Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa

CONCEPTS, ROLE-PLAYERS, POLICY AND PRACTICE

Edited by **THEO NEETHLING & HEIDI HUDSON**

Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa

Concepts, role-players, policy and practice

Edited by

Theo Neethling and Heidi Hudson

UCT PRESS

Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa:
Concepts, role-players, policy and practice

First published 2013
Print published 2013

Each chapter in this book has been independently peer-reviewed by academics who are experts in the field.

Contents

PART I   CONCEPTUAL ROOTS

PART II   ROLE-PLAYERS IN CONTEXT

PART III   POLICY AND PRACTICE

About the contributors

Deane-Peter Baker is a lecturer in applied ethics at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, where he is the programme coordinator for the applied ethics programme directed at the Cadets and Midshipmen of the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is also a non-residential senior research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg. Prior to moving to Australia in 2012, Dr Baker taught ethics at the United States Naval Academy, and philosophy and ethics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He has served in both the British and South African armies, and completed his military service as a reserve major in the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, SANDF. Dr Baker has published extensively on topics in ethics and philosophy, and is also a respected defence analyst who has addressed issues such as terrorism, maritime security, private military and security companies and military strategy. His most recent book is *Just warriors inc: the ethics of privatized force* (Continuum Press, 2010).

Cedric de Coning heads the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Research Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and he is also a senior advisor on peacekeeping and peacebuilding for ACCORD. He serves as special advisor to the head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union Commission, is a member of the UN Secretary-General's advisory group for the Peacebuilding Fund, and is a member of the Expert Reference Group of the Global Thematic Consultation on Conflict, Violence and Disaster of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. He is also an international advisor for the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM). He serves on the research board of CMC Finland and on the editorial boards of the journals *Global Governance* and *Peacebuilding*. Dr De Coning has a PhD in applied ethics from the Department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, and a Master's degree (*cum laude*) in conflict management and peace studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He started his career as a South African diplomat in Washington, D.C., and Addis Ababa, and he has been with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Algeria, Ethiopia and Sudan, and with the UN in East Timor and in New York. His research interests include the role of emerging powers in a changing world order, the peace–security–development nexus and several aspects of peace operations and peacebuilding, such as civilian capacity, civil–military coordination, protection of civilians and monitoring and evaluation. He works with complexity theory, and in particular its implications for international conflict management interventions and peacebuilding.

Lindy Heinecken was formerly a researcher and deputy director of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy. She now serves as professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University, where she lectures in political and industrial sociology. The main focus of her research is in the domain of armed forces and society, and she has published on a range of issues, including gender integration, civil–military relations, military unionism, the military profession, HIV/AIDS and security and, more recently, on the experiences of military personnel on peace operations. She holds an MSocSc from the University of Cape Town and a PhD from King's College, Department of War Studies, University of London. She serves on numerous academic boards, including the Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (USA) and the International Sociological Association's (ISA) Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution working group. She is also one of the pool of specialists conducting research for the South African Army.

Heidi Hudson is professor of international relations and director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State. Her current research interests concentrate on discursive and material gender deficits of liberal peacebuilding in the postcolony. Over the years she has contributed several chapters in books and has published numerous articles in, among others, *International Peacekeeping, Security Dialogue, Security Studies, Politikon, Strategic Review for Southern Africa* and *African Security Review.* She is co-editor of *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, an interdisciplinary international journal that operates at the intersection of politics, international relations and women's studies. Prof Hudson has held several fellowships, such as at the Nordic Africa Institute and the University of Calgary, Canada, and serves on the editorial board of, among others, *International Peacekeeping* and *Africa Insight.*

Greg Mills is director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. A special advisor to a number of African and other governments, he is widely published on international affairs, development and security, a columnist for South Africa's *Sunday Times*, and the author of the best-selling books *Why Africa is poor – and what Africans can do about it* (2010) and, with Jeffrey Herbst, *Africa's third liberation* (2012). In 2008, he was deployed as strategy advisor to the president of Rwanda. Since 2007, he has directed the secretariat to the Presidential International Advisory Board in Mozambique, and, since 2012, the Presidential Advisory Committee on the Economy of Malawi. In 2006, he was on assignment in Kabul as head of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Prism strategic analysis group, and was seconded to ISAF in Kandahar, also with Prism, in 2010, and to HQ ISAF again in Kabul in 2012. Based on his peacebuilding experiences, in 2011 he jointly edited, with General Sir David Richards, *Victory among people: lessons from countering insurgencies and*

stabilising fragile states (Royal United Services Institute, 2011). His latest book on international affairs, co-authored with John Peter Pham and David Kilcullen, is *Somalia – fixing Africa's most failed state* (2013).

Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Mokoena is a lecturer in the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, at the South African Military Academy in Saldanha. He is the chair of the Department of Political Science (Mil.) and his research interests include military history, strategy, conflict studies, international relations, international political economy, risk analysis and intelligence matters. He has published *The political economy of Burundi: a history of conflict and peace* (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010), and co-authored a special edition of the journal *Scientia Militaria* on conflict resolution in Africa, entitled 'Pursuing human security in Africa through developmental peace missions: ambitious construct or feasible ideal?' (2009).

Tim Murithi is head of programme at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and a research fellow at the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State. He worked previously in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, at the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), in Geneva, and as an adviser to the African Union. He has authored numerous publications, and is the author of *The African Union: pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development* (Ashgate, 2005) and *The ethics of peacebuilding* (Edinburgh University Press, 2009), and is co-editor of *The African Union Peace and Security Council: a five-year appraisal* (ISS, 2012).

Theo Neethling is professor and head of the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. He served as chair of the Department of Political Science (Mil.) in the Faculty of Military Science of Stellenbosch University from 2003 to early 2009, when he moved to the University of the Free State. He is the author (and co-author in some instances) of more than 90 articles in scientific and popular scientific publications, including 35 articles (as sole author) in accredited academic journals, and has contributed to 13 scholarly book publications. These publications appeared in South Africa, Australia, Germany, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, the Russian Federation, Canada, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the United States, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. He has also lectured in a visiting capacity at foreign institutions, most recently at the Osaka University's School for International Public Policy. He is currently serving on the editorial board of three academic journals, namely, *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, the *Journal of Contemporary History* and *Military and Strategic Affairs*. He also serves on the Advisory Council of the European Centre for Information Policy and Security. Prof Neethling is rated as a C2 category researcher by the National

Research Foundation and his research interests mainly concern security studