of one who has been baptised, we use Mvulani to remind the reader that Wilhelmine Stompjes was an African woman, born to a Ngqika family in the territory adjacent to the north-eastern frontier. Her family name was Mvulani. Wilhelmine was her Christian name and Stompjes her married name.

13 A Moravian *Lebenslauf* followed the convention of a Moravian memoir as explained by K.M. Faull, *Moravian Women's Memoirs: Their Related Lives 1750–1820* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); K.M. Faull, 'Relating Sisters' Lives: Moravian Women's Writings from 18th Century America', *Transactions of the Moravian Historical Society*, 31 (2000), pp.11–27; G. Mettele, 'Constructions of the Religious Self: Moravian Conversion and Transatlantic Communication', *Journal of Moravian History*, 2 (Spring 2007), p.19.

chiefs dubbed Mvulani 'the mouth of the missionaries'. Her role as a go-between may be compared with that of other interlocutors who interpreted indigenous cultures for their colonisers.[14] But Mvulani's activism against patriarchy and male chauvinism, visible in her interactions with the Tshatshu chiefs Bawana and Maphasa, makes her more than this.

The Moravians arrived in Bawana's territory in the winter of 1828 after journeying for several months by foot and ox wagon through the hot summer. The Tshatshu chief was not welcoming — he had wanted farmers, not preachers. Mvulani describes how disappointed she was as they waited and waited for him to greet them. 'The whole landscape was covered in high grass and bushes and it seemed to be a desert empty of people, inhabited only by wild animals. We did not come here for the beautiful landscape, to grow crops and harvest here and have a good time! Where are the Tambookies?' she asked. [15]

When Bawana finally showed up he was accompanied by his son, the young Chief Maphasa and his brother, Tsholopo. The meeting was awkward. Bawana seemed to be testing the Moravians who were irritable. Brother van Calker, the leader of the group, reported that Tsholopo's 'begging' for tobacco, items of clothing and other objects of curiosity was annoying. But the missionaries were determined to stay, and eventually found a suitable site on the Klipplaat River where they built Shiloh, place of peace.

Bawana met Mvulani on many occasions and he was clearly intrigued by this female Xhosa missionary who spoke two foreign languages. He began to

14 'Lebenslauf der Wilhelmine Stompjes Kaffer-Dolmetscherin und Nationalhelferin. Heimgegangen in Silo 9 Juli 1863' [Wilhelmine Stompjes 'Biography of Wilhelmine Stompjes, Indigenous-Interpreter and National Helper, passed away in Shilo on 9 July 1863'.] Moravian Mission Archives, Herrnhut, Germany. Translated by Annette Behrensmeyer (Hereafter Stompjes, Biography), p.86. For Moravians, this experience of redemption was judged by the intensity of emotions expressed. See W. Gabbert, 'Social and Cultural Conditions of Religious Conversion in Colonial Southwest Tanzania, 1891–1939', *Ethnology*, 40, 4 (Autumn 2001), p.295. For discussion on the role of interlocutors in colonial Africa, see B. N. Lawrance, E.L. Osborn, and R.L. Roberts (eds), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employers in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); R. S. Levine, *A Living Man from Africa: Jan Tzatzoe, Xhosa Chief and Missionary, and the Making of Nineteenth Century South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013),pp. 49–73; S.P. Lekgoathi, '"Colonial" Experts, Local Interlocutors, Informants and the Making of an Archive on the "Transvaal Ndebele", 1930–1989', *Journal of African History* 50,1 (2009), pp.61–80; V.C. Malherbe, *Krotoa, called "Eva": A Woman Between* (Rondebosch: University of Cape Town, 1990); J.C. Wells, "Eva's Men: Gender and Power in the Establishment of the Cape of Good Hope 1652–74', *Journal of African History*, 39 (1998), pp.417–437; P. Scully and C. Crais, *Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: A Ghost story and a Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); P. Scully, 'Malintzin, Pocahontas, and Krotoa: Indigenous Women and Myth Models of the Atlantic World', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 6, 3 (2005), pp.1–28.

15 Stompjes, Biography, p.71; P. Brock, N. Etherington, G. Griffiths and J. van Gent, *Indigenous Evangelists and Questions of Authority in the British Empire 1750–1940*, Studies in Christian Mission Vol 46 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp.132–154; Stompjes, Biography, p.72.

taunt her in the ritual way of gendered encounters, trying to figure out what kind of woman she was. Mvulani in turn harangued the chief about his polygamous ways. Brother Lemmertz tells the story:

> Bawana, who has seven wives, offered to sell one of his concubines to our Wilhelmine for a cow. She gave him a very proper answer and told him that all his proceedings were contrary to the law of God. He answered that if God Almighty forbade such things, he might as well forbid us to eat.[16]

This exchange is suggestive. Bawana would have been aware that Mvulani knew that men did not negotiate the exchange of women (or of cattle) with a woman. Was he implying that she was inappropriately assuming the role of a man? Was he simply engaging in the established custom of taunting his adversary and distancing himself from her? What did he make of this articulate, confident Xhosa woman who talked back to a chief? Mvulani conveyed a disregard for the social system in which African women were expected to seek their security through proper decorum. She also showed a lack of empathy for the imperatives of the political and material survival of the Thembu way of life. Polygamy was at the very core of this political economy; it made possible a gendered division of labour which assigned women to maize cultivation and food preparation so that men might concentrate on preparing for war and on accumulating cattle through raiding and breeding. A man who did not have multiple wives ran the risk of failing to reproduce and maintain his extended family.[17] This gender division of labour is illustrated in the sketches of the soldier artist, Henry Butler (figs 1.1 and 1.2). As chief, Bawana's role was to ensure that his people were able to accumulate wealth in cattle and had sufficient wives to ensure reproduction of the family and society. He could not follow missionary injunctions that threatened this arrangement. Mvulani's criticism made no sense to him.

To the Moravians' dismay, the abaThembu saw the missionaries' farming methods as a means of making women's labour more efficient rather than as a way of changing the gender division of labour and adopting new methods of farming. Intrigued at the efficiency of the watermill at Shiloh, Bawana's men 'exclaimed: "What a diligent woman is this mill, she works day and night, never

16 'Extracts from Letters of Brother John Lemmertz, Klipplaats River, 8 July 1829', J. Lemmertz and J.F. Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren among the Tambookies on the Klipplaats River for the first months of the year 1829', Periodical Accounts relating to the Missions of the Church of the United Brethren established among the Heathen Vol 11 (1829), pp.225–220.

17 For cattle economies and gender, see J. Ferguson, 'Bovine Mystique: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho', *Man* 20, 4 (1985), pp.647–674; Peires, *The House of Phalo*, pp.31–35.

gets hungry and drinks only water … How the Whites do manage to subjugate everything; not only human beings are to be their servants but even water is made to serve their needs.'"

Figure 1.1: Henry Butler, *Indigenous Kraal*, 1837. Pen and ink sketch, 5.5x10, Museum Africa, Johannesburg.[18]

Figure 1.2: Henry Butler, *Indigenous Forge*, 1836. Pen and ink sketch, 6x9. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.

18 For catalogue numbers for sketches by Henry Butler in this chapter see R. F. Kennnedy (compiled), *Catalogue of Pictures in the Africana Museum* (Johannesburg: Africana Museum, 1966), Vol 1, B1175, B1176, B1168, B1169, B1215, B1158. Established in 1933, the Africana Museum was renamed as Museum Africa in 1994.

Significantly, it was those who were redundant in the Thembu political economy who made their way to the mission station: Bawana's brother, Lande, who did not have chiefly responsibilities, and his older wives who had become a burden to their co-wives.[19]

In the meantime, Bawana's ally, Maqoma, was annoyed that amaTshatshu were encroaching on his territory. To convey his discontent, he seized 6000 head of Tshatshu cattle and put the men to flight. This fracas upset the Moravians, prompting them to ask the British for protection.[20] The British duly set up a temporary military post on the Klipplaat. The young Maphasa was deeply distrustful of the Moravians' failure to understand the terms of the alliance with his father and he seethed with anger when the missionaries supported his rivals.

An incident illustrating this difficulty occurred in February 1829. Supporters of the Gcina chief, Galela, who had raided Maphasa's people, took refuge at Shiloh. Maphasa and a group of armed men barged into the mission station, demanded the services of the interpreter, and accused the Moravians of encouraging British military officers and boer farmers to assist Galela and his people in their predations. Shaken by Maphasa's behaviour, Brother Lemmertz complained to Bawana who rebuked his son in the presence of the Moravians and two Tshatshu councillors. But Maphasa's distrust did not go away and years later, Brother van Calker admitted that the Moravians had not understood the situation adequately. He also acknowledged that most of the Tambookie who came to the mission were 'robbers, thieves and murderers' who were running away from their chiefs.[21] The Moravians' failure to understand internal conflict

19 van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', pp.29–30; Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren', *Periodical Accounts* Vol 11 (1829), 23 June 1829, p.177; 10 February1830, *Periodical Accounts*, p.443; Adolph Bonatz, 6 November 1832, p.178.

20 Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren', pp.167–175; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.119. This sequence of events differs from that set out by Timothy Stapleton, *Maqoma: Xhosa Resistance to Colonial Advance* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1994), p.51; and to some extent to the conclusions offered in fn.96, pp.232–233; CO 2712 Colonial Letters. D Campbell, Acting Secretary to J Bell, 30 January 1829 to 27 February 1829, p.96. After a few months the mission station moved away from the Oxkraal River to the Klipplaat River to escape flooding. Here the mission station of Shiloh was established. Stapleton suggests that the military post was established to protect Bawana, but evidence suggests that the colonial authorities responded to the missionaries' plea rather than to that of Bawana. See Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p.51.

21 Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren', p.170; van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', p.26; Henry Francis Fynn refers to those seeking refuge from their own chiefs as 'the delinquents of others', LG 409 Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1837–1844, Letter of Henry Francis Fynn to Hougham Hudson, Agents General, 10 January 1838; see also A. Bonatz ,'Description of the Mission-Settlement of Shiloh, in the Country of the Tambookies; with some account of the Manners, Customs &etc of the neighbouring Tribes', *Periodical Accounts relating to the Missions of the Church of the United Brethren established among the Heathen* Vol 13 (London, 1834), p.306.

on the Tambookie frontier served to foment violence and aid the British imperialism of which they were so critical. It was also profoundly detrimental to the amaTshatshu.

In the meantime, Maphasa was coming into his own as a chief of the amaTshatshu. Serious drought in the summer of 1829 led Bawana to leave the Klipplaat and move to the Swart Kei where the sweet grass provided good grazing and the mountains created a natural fortress. In the winter, Bawana moved off in the direction of the Kat River, leaving Maphasa on the Swart Kei. Galela, Bawana's old rival, died soon after his move and his son, Tyopho, took over as chief. Tyopho held Bawana's people responsible for his father's death. Fearing attack, Maphasa asked the Moravians to move closer to his great place but they refused, arguing that that they had no intention of serving as a shield against attacks from their enemies. They also lamented that his father, Bawana, showed no interest in 'the word of God'; the chief, they said, had scant disregard for 'the state of his soul'.[22]

By 1834, observant boers noted that Maphasa had become a wealthy and powerful chief, boasting a large and rapidly growing following, 'at a distance from the rest of the tribe under Bawana and virtually independent of it'. Maphasa shouldered more responsibility for containing intrigue and conflict along the Swart Kei, Klaas Smits and upper Klipplaat rivers where boers were interspersed among the different Thembu groups. Conflicts involving boers tended to spark quarrels between their Thembu neighbours. Interventions by Major Warden, a military officer whose duty was to curb cattle raiding and who made use of Khoesan trackers, did little to ameliorate these tensions.[23] A case involving the theft of horses illustrates the complexity of relationships across these diverse groups.

Johannes Erasmus, a boer who lived near the Ndungwana chief, Qwesha, complained that five horses had disappeared from his homestead overnight. He asked the chief to help him trace them, promising him a reward. Qwesha found the horses in the possession of Tyali, one of his followers, but Erasmus refused to hand over the reward. Annoyed at this breach of promise, Qwesha approached

22 Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the Brethren', p.177; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.129; J. Lemmertz letter of September 1828, *Periodical Accounts* Vol 11 (1829), pp.26–28. This account differs from that of Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p.51.

23 Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation of the European Settlement*, p.21; Andries Stoffels, a Khoesan man testified to the House of Commons' Select Committee on Aborigines that he had regularly tracked spoor for Major Warden. See extract from transcript in Ross, *These Oppressions Won't Cease*, p.60.

two other boers Stefanus Muller and his father, Christiaan Muller, who was close to Maphasa, and asked them to intervene.[24] But still Erasmus refused to pay over the reward. More horses, some of which belonged to Christiaan Muller, were taken from Erasmus's homestead. Frustrated, the boers sought the advice of Major Warden. Maphasa was summoned to a meeting. They hatched a plan to lure Qwesha into handing over the horses: if the boers took a parcel of Maphasa's cattle as compensation, they could exchange them for the horses. Maphasa would then have to sort out a deal with Qwesha on his own. The plan failed. Qwesha was not at home when the boers arrived with the cattle. Enraged, Erasmus demanded that they seize the cattle of his neighbour, Tshatshu. This was not acceptable to Maphasa; Tshatshu was guarding sacred cattle. Christiaan Muller's statement to Major Warden sets out what ensued:

> When Maphasa learned what was intended he said that they were his grandfather's cattle and not Qwesha's. The whole party with the exception of Christiaan Muller and Maphasa went to Tshatshu's kraal and took possession of the cattle, and on their return Maphasa again entreated that they might be restored, adding that if they must have some of Qwesha's cattle he would send his people to take them, provided Tshatshu's cattle were given up. This being agreed to, a party of Tambookies were sent by Maphasa who seized seventy head of Qwesha's cattle and brought them to Mr Warden [at the military post], who then gave up those of Tshatshu.[25]

Cattle could be rustled, seized and exchanged, but they were not impersonal and they were not all the same. Some cattle played a role in the spiritual life of people. For this reason, Maphasa would not allow cattle belonging to his grandfather to be used to broker a deal over the theft of horses. Neither the boers nor the British wanted to appreciate this cultural nuance and saw Maphasa as turning on his word. The absence of a common set of rules sowed distrust, rendering deal-making fragile.

Local conflict was exacerbated by plundering from the north. In October 1829, Maphasa lost five herds of cattle to marauders. In a state of agitation, he approached the military post for help but received little sympathy. Weary of monitoring cattle rustling in the north of the Colony, the British were preparing to withdraw their soldiers from the Klipplaat River. Maphasa

24 Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.120.

25 Colonial Letters, Albany and Somerset Letter from D. Campbell to Lt Col Bell Grahamstown 11 May 1829, pp.398–404, statement of Christiaan Muller encased.

and his men were left to ward off attacks on their own. Their main antagonist was Moorosi, a man of mixed Khoesan and Thembu parentage, who was chief of the Baputi clan in the Witteberge mountains. The raiding conducted by Moorosi and his men, who were vassals of Moshesh, was an important source of wealth for the Basotho king as he was establishing himself north west of the Drakensberg mountains. Brother Bonatz described these plunderers from the north as gangs of 'runaway thieves, Hottentots, Bushmen and coloured people of mixed race' who were armed with 'guns, powder and ball' and who often sold the stolen cattle to colonists.[26] None but the bravest would go after them. Excursions in pursuit of stolen cattle contributed to Maphasa's reputation as a courageous leader. But they also took him far away from home.

It was while he was on one of these expeditions in September 1834 that Bawana, Maphasa's father, was murdered. Bawana's body was discovered in the veld where he had been attending his cattle. Maphasa followed custom in the wake of his father's death. He first summoned his diviner to ascertain who had brought this evil. The diviner pointed to two women in the extended royal household, the mother and sister of Tsholopo, Bawana's half-brother, and accused them of witchcraft. They were tortured and burned alive. This act of punishment, warning and cleansing was a standard ritual when a chief died. Devastated, Bawana's brother, Tsholopo, committed suicide. Custom also required that Maphasa avenge his father's murder. The amaGcina supporters of the late chief Galela were prime suspects. Maphasa set out with 52 men and seized 1 000 cattle from Tyopho's kraal. But he was pursued by the amaGcina and forced to flee into the Colony.[27]

On his return to the Swart Kei, Maphasa became increasingly concerned that the amaGcina would escalate the conflict and seek the support of the Ndungwana chief Qwesha, who was at that time living near the source of the

26 Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren', pp. 289–292; the plunderers are described as 'Fetkannas' or 'Corannas' but there is no evidence indicating that these were Ngubengcuka's men sent to reign in Bawana as Stapleton suggests, see Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p.51; Lemmertz, 19 October 1829, *Periodical Accounts*, vol 11 (1829), p.292; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, pp.168–169; Theal, *History of South Africa 1873–1884*, pp.41–42; A. Bonatz, 'Extract of the Diary of Shiloh in the Tambookie Country, for the latter half of the year 1831', *Periodical Accounts*, Vol 12 (1831), p.425.

27 Lemmertz and Hoffman, 'Extract of the Diary of the Missionaries of the brethren', p.436; Adam Halter, 23 February 1831, *Periodical Accounts* Vol 12 (1831), p.86; P. Hallbeck, 8 December 1831, *Periodical Accounts* Vol 11 (1829), p.519. For background to Bawana's conflict with Galela see Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp.86–89; C. Crais, *The Making of the Colonial Order: White Supremacy and Black Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1770–1865* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992), p.113.

Kat River. Again, he asked the Moravians to move closer to his great place, but the missionaries held firmly to principle, declaring that they would have no part in 'the heathen law of vendetta'.[28]

Soon after Maphasa was installed as senior chief of the amaTshatshu, the British attempted to tidy up the messy situation on their north-eastern border. This they hoped to achieve by persuading the amaNdungwana and the amaGcina to return to the Mbashe region of Thembuland.[29] It would be far easier for them to deal with Maphasa in the absence of local feuding. Moving cautiously, Colonel Henry Somerset summoned the fractious abaThembu to a meeting. But his efforts came to naught. Qwesha refused to leave the Klaas Smits River and Tyopho insisted on remaining on the Bonkolo River. Somerset's intervention made life more difficult for Maphasa and did little to alleviate tensions in Tambookieland.

Meanwhile, the British faced more serious challenges from the Xhosa chiefs to the south-east. The situation erupted when one of Nqika's sons was wounded by soldiers sent to prevent him from grazing cattle where the British had forbidden it. Ngqika and Gcaleka fighters invaded the Colony, precipitating the War of Hintsa (1834–1835), the Sixth Frontier War. Maphasa did not become involved in the conflict, remaining neutral on the advice of Maqoma, another of Ngqika's sons. The alliance with Maqoma was important to Maphasa. Xhosa historian SEK Mqhayi attests to a close relationship between the house of Tshatshu and the Rharhabe Xhosa at Tyhume, south of the Amathole mountains. Suthu, great wife of the late Chief Ngqika, was Bawana's sister and mother of Sandile who succeeded to the chieftaincy on his father's death in December 1829.[30]

In a bid to demonstrate his neutrality in this war, Maphasa made a point of making peace with the Moravians and visited the mission at Shiloh for the first time in two years. The missionaries were pleased with the visit and were more willing to be helpful. When Colonel Henry Somerset, who

28 Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation of the European Settlement*, p.23; Colonial Letters, D. Campbell to Lt Col Bell Grahamstown 11 May 1829, pp.398–404; Stompjes, Biography, p.77.

29 British Parliamentary Papers 503–'35 Kaffir War, H. Somerset to D. Campbell 26 May 1834, pp.123–124.

30 Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp.93–94. Suthu was held in especially high esteem and was buried among them rather than being sent home to die as was customary for Thembu princesses among the amaXhosa. S.E.K. Mqhayi, *Abantu besizwe: Historical and biographical writings, 1902–1944*. Edited and translated by J. Opland with the assistance of L. Mabinza, K. Moropa, N. Mpolweni and A. Nyamende (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2009), p.44.

was investigating boer complaints that Maphasa's followers were raiding their cattle, summoned the chief to Grahamstown, Maphasa asked the Moravians for a letter of safe passage. On his return, the chief visited Shiloh more frequently.[31]

Maphasa, the Moravian missionaries and the British on the Tambookie frontier

Subsequent visits were not always cordial, often reflecting the deep distrust between Maphasa and the Moravians. On one occasion, the Tshatshu chief set out to confront them about a letter they had allegedly sent to the British in support of his rivals. He barged into the station with a cohort of men armed with spears and sporting battle dress — headgear made from the wings of the *indwe* (the blue crane). With his own interpreter in tow, he declared that Daniel, the Moravian's interpreter, was untrustworthy. The Moravians insisted that Daniel should translate despite their alarm over the imposing military regalia. With Maphasa's interpreter interrupting repeatedly and complaining that the translation was a misrepresentation, the meeting turned into an uproar. We do not know how Daniel was reading Maphasa's utterances, but this verbal encounter was yet another instance of Maphasa's sense that the Moravians neither understood nor were open to understanding the complexities of the Tambookie frontier. Maphasa's response was sharp; he saw the power of translation in knowledge-creation and sought to wrest it from those who would use it against him. Scholars have recognised that translation served as an act of conquest and that the in-between roles played by interpreters were often less innocent than colonisers and evangelisers allowed.[32]

Sensing the mounting tension, Mvulani came in from the garden and in the words of Brother Bonatz, 'edged her way through the men … shivering with fear when she saw the missionaries surrounded by these angry heathens who were all holding spears in their hands and giving signs that showed that they

31 'Extract of the diary of Shiloh on the Klipplaat River for the year 1833', *Periodical Accounts* Vol 13 (1833), p.57; Colonial Letters, H. Somerset to D. Campbell, Acting Commandant General for Eastern Province, 26 May 1831, p.277; A. Bonatz, 28 December 1834, *Periodical Accounts*, Vol 13 (1834).

32 Lawrance, Osborn, Roberts (eds), *Intermediaries, Interpreters and Clerks*; D. Petersen, 'Translating the word: Dialogism and Debate in two Gikuyu dictionaries', *Journal of Religious History*, 23, 1 (1991–2), pp.31–50; W.T. Kalusa, 'Language, Medical Auxiliaries, and the Re-interpretation of Missionary Medicine in Colonial Mwinilunga, Zambia 1922–51', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1 1 (2007), pp.57–78.

were ready to kill as soon as their chief told them to.' In the Moravian account, she immediately took over, sent the missionaries from the room and declared that the conversation 'must be concluded at once because it was entirely useless'. Alone with the chief and his *amaphakathi* (councillors or advisers), Mvulani berated them for visiting a peaceful place in war gear and told them to leave. Maphasa obeyed without a fuss.[33] Mvulani was pleased that the chief was more willing to listen to her than to her colleague.

This story is repeated in many Moravian documents but none of these accounts reveals what Mvulani said to Maphasa and what it was that sent him packing. It is probable that Mvulani did not tell the German missionaries exactly what she said or that the missionaries did not want to repeat it, an indication that this communication fell outside of Moravian discourse. Brother Bonatz was moved to comment that her exceptional bravery was 'even more impressive when considering that under Xhosa law, women are not allowed to enter such meetings.' In his missionary discourse, such courage emanated from her faith; 'through her, the Lord commanded the angry heathens to withdraw their murderous plans.'[34] As a Moravian tale of courage, the moment belongs to Mvulani; as a story of frontier encounter, it demonstrates the power of interlocution.

On 23 October 1835, not long after this incident, Maphasa was rudely reminded of the imperialist intentions of the British. Colonel Harry Smith met with him at Shiloh to inform him as senior chief that Tambookieland was to be annexed by the British. The territory south of the Stormberg and north of the Amathole mountains was about to become the British Province of Queen Adelaide. Maphasa had the choice of remaining on the frontier under British dominance or facing expulsion. The Tshatshu chief responded strategically — he wished to govern his people as he chose and to be protected by the British against his enemies. Smith nominally agreed to this arrangement.

Smith well knew that governors in the colonies did not have full authority in the colonisation process. Major decisions were taken by the British Parliament and its sub-committees in London. But even they were under pressure. Between 1834 and 1837, this Parliament was badgered by a lobby group calling itself the Aborigines Protection Society (APS). Activists in the name of humanitarianism, the APS persuaded the British Parliament that it

33 Stompjes, Biography, p.78. Brother Bonatz repeatedly intervenes in Mvulani's *Lebenslauf*, a feature of this genre of writing.

34 Stompjes, Biography, p.79.

had a duty to promote humanitarianism in all British territories and to see that indigenous peoples were protected.[35] The APS argued that the annexation of the north-eastern frontier would encourage colonists to take aboriginal land for themselves by expelling and dispossessing aboriginal people. It was Britain's duty to place protection of indigenous peoples ahead of colonial interests. Their unease over the annexation of Tambookieland was due in large part to the efforts of Dr John Philip, a missionary in the service of the South African chapter of the London Mission Society.[36]



Figure 1.3: Charles Davidson Bell, *Khoesan cattle rustlers pursued by boers*, 1836. Watercolour 10.7x14.2. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.[37]

35 The APS was formed in response to the establishment of a British Parliamentary Committee on Aborigines (1834–1837) and drew its inspiration from the British anti-slavery movement.

36 T. Keegan, *Dr Philip's Empire: One man's struggle for justice in nineteenth-century South Africa* (Cape Town: Random House/Zebra Press, 2016).

37 Original oil painting titled *Thieves: Bushmen Driving Cattle up a Kloof* c1836. Catalogue reference number B787, R. F. Kennnedy (compiled), *Catalogue of Pictures in the Africana Museum* (Johannesburg: Africana Museum, 1966). Charles Davidson Bell, a Scotsman, came to the Cape in 1830, joined the civil service and in 1848 was appointed to the post of Surveyor General. He travelled extensively in the colony and was a prolific artist. The description of this image reproduced in Vol 1 of Kennedy's catalogue reads, 'shows a scene enacted repeatedly during the long conflict between Bushman and frontier farmer. The Bushmen have captured some cattle and are driving them back to their mountain fastness. Some of their number ambush the pursuing farmers and are ready to let loose stones and arrows. One beast failing to make the climb is being killed to discourage the pursuers. Note the arrows worn in a band around the Bushmen's heads so that they can be quickly snatched and shot', p.178.

Philip was deeply concerned about the negative impact of the colonists in the eastern Cape and particularly worried about the Khoesan. As a member of the APS, he lobbied Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, informing him that 'The white man's intercourse has demoralised [the Khoesan], his traffic has defrauded them, his alliances have betrayed them, and his wars have destroyed them'. He appealed for the British government to send out more missionaries and fewer colonists to ensure the development of an independent, Christianised African population alongside the Cape Colony. Under pressure from the APS, Lord Glenelg called for the abandonment of the province and rescinded its annexation. Smith was instructed to cancel the annexation of Tambookieland and scrap his plans for creating a province of Queen Adelaide. [38]

The new diplomatic plan for the north-eastern frontier was to be a system of treaties or pacts with the chiefs that would require them to adhere to humanitarian principles in their dealings with the Khoesan. In the wording of a treaty signed on 18 January 1837, Maphasa was committed to protecting 'by all means in his power the Bushmen who reside, or may come to reside, within the said territory as the original Proprietors of the Soil, to let them enjoy all the rights and privileges to which the Tambookies are entitled'.[39] He was also required to monitor the actions of the other Thembu chiefs and their followers, ensuring that they adhered to the terms of the treaty and co-operated with the British agent located in the vicinity. Andries Stockenström was appointed lieutenant-governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony to oversee the administration of the treaties and Henry Francis Fynn was appointed as British agent in Maphasa's territory to oversee their implementation.

Fynn took up residence at Tarka Post some 48 kilometres from Maphasa's kraal, close to the boers on the upper Klaas Smits River. The son of a Cape Town hotel proprietor, Fynn had lived a colourful life as an ivory trader in Natal where the Zulu king Tshaka accorded him the status of 'chief' and gave

38 LG 12 12 Letters dispatched No 132. Remarks of the Commissioner General of the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope on the Return of Missions in South Africa, belonging to the London Missionary Society with accompanying documents forwarded to the Secretary to Government by the Revd. D. Philip under cover of his letter of the 7th Dec. 1830; John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.47. For discussion of the aborted annexation of the province of Queen Adelaide, see A. Lester, 'Settlers, the State and Colonial Power: The Colonisation of Queen Adelaide Province 1834–47', *Journal of African History*, 39 (1998), pp.221–245.

39 GH 19/4 Border Tribes Treaties Miscellaneous Papers. Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope, 'Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844'.

him several wives.[40] His credentials for appointment as British resident on the north-eastern frontier were that he spoke fluent isiXhosa and understood 'the African way' of doing things. Since Maphasa's great place was an eight-hour ride on horseback, he sought to corral the abaThembu west of Maphasa's place, bringing them closer to him and placing them under the control of Ndiniso, a relative of the amaGcina chief, Tyopho. Ndiniso was pleased at this recognition. At the same time, Maphasa was required to hand over to Ndiniso responsibility for those residing close to Qwesha, chief of the amaNdungwana.



Figure 1.4: Henry Butler, *The Tambookie chief Maphasa and his councillors proceeding to a conference with the Commandant of Caffraria at the Zwart Kei River*, 1836. Pen and ink sketch 6.2x8. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.

40 For significance of Henry Francis Fynn in the 'Mfecane' debate, see J. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Bolompo', *Journal of African History* 29 (1988), pp.487–519; C. Hamilton, 'The Character and Objects of Chaka', pp.37–63; J.B. Peires, 'Debate: Paradigm Deleted: The Materialist Interpretation of the Mfecane', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19, 2 (June 1993), pp.295–315.

While Fynn was arranging a more devolved system of authority, Maphasa was provided with an official seal in recognition of his status as the most senior Thembu chief on the Tambookie frontier. He was to use the stamp as an official signature on passes for travellers, documents and correspondence. It was an instrument of colonialism. Encased in metal, the seal was about seven centimetres square; the face was dipped into heated red wax before being stamped on to documents.

The seal was unmistakably colonial in its symbolism; the insignia were agricultural rather than pastoral. Below the name Mapassa at the centre are a sheaf of wheat and a leafy vegetable-like plant. At the top are two upright trees resembling conifers, standing tall on undulating mountains. There is no sign of cattle, the heart of Nguni culture, nor of maize and sorghum, the grain crops cultivated by the abaThembu in Tambookieland. The symbolic imagery on the seal represented British aspirations: to establish a frontier tamed by agrarian toil and European influence. It is unlikely that this imagery pleased the chief, who understood cattle to be the foundation of Thembu economy and society. Also, the chief smarted at the way the treaties interfered with the customary system of using cattle as a source of wealth, exchange and as a means of forcing negotiation.



Figure 1.5: Maphasa's wax seal.

Recreated by Tim James from a sketch made by Anne Mager in 1967 of the original wax seal at Queenstown and Frontier Museum. The seal was donated to the museum in 1951 by the widow of Canon Henchman. Despite a careful search in 2017, neither Anne Mager nor Thobile Mdlela, curator of the museum, could find the colonial wax seals that were indicated on the index cards.

In the violent environment of the Tambookie frontier, implementing the treaties was not easy. A harrowing incident on the Klaas Smits River illustrates the vulnerability of the Khoesan and affirms Dr Philip's quest for their protection. The story concerns an atrocity committed by one of the followers of the

Ndungwana chief, Qwesha, on a Khoesan woman in the employ of Reuben Jordaan, a boer farmer.

Jordaan moved into Maphasa's territory in the mid-1830s after Maphasa gave him permission to hire a farm vacated by two boers who had trekked across the Orange River. The terms of the arrangement were that Jordaan would occupy the land in return for allowing the Thembu *kumkani* to select four head of cattle annually from his herd. A few years later, Lozi, one of Qwesha's followers, established a homestead close to a natural spring on Jordaan's land, allowing his cattle to roam freely over it. Jordaan impounded the cattle. When Lozi came to collect them, Jordaan's friend hit him over the head with a rifle butt. Qwesha sent a messenger to ask why Lozi had been struck and demanded compensation for his injury. Jordaan jibbed, saying that he would only pay if Mtirara, the *kumkani*, ordered him to do so. Three days later Jordaan's shepherd, a Khoesan woman, staggered to his door, dripping with blood from a slit windpipe. He informed the British agent that the woman had managed to tell him a man had attacked her, thrown her into the fire, jumped on her back and cut her throat, as he shouted, 'It is your master that has so much strength!' Jordaan stitched her throat and nursed her for several days, giving her milk to drink. When she died two weeks later, he packed up and moved away. Qwesha handed over a man to the British resident agent to be charged for the murder. Subdued by this incident, Maphasa tightened his monitoring in the area.[41]

Occasionally, luck was on Maphasa's side. Early in 1840, Maphasa found himself warding off trouble with the amaGcaleka, his Xhosa neighbours to the east. Fynn reported that Maphasa had a fortunate escape when a Gcaleka attack on his great place was called off. The Gcaleka fighters were scared off when their diviner collapsed and died while invoking the ancestors. This was a bad omen; they could not go into battle.[42]

Both the Tshatshu chief, Maphasa, and the British agent, Fynn, were concerned by the increasing number of guns in the territory. Gun-running

41 GH 14/2, 14/3 Government House Papers received from Native Tribes, Diplomatic Agents and Government Officials: Border Tribes and Diplomatic Agents 1844–1845, Statement of Rudolph Jordan of Rietbokfountain Tembookie (sic) Country to H.F. Fynn, 15 May 1845; Diary Tambookie Residency 14–24 June 1845; February 1845–19 May 1845, 5–11 August 1945. Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1841–1844, Report by Warner 9 May 1843. Resentment of the Khoesan was not confined to the Swart Kei. Khoesan people living at the Bushman Institution on the White Kei River were repeatedly attacked by Myeki, the Mpondomise *kumkani* and father-in-law to Mtirara.

42 LG 409.Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1839–1840, Fynn to Hudson 9 March 1840.

was illegal but the Tambookie had no difficulty acquiring guns from itinerant traders. Maphasa sought the intervention of the British agent on several occasions. In one instance, Qwesha was found to be encouraging trade in guns and cattle with the boers. In another, Maphasa asked Fynn to pursue a trader who had taken 24 head of cattle and a horse in payment for a consignment of guns that he failed to deliver. The British agent advised him that he would be perfectly justified in seizing whatever goods the fleeing trader had abandoned. But Maphasa was unimpressed with advice that placed the onus on him. Demonstrating an astute sense of political play, he told Fynn that 'No trader's station has ever been seized in this country and I am not desirous of commencing as it might accustom me to such seizures'.[43] Rather, it was the duty of the British agent to see to it that his cattle were restored to him and the trading station closed down.

Boers too were caught up in the competitive business of raiding for the purposes of accumulating cattle. They occupied a position between the British agent, whose duty it was to control them, and the abaThembu in whose territory they were renting land. Boers moving into the area applied to the chief for grazing land. Most chiefs were keen to oblige. Like the British agent, they saw boers as a buffer between fractious Thembu groups; they also enjoyed the rent collected for use of land in their territory. The chief's followers were more sceptical and often resented these intruders whom they saw as depriving them of land they might occupy themselves. Tensions were exacerbated when boundaries were not clearly demarcated and when there was general pressure on grazing in the dry season. An incident involving Zacharias Pretorius who leased land from Maphasa illustrates the intertwined nature of these relationships and the intrigue that served as rough justice.

When Thembu cattle strayed onto his land, Pretorius seized some 200 head, claiming that his intention was to send them to the pound at Cradock over 97 kilometres away. Enraged by this theft, a band of Maphasa's followers armed with guns and assegais broke down Pretorius' kraal, drove the cattle out, trampled his garden and stamped on his chickens, terrifying his wife and children. Pretorius informed the field cornet at Cradock who reportedly 'would not come'. The treaties were useless, Pretorius told Fynn; they were unenforceable and made life 'unbearable'. Upon investigation Fynn found that the boundary line of the farm was not clear, and that the abaThembu believed

43 GH Papers received from Native Tribes, Diplomatic Agents and Government Officials: Fynn to H. Hudson, Acting Agent General, 29 June 1844 to H. Hudson.

that their cattle were grazing on open veld. To make peace, he ordered Pretorius to return the cattle and the culprits to pay 20 head of cattle in compensation for the destruction of his garden.[44]

Sir George Napier, Governor of the Cape Colony (1839–1843) followed up to ensure that Pretorius', complaint was dealt with. Anxious to foster a closer relationship with the boers on the frontier, he wanted them to trust the colonial government and believed them when they blamed stock theft on the Tambookies. Napier met Maphasa at Shiloh, accused the chief of failing to curb the predations of his followers and ordered Colonel Hare to despatch troops to seize cattle allegedly stolen from colonists. Fynn's records indicated that Maphasa was unfairly blamed. Of the 241 stolen horses and 559 stolen cattle that passed through Maphasa's territory between 1837 and 1844, only 160 horses and 379 cattle were traced to local kraals. The thieves were not Maphasa's followers, said Fynn, but men who had 'served in the colony', spoke the Dutch language and were able to 'ingratiate themselves to the Dutch colonists' in order to secure passes. The problem, in Fynn's view, was 'the general unwillingness of the Boers to adhere to the treaty, their professed ignorance of its contents, their taking matters into their own hands and failing to go through the government representative and the belief that government is not willing to redress their claims'.[45] A case in point involved a field cornet by the name of Cobus Potgieter who had made off with 70 head of Thembu cattle on false pretences. Fynn saw the boers as unreliable. Their trek towards Natal in 1836 had left large tracts of land in the Tarka area unoccupied and many of those who remained were 'of so irritable a nature as to obstruct all attempts at reconciliation'.[46]

Administration of the treaties entailed repeated meetings between the British and Maphasa, some of which were sketched by Henry Butler, the soldier artist. The treaty system created as many difficulties as it sought to remove. While the APS and the British Parliament were ameliorated, the treaty system failed

44 GH Papers received from Native Tribes, Diplomatic Agents and Government Officials: Border Tribes and Diplomatic Agents 1844–1845, Proceedings of the Tambookie Residency 25 April to 11 May 1845: Statement made by Zaccharias Pretorius to J.P. Verster, C.C. Cradock, 31 March 1845; Fynn to Hudson, 25 April 1845.

45 Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation of European Settlement* 177–178; GH 19/4: Border Tribes Treaties Miscellaneous Papers. Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope, 'Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844'; Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1837–1838; Fynn to Hudson, 10 January 1838. Wagenaar, *'Forgotten Frontier'*, p.143.

46 LG 409 Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1837–1838; Memo (n.d.) Report of Proceedings at the Tambookie Residency, 25 April to 11 May 1845; 1 October 1845/6 to February 1846, Fynn to Hudson, October 1845.

to win over the boers or provide the chiefs with an effective instrument with which to reign in their followers. The continued penetration of Tambookieland by white traders and farmers fuelled internal violence, rendering the Khoesan vulnerable and putting them to flight.[47]



Figure 1.6: Henry Butler, *Zwart Kei. Visit from the chief's wives*, 1839. Watercolour, 6x9. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.

From a historian's perspective, the treaties are a source of information about the way the British ranked the chiefs on the Tambookie frontier and the territorial boundaries they associated with Maphasa, the most senior chief. A treaty signed at Shiloh on 28 January 1841 set out Maphasa's extensive territory as stretching from 'the Swart Kei or Winterberg Spruit from its source in the Winterberg down to the conical hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smits river and thence the latter river to its source in the Kloof of the Bamboosberg called

47 Le Cordeur and Saunders (eds), *The Kitchingman Papers*, pp.190–191.

Buffelshoek.'[48] In this mapping, Maphasa's territory was over 160 kilometres at its furthest points, north to south, and roughly 64 kilometres east to west. In recognition of Maphasa's seniority on the frontier, the treaty stipulated that he ensure access to Shiloh, the British agent and the colony to the south.

Figure 1.7: Henry Butler, *British Grenadiers with a Tambooki war song accompaniment; Chief Maphasa, his brother Gamka and a councillor with British officers and soldiers on the evening of the conference* n.d. Watercolour 6x9. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.

Following the signing of this treaty, a period of relative calm followed on the Tambookie frontier where over 40 000 abaThembu resided. Maphasa celebrated the birth of his son, Gungubele, first-born of his great wife. Mindful that this respite was unlikely to last, the Tambookies continued trading cattle for horses and guns. By 1845 they had amassed roughly a thousand horses and 800 'stands of arms', including guns and assegais.[49]

48 GH 19/4 Border Tribes Treaties Miscellaneous Papers Article 4 of Treaty signed by A. Stöckenstrom, H Hudson, HF Fynn, marks of Maphasa and witnesses Qwesha and Nyela at Shiloh 18 January 1837.

49 LG 409 Letters received from the Resident Agent in Tambookieland 1837–1838; Fynn to Hudson 27 November 1840; 'Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844'. Robinson, assistant surveyor-general puts the number at 36 000; Miscellaneous Letters, J. Robinson to H. Bell, 23 March 1849, p.14. Cole's estimate of 25 000 seems not to have included those living beyond the Imvani and Indwe rivers. See *Grahamstown Journal* (20 January 1849), Letter from Subscriber.

The great house of the abaThembu moves to the Tambookie frontier

Relations between the Tambookies became even more complex after the arrival of the great house on the frontier.[50] Continuing conflicts on the Mbashe River had led to the murder of Ngubengcuka, the Thembu *kumkani*. Nonesi, his widow, was appointed regent for Ngubengcuka's heir, Mtirara. Nonesi was childless but as the great wife, she was regarded as the queen of the abaThembu and in 1830 was appointed to raise the heir born of a junior house. The Wesleyan missionary, Joseph Cox Warner, encouraged Nonesi and Mtirara to move away from the Mbashe River and settle on the frontier. Following this advice, Nonesi established her great place on the Imvani River. Born in 1821, Mtirara underwent circumcision in the early 1840s and was installed as *kumkani* in 1844. The Tambookies, the westerly abaThembu, accepted his seniority but since he was young and inexperienced, they were anxious about his ability to cope with the complexities of frontier politics. Some detractors cast doubt on his ability to rule simply because he was not born of the great house.[51]

Mtirara's first diplomatic engagement with the British was the signing of a treaty of co-operation on behalf of all the abaThembu on 25 March 1845. The aim of the British was to get the *kumkani* to take greater responsibility for the actions of Thembu subgroups on the frontier. This was a tall order. Fynn, the British agent, pointed out that the British had little understanding of the turmoil; colonial encroachment had broken up and divided the abaThembu, making it difficult for the *kumkani* to impose control. Colonial interference, including the actions of British agents across the region, had weakened his authority, fed into the 'internal jealousies of the numerous petty chiefs' and created divisions. Both on the Mbashe River and on the Tambookie frontier, Thembu politics were so wracked by internal wrangling that minor chiefs flouted the authority of their seniors at the slightest opportunity. A senior chief who attempted to punish them became so unpopular that he feared desertion

50 See Appendix 7 for genealogy of the abaThembu great house.

51 GH 22/3 High Commissioner Miscellaneous Papers February to June 1848, E.M. Cole to Richard Southey, Secretary to High Commissioner, Shiloh, 26 April 1848; R. Godlonton and E. Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War 1850–1852, II*, p.194; Nonesi had no children by Ngubengcuka; she raised the children of other wives as her own. Stapleton claims that she was demoted as Ngubengcuka's great wife. Nonesi served as regent for her minor stepson after Ngubengcuka's death. See T.J. Stapleton, *Faku: Rulership and Colonialism in the Mpondo kingdom (c.1780–1867)* (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2001), p.46; Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation*, p.21.

of his followers 'to the ranks of his enemies or even his apparent friendly neighbours.'[52]

Internecine quarrels continued from generation to generation. Soon after Mtirara's installation, Maphasa called on him to resolve a case in which followers of the Gcina chief, Tyopho, had stolen a 'large drove of cattle' from the amaTshatshu. Mtirara ordered Tyopho to get the cattle back and return them to Maphasa. But Tyopho declared that he was unable to do so. Those who had seized the cattle claimed that some 20 years earlier when they resided on the Mbashe, amaTshatshu had taken cattle from them. They were simply settling old scores. The feud between Bawana and Galela continued beyond their deaths, drawing in the next generation.[53]

In this environment, the young Mtirara relied heavily on the advice of the missionaries, principally JC Warner, who lived nearby, but also James Read of the London Missionary Society who established a mission for the Khoesan in the area in 1839. Unlike the Moravians who had refused to attach themselves to Bawana and Maphasa, the British missionaries worked very closely with the Thembu chiefs in whose territory they resided. Scholars observed that missionary interference no less than that of British agents disrupted internal lines of authority.[54] Warner and Read's interventions on behalf of Mtirara exacerbated tensions between Maphasa, the *kumkani* and the colonists.

Nonetheless, Maphasa remained loyal to the Thembu great house and when the opportunity came to demonstrate his support, he brought out all his men. Sihele, a historian of the abaThembu, tells the story. Sometime in 1845, the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili, incited by his followers and councillors, prepared to attack Mtirara's great place on the Imvani which was not far from his own great place beyond the St Marks mission station. As the amaGcaleka began to mass, the *kumkani* issued an urgent summons for all the westerly abaThembu to join in warding off the attack. Sihele describes how the amaTshatshu and

52 GH 19/5 Treaties with Native Tribes; Treaty signed by Tambookie Chiefs 25 March at Imvani Mission Institution. The chiefs were Mtirara (head of the amaHala section of the abaThembu) and Maphasa, Tyopho, Qwesha, Ngangane, Fadana, Deko, Mafuza. GH 14/6 Papers received from Native Tribes, Diplomatic Agents and Government Officials: Border Tribes and Diplomatic Agents from 1 Oct 1845/6 to Feb 1846, Tarka Post Tambookie Residency Diary from 21 October to 4 November 1845; GH 19/4 Analysis of Reports made at the Tambookie Residency from 1837 to September 1844.

53 GH 14/3 Border Tribes and Diplomatic Agents February 1845 to19 May 1845, proceedings at Tambookie Residency from 24 February to 10 March 1845.

54 Read's Bushman Station at Freemanton was run largely by his son James Read junior; van Calker, 'A century of Moravian missionary work', pp.24–27; Price, *Making Empire*, pp.96–97.

amaNdungwana mounted on horseback descended on the Imvani 'in their multitudes'. Their turnout demonstrated a united defence of the great house of the abaThembu. Surprised at this show of support, Sarhili 'returned home without putting up a fight'. Mtirara was deeply satisfied that Maphasa and a very large contingent of Tshatshu warriors had responded to his call.[55]

But the goodwill did not last long. Early in 1846, Mtirara accused Maphasa of seizing his cattle and appealed to Joseph Read, son of the missionary, James Read, and Sara, his Khoe wife. Joseph was a serving officer in the Cape Regiment. On Mtirara's request, he gathered a force of Khoesan fighters and led an expedition against Maphasa, recapturing 1 500 head of cattle. Mtirara followed up with a raid of his own, inflicting double punishment and adding insult to injury.

When the Seventh Frontier War (War of the Axe 1846–1847) broke out, Maphasa pledged neutrality. But his men were already in a state of agitation over Mtirara's behaviour. This made the Shiloh missionaries nervous and led them to ask Fynn, the British agent, for protection. Fynn instructed James Read junior and his Khoesan fighters from the Bushman station who comprised 200 men under Captain Madoor to defend Shiloh.[56] Their arrival intensified the mood of agitation among Maphasa's warriors. Observing that Maphasa was having difficulty restraining his men, the British sent Mfengu levies as reinforcements for the Khoesan. Among the casualties of the fighting at Shiloh was a white trader. The British held Maphasa's men responsible and seized 'between six and seven thousand head of horned cattle' in revenge. With Mtirara's permission, the British sent Captain William Hogge to attack Maphasa again, capturing 4 000 cattle. Maphasa was 'utterly ruined' by these raids.[57] With the help of the Thembu *kumkani*, the colonial authorities had 'eaten up' the chief of the amaTshatshu.

At the end of the War of the Axe, Mtirara was vulnerable. He met Governor Maitland at Blockdrift and asked for British protection so that he might rule undisturbed over the entire territory of Tambookieland. But the imperial government refused, denouncing his plan as a ruse that would enable him to advance his ambitions at the expense of the Khoesan who remained on

55 Sihele, 'Who are the abaThembu and where do they come from?' pp.72–73.

56 Extract from J.J. Freeman, *A Tour in South Africa, with Notices of Natal, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ceylon, Egypt and Palestine* (London, 1851) in Ross, *These Oppressions Won't Cease*, p.101.

57 Le Cordeur and Saunders (eds), *Kitchingman Papers*, p.259; Theal, *History of South Africa since September 1795 vol 3* (London, 1908), p.22–23; see also vol 4, p.281; Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation*, pp.288–289; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, pp.146–147.

the frontier. Apparently losing faith in Maitland, they sent out a new colonial governor, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith. An ambitious man, Smith was determined to break the power of the chiefs and to stamp a stronger colonial imprint on the landscape of the Tambookie frontier. On 17 December 1847, Smith declared the Zwaart [Swart] Kei, Klaas Smits and Kraai rivers as the eastern boundary and the Orange River as the northern boundary of the colony.[58] He allocated land in Tambookie territory to outsiders, applying a strategy of reward and punishment. On his instruction, Kamastone, a portion of land, was given to Chief Kama of the Gqunukwebe Xhosa who supported the British, and an adjacent piece was set aside for a Wesleyan mission station at Lesseyton.

Smith also abandoned the treaty system, announcing his intention to do so at a meeting with the chiefs on 7 January 1848. The abaThembu were represented by Mtirara and his most senior chief, Maphasa. Smith set the stage for a dramatic theatrical show of force. He had arranged that his men load a wagon with explosives and position it nearby. Calling the chiefs to watch the wagon, he shouted, 'Fire!'. The wagon burst into flames. 'That is what I will do to you if you do not behave yourselves,' he declared, gesturing at the flames. He then tore up a sheet of paper, tossed it into the air and shouted, 'Do you see this? … There go the treaties! Do you hear? No more treaties!' The chiefs watched in astonishment as the British made yet another about-turn in frontier policy. The colonial view that African politics was driven by 'caprice, revenge, fear and self-interest' no less aptly characterised British behaviour.[59]

In a second scene of this farcical performance, Smith set up an oathing ceremony. Chiefs were to take an oath recognising British authority, acknowledging the superiority of British culture and promising to accept its civilising mission. No doubt with little intention of taking it seriously, the chiefs solemnly took the oath. They swore to recognise the queen of England as their great chief and to compel their people to do so; they undertook to cease practising witchcraft, to prevent the violation of women, and to 'abolish the sin of buying wives'. They pledged to listen to their missionaries, make their people honest and curiously, to 'put to death every murderer'. Richard Price

58 British Parliamentary Papers 912–'48 Correspondence re Kaffirs, Maitland to Colonial Secretary 20 January 1847, pp.8–12; Governor Pottinger to colonial secretary, 20 January 1847, p.38; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.148.

59 Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation*, p.316; Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War of 1850–51*, II, p.272.

commented that Smith's schoolboy performances infantilised both colonists and colonisers in the service of the imperial project.[60]

With the demise of the treaty system, the office of the British resident on the frontier was disbanded. Fynn was sent to Pondoland and Eldred Mowbray Cole, briefly stationed as civil commissioner at Whittlesea, moved away. The British attitude to the Khoesan appears to have shifted. Captain Madoor complained that while the British recognised their rights to the land, they levied a tax on them. The Tambookies who had taken their land paid no such tax. 'Because we are mild,' said the Khoesan captain, 'we are made to endure the tax.'[61] In this frontier zone, the Tambookie held the upper hand. British failure to develop a consistent and trustworthy approach to their interaction with the Khoesan and the Tambookies was creating a shared sense of grievance between them.

In February 1848, Mtirara died. Despite his proximity to the missionary JC Warner, the Thembu *kumkani* followed his diviner's advice as he lay dying and accused his biological mother of poisoning him. His councillors directed her to be put to death. She would be stoned and burned in a ritual that would purge the evil she had brought upon the great house.[62] In the meantime, councillors to the great house decided that Chief Joyi would raise Mtirara's successor, Qeya (later Ngangelizwe), who was still a minor, on the Mbashe River. This meant that the great house would return to Thembuland. Nonesi remained on the frontier as its representative. An air of unease fell over the abaThembu as they faced another long period of regency and confronted the challenge of building cohesion across two regions with different imperatives.

Maphasa and the War of Mlanjeni

The wisdom of the decision to raise the Thembu heir far from the frontier was borne out when the amaNgqika and amaGcaleka took up arms against the

60 Theal, *History of South Africa: From the Foundation*, pp.314–315; G.C.M. Smith, *The Autobiography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith Bart, G.C.B.* Edited with the addition of some supplementary chapters by G.C. Moore Smith, M.A. With portraits and Illustrations. (London: John Murray, 1903), Chapter XLVIII; Price, *Making Empire*, fn.47, pp.187–188. Price points out that the argument that empire infantilised the colonised made by Fanon is often repeated while the infantilisation of the colonists themselves is overlooked.

61 GH 22/3 High Commissioner Miscellaneous Papers February to June 1848, E. M. Cole to Richard Southey, Secretary to High Commissioner, Shiloh, 17 April 1848, E. M. Cole to Richard Southey 21 May 1848. Fynn was sent to Pondoland to serve as agent to Chief Faku.

62 G.H. 22/3 Reports of Proceedings at the Tambookie Residence, Cole to Smith, beginning 25 March 1845.

Colony on 25 December 1850, precipitating the War of Mlanjeni, the Eighth Frontier War and the bloodiest of the frontier wars.

A fortnight later, aware that the belligerent chiefs were forming alliances with the Tambookies, WG Shepstone, curiously titled Commandant of Native Foreigners in the division of North Victoria, summoned the Thembu chiefs to Nonesi's place. He was instructed to secure their loyalty in the war. Nonesi gave her support but on Warner's advice removed herself to the Mbashe where chief Joyi might protect her. Nonesi could not speak for all 40 000 Tambookies on the frontier. Since the abaThembu were not under attack, each group was entitled to look to its own interests. The amaNdungwana, recently punished for raiding colonial and Mfengu cattle, pledged neutrality. Maphasa remained silent at the meeting but his followers made their sentiments known when they waylaid Shepstone on his way back to Whittlesea. A group of young fighters invoking Maphasa's war name shouted, '*Singa madodana ka Mahozi*!' (We are the special warriors of Maphasa). Rattled, Shepstone ordered his escort to attack. Opening fire, his amaGqunukwebe guards killed three of Maphasa's *amadodana* (young warriors) and wounded a fourth. Shepstone viewed this incident as Maphasa's declaration of war.[63] It may have been intended as such.

In the preceding weeks Maphasa had formed an alliance with the amaNgqika with whom he had family ties — Bawana's sister, Suthu, was the mother of Sandile, the Ngqika chief. Readying himself and his warriors for battle, he sent men to visit the prophet Mlanjeni so that they might report what the voices said and explain how his people would be protected against colonial bullets. He also forged an alliance with the Kat River Khoesan who were engaged in a militant rebellion at their settlement. This was a strategic move as the Kat River people had friends and allies among the Khoesan at Shiloh. They also had guns and made bullets cut from the legs of cast iron pots.

63 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1851 (635), Report from the Select Committee on the Kafir Tribes; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index, p.454. Nonesi returned to the Mbashe in February 1851. GH 22/3 High Commissioner Miscellaneous Papers February to June 1848, E.M. Cole to Richard Southey, Secretary to High Commissioner, Shiloh, 26 April 1848; R. Godlonton and E. Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War 1850–1852, II*, (London and Grahamstown: Pelham Richardson and Godlonton and White, 1851) p.194. Evidence of Sir Andries Stockenström 30 July 1951. Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War*, p.152.

They were reputed to be excellent marksmen. Maphasa recruited several hundred of these men to fight alongside his warriors.[64]

Figure 1.8: Mvulani Stompjes's cottage at Shiloh built in the 1830s. The walls and window shutters are pock-marked with bullet holes from 1852.

On 25 January 1851, with 1 500 to 2 000 men, most of them mounted and armed, Maphasa attacked Shiloh. It is not clear how many of the Kat River Khoesan men took part in this first battle, but the colonial forces reported that six men from Shiloh joined Maphasa and four others slipped out to take the news to the Kat River. The battle raged for two days. Hermanus Perl, one of the militants from Kat River, took over the Shiloh mission and its recently fortified buildings. Perl had command over all but 100 of the 479 abaThembu and 283 Khoesan residing at the mission. The police commandant at Whittlesea, Major Richard Tylden, was unable to hold back Maphasa's forces. On

64 R. Ross, 'Missions, Respectability and Civil Rights: The Cape Colony, 1828–1854', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 3 (Sept 1999), pp.333–345; T. Kirk, 'Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829–1854,' *Journal of African History*, 14, 13 (1973), pp.411–428; E. Elbourne, '"Race", Warfare and Religion in midnineteenth-century Southern Africa: the Khoikhoi rebellion against the Cape Colony and its uses, 1850–58', *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 13, 1 (June 2000), pp.17–42; Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War*, p.209. A.H. Duminy with L.J.G. Adcock (eds), *The Reminiscences of Richard Paver* Rhodes University Grahamstown series (Grahamstown: Rhodes University 1979), p.66.

30 January, the Moravians abandoned the station they had built up over 23 years. Mvulani, the Xhosa interpreter, lamented that 'Nobody came to say farewell to the teachers'. Filled with sorrow, they made their way 'through deserted landscapes towards the Orange River.'[65]

Major Tylden called for reinforcements.[66] Over the next fortnight a contingent of men under Chief Kama of the amaGqunukwebe and Mfengu levies from the Colony arrived to bolster colonial efforts. While they waited for munitions and supplies, the Mfengu and Gqunukwebe taunted the enemy, drawing them closer while preventing them from firing. Skirmishes occurred daily. Military hardware arrived on 9 February when the Cradock boers brought gunpowder, a cannon and 180 volunteers. Maphasa and his Khoesan allies suffered heavy losses as the boers pounded them. Intended to demoralise, the taunting became more aggressive. 'Why are you grovelling on the ground like dogs? What will you tell your women when you get home? Why don't you come up close to the walls like we did when we attacked Shiloh?' Towards the end of February, Tylden turned the cannon on the mission, pulverising the wall surrounding the church. Maphasa's men fled. Colonial forces moved in, removed the roof of the church, fortified the walls and sliced firing slits into the masonry. In the middle of March, six weeks after he first attacked the mission, Maphasa retreated to the Swart Kei, nursing a wounded leg. Tylden sent word to the missionaries that the battle of Shiloh was over.[67]

Angered by this defeat, Maphasa's brother, Kusi, joined a group of Kat River rebels in an attack on Goshen, the Moravian mission near the Windvogelberg, setting it alight and seizing cattle. Another band of Maphasa's followers set fire to the Wesleyan mission station at Lesseyton, near Shiloh. These incidents angered Maphasa who berated the attackers. There was no point fighting if there were no people to attack. 'We are fighting colonists, not buildings,' he scolded.[68]

65 Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War II*, pp.209–212, 149. According to missionary chronicler Bonatz, several British men antagonistic to the Moravians assisted Maphasa in his attack on Shiloh but this information does not surface in British accounts; Stompjes, Biography, p.92.

66 I. Mitford-Barberton, C.L.J., A.R.C.A., *Commandant Holden Bowker* (Cape Town and Pretoria: Human and Rousseau, 1970), pp.32–36.

67 Mitford-Barberton, *Commandant Holden Bowker*, p.34; van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work,' pp.36–44.

68 P. Moths, 'Heinrich Meyer — A stalwart of the Mission Field' in *Moravians in the Eastern Cape 1828–1928*, p.152; Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War II*, pp.265, 273. According to Mitford-Barberton, Maphasa had his kraal on the farm Zedegedeen; see Mitford-Barberton, *Commandant Holden Bowker*, p.33.

Figure 1.9: Henry Butler, ***Fingoes*** (amaMfengu) — *War Dress* 1835. Watercolour 7.5 x 9.5. Museum Africa, Johannesburg.

The battleground shifted to the Imvani and the Swart Kei. On 3 February, Tylden and his deputy, Field Commandant Bowker, mustered a force of 176 Gqunukwebe men, 176 amaMfengu, 25 Cradock burghers and a band of boers from Colesberg. They set out in pursuit of Maphasa. The first skirmish took place at the Bonkolo, where Kama's people drove some 3 000 of Maphasa's warriors into the mountains. Tylden reported 700 Khoesan with 'superior double barrel rifles' among Maphasa's forces.[69] On 13 April, Sarhili the Gcaleka chief arrived with reinforcements for Maphasa, posting his men on the mountain ridges of MacKay's Neck, an ascent of some 914 metres. From there the Gcaleka fighters attacked the colonial forces. But the colonists were forcing their way through to Maphasa's place on the Swart Kei. Tyopho, the amaGcina chief, came to Maphasa's support. On 15 April, Sarhili, Maphasa and Tyopho attacked from three sides and fought for some

69 Bowker is credited with the defence of Whittlesea as Tylden took command only after Maphasa had fled; see 'Minutes of Evidence, Committee on Mr T.H. Bowker's Memorial, Friday 14 May 1858,' Mitford-Barberton, *Commandant Holden Bowker*, pp.201–207; Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War II*, p.265.

12 hours in what became known as the Battle of Imvani. Sarhili lost 18 of his principal chiefs in the battle and was the first to capitulate. Maphasa and his men held out the longest, fleeing only when they were surprised in the rear by Tylden's boer volunteers.

The Battle of Imvani was a bloody affair. When the fighting stopped, 216 bodies lay on the hard ground. Guns and assegais bearing prophet Mlanjeni's blood-dipped charm-sticks lay strewn across the veld. Some 2 000 sheep and goats and 2 000 cattle were captured from Maphasa's stronghold and distributed among Tylden's Mfengu and Gqunukwebe allies. Defeat destroyed Sarhili's fighting spirit, but Maphasa's warriors did not give up. If their assegais were no match for the boers' gunpowder, they would avoid direct combat and recoup their losses by pillaging. In small bands, they ranged across the Swart Kei, Klaas Smits and Stormberg areas, raiding cattle as terrified burghers abandoned their farms. A few months later, Maphasa's fighters regrouped and in August they engaged Tylden in battle at Lukanji Mountain.[70]

Matters took a dramatic turn in January 1852 when Maphasa became ill. Vadana, his diviner, was called to point out who had brought this evil. Delisithazi, the chief's senior councillor was accused of poisoning the chief. The man allegedly held a grudge against Maphasa for not recognising his bravery in battle. Three other men were accused of being accomplices and put to death along with Delisithazi. This human sacrifice failed to save Maphasa's life and the chief died three days later.

Rumours of what went on before and after Maphasa's death circulated wildly among the colonists. An article in the press suggested Maphasa had died of a heart attack. The reporter claimed that while on his way to the Klaas Smits River to join an attack on Turvey's Post, Maphasa had complained of a violent pain in his chest and back and had collapsed and died. The Moravians got hold of a story that Maphasa's first wife was accused of causing the chief's death as she wanted her son to take over as chief. A young man in the employ of the Anglican missionaries reported that Yiliswa, Maphasa's great wife, believed that her co-wife had something to do with her husband's death. Other rumours held that Kusi, Maphasa's brother, was behind the accusations

70 Godlonton and Irving, *Narrative of the Kaffir War II*, pp.269–271; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.174; 'Report from Burghersdorp', *Grahamstown Journal*, 30 August 1851.

of poisoning.[71] Whatever the cause of his death, the amaTshatshu were wracked with pain and fear and in mourning.

Gungubele, son of Yiliswa, and heir to the chieftaincy, was only 10 or 11 years old when his father died. Yiliswa became regent for her son. Her people were at their lowest ebb. Some 10 months later, Sir George Cathcart exploited this weakness. Like Smith before him, he was determined to impose British control and reshape the landscape of the north-eastern frontier. On 22 November he announced that Maphasa's land was forfeited.

In Cathcart's documentation, Maphasa's land was 'an extensive tract of country', extending westward from the Great Kei River to the Klipplaat River with the Windvogelberg in the centre.[72] He informed the British Parliament as he justified its seizure:

> This country was considered to be allotted to the Tambookies of the tribe of Mapassa, but they have proved totally insufficient for its due occupation, and their participation in the rebellion, as well as this country having been made in parts a refuge for Gaika [Ngqika] cattle, are considerations which remove any claim there may have been to exclusive possession; and I am in hopes that a better arrangement may be made, now that an improved understanding with the Boers appears to have been so successfully brought about.[73]

Cathcart's justification for dispossessing the amaTshatshu was accepted by the British Parliament. Maphasa's former territory was to serve as a defensive cordon for the colony; amaTshatshu land would be parcelled out to young white men of 'strong character' who had served the Colony in the War of Mlanjeni 1850–1852. Both Dutch and English settlers would be considered for land grants.

71 Sir George Cathcart's claim that Maphasa was killed in the war is not borne out by other reports. Report of the Right Hon the Secretary of State for the Colonies, prepared, according to Earl Grey's instructions, by the Hon Lieut-General G. Cathcart; see Sir George Cathcart, Correspondence of Lieut-General the Hon, Sir George Cathcart, K.C.B. relative to his military operations in Kaffraria, until the termination of the Kafir war, and to his measures for the future maintenance of peace on that frontier and the protection and welfare of the people of South Africa Second Edition. (London, 1857). p.17; 'Death of Tambookie Chief Mapassa', *Grahamstown Journal*, 10 January 1852; E. van Calker, 'A Century of Moravian Mission Work', p.44; In 1857, the young Anglican catechist, Robert Mullins, wrote that he had quarrelled with Yiliswa over the brutal mistreatment of a woman she had accused of 'taking away her husband'. See B. Nicholls, N. Charton and M. Knowling, R. G. Knowling, Diary of Robert John Mullins, p.67; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.175.

72 See Figure 1.10. Spelling of the original has been retained except for Sandile and Maphasa.

73 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers. Cape of Good Hope, Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, and to the recent outbreak of the eastern frontier of the colony, (In continuation of papers presented to Parliament March 20, May 2, June 1851, and February 3, 1852), p.96. Evidence of Sir George Cathcart.

Clustered in groups on farms of approximately 1500 morgen, they were expected to maintain a firing weapon and muster to the call of colonial commanders in times of conflict. Quitrent title deeds stipulated that occupation was subject to rental payment and to beneficial use of the land. They were to construct a dwelling, erect fences and engage in productive farming. Queenstown, a new colonial town, was to be established on the banks of the Komani River, some 13 miles from the Swart Kei, where a magistrate would be located. Maphasa's land was laid out as three farms: Mapassa Kraal, Mapassa Leven and Mapassa Poort, and granted to Field Cornet Willem Christiaan Bouwer and his sons.[74]

Maphasa's people lost more than their land. Cathcart's proclamation declared that 'the name and independence of the tribe of Maphasa [would] cease' and the remnants of his 'almost annihilated' people would be 'dispersed among others'.[75] Proscribed in this way, Maphasa's people were to suffer the worst recrimination possible for their chief's resistance. Exploiting the chief's death and irked by British failure to draw him to their side and by his alliance with the Khoesan, Cathcart justified seizing his land. The British view that African politics was driven by revenge and self-gain clearly characterised their own behaviour.

The westerly Thembu are familiar with the main contours of this story of conquest and dispossession. They have listened to it in the poetry of the Thembu *ibongi*, the praise poet Yali-Manisi, and they have heard other renditions of this history. Scholars are often dismissive of the value of oral historical narrative as a source of critical inquiry. They point to a set of cliques at the core of this form of story-telling that limits the possibility of analysis. Information is liable to shift from one performance to another and the narrative typically combines praising and naming so that people remember little more than the heroes and villains, the courageous and the cowardly.

74 CPP 1/2/1/3 G33 Cape of Good Hope, Papers relative to the special Commissioner appointed in 1856 to inquire into the granting and occupation of farms in Queenstown and Victoria, Memorandum for Mr Cloete [M2] from M.R. Robinson Assistant Surveyor General, 23 November 1853. (Cape Town: Saul Solomon and Co, 1857), pp.45–46. See also Cape Archives, 1/QTN Queenstown Quitrent Register, July 1858–February 1899. Quitrent title for Mapassa's kraal was given to Johannes Lodevicus Bouwer in May 1854 and full title granted in February 1860. Willem Christiaan Bouwer received title for Mapassa Leven in 1859 and in 1879 took over Mapassa Poort from Willem Adriaan Goosen. Note: Mapassa is the colonial spelling.

75 Proclamation by His Excellency Lieutenant General the Hon George Cathcart Governor and Commander in Chief of the Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and of the Dependencies Thereof, Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, and her Majesty's High Commissioner for settling and adjustment of the Affairs of the territories in South Africa, adjacent and contiguous to the eastern and North-eastern Frontier of the said colony, &etc. in Cathcart Correspondence 1857, pp.239–240.



Figure 1.10: Maphasa's forfeited territory, 1852.

Copied, with some spelling changes, from Correspondence of Lieut. General the Hon Sir George Cathcart, K.C.B., relative to his military operations in Kaffraria until the termination of the Kafir War, and to his measures for the future maintenance of peace on that frontier, and the protection and welfare of the people of South Africa Second Edition (London: John Murray, 1857).

These critics bemoan the way oral narrative captures space and elides time in a loose rambling ballad shaped to suit immediate political purposes. Yet orality was the way that Africa constructed its past before colonial records provided a written source for the making of history; poetry, politics and power operated in combination to make and remake the past. Scholars open to this complexity have searched for traces of this mode of history-making in different contexts, past and present. They have highlighted the ways in which oral history is used to comment on society and to promote critical views.[76]

Phiko Velelo has crafted a poem that draws on this genre but which seeks to demonstrate that poetry can remain faithful to evidence, while at the same time drawing out emotion and intoning the ancestors. Read in conjunction with this chapter, the poet invites a more complex view of the past than is the convention in oral history while also bringing the reader into the excitement of an artistic performance. His poem follows the contours of a ballad that celebrates the westward migration of the abaThembu, lauds the chief's strategic ability and courage, identifies with the warriors' bravery and grieves at their terrible conquest. Written in the style of an oral narrative, it is an address to the ancestors, an appeal for their intervention in contemporary social and political struggles. It is deliberately evocative — one can almost smell the *impepho* (an aromatic grass used as incense) that might be burned on the occasion of its performance.

Bawana sikhumbule[77]

Camagu mhlekaz' omhle owawukumila kuhle
Ndakwalama ngelomphefumlo hayi ngelenyama
Sijong' inzala sibon' iinzwana neenzwakazi
Xa amanz'omlambo ecwengile iliso lawo lisulungekile
Vela nangephupha noko thina sakuxola

Ndikhumbula mhla ubambene noMadzikane phantsi-phezulu
Wakhal' uNgubengcuka ethi mbambe mzukulwana kaXhoba de ndifike
Wafika kunyembelekile umzimb'umanxeba-nxeba ngumkhonto weBhaca
Lathi lisiya kunina wab' umzi kaBhaca unyembezana
Kuba wayelele ngophoth'uMadzikan'esiya kooyisemkhulu

Yaqal' imbambano mhla kwabiw' amaxhoba
Iinto zikaGcaleka ezafika emva kwemfazwe zabanga

76 I. Hofmeyr, '*We Spend Our Years as a Tale That Is Told*', pp.3–9; G. Furniss and L. Gunner (eds), *Power, Marginality and African Oral Literatures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
77 Poem and translation by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo.

Zathi akukwaz'ukusimemel'ilize Ngubengcuka kaNdaba
Sifun'inxaxheba ukuze sigoduke ngoxolo hayi ngegazi
Waxakana nent'uNgubengcuka zimfun'egazini

Khawuta mfondini sel'uthatha iinkomo kumaTshatshu namaNdungwana
Wahamb'uKhawuta nomkhosi wakhe negquba leenkomo
Zasal'iinjengele zamaTshatshu namaNdungwana zisophisa
Zath'uNgubengcuka wondl'ooGcinumzi alambise ooXakathigaga
Zabe zon'iimfazwe zixhaphak'okwenkowane mhla ngendudumo

Wayiwela iNciba negqiza lakho ujong'eNtshonalanga
Azeka mzekwen'amaNdungwana namaGcina athi nathi siyalandela
Wasala nemath'uNgubengcuka kub'iMfecane yayingekapheli
Ethi nindishiya nabanina nto zikabawo ndithembe nina nje?
Nath'amaGcaleka akhona ayakukuhlangula mhla ngogayi

Wafika kuLukhantshi wabangisana naBathwa nooNoqhakancu
Nathi nibagwaza ngemikhonto babe benincuntsa ngeentolo
Yaba ngunomji kungekho igob'uphondo de kwafik'amaNgesi
Ayithakazelel'imbambano kub'efumen'ithuba lokuni thelekisa
Wahle wayiqond'ingozi walinik'izingel'iinyamakazi wasal'umhlaba

Nawubanga nawufumana ngegazi nangeenkomo
Kusuka kwiintaba zeNkonkobe ukuya kuthi xha ngoNontongwana
Kusukela kumlambo iCacadu neNciba ukuya kuthi ga ngeNxuba ne Gqili
Kulapho unyan'akh'uMaphasa waswantsulisana noMokoena noMogorosi
Wabuya mhla wawoselwa ngomkhonto kaBatsha into yakwaGcina

Kwathi kanti yindlela yokuthath'umthwalo wakho ugoduke
Wababik'eloo Mvangxeni, noXhoba, uTukwa noMawose
Wath'inzala yenu ndiyishiye nomhlaba ophangaleleyo
Ungabulindelang'ubuzaza bosiba lukaGeorge Cathcart
Awu! Wemk'umhlaba wamaTshatsh' ilanga lihlab' umhlaba

Mandikushiye mntwan'oMhle ndiyathemb'uMahozi wakwazisa
Uzungulichel'uJoji wawuthabatha mhla kwawa uMahozi injengel'uqobo
Wawuhlutha ngesibhengezo hayi ngokomthetho ophandiweyo waqulunqwa
Yaba ngath'uYiliswa nosapho bafikelwe ngamaxhwili nezilwangangubo
Bathi saa abantwana bakho okwamantshontsho efikelwe ngukhetsha

Awu! Elinxeba lisenobuzaza kunanamhla alikapholi
Ndeee-ee-e! ngxwayi-ngxwayi-tyibilili!

Remember us, Bawana

We salute you, great man of royal stature
We can recognise you spiritually not physically
From your progeny we discern your beauty
The river source determines the water quality
Come to us in our dreams to appease us

We will not forget your confrontation with Madzikane
Be resilient, grandson of Xhoba, exclaimed Ngubengcuka
On his arrival you were already fatally wounded
By sunset the Bhaca people were in mourning
Madzikane had suddenly joined his ancestors

Trouble occurred over the division of spoils of war
The Gcaleka warriors demanded their share
War created the expectation of Ngubengcuka sharing out the spoils evenly
There was no need for allies who did not fight to receive a reward
This put Ngubengcuka in a quandary

He told Khawuta to take from the Tshatshu's and Ndungwana's share
Khawuta's warriors went home with lots of cattle
Leaving the Tshatshu and Ndungwana warriors devastated
Ngubengcuka had compensated loafers instead of fighters
Confrontational attacks were becoming a common occurrence

You crossed the Kei River with a large following heading west
Ndungwana and Gcina groups wasted no time in following
Ngubengcuka had to deal with Mfecane conflicts with fewer fighters
His strong and trusted warriors had left him in the lurch
He would have to rely on Gcaleka support in times of war

Arriving at Hangklip you confronted the Khoesan people
Battles were fought—spears and shields against bows and arrows
Fighting continued until the arrival of the British
Colonists exploited the unrest for their greedy objectives
Realising the bigger danger, you reconciled with the Khoesan

With your blood and cattle, you secured the land
From the Stormberg mountains to the Winterberg mountains
From the Cacadu and Nciba rivers, to the Fish and Orange rivers
That is where your son, Maphasa, fought with Mokoena and Mogorosi
He came back after Batsha of amaGcina stabbed you with a spear

Batsha sent you on your way to join your ancestors
You reported to Mvangxeni, Xhoba, Tukwa and Mawose
Saying you had left their children with a big piece of land
Not anticipating the damage to be caused by Cathcart's pen
Oh! The land of amaTshatshu was snatched in broad daylight

Rest in peace my chief, Mahozi has given you all details
George Cathcart took the land on the demise of Mahozi
By proclamation without an act of parliament, the land was taken
It was an unforgettable and devastating day for Yiliswa and her family
Your children were dispersed like chickens attacked by a hawk

Oh! This wound has not healed; it still suppurates today
I rest my case!

This chapter began with Chief Bawana's westward move across the Tsomo tributary of the Great Kei with some 3 000 followers opening up Tambookieland as a western frontier for the abaThembu. Bawana and Maphasa did not seek more autonomy than was accorded any other Thembu chiefdom; nor did they establish a centre of power that challenged the authority of the *kumkani*. Rather, they served the abaThembu as senior chiefs, closest to the great house. In the new territory, Maphasa collected rent from boers in the name of the *kumkani* and the British recognised Maphasa as the most senior of the westerly chiefs only while the great house was in Thembuland. While other Thembu groups in this territory made the most of opportunities for rustling cattle and fomenting disputes, they too showed allegiance to the great house. In this respect, Tambookieland was an extension of Thembuland.

Tambookieland was also a frontier of British colonialism. Between 1828 and 1852, British interventions shifted repeatedly. Beginning with minor policing activity on the northern border of the Colony, the British attempted annexation of large tracts of Tambookieland. Compelled to rescind annexation, they introduced a diplomatic treaty system before embarking on conquest and colonial settlement. For the amaTshatshu and other Tambookie, this unstable and increasingly threatening strategy generated distrust and exacerbated internal violence. Insecurity and volatility were also due to the judgmental and self-righteous stance of the Moravian missionaries. Ultimately, the defeat of Maphasa would not have been possible on this frontier without the willingness of amaMfengu and amaGqunukwebe to fight on behalf of the colonists. Their readiness to do so had little to do with the abaThembu and much to do with displacements in the wake of the *mfecane* movement in the east, and with relationships in the Colony south of the Amathole mountains. This was a tumultuous time across the wider region.

The defeat of Maphasa's warriors at the Battle of Imvani, their forced removal from the Swart Kei and the proscription of the chieftaincy were decisive moments in the conquest of the amaTshatshu. Yet, despite their devastating effect, they do not conclude the process of conquest. That is yet to come. In the next chapter, we follow Yiliswa, her son, Gungubele, and their surviving followers as they trekked from Maphasa's stronghold in the Swart Kei valley to the Tambookie location where they were placed under a colonial superintendent.

CHAPTER 2

The Tambookie location and the destruction of chiefly authority

In December 1852, the Maphasa valley gleamed in the sunshine. Good rain had nourished the sweet grasses of the high ground and a canopy of thorn trees softened the rusty-brown iron stone that covered the mountain slopes. Grazing was particularly rich along the banks of the Klaas Smits River which flowed strongly from its confluence with the Swart Kei further up the valley from where Maphasa had his great place. The harsh, dry landscape of winter had given way to lush green after the first rains. But the summer was not to be enjoyed by Maphasa's widow and her people. Following the governor's edict, they were to vacate this territory. A few hundred people would accompany Yiliswa to the Tambookie location, some 30 kilometres east while the bulk of her people scattered in search of friendly chiefs to whom they might attach themselves.

Yiliswa, together with her followers and their cattle, trekked along the Swart Kei in a southerly direction to where the river allowed them to make a crossing before they turned eastwards to the Tambookie location. This bounded colonial space ran north for 113 kilometres from the confluence of the Swart Kei and White Kei (Cacadu) rivers and along Bram Nek to the Stormberg in the north, stretching about 48 kilometres from east to west. The Cacadu or White Kei River formed the boundary in the west and the Indwe River did so in the east. The location was intended to contain what colonists dubbed the 'Tambookie menace' — the abaThembu resistance to colonial advance on the north-eastern frontier. West of the Great Kei, the Mfengu and Gqunukwebe Xhosa, who were allies of the colonists, lived in less tightly supervised environments. By segregating and confining African people into rural locations, the British effectively closed the north-eastern frontier.[1]

1 A.K. Mager, 'Colonial Conquest and the Tambookie frontier: The story of Maphasa, c.1830–1853', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 2 (June 2013), pp.251–270; CO 2940 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Tambookie Agent, 1857–1848, CCP 1/2/1/5 G.6–'57. Report of the Government Agent with the Tambookies relative to a proposal to grant Annual Stipends from the Public Revenue to certain well-disposed Chiefs of that Tribe E.J.C. Wagenaar, *A Forgotten Frontier Zone — Settlements and Reactions in the Stormberg area between 1820–60*, Archives Year Book for South African History 45, 2, (1982), pp.171–174.



Figure 2.1: Tambookie location (est. 1852) and Emigrant Thembuland (est. 1865).

In the Tambookie location, the abaThembu were placed firmly under colonial control. JC Warner, the former Wesleyan missionary, was in charge of the Tambookie location. As superintendent, Warner sub-divided the location into sections where each of the four Thembu groups — the amaTshatshu, amaNdungwana, amaHala and amaGcina — resided under their chiefs. A pragmatist, Warner understood that the practicalities of supervision required he ignore Cathcart's proclamation for the time being. He would recognise Yiliswa as chief of the amaTshatshu. This did not mean that he was upholding the Tshatshu hereditary line that Cathcart's proclamation had expressly forbidden.

The matter of chiefly succession would be dealt with in due course by the magistrate in Queenstown. Yiliswa and her people settled in the southernmost corner on a plateau above the Gwatyu Stream. It was a secure spot, shielded by the impenetrable Theeberg Mountain to the south which separated the rugged location from the Bontebok flats. Immediately adjacent to Yiliswa was chief Ndarala of the amaNdungwana. Beyond him were the amaGcina. On the Imvani River in the Hala section lived Nonesi, representative of the Thembu great house and the most senior of the Thembu chiefs.[2] Close to the great place was Warner's residence. A census of the location taken in early 1857 recorded a population of under 16 000 people — 3 275 men, 4 487 women and 8 081 children.[3] That women outnumbered men was not unusual where young men were at risk of dying in battle. The losses of the amaTshatshu in the War of Mlanjeni were extensive. Life expectancy was limited and polygamy helped to ensure the rapid reproduction of society.

Living in a colonial location was a form of confinement. There was no freedom to move beyond the boundaries of the demarcated area and rules for behaviour were prescribed by the superintendent. The inhabitants, including chiefs, councillors and followers, became subjects of a colonial experiment intended to introduce a new lifestyle. People lived in close proximity in a manner to which they were wholly unaccustomed; they and their livestock were subject to a census and their movements were known by everyone. Missionaries and traders were dotted about. From time to time a boer farmer in search of additional labour would ask the location superintendent to assign him a temporary worker. The superintendent employed advisers who brought

2 For abaThembu genealogy, see Appendix 7; for abaThembu history see E.G. Sihele, Counsellor of the Thembu King of Roda, translated by N. C. Thisani, 'Who are the AbaThembu and where do they come from?' (Rhodes University, Cory Library, unpublished manuscript), n.d. The *kumkani* was vested in the descendants of Ngubengcuka, the great amaHala chief of the abaThembu. All abaThembu owed allegiance to the *kumkani*. In the 1850s, Qeya (Ngangelizwe), son of the late Mtirara, who was the son of Ngubengcuka, was growing up near the Mbashe River in Thembuland proper under Chief Joyi, Mtirara's brother, far from the troubled frontier. While Nonesi had no children of her own she had raised Mtirara and served as regent for him and after his untimely death, for his successor, Qeya (Ngangelizwe); 'Gwatyu', a battle song, was probably first used in the Eighth Frontier War. It appears in written accounts at this time and by the 1860s is identified on colonial maps as a tributary of the Swart Kei River, demarcating an area between the Imvani River and the confluence of the Swart and White Kei rivers.

3 CO 2940 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Tambookie Agent, 1857–1858, J.C. Warner to Richard Southey, resident secretary King William's Town, 27 February 1857; CCP 1/2/1/5 G.6–'57 Report of the Government Agent with the Tambookies, Census of the Tambookies inhabiting the Tambookie location, Division of Queenstown, December 1857. The next largest group were the amaHala with 1 522 men and 2 158 women; the amaNdungwana who were scattered after the cattle killing numbered a mere 189 men and 263 women.

him daily news and information about what people were doing. With this knowledge, he imposed control and directed activity pertaining to farming, social conduct and leisure. His objectives were to curb chiefs' powers, wean the people away from their chiefs and introduce western approaches to work and property. While some settled down more easily than others, residing in the Tambookie location was a punishment for all its residents; they yearned for their independence and the openness of the territory that they had been compelled to cede to the colonists.

Old tensions between the chiefs continued to simmer. Confinement in the location was particularly hard for the older chiefs — Qwesha, the Ndungwana chief who had earlier quarrelled with Maphasa and had fought in the War of Mlanjeni bitterly resented being subordinated to his son Ndarala; and chief Fadana chafed at his confinement in Nonesi's section. Yiliswa was in a strong position. She had survived the smelling out of Vadana, the diviner, after her husband's death, gained the respect of her late husband's councillors and enjoyed a substantial following. Unlike the amaHala, Yiliswa's people were not mixed up with the amaGcina and other clans.[4] Nonesi and Yiliswa, the two women, were the most senior chiefs in the Tambookie location.

While the colonial authorities did not recognise the status of the amaTshatshu, the missionaries and the superintendent of the Tambookie location acknowledged the status of both women as akin to that of a queen. Nonesi was queen of the abaThembu and Yiliswa was queen, not simply of the amaTshatshu, but of the Tambookies or westerly Thembu. The naming of Yiliswa as queen of the Tambookies, rather than umTshatshu, was a way of getting round the proscription of her husband's name but also of recognising her seniority among the westerly abaThembu. Both women were widows of great Thembu chiefs and were appointed to serve as regents whose duty was to hold the reins of power for the heir to the chieftaincy. They were expected to look after the affairs of the people while the heir was growing up. In most instances, the regent also raised the heir and prepared him for leadership. Like the chief, the regent did not take decisions on her own but acted on the advice of chiefly councillors, the *amaphakati* who were comprised of senior men, many of whom had served the late chief. Their role required that they

4 Yiliswa was still caught up with this issue five years on; B. Nicholls, N. Charton, M. Knowling (eds), *The Diary of Robert John Mullins 1883–1913* [annotated version] (Rhodes University, Department of History, 1998), p 57; 'Death of Tambookie Chief Mapassa', *Grahamstown Journal* 10 January 1852, University of Cape Town Special Collections, BC500 Papers of Edward Judge; Letter to Colonial Secretary 17 July 1870.

ensure the reproduction of the patriarchal order. They were not free to embrace the missionary discourse relating to mutually respectful relationships between women and men. Rather, they were bound to protect the chiefly system that they served as regents. Unlike Mvulani, the Moravian missionary, they could not and did not embrace the missionary worldview wholeheartedly. Advised by male councillors, the Thembu queens worked to achieve a power-driven consensus among them to ensure the support of their followers. [5]

Nonesi's councillors were geographically split between the Mbashe and Imvani settlements. After Mtirara's untimely death, Nonesi served as a proxy for the great house among the westerly abaThembu. Geographical separation provided her with significant autonomy and precipitated a reliance on her missionary, a relationship that also created difficulties. As a white colonial official, Warner's voice was not only external to the *amaphakati* but on some matters, transcended them, generating resentment among some of her people. This tension was fuelled by the perception that Nonesi was too loyal to the British. Certainly, the British indulged her, but they did so with some amusement. Sir George Cathcart's reports are laced with racial and gendered othering. On one occasion, he reported giving her a colourful poncho and commented that Nonesi 'put it on' immediately and 'no doubt rode home with satisfaction to her kraal'. He also mistakenly believed that Nonesi was Mtirara's biological mother and that as a 'Pondo princess' she was descended from the white woman who had survived shipwreck on the Mpondoland coast.[6]

Senior in age and in lineage to Yiliswa, Nonesi was also more experienced as a regent. Yiliswa respected her but kept a careful distance. Her late husband's councillors believed that Nonesi's closeness to Warner had played a part in weakening efforts to galvanise Thembu resistance to colonial advance. Yiliswa avoided being drawn into a close relationship with Nonesi and Warner. At the same time, she recognised that using a missionary adviser might be strategic. The challenges of the Tambookie location were dramatically different from those on the open frontier. She observed how Nonesi consulted Warner and that Ndarala was in touch with the Anglican missionaries at St Marks. Yiliswa did not want to find herself at a disadvantage.

5 Women did not constitute a homogenous grouping and status mattered. For differentiation among women in African societies, see J. Weir, 'Chiefly women and women's leadership in pre-colonial southern Africa' in Nomboniso Gasa (ed), *Women in South African History* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007), pp.3–19.

6 Cathcart Correspondence, Extract from private letter Grahamstown 11 November 1853, pp. 372–374.

Yiliswa and her people on the Gwatyu Stream in the Tambookie location

Within a year of settling on the Gwatyu Stream in the southern part of the Tambookie location, Yiliswa sent messengers to Maphasa's nemesis, the Shiloh Moravians. Remembering that Maphasa had a stormy relationship with the Moravians, Yiliswa hoped that she might be able to start again. On her invitation, Brother Heinrich Meyer and a group of Thembu converts at Shiloh saddled their horses and rode over to the Gwatyu, some 80 kilometres south east. They followed the Komani River where the foundations of the new settler town of Queenstown were being laid. Crossing over the Bolotwa River, they passed Nonesi's place on the left. As they headed towards the Gwatyu, they encountered a band of armed amaGcaleka returning from a bruising fight with the amaTshatshu. Meyer commented wryly that little had changed. Yiliswa accommodated her visitors in the homestead of her sister-in-law, the widow of Maphasa's brother Kusi. Meyer recognised him as the man who had burned down the mission house at Goshen and had made off with their cattle. Kusi was also suspected of masterminding the smelling out of those put to death for allegedly causing Maphasa's illness. He was not a man whom Meyer admired. But this kind of edgy engagement was what the frontier was all about for the missionary. His visit presented an opportunity to preach to the unconverted and he was grateful when Yiliswa at least attempted to quieten the rowdy crowd with shouts of '*Thulani!*' (Be quiet!) as he spoke. Meyer forwarded Yiliswa's request to the Moravian headquarters in Germany but received no reply. He was unable to develop a Moravian mission station on the Gwatyu.[7] Perhaps his superiors were not as forgiving of the destruction wrought on the Moravians in the War of Mlanjeni.

Yiliswa turned to the Anglicans. St Marks was a mere 19 kilometres distance and the Reverend HT Waters saw in her request an opportunity to extend his mission beyond the amaGcaleka to the abaThembu. Also, his notes suggest that he was flattered by her approach. 'I have had a very interesting interview with Yiliswa, the queen of the Tambookies', he wrote. 'She has a numerous tribe crammed up between the Swart Kei and the White Kei rivers. There are twenty or thirty kraals close around her own place and she is willing

7 P. Moths, 'Heinrich Meyer — A Stalwart in the Mission Field' in Baudert (transl) and Keegan (ed), *Moravians in the Eastern Cape 1828–1928*, pp.152–4. Wagenaar, *Forgotten frontier*, p.175; Instead, the Moravians rebuilt their station at Goshen beyond the boundary of the Tambookie location.

for the missionary to live close by her.' Yiliswa made a good impression on him. 'She came over here yesterday (Sunday) and attended evening service. She was dressed in European costume and rode a good horse. I have promised to preach at her kraal once a month until further notice.' But, he noted, there were logistical challenges. 'Her place at present is not approachable by waggon so far as I can make out.'[8] He would have to rely on horseback until a road was built.

Fortuitously, a young catechist, Robert John Mullins, had recently arrived from England, so Waters sent him over the river to Yiliswa's place with instructions to build a wagon road and a satellite station. Mullins, then 17 years old, had spent a few months with Chief Ndarala, who was keen to hold on to him, but Waters recognised the strategic importance of the amaTshatshu, a more senior lineage than the amaNdungwana. The late chief Maphasa had been highly influential on the frontier and the Anglicans preferred to establish an arrangement with his people. Duly dispatched to the Gwatyu, Mullins met Yiliswa on her way back from Wilson's trading store where she had been shopping. Striding ahead in a kaross and red blanket, the queen led him to her great place where she changed into western dress before sitting down to converse with the young missionary.[9]

Within a few months Mullins had seen to the building of the infrastructure of St Peter's on the Gwatyu, an outstation of St Marks, comprising a chapel and a boarding school. Yiliswa, Vezi and Ndarala, among others, attended regular church services and reportedly enjoyed the singing. Mullins's great strength was his musicality — he had been a chorister at New College in Oxford before his voice broke. When the school was ready to take in pupils, Mullins approached Yiliswa to enrol her own children as an example to her followers. Initially apprehensive, she relented and sent two of her children, Manati, and his little sister, Nonestita. Mullins was pleased and wrote in his diary, 'So, my first boarders were the Queen's children!' He observed that Manati was a 'very promising lad', a good leader who 'kept the other boys in order'. Little Nonestita found it more difficult to cope with boarding school and was reportedly often homesick. Chief Vezi, one of Yiliswa's *amaphakati*, was very supportive, encouraging those in her section to attend the school at St Peter's and those further away to attend

8 USPG Archive, Rhodes House, Oxford C/AFS/5 Grahamstown 1836–1907 Copy of letters from Reverend H T Waters, Principal of St Marks Church Mission Station, Kreli's Country, to the Lord Bishop of Grahamstown 1855.

9 *King William's Town Gazette*, 2 October 1858; Nicholls, Charton and Knowling, *Diary of Robert John Mullins*, p.34.

the weekly sessions held at one of the other homesteads. Yiliswa's councillors were not uniformly enthusiastic about missionary schooling. Mullins named Chief Vezi, the next in power to Yiliswa; Chief Micki; and the young Chief Faku as the strongest supporters of St Peter's. Yiliswa herself attended daily services at the chapel. All had sons at the boarding school. Vezi's son was 'the most gentlemanly' young man Mullins had ever seen and Faku's son, Loleba, was captain of the school. In January 1858, Mullins reported that 10 men, including the local teacher, 8 women and 13 children lived at St Peter's, with 9 more children in the boarding school.[10] Gungubele, Maphasa's heir, now 14 years old, remained under the tutelage of the amaTshatshu elders.

Social life in the location as in the wider frontier zone cohered around the value of cattle as power and prestige; cattle accumulation through feuding could still augment a chief's following. Daily routine for the men was punctuated by tasks related to cattle. Brother Bonatz, the Moravian priest, described this routine at the Shiloh mission station:

> At sunrise they creep out of their round huts, each with a round milking basket in his hand, skilfully manufactured by the women, and hasten to the cattle kraal. Everyone pays the greatest attention to his cows, and endeavours to obtain from them as much milk as possible. He, therefore, while milking, whistles or sings to them all kinds of songs, in which he tells them many stories and makes many promises … As soon as a cow is milked, her calf is called by name out of the calf-kraal, upon which it immediately comes, to get its share of the mother's milk. Many cows seem to provide faithfully for their offspring, giving but little when milked, and keeping back nearly the whole for the calf.

Boys were socialised in relation to cattle; they were taught the social value of cattle and assigned duties pertaining to cattle. In the afternoon, while men shared news and prepared their weapons (a third of the men in the Tambookie location had guns as well as assegais) in 'readiness for fighting whenever called upon by their chiefs', boys were sent to look after cattle. 'They are permitted at these times to exercise themselves in riding upon the oxen', wrote Brother Bonatz, 'and to drive the cattle rapidly before them.

10 Nonesi served as regent while Mtirara's son, Ngangelizwe, remained a minor. Ngangelizwe came of age in 1859 but Nonesi remained an influential leader in the region; C/AFS/ Grahamstown 1836–1907 Report of R J Mullins, St Peter's Mission, Gwatyu, Branch Station of St Marks, 15 January 1858; It is possible that Manati was later baptised as Peter. Nicholls, Charton and Knowling, *Diary of Robert John Mullins*, pp.40–41.

The object hereof is probably to accustom both to a hasty flight in the event of a hostile attack.'[11]

Confinement in the location did not signal the end of cattle raiding as the colonial authorities had hoped. Warner confirmed: 'The Tambookies steal a great deal, but they apprehend a great many thieves, and recover a great deal of stolen property in the course of the year.' The more serious problem in his view was that those suspected of cattle theft were punished threefold: by farmers who flogged them, chiefs who fined them and magistrates who imprisoned them. This layering of punishment, Warner advised, was generating resentment rather than curbing raiding.[12]

Cattle rustling served, inter alia, as a means of sustaining the practice of polygamy which underpinned the gender division of labour. Warner reported that while most men had two wives, the 'well-to-do' preferred 'three or four'. Wives shared the burdens of growing crops, and preparing food and drink for the homestead. But technology was slowly changing the nature of work. Metal hoes, spades, picks and ploughs — bought at one of the white trading stores that sprang up in the location — meant women no longer needed to plough 'on their knees, with wooden spades'. Warner reported that some households were beginning to farm comprehensively, with men working alongside women, ploughing between 2.5 and 5 hectares, and planting maize and wheat. Homesteads close to the river used watercourses to irrigate their lands and a few had small gardens with fruit trees. There was no shortage of expertise.

Even white settlers recognised that African farming skills were superior to those of European agricultural labourers. A field cornet in the Queenstown district admitted that Europeans could 'in all probability, perform some two or three things very well — plough, dig, or thatch, perhaps, and may be possessed of other accomplishments never required in Africa.' However, 'you will find natives almost as handy as Europeans in these matters, and who, one and all, can do a dozen things, essentially requisite in African farming, which the average European cannot do at all.'

11 A. Bonatz, 'Description of the Mission-Settlement at Shiloh, in the country of the Tambookies; with some account of the Manners, Customs etc of the neighbouring Tribes', *Periodical Accounts* relating to the Missions of the Church of the United Brethren established among the Heathen, Vol XIII London (1834), pp.351–352.

12 CCP 3/1/2/1/10 G 682 E2 Cape of Good Hope, Proceedings and Evidence taken by Commission on Native Affairs (Grahamstown: Godlonton and Richards, 1865) Hereafter, 1865 Commission on Native Affairs. Interview with Mr J C Warner, 11 February 1865, pp.70–79; A.N. Ella, Field Cornet to Commission on Native Affairs, p.38.

Indeed, white farmers were dependent on African skills and even 'their most determined detractor would be puzzled to say what he would do without them'.[13] Some residents of the location were in regular employment on white farms in the Queenstown district. Long-term workers were able to accumulate cattle and raise them on these farms. Casual workers were also sought after by the farmers who required extra hands in the fields or in construction.

From shopping at the store to burying their dead, people were selective about the cultural practices they preferred to adopt. Tobacco and snuff were more popular than tea, coffee or sugar as items of consumption. New ideas about death and burial were taken up unevenly. In the 1840s, the missionaries at Shiloh reported that the abaThembu refused to bury their dead out of fear that evil would befall them. Rather than handle a corpse, they hired Khoesan residents 'at the expense of a cow, to perform the interment'. A few years later, in 1865, Warner reported that 'the custom of exposing the aged and dying did not prevail to any extent and the Tambookies generally bury their dead'.[14] At the same time, most people in the location preferred 'go[ing] about naked' to wearing western dress.

For the male elders, defending patriarchy and primogeniture (the rule that inheritance follows a line, starting with the eldest male) as the foundation of identity and culture was an essential part of their social responsibility; this was as important as going to war. This foundational principle of the Thembu patriarchal order was not taught in the missionary school. Rather, the missionaries tried to inculcate a less aggressive attitude to women, discouraging the beating of wives and allowing daughters who objected to arranged marriages to seek the protection of colonial law. African men did not know what to make of these strange ideas about gender relations and feared that greater autonomy for women would upset the foundations of their society. Waters liked to repeat a conversation he overheard between two African men:

> Now that the missionary is coming, we must not beat our wives with sticks!
>
> Well, well, what shall we do now if our wives will not bring wood? Truly our wives will have all their own way if we may scold only for they will not hear.

13 Interview with Warner, pp.72–80; Bonatz, 'Description of the Mission-Settlement', p.35; Ella to Commission on Native Affairs, 1865, p.38. Ploughs became sought after as they helped to increase yields. The colonial authorities also liked the shift in the gender division of labour brought about by the technology. As men tended to handle the cattle-drawn ploughs, they took a more active role in agricultural production at the same time as relieving the burden on women. Extract from Freeman, *A Tour in South Africa* in Ross, *These Oppressions Won't Cease*, p.101

14 Interview with Warner, pp.78–80; Bonatz, 'Description of the Mission-Settlement', pp.402–405.

News of the new colonial law that allowed for a man to be imprisoned for six months for beating his wife was reputedly greeted with 'roars of unbelieving laughter'. In practice, it was extremely difficult for the missionaries to impose their views. Reforming the gender order of African society would remain a long-term missionary goal. Unlike the Moravian Mvulani, neither Nonesi nor Yiliswa appeared to show any interest in confronting the patriarchal order or the behaviour of men. They were both great wives of polygamous households; all other women were minors. They followed the rule that it was up to male guardians to bring complaints involving women to the chief's court. Councillors would assist the chief in hearing matters and ensure that appropriate damages were awarded. In the patriarchal society of which they were leaders, this was the system for deterring the excesses of violent male behaviour.[15]

The Tambookie location during the great famine and cattle-killing episode 1856–1857

By the autumn of 1857, a crisis was looming for inhabitants of the Tambookie location. The millenarian prophecy of a young girl, Nongqawuse, and her uncle, Mhlakaza, was spreading across the Tambookie location in 'a wave of fanaticism', wrote Reverend Waters. Mhlakaza had worked for a time in the employ of the Anglican bishop in Grahamstown. His niece, Nongqawuse, claimed to be able to hear voices prophesying that on an appointed day the ancestors would arise from the dead, drive out the whites and bring forth cattle in abundance from the bowels of the earth. The people should purge themselves in readiness for this day by killing their cattle.[16] Among the chiefs, Sarhili of the amaGcaleka, who lived a short distance from the Tambookie location, was the principal believer.

15 C.F. Pascoe, Keeper of Records, *Two Hundred Years of the SPG: An historical account of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 1701–1900* (London: NSPG Office, 1910), p.309; For Mvulani, see chapter 1; see also T.W. Bennett, *Customary Law in South Africa* (Cape Town: Juta, 2012), pp.250–4; A.K. Mager, *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan: A Social History of the Ciskei, 1945–1959* (Portsmouth NH, Oxford, Cape Town: Heinemann, 1999), pp.101–7.

16 C/AFS/ Grahamstown 1836–1907 Report of W T Waters, St Marks, 6 October 1857. The literature on the great cattle-killing episode, and the famine that followed it, is extensive. J.B. Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856–7* (Johannesburg, Bloomington, London: Ravan Press, Indiana University Press, James Currey, 1989); Peires, 'Nxele, Ntsikana and the Origins of the Xhosa Religious Reaction', *Journal of African History*, 20, 1 (1979), pp.51–61; Peires, 'Sir George Grey versus the Kaffir Relief Committee', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 10, 2 (1984), pp.145–169; Peires, 'The late great plot: the official delusion concerning the Xhosa Cattle Killing 1856–1857', *History in Africa*, 12 (1985), pp.253–279; Peires, '"Soft" Believers and "Hard" Unbelievers in the Xhosa Cattle Killing', *Journal of African History*, 27, 3 (1986),

For him, as for other believers, the deliverance promised by the prophecy was a reversal of conquest.

Several of Yiliswa's councillors visited Sarhili and began to spread the word among her followers. It was only six or seven years since her people had been defeated in Mlanjeni's war and the prophesies ignited hope that they might yet regain their freedom. The missionaries at St Marks and St Peter's tried to dissuade them, appalled by the chaos brought on by the 'believers'. In the words of the exasperated location superintendent, Sarhili's amaGcaleka, having slaughtered their own cattle, began to 'fatten themselves' on Tambookie cattle. 'Scarcely a night' went by when 'Gcaleka marauders' did not make off with Tambookie cattle, he lamented.[17] Two of Yiliswa's councillors were killed in one such raid. Qwesha, her late husband's erstwhile neighbour, was a staunch believer and sent his men on nightly raiding sorties.

Making matters worse for Yiliswa, her *amaphakati* were increasingly divided. Anxious to ensure that unbelievers did not cause the prophecy to fail,

pp.443–461; Peires, 'The Central Beliefs of the Xhosa Cattle Killing', *Journal of African History*, 28, 1 (1987), pp.43–63; Peires, 'Suicide or Genocide? Xhosa perceptions of the Nongqawuse catastrophe', *Radical History Review*, 46, 7 (1990), pp.47–57; J. Zarwan, 'The Xhosa Cattle Killings 1856–7 (le massacre du bétail chez les Xhosa, 1856–1857)', *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* (1976); J. Guy, 'A Landmark, not a Breakthrough', *South African Historical Journal* 23, 1 (1991), pp.227–231; L. Mpande, 'Cattle Killing as Resistance: the Dead Will Arise Reconsidered', *Research in African Literatures* 22, 3 (1991), pp.171–181; G.T. Sirayi, 'The African perspective of the 1856/1857 cattle killing movement', *South African Journal of African Languages*, 11, 1 (1991), pp.40–45; A. Ashforth, 'The Xhosa Cattle Killing and the Politics of Memory,' *Sociological Forum* 6, 3 (1991), pp.581–567; J. Lewis, 'Materialism and Idealism in the Historiography of the Xhosa Cattle Killing Movement 1856–7', *South African Historical Journal* 25, 1 (1991), pp.244–268; T.J. Stapleton, '"They no longer care for their chiefs": Another look at the Xhosa cattle killing of 1856–1857,' *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 24, 2 (1991), pp.383–392; Stapleton, 'Reluctant slaughter: Rethinking Maqoma's role in the Xhosa cattle killing (1853–1857)', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 26, 2 (1993), pp.345–369; C. Crais, *The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape 1770–1865: White Supremacy and Black resistance in Pre-industrial South Africa* (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1992), pp. 204–210; H. Bradford, 'Women, gender and colonialism: Rethinking the history of the British Cape Colony and its frontier zones c.1806–70', *Journal of African History* 37, 3 (1996), pp.351–370; H. Bradford, '"*Akukho Ntaka Inokubhabha Ngephiko Elinye*" (No Bird Can Fly on One Wing): The "Cattle-Killing Delusion" and Black Intellectuals, c1850-1910', *African Studies 67*, 2 Special Issue: The Xhosa Cattle Killing (2006), pp.209–232; B. Carton, 'The forgotten compass of death; apocalypse then and now in the social history of South Africa', *Journal of Social History*, 37, 1 (2003), pp.199–218; S.B. Davies, 'The Cattle Killing as Propaganda: Leon Schauder's Nonquassi (1939), *African Studies* Special Issue: the Xhosa Cattle Killing, 67, 2 (2006), pp.183–2008; S.B. Davies, 'Raising the Dead: the Xhosa Cattle Killing and the Mhlakaza-Goliat Delusion', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33, 1 (2007), pp.19–41; J. Wenzel, 'The problem of metaphor: tropic logic in cattle killing prophecies and their afterlives', *African Studies* Special Issue: the Xhosa Cattle Killing, 67, 2 (2006), pp.143–158; A. Offenburger, 'The Xhosa Cattle Killing Movement in History and Literature', *History Compass*, 7, 6 (2009), pp.1428–1443.

17 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Warner to Southey, 12 June 1857 and 17 June 1857.

stubborn believers put pressure on her to stop people from ploughing and to call for slaughtering to begin. Mullins commented that the queen would tell him 'nothing' but he watched to see what she would do, observing signs that 'something important was hatching' — Yiliswa was consulting with her headmen and visiting Nonesi. Some days later, Mullins wrote that the Tshatshu queen claimed to have ploughed and that the water had washed away her field. Many of her followers had stopped ploughing and were 'killing fast'. Yiliswa became more uncooperative and the location superintendent concluded that she had 'embraced the doctrines of Umhlakaza'. Almost all households in the Tshatshu section of the location were making doors for the return of the Dead.[18]

Everyday life was entirely changed as the fanaticism mounted. Everyone was in a state of agitation. A boer who came rushing into the Gwatyu in search of labour, usually plentiful according to Mullins, was entirely ignored. More seriously, the effects of famine became increasingly pronounced as they waited and waited for the second appointed day when the sun would rise blood red and the people would live in peace and plenty. On Sunday 20 July, Mullins reported that the first wagon load of *amatamba* (starving people) arrived at St John's on the Bolotwa River. One person had died on the road and another on arrival. Even Ndarala, who had been sceptical of Mhalakaza, was seen wearing a red blanket and slaughtering his cattle. It is not clear whether he and Yiliswa had had a change of heart or whether they acted under duress, in fear of reprisals.

Waiting for the appointed day was deeply unsettling. Corn supplies ran out and Yiliswa turned to Mullins for food. The regent was becoming more and more temperamental as her dependence on him increased. There had been no ploughing, sowing or harvesting for a season. Mullins recorded that on one occasion the Tshatshu queen complained angrily that a bag of maize he had given her was not full. When he remonstrated with her, she barged into the school, took her children out and went home in a rage. Two weeks later, she walked into his hut, sat on his bed and hung about in a bad mood until he gave her some sugar. On Christmas Eve, Yiliswa attended an event at the school in great spirits. But her good humour did not last; Mullins wrote that she was

18 W.M. Levick (ed), *The Diary of Robert John Mullins 1854–1861* Missionary of the Diocese of Grahamstown 1854–1913 (USPG Archive X1018 Rhodes House Oxford, 1953), pp.16–17 and p.36. This edited version of Mullins's diary is different from the annotated version edited by Nicholls, Charton and Knowling; Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Warner to Southey, 2 June 1857.

so cross on Christmas Day, she did not attend the church service. In the new year, she was in better spirits, sent Mullins a gift of a sheep and a loaf of bread, and asked for a shawl to go with her new dress. Other diary entries indicate a calmer relationship even in these times of anxiety and hunger. 'Yiliswa generally attends the evening service and seems glad to have a mission station near her,' observed Mullins in one entry.[19]

Beyond the immediate story of hunger and impending famine in the Tambookie location, Mullins's diary provides a glimpse into colonial inversions of the hierarchies of respect and authority, and the infantilising of the queen rather than an exploration of her conflict over Nongqawuse's prophecy. He does not discuss the pressures of her councillors or her anxiety about the encroaching famine. It is difficult to imagine how she could have taken advice from this young fellow, only a year or so older than Gungubele, her son and heir to the chieftaincy. Mullins was not yet a man in her eyes; he was not married, spoke only a little isiXhosa and was too inexperienced to serve as her adviser. The diary suggests that much of their conversation was concerned with domestic matters — food, clothing and children. Only once does Mullins record that he was able to help her settle a dispute over the theft of a horse.[20]

Famine intensified as people waited for the prophecy to be fulfilled. By dawn on the second appointed day, it was apparent that nothing was going to happen. The sun rose and set as usual. The millenarian prophecy had failed. There would be no exodus of whites, no rising of the dead and no renewal of cattle. The people were devastated. In the superintendent's reckoning, roughly a third of those living in the Tambookie location had not planted. Their granaries were empty and they faced acute hunger. Those who had lost everything blamed the unbelievers for the failure of the prophecy. The Thembu queen moved quickly to prevent her people turning on each other. Towards the end of February 1857, Nonesi invited Chief Joyi, brother of the late Chief Mtirara, who was raising the Thembu heir on the Mbashe River, to come over to the Tambookie location and help to restore hope among the Thembu. A large crowd assembled.

19 Nicholls, Charton and Knowling, *Diary of Robert John Mullins*, pp.42–53; C/AFS/5 Grahamstown 1836–1907, R.J. Mullins, St Peter's Mission Gwatyu, Branch Station of St Marks. Weekly Communication to the Bishop of Grahamstown, 16 August 1857, 15 January 1858.

20 Nicholls, Charton and Knowling, *Diary of Robert John Mullins*, p. 61. The diary stops as Mullins left the Eastern Cape for England in 1860.

Chief Joyi scolded those who had run after what he called the delusions of the Gcaleka chief Sarhili, and advised the abaThembu to follow their own leaders lest they end up as the 'servants' or subject people of Sarhili. At this point, a man whom Warner described as a 'spokesperson for Maphasa's people' expressed passionate relief that the crisis was over and, in an emotional piece of isiXhosa oratory, begged for forgiveness. Whether he spoke on behalf of Yiliswa, we do not know. His impassioned plea for mercy is well known.



Figure 2.2: Chief Sarhili of the amaXhosa. UBC Album 43.

> Mercy! Mercy! We have been listening to a lie; we have been led astray by falsehood, and have got bewildered in the black mist … Your children have not so far gone astray that they may not be recovered; they have not all fallen; many have been wise enough not to listen to these lies; and many who have listened have only done so with one ear; the cattle are not all dead, and there is a little corn left for the children to eat … Mercy! Mercy![21]

It could not have been easy for Yiliswa to watch as her followers prostrated themselves. For her part, she was ordered by Warner to pay back all the cattle she took from the *amagogotya* (unbelievers).[22] In an attempt to foster peace, Chief Joyi appealed to those who had stored their maize to share it with those who had none.

This crisis presented an opportunity for the location superintendent to send the destitute and those who might 'prefer working to stealing', to seek employment on the construction of a road linking the Tambookie location to Queenstown. Those who went to work saw themselves as doing their share for the household; they were engaged in *ukuphangela*.[23] To do one's share implied taking part in communal work, in raiding or fighting, and so to receive a share

21 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Tambookie Agent, 1857–1858, Warner to Southey, Resident Secretary King William's Town, 24 February 1857.

22 Nicholls, Charton and Knowling, *Diary of Robert John Mullins*, p.41.

23 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Tambookie Agent, 1857–1858, Warner to Southey, 11 March 1857; 7 April 1857, 12 May 1857. For more on *ukuphangela* see A.K. Mager, 'Tracking the concept "Work" on the north-eastern Cape frontier, South Africa' in A. Fleisch and R. Stephens (eds), *Doing Conceptual History in Africa* (Stockholm, Berghahn Books, 2016), pp.73–90.

of the harvest or plunder as reward. In a post-famine context, entering the job market was a short-term measure — men would go out and return with the means to acquire the cattle they had lost. Working in the Colony did not usher in a Protestant mode of thinking about work. Labour contracts under the Masters and Servants Act (Act 15 of 1856) did little to foster the idea of work as an end in itself; when an individual deemed that he had fulfilled his share, he gave up work. Even in the famine years, work remained a means to independence for those strong enough for hard labour. Many were too weak for work and were already facing death from starvation. By the end of 1857, some 2 307 lives in the Tambookie location were lost through starvation and the population was reduced to 15 793.[24]

Life in the location slowly returned to seasonal agricultural rhythms, bringing hope of recovery. When the rains came, Yiliswa began 'ploughing away very hard' and Mullins found himself admonishing her for working on a Sunday. Their health restored, women were encouraged to bear children. Yiliswa was one of the first to give birth in the wake of the famine. Her little girl, said Mullins, was the size of his 'two fists'.[25] There is no mention of the baby's father. The queen, like all other abaThembu, was subject to the *ukungena* custom whereby a suitable male relative was appointed by the family elders to ensure that widows of child-bearing age continued to have children. Yiliswa had several children by this arrangement.

While they had not suffered as much as Sarhili's amaXhosa, the westerly abaThembu had been badly shaken by the cattle killing and famine episode. Nonesi, the highest ranking and most consistent non-believer in the Tambookie location, had failed to protect her people from Sarhili's prophets. Each group had made their own decisions. Under pressure from her councillors, Yiliswa had not followed her advice and several chiefs looked to the regent, Chief Joyi, to safeguard the Thembu nation.[26] In so doing, they demonstrated a desire to limit Nonesi's role in the Tambookie location to the affairs of the amaHala.

The residents in Nonesi's sub-location were themselves divided. Those who had destroyed their food supplies became extremely troublesome as famine set in. Fadana, a minor amaGcina chief, and his 'bandit' sons who lived in her

24 CCP 1/2/1/5 G.6–'57. Report of the Government Agent with the Tambookies relative to a Proposal to Grant Annual Stipends.

25 C/AFS/ Grahamstown 1836–1907 Report of R J Mullins, St Peter's Mission, Gwatyu, Branch Station of St Marks, 15 January 1858.

26 Cape Commission on Native Affairs 1865 Appendix 6; Evidence of Tambookie Agent E. Warner, p.68; Wagenaar, *Forgotten Frontier*, p.179.

section of the location, embarked on a marauding campaign, stealing cattle and grain and terrorising unbelievers. Fearless themselves, this gang struck fear into other residents. Rumoured to be 'possessed of supernatural powers', Fadana seemed untouchable. Ironically, his ability to terrorise came from manipulating powers that were socially grounded — the powers of the chief, the sorcerer and the patriarch — and from ratcheting up the degree of violence usually associated with them. When he was finally arrested by the colonial police, he and his sons justified their rampage. First, it was legitimate for him to believe in the prophecy: 'Myself and my people were believers in the Prophet and killed all our cattle … Nonesi sent messengers to Sarhili to ask why the cattle should be slaughtered, he replied that as soon as the cattle were killed the Dead Would Arise.' Secondly, in Fadana's view, those who had food were obliged to give him a share notwithstanding his own reckless behaviour. 'After we had killed all our cattle our great chief Joyi came and requested the other Tambookie chiefs to subscribe corn and cattle for myself and people to live upon but they refused.'[27] Their refusal was hardly surprising given the way Fadana had treated them for many months. Nonesi was wholly unable to restrain him and her adviser JC Warner was slow to act, further weakening her authority.

The colonial police too caused trouble for Nonesi. Captain Walter Currie, commandant of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, wanted to evacuate the Tambookie location in the aftermath of the famine so that their land could be given to white settlers. Weak and hungry people were unlikely to resist. But Warner protected Nonesi and Yiliswa, pointing out that Yiliswa had 'done everything in her power to convince [him] of the sincerity of her repentance' and Nonesi, whom Sir George Cathcart acknowledged as 'the faithful Nonesi', had 'done nothing since that time [1852] to forfeit that designation'. He did not want to see these leaders antagonised. Always looking for ways of fostering a more western style of leadership, he argued that rather than eviction, these loyal chiefs should be granted government stipends to replace the 'fees and fines they receive from their people'.[28]

27 Papers of Joseph Cox Warner, Tambookie Agent, 1857–1858, Warner to Southey, 29 July 1857, 29 September 1857; Shepstone, Civil Commissioner's Office Queenstown to Southey, 7 August 1857; Voluntary Statement of Fadana made before Commandant Currie this 24 Day of September 1857.

28 Commandant Walter Currie (1819–1872) was a principal agent in the conquest of the north-eastern frontier, a service for which he was knighted. Sir Walter Currie is buried in the Grahamstown Cathedral; Warner lists amaTshatshu chiefs as: Yiliswa, Vizi [Vezi], Tabayi, Ujilincuka, Umvundla; amaHala chiefs as Nonesi, Maneli, Jlela, Ketelo; amaGcina chiefs as Gecelo, Guwanda, Ketelo; amaNdungwana chief, Ndarala (original spelling retained).

Southey's duplicity, the destruction of chiefly authority and the establishment of Emigrant Thembuland

As the location recovered, its inhabitants began to prosper. Several good ploughing seasons followed and location life settled into an agricultural rhythm, punctuated by the seasons and the rains. In 1864, Colonial Secretary Richard Southey interrupted this calm. This land had long been coveted by boer farmers who were constantly moving eastward to secure pasture. Like Captain Currie, Southey believed that the Tambookie location could be cleared and the land handed over to white settlers. Warned not to 'break faith with the Tambookies' by disregarding the promise that they would not be moved from the Tambookie location, Southey scoffed.[29] The Tambookie had been weakened by famine and in his view were not strong enough to put up resistance. In cahoots with Sir Philip Wodehouse the governor, he was ready to break this faith. But he would not use force.

Southey urged the chiefs in the Tambookie location to move with their followers across the Indwe River into land that had recently become vacant. The governor had confiscated this territory from Sarhili, the Xhosa chief who had promoted the millenarian prophecies of Mhlakaza and his niece Nongqawuse. To persuade them to move, Southey offered the inducement that those who moved would be allowed to live without interference from magistrates and free from taxation. Four minor chiefs — Raxoti Matanzima (son of Mtirara), Ndarala (son of Qwesha), Gecelo (son of Tyopho) and Stokwe (son of Ndlela) — moved across to establish Emigrant Thembuland.[30] Lured by Southey's promises, they were also motivated by the need for land and a place to establish homesteads of their own. Once they had moved, the four established a hierarchy amongst themselves.

Raxoti Matanzima, son of Mtirara and heir to the right-hand house of the abaThembu, was the most senior of the four and was accompanied by the largest group of emigrants. He was also the most vocal in his opposition to white magistrates. Gecelo had recently been displaced as regent of the amaGcina and had a far smaller following than his rival Mpangele in the old location. Stokwe Ndlela was a minor chief of the amaQwathi, an independent lineage of the amaXesibe which had affiliated to the abaThembu through allegiance. Stokwe had been subordinate to the Gcina chief in the Tambookie location and was

29 K.C.B. Cathcart, Correspondence relative to his military operations in Kaffraria until the termination of the Kafir War, and to his Measures for the future maintenance of peace on that frontier, and the protection and welfare of the people of South Africa. Second Edition. (London, John Murray, 1857), p.205.

30 Raxoti Matanzima of the amaHala, Ndarala of the amaNdungwana, Gecelo of the amaGcina and Stokwe of the amaQwathi. Sir Philip Wodehouse was governor at the Cape from 1860 to 1870.

keen to establish himself on his own terms. Of the four, Ndarala, son of Qwesha, chief of the amaNdungwana, had the smallest following. His emigration was opposed by his father, and his son and heir, Zenzile, who remained in the 'old location'.[31] Yiliswa and the amaTshatshu did not budge.

Nonesi vacillated; she crossed the river but remained only a short time before returning hurriedly. Her presence was not welcome to her grandson Raxoti Matanzima, the most dominant of the four emigrant chiefs. He had expected her to return to the Mbashe and had anticipated an elevation of status on her departure. But this did not happen and Raxoti harboured resentment. When Qeya, now Chief Ngangelizwe, was installed as *kumkani* of the abaThembu in 1863, Nonesi had stayed on in the Tambookie location, thwarting his hope of benefitting from her departure. Those who did not want to move tried to discourage Nonesi from doing so and argued that she was being used by the colonial authorities to divide the abaThembu. By creating the territory of Emigrant Thembuland and giving it an autonomous status, the move across the Indwe was seen to be separating the abaThembu into two distinct sections, one in the east, the other west of the Great Kei. Nonesi was persuaded not to take this step. JC Warner, Nonesi's erstwhile missionary, was annoyed with her for refusing to lead her followers across the Indwe and complained that she had become embittered and stubborn.[32] The political divisions over the creation of Emigrant Thembuland were to echo deep into the twenty-first century.

Once the most powerful umThembu west of the Tsomo, Nonesi was isolated. She looked forward to the appointment of a new superintendent with whom she might co-operate. The moment seemed to have arrived when the civil commissioner of Queenstown summoned the chiefs and their followers to a meeting on 22 November 1865. Anticipating the announcement of a new superintendent, Nonesi led her followers to the meeting at Glen Grey. Riding astride, she was followed by 1 000 men on horseback and 500 on foot.

A description of this event appeared in *The Queenstown Representative*, a weekly newspaper promoting the interests of white farmers. Comparing the costume and retinue of Nonesi, an African queen, to the pageantry of the British monarch, the reporter constructed a discourse that was profoundly racist and sexist. This perspective may be termed the colonial gaze.

31 Gugu Phandle, 'Evidence Wrong on Legitimacy of Chiefs', *Daily Dispatch* 12 September 2015.

32 J.C. Warner was persuaded to take up the post of British resident in the Transkei before rejoining the missionary service; E. J. C. Wagenaar, A History of the Thembu and their relationship with the Cape 1850–1900, PhD Thesis Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1988, pp.102, 179.

> One of the first natives to arrive on the ground was the great chief,—or perhaps it would be more correct to say chieftain,—Nonesi, who was attended by a goodly cavalcade, by several of the inferior chiefs, and by an umbrella bearer, who was busily engaged in shielding her sable majesty's delicate complexion from the rays of the sun, which on Wednesday were extremely fierce. As it is usual to describe the dresses worn by royal personages on great occasions, we may state, for the information of the curious, that Nonesi was attired in a sky-blue dress, which had evidently seen better days; a mantle, also of sky-blue, and also somewhat faded; a black riding hat, trimmed with brown ostrich feathers; and balmoral boots. The royal petticoats were of white, rendered somewhat dingy by use; and unless her Majesty's stockings were of the very hue and texture of her skin, we may safely affirm, from certain glimpses of the royal understandings with which the wind favoured us, that she wore none at all. The effect of Nonesi's somewhat magnificent "get-up" was slightly marred by the fact that she insisted on riding astride, instead of in the orthodox feminine fashion; but this gave a dash of piquancy to the affair which partially redeemed its want of dignity.

In this discourse, Nonesi is measured against the femininity of the British queen; the language constructs a caricature and makes fun of her femininity, ridiculing her mimicry of western codes of decorum, style and protocol.[33] The journalist turned to the lesser chiefs and the crowd at large:

> Very soon after the arrival of the great chief the plain in front of the old Mission station and school buildings began to swarm with life. Troop after troop of Thembus galloped up, all having some appearance of military discipline, and all armed with formidable knobkieries, with the exception of the headmen and chiefs, who generally carried assegais.

After the crowd had settled, the press report continues, the Queenstown civil commissioner, CD Griffith, read a message on behalf of the colonial secretary. 'All chiefs remaining on this side of the Indwe are no longer to have any authority in their tribe'. He went on, 'I have to tell you that all alike, chiefs and people, without exception, are to be dealt with under colonial law, and treated in every respect as British subjects; and therefore all matters of dispute among you are to be decided by the magistrate in Queenstown, and not by your chiefs at all.'[34]

33 P. Martin, 'Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville', *Journal of African History*, 35 (1994), pp.401–426, discusses African forms of dress as 'identity, status, values and a sense of occasion', p.401.

34 Extract from *Queenstown Representative* 25 November 1865 reprinted in W. C. Holden, *The Past and the Future of the Kaffir Races* (London: Paternoster Row, 1866), pp.396, 405.

By this decree Nonesi and the chiefs in Tambookieland were effectively deposed. Everyone in the Tambookie location was to come under the direct control of the magistrate at Queenstown. Up until this moment, the administrative system in the location had been a form of indirect rule — the chiefs had authority to run their own affairs according to their own custom, provided they did not condone what was repugnant to British law (murder and sexual violence in particular). The civil commissioner's announcement removed this relative autonomy. Under direct rule, chiefly authority was profoundly circumscribed. This was a decisive moment in the destruction of the chieftaincy.

To demonstrate what this meant, the civil commissioner announced that Nonesi's most recent judgement in a case of stock theft had been rescinded. She was no longer allowed to impose fines; she was to return the cattle she had seized and instruct the offender to appear before the Queenstown magistrate the next day. This public undoing of Nonesi's ruling demonstrated that the magistrate had displaced the chief; it was an act of deliberate humiliation of the Thembu queen and a degradation of the status of chiefs. The people were stunned. Someone in the crowd stood up and asked:

> Why should our chiefs be taken from us? Why should they be deprived of their authority? We have lived a long time in this country [western Thembuland]. Some little chiefs have gone away [across the Indwe], but why then should authority be taken away from the chiefs who remain?

Chief Vezi, the late Maphasa's brother and one of Yiliswa's councillors, stood up to defend Nonesi and the westerly abaThembu. Politely thanking the civil commissioner, he criticised his message and his attitude.

> The Tambookies as a tribe have not crossed the river. Nonesi belongs to government. She stays with her tribe in Tambookieland. Those who have crossed the river are young men who had no huts and no land here, and wanted some.

Shocked by the colonial secretary's decree and astounded at the dignified response of the chiefs and their people, the reporter commented, '*Thanks* the most respectful and stinging that ever fell from human lips,' and added that 'The sight of Chief Vezi "with hat in hand" returning thanks for his degradation must have been very galling to the magistrate, if he was capable of feeling.'

Nonesi could not fathom the depth of this colonial treachery. In spirited oration, she declared:

> I am an old chief, one of an old race. I was Mtirara's mother, [regent for Mtirara as heir] and I belong to government. I have always been loyal. … I never agreed to cross the river; and it is not known to anyone what I have done that the governor should be angry with me. Why, magistrate, do you speak in such a manner to me? … I am a chief; why should I be less than a chief? Why should I be driven across the river? I am an old woman. I have been here since I was a child; I have brought up children here; and some of them have died; and their graves are here … That is all I have to say today — to ask the question why I am treated in this manner, and to deny that the Thembu as a tribe ever agreed to cross the Indwe.

Deeply betrayed, she remained stoical: 'I and all my people have been expecting a successor to Warner, and we are still looking for one to come after. Let someone follow Warner.' [35]

In silence, the crowd picked up their knobkerries and assegais and went home. Conquest by administrative fiat was perhaps even more bitter than defeat in battle. The people and their chiefs had no opportunity to defend themselves.

Even the reporter was appalled. The colonial secretary had acted too harshly; a subject of the British Queen had been wronged. Richard Southey's demonstration of colonial duplicity followed on that of governors Smith and Cathcart before him.[36] But Southey's was more unjust as he had punished the chiefs for no wrong; his actions were perceived as cruel and treacherous and many feared the long-term consequences. Direct rule would break the back of chiefly authority and destroy the Thembu system of rule.

Nonesi lost all trust in the colonial government and never recovered from the devastating destruction wrought upon her and the chieftaincy in general. After a lifetime of persuading her people that they would be better served by complying with colonial rule than challenging it, she had been treated no differently than those who had fought the colonists. She had been publicly humiliated in front of the other chiefs and had had her authority revoked without warning. Nonesi was broken. She refused all further co-operation with the colonial regime. Three years later, she was declared a 'troublesome nuisance' and removed from the frontier. Colonial chronicler George McCall Theal blandly narrated that the former queen 'was put in a wagon, and sent with a police escort to Pondoland, where she was handed over to her brother

35 Holden, *Past and the Future of the Kaffir races*, p.403.

36 A. Ravenscroft, *The Postcolonial Eye: White Australian Desire and the Visual Field of Race*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp.7–30, discusses ways of seeing difference.

Ndamase, chief of the amaMpondo'.[37] The grant for her farm on the Imvani was cancelled. Her followers, the amaHala were left in the hands of two young chiefs, Mpangele and Mfanta, who did not get on.

Beyond the awful humiliation of the moment, the destruction of chiefly authority on 22 November 1865 represents one of the most far-reaching acts of colonial conquest in the history of this region. Chiefly power was never to recover. Magisterial rule meted out by the conquerors deeply undermined the power of the chiefs, scrambling the social order. Chiefs could not protect their people if they were unable to try those accused of taking their cattle or violating custom; they could not ensure justice if they were prevented from fining perpetrators and compensating victims; they could not retain their dignity when white men pushed them aside with such contempt. Ordinary people were appalled at the behaviour of the colonists and dismayed that they and their chiefs were unable to protect their dignity. Nonesi and Yiliswa had served as faithful regents, raised the young men who were to succeed to the chieftaincy, and listened to the counsel of their *amaphakathi*. They had led their people in the most difficult of circumstances. Southey's treatment of Nonesi and the limitation of the powers of the other chiefs had far-reaching implications; it was not clear what role the chiefs might play under the aegis of colonial control. The system of chieftaincy was in crisis and everyone was unsettled.

While Yiliswa must have been relieved that the amaTshatshu were not the colonial target this time round, she must have known that there was more to come. The queen of the Tambookies and her people were permitted to remain on the Gwatyu under the direct control of the magistrate in Queenstown. Gungubele, heir to the Tshatshu chieftainship, was soon to come of age. In the next chapter we explore escalating tensions between the magistrate and those who remained in the Tambookie location, as we follow the rise of Gungubele, heir to the chieftainship of amaTshatshu.

37 Ndamase, Nonesi's brother took care of her until her death. G. M. Theal, *History of South Africa since 1795*, Vol 8 (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1964), p.52.

CHAPTER 3

Settler colonialism and the vendetta against Gungubele

What did it mean to be Maphasa's heir? Gungubele, son of Maphasa and Yiliswa, had spent the first 10 years of his life in the Swart Kei valley; he had seen the devastation of war and felt the pain of dispossession. In the Tambookie location he came under the tutelage of the men who served as councillors during the regency of his mother. In 1862 at the age of 20, Gungubele came of age. Along with Ngangelizwe, heir to the abaThembu *bukumkani* (kingship) and a group of age-mates, Gungubele entered a manhood lodge on the Imvani River. Secluded from society, they underwent circumcision and received instruction in the meaning of manhood (*ubudoda*) and on the resilience, restraint and respect expected of men. On their re-entry into society, they were ready to assume the responsibilities that their hereditary status required of them. Ngangelizwe took over as *kumkani* of the abaThembu and remained in the Mbashe area while Gungubele prepared to take on the chieftainship of the amaTshatshu. This was no ordinary matter for a colonised people stripped of their name. For Gungubele to be recognised as a chief by the authorities, he would have to overcome Sir George Cathcart's banning and obtain government acceptance of his status as Maphasa's heir. The amaTshatshu prepared to approach the Queenstown magistrate. If he could not approve the installation of their chief, he might intercede on their behalf.

From its establishment in 1853, Queenstown served as the seat of colonial authority on the north-eastern frontier. Instructions from the governor came through the magistrate and civil commissioner in Queenstown. From 1859 to 1868, this position was held by Charles Griffith, the man who read out Southey's deposition of Chief Nonesi. Griffith was not a man to question higher authority. It was Griffith whom Gungubele's councillors would have to approach to secure recognition of their chief. They hoped that he would take his cue from JC Warner, the superintendent of the Tambookie location who had recognised Yiliswa as the chief of the amaTshatshu, counting her along with Nonesi as a 'first-class chief', a category he invented to acknowledge hereditary seniority and size of following. As first-class chiefs, they were paid larger stipends than those whom he appointed as second class, some of whom had no hereditary claim to the chieftainship. Gungubele's councillors were cautiously optimistic

that the magistrate would pardon the late Maphasa and recognise his heir. Some 200 elders mounted their horses and set off for Queenstown.

But they came back empty-handed. The magistrate refused to formalise Gungubele's chieftaincy.[1] Griffith, the man who had insulted Nonesi, was now insulting Gungubele. His councillors seethed with anger. They had toed the line since Maphasa's death; the magistrate's attitude was entirely unwarranted. In defiance, they installed their chief with the support of the great house of abaThembu. But there would be no forgiveness. By refusing to right the wrong of Governor Cathcart, Griffith hardened antagonism towards the colonial authorities. Those who had served as Maphasa's councillors took the insult personally.

The magistrate allowed the location superintendent to appoint Gungubele as a headman and to confer on him the authority which Yiliswa had inherited as leader of the amaTshatshu purely in the interests of day-to-day administration, in keeping with his system of devolving control through leaders recognised by their people. Gungubele was responsible for the Tshatshu families in the Gwatyu section. With over 1 000 adult men, the amaTshatshu were numerically the largest, yet the smaller sections had their chiefs recognised. Reducing a senior chief to the status of headman was a gross indignity. It was also profoundly unsettling — followers would not give allegiance to a leader whom they believed could not protect their well-being. In the meantime, they installed Gungubele as their chief and looked up to him. Even the Queenstown magistracy acknowledged that he was very popular among his people.[2]

Gungubele's great place was secured on the top of a steep hill with a good view of the surrounding countryside. The site was something of a stronghold, not unlike that of the mountainous Swart Kei valley where he grew up:

1 'G.6–'57 Report of the Government Agent with the Tambookies relative to a proposal to grant Annual Stipends from the Public Revenue to certain well-disposed Chiefs of that Tribe; J. Hemming, 'A Narrative of the Proceedings in the Tambookie location during the Kafir War of 1877-78', *The Cape Quarterly Review with which is incorporated the Cape Monthly Review*, 2, 6 (January 1883), p.94; Somana, *AmaTshatshu*, p.30.

2 Hemming, 'A Narrative of the Proceedings', 2, 6 (January 1883), p.94; CCP/1/2/1/5 G.6–'57 Report of the Government Agent with the Tambookies, Census of the Tambookies inhabiting the Tambookie location, Division of Queenstown, December 1857, listed 3 275 men, 4 487 women and 8 081 children. The four sections were the amaHala under Nonesi, amaGcina under Gecelo, amaNdungwana under Ndarala, amaTshatshu under Yiliswa; in 1870, Edward Judge listed the number of adult men by subgroup: amaGcina 2 487; amaNdungwana 590; amaTshatshu 1 163, amaHala 1 736. BC 500 UCT Special Collections Judge Papers Letter to Colonial Secretary, 17 July 1870.

> This hill, about 200 feet high, was rugged in the extreme, covered with boulders of all sizes from that of a small house down to that of a cannon ball, with trees and bushes pretty thickly scattered about it. The summit of this hill, on which stood Gungubele's huts and cattle kraals, is flat, and the hill forms a spur from the mountain dividing the country occupied by Gungubele from that of Vezi, [brother of Maphasa and councillor to Yiliswa] and is approached by two rugged footpaths.[3]

Figure 3.1: Site of Gungubele's great place on the Gwatyu.

Residents in Gungubele's section were relatively prosperous. The Gwatyu was contiguous with Staalklip, a particularly fertile piece of farming land to the south. The Gwatyu farmers were influenced by their neighbours' agricultural methods and obtained livestock from them. By 1864, most households had recovered from the famine. Some of those who had gone out to work returned with parcels of sheep and a few head of cattle. Warner recorded that 'returning servants' brought with them 'no less than 16 000 sheep and goats besides other stock' and all this was not stolen but 'properly certified'.[4] The Gwatyu farmers were quick to respond to the market. Driven by the high price of wool, investment in sheep became a popular trend with the more successful keeping flocks of 500 to 1 500 sheep. Increasing numbers of livestock meant that more grazing was needed. When Gungubele's neighbour, chief Ndarala, moved across

3 Hemming, 'A Narrative of the Proceedings', pp.100–101.

4 CCP 3/1/2/1/10 G682 E2 Cape of Good Hope, Proceedings and Evidence taken by Commission on Native Affairs (Grahamstown: Godlonton and Richards, 1865) Hereafter, 1865 Commission on Native Affairs. Interview with Mr J.C. Warner, 11 February 1865, p.82.

the Indwe, space was opened up for the congested Gwatyu farmers who moved onto this land, establishing 45 new homesteads. Initially, Warner instructed Gungubele to restrain his people from occupying the land but he soon relented, conceding that conditions on the Gwatyu were cramped and overcrowded. White traders bought up and resold the wool, wheat and maize at a profit. By the mid-1860s, the number of white traders supported by Gwatyu farmers had increased from two to a dozen or more. This commercial activity accelerated stratification in the location. One measure of economic status was the number of men who qualified on property grounds for 'certificates of citizenship', enabling them to move freely about the colony.[5] In 1865, at least 200 African men in the Tambookie location were in possession of these certificates. Those less fortunate were required to carry a pass if they left the location.

A mere 500 metres from his great place was St Peter's Mission on the Gwatyu. It was well-supported by Gungubele's people and the mission flourished after the arrival of the Reverend Newton in 1857. A Queenstown magistrate described St Peter's as the 'most credible [station] of its kind' beyond the borders of the colony. Indeed, the mission buildings, Gungubele's kraal and two trading stations created an idyllic colonial village-scape:

> The station consisted of a mission house with a good garden, behind which stood the church; a number of huts; small stone-built kraals, belonging to the school Kaffirs; the trading stations of Messrs.Thomson and Klette, (these premises being of considerable size), and a large garden enclosed by a stone and sod wall, belonging to the latter; the whole being situated on the Gwatyu stream, and lying between it and the hill on which Gungubele's huts stood.[6]

The magistrate contrasted the appearance of St Peter's with that of the Anglican mission station at Bolotwa which had 'a broken down, impoverished appearance', giving the impression of a place 'where but little appears to be done to improve the condition of the people.'[7]

While he had not attended the school with his younger brothers, Gungubele supported the mission and enjoyed a good relationship with the

5 Hemming, 'A Narrative of the Proceedings', p.95; Interview with Warner, 11 February 1865, p.70.
6 BC 293 UCT Special Collections, Stanford papers, Memorandum for Mr Solomon (no date), Case of the Rev. A.J. Newton, p.14.
7 CCP 1/2/1/35 G.17–'78 Cape of Good Hope. Blue Book on Native Affairs. Papers connected with the Insurrection of Gungubele, a Thembu chief residing in the Division of Queen's Town, Case of Gungubele, a Tambookie chief residing in the Division of Queen's Town, p.45; Newton's station comprised a chapel, school and printing press.

Reverend Newton. His brother Peter who had started schooling there went on to study under the church in Grahamstown. He was baptised in 1867 and took up employ at St Peter's as a teacher and lay preacher, working closely with the Reverend Newton. He also received a stipend from Warner and may have been a headman. But Peter did not enjoy good health and struggled with a bad chest. One of his monthly reports gives an indication of his day-to-day activities. An extract describing a home visit reveals a lightness of touch:

> *Wati omnye umntu, wangena weba ubona kanti uzakuti ashiye into yake embola zake ndati ke emna ndavuya ngokuba ebuzokuba umbona wam ndasuka ndahleka mna.* (One person came in and said that she had seen [the light] and wanted to give up her red [pagan] ways; I said I was pleased that she was going to take [steal] my vision. I then laughed and carried on.)[8]

Warner arranged for Peter to be granted a farm of some 1 220 hectares to which he held title on condition that he did not 'sell or let the land without the permission from and approval by the government'. Peter was a promising young man and his bride Mary was a mission-educated girl. On Christmas Day two years later, he died. His widow inherited 6 goats and 32 sheep valued at 6 shillings each. The farm retained his name but reverted to the state.[9] Some accounts suggest that Gungubele expected that the farm would come to him. He was annoyed that the conditions of the grant precluded this possibility and he resented colonial interference in indigenous rights to land.

Not long after he came of age, Gungubele married; he was a highly eligible young man, good looking and, according to none other than the Queenstown magistrate, a gentleman. Colonial photographs taken between the mid-1860s and mid-1870s provide a glimpse of Gungubele as a young man.

8 CO 4147 230 1867 Land granted 1967; extract from letter of Peter Maphasa to J.C. Warner, British residency, 21 July 1867. Translated by Anne Mager.

9 Peter Maphasa died in 1872. Lot B Gwatyu was divided up by the Commissioner of Crown Lands in terms of Act 37 of 1882 and parcelled out to struggling white farmers. See MOOC 13/1/280 94 Deceased Estate Papers. Quitrent grants were awarded to Rudolf David le Roux, Robert Dickson followed by Alexander Trotter Scott, Samuel Sutton followed by Walter Dawill Fletcher and G. Cloete; Cape Archives Lands Papers 1890, LND 1/339; Lands Papers 1890–1892 LND 1/470; Lands Papers 1893–1897 LND 1/471; Lands Papers LND 1/240; Interview with Jongulundi Gungubele and Obed Maphasa, 9 September 2010.



Figure 3.2: Chief Gungubele of the amaTshatshu. UBC Album 43.

This image was pasted in an album probably compiled by a visitor to Queenstown and subsequently donated to the University of British Columbia.[10] As with written documents, the way in which photographs are composed, and how they are presented, tells us a great deal about context – the times in which they were taken. Mounted in a photograph album alongside an image of the Gcaleka chief Sarhili (fig. 2.2), the photographs of Gungubele and Sarhili convey the conventions of studio portraits of the time. Gungubele is robed in traditional chiefly dress (a leopard-skin cloak) and Sarhili, the Gcaleka *kumkani*, in a lion skin (fig. 2.2). In both images, their eyes are downcast and their heads are at a slight angle in the photographic convention of the 1870s. It is possible that Gungubele may have requested that he be photographed, and may have had sight of his portrait, but it is unlikely that he would have known that his image would be sold like a trading-store trinket.

10 University of British Columbia Vancouver Rare Books and Special Collections, BC Historical Photographs, Album 43. These photographs were donated to the University of British Columbia (UBC) by DH Telfer. It is possible that the album belonged to a relative of Janie Telfer, wife of J J Preston, who died in childbirth in Queenstown in 1897 at the age of 26. Menus from a Castle Line ship for 1896 glued into the album indicate when it left the colony. The photographer is likely to have been one of several commercial photographers in Queenstown – the firms of Hale and Cronin, and A. Dugmore, for example, took portraits and sold postcards, depicting scenes of African life that were sold as 'cartes-de-visite'. These were popular from the 1860s. M. Bull and J. Denfield, *Secure the Shadow: The Story of Cape Photography from its beginnings to the end of 1870* (Cape Town: Terence McNally, 1970), p.86. For more recent work on colonial photography, see P. Landau and D. Kaspin (ed) *Images and Empires* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); C. Kratz, *The Ones that are Wanted* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).



Figure 3.3: Thembu family in Queenstown district. UBC Album 43.

The photographs of the chiefs, the Tambookie location and the servants of Queenstown served the colonial project as mementos for settlers and travellers in the Colony and in the way they portrayed and animated the meaning of African life.[11] In the primitive picturesque scene of Figure 3.3 above, an unsophisticated African family is identified with crumbling dwellings, rudimentary technology and rough blankets; the people and their belongings merge with the physical landscape.

The same album has photographs of women from the Tambookie location who became servants to the white settlers of Queenstown. They appear dressed in Victorian costume with neatly ironed frocks and head dresses. These images contrast sharply with those of the women in the impoverished rural setting. A wedding photograph of a mission-educated family portrays those at the top of the colonial hierarchy. Read together, the photographs send a message that colonial influence is positive; the signs of civilisation and education, showing African people lifted out of squalor and misery, are deliberate and unambiguous. The training of women in domestic duties served the dual purpose of acquiring servants and reforming African gender relations. These were central tenets of colonial modernisation initiatives.

11 J. Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p.119.

Figure 3.4: Three Queenstown domestic workers. UBC Album 43.

Figure 3.5: Wedding group. UBC Album 43.

Experiments in colonial modernisation and their failure

Following his recognition as a man, Gungubele married. Over the next decade he took two more wives. Polygamy remained the standard for African men in the Tambookie location and well-to-do men were expected to have more wives than ordinary people.[12] The missionaries were particularly opposed to polygamy and anxious to see it replaced with nuclear marriage. They believed that Christian teaching would slowly change attitudes and practices. But they also knew that change was more likely to occur if there were examples to follow.

For some years, Bishop Gray, the Anglican Bishop of Cape Town, had been conducting an experiment of his own. He had taken the daughter of the Ngqika chief, Sandile, to be educated in Cape Town. She was baptised as Emma and attended Zonnebloem, a school established for the children of chiefs. Since Emma was the only girl, she lived with Bishop Gray and his family and grew up alongside his daughters. By the time she turned 21, Emma was an accomplished young lady who read avidly and played the piano, the accomplishments of young Victorian women. Whether in discussion with Emma or on his own, Gray came to believe that his protégé would be of greatest value to the civilising and modernising project of colonialism if she married a chief. As the wife of a chief, she would have influence over her husband and serve as a model

12 1865 Commission on Native Affairs, Interview with Warner, 11 February 1865, p.68.

for others to follow. Gray and his counterpart in Grahamstown contrived that Emma should marry Ngangelizwe, the Thembu *kumkani*. Though not a Christian, Ngangelizwe was on good terms with the missionaries and reputedly of pleasant disposition. As a senior chief he was an eminently eligible bachelor; a Christian wife would be a good influence on him and on Thembu society, the bishop believed.

Emma travelled to Thembuland and with JC Warner acting as a go-between, she was introduced to Ngangelizwe in January 1864. In great excitement and in the style of an educated Victorian lady, she wrote to her former school teacher:

> I must tell you that I have seen the young chief, he is a tall fine young man, and I must let you know that the marriage is going to take place. Oh! How I wish you could be here and see him take my hand and kiss it, and I love him to, I am sure you would like him if you were to see him, and you would be quite amused with him.

She was in love. Philip Wodehouse, the colonial governor, visited Glen Grey and reported that Emma was indeed 'happy and contented' and that Ngangelizwe intended to 'build her a decent home and to treat her in a civilised manner'.[13] Gray's plan seemed to be going well.

Marriage for the Thembu *kumkani* was a matter of serious politics; his wives were selected by his councillors from royal families, with whom the abaThembu forged alliances cemented by the payment of lobola. This exchange of women for cattle was the first obstacle. When Emma's father, Sandile, demanded lobola for his daughter, Bishop Gray refused, declaring that he would not 'give Emma up' to be 'sold into slavery'; as an adult and a British subject, she was 'entitled to act for herself' and would not be forced into any marriage against her will.[14] Sandile did not press the point. There was a further glitch, this time from the groom's side. Ngangelizwe's councillors were adamant that the Thembu *kumkani* could not have only one wife. The idea was absurd; it was a ploy to weaken the Thembu king. While the councillors did not forbid the marriage, they insisted that if Emma married the king, she would have to accept co-wives. Ngangelizwe had to convey this message to her. Sihele's account of how Ngangelizwe approached Emma is suggestive:

13 J. Hodgson, *Princess Emma* (Craighall: AD Donker, 1987), p.111–113.
14 Correspondence between Bishop Gray and Warden Glover quoted in Hodgson, *Princess Emma*, pp.95–104.

> Then the hairy puffadder of Mtirara which was sighted by the Mbanga women going to work was shown in where the bride was. He was there for rather a long time, and people were beginning to wonder as to what was actually happening. At last, out he came. Notasi's son came out shouting saying: 'Saddle the horses, saddle them and let us go. I don't want that girl at all.'[15]

Whether Ngangelizwe was pleading with Emma to accept polygamy or whether he was frightening her away, we do not know. Either way, there was no reconciliation. Emma was deeply hurt, but neither she nor Bishop Gray would countenance polygamy. Devastated, Emma was sent to earn her keep as a school teacher at St Matthew's Mission in the diocese of Grahamstown. The colonists' failure to achieve the match indicated their limited reach in the complex matters of gender relations.

At St Matthew's, Emma became romantically involved with a fellow teacher and was viewed as an embarrassment to the church. To protect its image, the church would see to it that she married the first available chief. With the help of JC Warner, Emma was touted about the countryside from one chief to another. She was taken to the Gwatyu to meet Gungubele, but he complained that she was too old. Emma was 26, the same age as the Tshatshu chief. Horrified at what was happening to Emma, the Reverend Newton, Gungubele's missionary at St Peter's took the unusual step of criticising the church in the press. Emma was very unhappy, he wrote; it was not right that the church should return her to 'heathenism' against her will.[16] Despite the objection of one of its missionaries, the Anglican church, it seems, was unrepentant and wanted Emma off their hands. She had become a liability.

Emma was offered to Raxoti Matanzima in Emigrant Thembuland, but he too rejected her, complaining that he already had 'too many wives'. Matanzima advised Warner to take her to his neighbour, Stokwe Ndlela, who had fewer wives. Stokwe was interested. Already married to one of the Gcaleka chief Sarhili's daughters, the idea of marriage to two Xhosa princesses appealed to him. Emma, the daughter of Sandile, *kumkani* of the amaNgqika, would boost his status.[17] Emma had little option but to agree to the marriage. Over the next 10 years, Stokwe took seven more wives but gave Emma the status of great wife.

15 Sihele, 'Who are the abaThembu', p.92.
16 Who the teacher was remains unspoken; Hodgson, *Princess Emma*, pp.117–128; *Queenstown Free Press*, 21 August 1868.
17 Hodgson, *Princess Emma*, p.130; Sihele, 'Who are the abaThembu', p.92.

Emma adapted to rural life. She had five children, tilled the fields and helped her husband to keep a note of his land grants. Stokwe was not interested in education and Emma's children did not go to school. On special occasions, she set down her gardening hoe and played the piano at the Glen Grey mission.

This meddling in gender relations was but one dimension of colonial experimentation that encompassed a range of productive and social restructuring ventures. The Tambookie location was the site of one of the most ambitious projects of colonial modernisation. In its magisterial controls and administrative system, and through exposure to new farming methods and trading stores, this location was geared towards inculcating modernising influences.[18] From the mid-1850s to the mid-1860s, superintendent Warner sought to introduce ideas about the beneficial occupation of land that mimicked those imposed on white settlers — the fencing of lands, controlled movement of livestock, productive ways of tilling the soil and systematic upgrading of the homestead. He believed that by working for white farmers who had settled in the border districts, the abaThembu would acquire new farming skills. In 1870, this drive to impose colonial modernisation was strengthened with the appointment of Edward Judge as the magistrate (civil commissioner) in Queenstown. With the support of Sir Philip Wodehouse, the governor, Judge devised a template for speeding up the modernisation experiment. His plan was to get rid of communal tenure and to replace chiefs with modernising headmen. As principal moderniser, he would appoint the headmen, oversee the surveying of land into plots and supervise the introduction of individual tenure.[19]

In 1870, the Tambookie location was comprised of a population of about 15 000, of whom about 6 000 were adult men. Since the previous year, each household head had paid hut tax, generating funds for the location's administration. To strengthen his modernising drive, achieve greater control and ease the load of the superintendent, Judge divided the location into two administrative sections, overseen from Dordrecht and Queenstown respectively.[20] The combined area became the district of Glen Grey. Judge worked closely with James Ayliff, whom he appointed as magistrate in Dordrecht, and

18 Shula Marks describes how a retired educationist saw schooling as a means of acculturating a young woman almost a hundred years later. S. Marks (ed), *Not Either an Experimental Doll: The Separate Worlds of Three South African Women: Correspondence of Lily Moya, Mabel Palmer and Sibusisiwe Makhanya* (Pietermaritzburg: Killie Campbell Library Publications No 2, 1987).

19 1865 Commission on Native Affairs, Interview with Warner, 11 February 1865, p.70; The team was comprised of Edward Judge, James Ayliff, a native administrator and H. Southey, a land surveyor.

20 See fn.2.

H. Southey, the man who was to survey the land into plots. Judge himself remained in Queenstown.

In 1871, he appointed the first batch of headmen and allocated the first surveyed farms. The process ruffled a great many feathers. Judge identified the two most senior chiefs as Mpangele, the Gcina chief in the Dordrecht division, and Gungubele in the Queenstown section. The most senior Hala chief in the location was Mfanta, Raxoti Matanzima's brother by a junior house, but since he was planning to return to Thembuland, Judge declared that the amaHala had no chief in the location.[21] Tensili, chief of the amaNdungwana, was a very minor chief, in Judge's view.

Judge was determined that the modern district of Glen Grey would replace communal land arrangements and Warner's system of administration through information gathering, which Judge disparagingly described as 'espionage'. His model for modernising the location was built around the idea of individual tenure, taxation and the appointment of headmen regardless of their standing in Thembu society. It introduced a new form of stratification. At the bottom of the pyramid were ordinary residents who would live on surveyed farms without title. Headmen would supervise them and their farming activities. The next tier involved the grouping of farms into blocks of 10 or 12 under a field cornet appointed by the magistrate. These field cornets reported to the magistrate. Gungubele and his councillors disapproved of the colonial appointment of headmen, the idea of field cornets, the system of land allocation and the payment of taxes.

From the outset, Judge's social engineering created an atmosphere of unease. A glimpse into the uncertainty of relationships can be seen in a press report on Charles Brownlee's visit in 1873. At the end of the visit, Mfanta proposed the vote of thanks and in good ritual form declared that the residents had no complaints. He thanked the government for 'all they had done' and Edward Judge 'for his good advice at all times', promising that the people would do their best to follow his injunctions to eradicate burweed. More cynically, chief Xantini said he 'did not believe a word the other chiefs had said. As soon as the great chief's back was turned they would forget all about it and do nothing.' Gungubele's councillors remained silent even though they recognised that Judge's system was undermining the chiefs.[22]

21 BC 500 Judge Papers, Letter to Colonial Secretary, 17 July 1870. Judge proposed that Gungubele receive a farm of 2570 hectares and Tensili a farm of 10 280 to 12 850 hectares

22 BC 500 Judge Papers, Letter to Colonial Secretary, 17 July 1870; *Queenstown Free Press*, 'Meeting of the Hon C Brownlee with over 15 000 Tambookies at the Bolotwa on Tuesday 14 inst.', 11 February 1873; Blue Book on Native Affairs 1878, John Hemming, Civil Commissioner to the Hon J.X. Merriman, Commissioner of Crown Lands, 5 December 1877, p.193.

When the surveying was completed in 1876, Gungubele and Mpangele, as the most senior chiefs, were given the largest farms. Mshweshwe, son of Gungubele's brother, Somana, was also allocated a farm. Educated at the Anglican seminary in Grahamstown, Mshweshwe lived on the Bolotwa close to St John the Baptist Mission Station. Gungubele did not get on with his nephew whom he felt was too close to the Queenstown magistracy.

Gungubele did not take up title to the farm he was granted. He had other ideas. In a bid to get back his father's land, he approached Commandant WC Bouwer, a farmer in the Swart Kei valley from where the amaTshatshu had been removed. Gungubele made an offer to purchase the farm, Mapassa Poort, one of three granted to Bouwer and his sons in 1852.[23] These farms were allotted on the quitrent system as reward for the part the Bouwer men had played in the Eighth Frontier War. Gungubele's bid to return to his father's land was a bold and clever move. His offer to purchase demonstrated that he would play the colonists at their own game. If land was a commodity to be bought and sold, he would avail himself of the opportunity. There was no law forbidding him to purchase land in the white border district of Queenstown. He would enter into a commercial exchange with a willing seller. His intention was not to abandon the Gwatyu but to extend the land available to his people and to restore the dignity of the amaTshatshu. His initiative was supported by those among his followers who were willing to farm in the Swart Kei valley and contribute to financing the purchase.

In November, Gungubele purchased Mapassa Poort for the sum of £2 200, paying the first instalment of £200 on the day of the sale. He was anxious for his people to take occupation. It was the rainy season and he wanted immediate occupation. Ploughing commenced and grain pits were dug, plastered and sealed in anticipation of a good harvest. But Gungubele and his people were not to reap what they had planted. The return of the Tshatshu chief was short-lived.

When the second instalment of £800 fell due on 1 January 1877, Gungubele was unable to come up with the full sum. His partial payment of £300 was rejected by Commandant Bouwer on the advice of his lawyer, JW Bell of Queenstown, who sued for the balance of the payment, plus interest and costs. In October, the Circuit Court found in Bouwer's favour and a summons

23 Three farms were allocated to the Bouwer family: Mapassa Leven, Mapassa Kraal and Mapassa Poort. Aubrey Somana gives Mapassa Leven as the farm that Gungubele purchased but the colonial records indicate that Bouwer lived on Mapassa Leven and sold Mapassa Poort. Blue Book on Native Affairs 1878, Messrs Bell and Shepstone to Civil Commissioner, 26 November 1877, p.188.

was issued against Gungubele. Hemming claimed that he had tried to dissuade the chief from buying the farm in the first instance and when he could not raise the second instalment, he had advised him to cancel the sale.[24] Ignoring the lawyer, the Tshatshu chief requested renegotiation of the timing of the second instalment. His cattle would stand surety. Neither Bell nor Hemming was willing to indulge him.[25] His people were chased from the farm. A hundred years later in the mid-1970s, Gungubele's grain pits were found intact.[26]

Gungubele faced sequestration; all his stock and the farm granted him in the Tambookie location would be handed over. Protesting yet another instance of colonial injustice, he asked, 'Why should Bouwer have £500 and the farm too?' The magistracy was not at one on how to handle the situation. While the magistrate's clerk 'called for the exercise of the utmost caution and vigilance', Bouwer's lawyer 'publicly declared his intention of harassing Gungubele'. The magistrate also seemed intent on inciting Gungubele into rebellion.[27] Rumours that Gungubele faced imminent arrest travelled 'on the wind' (*ngomoya*).

Gungubele found a ready friend in Mfanta, whose brothers by different and more senior houses were Ngangelizwe of the great house, and Raxoti Matanzima of the right-hand house. Mfanta had grown up with Matanzima under Nonesi on the Imvani River. Like Nonesi, he did not cross over to Emigrant Thembuland where he would have been subordinate to his ambitious half-brother Matanzima. Preferring to remain loyal to the great house, he spent some time with Ngangelizwe in Thembuland but returned to the Bolotwa section of the Tambookie location in the mid-1870s.

In the politics of the Tambookie location, Mfanta grew closer to Gungubele. Despite differences in personality, they were drawn together in their opposition to Judge's administrative system, bitterly resenting the appointment of colonial headmen, the allocation of surveyed land to a select few and the imposition of tax on all residents. By chance, they both became embroiled in law suits against settlers. While Gungubele was wrangling with Bouwer's lawyer, Mfanta had

24 Blue Book on Native Affairs, Hemming to Merriman, November 1877, p.192.

25 BC 293 UCT Special Collections. Stanford Papers. Memo to S.S./Memo for Mr Solomon. Case of Gungubele (n.d.).

26 Interview with Gary Miles who found two grain pits beneath a clump of *Scotia* trees in 1975 when he was ploughing on the farm registered as Mapassa Poort. The pits were large enough to hold 30 bags of mealies, their solid walls of tightly packed mud and dung still intact and clean. They were covered by a large boulder. Sadly, the pits collapsed when the land was irrigated. Interview with Anne Mager, 28 May 2013.

27 Blue Book on Native Affairs 1878, Hemming to Merriman, 14 December 1877, p.194; Memo to S.S., p.2.

become caught up in an argument with a trader called Schultz who brought a libel suit against him, accusing him of 'warlike' intentions.[28] Like many other abaThembu, they saw colonial law as unjust, lacking a sense of fairness and stacked against African people. Even superintendent Warner could see that from a Thembu perspective, colonial law was devoid of the 'moral influence' that might govern social relations.[29] In its individualism and legal remedies, colonial law fostered conflict. These tensions were also present in Judge's approach to a modernist administration of the Tambookie location.

A mood of restlessness pervaded and the relationship between the magistrate and the residents began deteriorating rapidly as Judge's headmen and tax collectors traversed the location. Everyone resented paying taxes and those who had received title to farms struggled to meet their quitrent payments. The magistrate's messengers reported that they regularly encountered hostile residents standing 'at their kraal gates with assegais in their hands', daring them to attach their writs for debt.[30] Drought exacerbated these tensions. The rainfall in the summer of 1877 was below average and the effects were dire. 'There was but little doubt that a period of famine was fast approaching,' reported one colonial officer. 'At this season of the year the hillsides are usually covered with rich green grass; this year, however, the long-continued drought parched and withered every blade, and the country was red instead of green. Every streamlet was dried up, and the rivers stood still in their beds.'[31] Without the possibility of moving away in search of pasture, those confined within the location became increasingly agitated.

Hemming's campaign and the Battle of the Gwatyu

Beyond the frontier, war had broken out between Sarhili's amaGcaleka and the amaMfengu following a scuffle at a wedding feast on the border between their territories. The amaXhosa refer to this war as that of Ngcayecibi (vlei grass) after the man who had hosted the wedding feast; colonists referred to it as the Gcaleka War. Alliance partnerships kicked in and almost everyone east and west of the Great Kei River was drawn into the fray. Perceiving an opportunity

28 MSC 13 Merriman Papers. C.H. Driver Civil Commissioner Queenstown 18 December 1877; Wagenaar, History of the Thembu, p.285. Wagenaar, *A Forgotten Frontier Zone*.

29 1865 Commission on Native Affairs, p.67.

30 Hemming to Merriman, 26 November 1877, p.95.

31 A. A. T. Cunynghame, *My Command in South Africa, 1874–1878: comprising experiences of travel in the colonies of South Africa and the independent states*. Second Edition. (London, Macmillan, 1880), p.361; Editorial, *Queenstown Free Press* 29 December 1877.

to crush Sarhili, the colonial forces weighed in behind the amaMfengu. Colonial involvement in the conflict fuelled resentment among chiefs who chafed under the yoke of magistrates. In the Tambookie location, Gungubele and Mfanta readied themselves and waited. Their call would come from Sandile, chief of the amaNgqika, Maphasa's old ally.[32]

In the meantime, Mfanta was waging his own vendetta against the traders and spreading distrust. Towards the end of 1877, several traders on the Gwatyu were robbed. Hemming summoned Gungubele to Queenstown. But the chief was suspicious of the magistrate's intentions. He had reason to believe that Bouwer's lawyer wanted to have him arrested and sent a message that he would not come. Annoyed, the magistrate rode over to Gungubele's kraal and demanded that even if he did not personally go to Queenstown, he was to see that those responsible for attacking the trading stores in his section were delivered to the magistracy. Hemming described the encounter near Gungubele's great place:

> When we got to the bottom of the hill, Gongubele [sic] came to us. I told him then that I demanded the men who had been misconducting themselves. He was inclined to be insolent, [sic] he asked what colour are they, I said the same colour as yourself. Well, have they got ear marks so that I may know them? "You know well who they are and where they are for some of them are your counsellors," I said. He said he could not go after them as he had not got a pass. That is soon settled said I., "for here is a pass for you to go anywhere in South Africa, to find them" and I give you ten days to get them, if you do not I shall come again to you.[33]

Gungubele was playing the magistrate. Despite this verbal challenge, he handed over the men and the assegai-maker who lived near his kraal. It was evident, said one judicial officer, that Hemming was spoiling for a fight and did little to conceal it. CH Driver, the clerk in charge of the Tambookie location, urged Hemming not to antagonise the Tshatshu chief whom he believed was keen to avoid a fight. 'And if this farm business could be settled', he added, 'I think the

32 R. Bouch, 'Glen Grey before Cecil Rhodes: How a Crisis of Local Colonial Authority led to the Glen Grey Act of 1894', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 27, 1 (1993), pp.1–24; R. Bouch, 'The colonisation of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland 1852–1886', PhD Thesis, University of London (1990), pp.140–161; R. Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Ventury Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.353.

33 Cory library. Sir George E Cory Interviews 5/3/14. Cory Notes Vol 9 pp. 484–488 'The Gungubele Affair, Conversation with Mr Hemming on the Gungubele Affair'.

danger of his doing so could be averted provided the amaNgqika [his alliance partners south of the location] remain quiet.'[34] There was a simple solution the clerk explained: the government should pay Gungubele's debt to Bouwer, take over the farm, allow him to live there and recover the cost through hut tax. But Hemming preferred to take his counsel from Bell, Bouwer's pugnacious lawyer, and sought permission from the governor to build up a contingent of armed men.

Rumours that Gungubele was about to join forces with Sarhili intensified as Christmas approached. Hemming claimed to have been informed by Gungubele's nephew, Mshweshwe, that he was in talks with Sandile and was prepared to fight. White traders and farmers on the Swart Kei flocked into Queenstown, telling stories of 'Tambookies selling sheep and purchasing blankets, saddles, bridles, tinder boxes, knives, and hatchets' and of their moving about the location, carrying arms in readiness for war. Christmas came and went without incident. On Boxing Day, Gungubele sent his brother to Queenstown to report to Hemming that he could not come in person as there were rumours that he was to be arrested.[35]

In the new year, martial law was proclaimed in the border districts of Queenstown and Wodehouse. Hemming's request for troops was approved. Tensions in the Tambookie location intensified. At the Bolotwa, Gungubele's men impounded the cattle of his nephew Mshweshwe, son of his brother, Somana. Gungubele did not get along with Mshweshwe, saw him as a lackey of the colonists and held him in deep distrust. They also took Herman Kubi as prisoner. Hemming's spies found bundles of assegais in the hut of Mfanta.[36] This was evidence enough for the colonists that the Tshatshu chief was preparing for war.[37] Impatient for action, Hemming issued a warrant of arrest for a group of men who had allegedly harassed a colonial work-party in Gungubele's area.

34 Memo to S.S., p.7–8; Cape of Good Hope Blue Book on Native Affairs, C.H. Driver, Clerk in Charge, Tambookie location to John Hemming, Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, Queen's Town, 3 December 1877, p.196.

35 Wagenaar, History of Thembu, p.286; *Grahamstown Journal*, 'The Trial of Gungubele', 29 July 1878; Untitled, *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 January 1878; MSC 13 N.J. Merriman Collection 1828–1878 Digest of Evidence against Gungubele; 'Local and General', *Queenstown Free Press*, 29 December 1877.

36 See D.L.P. Yali-Manisi, 'Idabi laseGwatyu' in P.T. Mtuze and R.H. Kaschula (eds) *Izibonga zomthonyama* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1993), p.63; Mshweshwe was the son of Somana, Maphasa's brother; Kubi's evidence to circuit court in 'The Outbreak in the Tembu location', *Queenstown Free Press*, 7 June 1878; Blue Book on Native Affairs, Hemming to Merriman, 11 January 1878, p.195.

37 Cape of Good Hope Blue Book on Native Affairs 1878, Driver, Clerk in Charge, Tambookie location to John Hemming, Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, Queen's Town, 4 December 1877, p.198; Affidavit of G. Schwaartz, p.199; Affidavit of F. Deckert, pp.199–200. See also *Queenstown Free Press*, 5 January 1878.

When the chief did not respond, Hemming marched with his troops to the Gwatyu.

News of the advancing colonial troops travelled quickly. Women buried their cooking pots and made for the mountains while the men mustered at Gungubele's great place. With no way out, the chief summoned Sovag, the medicine man, to minister protection to the fighters. Sovag worked for a white farmer and it took some time to fetch him.[38] Commander John Mayaba, aka 'No Go', a former servant in Queenstown and reputedly a 'deadly shot', planned the defence of Gungubele's great place. Sovag rubbed a potion of ox-liver and root powder into the warriors' joints and hung a necklace of roots around each one's neck, promising that they would turn into bullets at the critical moment. But before he had tended to all the assembled men — together Mfanta's and Gungubele's fighters numbered several thousand — Hemming's forces were sighted. The fighters grabbed their guns and assegais and rushed to prevent them reaching the great place. But the battle did not go well. Gungubele and Mfanta were forced to retreat. Gungubele lost at least 100 men; his step-brother was wounded and taken prisoner. His leg was amputated in the Queenstown and Frontier Hospital. Some 60 horses, among them Gungubele's white riding horse, were captured and his great place was torched. Three days later, 2 000 men took position on the White Kei River opposite St Marks Mission Station and taunted the colonial forces that had gathered there under the command of Mr Levey, resident magistrate in Emigrant Thembuland. On 24 January, Gungubele's fighters took on the colonists in 'the Battle of the Gwatyu'. The battle was bloody. Gungubele and Mfanta lost 180 men. Mshweshwe, son of Somana, was accused of feeding information to the colonists and his body was pierced by more than 30 assegais.[39] His death, wrote the poet Yali-Manisi, was that of a traitor:

> *Samqond' aph' uMsheshwe kaSomana, Sihleli nje kanti yinjilaphethu; Kuba nguye owahal' amaGwangqa, Wawabonis'amaXhoba kaThukwa.* [We

38 Sovag is spelled Sonag in some sources.

39 Evidence of Herman Kubi to Circuit Court, 'The Outbreak in the Tembu location', *Queenstown Free Press*, 7 June 1878; Circuit Court, Queenstown. *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 July 1878, evidence of Manisano, John Gala and Kwenzi (Quinsey) for Mfanta; Kube, Jantjie and Mati for Gungubele. Nearly 100 men were charged, most of them convicted of sedition; Estimates of those killed varied between 100 and 150 of Gungubele's men; three colonial volunteers were injured. See 'The Gongobello Campaign: The First Engagement', *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 January 1878; Matanzima, Ndarala and Stokwe all sent troops at this point. See 'St Marks', *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 January 1878; 'Last Saturday's Fight', *Queenstown Free Press*, 2 February 1878.

> thought we understood Mshweshwe, son of Somana, but while we were sitting with him, it turned out that he was not with us; he was the one who called the whites and showed them where the victims are.] [40]

Gungubele's men regrouped in the mountains at the confluence of the Swart and White Kei rivers where they were joined by Mfanta. From this stronghold, they 'baffled all attempts to dislodge [them]' for several days.[41] Hemming called for reinforcements. On 4 February, Commandant Griffith of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police attacked Gungubele's stronghold with 1 200 men. The warriors broke up into small groups and carried on fighting a guerrilla war, moving about 'from place to place' and retreating to the mountains after brief encounters. As supplies of food and gunpowder ran out, they were worn down. Groups of women and children began surrendering themselves to the colonial forces. By the end of February, the Gwatyu was a wasteland and St Peter's lay in smouldering ruins.

Gungubele took refuge among the amaNgqika south of the Tambookie location. On 9 April, he and 14 councillors (among them a man who had been employed as a detective in the colonial service for 17 years) handed themselves over to the Queenstown magistrate. Soon after, Mfanta and his ally, Stokwe Tyali, were arrested. Stokwe Tyali took up arms late in the war; his crops and homestead were scorched in punishment for supporting the anti-colonial 'rebels'. Hundreds of fighters handed themselves in, with the *Queenstown Free Press* reporting a figure of over 400. When the gaol was filled, the men were accommodated in trading stores commandeered for the purpose. The three chiefs were charged with treason, a crime that carried the death penalty, and with sedition (inciting people to rebel against the state). Passing judgement on their followers, Justice Dwyer of the Circuit Court scolded, 'You were happy and well off in the Tambookie Location but were led to break out. Now nearly all the chiefs are sent or taken prisoners, and one condemned to be hanged ... you are the dupes of Gungubele and Umfanta.' Dwyer handed down sentences of between three and five years with hard labour to over 100 men. Sovag, Gungubele's war doctor, was sentenced to 25 lashes and 5 years' imprisonment for 'deceiving the people' while Mfanta's war doctor was given only one year with hard labour. [42]

Gungubele's trial was rigged from the start. The judge was advised by a jury of white colonists, out of whom three had participated in the attack on

40 Yali-Manisi, 'Idabi lase Gwatyu', p.63. Translated by Anne Mager.
41 Thomas J. Lucas, *The Zulus and the British Frontier* (London: Chapman Hall, 1879), pp.276–279.
42 'Circuit Court', *Queenstown Free Press*, 6 April 1878, 26 July 1878.

the chief. One was the son of JW Bell, Bouwer's lawyer. When Gungubele's defence objected that the composition of the jury might compromise the trial, the court had no difficulty in dismissing the argument. The hearing lasted no more than a day and the jury deliberately ignored the evidence. Witness after witness testified that Gungubele was opposed to war but was pushed by the *amaphakati*, his councillors. Hendrich Bamba, who described himself as umNgqika living on the Gwatyu, said under oath, 'The chief continually said I am not fighting. I don't want war; it was the great councillors who urged war' and added that Gungubele invariably 'drove the people away and said they were not to hold meetings' to talk about war. He had once heard Nomiba, a councillor, say to Gungubele, 'If you go to Queenstown [ie, to the magistrate] and don't fight I shall get another chief as you are with the Government'.

The jury also ignored the testimony of Reverend Newton, Gungubele's missionary who testified to the good character of the chief. Reverend Newton's evidence corroborated the view that the councillors were the belligerents. 'I saw him every week and saw nothing to lead me to suppose he was anxious to go to war with the Government. He has been chief about twelve years. I think he is entirely in the hands of his councillors. Some of them were councillors to his father.' Indeed, Mtyelela, Makendhlana and Chief Hlenuka had served Maphasa and were keen to resuscitate the power of the amaTshatshu. But Newton's corroboration of the evidence, that Gungubele had opposed war and had wrangled with his councillors, did not sway the court.[43]

As a white man who did not support the aggression of the colonists or the treachery of the magistrate, Gungubele's missionary became the target of colonial gossip, innuendo and treachery; and his role in the war was subjected to official inquiry. Newton had annoyed Hemming by refusing to leave his station until the afternoon of the attack when he walked over to the Bolotwa. Here he met up with the colonial troops who asked for directions to Gungubele's kraal. But the troops followed a different path and by ignoring Newton's advice, allegedly avoided an ambush. Building a case of conspiracy and treason against Newton, whom he had once described as an upright man, Hemming extracted a statement from a prisoner to the effect that the missionary had advised Gungubele to 'fight hard'. He also obtained a statement against Newton from Reverend Patten at the Bolotwa who was well-known as 'a man of notoriously

43 'The Surrender of Gongobella', *Queenstown Free Press*, 13 April 1878; 'Circuit Court', *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 July 1878.

low and immoral character', a man whose integrity was in doubt.[44] Ultimately, a government inquiry exonerated Newton from any wrong-doing in the course of Hemming's campaign.[45] For all his anguish, Newton fared better than Gungubele at the hands of the colonists.

To suit their ends, the Queenstown jury relied exclusively on the evidence of one man who had not been anywhere near the conflict and appeared to have been coached. It took them only 30 minutes to reach a unanimous decision of guilty. The judge sentenced the Tshatshu chief to death. Later, Gungubele's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The High Court in Grahamstown accepted the evidence that the chief had been pushed by his councillors. Gungubele was held on Robben Island and separated from Mfanta who was committed to hard labour for life and held at the Breakwater Prison, where he died.[46] Mfanta's tiny group of followers was dispersed and the amaTshatshu were all but destroyed.

Built up systematically over several months, Hemming's campaign had been the final stage in the conquest of the amaTshatshu. Stage by stage, Hemming had built up a personal antipathy towards Gungubele and used his position as a frontier magistrate to escalate conflict so that he might justify calling in colonial troops and waging war against him. He had supported John Bell, the scurrilous lawyer of Willem Bouwer, hounded the chief to administer the unpopular measures introduced to introduce modernity to the Tambookie location, and incited his councillors to war. He had persuaded the governor to send colonial troops to fight Gungubele and, on the chief's defeat, had rigged the jury. As the sham trial got underway, he sought to discredit the chief's missionary and published one-sided accounts of this heroic battle in the colonial press. This campaign, in the words of a Circuit Court judge, had resulted in the 'practical extermination of a whole clan'. Hemming achieved what Cathcart's proclamation had intended in 1852.

44 'The Gongobella Campaign'; Letter to editor Gwytu [sic] Station, *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 January 1878; Stanford Papers. Memorandum for Mr Solomon (no date) Case of the Rev. A.J. Newton, p.14.

45 Newton's wife fell into depression and died a few months after the rumours against her husband began. Newton rebuilt St Peter's on the Indwe River in Emigrant Thembuland in 1899.

46 The jury included James Stewart, G.A. Fincham, Edward Cotterrell, Samuel Larter, S.C. Bell, D. Coombes, James Hagan, James (surname indistinct, newsprint damaged), G.T. Stewart, James Fordham, J.J. Edwards, John Miles and W. Jeffrey, 'Circuit Court', *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 July 1878. Three of the men were challenged by Advocate Foster for having taken part in the Battle of the Gwatyu. See Appendix 4 for extract on the press report of the trial of Gungubele; 'Circuit Court', *Queenstown Free Press*, 26 July 1878.



Figure 3.6: John Hemming, civil commissioner (magistrate) in Queenstown in the 1870s. Cape Archives Photographs AG 1217.

Figure 3.7: Sir George Cathcart, Governor and Commander in Chief at the Cape (January 1852-March 1854). Elliott Collection E451.

While Hemming's account of the campaign was entirely self-serving, justified by a desire to acquire more land for white settlers, there were some among the colonists who were disturbed by the treachery of the campaign and the miscarriage of justice at the trial.[47] They wanted to know if indeed the magistrate had misled them into believing that the Tshatshu chief was a dangerous warmonger, who had authorised his military campaign and why Gungubele, a British subject, had not been treated in an appropriate manner. Their answer came from an unexpected quarter.

General Sir Arthur Cunynghame, the queen's Commander in Chief in South Africa, condemned Hemming's behaviour. The magistrate did not have the authority to declare war and should be brought to book, he stated. In a formal minute to the South African Parliament, published in the *Queenstown Free Press*, Cunynghame described Hemming's actions as 'arbitrary and illegal'.[48] The magistrate, he said, had jeopardised imperial authority by taking wholly unwarranted action against a British subject and had endangered the safety of colonists in the border districts:

47 Hemming, 'A Narrative of the Proceedings', pp.101–124.
48 T. Cunynghame, General, 'The Gongobella Affair', *Queenstown Free Press*, 24 May 1878.

> Gongobella [sic] was a British subject, residing within the jurisdiction of the courts of law, and if he had committed any act against the laws of the colony, there were proper methods of procedure; but it is not tolerable that any resident magistrate should be given carte-blanche to lead a warlike expedition against any person who has not successfully obeyed his command to capture and deliver up wrongdoers, or who, under a false impression, has taken suitable measures to repel an anticipated attack. In all that Gongobella [sic] did, there is nothing to indicate any disloyalty against government, and it is the purest tyranny of might to crush him to pieces on the first paltry excuse.

Cunynghame also pointed a finger at John Xavier Merriman, a pro-settler Member of the Cape Parliament, who had taken over the conduct of the war, colluded with Hemming and taken it upon himself to authorise the campaign. Merriman, he fumed, was driven by a 'thirst for power [that] almost amounted to a mania'. His support for Hemming meant that there was little chance of his being brought to book.[49] Cunynghame was proven correct. The demise of Gungubele's chieftaincy and the destruction of the people west of the Great Kei are instances of how settler colonialism extended the limits of coercion, drawing colonial force to itself.

The demise of the Tambookie location, and the Qwathi rebellion

Gungubele's arrest rendered his followers deeply insecure. Yiliswa and a handful of supporters huddled together on a farm which had been surveyed for her, but for which she had not been given the title deed. Insecurity prevailed. Many of those who were not jailed moved out of the location and Raxoti Matanzima eyed the land they vacated. [50] In January 1881, the Gwatyu was proclaimed a native location, suggesting that this section might be excised from the rest of the Tambookie location. However, colonial plans were interrupted by the outbreak of war on the north-eastern frontier.[51]

49 Cunynghame, *My Command in South Africa*, pp.364–370; Wagenaar, 'History of the Thembu', p.404.

50 Mthatha Archives File 3/20/3/1 Old No 283/22 NAD St Mark's Locations, Location No 1: Ndlunkulu, A.M. Stanford, Assistant Chief Magistrate Transkeian Territories to Secretary of Native Affairs, 12 April 1906.

51 CO 5869 Proclamation by His Excellency Sir George Cumine Strahan, Proclamation no 4, 1881 (3 January 1881) under the provision of Act no 6 of 1876 and Act no 8 of 1878; Government Gazette no 6098. Because the Gwatyu was in the Queenstown district, it came under regulations for native locations within the Colony. See Native Locations Act no 37 of 1884 for more detail on these regulations.

This time the protagonists were amaQwathi chiefs, among them Stokwe Ndlela, husband of Emma Sandile and leader of the amaQwathi of Emigrant Thembuland. The amaQwathi were abaThembu by allegiance rather than descent and they guarded their autonomy carefully. In the mid-1870s, colonial penetration of Thembuland and the weakness of the Thembu *kumkani* were complicating this allegiance. The amaQwathi were distressed when Ngangelizwe asked for British protection after his violent domestic behaviour landed him in trouble with his father-in-law, Sarhili. Chief Dalasile, the Qwathi leader in Thembuland proper, was concerned that the Thembu *kumkani* was handing them over to the British.[52] Since Dalasile was not in good health, he wanted to ensure that his successor was not compromised by any terms that Ngangelizwe might have agreed to.

On 31 December 1875, the Special Commissioner for Transkeian Affairs met with Chief Dalasile and about 600 followers at All Saints Mission. In return for British protection, the amaQwathi were to pay tax, give up 'witchcraft', 'superstition' and 'smelling out' and submit to magisterial rule. Dalasile baulked. He replied that he did not want to receive a salary, pay tax or hand his authority to a magistrate. Responding to the British use of 'witchcraft' as a proxy for his culture, he added, 'I like witchcraft myself'. He would not be manipulated. 'I understood that giving myself to government meant giving myself up individually and that I should still have the management of my tribe as I came under government with clean hands.' But the die was cast; as the amaQwathi had feared, Probart informed them that Ngangelizwe, their king, had handed all who lived in Thembuland to the government. There was little they could do; Ngangelizwe had let them down. When the War of Ngcayecibi broke out two years later, the amaQwathi were prevented from supporting the amaGcaleka by the terms of Ngangelizwe's agreement with the British. They had little option but to 'sit still' while the fighting was on and provide refuge to fleeing amaGcaleka after it ended.[53]

52 Ngangelizwe was married to Novili, Sarhili's daughter. His reputation for domestic violence alarmed Sarhili and came to a head when Ngangelizwe beat Nongxokozelo, his wife's helper, and had her clubbed to death with a knobbed stick. Sihele, 'Who are the Thembu', pp.98–100; NA 1146 Papers of the Thembuland Commission 1883, 'Conditions under which the Tembus became British subjects 28 October 1875'.

53 Papers of the Thembuland Commission, Minutes of Meeting held 31 December 1875 between Mr Probart, Special Commissioner for Transkeian Affairs and Dalasile, Chief of the amaQwathi tribe (Tambookie) at All Saints Mission Station. Meeting chaired by William Wright, British Resident at Emjanyana. Cape of Good Hope Blue Book on Native Affairs 1878, Report of Acting Magistrate with Dalasile, Umtata 29 January 1878, p.114.

The Qwathi were keenly aware of growing white supremacy. They watched as the British seized the land of those recently conquered and were appalled by the congestion it caused all the way from the Tambookie frontier to Thembuland. They also resented those who were given land by the missions, who themselves had been granted land by chiefs. Even colonial officials acknowledged that people felt that they were 'being steadily pressed into a position where they must either fight or submit to dispossession of all the lands they formerly owned'.[54]

In October 1880, sparked by the murder of a magistrate at Qumbu in East Griqualand, this feeling of oppression by the British erupted into the Qwathi rebellion. The uprising drew in Thembu groups from across the region and lasted many months. Hundreds were killed. Among them was Stokwe Ndlela, Emma Sandile's husband. Emma was smelled out as the cause of the evil that had befallen her husband and accused of witchcraft. She escaped death by fleeing to the magistrate.[55] Known alternately as the Qwathi rebellion, the Thembuland uprising or the Gun War, this fight was the last major anti-colonial push encompassing the Tambookie frontier, and its consequences spread across greater Thembuland. The British defeated the amaQwathi, disbanded the Tambookie location and annexed Thembuland in the space of a few months. The British had conquered the abaThembu. The term Tambookie disappeared from official use with the demise of the Tambookie location. The abaThembu west of the Great Kei were to live in districts under the supervision of magistrates and native commissioners.

The colonial government appointed the Thembuland Settlement Commission to preside over the dispossession of those punished for taking up arms, the clearing of the Tambookie location in the Queenstown district and the relocation of its inhabitants. Under the guidance of John Hemming, the commission's chair, those removed were directed to locations where they might beg for a portion of land. Yiliswa sent her councillors to ask Hemming, the man who had destroyed Gungubele, for a place where her people might live. Hlenuka, Gungubele's old councillor who had served a five-year sentence for sedition after Gungubele's defeat in 1877, approached the commission on her behalf.

54 Papers of the Thembuland Commission, Telegram from Chief Magistrate Umtata to Secretary of Native Affairs, Aliwal North, on 11 September 1880 sent by H.H. Bunn.

55 G.2 – '85. Cape of Good Hope. Blue Book on Native Affairs 1885 Section 111 Thembuland, p.117; Emma was treated sympathetically in the wake of the rebellion and given a farm in the Glen Grey district. G. 66–'83. Cape of Good Hope. Reports and Proceedings of the Thembuland Commission Vol 1 (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1883), paragraph 22, p.9 in Cape of Good Hope, House of Assembly Sixth Session Parliament Annexures Votes and Proceedings, 1883, Vol 3.

Hemming offered Yiliswa, Gungubele's three wives and a few 'servants' a place in Glen Grey. But the Tshatshu royal family declined the offer. Despite their dire circumstances, they would not live under Matanzima. Hlenuka approached the Reverend Patten of St John the Baptist mission station at the Bolotwa to intercede on their behalf. Hemming delegated the task of relocating Yiliswa to Walter Stanford so that the commission would be 'rid of him [Hlenuka] and his following.'[56] Stanford followed up on Yiliswa's request and Hemming replied to Reverend Patten:

> I am directed to inform you, and to request you to inform Yiliswa, the mother, and the three wives of Gungubele, that the Resident Magistrate of Southeyville [C.J. Levey] has provided a place for themselves and such servants as he considers necessary, not exceeding five, at Bamboduna's location in his district and such location not to exceed 250 morgen of land at quitrent of £2/10 per annum being 20/– per 100 morgen.[57]

In August 1883, with the help of the Thembu *kumkani*, Yiliswa and a small group of followers trekked to Makwababa, near Cofimvaba in the St Marks district some 145 kilometres away. Here they set up home on land forfeited by Bambonduna after the Thembuland uprising.[58] Located on top of a hill overlooking grassy plains below, Makwababa was cold and windy in August and the amaTshatshu longed for the shelter of the mountains on the Gwatyu. Maphasa's brother, Chief Vezi, and a small group who could not be accommodated at Makwababa moved to Glen Grey. Smaller groups of amaTshatshu moved about the region where they were accommodated by other Thembu groups. Once the most powerful Thembu presence west of the Great Kei river, they had been reduced to a handful of families alongside strangers in scattered localities. Yali-Manisi, the Thembu praise poet, lamented, '*Phutumani maTshatshu zimkile, Zimkil*'

56 *Queenstown Free Press*, 'Circuit Court', 26 July 1878, p.4; colonial spelling of Hlenuka is inconsistent; G. 66–'83. Cape of Good Hope Sixth Session of Parliament 1883 Annexures Votes and Proceedings House of Assembly, Reports and Proceedings of the Thembuland Commission Vol 1 (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1883), p.10, John Hemming, Chairman to CF Driver, Esq, Lady Frere, 7 February 1883, p. E46 & E.47. For discussion of Thembuland Commission's land allocations in Xhalanga see Prof Lungisile Ntsebeza and Dr Fani Ncapayi, Land Reform in the Xhalanga district, Eastern Cape (A case study appended to the report on Land Redistribution) A research report commissioned by the High Level Panel of Parliament, 9 January 2016. https://www.parliament.gov.za accessed 18 April 2018.

57 Mthatha Archives File 3/20/3/1 Old No 283/22 NAD St Marks Locations Location No 1: Ndlunkulu.

58 G3 –'84, Cape of Good Hope Ministerial Department of Native Affairs Blue Book on Native Affairs 1884 (Cape Town, 1884), p.59; Report of Office of Civil Commissioner of Queenstown 21 January 1884; Somana, *AmaTshatshu*, p.37.

iinkomo zakoYiliswa'. [Follow on amaTshatshu, they have gone, the cows of Yiliswa have gone.] [59]

Yiliswa struggled to settle at Makwababa. Stanford's letter had implied that she would receive quitrent title but the land was allocated as communal. While quitrent had been unpopular on the Gwatyu, Yiliswa hoped that it might bring security at Makwababa. Her section of the location was small and her people were desperately crowded. In 1886, Yiliswa applied for more land and requested that it be granted on the quitrent tenure system. But her request was refused; colonial modernisation had not yet extended to this area. The Secretary of Native Affairs informed her that no titles were issued in this area and that she was to wait for surveying to be carried out before applying again.[60]

In 1888, Gungubele was released from Robben Island as part of an amnesty for Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Mfanta remained imprisoned at the Breakwater Prison where he is believed to have died. Gungubele was taken to Makwababa to reunite with his family. Yiliswa died two years after his release. Gungubele applied to regain the farm granted to him on the Gwatyu in 1876, but his request was refused on the grounds that the farm had been allocated prior to the annexation of Emigrant Thembuland and that he had lost his title.[61]

Makwababa was the smaller section of Qhitsi with 69 hut tax payers as opposed to the neighbouring 129; the headmanship went to Palele. Once a popular chief with a large following, Gungubele had been stripped of his dignity, authority and land. His people were refugees on the fringes of distant communities, marginalised and impoverished. Their economic system had been destroyed and the future held little prospect of recovery. They had lost their self-esteem and with it, part of their identity. This was the meaning of conquest. Gungubele died in 1923; he was buried at Makwababa.[62]

Gungubele's life story is a tale of tragedy. When he succeeded to the chieftainship of the amaTshatshu in the late 1860s, Gungubele was a forward-looking young man and a popular leader. In the 1870s, he was steadily worn down by the imposition of colonial regulations that undermined his authority and by magistrates who fomented trouble. He struggled to contain the discontent

59 Yali-Manisi, 'Idabi lase Gwatyu', p.63.

60 Office of Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, Cape of Good Hope, 13 September 1886, L. Marquard to Rev. D. Doig Young. Assist Chief Magistrate Umtata 9 March 1906.

61 Secretary of Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 30 April 1906.

62 Mthatha Archives File 3/20/3/1 Old No 283/22 NAD St Marks Locations Location No 1; Ndlunkulu. Resident Magistrate Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate Umtata 10 June 1909; 'Ukumisela kwelaBatembu', *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 9 May 1889; 'Umhleli Elizweni', *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 24 March 1914.

of his councillors and followers. In 1877, he was forced into a corner by the treachery of John Hemming, the magistrate in Queenstown. Culminating in the Battle of the Gwatyu, Hemming's campaign had been the final stage of conquest for the amaTshatshu. When he came out of prison a decade later, Gungubele found that the entire Thembu kingdom had been conquered and dispossessed. His people, the amaTshatshu, were vulnerable and dependent on others; their esteem was at a low ebb. Power over the lives of his countrymen and women was now in the hands of British officials in charge of 'native affairs'. Their task was to ensure that African lives facilitated settler economic exploitation of the British territory that in 1910 became the Union of South Africa. In this divided nation, all black people suffered under the yoke of colonialism, but those who resisted strongly, and whom conquest devastated dramatically, suffered severely in the ensuing decades. We explore what colonialism meant for Gungubele's sons and chiefly power west of the Great Kei River in the next chapter.



Z. 25.

Reference No. 123

In replying please quote the above number.

Met verwijzing naar No.

Gelieve bij beantwoording bovenstaand nummer aan te halen.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.—UNIE VAN ZUID-AFRIKA.

PRETORIA, 191...

SIR, WELEDELE HEER,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your minute
Ik heb de eer ontvangst te erkennen van uw

No. 283/1/191 of the 7th instant on the subject of
No. d.d. betreffende

death of Headman Gungubele Mapasa, St Marks.

and to inform you that your recommendation in regard
en u mede te delen dat

to the appointment of a minor chief will
be awaited.

I have the honour to be,—Ik heb de eer te zijn,
Sir,—Weledele Heer,
Your obedient Servant,
Uw dw. dienaar,

4054—5/6/19—50,000 S,

Msna.

Figure 3.8: Gungubele's death certificate. Mthatha Archives.

CHAPTER 4

The politics of public office under apartheid and the rise of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima

In the wake of the Thembuland uprising, the amaTshatshu were forcibly removed for the third time since Maphasa's death in 1852 and were even more widely dispersed. Some went across to Emigrant Thembuland, where they formed the tiny settlement of Tshatshu in the Glen Grey district, or found a spot in one of the other locations. Yiliswa and her family moved to Makwababa in the St Marks district, where Gungubele joined them on his release from Robben Island a few years later. To make way for their father, Gungubele's older sons crossed the Tsomo River to settle at Caba in the Engcobo district about 50 kilometres to the east. Gcuwa, the eldest son and heir to the chieftaincy became headman at Caba. Only a few hours apart on foot, these locations fell into different districts and administrative regions of the Native Affairs Department (NAD). Tshatshu and Makwababa were in Emigrant Thembuland, while Caba was in Thembuland proper, the domain of the Thembu *kumkani*.[1]

Magisterial rule was applied across all these districts after the establishment of the NAD in 1894 but policy and administrative orientation reflected different degrees of colonial penetration. No land had been surveyed in the Transkei districts and communal systems of tenure prevailed. Surveying in Emigrant Thembuland had begun in the 1870s, in the northern part of the Glen Grey district which remained an area of African occupation when the Queenstown section was excised for white occupation. Superimposed on the northern part of the old Tambookie location, Glen Grey continued as a site for colonial modernisation. Sir George Grey's vision built on the experiment of the Tambookie location in the appointment of compliant headmen, the allocation of quitrent plots and the introduction of intensive farming methods. In 1894, the Cape Parliament passed the Glen Grey Act formalising this policy of modernising land tenure

1 For headmanship of Caba, see Mthatha Archives NAD, Resident Magistrate Engcobo to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 21 August 1923. See Chapter 2 for the establishment of Emigrant Thembuland in 1865 when Matanzima and three others defied Nonesi and crossed over the Indwe River. Raxoti Matanzima, half-brother of Mtirara, the *kumkani*, was the eldest son of the right-hand house and saw himself as the most senior chief in Emigrant Thembuland. Proclamation 140 of 1885 set the boundaries of the St Marks and Xhalanga districts that comprised Emigrant Thembuland.

and governance in anticipation of extending the experiment. Beyond Glen Grey, the rural locations (*ilali*) of Emigrant Thembuland (St Marks and Xhalanga districts) followed the principles of communal tenure, and farming plots were allocated to households by the headman. Across both regions, magistrates were appointed to see that the colonised were obedient and that they acquired industrious habits that served the colonial economy without drawing on its resources.



Figure 4.1: NAD districts in 1950. Xhalanga and St Marks comprise Emigrant Thembuland.

Politics and the idea of leadership in these colonised spaces were tied to public office, specifically the position of location headman, struggles over the hereditary line and entitlement to hold office. The headman served two competing mandates — he was to satisfy the magistrate that his people served the colonial project, and he had to convince his followers that he was looking out for their interests. Location residents did not necessarily identify with a single set of interests and the selection of a headman was often fraught. In many localities, people saw the hereditary chief as the keeper of identity. Proper succession mattered to people and contestation was expressed through the language of genealogy. So important was this oral history that magistrates required to administer customary law were compelled to consult African experts to corroborate the hereditary lineages presented to them.

Genealogies are more than a list of names; they are short stories passed down through oral tradition, a mode of telling that people live by. Genealogies are a way of knowing. They set out historical time and identify who belongs to whom. They are deployed as a political tool. Chiefs name their ancestral line and make claims on authority and power, ordinary people repeat the citations to indicate their belonging. Genealogies do not operate in a vacuum — custom, personality and political context also play a part in the determination of succession. Those who are not directly in the line of succession might secure power through other means. Some scholars have argued that to give credence to genealogy is to mask fluidities and to obscure the power that ambitious parties deploy in adapting stories to suit themselves. A less ideologically driven route is to ask questions, to probe and to examine the role that genealogy played in leadership succession in the colonised territories. This way allows for a more nuanced view of African epistemology and politics, and an appreciation of some of the complexities of local politics.

But there are challenges. Colonial administration brought greater rigidity to the principle of heredity in determining leadership. While magistrates followed genealogy as a default line of political control and mapped genealogies onto bounded territories, genealogies were not primarily in the hands of colonisers. Whether by following or departing from the table of succession, magistrates were not necessarily inventing tradition.[2] Genealogy was part of local political vernacular and of political deliberation. For chiefly families and those close to them, the ability to cite genealogy was all that was left of a more rounded way of knowing, a means of distinguishing one's past from that of others and so preventing its obliteration. Remembering the line of succession kept alive the possibility of reclaiming something that had been lost. At the same time, inventing a new line of authority created an opportunity to persuade others to believe in it. Both options held the prospect of forging a pathway to power.

Genealogies were valuable in real time. They were particularly useful in moments of change — when colonial policy sought to merge ethnicity and territory or when a headman was to be appointed. Genealogies encompassed the duties and responsibilities of each house in relation to the great house

2 I. Hofmeyr, '*We Spend Our Years as a Tale that Is Told*': *Oral historical narrative in a South African Chiefdom* (London: James Currey, 1994); C. Crais, 'Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa', *Journal of Social History*, 39, 3, Special Issue on the Future of Social History (Spring 2006), pp.721–740; C. Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) discusses these limits.

and, in this respect, genealogies were less rigid than they might seem. In some instances, the rights of a house changed in response to conquest and colonialism. Jeff Peires shows that the right-hand house of the amaXhosa sought to generate a new line of succession consequent to its geographical separation from the great house. It was not custom for the right-hand house to separate from the *kumkani* in the process of segmentation. However, when the right-hand house of the amaXhosa found themselves in the Colony at a remove from the great house, they claimed separation from the great house. Peires argues that treating the right-hand house as generating a new line of succession was a recent practice. It was advocated by western-educated scholars of Xhosa custom such as Tiyo Soga, who saw it as a way of accommodating lineages that were separated by colonial reshaping of the political and geographical landscape.[3] This splitting of the kingdom and the augmentation of the powers of the right-hand house came to be endorsed by ethnographers of the NAD.

The territorial and political separation of Emigrant Thembuland (initially between the Indwe and Tsomo rivers) from Thembuland proper afforded the descendants of Raxoti Matanzima an opportunity to follow the example of the Ngqika house of the amaXhosa, and to assert the legitimacy of a new line of succession for the right-hand house. Recourse to genealogy did not imply stability nor was it eliminated by the introduction of new approaches to local governance under the Glen Grey Act. As conversations around public office became less ordinary, genealogies became more strategically deployed.

In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act (Act 68 of 1951) brought genealogy to the fore as an instrument of apartheid social engineering. Apartheid officials would tie genealogy to its project of ethnicisation, a process of tightening or creating ethnicities and mapping them onto localities. In this utilitarian deployment, crudely invented succession stories might become powerful as they aligned with control over people and territory. Under apartheid's Bantu Authorities, places too acquired genealogies.

This chapter explores ways in which colonialism constructed and reconstructed the political terrain of the abaThembu west of the Great Kei and west of its northern tributary, the Tsomo River, in the first half of the twentieth century. It examines the meaning of public office and foregrounds struggles over the position of headman and the designation of a paramount chief in successive

3 J.B. Peires, 'The Rise of the "Right-hand House" in the History and Historiography of the Xhosa', *History in Africa*, 2 (1975), pp.113–125.

eras of the NAD administration. It tracks the rise of the right-hand house of the abaThembu under the leadership of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, and highlights his deployment of Bantu Authorities in the service of his ambitions. It eavesdrops on the locations where Gungubele's sons lived in obscurity and identifies signs of their re-awakening. In all of these moments, it discusses the meaning and use of genealogies.

Chiefs and headmen in the employ of the colonial administration

Districts and rural locations were established by the NAD for administrative convenience. The politics that unfolded within and between locations and the NAD after 1894 was all-consuming, shaping the well-being and prospects of residents. NAD policy was to consult residents before appointing a headman, and native commissioners were to guide them to identify appropriate candidates. The headman was an important figure, a man who served his people under the aegis of the colonial master. For those under him, quality of daily life turned on his ability to cope with this conundrum.

Until the advent of the apartheid government in 1948, the NAD was ambivalent about the place of chiefs. Some administrators believed that the 'tyrannical rule' of chiefs should be eliminated, while others favoured making use of chiefs in the administration of their people.[4] However, as they struggled to run their districts in the first three decades of the twentieth century, some of them came to lean on chiefs, and the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' chiefs became more important than their elimination. Good chiefs did not object to the colonial state abrogating power to itself and did not hanker for the old instruments of fear — weaponry, belief in witchcraft, spying and the endless gathering of information about friends and foes. Walter Stanford, Chief Native Commissioner of the Transkei, identified hard and soft approaches to chiefs. The sympathetic approach was represented by Charles Brownlee, son of a missionary and superintendent of the area south of the St Marks district. Brownlee defended chiefs, arguing that chiefly rule was not entirely tyrannical. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the hard approach was associated with JC Warner who had returned to his calling as a Wesleyan missionary after serving as superintendent of the Tambookie location. Warner believed that unless chiefs were stripped of their power and African customs abolished, 'civilisation',

4 R. Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.235.

as represented by Christianity and the ethic of hard work, would not take hold.[5] For practical purposes he was compelled to accept that, for the time being, the abaThembu (among whom he worked) believed in their chiefs.

Individual NAD personnel tended to move about along this continuum. TWC Norton, a senior native commissioner, believed that NAD paternalism would replace chiefly rule in time. In 1923, he advised his junior colleagues that their duty was not to capitulate to traditional views, but to 'assist and guide an undeveloped people in accommodating themselves to the novel and highly complex environment thrust upon them.' They were to make 'themselves accessible to natives and show 'readiness to enter into their difficulties, however trivial they may appear'. By the end of the decade Norton had revised his view. Admitting that chiefly rule had 'many virtues', he argued that chiefs should be permitted to implement 'their own system of government', provided they understood that they were subordinate to the magistrate and not to the *kumkani*. Furthermore, chiefs should be appointed according to the heredity rules, particularly in the 'wilder (sic) regions of the Transkei'. As the British had found elsewhere, there were real advantages to be gained. Working through chiefs cost nothing and served to 'keep the people loyal and contented and prevent them running after every Tom, Dick and Harry who go there to incite them'. But as Norton admitted, this about-turn clashed with the principles of modernisation and made him unpopular with the younger native commissioners who were busy weaning the people off chiefs, even in the allegedly 'wilder' regions. [6]

In a bid to extend the modernist principles of the Glen Grey Act more broadly, the NAD created the United Transkeian Territories General Council (UTTGC). Known as the Bhunga (place of discussion), the council was comprised of elected representatives from those districts that chose to participate. Paternalistic in conception, the Bhunga had only advisory powers

5 Walter Stanford, the son of 1820 settlers grew up with his uncle Joseph Cox Warner in the Queenstown district and was educated at the Lovedale Missionary Institute. He worked for the NAD, was appointed magistrate to Thembuland in 1876 and Chief Native Commissioner of the Transkei in 1902. In 1919 he was knighted by the Queen of England and became Sir Walter Stanford. W. Stanford, *The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford*, Vol 1, 1850–1885 edited with introduction, footnotes and sketch map by J.W. MacQuarrie (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1958), pp.1–19; p.126.

6 NTS 24/276 1693 Native Administration, Union Circular No 29/1920 to All members of the Native Affairs Department and officials dealing with Native Matters 27 August 1920; T.W.C. Norton Chief Native Commissioner Circular no 1/1923, 22 May 1923. T.W.C. Norton, Native Commissioner in the Transkei, was promoted to Chief Native Commissioner of Ciskei and later, sent to Natal. He was the son of W.R. Norton, Assistant Director of Native Agriculture; SAB 45/276 (3) Native Administration Act 38/1927 Appointment Chiefs and Headmen Transkei, J.F.H. [sic] 73 Parliament Street Cape Town, 12 August 1929, to W.T. Welsh Chief Magistrate Transkei.

and was presided over by the Chief Native Commissioner.[7] It collected taxes, saw to the maintenance of infrastructure and debated matters affecting local areas. If the Bhunga's purpose was to train elected leaders to serve as an alternative to chiefly rule, it was not entirely successful. Not all those who were chosen by election wanted to eradicate the chieftaincy. Native Commissioner Garthorne's reponse to a Bhunga councillor, who asked how he might claim his position as hereditary chief, was nothing short of exasperation. He reported:

> The term Chief was superfluous and even retrograde, and was merely ascribed to some few persons representing an outstanding tradition, and rather as a sop to the conservatism of the more backward Natives than of practical use. I rather laboured the highly developed Cape Native policy which I understood had successfully subordinated tribal stagnation to individual progress.[8]

Garthorne's views were supported by some Bhunga councillors who were as passionate in their defence of the new modern system as he was. Councillor SS Matoti of Southeyville went so far as to demand that some locations

> be reserved for people who will send their children to school, attend the divine services, and stop working on Sundays, and those people who would rather stick to heathen customs removed from our midst, as our principle is to civilise our heathen native people, and discourage heathenism as much as we can and to say the least I may point out that we do not wish to see our children taught old native customs.'

Ironically, a few years later, Matoti was suspended as headman for taking bribes.[9] In general, elected Bhunga representatives did not supersede chiefs beyond Glen Grey and Xhalanga and even these districts sometimes elected chiefs to represent them on the council. NAD officials were well aware that parallel systems of law were a feature of colonialism in other parts of colonial Africa, and most councillors had no difficulty in combining the two systems. Since the council system served both as a space for controlled debate and as a conduit for NAD policy, it was similar to a headman's *inkundla*. If chiefs put a brake

7 G.A. Mbeki, *Transkei in the Making* (Durban: Verulam Press, 1939).

8 SAB 45/276 (3) (2) Native Administration Act 38/1927, Appointment of Chiefs and Headmen Transkei, G.R. Garthorne to Secretary for Native Affairs, Recognition of Chiefs, 18 March 1929.

9 Mthatha Archives, NAD F 3/20/3/26, Headman Southeyville, St Marks, S.S. Matoti to Chief Magistrate Transkeian Territories, 20 February 1920; Matoti to Assistant Chief Magistrate, 13 June 1927.

on the modernising interests of the elite in their locations, the Chief Native Commissioner did so at council meetings. Debates over the system of land tenure are a case in point. Councillors who motivated for the right to redeem quitrent land so that they might own it and dispose of it as freehold were quickly told that this was not the vision of the Glen Grey Act. NAD modernisation had its limits.

Location headmen rather than Bhunga councillors were the foundation of the NAD administration. In 1910, 939 headmen were employed by the NAD in the Transkeian Territories. Engcobo had 65 headmen and St Marks had 49. Only one third of these headmen were carrying out their duties to the satisfaction of the NAD. Headmen were required to allocate arable lands to household heads, in consultation with the native commissioner, and to ensure that allotments did not encroach demarcated boundaries. They were to see to it that lands were beneficially occupied and that residents took their stock to the dipping tank and paid their taxes. These duties were designed so that headmen would help their people accommodate colonial rule, but as locations became more congested and land more scarce, the headman's job became more difficult. Over time, headmen became increasingly burdened with disputes over land allocations, boundaries, theft, family feuds and domestic violence rather than attending to the upliftment of their communities.[10]

Disputes, like drought, were endemic to location life. Beyond genealogy, a candidate for headmanship who knew 'all the disputes' was likely to receive the endorsement of residents over one who did not. This was provided, of course, that he was deemed to be capable of fairness and was not embroiled in a dispute himself. A location was knowable principally through the history of its disputes. Tracing disputes brought into view hierarchies of respect and authority, wealth and poverty, attitudes to women and schooling and patterns of land allocation and use. In some locations, disputes were sparked by the way people saw ethnic difference; in others, tensions occurred as people struggled to accommodate personality at the same time as adhering to the principles of heredity. While a weak or corrupt headman fostered enmity and conflict, a man who was not of the bloodline was considered 'unknown' and lacked the steadying influence of senior members of a chiefly family.

10 SAB 45/276 (3) (2) Native Administration Act 38/1927 Appointment of Chiefs and Headmen Transkei, Chief Magistrate Transkei to Secretary for Native Affairs, Native Chiefs and Headmen, Stipends and Allowances, 9 October 1911; two thirds of the headmen did not receive an increase in their stipends as they were assessed as not having carried out their duties satisfactorily. BAO F 54/1184/18. Chief of Ngqaba Location, Engcobo, Investigation of Corporal S. Ntshinka 17 October 1938 deals with re-allotment of Garden Lot no 71 in Ngqaba location.

Chiefs and headmen in the employ of the NAD did not so much resist or collaborate as try to figure out ways of reconciling the new systems of administration, and colonised native custom, with their own ways of seeing and doing: how were they to deploy what was distinctive about their way of life and ways of knowing so that this would survive on the colonial landscape? Their responses were developed less in the abstract than in the moment, in the context of the frustration of their followers and in their encounters with NAD officials at headmen's meetings, dipping tanks and above all, in the offices of the native commissioner and local magistrate. Conversations at these sites reveal the often painfully ambiguous ways in which chiefs and people confronted and appropriated colonial intrusions. These frustrations were not specific to this region but were experienced in many parts of colonial Africa, as Fred Cooper has observed.[11]

Neither the modernisation experiment of the Glen Grey system nor the Bhunga advisory council was able to stave off the impending collapse of agriculture across large areas of Thembuland and Emigrant Thembuland. This collapse was not a sudden event. Subsistence agriculture was becoming less and less efficient, as migrant labour kept men away from farming and left women without support. Overcrowding, overgrazing and denudation of the veld meant that communities were increasingly unable to cope with the effects of endemic drought. In the Engcobo and St Marks districts, acute drought conditions occurred every few years. In 1920, 1933 and 1940, harvests fell to below half the usual crop yield and in some parts failed completely. Hardship also followed the fall in demand for wool during the Great Depression. Headmen pleaded for aid. The NAD responded by authorising native commissioners to provide maize to the destitute. In the Engcobo district, relief was provided in the form of roughly half a kilogram (1lb) of maize meal per day for 'old men, widows and others who are destitute and have no friends or relatives to support them'. At the same time, labour recruiters were encouraged to sign up men for mine work. In the adjacent Tsomo district, the number of men willing to enlist for the mines jumped fourfold as a consequence of hunger. Belts remained tightened over the next few years as the effects of the Great Depression were felt both by a cautious NAD operating under austerity and by African wool farmers experiencing low prices. The drought in 1940 was devastating — only 25 per cent of the normal crop was reaped in Engcobo, with Cofimvaba faring little better at 30 per cent.

11 F. Cooper, 'Conflict and connection: Rethinking Colonial African History', *The American Historical Review*, 99, 5 (December 1994), pp.1516–1545.

In many districts, a cash-strapped NAD shifted responsibility onto the drought-stricken households themselves. Those who were hungry were to buy their own food from the stores, and white traders were asked to lay in sufficient stocks to meet demand. It was expected that funds would come from labour remittances rather than from taxes collected. [12]

At the same time, the NAD accused the hungry of a lack of commitment to stock improvement and land rehabilitation initiatives. The native commissioner complained that most people in the St Marks district had shown no interest in the land stabilisation and betterment schemes for livestock. Rural people remained sceptical of the magistrate's promise that compensation would be paid to 'wipe away the tears' of those who moved their homesteads in compliance with closer settlement planning. For 30 years and more, residents of St Marks viewed the separation of residential, grazing and commonage areas as a ploy to reduce their land and livestock rather than methods of improving livelihoods.[13] They could not see how rehabilitation would cushion them against the effects of drought as the native commissioner claimed. Increasingly disillusioned, NAD officials were desperate to make their agricultural modernisation strategies find acceptance and take hold.

In this environment, and against the backdrop of a dysfunctional household, the great-grandson of Raxoti Matanzima, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, was growing up. Kaiser believed that he could do better than the NAD, the *kumkani* and the headmen in improving the lives of the abaThembu.

The rise of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima and the creation of Bantu Authorities

For decades as he was growing up, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima's father, Mhlobo, grandson of Mtirara by the right-hand house, struggled with alcohol dependency. Magistrates reported that Mhlobo was 'invariably under the influence of liquor' and neglected his duties as headman. His people 'outwardly' respected him but did as they pleased 'behind his back'. His location was in a mess. Young men 'armed with pick handles and *bunguzas*' moved about

12 NTS 8/336 Transkei Famine Part 4, Tsomo Magistrate to Chief Magistrate, 22 August 1933; Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate, 16 February 1934; Umtata Magistrate to Chief Magistrate, 26 August 1933; Director of Agriculture to Chief Magistrate of Transkei, 16 July 1940; Chief Magistrate Transkeian Territories to Secretary for Native Affairs, 15 July 1940.

13 Mthatha Archives, NAD, Headman Camama Forest, St Marks, Minutes of Meeting held on 24 October 1963. The meeting was unanimous in its rejection of stabilisation. See also NTS 390/278 (1) Annual Departmental report, 1951 to 1952, Reports for Individual Districts; Annual Report: Glen Grey District 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952.

terrorising residents.[14] By 1932 the situation had become 'unbearable' for the residents and Mhlobo's drinking habit was 'fast dragging him to insanity'. According to the table of succession, Kaiser would succeed his father. But since he was only 17 and a student at Lovedale College when his father died, his uncle Dalubuhle would serve as regent until he completed his legal studies. In 1940, Kaiser was appointed chief of the amaHala in Emigrant Thembuland and headman of Qamata Poort location.[15]

The young law graduate saw himself not only as chief of the amaHala section of the abaThembu, but of all the people of Emigrant Thembuland. As the direct descendant of Mtirara by the right-hand house, and as the grandson of Raxoti Matanzima, founder of Emigrant Thembuland, he was the most senior chief in this region. But Kaiser had a bigger vision: he believed that in his person he embodied the principle of legitimate fission. As head of the right-hand house he would complete what his grandfather had begun and consolidate a new line of succession. Furthermore, since Emigrant Thembuland was administered autonomously of the Thembu *kumkani*, his status should be equal to that of the *kumkani*. Kaiser was nothing short of cunning. Deploying genealogy and the albeit contentious argument of fission by the right-hand house, he constructed a traditional right: by declaring his grandfather's powers as legal precedent, he created a sense that his authority could not be challenged in law. Imbued with a sense of superiority and driven to make good where his father had failed, he was confident that he could and would outmanoeuvre the magistrates and the abaThembu *kumkani* on the political playing field.

From the moment of his installation in 1940, Kaiser Matanzima began pressurising the NAD to install him as 'paramount chief' of Emigrant Thembuland. However, both the Thembu *kumkani* and the chief magistrate at Umtata believed that Kaiser's claim to this status ran counter to custom — the right-hand house did not have the right to establish a separate kingdom in Thembu custom. Kaiser's ambitions were a threat to stability among the abaThembu. Undeterred, he embarked on what was to become his set piece: he would set the magistrates against each other. Astute in his observation of whom

14 A *bunguza* (Afrikaans: *knobkierie*) was a deadly weapon used at close range; it was a short thick stick with a large round head with ridges cut into it.; see J.H. Soga, *The Ama-Xosa Life and Customs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.313.

15 Mthatha Archives, NAD, Magistrate Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 23 October 1919; NAD Minutes of meeting between magistrate, Cofimvaba, and a deputation consisting of councillors and members of the Thembu tribe, held in the Court room, Cofimvaba, on 30 April 1932.The farm Qamata Poort was proclaimed a native location in 1942; Proclamation 246 of 1942, Proclamation of the farm Qamata Poort in the District of St Marks as a native location.

he might target, he won over the more expedient among the NAD officials. GK Hemming, descendant of John Hemming, the man who had instigated the war against Gungubele, supported Kaiser's ambitions. Hemming junior acknowledged that while Raxoti Matanzima had not enjoyed the powers that Kaiser laid claim to, it would be convenient for the NAD if the local Thembu people came under Matanzima's great place at Qamata Poort. In Hemming's view, the NAD should go ahead and confer the power of paramountcy on Kaiser. Other native commissioners scoffed at the idea, arguing that it would be totally unacceptable to the people. While setting the magistrates against one another was encouraging, the young chief was not immediately successful. The NAD would not risk a move that might foment unrest among the abaThembu.

In the meantime, Kaiser sought to expand his political footprint across Emigrant Thembuland, one location at a time. Unlike his father, he was not 'one of the people'. Kaiser did not drink alcohol or socialise with his subjects. Rather, he set himself apart, taking care to demonstrate his superiority over them, reminding them that he was both highly educated and of royal lineage. In the view of the local magistrate, Kaiser's lifestyle was 'out of sympathy with that of his people'. He liked to appear at big events in full academic regalia and peppered his public addresses with Latin quotes. He made little effort to find out what people wanted and encountered opposition to his attempts to steamroller them into accepting his preferred candidates for headmanship. In this he ran counter to NAD policy. While the grounds for objecting to certain candidates might vary — some locations were opposed to Thembu suzerainty, others objected to individual candidates — in all instances, the right of the location to make its own determinations was respected by the NAD and had become sacrosanct to the people. Location residents held on to this principle as if it were the last line of defence against colonial control.[16]

One of his first attempts to ride roughshod over the people was at Ntshingeni location in the St Marks district. Most of the residents in this location were amaGcaleka who did not want a Thembu headman. But Kaiser ignored them. As soon as he became chief, Kaiser planned to have Dalubuhle Matanzima, his uncle and former regent, take over the headmanship at Ntshingeni. This

16 NTS 118 47/23, 51/23 Vol 1 St Marks Headmen Location 47 (hereafter "St Marks Headmen Location 47"); Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, 6 September 1941; Magistrate of Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate Umtata; Cofimvaba, 27 August 1941; Magistrate of Cofimvaba, G.K. Hemming, to D.L. Smit, Secretary for Native Affairs, 28 February 1945; G. Mears, Secretary of Native Affairs, to Senator Welsh, 31 January 1946; Magistrate Norton to Chief Magistrate Umtata, Status and Position of K.D. Matanzima in St Marks, 30 July 1953.

move would serve a double purpose: he would transfer his uncle out of Qamata, where Kaiser himself had become headman, and he would secure control over Ntshingeni, where the amaGcaleka were troublesome. Kaiser did not anticipate the depth of hostility to his plan. Infuriated by the popular rejection of his uncle, Kaiser railed at the magistrate. 'I look upon this defiance of authority as an insult'. Dalubuhle, he said, was the only one who could 'obliterate' this 'spirit of defiance'. But the magistrate, WRC Norton, was not persuaded. He believed in a 'softer' approach and tried to convince the young chief to follow suit. It was not government policy, he explained, to 'define geographically the jurisdiction of a chief' as this was likely to create friction. Since Ntshingeni residents constituted 'the last remnant of what was once Gcaleka country', it was unwise to 'deny their allegiance to the Gcaleka chief'. Kaiser was to exercise patience. Time would make things easier. 'Intermarriage and contact will in time remove the barrier and you can shorten that time by a sympathetic attitude towards these locations,' the magistrate advised.[17]

Not to be put down, the young Kaiser gave the senior magistrate a lesson on Thembu tradition. First, it was axiomatic that everyone on Thembu soil owed allegiance to the Thembu chief. The amaGcaleka, he said, 'must give allegiance to me'. They were '*ipso facto* ... under the jurisdiction of the Thembu chief and while they should not be denied allegiance to the Gcaleka chiefs they should be loyal to the present occupiers of the country as it no more belongs to Gcalekaland.' Secondly, it had been 'the tradition from time immemorial for the chief in this part of Thembuland to nominate regents and other suitable blood relatives to take charge of vacant locations where necessary without any opposition from the people.'[18] Kaiser did not succeed in this attempt to impose his uncle as headman at Ntshingeni. But he had learned a valuable lesson: he would not allow any magistrate to lecture him and he would deploy tradition as he chose. This way he would bring every location in Emigrant Thembuland under his control.

His next move was to badger the NAD for civil and criminal jurisdiction over all the districts of Emigrant Thembuland. When the magistrate baulked, he accused his employers of 'cynical deprivation of my hereditary rights at a time

17 NTS 118 47/23 St Marks Headmen Location 4, St Marks, Cofimvaba Magistrate to Chief Magistrate, 12 February 1940; Mthatha Archives, NAD, Chief Magistrate R. Fyfe King, Transkeian Territories to Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, Great Place, Qamata, 14 November 1940.

18 Mthatha Archives, NAD, Headman Ntshingeni Location, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 9 November 1940; Matanzima to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 2 December 1940; D.L. Smit Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 9 December 1940.

when my people should benefit from my education'. Getting ahead of the NAD, he conferred upon himself the title of 'chief of the Emigrant Thembus', claiming that it was his 'correct title and status' due to him 'by heredity' right. He also took no notice of the objections of the Thembu *kumkani* until the NAD stepped in. The NAD ordered him to pay a fine and to apologise to the *kumkani*. Still on the attack, he tried to drive a wedge between the native commissioner, the *kumkani* and the NAD head office by claiming that it was only the 'local authorities' who did not recognise the right-hand house. Everyone else 'look[ed] upon Emigrant Thembuland as my area under the designation "*Inkosi yase Rhoda*"'. The NAD ignored him. Both the claim to 'Chief of Emigrant Thembuland' and the designation '*Inkosi yase Rhoda*' were audaciously strategic, a demonstration of a new style of politics that went beyond simple resistance to colonialism. Matanzima was playing the colonial authorities, exploiting their weaknesses and intimidating his fellow chiefs.[19]

The National Party victory and the change of government in 1948 played into his hands. Unlike the previous ruling party, the National Party was very interested in Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima; he was precisely the kind of man needed for their separate development strategy. When Hendrik Verwoerd was appointed as the Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, he was determined that English civil servants would not stand in the way of the apartheid strategy he was crafting. Placing Afrikaners in all the senior positions, he lost no time in refashioning the English-dominated NAD into the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD). In 1951, he guided the Bantu Authorities Act through Parliament and thereby established a platform for the resuscitation of traditional authority. With the backing of the new Minister, Kaiser pushed his way forward, insisting, demanding, and scolding old-school magistrates who blocked his quest for power.

Bantu Authorities recast the political landscape. Individual locations were required to identify themselves ethnically so that they could come together in a Tribal Authority headed by a chief. Many people in the rural areas were puzzled by this change of policy and had difficulty getting the new political

19 St Marks Headman Location 47, K.D. Matanzima to Senator W. Campbell 4, August 1948; Matanzima BA Chief of the Emigrant Thembus to Native Commissioner Cofimvaba, 4 August 1950; Matanzima Statement to Native Commissioner Cofimvaba n.d; Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs 6 November 1953; Matanzima, Statement sent to Advocate A.B. Beyers QC Temple Chambers Cape Town n.d. Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territories to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 December 1954, fined £32.10/– in September 1952; Vol IV, Cofimvaba Magistrate Norton to Chief Magistrate, 30 July 1953.

landscape into focus. For over 50 years, they had been told to cling less tightly to tradition, chiefs and ethnicity and to follow colonial law. This seemed to be something new in the guise of the old. Native commissioners were sent out to explain the new system. 'What is a Fingo location?' one headman asked. The native commissioner replied patiently, if not convincingly, 'In all locations there are a variety of tribes represented, but the classification depends on the majority of the population.' Unsure what role the magistrate would play in the new dispensation, another wondered, 'Will we be under the law or under the chief?' Beyond these question and answer sessions, there was to be no discussion and no consultation. While pockets of more generalised debate occurred in some areas under the auspices of the All African Convention, the immediate practicalities of constituting ethnic authorities defined the contours of unrest that erupted across Engcobo and Cofimvaba (the new name for the St Marks district) over the next five years.[20]

Kaiser Matanzima's enthusiasm for Bantu Authorities was so overt that the chief magistrate of the Transkei expressed alarm. 'The Bantu Authorities Act is being propagated enthusiastically by the chief, possibly for its intrinsic value, but I greatly suspect that it has been seized upon by him to further his scheme for independence and to boost his personal status.' The magistrate was right. Bantu Authorities dovetailed with Kaiser's own cause and provided a new platform for him to further his ambitions to expand his territory. If he could incorporate Glen Grey into a territorial authority under his jurisdiction, he would be well on his way to realising his dream of a greater 'western Thembuland paramountcy', parallel to Thembuland proper which he would reduce to Eastern Thembuland. There was some precedence in the region. Pondoland had been divided into east and west along these lines. He moved swiftly, calling his henchmen in Xhalanga, Cofimvaba and Glen Grey to a meeting at his great place on 21 May 1955. Here he declared that the abaThembu, including those in Glen Grey, had accepted Bantu Authorities 'unanimously'. 'We shall now graze our cattle on common land with other members of our tribe'.[21] This salvo was a

20 Mthatha Archives, NAD, Minutes of a meeting of Chiefs, Headmen and People at Cofimvaba, 18 January 1955; Tsotsi, Out of Court; I.B. Tabata, *The Awakening of a People* (1950) pdf www.sahistory.org.za accessed 14 March 2018; Lungisile Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006).

21 St Marks Headman Location 47, T.D Ramsay, Chief Magistrate Transkei to Secretary for Native Affairs, 20 October 1955; K.D. Matanzima, Statement sent to Advocate A.B. Beyers QC Temple Chambers Cape Town n.d.; K.D. Matanzima to Native Commissioner, Cofimvaba, 28 May 1955.

public signal of Kaiser's determination to deploy Bantu Authorities as an expansionist tool.

Support for chiefly rule was weaker in Glen Grey and Xhalanga than in the neighbouring districts. The population of these districts was relatively diverse and dominated by people described as Mfengu or Fingo. Broadly speaking, they were an amalgam of refugees from the abaMbo and others who had lost their chiefs. They could and did claim many ancestries and did not approximate the roughest homogeneity as an ethnic group. Many of their grandfathers had served alongside colonial troops in the frontier wars, and it was from the younger generation that the NAD had recruited its policemen, teachers and clerks. Not all those described as Mfengu were compliant. By the mid-1950s, the Mfengu constituted the core of an educated elite opposed to chiefly rule, but they also objected to Matanzima's ambitions and to the Bantu Authorities Act. Through local teacher, parent and resident organisations in Glen Grey, the All African Convention achieved significant influence in some Glen Grey locations.

Alongside them were abaThembu with different histories, identities and experiences of conquest. Some were persuaded that there was something to be gained by following Kaiser. One of these was Chief Manzezulu Mfanta, also of the right-hand house of the abaThembu; his grandfather was a brother of Raxoti Matanzima by a different mother, a more junior house. He had also been friendly with Gungubele, chief of the amaTshatshu. But Mfanta's descendants lost their land when he was imprisoned for life. His grandson, Manzezulu, hoped to regain their lost status by keeping close to Kaiser Matanzima. He would assist Kaiser in propagating the idea of a consolidated western Thembuland and he would help to redraw boundaries so that he could re-establish the name of Mfanta. With his sights on these objectives, Manzezulu became one of Kaiser Matanzima's chief lieutenants.[22] One of his most difficult tasks was to ensure that Glen Grey did not excise itself from the imagining of a western Thembuland.

Kaiser applied his mind to creating a platform for promoting the separation of Emigrant Thembuland from the jurisdiction of the Thembu *kumkani*. His strategy was masterful: he rejoined the Bhunga, which he had earlier declared 'obsolete', took control of a key subcommittee and recommended the establishment of two separate regional authorities for the abaThembu. Regional authorities were the top tier of the Bantu Authorities structure and the foundation for splitting the abaThembu into two jurisdictions.[23] Terence

22 Interview Jongixanti Mtirara, 8 September 2010.

23 'AbaThembu tribe', http://members.iinet.au/~royalty/states/southafrica/thembu.html The four tiers of Bantu Authorities were Community, Tribal, Regional and Territorial Authorities.

Ramsay, Chief Magistrate and Chief Native Commissioner of the Transkei, was alarmed and wanted the proposal rejected out of hand. But he was overruled by TF Coertze, chief clerk at the NAD head office. It could do no harm (*geen kwaad doen*) to recognise Matanzima as senior chief in Emigrant Thembuland, he told Ramsay, and 'might serve to settle the tension with Sabata' (Sabata Dalindyebo, 'Jonguhlanga' the *kumkani*.) The Secretary for Native Affairs began investigating the viability of instituting a parallel paramountcy. Kaiser must have been delighted that he had outplayed both the *kumkani* and the chief magistrate.

Three years later, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima was installed as chief of the Emigrant Thembus. To prevent the *kumkani* from 'interfering' in his territory, he would be granted civil and criminal jurisdiction over Emigrant Thembuland. All Kaiser needed to do, to acknowledge the *kumkani*, was to pay him an annual fee. A new designation, that of subchief, would be used for all other Thembu chiefs. This was an experiment which the Secretary for Native Affairs acknowledged 'might, or might not, work satisfactorily'. The onus was on Dalindyebo to exercise 'tact and statesmanship'. Kaiser had manipulated the NAD head office into sidelining the Thembu *kumkani*. But this was not enough for Kaiser who continued 'doing all sorts of things to expand his domain'. Using the occasion of his installation as 'Paramount of the Emigrant Thembus' to press for the speedy annexation of Glen Grey to Emigrant Thembuland, he repeated the refrain that everyone under his jurisdiction was umThembu: the 'Emigrant Thembus who live in the Glen Grey District' were 'ethnically one and the same with us' by virtue of their residing on Thembu soil.[24] The creation of an autonomous western Thembuland independent of the Thembu *kumkani* was in his sights.

In the meantime, Kaiser had family matters to attend to. His brother George, an attorney, was in financial difficulties and needed a job. Motivating that he required 'efficient people to do the work' of the 'bantuisation' of native administration, he proposed that George be appointed to head the Qamata Tribal Authority. This structure he said, 'required a chief of high rank with educational qualifications equivalent to those of the Chief of Emigrant Thembuland'.

24 St Marks Headmen Location 47, T.F. Coertze Chief Clerk, NAD, Pretoria, 9 December 1955; Secretary for Native Affairs, C.B. Young to Chief Native Commissioner, Umtata confirming appointment under subsection (7) of section two of the Native Administration Act 1927 (Act 32 of 1927) as amended (letter dated 7 May 1958); Speech of Chief George Mzimvubu Matanzima on the Occasion of Installation of Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, B.A., as 'Chief of the Emigrant Tembus' at the Great Place, Qamata, 16 July 1958.

Ramsay, the Chief Native Commissioner, objected; in his view George was not a sound character. But under apartheid, strategy trumped integrity and officials connived with nepotism. Leibbrandt, a clerk in Ramsay's office and an admirer of Kaiser Matanzima, supported the move. HF Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, lost no time in creating a sub-chieftainship for George Mzimvubu Matanzima so that he might serve as Kaiser's adviser.[25] From then on, the BAD head office communicated directly with Kaiser, bypassing Ramsay. Kaiser had successfully driven a wedge between his arch detractor in Mthatha and the BAD head office.

Who is a Thembu? What is custom? Kaiser Matanzima at Ntshingeni and Qumanco locations

Kaiser was less adept at winning over people on the ground than at manipulating the BAD. Opposition to his power-mongering occurred within and also across locations. It was generally expressed in parochial ways and informed by what chiefs, headmen and people knew of Kaiser's ambitions and how they experienced the effects of Bantu Authorities. Conflict was often driven by old divisions or loyalties and the issue of bloodline in choosing a headman. As competing interest groups jostled for control, the headman's *inkundla* became a site of agitation, debate and falling out.

Conflict erupted once more at Ntshingeni where persistent divisions were exacerbated by Kaiser's determination to exert control. The residents became alarmed when their headman began to cooperate with the *uber* chief and complained that he was 'selling them out' to the abaThembu. A large faction petitioned the magistrate to have him removed as headman and replaced by Budge (Badji) Daniel whom they trusted to defend the amaGcaleka. But Kaiser scoffed. This man who 'professes so much to be a Gcaleka', he declared, was in fact, 'a Fingo whose grandfather came from Cala'. But Kaiser knew that this was not a strong argument, as custom trumped origins and he quickly reiterated that aliens living in Thembu territory paid tribute to the abaThembu and did not dictate the terms of their residence. 'I contend that I have jurisdiction over ... the tributary Gcaleka Tribal Authority as it pays allegiance to me,' adding that 'St Marks and Ntshingeni people are in relation as the Germans, Frenchmen

25 NTS 118 47/23, 51/23 Vol 1 St Marks Headman Location 47, K.D. Matanzima to Native Commissioner Cofimvaba, 28 February 1959; T.D. Ramsay to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 March 1959; Ramsay to Secretary for Native Affairs, 21 May 1959; Prime Minister's Office Minute No 1398, 27 June 1959.

living in the Union of South Africa. They must bow to the Authority in charge in Emigrant Tembuland.' He was annoyed that the BAD was not supporting him in this matter. He implied that they failed to appreciate that his appointment over all Emigrant Thembuland had 'simplified the issues and removed all claims by alien tribes'. But Ramsay stood firm and allowed the locations with a Gcaleka majority to form their own tribal authority. His rationale was that since these people were living on land that had belonged to the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili, they were not the subject people of the abaThembu. Kaiser had a short memory and was subverting custom to his own ends.[26]

As headman of Ntshingeni, Badji Daniel kept Kaiser out of his location until his own corruption drove the people to protest. Badji was charged and found guilty of gross dereliction of duty and of insubordination. Asked at the disciplinary hearing why he failed to acknowledge correspondence from Kaiser Matanzima's great place, he replied: 'I do nothing with the notice. I merely put it on my file', adding that 'I must admit that all this time I have been under the impression that I had nothing to do with KD Matanzima as we have here our own authority, Gcaleka Tribal Authority.' Badji was not a happy man. He had reputedly 'chased his wife away' and was receiving medicine for chest ache from a Malawian herbalist attending his daughter, who had been afflicted by 'native poison'. He was also said to be a fraudster. On one occasion he dressed up as an *imbongi* (praise poet) and collected money from people. Some believed that he played it both ways and made money as a 'government informer'.[27] If Badji Daniel was opposed to Bantu Authorities, it was less a matter of principle than of personality. His poorly administered location was a hothouse of frustration, resentment and restiveness.

Several other locations acknowledged that while their forebears had paid tribute (*ukubusa*) and respect (*ukukhonza*) to the abaThembu, this did not mean that they were to fall under the Hala Tribal Authority. These locations identified themselves as having a majority of amaQwathi and amaJumba residents. When the government ethnologist confirmed that these groups came from distinctly different genealogical lines, they were immediately granted their own tribal authorities under the Bantu Authorities Act. This did not mean that these tribal authorities functioned smoothly.

26 St Marks Headman Location 47, K.D. Matanzima to Native Commissioner Cofimvaba, 28 July 1958, 12 September 1958; Chief Magistrate Umtata to Secretary for Native Affairs, 15 July 1958; Mthatha Archives, NAD, T.D. Ramsay to Secretary for Bantu Administration, 4 July 1959.

27 St Marks Headman Location 47, Record of Proceedings, Inquiry held at Arthur Mfebe's kraal at St Marks location in St Marks district, 29 September 1960; Cofimvaba Magistrate's Court, Case 382, 13 June 1952; Mthatha Archives Box 171, Folder St Marks Chiefs and Headmen, File no 3/20.

From the outset, the Jumba Tribal Authority was an administrative muddle, an instance of institutional failure flowing from the corruption and incompetence of the chief. At the time of his appointment, chief Qaqauli Mgudlwa's history of poor administration and corruption was already well known. In 1939, after only two years as headman, a section of the people of Qumanco had petitioned for his removal. They perceived him as a notorious 'thief and a liar'; they said that he 'stole land belonging to the Government'; that he used war funds and school funds for his own purposes; that he 'received horses in payment for land' and that he had allocated a kraal site on the commonage to his girlfriend, a 'coloured' woman whom he called 'Darlie Mgudlwa'. He was also criticised for repeatedly mistreating his wife whom he had married by 'Christian rites.'[28] But Qaqauli also had strong supporters. When he was charged with using public funds for his own purposes, they defended him, claiming that the magistrate had erred. It was not 'contrary to native custom' for a chief 'to divert moneys collected for public purposes to his own use' they argued. Indeed, he was entitled to do so. The magistrate called a NAD expert on native custom, GMB Whitfield:

> No such Custom ever existed and even if it did then that Custom has now been abrogated ... If moneys collected for public purposes, such as for the erection of a school, are misappropriated by the Chief it becomes unnatural justice and the Chief is liable to prosecution as he is also subject to the laws in force.[29]

This testimony led to Qaqauli's conviction. In the meantime, his supporters requested Kaiser Matanzima to challenge the white expert. In his legal opinion, Kaiser Matanzima who added BA (Bachelor of Arts) after his name, argued:

> The seriousness of the crime which has culminated in Bellairs' [Qaqauli] dismissal is indisputable from the European legal point of view but the Tembus, whose concept of law and custom differs radically from that

28 BAO F 54/1184/20 Part 1, Kapteins en Hoofmanne Lokasie 20+ 19, Magistrate at Engcobo to Chief Sithembele Mgudlwa, 30 October 1958. The locations in his area were Beyele, Qumanco, Elucwecwe, Lahlangubo, Gubenxa and Nkwenkwezi; Box 171, Jumba Tribe File 3/20/3/10, Chief Magistrate Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 16 November 1939.

29 Mthatha Archives Box 171 File St Marks Headman, Jumba Tribe File, Rex v Bellairs Qaqauli Mgudlwa; Charged with misappropriating funds collected from public for specific purpose or alternative theft, ie contravening sections 185 or 179 Act 24 of 1886. Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate Umtata 20 October1943; H.G. Mgudlwa to M. De Villiers Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territories requesting leniency and a fine rather than suspension of Q. Mgudlwa, 25 November 1943.

> practised by the western people, question the criminality of Bellairs' behaviour. If the record of the case be clearly understood it will be noted that it was unequivocally stated in evidence by all the witnesses including crown witnesses that Bellairs was, as it were, the bank of his people and could use the money collected for the specific purpose of building a school which was deferred until normal times as long as he paid it back when it was required.[30]

What Kaiser was hinting at was that ideas about money were partly derived from the notion of wealth in cattle and the way chiefs built up their herds from the gifts (*ubaso*) of their subjects. The magistrate at Engcobo confirmed that since such fees were not acceptable to the native commissioners, they were paid secretly. As in the past, chiefs claimed that these cattle belonged to the people but exercised the right to do with them as they pleased. This argument did not go down well with the Qumanco residents who had been led to believe that the chief was building up a store of cattle to pay for their children's education. In view of this disappointment, they demanded an end to the practice of paying fees to the headman for the allotment of land or investigation of a complaint.

After completing his sentence and spending two years in the Public Health Department as 'an assistant de-verminiser' where he had been 'taught discipline and work', Qaqauli was deemed to have been reformed. He was reinstated as chief and appointed head of the Jumba Tribal Authority but soon fell into his old ways, took to heavy drinking and was constantly embroiled in quarrels and litigation.[31] He was deemed wholly unable to perform his duties as head of the Jumba Tribal Authority. Kaiser Matanzima admitted that he took 'hardly any interest in tribal authority affairs and pays little attention to urgent letters emanating from this office'. Land matters in Qumanco were 'chaotic' as Qaqauli held on to certificates of occupation rather than handing them to the occupiers. In so doing, he retained the power to use them to threaten to withdraw their rights of occupation. Despite his claim to the bloodline, Qaqauli had 'lost the confidence and respect of his people' and Kaiser recommended that Qaqauli resign the headmanship but

30 BAO Vol 1/238 F54/1184/35 Chiefs and Headmen Location 35 All Saints Engcobo, Magistrate J.O. Cornell to Chief Magistrate Umtata 5 June 1953.

31 BAO Vol 1/238 F54/1184/35 All Saints, Engcobo, Cornell to Chief Magistrate, 5 June 1953; Chiefs and Headmen Location 35, Magistrate of Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate Umtata, 26 March 1945; Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate Umtata 23 July 1945; Case 413/53. Chief Magistrate repeatedly instructed Cofimvaba Magistrate to warn him of dangers of drinking and of criminal conviction, 21 August 1953; Chief Magistrate to Cofimvaba Magistrate 1 September 1953; Chief Magistrate to Secretary for Native Affairs, 8 December 1953; Cofimvaba Magistrate to Chief Magistrate 2 November 1959.

retain his position as chief.[32] An unpopular chief could easily be sidelined by a strong headman.

Strong objections to his dismissal came from SK (Sithembele) Mgudlwa, secretary of the Jumba Tribal Authority. Sithembele Mgudlwa was a relative and protégé of Qaqauli, 'a liberal' and a 'suspected member of the banned African National Congress', he said. 'It was known to the NAD that he had hosted Patrick Duncan, leader of the Liberal Party, at Qumanco and had arranged for him to address a secret meeting.' If Sithembele was indeed an ANC member, the people had gained little from it.

Following the line of succession, Qaqauli's son took over as head of the amaJumba. Anxious to move on, the people followed his lead, showing a keen interest in rehabilitation and Bantu Authorities. A delighted magistrate chirped that the Jumba Tribal Authority was flourishing and the books prepared by the 'Bantu girl' employed as clerk showed an increase in the bank balance every month.[33] Under instructions from BAD, Bantu Authorities were using female clerical labour to compensate for the administrative weaknesses of hereditary chiefs.

Turning their backs: the amaQwathi and Bantu Authorities

Alongside the amaJumba in the Engcobo district were the amaQwathi, an independent lineage of the Xesibe which became abaThembu by allegiance. In 1880 they had instigated a rebellion that engulfed Thembuland in a final bid to avoid British control. In the wake of the rebellion, they settled in locations clustered around the All Saints mission where rebels and loyalists resided side by side. Several families rose to prominence through their association with Christianity and modernity. Among them were the Poswayo at All Saints and the Xundu family at Manzana location.[34] But many others were sceptical of the church and its influence. Unsettled and deeply divided, the amaQwathi were at loggerheads with one another over Bantu Authorities. For those interested in public office, Bantu Authorities created new opportunities to serve the people with positions in three tiers of administration — the local authority, the regional

32 Mthatha Archives Box 171, Jumba Tribe File, K.D. Matanzima to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner 15 September 1959. Cofimvaba Magistrate to Chief Magistrate, 2 November 1959.

33 Mthatha Archives Box 171, Jumba Tribe File, Magistrate Cofimvaba 7 September 1961 to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Umtata; Cofimvaba Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Chief Bantu Commissioner Umtata 10 September 1962; Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Umtata 17 January 1963.

34 For more on amaQwathi see Chapter 3. For Poswayo family see Chiefs and Headmen Location 35 All Saints Engcobo, Magistrate J.O. Cornell to Chief Magistrate Umtata 4 May 1953.

authority and the territorial authority. For others, these apartheid structures were useful only as a mask for conducting underground political activity. Distrust abounded and rumour-mongering was rife.

In 1962, the headmanship of Manzana fell vacant and the next in line according to the chiefly table of succession could not take up the position. The hereditary chief of the Dalasile family was a minor and the regent, Mayeza Dalasile, was serving as head of the Qwathi Tribal Authority. An acting headman would be able to hold the position for the young heir who was away at work in Benoni. The Xundu family had put forward candidates for this position since the 1920s without any success. When Amos Xundu stepped forward in 1962, his family mounted an active campaign to support his appointment and Mayeza Dalasile endorsed it. According to the Qwathi regent, Amos Xundu was both a staunch and faithful follower of the Qwathi royal family and loyal to the magistrates. As a councillor to the regent, he had 'advocated acceptance of Tribal Authority when the tribe was still doubtful about it.' [35]

His followers petitioned the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, presenting his curriculum vitae as a new form of genealogy, a sign of legitimacy. Amos Xundu's claim for suitability rested on generations of loyal service to the government: he was the grandson of Mfundisi Xundu, who served as 'escort and bodyguard to Mr Stanford then Magistrate of Engcobo during the Qwathi war'; and his father, 'Charles Xundu was a councillor to the chief during his lifetime.' Amos Xundu himself had been 'prepared and disciplined for this post in various ways such as acting as a policeman, as a court deputy messenger, as a member of the Bhunga.' He had 'presided over the school Board since its inauguration,' and was 'closely associated with the local farmers association.' Finally, he was 'directly connected to the Qwathi great house' and through his efforts as a 'most ambitious and courageous chief's councillor', he was instrumental in the restoration of the Qwathi chieftainship, raising it 'from the status of headmanship to that of a recognised chief.' This task had required 'faithful assistance' in helping to iron out 'complications' and 'untold difficulties.'[36]

His opponent, Barret Saul, was unsuitable for the position, said Mayeza: 'He has not the trait of settling disputes by peaceful means. He plots against

35 BAO Vol 1/238 F 54/1184/29–50, Ontwikkelingshulp Chiefs and Headmen Engcobo; Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30 Manzana, Chief Magistrate to Magistrate Engcobo, 15 December 1952; D. Dalasile for Qwati Tribal Authority to Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 20 June 1962.

36 BAO Vol 1/238 F 54/1184/30, Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30 Manzana, hereafter "Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30", Plea signed by Val A. Xundu, Selby Mandu and Caweni Ndzanga, 1 February 1960 and sent to C.B. Young, NAD, Pretoria; Engcobo Bantu Affairs Commissioner A.C. S. du Plessis to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 18 June 1962; Memo Headmanship of Manzana Location 30, Bantu Affairs Commissioner B.A. Midgley, 5 March 1960.

people holding different means to those cherished by him' and worst of all, he did not work well with the head of the Tribal Authority.[37]

Whether the BAD was swayed by a dislike of Amos as a representative of the educated elite or by their distrust of his petitioner, it is difficult to tell. The magistrate was not impressed with Valindawo AC Xundu, petitioner on behalf of Amos Xundu, suspecting him of 'subversive tendencies'. Valindawo associated with members of the ANC while overtly supporting Bantu Authorities. Put to the vote, the overwhelming majority of Manzana residents supported Barret Saul. Amos Xundu was rejected by a vote of 99 to 212.

Amos continued to serve as a councillor on the Qwathi Tribal Authority where the politics were no less turbulent than those in the location. Exacerbating matters was that the magistrate, JAS Brownlee, son of the late Charles Brownlee, who had advocated a soft approach in the treatment of colonised people, repeatedly antagonised them. At the installation of Mayeza Dalasile as head of the Tribal Authority, Brownlee spelled out the meaning of Bantu Authorities. African people, he said, had been granted a 'little independence' and were expected to take more responsibility for their affairs in return for this favour.[38] He continued setting out his hard line in a patronising tone:

> Today we have reached the stage where the white man is no longer there to give a helping hand all the time. In the past your white friends have helped you more than they should have and today there is a feeling among the people that the Government will do things for them ... When a man comes to me and says my wife has run away, the government must find her; but in your everyday life you can help yourselves and improve your living conditions by the use of a little independence.[39]

At the next meeting, the young Brownlee proposed that the amaQwathi divide into three tribal authorities. This move would reduce the factionalism tearing them apart and facilitate administration and progress. For weeks there was no other topic of conversation in the Qwathi locations. Debate raged, rumours abounded and fists flew. While some were desperately trying to prevent any division,

37 Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30, D. Dalasile for Qwati Tribal Authority to Bantu Affairs Commissioner Engcobo 20 June 1962.

38 Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30, Magistrate Engcobo to Chief Magistrate, 24 April 1954; Mthatha Archives, NAD, Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs, Headmen and people held at Engcobo on 4 October 1957.

39 Chiefs and Headmen Location no 30, Minutes of meeting at Nkondlo held on 21 October 1954 for installation of Chief Regent Mayeza Dalasile of Qwathi tribe at 12.30pm.

a group calling itself Imincayi emerged 'from nowhere' and made a bid for the leadership of one of the proposed tribal authorities. Rumours spread that this was an insurgent intervention, and the Qwathi decided to pull together to prevent being split into three tribal authorities. Chiefs, headmen and people 'violently rejected' Brownlee's proposal, shouting that the magistrate was trying to 'split the clan and derogate from the Chief's authority'.[40] Acting in unison, they refused to greet the magistrate and remained with their backs turned for the duration of the meeting.

Brownlee was mortified. In the company of the Chief Native Commissioner, Terence Ramsay, he addressed a smaller meeting of chiefs and headmen a week later where he vented his spleen:

> When I arrived at the meeting in the company of your chief [Mayeza], there were several hundred people seated on the ground. As we approached, those people remained seated. Not one greeted. Not a single voice was raised in greeting. It was a deliberate insult to me as Magistrate and to your chief. I repeat that it was a deliberate insult and one which was decided upon before I arrived. This is not the behaviour of men but of uncircumcised boys who have not yet learned good manners.[41]

To teach them good manners, he would beat the Qwathi with a 'little switch': he would deny them all privileges until such time as they 'made reparations'; the magistrate would issue no liquor permits, no kraal sites, no permits to move livestock, no re-allotment of land and he would deny permission to any headmen seeking to go on leave. Chief Mayeza attempted to apologise on behalf of the headmen but that was not good enough. Brownlee declared that he would only accept an apology that came from a meeting of the full Qwathi clan, including all those who had been part of the insult.

Standing up, Ramsay demanded that all the chiefs and headmen take an oath of loyalty. This was punishment: the headmen knew how the oath worked. One of their number, Samuel Mcaba, had been instructed to take it when he was caught slumbering at a meeting and was suspended when he refused. The oath read:

40 Petition Lower Gqaga location Engcobo 19 May 1956. Rejected by amaQwati. NTS F54/1184/54 vol 1, Ontwikkelingshup; Qwati Tribal Authority Part 2 Kapteins en Hoofmanne Engcobo. Chief Magistrate Umtata to Secretary of Native Affairs 30 August 1956.

41 Mthatha Archives, NAD File 3/4/1/, Chiefs and Headmen Quarterly meetings Engcobo. Minutes of the meeting held in the court room of the magistrate's office, Engcobo, on 10 December 1957.

> I being a chief/headman appointed/recognised/paid by the government, do hereby undertake to carry out the duties pertaining to my post, a list of which has been supplied to me, to uphold the laws of the land to the best of my ability, to counter subversive propaganda, to report all illegal meetings held in my area and to report the presence of troublemakers therein. So help me God. [42]

Only 2 of the 40 headmen at the meeting had the courage to refuse. Ramsay declared them dismissed.[43] The little switch had become a *sjambok*.

The Secretary for Native Affairs did not support Ramsay's oath-taking and scolded him for adopting a dangerous course of action:

> The Chief Native Commissioner's approach is wrong and will do more harm than good. He treats the natives like children and irresponsible children at that. These natives are not children and the person who treats them as such doesn't understand them. This approach is more likely to antagonise them than induce their co-operation. One wonders what the CNC said at the meeting of 40 headmen. The declaration which the CNC wanted them to affirm and sign was unnecessary. The regulations published under Proclamation no 110 of 1957 plainly prescribe the duties, powers etc of chiefs and headmen.[44]

Ramsay was instructed to reinstate the headmen he had dismissed and to call a special conciliatory meeting. Brownlee was to drop the proposal that the Qwathi Tribal Authority split into three. Appeased, the chiefs and headmen apologised for turning their backs on the magistrate. While the Secretary for Native Affairs had averted a crisis, the amaQwathi remained unconvinced that Bantu Authorities would bring them any good.

The amaTshatshu: down but not out

Gungubele's sons did not play a prominent role in the politics of Bantu Authorities, partly because of their geographical dispersal. Some lived in the same magisterial district as the Qwathi Thembu while others lived not far away across the Tsomo River. This geographical division meant that they were drawn into Bantu Authorities in different ways. Those at Makwababa in the St Marks

42 SAB 45/276 (3) (2) Native Administration Act 38/1927, Appointment of Chiefs and Headmen Transkei; Chief Native Commissioner T.D. Ramsay to Secretary for Native Affairs 18 December 1957; BAO Vol 1/238 F 54/1184/46 Chiefs and Headmen location no 31 Qutubeni Engcobo.

43 Mthatha Archives, NAD File 3/4/1/, Chiefs and Headmen Quarterly meetings Engcobo. Minutes of the meeting held in the court room of the magistrate's office, Engcobo, on 10 December 1957.

44 BAO Vol 1/238 F 54/1184/35 Chiefs and Headmen Location 35 All Saints Engcobo.

(Cofimvaba) district were closer to the political turmoil generated by Kaiser Matanzima than those living at Caba in the Engcobo district. In each of these localities, the amaTshatshu were preoccupied with holding onto the hereditary line despite Sir George Cathcart's proscription. They would not let go of the line — they were amaTshatshu, not just anyone. At the same time, they were keen to be led by the best man available in the chiefly family.

Gcuwa, Gungubele's eldest son who was headman at Caba, died in 1915, seven years before his father. When Gungubele died, Gcuwa's son would become chief. Whether he was recognised by government or not, the amaTshatshu would follow the rules of heredity. Gcuwa's son, Ginyimvubu, was still a minor but he died before he could take over. In the meantime, the headmanship was held by Ngangolwandle, one of Gcuwa's brothers. When he stepped down, his place was taken by Dabulamanzi, his brother from a more junior house. At the time of his appointment in 1923, Dabulamanzi was young, illiterate and not interested in leadership. Nonetheless, the native commissioner of Engcobo accepted that 'the sentiment of the people' was so 'strongly against departure from the line of primogeniture', that Dabulamanzi would have to be appointed as acting headman. When the heir died eight years later, Dabulamanzi was confirmed as headman.[45] But this was a departure from the line and would be amended later.

When Gungubele died at Makwababa in January 1923, the magistrate presided over a meeting to appoint a replacement. There were two nominees — the late chief's brother, Veliti Gungubele, and Mpondombini O'Grady (Gledi) Maphasa Gungubele, eldest son of the woman Gungubele had married to replace his great wife thereby creating the *qadi* house or support for the great house. Mpondombini's supporters maintained that Gungubele had identified him as successor as he lay on his deathbed. His appointment would demonstrate embodiment of the authority of the late chief. However, some argued that he was not the rightful successor, maintaining that Makwababa, as the second domicile of the Tshatshu royal family, should be under the right-hand house. Their argument was that since the great house was at Caba, the right-hand house should take Makwababa. 'As the son of the Qadi wife to the great house', Mpondombini was not of the right-hand house. Flying in the face of strong opposition, the native commissioner settled in favour of those who wanted the right-hand house, a more straightforward option for him as no *inter regnum* was required. But the man he appointed was not suitable for

45 Dabulamanzi was the grandfather of Mondli Gungubele who, after the advent of democracy, served variously as Member of Parliament for the ANC, mayor of Ekurhuleni, the largest metropolitan region in South Africa, and as Deputy Minister of Finance in President Cyril Ramaphosa's Cabinet.

the job. Within two years of his appointment, Veliti was found guilty of failing to bring his people to the district surgeon to be vaccinated against smallpox and he was fined £2/–. He continued to play this game of non-cooperation until he was charged with dereliction of duty. Veliti asked for a lawyer but NAD rules did not allow legal representation at native commissioner's courts. After the hearing Veliti hired an attorney to obtain a copy of the proceedings of his hearing. He also declined to present himself to the magistrate. Instead, he sent a note to the effect that he had caught a cold and was not able to attend. On his dismissal, he enquired about the implications for his son's succession, but received no definite answer.[46]

The battle between the two houses resumed. Veliti's son, Gqongqo Gungubele, stood for the position of headman but residents believed that he would follow in his father's footsteps. He had already been censured for occupying a site unlawfully allocated to him by his father. In July 1933, Makwababa residents elected Mpondombini to the headmanship of Makwababa, ending 11 years of neglect. Mpondombini was 29 years' old and had three years of primary school. He enjoyed the support of the older residents and of the chief regent at Caba. Mpondombini turned out much as Gungubele had said he would. He was conscientious in his administrative duties, visited his people in the mining compounds on the Witwatersrand and pressured the NAD to build a school. His weakness for drawing his fists after a beer drink was forgiven by the magistrate on more than one occasion.[47]

Bantu Authorities brought little change for the two principal seats of Tshatshu authority. Caba in the Engcobo district and Makwababa in the Cofimvaba district came under the Hala Tribal Authority. Mpondombini

46 Hindsight enables us to see that Gungubele knew what he was doing. Mthatha Archives, Box 171, File St Marks Location No 5: Makwababa St Marks File 3/20/3/5 Vol 1, Cofimvaba Magistrate to Chief Magistrate, 13 July 1922; Magistrate Cofimvaba to Chief Magistrate, 25 September 1922; Contravention of Regulation 16 of Government Notice 2197 of 1930. Framed under Act 36 of 1919. Case heard by John Granville Pike; Case 526/31 The King vs Silwanyana Ntliziyo, Headman of Nobokwe Location St Marks. Fined 10/ — or 4 days IHL; Headman Makwababa St Marks File 3/20/3/5, A. Anderson Attorney at Tsomo to Minister of Native Affairs requesting copy of proceedings of hearing against Veliti; reply from Secretary of Native Affairs to Anderson 29 September 1933; The note was written by Mr Conacher, a white trader at Qhitsi; File 3/20/3/7 Mthatha Archives Box 171 File St Marks Location, Location no 7 Nobokwe, St Marks District. Part 1 identifies instances of resistance to vaccination. Chief Magistrate Transkei to Secretary for Native Affairs 20 February 1933. Secretary for Native Affairs confirms termination of appointment of Veliti Gungubele as headman from 1 April 1933. Telegram to Tembu Umtata, 28 March 1933. Note 6 June 1933.

47 Mthatha Archives, Box 171, File Headman Makwababa St Marks File 3/20/3/5, Chief Magistrate Transkeian Territories to Magistrate Cofimvaba, 12 October 1942; Chief Magistrate to Secretary of Native Affairs 3 November 1942.

Maphasa, headman of Makwababa, served on the Hala Tribal Authority in Emigrant Thembuland under Manzezulu Mtirara; Kaiser Sobantu Gcuwa, headman of Caba in Engcobo served on the Hala Tribal Authority of the Transkei under Chief Mcawezulu Mtirara.[48] While they kept their political cards close to their chests, these men were quietly opposed to Kaiser Matanzima's power-mongering and remained firm in their loyalty to the Thembu *kumkani*. Their stance was informed by their own history: Gungubele had opposed Raxoti Matanzima's moving to Emigrant Thembuland and disliked his quest for power. They were grateful to the Thembu *kumkani* for taking care of Yiliswa while Gungubele was on Robben Island. They would not abandon the great house and spilt the abaThembu.

In the late 1950s, rumours of apartheid plans for augmenting the Transkei in anticipation of its independence reached Caba and Makwababa. They heard 'on the wind' (*gomoya*) that land would soon be excised from the Queenstown district and handed over to the tribal authorities of Emigrant Thembuland. For the amaTshatshu who knew their history, Queenstown and its district were located in the territory of Maphasa and Gungubele had had his great place on the Gwatyu. One man saw this as a chance to make a bid to return to this land. He was Kaiser Sobantu Gcuwa's half-brother, Dabulamanzi Gungubele. Retired from the headmanship of Caba since 1945, he remained a councillor to the chief. On his behalf, he would approach the Secretary for Native Affairs.



Figure 4.2: Mondli Gungubele, grandson of Dabulamanzi.

Photograph supplied by Mondli Gungubele.

48 St Marks Headman Location 47, Secretary for Native Affairs, C.B. Young to Chief Native Commissioner, 7 May 1958; Mthatha Archives, Engcobo Box 172, File 3/4/3/7–3/4/3/16, File 3/4/3/11, Headman Caba Engcobo Minutes of meeting of Chiefs, Headmen and people held at Engcobo on 4 October 1957; Kaiser Sobantu Gungubele to Secretary for Native Affairs.

As he was illiterate, Dabulamanzi enlisted a teacher to write a letter requesting recognition of the Tshatshu chieftaincy and setting out their right to any land excised from the Queenstown district. The teacher would send the letter to the NAD in the name of the Tshatshu chief, Kaiser Sobantu Gcuwa.

On receiving the letter, the Secretary for Native Affairs instructed the chief magistrate at Umtata to investigate the claim. He in turn enlisted the help of the government ethnologist. Who were these amaTshatshu and where did they come from? The ethnologist's report drew extensively on the notes of the colonial missionary, Charles Brownlee, and the ethnographic taxonomy of van Warmelo who was the senior government ethnologist in the 1930s.[49]

> After the wars with the amaNdungwane in 1828 a number of Thembu clans moved across the Kei into what is now the Queenstown district. The chief of highest rank among these emigrant tribes was Bawana, father of Mapassa. Mapassa aided the amaRarabe in their war against the Cape Colony in 1846–7 and his tribe was 'reduced to utter destitution' and was placed by Sir George Cathcart in the so-called Tambookie location in what is now Glen Grey. Mapassa was deposed and Nonesi, the great Wife of Ngubencuka, was appointed a headman over the location by Cathcart. There are references to this in Brownlee's historical records pp 21–4. The Tshatshu appear to have ceased to exist as a separate tribe and they are not listed in van Warmelo's A Preliminary Survey. Their remnants were formally placed directly under the senior tribe.[50]

While he acknowledged that Maphasa's people were the highest ranking 'tribe' in the Queenstown district, their demise left him unclear as to the way forward. He pointed out that the author of the letter was 'not clear exactly what he wants' and proposed that the *kumkani* be asked for advice. 'On the face of it, it would seem undesirable and unnecessary to add to the number of Thembu chiefs, but, in deference to our policy of self-determination it might be advisable to approach the paramount chief for his comments. It is definitely an internal matter as far as the Thembu are concerned,' he concluded.

49 C. Brownlee, *Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History* (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, 1896); N. J. van Warmelo, *A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa*, Ethnological publication no 5 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935). For more on van Warmelo see S. P. Lekgoathi, 'Colonial experts, local interlocutors, informants and the making of an archive on the "Transvaal Ndebele" 1930–1989', *Journal of African History* 50, 1 (2009), pp.61–80; S. Pugach, 'Carl Meinhof and the German influence on Nicholas van Warmelo's ethnological and linguistic writing 1927–1935', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30 (2004), pp.827–828.

50 Mthatha Archives Box 3/4/7–3/4/3/16 File 3/4/3/11 Engcobo, Chief Magistrate Umtata to Secretary for Native Affairs, 16 January 1956.

Ramsay appears to have ignored this suggestion. Instead, he interviewed Kaiser Sobantu Gcuwa and narrowed his report to the findings over which he had control. Sobantu was not the initiator of the approach and Dabulamanzi did not have authority to write on his behalf, he reported. Sobantu could not say what land the amaTshatshu had occupied in the Queenstown district and Dabulamanzi's clarification that Gungubele's country was 'round about Gwatyu' did not satisfy Ramsay. He instructed the magistrate at Engcobo to 'inform Headman Kaiser Sobantu Gcuwa that as Gwatyu in the Queenstown district is not a native area, his claim to chieftainship of that area cannot be considered'. He also told the magistrate to reprimand Dabulamanzi for causing him an inconvenience.[51]

Excluded from the game of politics for three generations, Maphasa's descendants were no longer adept at power play. Their approach was clumsy and they did not know how to pull together. Their political strategising was as indeterminate and scattered as their following. In his expert opinion, the government ethnologist acknowledged that the Tshatshu bid followed the logic of Bantu Authorities, but their recognition would require the unscrambling of history. To gather this clan into one place and to pair ethnicity with territory would be a cumbersome task. In Ramsay's view, it was altogether too inconvenient to entertain. There was little risk in dismissing it and he anticipated no fall-out to his sending Sobantu away empty-handed. Little did he know how many times those responsible for 'native affairs' had done this to them. He could reject their plea but he could not obliterate the past. History does not go away. Dabulamanzi had woken a sleeping lion, albeit one that was hobbled by its wounds. The amaTshatshu slowly began to connect with one another and to re-enter the political fray.

They did not oppose Bantu Authorities but took up their places in the local and regional structures as they were rolled out across Thembuland and Emigrant Thembuland in the 1960s. Like many others in public office, the headmen of Makwababa and Caba represented communities burdened with the past and uninspired by the future. Their resentment and enthusiasm were muted and commingled. How chiefs and people responded to Bantu Authorities and to their promotion by the *uber* chief Kaiser Matanzima varied from one

51 Mthatha Archives Box 3/4/7–3/4/3/16 File 3/4/3/11 Engcobo, Headman Caba Interviewed by the Resident Magistrate Engcobo, Minutes of 26 January 1956; T.D. Ramsay Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territorial Authority Umtata, 9 February 1956 to Magistrate Engcobo; see also Secretary of Native Affairs to Kaiser Sobantu Gungubele, 2 May 1956.

locality to another, their take-up and objections informed by their own stories of conquest and displacement. Everyone learned the new political game: ethnicity could be ascribed, assigned and deployed in the service of these structures of tribalisation and in the promotion of their own interests. Its critics feared that Bantu Authorities placed a ceiling on the advancement of black people while offering opportunities to a handful of administrators.

The consolidation of the homeland territories of Transkei and Ciskei, the phase of bantuisation that followed Bantu Authorities in the early 1970s, raised the possibility that sections of old Tambookieland would be released for African occupation. Driven by the deal-making of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima and Lennox Leslie Sebe of the Ciskei bantustan, plans for territorial consolidation created a new political game in which the amaTshatshu might participate and play to their strengths. In the next chapter, we follow the Tshatshu groups that ran into this fray and observe how they became injured in the social engineering that followed homeland consolidation.

CHAPTER 5

Claiming identity, constructing ethnicity: the rise of the right-hand house of Tshatshu and the politics of bantustan independence

At the height of bantustan politics in the 1960s, descendants of Tshatshu's right-hand house stepped forward to claim chiefly status in the Glen Grey district. Acknowledging that they were minors in relation to the great house and declaring their respect for the great house, they announced their intent to fight for recognition of their place in this chiefly lineage. Their quest for recognition of the right-hand house played out on the stage of bantuisation in the run-up to the independence of the Transkei and Ciskei. Contestation over land and people was driven by Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, who had his eye on the presidency of the Transkei, and Lennox Leslie Wongama Sebe, who sought to head the Ciskei, with the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) acting as final adjudicator on tricky issues.

The requirement of bantuisation that each ethnic group should be under the leadership of its own chief opened the way for ambitious individuals with a link to a royal family to claim chiefly status. Confronted with a rush of genealogies hastily constructed in support of chiefly claims, the BAD employed a team of Bantu ethnologists to determine their validity. These ethnologists were Afrikaners trained in *volkekunde*, the nationalist version of anthropology taught at Afrikaans universities.[1] Their job was to determine whether the genealogical line presented by the claimants was credible. What mattered in their determinations was not legitimacy but the facilitation of Bantu Authorities and bantustan independence. Ethnologically manufactured chiefs were more likely to occur in localities characterised by diversity and where ethnicity and chiefly politics had played little or no part since conquest, and in localities to which people were removed as part of the apartheid project.

Volkekunde, the study of ethnology, was perceived as dangerous, both by modernists who did not want a return to patriarchal chiefdoms and by chiefs

1 R. Gordon, 'Apartheid's Anthropologists: The Genealogy of Afrikaner Anthropology', *American Ethnologist*, 15 3 (1988), pp.535–553.

and elders who took their role as custodians of history and culture seriously. Ethnology looked for and emphasised deep cultural differences between groups. Informed by the ideas of racial science, fascism, genetics and biological determinism, *volkekunde* classified and described people in essentialist terms.[2] Its purpose, according to Cees van de Waal, a reformed ethnologist, was to demonstrate that 'humans were members of culturally separate peoples, that each lived according to their culture in a highly integrated ethnos with clear boundaries into which new generations were enculturated.'[3] Drawing on the race theory of the German linguist, Carl Meinhof, *volkekundiges* distinguished between civilised and non-civilised cultures 'associated with physical differences' and emphasised incompatibility between them. Students of *volkekunde* were advised that 'To preserve the minority group in a contact situation, the only solution was segregation, or parallel development' and that they should see the application of *volkekunde* as *volksdiens*, an act of service to the Afrikaner nation.[4]

Genealogy and ethnology sometimes converged in servicing apartheid's Bantu Authorities Act (1951). However, ethnologists were frequently inventive in their genealogical determinations and were prone to contradicting each other. Waiting for the report of a Bantu ethnologist was not unlike watching the diviner read his bones. Disregarding fairness or accuracy, those who benefited from these ethnological scripts would defend them. Bantu ethnologists were most often called upon in areas where ethnic backgrounds were too diverse for people to be squeezed into ethnicised structures without immense difficulty. Bantu ethnologists also intervened when leadership claims were heavily contested or when bantustan leaders, engaging in neo-patrimonial practices, promoted family members to positions of authority and power, upsetting local people. These elements of ethnological practice are present in the story of the exodus from Glen Grey.

Glen Grey was 'in-between' in more ways than one. Geographically attached to the Transkei and administratively part of the Ciskei, it was eyed by both Transkei and Ciskei leaders as they prepared for homeland independence

2 C.S. van de Waal, 'Long walk from *volkekunde* to anthropology: reflections on representing the human in South Africa', *Anthropology Southern Africa*, Vol 38, no 3 (2015), pp.216–234; A. Bank, 'Fathering *volkekunde*: race and culture in the ethnological writings of Werner Eiselen, Stellenbosch University, 1926–1936', *Anthropology Southern Africa* (2015), pp.1–17, J. C. Kotze, 'Volkekunde en grense', inaugural speech as Head of Volkekunde, Rand Afrikaans University, Thursday 26 August 1982 UJContent, http:hdl.handle.net/10210/2250. Accessed 20 March 2018.

3 Van de Waal, 'Long walk from *volkekunde*', p.222.

4 Van de Waal, 'Long walk from *volkekunde*', p.223.

in the 1970s. The district was politically complex and socially heterogeneous, and had presented administrative difficulties for Bantu Authorities. Kaiser Matanzima wanted the territory to be incorporated into the Transkei and sought to offload those who objected onto the Ciskei. His apartheid masters also required demonstrable evidence that he enjoyed the support of those who remained. The process of manufacturing this support opened the way for the Tshatshu right-hand house at Glen Grey to press for recognition and for their return to historical land.

The right-hand house of Tshatshu claimed descent from Chief Vezi, son of Bawana's brother, Chungwa, who had lived in the area with his brother in the 1820s. Their domicile in Glen Grey dated back to 1883, when Vezi had moved there after the Thembuland uprising. Vezi had lived near Shiloh in the Whittlesea area of the north-eastern frontier and had served as a councillor first to Maphasa and then to Yiliswa. In Glen Grey, his followers settled in four locations — Rodana, Tshatshu, Mtsalane and Mpothulo. In 1973 some 17 588 adult men in these locations continued to identify themselves as amaTshatshu.[5] Reuben Makhebenge Katsi served as headman at Rodana from 1942. In the 1950s, he came to think of himself as a chief, preferred to be called by the salutation, Aa! Zwelinzima, and attended meetings of the Council of Chiefs in Lady Frere. At the height of Bantu Authorities in the mid-1960s, Reuben Katsi sought recognition as a chief of the amaTshatshu in Glen Grey. He claimed that he was a descendant of the house of Chungwa, son of Tshatshu by his right-hand house. His own father was Ngubenyathi, grandson of Vezi. Gungubele, he said, had recognised the house of Chungwa.[6] However, the Tshatshu great house did not endorse his claim. Reuben was from a junior house, the *ixhiba* (support) house of Chungwa. This Reuben admitted but claimed that his great grandfather Katsi, son of Vezi in the *ixhiba* house, had been given to the great house. Teba, Vezi's only son in the great house had drowned at the age of 13. Another difficulty was that the great house considered it unacceptable for a junior house to seek recognition before Sobantu, Gungubele's heir, was accorded official recognition. Sobantu himself was not a vocal personality. This struggle was taken up on his behalf by Thembekile Enoch Tshunungwa, a skilled politician.

5 BAO 54/1368/03 File 54 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam. Lady Frere; J.S. Malan, Bantu Ethnologist 'Claim for citizenship: AmaTshatshu Tribe Glen Grey', p.2. Adult men were counted because it was assumed that only they were heads of households and economically useful as labour.

6 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam. Lady Frere. Notes on interview on 9/2/66 Halas and Tshatshus. The *ixhiba* house is the support for the right-hand house.

Tshunungwa had served as Cape provincial secretary of the ANC from 1955 to 1961 and was charged in the Treason Trial along with Nelson Mandela and others. While he was not convicted, he was forced to give up his job as a teacher, and he moved to the Transkei where he opened a trading store, became an adviser to KD Matanzima and served as deputy chairman of the Glen Grey Territorial Authority. He opposed Reuben Katsi's precocious move which he saw as a threat to the gains of Bantu Authorities. His main fear was that granting Reuben Katsi chiefly status would lead to a Tshatshu Tribal Authority in the heartland of Matanzima's territory, and result in the excision of four locations from the amaHala Tribal Authority under Chief Manzezulu Mtirara. He also pointed out that recognising the Chungwa house ahead of the great house ran the risk of elevating the status of the junior house above that of the great house, and he feared this was what Reuben Katsi wished for. Tensions mounted as the dispute locked down. Meetings involving Tshatshu councillors were fraught with acrimony and verbal assaults flew wildly. On one occasion, after a meeting with the magistrate and officials of the BAD, Tshunungwa and Katsi came to blows.[7]

Resolving this dispute was a complex matter that centred on the rules pertaining to expansion and fission arising from junior houses breaking away from the great house. The westward migration of the right-hand house, and their residence inside colonial boundaries in the nineteenth century, complicated relations between houses and led to new ideas about the meaning of 'fission'. Ethnologist Hammond-Tooke set out a formulation which he believed explained the structural arrangements of the house system, and which described a process of breaking away from the great house and the setting up of new polities through fission.[8] Jeff Peires challenged this ethnographic model in relation to the history of the great houses of the amaXhosa. Peires argued that the rise of the right-hand house had more to do with expediency than with established historical patterns. It was a means of adapting 'an old domestic practice to rationalise a new set of political circumstances' brought about by colonialism.[9] This rationalisation was evident in the story of Kaiser Matanzima's breakaway from the Thembu great house. Of significance to a far smaller number of people, the rise of the right-hand house of Tshatshu in the 1960s demonstrates how people, ethnological experts, administrators and the

7 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam. Notes on interview on 9/2/66 Halas and Tshatshus.
8 W.D. Hammond-Tooke, 'Segmentation and Fission in Cape Nguni Politics', *Africa* 35 (1965), pp.143–166.
9 J. B. Peires, 'The Rise of the "Right-Hand House" in the History and Historiography of the Xhosa', *History of Africa*, 2 (1975), pp.113–125.

courts grappled with the difficulties of determining the authority of those who had lived on the frontier for several generations.

Bantu ethnology, bantustan 'independence' and the right-hand house of Tshatshu

In a bid to determine the validity of Reuben Katsi's claim as heir to the right-hand house and to gauge the extent of his support, TA Moll, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Glen Grey, enlisted the support of Dr CV Bothma, the Bantu ethnologist. Bothma's task was to choose between two genealogies, one drawn up by Tshunungwa, the other by Mac Nkopa, an elderly Ndungwana resident from the Shiloh area. We do not know what Bothma concluded as his report was not in the archive bundle. It is possible that his report went directly to the secretary for the BAD and that it informed his view that the amaTshatshu had never been subordinate to the amaHala, that they should be recognised as a distinct chieftainship and that Sobantu, son of the great house, was heir to this chieftaincy.

Recognition on historical grounds was relatively straightforward, but an acceptable settlement required that the complex issues of place, chiefly domicile and area of jurisdiction be sorted out. The secretary for the BAD acknowledged that requiring Sobantu to move to Glen Grey would be extremely tricky — in his words, 'ultra delicate'. Not only would he come face-to-face with Katsi, but his presence might annoy Matanzima whose own house was junior to that of the amaTshatshu. The success of his plan depended on a series of conditions and concessions. It was not clear that Reuben Katsi would stand down in favour of Sobantu Gungubele. It was uncertain whether Manzezulu Mtirara, under whom the Thembu chiefs of Glen Grey fell, would support recognition of the amaTshatshu as it would upset the bantustan status quo. A descendant of Mfanta, Manzezulu had been appointed as a chief by Matanzima. He complained that the local bantu commissioner was 'deliberately confusing' matters by searching for the true hereditary line.[10] It was also possible that Sobantu and his followers would not be willing to move from the Engcobo district to Glen Grey, close to where Matanzima resided.

Unable to deny their history, Kaiser Matanzima supported the recognition of the Tshatshu chieftaincy in principle and delegated the political detail to

10 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, Notes on interview on 9/2/66 Halas and Tshatshus; P.A. Franken, Secretary of Bantu Affairs and Development to Chief Bantu Commissioner, King William's Town, 27 September 1966, described his plan as '*ultradelikaat*'.

Chief Manzezulu Mtirara. Since Manzezulu was not prepared to have a chief senior to him on his own patch, he proposed that Sobantu be appointed as sub-chief under him. He would be given responsibility, temporarily, for the administration of the Rodana and Bolotwa locations. When the state acquired land 'traditionally belonging to Gungubele Maphasa' and handed it over to Transkei, Sobantu would relocate to that land. The secretary for the BAD insisted that the amaTshatshu were not historically subordinate to the amaHala and should be accorded full chiefly status. Sobantu could not be placed under Manzezulu. Piqued, Manzezulu turned against the amaTshatshu, withdrew his offer of two locations for the Tshatshu great house and recommended that Katsi's 'Tshatshus be given their chieftainship over the portion occupied by Mapassa's people in Whittlesea' in the Ciskei. This way, he would not have to deal with them. A wily politician, Manzezulu proposed that the amaGcina be accorded chiefly recognition to offset recognition of the amaTshatshu. On this matter, he met with success. The amaGcina would form a tribal authority in Glen Grey.[11]

Expediently in his capacity as the self-appointed paramount chief of the western Thembu, Kaiser Matanzima arranged a consultative meeting of the Tshatshu elders and Thembu chiefs west of the Kei River to discuss the matter of the amaTshatshu. Reuben Katsi did not attend this meeting.[12] Here the great house of the amaTshatshu informed Matanzima that they did not want to move to Glen Grey or to the Whittlesea area of Ciskei. They would wait until the apartheid government fulfilled its promise to expropriate the land that had once been occupied by Gungubele on the Gwatyu. They would move there when the land became available. Matanzima wrote to the secretary for the BAD, accepting recognition of the amaTshatshu as a chieftaincy independent of the amaHala, provided that the Gwatyu farms were purchased for their resettlement. He also proposed that the Shiloh reserve near Whittlesea in the Ciskei, where a group

11 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, Manzezulu to Secretary BAD 11 October 1966; Franken to Chief Bantu Commissioner King William's Town, 4 November 1966; T.A. Moll to Chief Bantu Commissioner, King William's Town, 11 March 1968; BAO 54/1368/03. File 54 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. Gcinastam, Manzezulu to Chief Bantu Commissioner King William's Town, 28 November 1966. Three Tribal Authorities were established in Glen Grey each under a chief: Manzezulu Mtirara for the amaHala (and the most senior of the chiefs serving the largest number of people, approx 58 323); Zwelixolile Mpangele for the amaGcina, Gwebindlala Mhlontlo for the amaMhlontlo Tribal Authority. Zwelixolile Mpangele would be appointed as chief and assume control over eight locations. L.E. Wotshela, 'Homeland Consolidation, Resettlement and Local Politics in the Border and Ciskei Region of the Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1960 to 1996', PhD Thesis in Modern History (Oxford University, July 2001), p.156.

12 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, K.D. Matanzima to Secretary BAD, 15 February 1967.

of amaTshatshu resided, come under Sobantu's jurisdiction.[13] Matanzima's proposal would consolidate Tshatshu ethnicity under the great house. He was silent on Reuben Katsi's claim.

Beyond this matter of the Tshatshu chieftaincy, Kaiser Matanzima was engaged in a larger struggle over Glen Grey. Since the district was dominated by the amaHala clan of the abaThembu, he regarded it as part of his territory. However, if he wanted it incorporated into the Transkei, which was now a self-governing state on its way to becoming independent, he would have to persuade Lennox Sebe, his counterpart in the Ciskei, that this was to his advantage. The BAD, he believed, would be won over by the fact that most people supported him and the idea of Transkei independence. In a referendum in October 1971, Glen Grey inhabitants were asked whether they wished to be incorporated into independent Transkei or to remain in the Ciskei. To Matanzima's chagrin, the overwhelming majority, some 83.7 per cent, voted against incorporation. Historian Luvuyo Wotshela suggests that this vote was determined by a desire to avoid having to take on Transkei citizenship, and the belief that Lennox Sebe was not interested in independence for Ciskei.[14] These voters were proven wrong.

A few months later the Ciskei was pronounced a self-governing territory (Proclamation R107 of 1972). Lennox Sebe wanted to ascertain where matters stood in the Tshatshu great house before agreeing to accept Reuben Katsi and he requested the magistrate at Lady Frere to investigate. Magistrate Boucher believed firmly that Sobantu's claims to the chieftainship were 'greater' than Katsi's and that he would have to accept this. However, he suggested that a compromise might be reached by appointing Sobantu Gungubele as chief in the Transkei and recognising Katsi as chief in the Ciskei.[15] Fearing opposition from the great house, a somewhat exasperated BAD turned once again to their ethnologists.

In January 1973, JS Malan submitted a report on the Tshatshu claim for chieftainship. Following *volkekunde* rules of description, Malan repeated earlier findings: Reuben Katsi had acknowledged Sobantu's seniority and Manzezulu Mtirara was willing to allow Sobantu access to the amaTshatshu in his area of jurisdiction.[16] Malan made no mention of the people residing in the locations

13 Matanzima to Chief Bantu Commissioner, King William's Town, 7 September 1967.
14 D.A. Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa 1964–1974: Parties and Issues* (London: Hurst and Co, 1975), p.162; Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, pp.159–160.
15 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, D.G. Boucher to Department of the Chief Minister of Finance, Ciskeian Government Service, 6 September 1972.
16 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, J.S. Malan Ethnologist. Claim for Tshatshu Chieftainship AmaTshatshu Tribe Glen Grey n.d.

under Katsi and Sobantu and assumed that the ill-feeling had dissipated. However, a second ethnological report by AO Jackson described the Tshatshu chieftainship as being caught up in constant political turmoil. Tensions between Mtirara and Katsi were a running sore into which Katsi had poured salt by voting against Glen Grey's incorporation into an independent Transkei. More complications would be created if Sobantu moved to Glen Grey, as his people in Engcobo would be bereft of a leader; Katsi's followers in Glen Grey might accept his seniority but prefer that he remain in Engcobo. The matter was finalised in the ethnologist's report by the Ciskei's decision 'not to import chiefs from outside'. Jackson had also done his homework on the genealogical dispute. Tshunungwa's genealogy identified Katsi as coming from Vezi's right-hand house and that he was therefore not the rightful heir to the chieftaincy. Katsi claimed that he had grown up in the great house, because Gungubele had named the status of Vezi's wives and had placed his grandmother in the great house. Jackson avoided relying entirely on hearsay and cited John Henderson Soga's classic text *The AmaXhosa: Life and Customs* to confirm the custom of placing a son of the right-hand house in the great house so that he might be raised as heir. Jackson also acknowledged that acrimony had influenced attitudes and decisions in this matter. He cited Tshunungwa's remark that Katsi had ruined his chances of recognition as a sub-chief by showing disrespect to Manzezulu Mtirara. Jackson's concluding ethnological point was that the amaHala and the amaTshatshu were of two distinct houses and that Mtirara had no authority to determine their fate ('*geen tradisionele reg om oor die lotgevalle van die Tshatshu te beskik nie*').[17] Clearly, Jackson believed that Katsi's case was deserving, but not in the Ciskei. He seemed to imply that something would have to give.

Something did give. Claiming that his people did not understand the referendum, Kaiser Matanzima consulted the chiefs and headmen. The outcome of the referendum was overturned. Only one headman, Reuben Katsi, spoke against incorporation.[18] This difficulty was solved through a political deal. Matanzima agreed to give up his claim to authority over the abaThembu in the Whittlesea district in exchange for Glen Grey. He would allow Reuben

17 Kapteins en Hoofmanne. AmaTshatshustam, R.D. Jackson, Ethnologist, Memo: Hoof, Staatkundige Ontwikkeling, Die Tshatshu van Glen Grey, 12 January 1973. A.O. Jackson published *The Ethnic composition of the Ciskei and Transkei*, Department of Bantu Affairs and Development, Ethnological Publications Issue 53, 1975, digitised by University of Virginia in 2009.

18 Presentation to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo in his capacity as a member of the Tshatshu Traditional Council at Whittlesea on Wednesday 24 October 2012, p.4.

Katsi and his followers to move to Whittlesea and reside there under Sebe's jurisdiction. The BAD agreed to these terms and waited for Lennox Sebe to accept them.

Sebe persuaded his advisers that their decision not to 'import chiefs' would be subject to exceptions. This paved the way for Katsi and his followers to move to land once occupied by Chief Vezi of the house of Chungwa. If the great house was unhappy with this arrangement, they did not prevent Reuben Katsi and his followers from relocating. The BAD wanted the move to be completed before Transkei's independence on 26 October 1976.

With a population of just over 600 000 in 1976, the Ciskei was far smaller than the Transkei with approximately two million people. It was also more crowded, despite the absence of two thirds of its population who were at work in cities outside the bantustan. To ease the congestion, Sebe's Territorial Authority sought to claim an area that extended west of the Gamtoos River. This would make the Ciskei three times larger than the area envisaged by the apartheid state, but the expansion did not happen. Across the Ciskei, poverty, unemployment and malnutrition were widespread with high rates of infant mortality particularly in the overcrowded areas.[19] Hewu, the district in which Whittlesea and Shiloh were situated, was expanded to accommodate new arrivals but land was badly needed by those who had been relocated there under apartheid's forced removals programme a decade earlier.[20] In the mid-nineteenth century, this area had not been considered ideal for settlement by those moving west of the Kei River. According to Mvulani Stompjes, interpreter for the Moravian missionaries, Bawana's people complained that it was 'open and barren', the grazing was not good and 'one could not grow crops'.[21] Exposure to the wind made it very cold in winter. By the 1960s, white farmers using modern technologies had developed successful farms on this ground, supplementing surface water with water from boreholes, and raising large flocks of sheep on the sweet grasses. In the 1970s, the apartheid state resettled those people deemed to be 'surplus' to the labour needs of the cities in the area. The promised jobs in local 'border' industries failed to materialise.[22]

19 Ciskei Government Service, Ciskei Commission Report. Chairman George Philip Quail (Silverton: Conference Associates, 1980), pp.53–59.

20 The Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa: The SPP Reports Vol. 2 The Eastern Cape* (Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 1983), pp.206–246.

21 Stompjes, Biography, p.73.

22 Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSEC), Report on Whittlesea: A socio-economic profile and LED strategy (February 1999), pp.3–7; 16–17.

As Transkei independence loomed closer, Lennox Sebe increased pressure on those who wanted to move. But Katsi and his followers were dragging their feet. They wanted to see the land, schools, hospitals and other amenities that they had been promised. To speed things up, the deputy minister of the BAD, P Uys, promised compensation for immovable property and Lennox Sebe sent a delegation of eight men to persuade Reuben Katsi to lead the emigration. People believed this was a sign that Sebe recognised Katsi's chiefly status. [23] The news was received in the city with some excitement. Migrant workers in Cape Town came together in a loose association they called the Glen Grey Mission Association, so that they might play a part in this fast-moving scenario.[24] Sebe provided transport for a reconnaissance party from Glen Grey. Through the bus windows, passengers saw farm land stretching all the way to the Stormberg mountains. Their guides told them that many farms would become part of the area released for occupation, but they neglected to add that this land would be settled by many thousands more than those undertaking the reconnoitring trip. On their return to Glen Grey they talked of generous lands, compensation for fixed property left behind in Glen Grey and a new beginning far from Kaiser Matanzima.[25]

Apprehension set in when Kaiser visited the Tshatshu village to bid them farewell. He used the opportunity to warn those who would emigrate that he had eyes and ears everywhere, and that he would watch the abaThembu in the Ciskei in his capacity as paramount chief of western Thembuland.[26] But there was no time for hesitation. Under pressure to make the move before Transkei independence, the Glen Grey emigrants crossed over in September 1976. As they left, 'the borders were closed' and they were not free to come and go between their old and new abodes.[27] Their identity documents were endorsed with Katsi's signature and a Ciskei stamp. Their Glen Grey addresses were struck out.

23 Luvuyo Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, p.159.
24 Interview, Anne Mager with Mrs Rengqe, 16 April 2015.
25 Cory Library Manuscript 10 336 Folder 1 of 1 Glen Grey. Report on the Removal of the Tshatshu, Ndungwana and Gcina sub-groups from the Thembu heartland around Mbashe River to Queenstown district and later to the Tambookie location in the Glen Grey District c.1992.
26 Presentation to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo in his capacity as a member of the Tshatshu Traditional Council at Whittlesea on Wednesday 24 October 2012, p.4.
27 Interview, Anne Mager with Mrs Rengqe.

The Glen Grey émigrés and their resettlement at Zweledinga

Arriving with all their movable belongings, the émigrés were initially restricted to the tented relocation camps on the farms Bushby Park, Pavet and Oxton where they mingled with thousands of others relocating from different parts of Glen Grey and Hershel. A few people went to friends at the Sada resettlement camp established in the 1960s to accommodate thousands of people forcibly removed from cities and white farms.[28] In 1972, Sada had a population of 25 000 and was declared 'full'.[29]

A shack settlement called Madakeni sprang up alongside it as 70 000 more people arrived in 1977. The Whittlesea district (Hewu) was fast becoming an overcrowded rural slum. But the Glen Grey and Herschel émigrés believed the Ciskei developmental planners and hoped that Zweledinga might yet become the Promised Land. By 1979, most of them were able to move into three planned villages in the Zweledinga area — Yonda, Mbekweni and Sibonile. The villages followed the blueprint of Gary Godden, Ciskei's principal planner. Housing was allocated along the lines of the stratification of Glen Grey — those who had left behind extensive property received more than others at Zweledinga. Some were given houses, garden plots and access to grazing land, while others had to be content with a house and no more. Several had to wait well into the 1980s for a place to live. Many did not receive compensation for the property they had left behind in Glen Grey. A few daring individuals, who had given up hope of acquiring surveyed sites, moved to the outskirts of Zweledinga to run their stock on the farm of Allanwater, beyond the regular beat of Sebe's patrols. Principal among the émigrés who lived as squatters was Rex Bokuva, a man who reputedly built up a large flock of sheep and became wealthier and more influential than those in the planned villages. These differences in treatment and status led to discontent, and factions began to form.[30]

Soon after their arrival, the émigrés learned that the politics of Bantu Authorities in ethnically diverse Hewu was even more complex and acrimonious than had been the case in Glen Grey. Long-term residents, who called themselves amaTshatshu, had attempted to create a Bawana Tribal Authority in 1966 but had made little headway.

28 Interview, Mrs Rengqe; Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, p.164; Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa, The SPP Reports, Vol. 2*, pp.206–246.
29 Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa, The SPP Reports, Vol. 2*, p.207.
30 Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, pp.177–179.



Figure 5.1: Zweledinga in the Queenstown District 1980.

Instead, they were assigned to the amaHlubi-controlled Zulukama Tribal Authority, thereby shunning the divisive politics of the Thembu-dominated Ndlovukazi Tribal Authority.[31] Throughout the 1960s, Magistrate AJ Wilson had urged the BAD to encourage the formation of community rather than tribal authorities so that people from different backgrounds might be accommodated. But he was blocked by his colleagues who promoted separate development and fostered Bantu Authorities. Among them was JH Abraham, the Commissioner

31 CA 1/WSA 3/1/, BAC Hewu/Whittlesea, Notes of Meeting held 14 October 1965 with K.R. Crossman, Assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner.

General of Xhosa ethnicity.[32] Wilson's preference for a community authority was also rejected by African leaders who had a vested interest in the promise of Bantu Authorities. Many of them were bureaucrats employed in the territorial, regional and tribal authority structures established after 1957, and were benefiting from the salaries they earned. They saw in Bantu Authorities a chance for marginalising white officialdom and for replacing it with essentialised identity politics. This view was articulated by a member of the tribal authority council who declared:

> Methinks there is some difference between a Tribal Authority and a Community Authority. This word community means a conglomeration of people with no definite customs or traditions. As far as I know the people of Hewu have definite customs and traditions and therefore fit to a tribal existence. If they take community authorities they will be far from chieftainship.[33]

This councillor, who claimed that he was iBhele, admitted that he had no idea whether there was an iBhele person of royal blood in the area or whether the amaBhele had a claim in Hewu. History was irrelevant. 'We want the shortest cut to chieftainship and that is to retain our Tribal Authorities,' he declared. Another councillor commented derisively that community authorities were best suited for coloureds who had no chiefs.[34]

It was into this fray that the Glen Grey émigrés moved in 1976. A year later, Lennox Sebe, chief minister of the Ciskei, recognised Reuben Katsi as chief of the abaThembu of Zweledinga for the purposes of the Ciskei bureaucracy. The occasion of his recognition was filled with foreboding. Katsi did not have the support of all the abaThembu in the Zweledinga area. Opposition came principally from the amaNdungwana, descendants of Qwesha who had given Bawana a difficult time in the nineteenth century. They put forward JJ Mdyosi, a migrant worker in Cape Town, as a candidate for the chieftaincy. But Sebe honoured his promise to Katsi and accorded him official recognition at a public rally towards the end of 1979. People crowded into a tent pitched alongside shacks that served as a makeshift school. In an act that was both provocative and symbolic, one of the amaNdungwana men pulled Katsi's chair from behind as he was about to be seated. Katsi fell to the ground.

32 BAC Hewu/Whittlesea, Minutes of Meeting of Tribal Authorities held on 19 May 1961.
33 BAC Hewu/Whittlesea, Notes of Meeting held on 14 October 1965 with K.R. Crossman, Assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner; Statement by Cr Mtshiselwa.
34 BAC Hewu/Whittlesea, Notes of Meeting held 14 October 1965 with K.R. Crossman; Statement made by Cr Mtshiselwa; Comment made by Cr M.Z. Mgole of Ndlovukazi Tribal Authority.

Recognition did not mean that Katsi had been installed as a chief of the amaTshatshu or of the abaThembu. Sebe was a Xhosa and so did not have the authority to determine Katsi's status outside the structures of his bantustan. Nonetheless, Katsi's followers continued to press for his formal installation.[35] They were well aware that they were far more likely to benefit from bantustan resources through a chief than without one. But they were disappointed. Reuben Katsi's name appeared on the Ciskei list of Thembu chiefs as umHala rather than umTshatshu, subordinating him to their leaders.[36] Some of his followers believe that this 'error' was a deliberate ploy to obscure Katsi's historical link to the area.

Reuben Katsi moved into his official residence, the homestead on a farm south-west of Oxton. But Katsi was no more compliant under Sebe than he had been under Matanzima and Manzezulu. He continued to oppose bantustan independence and was regarded as a 'trouble maker'.[37] He became increasingly caught up in the growing opposition to Ciskeian independence. His friendship with Councillor Myataza of the Ciskei National Independence Party did not protect him from Sebe's bantustan forces. On one occasion, Sebe's armed security officers stormed into his residence where a group of Zenzele women were engaged in a sewing project. As the guards charged towards the front door, the women threw a piece of cloth over their chief and scurried him out of the work room. He was not at home but was attending a meeting at the school, they told the guards. As they roared off in the direction of the school, Katsi was driven away to the 'safe house' of Councillor Myataza.[38] The guards broke up the meeting at the school and assaulted those who resisted. By the end of December 1980, five leading members of the Zweledinga Tshatshu were detained in the maximum-security prison at Middledrift: Matthew Rengqe, Peter Bolsiki, S'dakana Plaatjie, Tutu Ngunuza and Zilimbola Feke.

In December 1980, as this conflict was playing out, a referendum was conducted on Ciskei independence. Over 90 per cent of those who participated supported the idea of Ciskei independence; those who were opposed to it boycotted the referendum. At the same time, a commission appointed by the Ciskei government and chaired by George Quail concluded that an

35 Interview, Anne Mager with Mr Konzeka, 16 April 2015.
36 Presentation to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo in his capacity as a member of the Tshatshu Traditional Council at Whittlesea on Wednesday 24 October 2012, p.5.
37 *Daily Dispatch*, 29 February 1980.
38 Interview, Mrs Nongxolo Ngqula, 16 April 2015. The sewing project was sponsored by the Shiloh mission.

independent Ciskei was not economically viable. The commission also warned that administration through Bantu Authorities was bound to lead to instability. George Quail argued that ethnicity was not a sound basis for the ordering of a society in the late twentieth century even if people placed a high value on identity. Bantu Authorities, he pointed out, ignored the religious and class lines that cut across ethnic divisions. People looked to local government rather than tradition for fair and just administration.[39] In the view of the commission, democracies fared best in societies with strong voluntary associations which were characterised by openness and egalitarianism. This allowed for a more democratic form of political engagement than that afforded by ethnicity.

The commission did not fully appreciate its own findings. Warning that ethnicised political power would engender 'a process of ethnic polarisation and competition … with disastrous consequences for the stability of the future society', the chairman had in mind differences between ethnic homelands rather than those that created political churning within them.[40] The report stopped short of admitting that Bantu Authorities had already diminished the value of — and in some instances destroyed — the vigilance and residents' associations that were moving towards a more democratic society. Preoccupied with bantustan independence, the commissioners did not see that Bantu Authorities had already driven people apart. Polarisation was now a feature of a bantustan society across the Ciskei. Perhaps, because he was compromised by his close relationship with the Ciskei government, CHT Lalendle failed to explore how six political parties, which had been established between 1968 and 1978, had given way to a 'one-party state' by 1980. He mentioned this shift only briefly.[41] Fear and self-censorship were all pervasive. This was apparently of little importance to Lennox Sebe and the apartheid state which ignored the commission's findings. A year later, on 4 December 1981, Ciskei was declared an independent state.

Worn down by the stress of Zweledinga politics, Reuben Katsi died suddenly in 1980. His death plunged the Glen Grey émigrés into further crisis. There was no obvious successor in the short term. His son, Sabelo Prince Katsi, was still at school and the people had not yet settled. Thirty years on, the chieftainship had not been formalised. Reuben Katsi's death created a sublime opportunity for Lennox Sebe to engage in his preferred style of neo-patrimonial

39 Ciskei Government Service, Ciskei Commission Report., p.219; Appendix 12, p.283.
40 Ciskei Government Service, Ciskei Commission Report, p.245.
41 Ciskei Government Service, Ciskei Commission Report, p.143; A.K. Mager, *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan*, pp.98–123.

politics by creating a chieftaincy for his brother-in-law, Simon Mthobeni Hebe, and placing him at the head of the Zweledinga Tribal Authority.

A stranger to the abaThembu of Zweledinga, Simon Hebe belonged to the amaNgxongo group of the amaQwathi. In the early nineteenth century, they were vassals to the abaThembu and latecomers to the north-eastern frontier. Simon Hebe was not from a chiefly family and knew little about the role of a chief. He had spent most of his adult life as a businessman in Mbekweni township near Paarl in the Western Cape, and he had relocated to Zweledinga to benefit from opportunities in his brother-in-law's bantustan. Under the Ciskeian Authorities Act, the cabinet was empowered to appoint 'any person who in the opinion of the cabinet is qualified to hold office' as a chief. Sebe could appoint anyone he wanted. When the Thembu Tribal Authority was created in 1981, Simon Hebe was installed as chief of the abaThembu in Zweledinga.[42] With those leading the opposition behind bars, Sebe did not anticipate opposition. But his opponents sent a strong symbolic message that all was not well when one of them ran off with Hebe's ceremonial blanket. Sebe sent a senior cabinet minister to warn the amaTshatshu and amaNdungwana that their opposition would not be tolerated. Nzimeni Cawe, a follower of Katsi who was vocal in his opposition to Hebe's appointment was arrested, beaten and convicted for the theft of a blanket. Reuben Katsi's widow was evicted from the farm house which was vandalised to prevent re-occupation. Those who rallied to her support were not spared. Mrs Rengqe, whose husband, Matthew, was already in detention, was detained and held at the Poplar Grove military base. Young Sabelo Katsi and his school mates were detained in Queenstown for 29 days. Tensions mounted. Scores more were detained without trial. After many months, Sebe's strategy began to pay off. Fear and exhaustion set in. When he was released, Sabelo Katsi gave up school to escape the police and went to Bloemfontein in search of work. Some Tshatshu followers went over to the amaNgxongo and submitted to Simon Hebe's authority.[43]

42 Ciskeian Authorities Act, Act 8 of 1978; see also: The matter between the Premier of the Eastern Cape, the Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, the Superintendent General for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, Eastern Cape and Chief Viwe Simon Hebe, Sabelo Prince Katsi, the Chairman of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, Case No 14/2014 in the High Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Local Division, Bhisho) (hereafter Case 14/2014 in the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Cape Division, Bhisho).

43 Those detained included Thembinkosi Velele, Phazamile Magwana, Totshi Mthini, Zamemvula Bangani among others; a group of fourteen men, including Bangela Satywetywe and Mpendulo Kelem, were detained without trial and held at Whittlesea and Bulhoek prisons for several weeks. Interview, Anne Mager with Zandisile Raymond Cawe, son of Nzimeni Cawe, 16 April 2015; *Daily Dispatch*, 29 February 1980; Presentation to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo, p.8

Sebe's creation of a Thembu Tribal Authority was a defiant move intended not only to bring order to Zweledinga, but to signal to Matanzima that, as the president of Ciskei, he could do as he pleased — even in matters that concerned the abaThembu. Ethnicity would be melded to the shape of Bantu Authorities. Infuriated, Matanzima sent his councillor, Thembekile ka Tshunungwa, to see what was going on. But he too was arrested and detained. On his release, Tshunungwa and Matanzima worked to construct a united Thembu front against Simon Hebe's fraudulent status as chief. In 1983, after Peter Bolsiki was released from detention, he and Jack Mdyosi, who had abandoned his quest for the amaNdungwana chieftainship, sought the backing of Kaiser Matanzima to challenge Simon Hebe's appointment as a Thembu chief in the courts. They would have his appointment rescinded.[44] Matanzima's supporting affidavit declared that Simon Hebe had served as his representative in Paarl; he knew the man well and the genealogy he had used to back his chiefly claim was 'complete fabrication'. If Hebe were to take the oath in court he would be liable for perjury. He also declared that the land in the Whittlesea district 'belonged to Bawana Tshatshu' above other Thembu groups.[45]

In opposing papers, the Bantu ethnologist, Nicolaas Jacobus de Beer, took a different view. De Beer was a local fellow. He had grown up in Sterkstroom, a village established by Afrikaner trekboers in Bawana's time, and had studied ethnology through the University of South Africa (UNISA). Having made known his pedigree and claim to local knowledge, he set out what he called a research method. He had compiled profiles on each candidate for the chieftaincy from interviews (arranged by the magistrate) with each of them and their councillors. His objective, it seems, was not to verify Hebe's genealogy but to submit profiles on those who would be chief to the Ciskeian government. De Beer concluded that if Hebe's genealogy were correct, his claim was stronger than that of Katsi. Sebe was so pleased with the report that he gave De Beer a permanent job in his government.[46] But once in court, the case did not get as far as debating ethnology. Judge Benjamin de Villiers Pickard preferred to dismiss the application and, as a further sign of his political loyalty to Sebe, he added costs to those who would use Matanzima to back them in the Ciskei. Bolsiki and Mdyosi's lawyers had erroneously referred to Lennox Sebe as the

44 Presentation to the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo, p.9.

45 Case 14/2014 in the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Cape Division, Bhisho, Affidavit of K.D. Matanzima on Thembu Chieftainship signed at Mthatha on 11 April 1983.

46 Case 14/2014 Affidavit of Nicolaas Jacobus de Beer signed at Zwelitsha on 13 January 1983.

'chief minister' of the Ciskei, a position that had fallen away when he became president of the Ciskei at independence. This slip gave Pickard a technicality on which to find fault with the case of Hebe's opponents.[47] By adding costs, he hoped to dampen their spirits. The judge's attitude demonstrated that appeals to higher authority were certain to fail.

Buoyed by the court victory, Simon Hebe set about dispensing patronage. He delegated administrative duties to three brothers and a brother-in-law who used the tribal authority's official vehicle and tractors for their own use. He also built a network of patronage through the appointment of headmen and the allocation of land.[48] He treated the people with contempt, referring to them as illegitimate (*imigqakhwe*) and polecats (*amaqaqa*). He gave jobs to female relatives under their maiden names and failed to protect poor women. Some were forced to provide sexual services to men, who were in charge of the drought relief schemes, in return for menial work.[49] He carried a pistol to ward off opponents and reputedly pointed it at Nzimeni Cawe when he dared to contradict him in a meeting at Yonda. Nonetheless, Hebe enjoyed the good life of the new bantustan elite — the bantustan bureaucrats, politicians, teachers and nurses employed in the new urban centre of Dongwe near Whittlesea.

By the mid-1980s, a political discourse once confined to the cities began to seep into rural Ciskei. Workers with trade union experience or exposure to the United Democratic Front (UDF), a political movement against apartheid, understood that bantustans were creatures of apartheid and encouraged residents to link local demands to broad anti-apartheid resistance. Opposition to bantustan tribal authorities was supported by non-government organisations (NGOs) that helped people to focus on specific demands that stood a chance of success. Luvuyo Wotshela outlined how the Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC) and the Border Rural Committee (BRC), among others, encouraged people to form representative bodies following the launch of the UDF in August 1983. These NGOs supported the Glen Grey and Herschel émigrés in their struggle to get the Ciskei government to keep its promise to pay compensation, and to provide land and amenities that had spurred their relocation in 1976.

47 Case No 357/82 in the Supreme Court of Ciskei, Peter Bolisiki and Jack Mdyosi v the President of the Ciskei in Executive Council.

48 Case No 14/4 in the High Court of South Africa Eastern Cape Division, Bhisho, Annexure D, 'Complaints', signed by W. Kibido, M.J. Cenenda, D.E. Mgushulwana and Z.H. Tshaka in the Mbekweni Administrative Area; W. Plaatjie and B. Kani in the Mbekweni area; Z.H. Nelani of Sibonile and N. Cawe of Yonda on 6 January 1988.

49 Case No 14/4 in the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Cape Division, Bhisho, Annexure D, 'Complaints'.

The longer they were required to wait, the more the resources meant to make good on these promises diminished. By 1988 the population of Zweledinga had almost doubled, having grown from 17 933 in 1976 to 33 273. This extensive overcrowding diluted any compensation they might receive.

Renewed political activity and the support it received from outside NGOs attracted the attention of Tutu Ngunuza, a member of the Ndungwana group who was opposed to Sebe's brother-in-law. He saw in the moment an opportunity to expose Simon Hebe's predilection for extending grazing rights to his cronies in the Thembu Tribal Authority while ignoring all others. As Ngunuza began to attract a following, he drew in his old friend, Rex Bokuva, who had accumulated sufficient sheep and goats on Allanwater farm to achieve recognition as a 'big man'. They were joined by Hennick Nelani of the amaGcina who was disgruntled by his dismissal from the headmanship of Sibonile village. Their meeting with the GRC in 1986 led to their adopting a more confrontational approach.[50] As with many others, this group was not opposed to traditional leadership and held conservative views on this question. Their disruption of the Thembu Tribal Authority was driven by a need for grazing land and the conviction that Simon Hebe was an imposter. Their efforts were spurred on by a rapid succession of momentous events — the ousting of Lennox Sebe by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, the unbanning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela and the formation of the Zweledinga Residents' Association (ZRA).

Euphoria and intense political activity gripped the people of Zweledinga. This was the moment for the people to take ownership of all the missing elements of the Promised Land. Hyped up with militancy, the newly formed ZRA was at the forefront of land invasions. Its followers occupied neighbouring land which belonged to the South African Development Trust and white farmers. Invaders constructed shacks and moved onto the seized land. Where the invasion was led by Bokuva's group, land was used for grazing. The ZRA managed these competing interests and the strategies that flowed from them with the support of the BRC. By 1994, the ZRA had secured three farms on the Klipplaat River, a victory for its supporters. This also resulted in an easing of the congestion in this vastly overcrowded area. A year later, the ZRA joined forces with the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), which had moved into Whittlesea, and took over the Thembu Tribal Authority offices and the Shiloh Irrigation Scheme.

50 Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, pp.196–200. Tutu Ngunuza had supported Jack Mdyosi's bid for the chieftainship of amaNdungwana.

In a heady populist moment, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo abolished headmen. Across the Ciskei, the campaign against Bantu Authorities had targeted headmen and Gqozo believed that he would gain support by doing away with them. With the prospect of a backlash from the headmen in some areas and of a radical takeover by residents' associations in others, he quickly reinstated the headmen. Gqozo also realised that opposition to traditional leaders stemmed from anger over who was appointed rather than from a desire to restructure rural locations. In a bid to sort out this problem, he launched an investigation into disputes over appointments under Bantu Authorities. Mr M Bulube of the Supreme Court in Bhisho was appointed to lead the investigating group.[51]

Supporters of the amaTshatshu summoned Sabelo Katsi back to Zweledinga so that he might present his case. Katsi's claim was upheld. Simon Mthobeni Hebe was found not to be of royal blood, his chieftainship was annulled, and he was dismissed as head of the Thembu Tribal Authority. But he contested his dismissal and secured the intervention of Maxhoba Sandile, *kumkani* of the amaRharhabe, a man adept at the game of ethnicity in the Ciskei. The ruling was overturned and Hebe was duly reinstated. Chief Lent Maqoma was sent to Zweledinga to ascertain the feeling of the people. Reporting on his trip, Maqoma's assistant noted that Tshatshu councillors were concerned that: 'If the government can go on insisting that Hebe is a chief something will happen, and we want peace in this area'. He also recorded that 'Chief Hebe himself nearly messed up the meeting by lifting up fists and say[ing] "Down *nge* Res up *nge* Chiefs"' (Down with the Residents' Association, up with the Chiefs).[52] Notwithstanding this opposition, Simon Hebe remained in his post.

51 It is not clear whether this investigation was separate from or part of the inquiry into discriminatory legislation in the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC) states established by the Planning Committee of the Negotiating Council in September 1993 and on which Mr Bulube served as the Ciskei representative.

52 Bulube's report was never released but a copy of the letter dismissing Simon Mthobeni Hebe is in the court papers of Case 14/2014 in the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Cape Division, Bhisho, Annexure, Letter from Director General of the Department of the Council of State to The Head of the Financial Division concerning the Reinstatement of Chief S.M. Hebe: Thembu Tribal Authority; Annexure E, Visit to Zweledinga on 24 May 1991 by Honourable Chief L Maqoma and Chief Zibi concerning Community Views about Chieftainship. Report compiled by L.B. Yenana, 28 May 1991. See also *Daily Dispatch*, 25 June 1993 and South African Parliament, Proceedings of the National Assembly, 11 November 2002.

Figure 5.2: Mrs Rengqe and Sabelo Katsi in Zweledinga with Nowinala Katsi in the background.

In time it became clear that he had manufactured a new source of support by ingratiating himself to the ANC through providing accommodation for returning cadres. He was welcomed into the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) and he took up a position on the Hewu Traditional Council. In 1997, he became a member of the National House of Traditional Leaders. Hebe's canny shift from bantustan to ANC politics breathed new life into his political career. But its stresses took their toll and he died in March 1999. Shortly before his death, he told Luvuyo Wotshela that he had been interested only in the Thembu chieftaincy; he had been drawn into far more complex politics by his brother-in-law, Lennox Sebe.[53] Nearly a decade later, on 1 July 2007, his son, Viwe Hebe, was appointed as his successor. The struggle over the legitimacy of the Hebe chieftaincy passed to the next generation.

By this time, the ANC had become engaged in a process of regulating traditional leadership in the hope that chiefs and headmen would keep voters in the fold of the ANC and make a positive contribution to rural development. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act 41 of 2003, amended in 2009) was followed by the establishment of the Commission on

53 Wotshela, Homeland Consolidation, p.172.

Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (Nhlapho Commission).[54] These developments were watched with great interest by the amaTshatshu. The great house and its right-hand house began to work together to free their chieftaincy from the strictures of the colonial and apartheid past. Their first move was to take Sabelo Katsi's claim to the Eastern Cape Committee on disputes between traditional leaders. Its chairperson, Dr Nokuzola Mndende, ruled that Sabelo Katsi's claim was legitimate and recommended that he be appointed senior traditional leader of the Thembu Traditional Council in Whittlesea.[55] Noxolo Kiviet, premier of the Eastern Cape accepted her recommendation and informed Sabelo Katsi. But Viwe Hebe challenged the ruling in the High Court. On 29 January 2016, Judge Bacela set aside the premier's decision on three grounds. The premier had neglected to ask her deputy to counter-sign her endorsement of Mndende's recommendation; she had granted Katsi the chieftainship without first removing Viwe Hebe from the position; and ignored the affidavit of Chief Jongilanga. Counsel for the incumbent premier (Phumulo Masuale had replaced Noxolo Kiviet) had come to court wholly unprepared, while Viwe Hebe's counsel provided an erudite legal argument. The premier appealed these findings and appointed new senior counsel.

On 28 September 2017, the Bhisho High Court upheld Judge Bacela's decision. In the view of the presiding judge, Judge van Zyl, the Mndende Committee had strayed beyond its mandate. The Zweledinga position was not intended to be a means of satisfying the historical claim of the amaTshatshu. It was rather a means of providing leadership for the wider Thembu 'community' of Zweledinga, which had been defined as 'more than one tribe' in the Ciskeian Authorities Act. Viwe, Simon Hebe's father, had been appointed in the 1980s and his son had inherited this position. Viwe Hebe remained in his post. Judge van Zyl's acceptance of bantustan legislation, and Sebe's appointments of family members as legitimate chiefs, stood in the way of those who sought restitution against colonial and apartheid injustice. For the amaTshatshu, the question of what was to be done

54 Critics of the state's tinkering with traditional leadership tend to see it as a simple extension of Bantu Authorities in direct opposition to 'community'; M. de Souza and M. Jara (eds.) *Custom, citizenship and rights: Community voices on the repeal of the Black Authorities Act* (University of Cape Town, Law, Race and Gender Research Unit, July 2010).

55 Recommendation of the Eastern Cape Provincial Committee of the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims established in terms of Section 26A(1) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act (Act 23 of 2009) on the Traditional Leadership Claim of Thembu Traditional Council, Sabelo Prince Katsi against Viwe Hebe, 11 April 2013. Initialled N.M. and submitted as evidence in the High Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Local Division, Bhisho) Case 14/4.

about bantustan chiefs had not been resolved. In the meantime, the legacy of the apartheid era generated good business for lawyers and held back the advancement of the people who resided under chiefs.[56]

Phiko Velelo, co-author of this book, tells of the struggle of the House of Chungwa as an insider who has been touched by the pain and longing of the people. His poem takes the form of a ballad which might be recited and performed before an audience. In this rendition of history, the poet addresses the ancestors, pleading with those who have gone before to watch over and guide those who hold onto their name. Velelo sets out a chronicle of the roller-coaster ride of the Tshatshu émigrés from Glen Grey, and demonstrates that the broken promise of chiefly recognition is as distressing to them as is the failure of material compensation. He shows that for the amaTshatshu, material, social and spiritual elements are inseparable aspects of restitution.

Lala ngoxolo Zwelinzima[57]

Bhota mhlekaz'omhle nokuba ulele na;
Abunakuhl'ubuthongo kuba kusengxaka-ngxaka;
Wawushiye kunjalo kaloku sel'ulibele na?
Iseyiloo mbondandimunye exak'isizwe nabagwebi;
Chopha kaloku ngeempundu bakuxelel'iindaba.

Usakhumbula na ugushwa ngabafazi bakaZenzele kukubi?
Mhla uNongxolo wakubeleka wakufaka phantsi kwemithungo?
Oomam'uNgxazisa nooHondwana bokh'isathanga bekukhusela;
Bath'awukho usentlanganisweni bemk'onqaway'iphuzwa bedanile;
Bafik'esikolweni badal'ingxushungxushu laphalal'igazi.

Zaquqa zibuyelel'izithuthi zoogcin'umthetho zazal'iintolongo;
Kwathathw'indoda nenkwenkwe kungajongw'ubukho bejwabu;
Alal'ezintaben'amakhwenkwe nooyise kungekho mvaleli;
Baqal'abafazi banyathel'inkundla kuba kunyembelekile;
Kungenjalo imfuyo yodliwa ngamaxhwili nezandawan'ikat'ilaleziko;

UZwelandile wahlambifutha ngeenyembezi;
Washiya kusisankxwe uMaRhadeb'ebambeyeka;

56 Case 14/2014 Eastern Cape Division, Full Court Appeal, Bhisho. In the matter between the Premier of the Eastern Cape, the Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, the Superintendent General for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims and Chief Viwe Simon Hebe, First respondent, Sabelo Prince Katsi, Second respondent, The Chairman of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders. Judgment D. van Zyl, D.J.P. Counsel for Viwe Hebe was Advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, a rising star at the Johannesburg bar.

57 Poem written and translated by Phiko Jeffrey Velelo.

Bath'ooSiqhel'ukuyala le nkosan'ayilivang'ityeba;
Kant'umntwan'egazi uhletyelw'into weva waphuthuma;
Baleka kwedin'uyihlo selewubophile umthwalo uyagoduka;

Awu! Walil'umzi kaTshatsh'olithafa kwanyembezana!
Lakuthin'ukuhamb'itholel'duna besengentla kwendlela na?
Wagqadaz'okaTshunungwa ebik'imbiba ebik'ibuzi kwatsho kwalunga;
Wababiz'oontlabazahlukane bayikhaph'ipon'engqungqumbana njengesheleni;
Wawulaph'umPhesheya nomNeno Nciba ncakasana, eMagadana.

Wayelaph'uXaba intong'esekhosi kaNgweyesizwe yena gaqa;
Walum'evuthela eth'uphethumyalezo kaTshawe lamaTshawe;
Wath'emva kwenzila zenize noSabelo eBhisho azokulungiselelwa;
Kant'ubabetha ngemf'iphindiwe umlanya kaNgwengwe ugxeleshile;
Awu! Hayi amajingiqhiw'alomhlaba makancanywe!

Lwalulaph'ufafolude lwakwaDlomo limel'uDaliwonga kaNogate;
Nditsho uNgangomhlaba int'echul'ukunyathela okukacwethe;
Waluyal'usapho lwakowabo kwatsho kwavokotheka;
Wazosul'uNofinish'iinyembezi okomzuzwana engamaz'uNongekehli.
Yagoduk'inkwenkwe kaSophitsho iba ngelay'ifezile.

Lwalukhona nogxogx'olude lwaseMaNgxongweni kanye-kanye,
Kaloku ibingummeli wenqila yaseZweledinga phantsi kukaKatsi kanye;
Lifak'iindondo zalo hayi ke khona ukufaneleka kwalo;
Latheth'akwamila-ngca ukubonginkosi yalo ngokuyiph'indawo;
Lamthuthuzel'uZwelandile kanti lithi: "Lelam'elonqatha kwedini!"

Awu! Yesuka yahlala emveni koko iintilongo zaba likhaya kwabaninzi;
Iinto zooCawe, ooRengqe nooFeke baqamela ngenqindi esamenteni;
Belandelwa ngooSatywetywe, ooPlaatjie nooNgunuza belala bebaliwe;
NamaTshatsh'ooTshunungwa nooZwelandile abasindanga kumsind'okhoyo;
Basincam'isikol'ooZwelandile nooMalumejele babhac'ela kweleendunduma.

UNofinish uMaRhadebe wakhutshwa ngesomvana wokulahlw'eYonda;
UNongayindoda uMamNgwevu waya kuvalelwa emajonini ePoplar Grove;
Baphakam'ooBolsiki bath'uNotshe zange kube nje kwaMawose;
Bawufak'umsil'engwe eBhisho kwinkundl'ephakamileyo;
Wayichophel'okaPikard iJaji eyongameleyo yomNeno Nciba.

Wath'okaPikard isitulo abasimangaleleyo asisenamntu;
Nkqu neencukuthu sezabaleka zasishiya kukhal'ibhungane;
Izinto zijikile umneno Nciba sele uno"zifele geqe";
Osezintanjeni ke ngoko nguMongameli hayi iNkulumbuso;
Yalal'inkom'isengwa malawundini baphi na ooNgqondo-ngqondo?

Lafika ijoni lathabath'ulawulo ngezigalo;
Latyumb'okaBulube ukuba alungis'izinto zobukhosi;
Wagwetyelw' uZwelandile suka alal' amaTshatshu;

Ath'esothuka zabe sezinye zatyhola;
Awu! Babamb'isisila kant'intak'imkile.

Lwangen'ulawulo lwesininzi bath'izinto zizolunga;
Wachungw'okaNhlapo uThandabantu ngegama;
Wath'akuxinwa zezeekumkani kwabizw'okaMndende;
Lafik'igqirha lenkcubeko kwezakwaNtu batsho baxola;
Laphanda, laphengulula, laphica, lagqithisa!

Lakhal'ixilongo lathi yizani makwedin'ibuyil'ingxelo;
Umama wesizwe uNoxolo kaKiviet wayibek'indaba;
Wathi hamba mzukulwana kaNgubenyathi iintambo ndikunikile;
Bagqalakathula okwamankonyan'ebon'onina ukugoduka;
Bevum'ingoma: "Mayibuyel'ekhay'icamagu livumile".

Ithe ingekabuywa le ngoma babizelw'emaplangini;
Kwathw' inkwenkwa semaNgxongweni ifun'undikho;
Ifun'iNkulumbuso uqobo etshatshalazeni
Ngokumthoba ngesinyokothi iphakamis'uSabelo
Yasuk'intyori kuNoxolo yathi nambe kuPhumulo

Zanqoz'iintonga kwinkundl'ephakamileyo kwanzima
Waqul'ekhulula umfo kaNtsaluba ebile xhopho
Engaphiwa thuba nguMadredzi kaNgcukayithobi
Wonakal'umcimbi ngokuphathwa ngamagangxa
OkaBacela wath'iNkulumbuso yasithath'isigqib'embarheni

Kuba kalokw'ingxelo kaJongilanga zang'isiw'eso
Ikomishoni kaGqirha Mndende yayibetha ngoyaba
Umphathiswa wesebe lezeenkosi zange angqine ngomsizi
Kwabekw'eny'inkunzi ingathenwanga egquba esibayeni
Ekuyakuthi zakukhonya zombini konakale ekuhlaleni
Ibe yingxuba kaxaka endaweni yesisombululo

Kwabizwa okaArendse phantsi kweNtab'eTafile abhene
KwaGompo kwavunyelwana ngokuphindwa kwedabi
Kungentsuku zatywala kwabuyelwa eBhisho ngesezolo
Wagalela ngezithong'okaArendse emel'iNkulumbuso
Laphindisa nelamaNgxongo ngezalo yangumbhodamo
Zamntyontyel'uArendse ezikaTubhana zithembile noko

Kwisihlalo sokugweba kwakuhlel'igwangqa lakwa Van Zyl
Encediswa yinzwakazi yakwa Stretch nomfo wakwa Mageza
Basimilisela isigqibo sikaBacela ngazandla zombini
Basikhab'isibheno seNkulumbuso nganyawo zombini
Lasithw'ilang'emini kumaTshatshu kwanga kungo 1940
Wath'omnye suka soz'uve lento ayiyodwa ineqhubezelo

Bayabulis'abantwana bakho mzukulwana kaVezi;
Ndeee-ee-e! Ntwayi! Ntwayi! Vovololo!

Rest in peace Zwelinzima

Greetings to you even though you are in deep sleep
You cannot sleep peacefully while this pandemonium continues.
Have you forgotten that you left issues unresolved?
The people and even the judges are failing to resolve them.
Sit still as they tell you what is happening.

Do you remember when the Zenzele women secured your safety?
The day Nongxolo hid you under their sewing cloths?
Mothers Ngxazisa and Hondwana shielded you for your safety.
Declaring that you had gone to a meeting, the aggressors left in disappointment;
They rushed off to the school in anger and created a bloody mayhem.

Police vans did not stop imprisoning people until the prisons could take no more.
Men and boys alike — no sensitivity to circumcision status — were put in the same cell.
Boys and their fathers slept in the mountains leaving no-one to look after livestock.
This crisis forced women to abandon tradition and save the situation.
The alternative was starvation, hunger and deprivation.

Zwelandile wiped his ochre with tears.
He left his mother in a state of confusion.
Party goers accused the prince of misbehaving.
Ancestors whispered in his ear, he must depart for Cape Town.
Because you were on your way to join your predecessors.

Oh! What a fall, what a cry!
Why is Zwelinzima leaving his people in such a mess?
Thembekile ka Tshunungwa did so well organising your send-off.
Friends and foes came together to bid you farewell.
For the first time dignitaries from Transkei and Ciskei came under one roof.

Reverend Xaba, the right-hand man of Sebe was there in person.
Delivering mixed messages as a servant of Tshawe the Great.
Even saying after the mourning period, Sabelo will take over.
Not aware that Ngweyesizwe had fixed the position for his brother-in-law.
Oh! What a pity for those sticking to proper procedures of succession!

Tallman from Dlomo's house representing Nogate's son was also there.
This means Ngangomhlaba, man of grandeur, dignity and style.
Oh! What a wonderful consoling and comforting speech he made.
Wiping away the tears of the widow not knowing what is to come.
The young man of Ngqolomsila went home thinking all is well.

Simon Hebe of the amaNgxongo was there in person.
He was Zweledinga Member of Parliament under Katsi's jurisdiction.
Oh! What a spectacular sight he was in his sunglasses!
He gave tribute to you as his leader and for accepting him as his subject.
Consoling Sabelo while saying inwardly: 'My eyes are now fixed on this vacant chiefly position'.

Can you imagine how soon prisons became dwelling places for many?
Your staunch supporters like Cawe, Rengqe and Feke — they were all there!
Not to mention that for Satywetywe, Plaatjie and Ngunuza it became their home.
Even the Tshatshus—Tshunungwa and Zwelandile—were not spared this wrath
The prince and his supporters had no option but to abandon school and flee to the cities.

The widow, Nofinish, was deported unceremoniously to Yonda.
The tough one, Mrs Rengqe, was detained at the Poplar Grove military base.
Finally Bolsiki and others could not stomach the situation any longer.
They appealed to the Bhisho High Court for remedy.
Judge Pickard of Ciskei presided over the matter.

He ruled that the position [of Chief Minister] did not exist anymore.
There is not a trace that it was ever created.
Things have changed; the Ciskei is now an 'independent state'.
It has a State President and no more a Chief Minister.
This new technicality needed experts of superb calibre.

Brigadier Gqozo seized power by force
Appointed Bulube to investigate chieftainship squabbles.
The recommendations favoured Zwelandile but he never ascended to power.
Paradoxically Dal'ubuzwe remained in charge.
Alas! amaTshatshu were clinging to feathers. The bird had flown.

AmaTshatshu hopes were raised when democracy arrived.
The Nhlapo Commission was sent to sort out chiefly disputes
Confined to resolving the disputes of kings, Mndende was appointed.
An expert in traditional and cultural issue; this was comforting.
The commissioner investigated, researched, probed and recommended.

Zwelandile was called to hear the results;
Premier Kiviet announced her decision;
Zwelandile is indeed the chief of [abaThembu in] Zweledinga.
Jubilant like calves going to suck milk amaTshatshu went home.
Singing and dancing: 'The challenge is over at last'.

Still excited they were called back to the High Court.
Viwe Hebe had appealed the decision

So that it be set aside by the High Court
For deposing him and installing Sabelo
The responsibility shifted from Noxolo to Phumulo.

Serious arguments took place between the two parties
The uncertainty was hovering over Ntsaluba's argument
Tembeka's argument sounded more convincing
The case was lost on poor argument and technicality
The Premier's decision sounded very irrational.

It failed to recognise Jongilanga's affidavit
And was never countersigned by the line functionary
Sabelo was installed prior to Viwe's removal
A good recipe for creating pandemonium
Exacerbating the situation rather than solving it.

Advocate Norman Arendse from Cape Town was engaged to lodge an appeal
Application for appeal was heard and granted in East London
Soon thereafter the case was adjudicated in the Bhisho High Court
Advocate Arendse led the argument for the Premier's Office
While Viwe of amaNgxongo clan had their Senior Counsel

The presiding officer was Judge Van Zyl
Assisted by Judges Stretch and Mageza
Judge Bacela's prior decision was upheld
The Premier's decision was rendered invalid
For the amaTshatshu, this day resembled the eclipse of 1940
Most of them could not fathom the turn of events

Greetings from your children grandson of Vezi
The judge has left, court is out!

Without knowing the details of this case, Bantu Holomisa offered the view that leadership difficulties were tied up with the troubles of the people and 'thrived in an administrative mess'. Instead of managing a crisis they had inherited, the ANC government should tackle the problem of overcrowding in areas where people had been dumped and begin to work on a development strategy. He spelled out his view as an opposition party leader and former head of the Transkei:

> The ANC could begin by calling everyone to sit around the table in a sort of national convention, admit that their models have failed and look at new models to deal with the land question. There is an urgency to apply the constitutional principle of improving the quality of life for all particularly in the dumping grounds of the apartheid era. Those who are committed to farming should be allocated smallholdings and undergo education in

> appropriate skills such as how to keep a cash book and how to care for the environment. National Development Banks could provide grants in kind. For this to work, the whole family must be invested in farming.

While the debate over remedies is yet to come, the story of the amaTshatshu at Zweledinga is indicative of a humanitarian crisis brought about by apartheid engineering and the failure of successive post-apartheid governments. Without attention to and state support for sustainable development, this crisis will escalate. In the words of Bantu Holomisa, 'Zweledinga, and other resettlement areas, are a ticking time bomb. The government is doing nothing about improving conditions. One day people will stand up and say enough is enough.'[58]

But there is more to this crisis than political economy. The story of the Tshatshu émigrés also demonstrates how anti-apartheid struggles might be informed by deeper anti-colonial sentiments. Underlying Reuben Katsi's opposition to Transkei independence was a desire to go home to a place where he and his people belonged and where his status might be restored. His followers were inspired by a vision that was restorative. What they saw out of the bus window on their reconnaissance trip in the 1970s was a landscape of mountains and rivers whose names told of home and offered a vista of wide open spaces and plentiful grazing. They saw a Promised Land. There was no sign that they were thinking about some western-style democracy in their quest for deliverance from Kaiser Matanzima. Nor did their subsequent experience of governance in the Whittlesea district kindle a vision of a democratic dispensation and how they might fit into it. Rather, they were caught up in an environment of political churning which was laced with an ongoing sense of loss. They lived alongside countless others who felt similarly bereft. To find acceptance among them, attempts to remedy the past would need to take cognisance of affective complexities.

Reuben Katsi's actions served as a catalyst for the resurgence of the Tshatshu great house, propelling Enoch ka Tshunungwa, the man who initially opposed his claims, to throw himself into revitalising the great house of the amaTshatshu. We follow this process and its consequences in the next chapter.

58 Interview, Anne Mager with Bantu Holomisa, leader of the United Democratic Movement (UDM), 10 October 2017.

CHAPTER 6

Chiefly politics, restitution and new imaginings in the era of democracy

Scholars have characterised the first two decades after the end of apartheid as an era of neo-traditionalism implemented by the ANC. As evidence they cite the legal architecture put in place after 1994, the political discourses that legitimated simultaneously a return to tradition and a turn away from the ANC's promised radical democracy.[1] This top-down approach tends to ignore the agency of those fighting for *ubukhosi* or struggling for chiefly recognition as a form of restitution. Political expediency on the part of the ANC does not provide adequate explanation for the resurgence of chieftaincy nor does it take into account the differences in impact of this resurgence on localities. The play of chiefly power no less than that of political parties and interest groups was and is informed by local initiatives, government policies and legislation. This chapter locates the resurgence of the Tshatshu chieftaincy in the broader political landscape of post-apartheid regional politics.

In February 1990, as Nelson Mandela walked free and the ANC was unbanned, South Africa entered a new epoch. Apartheid would be replaced by a majoritarian dispensation. What this meant would depend on the negotiation process, its outcomes and the compromises reached. For their part, the amaTshatshu held little hope that they would make headway in their quest for formal recognition. Their journey seemed to have ended just as it was beginning. 'Everyone believed that the ANC did not support chieftainship,' said Obed Maphasa.[2] Like so many others, he underestimated the determination of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) and its leader, Phatekile Holomisa.

1 C. Walker, 'Women, "Tradition" and Reconstruction', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 15, 1, (1995), pp.58–71; L. Ntsebeza, 'Traditional Authorities and Democracy: Are we back to Apartheid?' in G. Ruiters (ed), *The Fate of the Eastern Cape: History, Politics and Social Policy* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press), 2011, p.85; B. Oomen, '"We must now go back to our history": Retraditionalisation in a Northern Province Chieftaincy', *African Studies*, 59,1 (2000), pp.71–95.

2 Interview, Anne Mager with Obed Maphasa, 15 April 2015.

Formed in 1987 as a means of mobilising traditional leaders to oppose apartheid, CONTRALESA was not a popular organisation. With its eye firmly on augmenting chiefly power, it did not seek the support of those who, by choice or because of geographical location, lived under traditional leaders. It confined itself to organising the chiefs and headmen themselves. Initially, CONTRALESA was fraught with in-fighting and achieved little. In 1991, its leader was murdered and Phatekile Holomisa took over the leadership. A cousin of Bantu Holomisa, the president of the Transkei, Phatekile was ambitious. He was also strategic and had struck up a relationship with the ANC in exile in the mid-1980s. When his turn came to take on his father's mantle as chief of the minor amaHegebe clan, he consulted the banned organisation. As president of CONTRALESA, he drew himself closer to the now unbanned ANC. He also embarked on a campaign to strengthen CONTRALESA by recruiting chiefs who were still tied to the Transkei and Ciskei traditional leaders' associations.

As negotiations for an interim government were under way, the ANC stuck to its principle that the powers of the chiefs would be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the legal system. CONTRALESA negotiated hard to have chiefly power placed beyond the Constitution and threatened to withdraw from the negotiation process if they were ignored. Fearing that CONTRALESA would team up with Inkatha, the Zulu cultural organisation, the ANC did not ignore Holomisa. While these organisations wanted a new South Africa in which the state would underwrite patriarchal authority, Holomisa was far less hostile than Mangosuthu Buthulezi, the leader of Inkatha. The demands of CONTRALESA and Inkatha provoked fury among women's and feminist groups organised under the umbrella of the Women's National Coalition (WNC).[3] CONTRALESA and Inkatha, the WNC claimed, pitted cultural rights against democracy and human rights. They argued that customary law was an instrument of oppression which was used to shore up patriarchal controls and deny women basic human rights and freedoms.[4] But these objections were brushed aside by the traditionalists who promoted an essentialist view of African culture throughout the negotiations. At one point, CONTRALESA denounced

3 T. Nhlapho, 'Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate', *International Journal of Law and the Family* 9, 1995, p. 211.

4 Walker, 'Women, "Tradition" and Reconstruction', p.58.

all 'foreign concepts and institutions', declared that South Africa was a 'union of kingdoms' and that the head of state should be drawn from one of its 'monarchies'.[5] By the end of the negotiations, CONTRALESA had secured recognition for traditional leadership in the Constitution, but they were bitterly disappointed that they had to accept an advisory Council of Traditional Leaders rather than a parliamentary National House of Chiefs. Also disappointed was Dr Nokuzola Mndende, a PhD graduate in Religious Studies, who objected that chiefs — whom she described as the custodians of 'indigenous traditions' — had to plead for recognition. She criticised the new dispensation for its 'diminution of an African identity' and for encouraging 'cultural dependency and black submissiveness to another culture and spirituality'.[6] In their efforts to protect what they believed was African from outside influences, Mndende and CONTRALESA constructed an ethno-philosophy that was neither locally inclusive nor broadly Pan African.[7]

Phatekile Holomisa's cousin, Bantu Holomisa, forged his own political path in his journey from bantustanisation to democracy. In 1987, he ousted Stella Sigcau, president of the Transkei, in a coup d' état. While serving as head of the bantustan, Bantu Holomisa integrated Umkhonto we Sizwe guerrillas into his army. He also served as an ANC Member of Parliament in the first democratically elected government. In September 1996, ahead of the local government elections, he was expelled from the ANC and this propelled him into oppositional politics. Together with Roelf Meyer, a former National Party member, he formed the United Democratic Movement (UDM) with the aim of preventing the ANC from sweeping the board at the local government elections. Bantu Holomisa's views were broadly aligned with those of his cousin, but he appeared less narrow in his thinking and accepted the need for change. Roger Southall describes Bantu Holomisa as supportive of a 'progressive chieftaincy' — an amalgam of 'traditional values', democracy and African nationalism. He was both pragmatic and diplomatic. Rather than focus on an idealised past, he was respectful of the chiefs, referred to paramount chiefs as 'kings' and helped them to cast off their image as bantustan stooges. He also urged them to embrace rural development initiatives.[8]

5 Maloka and Gordon, 'Chieftainship', pp.46–47.

6 N. Mndende, Director of Icamagu Institute, 'Traditional Leadership and Governance Recontextualised', Unpublished Paper, n.d.

7 I. Karp and D.A. Masolo, *African Philosophy as Cultural Inquiry* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp.1–18; A. Rettova, 'African philosophy as radical critique', Editorial, *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 28, 2 (2016), pp.127–131.

8 R. Southall, 'The struggle for a place called home: the ANC versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 26, 2 (1999), p.162.

In the run-up to the 1999 national and provincial elections, the Eastern Cape was in political turmoil. The chiefs were dissatisfied with the limited powers of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders which had been established in 1996 and were bitterly opposed to the provincial Regulation of Development in Rural Areas Act (1997) that sought to displace chiefly power with elected Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs).[9] Disgruntlement also gripped the old bantustan elite as the national government pared down the bloated civil service inherited from the apartheid era, cut down on promotions and removed some 8 000 'ghost workers' from the civil servants' payroll. They seethed at the removal of 3 000 fictitious pensioners from the old-age grant list and at the slashing of budgets for health and welfare.[10] They were not in favour of Bhisho becoming the provincial capital, despite its more central location, as many had homes in Mthatha, which they feared would become a backwater.

Campaigning for the 1999 elections took place against this political backdrop. While the ANC knew there was little prospect of defeat at the polls by Bantu Holomisa's UDM, they were concerned that they might lose substantial numbers of voters among the old bantustan elite. The ruling party looked to the chiefs, taking at face value their claim to speak for the rural poor, and increased their pay. ANC leaders were deployed across the former Transkei, and following CONTRALESA's lead, they addressed Transkei's six paramount chiefs as 'kings'.[11] Nelson Mandela attended the installation of Phatekile Holomisa as chief of the amaHegebe, a group which had been incorporated into the Thembu nation as vassals.

The language of 'kingship' emerged as a rebranding exercise that was intentionally anti-colonial. Proponents of this term rejected 'paramount chief' as derogatory in that it set African leaders apart from the kings and queens of Europe. Rhetorically, African leaders were to be accorded the same respect. This new approach was endorsed by the government's commissions on traditional leadership.[12] However, the notion of kingship was also seen as anti-democratic in that it sought to strengthen hereditary privilege. Kingship implied that chiefs were separate from appointed or elected officials of the

9 Ntsebeza, 'Traditional Authorities and Democracy: Are we back to Apartheid?', p.85.
10 Southall, 'The struggle for a place called home', p.159.
11 Southall, 'The struggle for a place called home', p.163.
12 Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Republic of South Africa, Information Sheet: The President's Announcement of the Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (Nhlapho Commission) 29 July 2010.

state. By calling themselves kings, senior chiefs might see themselves as above the structures of local government. This meant that lines of accountability would be obscured and would lead to chiefs ignoring the wishes of those who lived under them. Those who preferred the term 'king' also glossed over the conventional meaning of a king as one who ruled over a state by means of a bureaucracy supported by an army. But these criticisms were largely ignored. As a component of postcolonial rhetoric, the term 'king' suggested an anti-colonial stance that played on the hierarchy between nations rather than inequality in rural social relations. The rhetoric was seductive: Winnie Madikizela Mandela, the wife of Nelson Mandela at the time and an ANC Member of Parliament, claimed her royal position as a Mpondo princess from Bizana.[13] Desperate to woo the chiefs, the ruling party ignored this dissonance and the undemocratic values which had been endorsed by the notion of kingship.

ANC sympathy for the chiefs which had been articulated in the local government elections in the late 1990s did not indicate a simple return to the chiefly autonomy of the bantustan era. By embedding chiefs in local structures alongside state officials, the state sought to shift their mode of working in a new direction. District municipalities brought into play by the Municipal Structures Amendment Act in 1998 (Act 117 of 1998) were to be the agents of rural development in all localities. Elected municipal councillors served the people as their representatives alongside municipal officials and members of the traditional councils.[14] But this collectivised leadership was fraught with difficulty. Each category of representative had a different mandate and served competing interests. Chiefs and councillors vied for the support of the people; municipal officials controlled the budget. This 'lumping together of town and country', designed to facilitate a process of modernising rural government, floundered as the chiefs were poorly served by councillors who had no vision, training or resources to deliver on their mandate.[15] Local government became a site of contest rather than a space for

13 Maloka and Gordon, 'Chieftainship', pp.46–47. For more on postcolonialism see Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism The New Critical Idiom* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.195–208.

14 Local traditional councils, established in terms of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003), allow for 40% of the membership to be elected while 60% of the members are appointed by the chief.

15 K. George and M.S. Binza, 'The role of traditional leadership in promoting governance and development in rural South Africa: A Case study of the Mgwalana Traditional Authority', *Digital Knowledge*, 46, (2011), p.9 http://hdl.handle.net/11189/4923, accessed on 25 June 2018. Boyane Tshehla, 'Here to stay: Traditional Leaders' role in justice and crime prevention', *SA Crime Quarterly* (11 March 2005), pp.15–20.

the promotion of emancipatory and developmental agendas. The weakness of local government enabled neo-traditionalism to grow in the decades that followed the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s.

The ANC's continued support for chiefs was due not only to a fear of losing electoral support. Having failed to promote rural development in the first decade of its rule and confronted with the responsibility for institutional change, the ANC concluded that stability would be best served by avoiding change that was too extensive in scope or too rapid. Chiefs and people needed to evaluate new ideas in relation to pre-existing ideas; institutions should follow a path that was relatively familiar. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003) relied on the institutional forms and modes of operation built up in the bantustan era. While this conservatism ensured bureaucratic continuity, it signalled that the ANC was following the easiest path rather than trying to re-imagine development in the rural areas. The Act resuscitated chiefly power through the establishment of traditional councils that resembled the tribal authorities of the bantustan era. People saw little difference between these new structures and the old and referred to the traditional councils as 'The Tribal'. The chiefs were appeased and the National Council of Provinces signalled their pleasure that government had 'significantly expanded the roles and functions of traditional leaders, and restored respect for the institution which had been eroded over a period of time by successive colonial and apartheid regimes.'[16]

Some critics decried the ANC's turn to neo-traditionalism as a setback for democracy, while others drew on a wider postcolonial context to explain that where the state failed to support rural people, chiefs stepped in. Chiefs gained ascendancy where national states were weakened from within by corruption, poor leadership and mismanagement. They were buoyed by an international climate that favoured protection of indigenous rights and by unprotected, open economies that allowed for free trade.[17] While this context is useful, these arguments pay insufficient attention to political agency and to the adaptability of the institution of the chieftaincy. In South Africa, traditional leaders were relatively well organised. They also operated with

16 Parliament of South Africa. Proceedings of the National Council of Provinces, Questions and Reply, 12 April 2005, Unrevised Hansard, https://www.parliament.gov.za

17 C. Murray, *South Africa's Troubled Royalty: Traditional Leaders after Democracy*, Law and Policy Paper 23 (Australian National University, Centre for International and Public Law: Federation Press 2004); P. Mashele, 'Traditional Leadership in South Africa's New democracy', 349–354; Oomen, 'Retraditionalisation', pp.71–95.

some success as a cohesive force through CONTRALESA, and subsequently through the post-apartheid provincial and national houses of traditional leaders. Political organisation gave them a voice, enabling them to lobby the state in key political forums.[18] In contrast, opposition to chiefs in the former Transkei, as in many rural areas, was generally poorly organised.[19] NGOs tended to focus on local projects and opposition parties did not object to neo-traditional policies.

The return to tradition was not so much a consequence of strong support for chiefly rule, nor was it a result of the capitulation of the ANC government to its own fears of losing control in the rural areas. The move towards tradition was rather a consequence of the weakness of opposition to it. Some scholars have suggested that the absence of a strong local oppositional discourse is indicative of a residual shared belief that chiefs play a role as custodians of a rural communalism and that they protect this way of being against an encroaching urban individualism.[20] But the Ghanaian scholar, Kwasi Wiredu, does not see a dichotomy between urban and rural. He describes a communalist society as 'one in which an individual is brought up to cultivate an intimate sense of obligation and belonging to quite large groups of people on the basis of kinship affiliations'. This sense of being in relation to others cultivates feelings of sympathy towards the wider society. In Wiredu's view, communalism is central to an African ethos. Away from Africa in an American city, he felt 'a nostalgia for that ethos in [his] bones every day'.[21] Drawing on this perspective, Koelble and LiPuma argue that African thought recognises 'another timespace of dignity, self-worth and self-determination' which 'represents a refusal to separate politics, local communities, morality and the market economy as separate spheres of existence'. They believe that many people are drawn to this ideology for its

18 R. Southall and Z. De Sas Kropiwnicki, 'Containing the Chiefs: The ANC and Traditional Leaders in the Eastern Cape, South Africa', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 37, 1 (2003), pp.48–82; J. M. Williams, 'Leading from Behind: Democratic Consolidation and the Chieftaincy in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, 1 (2004), pp.113–136.

19 S. Hassim, 'Voices, Hierarchies and Spaces: Reconfiguring the Women's Movement in Democratic South Africa', Political Studies and School of Development Studies, University of the Witwatersrand (2004). Paper commissioned for joint project of University of Witwatersrand and University of Kwa-Zulu Natal on 'Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-apartheid South Africa'.

20 Oomen, 'Retraditionalisation', p.74.

21 K. Wiredu, 'Our problem of knowledge: Brief reflections on knowledge and development in Africa', in I. Karp and D.A. Masolo, *African Philosophy as Cultural Inquiry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p.183

ability to interconnect the parts of life that they experience as pulled apart by modern capitalism.[22] This thinking has contributed to a broader search for an African postcolonial society. However, no overarching theory can encompass the range of what might find its way into postcolonial thought, explain the return to tradition, or inform an oppositional politics in South Africa.

In the world of real politics, struggles turned less on world view than on trust, everyday life and material needs. Across the Eastern Cape, traditional leaders were angered by the state taking over administrative functions for which they had been responsible under apartheid. Rural people were distressed by the state's incompetence. Inexperienced urban bureaucrats were neither trusted nor welcome in rural areas where chiefs were the only familiar administrative authority.[23]

Against this political backdrop, the great house of amaTshatshu continued to struggle for restitution.

Post-apartheid rural politics and the house of Tshatshu

In January 1991, the amaTshatshu arranged a ceremony to unveil a tombstone for Gungubele (1833–1923) at Makwababa, Qhitsi. This would be a powerfully symbolic moment, an announcement that their campaign for restitution and restoration of their pride was to continue into the post-apartheid era.

Makwababa is situated deep in the hills of Qhitsi, some 95 kilometres from Mthatha. The tarred road undulates across the grassveld, between pointed hills and muddy rivers, until it crosses the Tsomo, a tributary of the Great Kei River and the south-eastern boundary of western Thembuland. Some 20 kilometres on is the turn-off to Makwababa. The dirt road is rudimentary; the driver skirts potholes, crosses dongas (soil erosion gullies) and struggles up steep inclines. Perched halfway up the hill to Qhitsi, Makwababa is a small, tidy settlement. On the left is a fenced-off field of maize, the collective project of the village and testimony to the dynamic leadership of its headman, Obed Maphasa, son of Mpondombini, descendant of Gungubele by a junior house. If you are lucky, a majestic goshawk will perch on the fencing pole and fix its eye on you, a symbolic reminder that you have entered Gungubele's space. Behind the sign for Gungubele High School, well-maintained classrooms come

22 T. A. Koelble and E. LiPuma, 'Traditional Leaders and the Culture of Governance in South Africa', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institution* 24, 1 (January 2011), p.14.

23 J.B. Peires, 'Traditional Leaders in Purgatory: Local Government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St Johns, 1990–2000', *African Studies*, 59, 1 (2000), pp.97–114.

into view. Opposite the school, residential houses are neatly grouped together in the manner of the betterment schemes of the 1960s. On the sloping ground of the commonage, one can discern mounds of red ironstone that mark the graves of Yiliswa, Gungubele and Mpondombini. The view through clear skies leads across the valley to the hills on the far side and down to the Tsomo. The air is dry and the sweet smell of fresh cow dung brushes the nostrils. One wonders whether the memory of salty sea mist and cold, damp Robben Island turf blurred Gungubele's gaze as he stood viewing this open landscape.

Energised by the efforts of the right-hand house to reclaim chiefly status in Glen Grey, Enoch Thembekile ka Tshunungwa turned his attention to revitalising the great house of the amaTshatshu. Soon after Nelson Mandela's release from prison, Tshunungwa proposed that the amaTshatshu place a tombstone on the grave of Gungubele at Makwababa. It was 75 years since Gungubele had died; this was an opportune moment to restore his memory. An inscribed tombstone, which would be ceremoniously unveiled, would serve as a sign that the great house of Tshatshu was awakening. Tshunungwa's strategy was masterful. He would call on an old comrade to do him a favour. As secretary of the Cape ANC in 1961 and a co-accused in the Treason Trial later that year, he was well connected to the older ANC leadership. He felt certain that Nelson Mandela would remember him, and that he would empathise with Gungubele's experience as a prisoner on Robben Island. Tshunungwa sent Nelson Mandela a letter, inviting him to the unveiling of Gungubele's tombstone.



Figure 6.1: The scattered villages of Maphasa's people.

In the new year of 1991, the amaTshatshu and special guests — among them Chief Joyi of the Thembu great house and Ngangomhlaba Matanzima of the right-hand house — gathered at headman Obed Maphasa's place at Makwababa. These dignitaries and a gathering of villagers were about to make their way down the hill to Gungubele's graveside. A shiny, new granite tombstone replaced the warm, red ironstone rocks that had marked his grave for the past 75 years. The amaTshatshu would unveil the stone and ask Gungubele to take care of the well-being of his people and guide their struggle for recognition.

Tshunungwa and Obed Maphasa checked the time on their wrist watches. Looking up, they saw a tiny black speck in the bright blue sky. As it grew larger and noisier, a joyful cry went out that Nelson Mandela's helicopter was about to land. Ululating and waving their arms, people from surrounding villages rushed from their houses. '*UMandela ufikile! Yili yili yiliii!*' [Mandela has arrived!] There was no stopping to dress for the occasion. The helicopter hovered, its blades whipping up dust, and came to a standstill on the commonage at Makawababa. Nelson Mandela stepped out onto the grassy slope. Smiling broadly, he greeted his former comrade and the assembled amaTshatshu, hailing them as fellow abaThembu. Later, when he addressed the gathering, he honoured Gungubele as a great man and a leader who had stood up to the colonisers.

The moment was all too brief. Within an hour, the official helicopter took to the skies. There was no sign that Nelson Mandela had been present in the place where Yiliswa and her son Gungubele lay in their graves. Unaccustomed to recognition, the amaTshatshu had not used the event to its greatest advantage — there were no representatives of the press to promote their cause. While the villagers feasted on four head of cattle slaughtered for the occasion, the Tshatshu leaders were content with a warm glow in their hearts.

We leave Makwababa in the capable hands of headman Obed Maphasa and cross the Tsomo River to Caba in Thembuland proper, where Gungubele's sons had moved a hundred years earlier. Here the next stage of the Tshatshu's fight for *ubukhosi* took place. Largely an internal contest between two houses, the struggle spanned a decade from the mid-1990s.

Caba lies north of Engcobo, high up in the mountains. As the crow flies, the distance is not more than 30 kilometres but the journey is arduous. With the dirt road little more than a track in places where it has been washed away, the driver has to negotiate ruts, one wheel at a time. In 1995 some 2 000 people

resided in the five villages that make up Caba.[24] For most, daily life is a struggle. Unable to find wood and too poor to buy paraffin, many homesteads burn cow dung for fuel. Women gather the cow pats and pack them into mounds to dry close to their houses. A few homesteads have small gardens, but there are no large fields of maize. Ploughing stopped in the early 1990s when assistance from the homeland government ended. Without cattle or tractors, the hard ground was unworkable. The poor subsist on social grants, while the better-off supplement state welfare with sales of livestock or remittances from family members in town. A few herdsmen on horseback shepherd flocks of sheep across the slopes to the far end of the commonage, where they hope to find grazing. Most of the older men have returned home after years as migrant workers on the mines and in the cities and have settled down to live as farmers. Many young children have never seen a white person and react fearfully at the sight of one. Villagers live close to the elements on this treeless landscape where they endure icy winds in winter and unforgiving sun in summer.

Figure 6.2: Tata Obed Maphasa at the site of the graves of Yiliswa, Gungubele and his own father.

Figure 6.3: Mncedisi Gungubele (Aah! Jongulundi), direct descendant of the great house of Tshatshu.

24 The villages that make up the Tshatshu area of Caba are Caba, Lunda, Nxamakele, Ndungwane, Cecweni (including Ngwevana).

Political talk stirred up feelings in the village as ANC campaigning ahead of the 1999 national elections reached the area. At this time, 'All Gcuwa's people joined the ANC,' said one of Gungubele's great-grandsons. By demonstrating their allegiance to the ruling party, they hoped to be favoured for resources. Caba badly needed a new school, road repairs and farming support. But they also recognised that many of the local ANC leaders were abaThembu. These were people whom they 'knew'. They were 'of their own' and they believed them when they said that the future was in their hands. Bantu Holomisa, they said, belonged to the past. At the same time, a small group of residents began to articulate discontent with their headman, a son of Gcuwa by a junior house. He was an elderly man, perhaps in his late seventies, but his age was not a matter of concern. Whether through habit or expediency, complaints about his headmanship were articulated as problems of legitimacy and behaviour, the criteria followed by colonial magistrates in their appointment of headmen. Invoking the rhetoric of the ANC, his critics said they did not want a headman who had been appointed under the bantustan system; his headmanship should be ended as it was no longer legitimate. Khayalakhe, son of Sobantu and grandson of Gcuwa from the great house, should take his place. Since the first son of the great house had moved to the Gwatyu, his younger brother should take over at Caba. There was also dissatisfaction over the old headman's social conduct. Villagers complained that the 'old man' had an 'outdated attitude'; he was a cantankerous fellow, given to fighting after drinking beer and disrespectful of women.

Mindful of the emancipatory discourses deployed by their more sophisticated urban family members, women were particularly vocal in their preference for Khayalakhe's more 'modern' approach. They illustrated this by way of example: he was more inclusive in the way he dealt with problems; and he treated his unmarried sister 'like a man', affording her dignity and allowing her to build a house adjacent to his homestead. If there was an implicit critique of patriarchal practices in the women's discourse, it did not extend to criticising Khayalakhe's marriage by *ukuthwala*. In 1991, he had taken Noxolo as his wife after a brief meeting at which she had told him she wanted to study and was not ready for marriage. *Ukuthwala*, the abduction of young women as brides, was usually undertaken with the consent of their fathers, but occasionally it was a means of circumventing paternal control, a form of elopement. It was both widely practised and controversial. Gender activists condemned the practice for the way the wishes of the woman were ignored and for the violence associated with abduction. But opposition to the

custom had not yet garnered much support in the rural areas.[25] While rural women were often afforded greater mobility for the purposes of wage earning, male domination remained a feature of domestic and social relations.

As the contest dragged on, the old headman became frustrated. On one occasion, he shouted in an intoxicated state: 'Come and take your blanket', so signalling that he was wearying of the contest. But his supporters were not yet tired. Tensions escalated and came to a head over the timing of a circumcision lodge for young men in the village. Defying the headman, Khayalakhe went ahead with arrangements for his son and a cohort of young men to commence the ritual of manhood. In the darkness of night, their grass huts were torched and the young men — their wounds not yet healed — fled for their lives. Rumours of who was responsible floated in the wind, but no-one was held accountable. The old man finally gave up defending his position. With the backing of the *kumkani*, Khayalakhe approached the local authority and was inducted as headman.[26] The outgoing headman accepted the result of this protracted struggle and he soon appeared, looking relaxed and jovial at gatherings at his former rival's homestead. The villagers settled down. A few years later, Khayalakhe — Dumelusuthu by his praise name — assumed leadership of the traditional council and the government recognised him as a chief in view of the status of the Tshatshu clan. Khayalakhe sent a message to his wife that she must return home. Noxolo gave up her job as a petrol attendant on the coast and returned to Caba. In her role as the chief's wife, she attended to the needs of the women in the villages under her husband's control and distributed food to the destitute.

Khayalakhe, who was also an active member of a charismatic Christian church, became a popular headman in the locality where he lived but wider restlessness generated by state support for hereditary rulers meant that outsiders tried to usurp this position from time to time. In April 2015, Khayalakhe had to fend off a claimant from far 'down in the valley', when

25 C. Monyane, 'Is Ukuthwala another form of "Forced Marriage"?', *South African Review of Sociology* 44, 3 (2013), pp.64–82; L. Mwambene and J. Sloth-Nielsen, 'Benign accommodation? Ukuthwala, "forced marriage" and the South African Children's Act', *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 11,1 (2011), pp.1–22; M. van der Watt and M. Ovens, 'Contextualising the practice of Ukuthwala within South Africa', *Child Abuse Research in South Africa* 13, 1 (2012), pp.11–26; K. Rice, 'Ukuthwala in rural South Africa: Abduction marriage as a site of negotiation about gender, rights and generational authority among the Xhosa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 2 (2014), pp.381–399; D.S. Koyana and J.S. Bekker, 'The Indomitable Ukuthwala Custom', *De Jure* 40 (2007), pp.139–144.

26 This account, and others in this chapter, is an amalgam of interviews conducted in these localities on different occasions between 2014 and 2017.

a man wholly unknown in the mountains made a bid for the headmanship of Caba.[27] Fighting for *ubukhosi* was not confined to those with legitimate claims. 'We are in a time of claims and counter claims. It never stops. Every minute there is someone trying to claim authority over your people,' commented Obed Maphasa.

Local government did not honour its commitments. While the traditional council at Caba served as a link between the people and local government, it received no practical or financial support. For over a decade, Tetelwa Maphasa, Khayalakhe's sister who was secretary of the traditional council, used her own meagre resources for printing, stationery and transport. The district council was even more dysfunctional. The jostling of three sets of competing representatives — traditional leaders (chiefs or headmen), elected councillors and municipal officials — fuelled disagreement and led to inaction. But most frustrating of all was the high turnover of municipal officials. 'Every time someone new arrives you have to start over,' said Obed Maphasa. 'They stay in their jobs three years before climbing the ladder up to the next job. The first two years they are learning. Only in the third year do they do something. Then they leave and it all collapses.'[28] This experience extended across the former Transkei to the Gwatyu in the Queenstown district (the former Tambookie location) where Gungubele's hereditary heir was fighting for recognition as chief of the amaTshatshu.

To reach the Gwatyu from Engcobo, one heads westward on the R61, a provincial road with heavy traffic, poor visibility in misty and rainy conditions and a high accident rate. Under clear skies, the eye follows a changing landscape on which open grasslands give way to craggy mountains, rocky terrain and thornveld. After about 140 kilometres, the road turns off to the Gwatyu, tucked up against the Theeberg mountains that run parallel to the tarred road towards Cathcart. This territory was inhabited by the Khoesan until they were ousted by the westward movement of the abaThembu in the 1820s. In 1852, the amaTshatshu were moved here when the colonial Tambookie location was established. In 1883, they were removed so that the government could create small farms for the not so well-to-do white settlers. This past is etched into the landscape, layer by layer. Khoesan rock art adorns the caverns, and the site of Gungubele's great place on a plateau in a secluded valley is clearly visible above the rubble from nearby mission buildings. Broken-down

27 Interview, Obed Maphasa.
28 Interview, Obed Maphasa.

homesteads map a grid of farms across the terrain. In the apartheid era these farms — 58 in total extending over 38 000 hectares of land — were taken over by the state for bantustan consolidation. In the 1970s, the Transkei went head to head with the Ciskei in a competition over this land. Kaiser Matanzima cleverly used the historical relationship of the amaTshatshu to support his bid and he secured the land as part of the Transkei's independence package in 1976. He was then under some obligation to afford the amaTshatshu an opportunity to return to it. In 1981, Sobantu Gungubele was sent by his councillors to reoccupy the Gwatyu on behalf of his people. Heir to the Tshatshu chieftaincy, Sobantu had served as headman at Caba since 1945. He was 66 years old. His return to the Gwatyu was symbolic. The amaTshatshu had not lived here since Yiliswa had been forcibly moved nearly a hundred years earlier. This was a powerfully significant moment in the amaTshatshu fight for restitution.

Initially reluctant to uproot himself, Sobantu relented under pressure. As Gungubele's direct heir, it was his duty to reoccupy this land on behalf of his people. It was a hard moment for Sobantu personally. Leaving behind his first wife who was in poor health, he and his second wife squeezed into Obed Maphasa's little bakkie. Laden with personal belongings and bits of furniture, they inched down the hillside to Engcobo and made their way across to the Gwatyu, followed by a handful of families from Caba. Sobantu settled in the old farmhouse on the farm 'Fordyce' close to where Gungubele had once had his great place. The farm was named by descendants of the army colonel who had hunted Maqoma in 1851. Perhaps Maqoma would have smiled at the return of Bawana's descendants. Sobantu and his little group were surrounded by over 200 former farmworkers who were permitted to remain on this land as previous employees of the white farmers.

Officially handed over to an 'independent' Transkei, the Gwatyu farms remained state-owned. While president of the Transkei, Matanzima used the land to sustain his network of patronage. He allocated farms on leasehold to himself; his family, including one of his wives; his brother, Ngangomhlaba Matanzima; and close supporters, such as his praise singer and a Transkei policeman. The Ndungwana chief, Ndarala, also received a leasehold farm.[29] The Transkei president led the lessees to believe that they would be given the option of buying their farms. In a bid to ensure that the amaTshatshu

29 Rosalie Kingwill and Monty Roodt, Social Land Audit of the Gwatyu block of farms, Cofimvaba district, Eastern Cape. Report to the Department of Land Affairs, Eastern Cape office (March 2000), Unpublished.

were not excluded from this level of occupation, Obed Maphasa, Sobantu's half-brother, applied to lease a farm close to where Peter Maphasa had lived. He also hoped that leasehold would be translated into freehold and that he might come to own it. His move resonated with Gungubele's bid to buy the farm, Maphasa Poort, in 1877.

For the rest, Matanzima used state land as if it were tribal land. Bringing the Gwatyu in line with the land tenure system which was common to other rural locations across the Transkei, he required former farmworkers to apply for land under the communal system. Those who were successful would be issued with 'permission to occupy' (PTO) certificates. To administer the area, he established a tribal authority in the Gwatyu area under the leadership of Sobantu Gungubele. However, neither the complex set of tenure arrangements, nor the heterogeneous community, could be contained under a tribal authority. Its imposition on this diverse population was ill-considered. Farmworkers had no experience of living under a headman and were not interested in having a chief. The new lessees were drawn from an elite that was unlikely to draw close to a chief with whom they had not grown up. Kaiser Matanzima's 'retribalising' approach reflected a desire to avoid establishing a regulatory regime that recognised the need for a more complex view of rights to land. It also ignored the possibility that there were some people who had not been brought up with an intimate sense of belonging and obligation to kin. This lack of discernment led to confusion and distrust of any form of regulation and destroyed any prospect of development in the area.

By the time KD Matanzima was forced to resign as president of the Transkei in 1986, no farm leases had been registered and no PTO documents had been drawn up. Some leases were registered after Bantu Holomisa came to power and rental payments were collected, but there was still no certainty that the farms would be made available for purchase. In the meantime, infrastructure, including dams, reservoirs, windmills, stock watering-points, fences and homesteads were falling into disrepair. For the most part, lessees did not live in the area and employed family labour, generally paying them in kind. In some instances, family members assumed that they had inherited the right to take over leases. Farm-dwellers grazed their livestock alongside those of absentee lessees. Sheep, goats and cattle roamed across boundaries in an uncontrolled manner. There was no regulation, the chief had no authority over lessees or farm-dwellers and a situation of anarchy prevailed. The advent of the new democratic government in the mid-1990s held out the prospect of a more planned development strategy. Sobantu was keen to have the tenure

situation settled so that farmers might begin to effect improvements and put an end to the degradation of land.

Towards the end of 1995, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) selected the Gwatyu as a key site for the Eastern Cape Land Reform Pilot Programme. A private company was contracted to conduct a pre-planning survey of land ownership and occupation patterns, infrastructural resources and farming activities. The DLA followed up by setting out a planning strategy and instructing the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Maladministration and Corruption (Heath Commission) to investigate the lease agreements, payments of rentals and eviction orders that some of the lessees had taken out against the former farmworkers living on their farms.[30] It also requested those who were not engaged in farming to move to the peri-urban settlement of Tembani on the farm Oat Hay. Tembani was a central element of the restitution and redistribution plan for the Gwatyu, as it was envisaged that those who settled at Tembani would find work in Queenstown. But few were willing to move. This division into farmers and urban workers was strikingly similar to the colonial plan for the Tambookie location in the 1860s and was no more successful. Legislation passed in 1997 complicated the DLA's plan. As long-term residents on this land, farm-dwellers were protected under the Extension of Security of Tenure (Act 62) of 1997; any move required their consent and the provision of alternative accommodation. In 1999 when the Gova family attempted to evict four families from the farm Rocklands, the farm-dwellers approached the Legal Resources Centre for advice and took the matter to the courts.[31] Caught between the law and its own development plan, the DLA turned its attention away from the Gwatyu. In the absence of land and agricultural regulation, farming practices became increasingly informal. Farm dwellers ignored farm boundaries and grazed their livestock and that of the lessees across the entire area.

At the same time, people from further afield moved into Tembani and the population swelled. Only a handful of residents found jobs in town and the majority were unemployed. Following the pattern of many peri-urban settlements, women subsisted on social grants (pensions, child support and

30 Commission of Inquiry into Maladministration and Corruption (1998–2001): Chair Judge Willem Heath.

31 Kingwill and Roodt, Social Land Audit of the Gwatyu block of farms, p.8. For discussion of the difficulties in implementing the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), see H.N. Mfeya, Status of farm dwellers in the Great Kei municipality post implementation of the Security of Tenure Act, MA Thesis, Nelson Mandela University, 2017 and Ruth Hall, Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform on Extension of Security of Tenure Bill of 2015, University of the Western Cape, PLAAS, 2016.

disability grants) and some men found intermittent day labour on public works projects, such as road-building. As the township expanded, so its politics became more complex. NGOs, who worked with the civic associations and their malcontents, came and went; local populist leaders acted as self-appointed spokesmen for the residents, but disappeared when their politics brought too few kickbacks. Tales abounded of men in smart suits, promising resources and extracting contributions from unsuspecting hopefuls, only to disappear without trace. Mncedisi Gungubele, son of Sobantu, commented that one of his most important duties was to protect the people from conmen and tricksters. Tembani contributed little to rural development.

In the meantime, the Gwatyu farms were groaning under the weight of unregulated farming practices. In the year 2 000, about 300 farm-dwellers owned roughly 10 000 goats, 3 000 sheep and 3 500 cattle, amounting to 60 per cent of the livestock on the Gwatyu farms.[32] The number of stock exceeded the carrying capacity by more than eight times. Adding to this number, were the livestock that had invaded from neighbouring areas. This 'poach-grazing' became particularly prevalent near Bolotwa and spread to those Gwatyu farms accessible from the road. Broken fences made it easy. Neither the chief nor the farm-dwellers could stop this irregular grazing. Whenever they tried to chase the invaders away, they 'forced their way back'. Alarmed by the rapid deterioration of the veld, a lessee commented that 'everybody was taking for themselves. Nobody had a care for the future'.[33]

In a bid to bring all sectors of the Gwatyu rural community into a single decision-making structure with which they might communicate, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) advised the establishment of a Community Property Association (CPA). The purpose of a CPA, as set out in the Community Property Association Act of 1996 was to hold farms or state land that had been allocated in the restitution process, on behalf of beneficiaries. A CPA was empowered to allocate, manage and protect substantive rights to and in land, in a group-ownership setting.[34] Underlying

32 Kingwill and Roodt, Social Land Audit of the Gwatyu block of farms, pp. 19–37.

33 Interview, Obed Maphasa.

34 The Communal Property Association Act (Act 28 of 1996) requires CPAs to allocate substantive rights to use in land. Substantive rights include ownership rights, use rights, occupation rights, access rights and grazing rights. See D. James, *Gaining Ground: 'Rights' and 'Property' in South African Land Reform* (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); W. Beinart, P. Delius and M. Hay, *Rights to Land: A Guide to Tenure Upgrading and Restitution in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2017); Centre for Law and Society at UCT and B. Cousins, Communal Property Associations (CPAs), Position Paper for National Land Tenure Summit, 2014.

this legislation was the assumption of a cohesive, democratic community in which people had clear land rights. The difficulty on the Gwatyu was that there was no security of tenure and no clarity on land rights. In some instances, tenure rights had not been registered; in others it was not clear what, if any, legal rights pertained. It was not clear how the CPA could function in an environment where tenure was largely off-register and of uncertain legal status. The CPA struggled to get off the ground, beleaguered by multiple disparate interests. Six years later, those attempting to set up the CPA had not yet brought the various groupings into a relationship of co-operation. While some believed that the CPA might provide a starting point for guiding land use, others believed that until tenure rights were firmly established, people would do 'exactly as they pleased'.[35] The Gwatyu was far from a cohesive community and the CPA had no effect on the unbridled farming activities that exacerbated the destruction of grazing, fencing and water resources. Unable to overcome these obstacles, the DRDLR appeared to give up on the Gwatyu.

This failure of post-apartheid land reform had its roots in the 1970s when the apartheid state had handed over land to the Transkei, thus allowing Kaiser Matanzima to allocate farms without establishing firm tenure arrangements. By the time apartheid came to an end, there had been 20 years of unregulated farming. Those concerned about the degradation of the land and the lack of development repeatedly requested government direction. Rapid turnover in government departments led to endless duplication of costly land audits and surveys of the irregular tenure situation. One of the expert reports maintained that the concept of land rights was not useful to finding a solution to the Gwatyu crisis. While many of the farm-dwellers were farming relatively successfully and often as efficiently as the lessees, they did not qualify for land rights *per se*. In their view, the DLA would do better to deploy a concept of 'beneficial occupation' as a vector along which to award more long-term security in land. The state did not follow up this suggestion.[36]

Sobantu Gungubele died in 2002; his son Mncedisi Gungubele gave up his position as a captain in the military forces and took over the leadership of the amaTshatshu.

35 Interview, Obed Maphasa.

36 K. Mokgope, *Land reform, sustainable rural livelihoods and gender relations: A case study of Gallawater — A Farm*, Research Report no 5 (University of the Western Cape, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies/PLAAS, November 2000), pp.5–6; See Kingwill and Roodt, Social Land Audit of the Gwatyu block of farms, incorporating J.E. Danckwerts, Comment with respect to proposed Land Reform Programme: Gwatyu, 4 June 1997 (Annexure 4).

He and his wife, Nosizwe Gungubele, inherited a decaying farmhouse and served an increasingly complex community on the Gwatyu. They made a good team: Nosizwe had served as secretary of the local traditional council under Sobantu and was able to give her husband valuable support when he took over his father's role. But they were unable to set the Gwatyu on a new path. The situation on the farms and the problems of the Tembani settlement were not simple matters of dispute. They were symptoms of deeply structured underdevelopment and dysfunctional social relations which emanated from settler colonialism. They were also a consequence of a poorly conceived process of land restitution. Restoring land without security of tenure and state-supported land use had led to increasing informality. After 40 years, the difficulties were seemingly intractable and the will of government officials to deal with them appeared to have dissipated.

Asked why the state took so little interest in the Gwatyu, a senior manager in the Eastern Cape Rural Development Agency (ECRDA) commented that officials assigned to work with the Gwatyu CPA were 'all running to get into parliament or the municipality to get closer to resources. Once there, they say "it starts with me and my families". Their term is so short that they do not get beyond attending to the family. Gwatyu is a victim of that situation. There is no one in government interested in bringing resources to them. The ECRDA had advertised funding for loans but the Gwatyu CPA had not put in a business plan.'[37] Given the range of competing interests and the uncertainty over land tenure, it is difficult to imagine how the CPA committee might have managed a loan or where it might have been directed. Rumours that consultants or NGOs would be brought in to break the impasse did not materialise. The Gwatyu remains a short-term 'paradise' for those benefiting from uncontrolled land use. It is a long-term developmental travesty.[38]

In the meantime, the pace of restitution in relation to the chieftaincy was quickening. In 2010, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (Nhlapho Commission) affirmed the existence of a single Thembu 'kingship' following the lineage of the Dalindyebo royal house.[39] The commission's findings were of immense interest to the amaTshatshu. They were delighted that the great house of abaThembu had succeeded in its petition to have Matanzima's paramountcy struck down as an unlawful

37 Interview, Anne Mager with W.S., King William's Town, 10 September 2015.
38 See Appendix 5 for map of Gwatyu farm boundaries and forms of occupation as at 2000.
39 Ministry for Cooperative Governance (Nhlapho Commission), 29 July 2010.

manipulation of the bantustan system; the Matanzima subgroup could claim no more than the rank of ordinary chief (*inkosi*).[40] This ruling vindicated the majority of amaTshatshu, who held the view that there was only one Thembu institution of *ubukumkani* and did not want to see a split in the Thembu nation. They also hoped that the amaTshatshu would now be able to emerge from the Matanzima shadow and reassert their status as senior to that of the Matanzima house.

But this process was not as straightforward as it might have been. Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, the Thembu *kumkani* since 2006, was a troubled man. A year before his installation he was charged with murder, fraud, attempted murder, assault, kidnapping and arson — crimes he had committed against his subjects in 1995 and 1996. In 2009, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for culpable homicide, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, arson, kidnapping and defeating the ends of justice. The Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the culpable homicide conviction and reduced his sentence to 12 years. Finally, he appealed to Jacob Zuma to grant him a presidential pardon. Unsuccessful in this appeal, Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo began serving his sentence in December 2015. At the time of the installation of Mncedisi Gungubele as chief, Buyelekhaya was awaiting the outcome of the appeal. While his behaviour was erratic and unreliable, he remained the Thembu *kumkani* and was duly invited to perform the installation of the Tshatshu chief, the first official installation since Maphasa had become chief in 1835 decades before the conquest of the amaTshatshu. The occasion of the restitution of the Tshatshu chieftaincy was of immense historical significance. It was also a step towards restitution.

On 26 April 2013, Mncedisi Gungubele was formally installed at a ceremony held at the Gwatyu great place and took the praise name Aah! Jongulundi. The event was joyful, tearful and powerfully symbolic. A newly erected sign directed visitors from the national road. Cars and bakkies carrying well-wishers sped along the gravel road, dodging the grader that was hastily smoothing over the ruts. At 10 am, the scheduled starting time, a crowd of several hundred people, many in traditional dress, milled about outside the marquee. Several hours later, the crowd had doubled but there was no sign that the ceremony was about to begin. People began to drift away. The chief and his councillors were locked in discussion in the old farmhouse. Senior

40 This Commission was established in terms of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act 41 of 2003).

women chatted in the lounge of the chief's modest house, which had been built alongside the old farm house now used only for meetings. Sometime after 1 pm, a woman in traditional dress, bearing a staff, stepped out of the house, ululating. Her voice reached a crescendo as the chief followed and his *amaphakathi* fell into step behind him, leading the procession towards the marquee. People re-emerged from their houses and the crowd swelled. Phiko Velelo, the master of ceremonies, took charge; the school choir sang joyful songs and women danced. Apples were passed around and presents were handed up. Speaking in English with a Xhosa translator, Aubrey Velile Somana outlined the history of the amaTshatshu. Still the crowd waited, the glare from the white marquee bouncing off the white table cloths.

Finally, the dignitaries entered. A dozen or more chiefs and their councillors, dressed in braided white robes with pale-blue beaded necklaces draped around their necks and leopard skin wraps across their shoulders, led the way. They were followed by government officials in suits. Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo was not among them. Nosizwe, whose husband was about to be enrobed as chief, wiped away a tear. The head of the Thembu great house, the king, had let the amaTshatshu down. Jongulundi would be installed by a member of the right-hand house, a nephew of Kaiser Matanzima. Symbolically, this was a catastrophe for the new chief: Jongulundi had wanted to demonstrate the support of the amaTshatshu for a unified Thembu nation. His installation by the right-hand house was not what he wanted. But reality trumped symbolism. The king was wayward; not only was he a convicted criminal but by his own admission, he was fond of smoking marijuana. This habit, someone whispered, 'was especially bad for a king'. In contrast, Matanzima's family was educated and reliable and they had the authority to conduct the installation. Jongulundi accepted that this was the status quo for the moment. At the same time, he would not allow the occasion to be used by others. He bowed his head and submitted to the injunctions of the ritual. Standing up to address the crowd, he declared that the amaTshatshu supported the great house of the abaThembu and that they had never sought to divide the Thembu nation. This position pertained, no matter who the incumbent *kumkani* was or what others might say. Implicit in his message was that while Buyelekhaya had let him down, he would not allow anyone to exploit this disappointment for their own purposes.

Figure 6.4: Nosizwe Gungubele at the installation of her husband Jongulundi as chief of the amaTshathsu. Alongside her are Nonurse and Nomangqika.

Figure 6.5: Khayalakhe Gungubele (Jongulundi's brother) and Noxolo at the installation of Jongulundi.

Demonstrating his statesmanship, Jongulundi had repudiated the view that Bawana might have wanted to be independent of the *ubukumkani* babaThembu (the Thembu kingship). Unsettled, the Matanzima entourage began to leave. A young praise singer launched into a lengthy exposition but was cut short. It had been a long day. It was time to feast.

The installation of the Tshatshu chieftaincy was now ritually complete, embodied in Jongulundi who would ensure the continuation of the name of Maphasa. Sir George Cathcart's decree had finally come to an end after 161 years. Terrible damage had been done, but the amaTshatshu were on the road to recovery. 'We had a great day,' observed Obed Maphasa, 'It was almost perfect.' Jongulundi's installation ensconced him as the senior chief of the amaTshatshu, a rank determined by the status of his mother as great wife, by primogeniture (he was the eldest son of the great wife) and by the performance of key rituals leading up to the installation.

Serving the people, serving the state

Completing the enrobing ceremony as a chief did not mean that serving the people became more effective; nor did it mean that the state provided greater support. As the number of chiefs increased across the country's rural areas, so the relationship between the chiefs and local government became more strained. By 2013, officials were complaining that traditional leaders were a drain on the fiscus. The economy was sliding into recession and the government was increasingly short of cash. The state supported 13 kings

and queens nationally (despite the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims having reduced the number of kingdoms to seven); officials in the national and provincial houses of traditional leaders; ordinary members of these houses; senior traditional leaders (chiefs); and headmen and headwomen. With annual increments, the bill was more than the state could afford. The remuneration cost for these traditional leaders amounted to R575 million in 2014. Kings were worth R1.03 million a year each, senior traditional leaders R188 424 annually and headmen R79 364.[41] In 2016, the Independent Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers recommended a freeze on salary increases and the Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs 'suspended for the time being' the recognition of any new chiefs. At the same time, critics accused the ruling party of 'opening the way for a reassertion of undemocratic, patriarchal forms of government', and lamented that President Jacob Zuma's support for the chieftaincy echoed that of the apartheid era.[42]

The shortage of state funds rather than a change of policy slowed down the 'fight for *ubukhosi*' in general and dampened Tshatshu aspirations for a chiefly position at Makwababa. In July 2017, Wonga Maphasa gave up his job in Durban to take over the headmanship at Makwababa from his ageing father, Obed Maphasa. Wonga planned to seek recognition as a chief but he would have to be patient. While he was phlegmatic, Obed Maphasa was also critical of the state. In his view, the government could save money and improve service delivery by investing in the institution of chieftainship. Municipal and other state officials took their salaries and did nothing. Bantu Holomisa confirmed this view, adding that 'some councillors were not well-educated and simply used their jobs as an ATM [automated teller machine], a source of cash'.[43] There was also a problem of continuity. 'People in government come and go,' said Maphasa, 'but hereditary leaders remain where their people are. Training them would help them to know how to advance economic and social development' and contribute to reforming the manner in which they conducted themselves. He elaborated:

> Government should rather train and invest in traditional leaders because they are going to be there a long time. Investing in chiefs means educating

41 'How much you pay for South Africa's royal families', http://businesstech.co.za 01 June 2015, accessed 03 August 2017.
42 William Beinart, 'Do we want wall-to-wall chiefs in SA?' *Sunday Times*, 10 August 2014, p.19.
43 Interview, Anne Mager with Bantu Holomisa 10 October 2017.

> them. Education helps them so they don't fall back on authoritarianism. If they are educated they will know how to act immediately when intervention is needed. Delegating tasks and establishing committees is also part of an educated style of leadership. But education without vision is no use. If I am a chief, I must know why I am here, why was I made a chief. A chief must have vision. And I must know what my duties, roles and responsibilities are.[44]

The provincial House of Traditional Leaders provided a forum for the discussion of the implications of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights for chiefly power and the administration of customary law. Isolated in their villages, most rural leaders were not exposed to these discussions. Without the confidence of knowledge, they fell back on defensive arguments. Ngangomhlaba Matanzima, chair of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, believed that in the short term, joint training of municipal officials and traditional leaders would be useful. For the long term, he had proposed that a special curriculum for the sons of chiefs be introduced in high school, but the idea was rejected by the provincial education department.[45]

One of the key challenges facing rural communities in the Eastern Cape was the regulation of rituals pertaining to manhood, circumcision schools and the practice of traditional circumcision. Following an escalating number of deaths and penile amputations due to botched circumcisions in the late 1990s, government stepped in. The Traditional Circumcision Act (Act 6 of 2001) set out guidelines for practitioners to follow. But the problems continued. The Eastern Cape Department of Health reported that between 2006 and 2013, no fewer than 40 young male initiates had died after undergoing circumcision; 359 had been admitted to hospital and 24 had been so badly infected that their penises had been amputated. Deaths were due to infections and mutilations, beating, dehydration and the carelessness of intoxicated 'surgeons'. While the province admitted that 2 314 circumcisions had been performed illegally at hundreds of unregistered circumcision schools, only 19 arrests had been made. Notwithstanding the enormity of the health crisis, there were few calls for the abandonment of the practice and the banning of initiation schools. Defenders of the practice pointed out that 12 169 'successful' circumcisions had been performed over this time. Imagining manhood without circumcision, or circumcision as an operation

44 Interview, Obed Maphasa.
45 Interview, Anne Mager with Ngangomhlaba Matanzima 9 September 2015 at Qamata.

performed in a hospital, was a step too far for the construction of male identity. Those attending the provincial inquiry wanted to see tighter control, training for traditional surgeons and nurses and sterilisation of equipment.[46] Extensive media coverage of these issues and the production of a controversial feature film on circumcision in the Eastern Cape led to public debate on competing notions of manhood and the appropriateness of attending a circumcision lodge in the twenty-first century.[47]

While some traditional leaders reacted defensively, others recognised that the crisis extended beyond physical health and that the very meaning of the circumcision ritual was in crisis. The purpose of male initiation, said Ngangomhlaba Matanzima, was to produce qualities in men that enabled them to know what it meant to be responsible in and to society, 'to serve as leaders, take care of their well-being and to provide security for others'. Initiation school was a site where boys learned to be men who were capable of resilience and reason. Here too they learned that 'a man does not mishandle women and a man does not pick up things [venereal disease and HIV — human immunodeficiency virus]'. This reference to the dangers of casual sex served to illustrate the chief's point: manhood was about restraint. Controlled behaviour was particularly important in the context of widespread HIV infection in South Africa.[48] But the problem was that those responsible for teaching these values were failing in their duties.

46 Eastern Cape Circumcision deaths: Provincial Department of Health; Hate Crimes and Initiatives for LGBTI group: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development briefings NCOP Women, Children and People with Disabilities 10 September 2013; see also T. Kepe, 'Secrets that Kill: Crisis, custodianship and responsibility in ritual male circumcision in the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa', *Social Science and Medicine* 70 (2010), pp.729–735; Lumka Sheila Funani. *Circumcision among the amaXhosa: A Medical Investigation* (Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1990).

47 *Inxeba/The Wound* 2017, Drama/Romance 1hr 28m, Director John Trengrove, Producer Elias Ribeiro, Produced by Urucu Media, Released 14 September 2017 in Germany.

48 For more on circumcision and male behaviour in the context of HIV and AIDS see L.A. Eaton, D.N. Cain, A. Agrawal, S. Jooste, N. Undermans, S.C. Kalichman, 'The influence of male circumcision for HIV prevention on sexual behaviour among traditionally circumcised men in Cape Town, South Africa', *International Journal of STD and AIDS* (1 November, 2011); R. Wamai, B. Morris, S. Bailis, D. Sekal, J. Klausner, R. Appleton, N. Sewankambo, D. Cooper, J. Bongaarts, G. de Bruyn, A. Wodak, J. Banerjee, 'Male circumcision for HIV prevention: current evidence and implementation in sub-Saharan Africa', *Journal of the International AIDS Society* (October 2011) https//doi.org/10.1186/1758–2652–14–49; E.J. Mills, C. Beyrer, J. Birungi, M.R. Dybul, 'Engaging men in prevention and care for HIV/AIDS in Africa', *PLoS Med* 9(2):e1001167 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001167; Karl Peltzer, 'HIV/AIDS/STD knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in a rural South African adult population', *South African Journal of Psychology* (November 2003); O. Shisana, T. Rehle, L.C. Simbayi, K. Zuma, S. Jooste, N. Zungu, D. Labadarios, D. Onoya, *South African National HIV Prevalence, Incidence and Behaviour Survey, 2012* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2014).

Iingcibi (traditional surgeons) were negligent in their practice; *ikhankhatha* (guardians or traditional nurses) were not practising good hygiene and senior men were not educating the boys properly. Young men were 'coming out of these schools arrogant, some of them behaving as rapists and drunkards', displaying behaviours that flowed from their lack of understanding of the meaning of manhood. Ultimately, traditional leaders were responsible, he said. Chiefs, headmen and their advisers were failing to prepare the men who ran initiation schools so that they could guide the boys in discussing the purpose of circumcision and the values and behaviours that made them socially acceptable men. Rather than attending to these serious matters, those who ran initiation schools were succumbing to opportunism by accepting young boys before they were ready. They were too eager to get their money.[49]

As in colonial times, the distinction between good and bad was a feature of many conversations about men and about chiefs. Good chiefs, said Obed Maphasa, contributed to the well-being of their people. They did not put their heads in the sand but stepped forward to lead their people. Good chiefs led through consultation and did not act alone. They did not side with some people against others without public engagement, and they kept the peace by balancing competing interests in the community. To illustrate his point, Obed Maphasa told the story of how he had dealt with the problem of excessive alcohol consumption. Young men in his village wanted freedom to drink alcohol as they wished and those running shebeens (illicit drinking houses) encouraged them. Distraught grandmothers complained to him that they were unable to protect their pension monies from predatory youths, and young women lived in fear of being preyed on by men who had lost their inhibitions. Obed Maphasa called a public meeting, an *imbizo*, to discuss how to solve this problem. Taking his cue from 'One brave woman who stood up and said the only solution is to close the shebeens', Maphasa closed the shebeens for three months. He also imposed a fine on anyone who dared to flout the decision of the *imbizo*. The monies collected from the fines and the confiscated alcohol were used to pay young men to carry out repairs on village infrastructure. When the shebeens reopened, their hours were curtailed. Secure in the knowledge that they had the headman's backing, the residents kept a watchful eye on shebeens and their patrons.[50] His story also reinforced his view that chiefs who lived among the people were far more useful than government officials residing in towns.

49 Interview, Ngangomhlaba Matanzima.
50 Interview, Obed Maphasa.

In the belief that they would be good for their people, individuals from chiefly families took up the fight for *ubukhosi*. Sometimes preoccupation with leadership disputes led to a neglect of duties. This was a serious matter, said Ngangomhlaba Matanzima. If traditional leaders did not demonstrate their value, he feared that the Constitution would be amended 'to close the space for traditional leadership'.[51] But fighting for *ubukhosi* did not necessarily mean that those with different views severed their bonds with one another. Competing chiefly families and government officials west of the Great Kei came together in times of crisis, offering solidarity and providing support.

One such moment was the tragic and untimely death of Nosizwe Gungubele, wife of Jongulundi, in 2016. Nosizwe was killed by a speeding motorist who rammed into the vehicle driven by her husband. Her funeral was addressed by representatives of the provincial government, the municipality and the House of Traditional Leaders, and was attended by chiefs from several Thembu groups. Grieving the loss of a fine and immensely capable person, they recognised that Nosizwe's death was a terrible blow to the chief, to the amaTshatshu and to the diverse people whom her husband served. Her passing left a void in their lives and in the leadership of the Tshatshu great house. Nosizwe was buried in front of the old farmstead used as the chief's meeting place. Jongulundi, who was critically injured in the accident, placed a tombstone on her grave when he returned from hospital some months later. This book is dedicated to Nosizwe who followed in the footsteps of Yiliswa, queen of the Tambookies.

In this region of the Eastern Cape, fighting for *ubukhosi* was entangled with the imagining of western Thembuland. Multiple constructions of the meaning of this imagined entity emerged in political contestations over place, belonging and power. Different founding moments, geographical boundaries and jurisdictions articulated with competing versions of the history of the territory west of the Kei River, and became tied to the promotion of selectively constructed notions of heritage. Those promoting these narratives sought to configure a past that might fit with an envisaged future. An exploration of competing notions of western Thembuland serves as an indeterminate conclusion to this history and as a sign of the continued rumblings north-west of the Great Kei.

51 Interview, Ngangomhlaba Matanzima.

IN CONCLUSION

Imagining and re-imagining western Thembuland

We end this book with an account of political contestation over the re-imagining of western Thembuland as an idea and as a place. As an idea, western Thembuland came into play against the concept of Thembuland proper. Its first usage appeared in colonial documents in the mid-nineteenth century, in which it was referred to loosely as the area where the abaThembu were living, north-west of the Great Kei. The areas identified with the westerly abaThembu were known successively as the Tambookie or north-eastern frontier (1835–1852), the Tambookie location (1853–1877), Emigrant Thembuland (1865–1976) and the Glen Grey district (1877–2017). The territory to which this naming applied shifted as boundaries were redrawn in the processes of conquest and colonialism. More constant was the idea of westerly abaThembu: people who had followed Thembu chiefs across the northern reaches of the Great Kei River in the nineteenth century. Implicit in the idea of westerly abaThembu is the agency of the people themselves which is evident in their allegiances, migration, claims to territory and political conflicts. The postcolonial contestation over the idea of a western Thembuland arises from the various constructions of the colonial project, the ambitions of individual chiefs, the political manoeuvring of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima in the 1950s and the demise of the Matanzima dynasty.

After the final uprising of the abaThembu in 1883, the abaThembu west of the Great Kei were confined in rural locations under colonial administration. Emigrant Thembuland was comprised of the districts of Xhalanga and St Marks and was administered independently of Thembuland proper, east of the Great Kei River. From 1894, the colonial modernisation strategy followed the principles set out in the Glen Grey Act. Not all the inhabitants were abaThembu and in some areas, backgrounds were extremely diverse. An Anglican missionary commented in the 1890s that in Xhalanga, there was a great

'mixture of races — Fingoes, Xhosa, Thembu, Basutos, half-castes, English'.[1] In this area, ethnic identities began to fade, so opening new ways of thinking about social relations and governance. Religious and nationalist movements emerged in the early twentieth century but by mid-century, their growth had been curtailed by the imposition of Bantu Authorities and the rise to power of Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima.

A product of apartheid rather than its puppet, Matanzima called for the recognition of western Thembuland as an autonomous region and declared himself paramount chief of the westerly abaThembu. Head of the right-hand house of the abaThembu, he clashed with the great house and those loyal to it. For Matanzima, colonial administrative jurisdiction spliced territories, people and power. The areas occupied by abaThembu north-west of the Kei had never been administered by the great house. From the outset, they had been treated as separate in both colonial and chiefly matters.

Matanzima's version of history glosses over the complexities of the founding moment of Emigrant Thembuland. These included the manipulation of the colonial government, and the hubris of his great-grandfather, Raxoti Matanzima, who defied the great house, vacated the Tambookie location and moved across the Indwe River to settle in Emigrant Thembuland. That this was territory confiscated from the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili, by the colonial government, does not enter his story. From his perspective, the history of western Thembuland begins with his great-grandfather and leads to the claim that he led the right-hand house to establish a new kingdom that was autonomous of the great house. The final rift came with the independence of the Transkei in 1976. This moment marked the apex of Kaiser Matanzima's power, led to the self-imposed exile of the *kumkani* and the creation of a paramountcy for the right-hand house, the abaThembu base Rhoda. With the *kumkani* out of the way, Kaiser became president of the Transkei and abandoned the idea of a separate western Thembuland.

In 2010, the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims put an end to the Matanzima paramountcy by ruling that Kaiser Matanzima had invented the idea of abaThembu base Rhoda. The Matanzimas were ordinary chiefs or 'senior traditional leaders'. This ruling led to a revitalising of and shift in the Matanzima narrative of western Thembuland. Ngangomhlaba Matanzima suggests that the founding moment for an autonomous western

1 Pascoe, Keeper of Records, p.304 C.

Thembuland occurred in 1864 when regent Nonesi's grandsons by different houses adopted opposing political stances. Raxoti Matanzima agreed to cross the Indwe; Mfanta, his half-brother, opposed the move and sided with Ngangelizwe of the great house who was not living on the frontier. As he settled down in the colonially demarcated territory of Emigrant Thembuland, Raxoti Matanzima began to exercise power without consulting the *kumkani*. 'That is where it all started,' said Ngangomhlaba Matanzima, implying that this moment of origin gave legitimacy to the notion of western Thembuland and that it explained how the right-hand house had come to power.[2] The Matanzima dynasty was created on the initiative of his great-grandfather, not apartheid. His brother, said Ngangomhlaba, had built on this legacy. He had used the system of Bantu Authorities to build schools and clinics and to support large agricultural projects. The main difficulty was that the great house did not want to acknowledge that development had occurred under Kaiser Matanzima.[3]

The descendants of Mfanta, son of Mtirara by a junior house, were also players in this political game. For them, the founding moment of the western Thembuland conflict was when Nonesi, queen of the abaThembu, was banished for defying the colonial authorities by refusing to cross into Emigrant Thembuland. In this narrative, Mfanta followed the lead of Nonesi, was hostile to the creation of Emigrant Thembuland and disliked Raxoti Matanzima's power-mongering. Distressed by the rift between Nonesi and Raxoti, he removed himself to the great house on the Mbashe River for some months. He returned to the Tambookie location (renamed Glen Grey) in a disgruntled state of mind and became embroiled in conflict with white traders. He was recognised as a headman and allocated land near to where he had grown up under Nonesi. A minor chief, Mfanta struggled to establish himself as a leader and his following remained small. In the War of Ngcayecibi in 1877, he took up arms against the colonists and was imprisoned for life. His followers had little option but to take shelter in Emigrant Thembuland under Raxoti Matanzima.

In the era of Kaiser Matanzima, Manzezulu Mtirara and other descendants of Mfanta effected three discursive moves: they played down Mfanta's oppositional politics, associated themselves more closely with the name of Nonesi and celebrated the strategic astuteness of Raxoti Matanzima. 'Like Shaka,' said Jongixanti, regent for Mfanta's heir, 'Raxoti Matanzima made the move that gave the strongest power'. It was this challenge of power that led to the divisions

2 Pascoe, Keeper of Records, p.304 C
3 Interview, Anne Mager with Ngangomhlaba Matanzima, 9 September 2015 at Qamata.

between western Thembuland and Thembuland proper. 'Ngangelizwe never had authority over Western Thembuland. He had his own area, Matanzima had his.' Mfanta's people were compelled to plead with Raxoti for a place in the wake of their leader's arrest and incarceration. They were rendered wholly dependent on the Matanzima family. Their loyalty was rewarded in 1974 when Matanzima appointed Manzezulu Mtirara, a descendant of Mfanta's house, as a chief.

Jongixanti outlined how Manzezulu used his influence to revive the status of Mfanta's people. The bantustan era was a difficult time: conquest had destroyed the institutions of the abaThembu, the people were struggling to find direction and there were no role models. Manzezulu worked closely with Matanzima and believed that Bantu Authorities would help them to build African institutions. When Manzezulu died in 2002, he left two authorities in the control of Mfanta's people — the Zilingwenya Hala Tribal Authority and the Nonesi Tribal Authority. Jongixanti felt indebted to Matanzima. 'You cannot run away from the hand that feeds you,' he said. 'You have to work together.' Even so, he was more inclined to invoke the name of Nonesi than that of Matanzima. It was a strategic ploy. Nonesi's name was less tainted than Matanzima's, and would take his people further in their imagining of western Thembuland in the post-apartheid era. In Jongixanti's vision, western Thembuland was comprised of the geographical entities of Emigrant Thembuland and Glen Grey. Conveniently ignoring Nonesi's role as representative of the great house, he declared that these areas had been under Matanzima and Nonesi and had never come under the control of the great house of the abaThembu. Asked whether he envisaged a split in the Thembu nation, Jongixanti replied: 'At the moment, the thinking is that there can be two kings; this is in fact the decision of the people in western Thembuland.' In a bid to secure their guidance in these matters Jongixanti Mtirara visited Mpondoland and Cape Town to ask the ancestors for the spiritual return of Nonesi and Mfanta to western Thembuland. On 1 March 2011, Jongixanti and his councillors performed a brief ceremony at the Breakwater Lodge, the site of the former Breakwater Prison where Mfanta had died, and asked him to intercede on behalf of his people. [4]

Both the Matanzima and Mfanta-Nonesi histories edited out the history of the amaTshatshu. This erasure was a strategic necessity, informed by a desire to distance themselves from a narrative which ran counter to their claims for land and political authority. In contrast, Jongulundi, chief of the amaTshatshu,

4 Interview, Anne Mager with Jongixanti Mtirara, Queenstown, 8 September 2010; Chief Jongixanti was accompanied to the Breakwater Lodge by Anne Mager; see also *Cape Times*, 2 March 2011, p.5.

did not promote a notion of western Thembuland as a separate kingdom. He remained adamant that Bawana had not sought to establish a separate kingdom; that Yiliswa and Gungubele had been cared for by the *kumkani* after they were dispossessed; and that the amaTshatshu had never supported the splitting of the Thembu nation in the apartheid era. For him, the notion of western Thembuland denoted the broad region west of the Kei River which had been opened by Bawana and those who followed him. It was an extension of Thembuland. He did not agree with the view expressed by a few individuals that Bawana had crossed the Kei with the express purpose of creating a separate kingdom. Jongulundi and his councillors rejected this version of history as fabrication. Their understanding was that Bawana had sought to escape the conflict brought about by the mfecane and the internal quarrels associated with it. He had not sought a kingdom of his own. His son, Maphasa, had supported the *kumkani* on the frontier at critical moments. Gungubele and Yiliswa did not leave their area until they were militarily conquered and forcibly removed. It was the *kumkani* who ensured they had a place to live when the final act of colonial dispossession was perpetrated. For the amaTshatshu, western Thembuland had always been a part of a greater Thembuland. In this sense, they had returned to the area when it became possible to do so. They wanted to restore their history to western Thembuland and themselves to the history of the abaThembu. This was important for their social standing, their well-being and their ability to access resources. Jongulundi was anxious to ensure that the history of the amaTshatshu was not distorted for political gain. History mattered for integrity and legitimacy, as well as resources. People wanted to know where they came from and what colonialism had done to them. In the postcolonial era of restitution politics, what they could hope to achieve could depend on their credibility and confidence in this knowledge.

Aubrey Velile Somana entered the debate on the imagining of western Thembuland with the publication of his history of the amaTshatshu. The first step in presenting his postcolonial vision was to fix the boundaries of the territory and to establish jurisdiction over it. Western Thembuland stretched from the Katberg mountains in the south to the Stormberg River in the north and east to the Indwe River. These boundaries had been recognised by the colonial authorities as the area over which the Tshatshu chiefs, Bawana and Maphasa, presided. Any decolonisation process should restore this jurisdiction and place all those who lived in it under an amaTshatshu Traditional Authority. Restoring of territory and power would go some way to righting the wrongs of the past. But there was more to his argument. For Somana, political and territorial restitution did not amount to full postcolonial compensation for

the amaTshatshu. The key issue was the restoration of autonomous collective culture.

By removing the chieftainship of the amaTshatshu, taking their land and scattering them in 1852, Governor Sir George Cathcart had committed an act of ethnocide against the amaTshatshu. This act was intentional and had been directed at destroying their standing, culture and identity. Somana's argument drew on the notion of ethnocide which emanated from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948), adopted by the United Nations. According to the Convention, ethnocide flows from the definition of genocide as a range of acts 'committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group'.[5] At the time of its crafting, ethnocide was understood to be the deliberate annihilation of culture rather than the physical destruction of people; both mental and bodily harm were recognised. Ethnocide was deemed 'actionable', meaning that it could be investigated as a crime. Somana's purpose in this argument was to demonstrate colonial criminality. He also believed that the state had an obligation to 'reinstate amaTshatshu to the pre-Cathcart status quo ante'.[6] How far he might succeed was not clear. The law remained a subject of contestation as the parameters and framing of genocide and the place of ethnocide within them remained controversial. Some scholars argued for a liberal drawing of the boundaries surrounding genocide and endorsed the inclusion of ethnocide, while others were more sceptical.[7] Another difficulty was that colonial attack, dispersal and dispossession were features of conquest and not directed at the amaTshatshu alone. Throughout the frontier wars, the British targeted and punished those chiefs whose stature and influence they sought to diminish. To establish ethnocide, a court would have to examine key questions: What would make the stripping of recognition, the un-naming of Maphasa in 1852, an act of ethnocide? Was the expediency of the colonial governor evidence of intent to erase a culture and a people?

To his anti-colonial argument, Somana added a further element, derived from the discourse of African expansion through fission. He suggested that Bawana had left the Mbashe area in the 1820s with the intention of establishing a separate kingdom, entirely autonomous and independent of the Thembu

5 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) available on www.un.org/millenium/law/iv-htm. See also A. Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.3-30.

6 Somana, *AmaTshatshu*, p.53.

7 See discussion of this issue in Jones, *Genocide*, pp.3–30.

kumkani. Fission is a complex issue. While it has been deployed by ethnologists and some scholars as an explanation for the rise of more junior houses, Jeff Peires has argued that segmentation rather than fission characterised Xhosa dispersal west of the Kei River. Segmentation occurs when a 'social group becomes subdivided while maintaining its unity and cohesion' — as evidenced in loyalty to a single great house. Fission, a more complete break, occurs when 'a social group divides into two or more distinct groups, so that the original group disappears as a social entity.'[8] The idea of fission as a means of expansion was animated by the Nhlapho Commission's findings that the Matanzima family had no claim to a separate kingdom. This ruling invited the possibility that others who moved west of the Kei might have sought a separate kingdom. Also, for Somana, the misdemeanours of Buyelekhaya, the *kumkani*, made the idea of autonomy seem attractive. In researching this book, we could find no indication that Bawana had sought separation from the Thembu great house, nor that the amaTshatshu had done so subsequently. Rather, evidence pointed to loyalty to the Thembu *kumkani* in the most trying of times.

The concept of western Thembuland collapses without the supporting narrative of chiefly authority and the mapping of this authority onto territory. Keenly aware that their futures may be tied to the way this struggle unfolds, the protagonists are watchful, scanning the political landscape before they make the next move. For them this politics is not imaginary. But even they are aware that as a political, social and geographical entity, western Thembuland is slippery. Its meanings are unstable, invented and tied to politics that shift in real time. Those whose power comes from the successful wielding of history and culture must ensure the potency of their views and deploy them strategically.

Political tensions associated with the debate over western Thembuland permeated the fight for *ubukhosi* west of the Kei River, complicating claims for restoration of chiefly status and the restitution of land. The Tshatshu great house achieved formal recognition and celebrated the installation of its chief in 2013, thereby ending a century and half of colonial banishment. While restoration brought a sense of pride and dignity to those for whom this history mattered, the effects of conquest were not easily undone. Nor did restitution of land lead to improved livelihoods. In the mid-1970s, the chief's father and a small group of followers returned to the Gwatyu area of the old Tambookie location from where

8 J.B. Peires, 'The rise of the "Right-Hand House"', p.121; Peires used the definition of a scholar of social networks in southern Africa; J.A. Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society: A political history of the Fort Jameson Ngoni,* Second Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), p.57.

they had been removed in the nineteenth century. They were located alongside those who had been employed as farmworkers and a handful of leaseholders. Over the next 40 years, informality became the norm, as land rights, tenure arrangements and farming remained unregulated. Overcrowding and overstocking compromised the quality of human life and led to degradation of the environment and livestock. By 2013 degradation rather than development characterised the area. In 2018, an SABC documentary named the Gwatyu *The Other Side of Eden*.[9] The postcolonial government had failed to recognise the disastrous consequences of land restitution without registered tenure, support for farming and a development strategy embraced by the people.

A second group of amaTshatshu, who relocated from Glen Grey to the Zweledinga/Whittlesea area in the 1970s, fared no better. Among the émigrés was the right-hand house of Tshatshu, which had been promised chiefly recognition in the Ciskei. Forty years later, they were still trying to free themselves from a bogus chieftaincy created by Lennox Sebe, president of the Ciskei, for his brother-in-law. Many failed to receive the compensation they had been promised for fixed property left behind and were persecuted by the bantustan regime in their struggle for land and recognition. They continue to live in a state of impoverishment in the most unforgiving Promised Land.

The political imagining of western Thembuland is one of hope, promise and reversal of fortune. It reveals continuities in mindset arising from the westward movement of the abaThembu, colonial encounter and conquest on the Tambookie frontier. New iterations are revised, rehearsed and propagated in the context of the indeterminate authority that has beset this frontier region of the Eastern Cape since the mid-1990s. To dismiss them as obsolete configurations of identity, power and place is to ignore the challenge of inserting people into a meaningful process of postcolonial imagining.

The ANC government appears to be overwhelmed by the seemingly intractable problems of the old Tambookie frontier. It has made little use of the extensive enabling legislation for rural municipalities and local government, land restitution, tenure arrangements and chiefly responsibility to unravel entanglements and set people on a developmental path. Livelihoods continue to fail and dependence on social grants increases every year. Remedying these and other maladies requires a multi-faceted, complex and inclusive imagining of postcolonial rural development. It means recognising that the state has not yet identified the appropriate means for forging a viable developmental strategy for the people of this profoundly damaged region.

9 South African Broadcasting Corporation, Special Assignment, *The Other Side of Eden*, Producer Hazel Friedman, 20 May 2018.

APPENDIX 1

Extract from colonial treaty with Chief Maphasa

Treaty entered into between Andries Stockenström, Esq., Lieut. Governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and the Tambookie chief Mapassa, when after the fullest explanations by means of the Resident Agent, Mr Henry Fynn, the following articles of convention were fully agreed upon, in the presence of Hougham Hudson, Esq., Agent-General, and the said Resident Agent, Mr Henry Fynn, as also the Tambookie Counsellors Quasha [sic] and Nyela, subject nevertheless, to the ratification by or on behalf of his said Majesty. Provisionally ratified in Cape Town by Governor B. D'urban on 1st June 1837.

Article 1. There shall be peace and unity for ever, between his said Britannic Majesty, his subjects – particularly those of the said colony – and the said contracting chief and his tribe; and both parties shall honestly and faithfully use their utmost endeavours to prevent a rupture of the same, to remove every cause for disagreement which may occur, and scrupulously to abide by the engagements contained in the treaty.

Article 2. The said contracting chief doth acknowledge that the country which he and his tribe do occupy between the Stormberg and Kaffraria, and adjoining the eastern frontier of the colony, is part of what was the Bushman country, still thinly inhabited by the remnants of the said tribe.

Article 3. The said Lieut. Governor doth engage, on the part of his said Majesty, not to molest the said chief or tribe, or cause him or them to be molested in the possession of the said territory, or to lay claim to any part thereof, provided the said chief or tribe do not in any way disturb the peace of the colony, or molest the inhabitants therein; and provided also the said chief and tribe shall strictly adhere to the terms of this treaty.

Article 4. The boundary between the said colony and the territory possessed by the said chief and tribe is agreed to be the Zwarte Kei or Winterberg Spruit, from its source in the Winterberg down to the colonial hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smits Rriver, and thence the latter river to its source in that kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called Buffels Hoek; provided, however, that the free communication between the Kat and Gonappe rivers, and the said territory of the Shiloh missionary institution, as also between the Tarka and Kaffraria through the now uninhabited country east of the Winterberg, continue uninterrupted as hitherto.

Article 5. The said contracting chief engages to protect by all means in his power the Bushmen who reside, or may come to reside, within the said territory, as the original proprietors of the soil, to let them enjoy all rights and privileges to which

the Tambookies are entitled, and to be responsible for their acts, in the same manner as he binds himself by this treaty for the acts of the Tambookies.

Article 6. No Tambookies, armed or unarmed, single or in number, male or female, shall be allowed to cross the said boundary into the colony, and no British subject, armed or unarmed, single or in number, shall be allowed to cross into the said territory occupied by the Tambookies, except with the permission and under the restriction hereinafter to be specified in article 10.

Article 7. The said contracting chiefs shall, with the concurrence of the Lieut. Governor, or person appointed by him, fix upon certain points in the said territory, as near to the said boundary and to each other as convenient, at each of which he shall station a chief or responsible man of his tribe, to be called, for the sake of distinction, "pakati", to reside there, and to act as guard.

It shall be the duty of such amapakati to keep a good and constant understanding with the field-cornets residing nearest to their said residences, and to do everything in their power to prevent inroads or aggressions, either on the part of the colonists against the Tambookies or of the Tambookies against the colonists.

The amapakati, who shall be so stationed, must, by the said contracting chief, be made known, by name, to the said field-cornets, and any change, either of person or station, which may take place with reference to the said amapakati must be previously communicated to the said field-cornets.

The amapakati shall be responsible to their own chief, who will see the necessity of selecting for such stations trustworthy men, and to punish every neglect, fraud, or deception, which they may commit, as the said contracting chief hereby pledges himself to do.

Article 8. The said Lieut. Governor engages, on the part of his said Majesty, to place an agent, to reside in a convenient situation in the said territory, which agent shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity; and the said contracting chief binds himself to respect such agent as the representative of the British government and to protect his person, family, and property, to the utmost of his power, and to leave him full liberty of ingress and egress through the territory, or across the boundary into the colony, at all times, without the least molestation or hindrance.

Source: CA. CCP 3/1/2/4 no 15 Cape of Good Hope – Treaties with Native Chiefs 1806–1854.

APPENDIX 2

Sir George Cathcart's Proclamation (1852)

Proclamation by His Excellency Lieutenant General the Hon George Cathcart Governor and Commander in Chief of the Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and of the Dependencies Thereof, Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, and her Majesty's High Commissioner for settling and adjustment of the Affairs of the territories in South Africa, adjacent and contiguous to the eastern and North-eastern Frontier of the said colony, &etc.

'I hereby grant a free pardon to all Tambookies who may be desirous to reside as British subjects, as aforesaid, within the colonial boundary.

And I do hereby proclaim, that the royal regent Nonesi may return and reoccupy her former possessions; and that all Tambookies are henceforth to be entitled to the same protection of the laws as all other of Her Majesty's subjects.

And I further declare and make known, that as a just penalty for their heinous offences, the lands of the tribe of Mapassa are hereby declared forfeited; but their said chief having been killed, and the tribe sufficiently punished, the remnant of the said tribe is included in the pardon granted as above, and will be allowed to place themselves under the responsible authority of some other Tambookie chief, but the name and independence of the tribe of Mapassa will cease.

And I do further declare and make known, that I have appointed Joseph Cox Warner, Esq., Agent for the Tambookies, and have authorised him to form locations of the said tribes in the district of North Victoria, within certain limits and boundaries to be hereafter defined by proclamation.

And lastly, I declare and make known that no Hottentot will be allowed to settle within the locations of the Tambookies, without special sanction first obtained from me.'

Correspondence of Lieut. General the Hon Sir George Cathcart, K.C.B., relative to his military operations in Kaffraria until the termination of the Kafir War, and to his Measures for the future maintenance of peace on that frontier, and the protection and welfare of the people of South Africa Second Edition (London: John Murray, 1857), pp.239–240.

APPENDIX 3

Report and Proceedings of the Tembuland Commission

G. 66–83. Cape of Good Hope Report and Proceedings of the Tembuland Commission Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to determine upon the Settlement and Permanent Occupation of the territory lately occupied by the Rebel Emigrant Tembus, that portion of Tembuland proper known as Maxongo's Hoek, and the vacant lands in the District of Gatberg with Appendices and Maps Vol 1 (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1883).

Enclosure No 1 of No 16: The Civil Commissioner, Queen's Town, to the Colonial Office.

Civil Commissioner's Office, Queen's Town, 24th November, 1865. No 119

The Honourable the Colonial Secretary, Cape Town.

Sir, – I have the honour to report for the information of His Excellency the Governor, that on 16th instant I received the enclosed letter from Inspector Gilfillan, and concurring with his suggestion I thought it advisable (in order to prevent the chance of Nonesi or any other chief pleading ignorance again in similar cases) to convene a meeting of all the chiefs and make known to them the instructions contained in your letter no 1718 of the 19th August, 2170 of the 19th ultimo, and 2264 of the 31st ultimo.

Having made arrangements for the chiefs to meet me at Glen Grey on Wednesday, the 22nd instant, I accordingly proceeded there and met most of the Tambookie chiefs and a large number of their followers. I opened the proceedings by conveying to them the instructions which I had received in your letters before-mentioned. I told the chiefs and people that His Excellency wished it to be understood that no person now amongst that portion of the tribe remaining in the Colony possesses the authority formerly exercised by the chiefs, and that the inhabitants of the Tambookie location are in future to be dealt with under Colonial law, and to be treated in every respect as British subjects.

I then addressed Nonesi personally, and told her that a complaint had been lodged with me by one of her people, to the effect that an ox of his had been seized and slaughtered by her orders; that she had no authority to touch the property or persons

of any of her people unless acting under the orders of a judge, magistrate, or police officer; that the people sent by her to take the ox would have to appear before the Magistrate in Queen's Town and answer to charges of robbery.

I also stated that I wished all the people to understand that it will be no excuse for them to say they were acting under the orders of the chief in carrying out any case which is contrary to Colonial law, that the law will not recognise any such excuse, and that anyone committing a crime under such circumstances will be brought to trial and have to suffer the penalty which the law imposes.

In reply to a question put by one of the Councillors, I stated that I wished them to all understand that in the Colony there is only one great chief, the Governor; that as they live in the Colony they will have to submit to Colonial laws and customs, which recognises no other authority but that of the Governor and the officers he appoints to act under him.

Some other questions were put to me in order to draw me into a lengthy discussion (according to Kaffir style), but these I cut short by stating that I had not come to answer questions or to enter into any arguments with them but simply to tell them the Governor's instructions.

At the same time I said if they had any communication they wished to make to the governor I would forward it.

Nonesi then spoke as follows: 'I am an old chief, one of an old race, I am Mtirara's mother, and I belong to Government. I have always been loyal: I was here under Warner, and when he left us he left his son behind. When his son was going away I tried to prevent it, but the government would not listen. I am the mother of the great chief Qeya [Ngangelizwe]; he is away from here but I do not want to go away. I never agreed to cross the river, and it is not known to anyone what I have done that the Government should be angry with me. Why, Magistrate, do you speak in such a manner to me? If I have been guilty of any fault let me know my fault and then tell me that you will drive me over the river or deprive me of my authority. I am a chief. Why should I be less than a chief? Why should I be driven across the Indwe? I am an old woman; I have been here since I was a child; I have brought up children here, some of them have died and their graves are here. I have been living with my own people in my own country, and have done nothing to make people deal so harshly with me. What have I done? The Tambookie are a large nation. My own people and the people of Qeya, my son, all consider themselves under the English Government. Why, then, are we called together here to receive this particular news today? I have always been loyal to the British government. I was loyal when the other chiefs were fighting. In the cattle-slaughtering I was on the English side. I have all the country down this side of the Indwe, and have kept it loyal. I had always until now someone to look after me and see that I was properly dealt with. When the Governor took Warner away I hoped that someone would be sent in his place, but no one is sent. We do not deny being under the Government; the Tambookies, wherever they may be, are as we all know, under the Government; we do not wish it otherwise. Who

among us said that we were willing to go over the Indwe? I never agreed to go over; some have crossed, others remain here. Those who have crossed the Indwe were not sent across by me. I cannot say anything about them, they pleased themselves. This is all I have to say today, to ask why I am treated in such a manner, and to deny that the Tambookies as a tribe ever agreed to cross the Indwe. I and all my people have been expecting a successor to Warner, and we are still looking for one to come to after him.'

The chief Vezi then said: 'I thank the Magistrate for calling his children together that he may see them. We have been your children for a long time, and have always been under your protection, but you have today to say something to us that we do not understand. You say we are to be under Colonial law, we thought we always were under that law; still for what you have said I thank you today with my hat in my hand. I speak the word for all who are here; they always wanted to belong to the Government. The Governor has today kindly taken them under his protection or rule. We cannot understand this thing, but we thank you. The Tambookies as a tribe have not crossed the river. Nonesi belongs to Government; she stays with her people in the Tambookie location. Those who have crossed the Indwe are mostly young men who had no kraals and no land here and wanted some. Nonesi always was the governor's, and will be so still. Her children always were your dogs, and will remain so.'

I have also to report that before dismissing the assembly of chiefs and their followers I called the two headmen, Carolus and Silo, and conveyed to them the instructions contained in your letter No 2324, of the 9th inst. Headman Carolus replied as follows:

'I thank you, Magistrate, for your words; I am thankful for what the Government has done for us; we are all thankful, but there were chiefs and headmen before the Government paid us, and there will be chiefs and headmen still, even if they are without pay.'

I also told the meeting that the kraals vacated by those who have gone over the Indwe were not to be occupied again without my permission.

In conclusion, I have much pleasure in reporting that the chiefs and their followers listened with great respect to all that I had to say.

I have, & c.,

(Sd.) Charles D. Griffith,

Civil Commissioner

APPENDIX 4

Trial of Gungubele, chief of the amaTshatshu

Extracts from *Queenstown Free Press* 26 July 1878.

Wednesday, July 24th, 1878.

His lordship took his seat on the bench precisely at 10 o'clock. The Jury having been called Mr Brown placed Gungubele in the prisoner's box.

Mr Foster on behalf of the prisoner applied for the removal of the trial to Grahamstown. There had been a good deal of excitement about the case. The Jury would no doubt do their duty, but it would be better, perhaps to have a Jury out of Queenstown to try the prisoner. Mr Brown opposed. There had been considerable expense incurred. If it had been made before no doubt the Government would have gone to the extra expense. His Lordship said he could not see his way clear to accede to the request of Mr Foster. He believed he would have a fair trial. The feeling would be quite as strong in Grahamstown as here, and he believed there would be quite as fair a trial here as there. There was feeling everywhere in consequence of the vast destruction of property throughout the colony. Mr Foster did not wish to cast any slur on the Jury in Queenstown.

The prisoner was then charged with High Treason as follows:

That Gungubele, now or lately an agriculturalist, and now or lately residing in the Tambookie location, in the district of Queenstown, is guilty of the crime of High Treason: In that, the said Gungubele being the subject of our Majesty Queen Victoria, not regarding the duty of his allegiance but on the contrary wholly withdrawing the fidelity and obedience due, of right, by every subject of her majesty to Her said Majesty, upon or about the twenty fourth day of January in the year of our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy Eight, and at Gwatyu in the Tambookie location, in the district of Queenstown aforesaid, with force and arms, together with diverse other false traitors, armed and collected in a warlike manner, that is to say, with guns and assegais, being then and there wrongfully, unlawfully, maliciously and traitorously assembled and gathered together did most wickedly, maliciously and traitorously levy and make war and rebellion against Her Majesty the Queen Victoria, within this her settlement of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and did, then and there, maliciously and traitorously attempt and endeavour, by force and arms to subvert and destroy the Government of our said majesty the Queen Victoria, within this settlement, as by the Law established, and did, then and there, in furtherance of the said war and rebellion so levied, repeatedly discharge a gun loaded with gunpowder and leaden ball at and against a certain burgher or other irregular force of Her Majesty's lawful authority, and did embody, procure

and command diverse other false traitors to assault, shoot and utterly destroy the said force, and other traitorous acts, in furtherance of the said war and rebellion so traitorously levied, the said Gungubele did do and commit.

Plea: Not Guilty.

The following jury were then called, James Stewart, G.A. Fincham, Edward Cotterell, Samuel Larter, S.C. Bell (challenged by the Crown, being in Gwatyu fight), D. Coombes, James Hagan, James [indistinct name] (challenged by Mr Foster being in Gwatyu fight), G.T. Stewart (challenged by Mr Foster being in Gwatyu fight), (initials not clear) Fordham, J.J. Edwards, John Miles and W. Jeffrey.

Advocate Brown called.

Hendrik Bomba sworn, states: I am a Gaika (umNqika), I have been residing in the Tambookie location; I know the prisoner; I resided upon his ground; I know Mr Keitzman, a trader; I remember Mr Keitzman being assaulted; I remember Mr Swartz's shop being broken open; I remember the Magistrate Mr Hemming coming to Gungubele's place; I was present, and understood what was said; I saw the Magistrate; he spoke in English, which was interpreted by Mr H. Driver.

Examination continued: I remember a meeting at Gungubele's place; Gungubele was not present; I remember the commando coming to Gwatyu; there were meetings before the commando came; Gungubele invariably drove the people away and said they were not to hold meetings. I was there when witch doctor Sivoga [Sovag] was present; he attended to the people and gave them medicine; Sivoga said chief was to come first and he came; the doctor threw some black meal into Gungubele's mouth; the chief said, "What is all this you are doing to me," the great men (councillors) then spoke and said these questions were not to be put to the doctor; the doctor then hid away; all of the people (myself included) were doctored; he placed some of this black meal in my mouth, upon my forehead, and on my chest.

By His Lordship: The prisoner was present when all this doctoring took place; the doctoring was so that the bullets would not enter [penetrate]; the doctor said after this the bullets would not enter; the chief heard all this; I believed the doctor.

Examination continued: The chief continually said I am not fighting. I don't want war; it was the great councillors who urged war; when the white army came to the Gwatyu on Thursday morning and passed down the smaller Gwatyu, entering the school Station, some remained at the station, others went to Gungubele's place, a short distance further. Gungubele ran to the mountain where he had been before; the army dismounted and surrounded the prisoner's place; some of the white army said to some of the abaThembu, go call your chief, put down your weapons and talk. abaThembu said if you have come to talk why have you surrounded the place. I understood, Xhosa was spoken; the abaThembu were armed with guns and assegais; the abaThembu did not put down their arms; the prisoner was in his mountain with a small lot of about 200 men armed with guns and assegais; these were his body guard; there was a fight; the fight commenced almost immediately; the man who

fired first had escaped from gaol; he fired at the white man; he heard white man say 'fire the gun'; the fight then became general; Gungubele remained in the mountain during the fight, but the men that had been with him came down. The prisoner did not hound the men on, as is done on other occasions; I did not tell the Magistrates that Gungubele said to us 'sar now' [prepare to attack] and threw us into confusion; prisoner did not fight then, but when the army came up to Gungubele, he did fight. The abaThembu retreated to where the chief was; the white army pursued them; they captured the chief's horses; the white men fired and the chief also fired; I saw him fire; I don't know how many times; we were defeated and pursued; the chief asked who fired the first shot. Gungubele fled too but remained assisting others to get away. He is not fleet of foot, being accustomed to ride; he encouraged the people to get away, and fired a shot now and again; fired at the white army.

Cross-examined by Mr Foster: I was about 90 feet from the prisoner when we were retreating. There were other people between; I was slightly in front of the prisoner on his right hand. I can run with fleetness I did not require to be helped by the prisoner but he encouraged me also. The chief said, "Why do you flee? What has driven you away?" I was close to the chief when he fired two shots out of his double barrel gun. I saw those two and only those. I surrendered the day after the fight.

…

Kube sworn: I was at the fight at Gwatyu. I saw the chief there. He came to the lot of people where I was during the fight. The chief said, "This is what I told you; I said you were not to fight with the white men". Then he said "Go and fight with them. There they are." Chief had a gun in his hand. I and the prisoner were present the day before the battle when it was arranged how to post the men. One wing at Staalklip was not to go to Gwatyu. Noholo's wing was to remain at Mdemwe, next morning the white army came.

Mati sworn: I am a field cornet in the Tambookie location. I was at the fight at the Gwatyu. I fought on the English side. Gungubele was on the opposite side of the mountain. During the night and after the retreat I heard prisoner speak to his men. He called upon them not to run away. I know his voice well and I am quite sure he said this.

Cross-examined by Mr Foster: The prisoner said, "Fight now; this is what you wanted." The prisoner said "You wanted this. Now you have got it, fight." There was a ravine between the prisoner and myself but I heard the words distinctly. Gungubele is a relative of mine; he did not want to fight, but the people turned him."

Hendrich Bamba re-called: I know a councillor the prisoner named Nomiba. He once said to Gungubele, "If you go to Queenstown and don't fight I shall get another chief as you are with the Government."

Rev. A.J. Newton sworn: I was in charge of mission in prisoner's location. I have been resident there eleven years. I have known the prisoner about seventeen years. I have had opportunities of observing his conduct and general demeanour. I have never known him to be disaffected towards the Government. I saw him every week, and

saw nothing to lead me to suppose he was anxious to go to war with the Government. He has been chief about twelve years. I think he is entirely in the hands of councillors. Several of them were councillors to his father. Umtyella was one.

Advocate Brown [for the state]: ... According to the evidence of Bomba, Gungubele had fired on the Queen's forces and reloaded and fired again, and that he had urged his men on and incited them to fight if they believed this evidence they could come to only one conclusion. They know well the power of the chiefs and could ascertain with what reluctance the evidence against the prisoner was given, but this made it all the more trustworthy. He felt the Jury must come to the conclusion that the prisoner was at the Gwatyu during the battle, took part in the fight, urged the men to fight, and was consequently guilty of the crime of High Treason.

Advocate Foster [for Gungubele] said: It is not only to be proved that prisoner was present at the Gwatyu but that he had previously stirred up rebellion amongst his people. Bomba had said when meetings were at Gungubele's he disapproved of it and drove the people away. This was a sure proof that he did not want war. When he asked the witch doctor certain questions, his councillors told him he was not to do so, he was controlled by them. There was no evidence that Gungubele had placed the troops for battle, and during the fight he was away with the body guards. He got mixed up in a fight by force of circumstances and these alone. He was opposed to his councillors in wanting to go to war, but obliged to go with them. When the commando came up and enquired for Gungubele he was not there. The councillors had put him out of the way. They were afraid that if he were there he would listen to the Magistrate and the chances of a battle would be gone. If the Jury considered the case fairly and dispassionately they must return a verdict in favour of the prisoner.

His Lordship explained to the jury what constituted the crime with which the prisoner was charged, alluded to the chances he had to escape from the thraldom of evil councillors, summarised the evidence, and told the jury if they believed the evidence they must bring the prisoner in guilty.

The jury then retired and after half an hour, they came into the court when the foreman (Mr Cotterel) told His Lordship they were unanimous as to their verdict, but that three jurymen wished to recommend prisoner to mercy, but that the others objected.

His Lordship then put on his black cap, and addressing the prisoner said: You have been found guilty of the crime of High Treason, and the jury have found you guilty not only of being armed against your Queen, but of having fired upon the Queen's troops which constitutes the crime. I believe you were long wavering whether you would fight or not, but it is clear you made arrangements, jointly with your councillors, for placing your army in position on the day of the battle, no doubt to look on, and rejoice in the fight, and to be able afterwards to say you took no part in it. But when your army retreated, whether carried away by excitement or any other cause, you joined in the fight, and acted as general in Command. You are the one that has caused all the misfortune that has recently befallen the country. You are responsible for all the deaths of your people during the war.

APPENDIX 5

Gwatyu Farm boundaries showing forms of occupation in 2000



Figure A1: Gwatyu Farm boundaries showing forms of occupation in 2000.

Source: Rosalie Kingwill and Monty Roodt, Social Land Audit of the Gwatyu block of farms, Cofimvaba district, Eastern Cape. Report to the Department of Land Affairs, Eastern Cape (March 2000) Unpublished.

APPENDIX 6

Genealogy of the House of Tshatshu



Figure A2: Genealogy of the amaTshatshu/*Umnombo wendlu enkulu kaTshatshu*.

APPENDIX 7
Genealogy of the abaThembu



Figure A3: Genealogical chart of the abaThembu.

Source: John Henderson Soga, *The Southeastern Bantu: Abe-Nguni, Aba-Mbo, Ama-Lala* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1930)

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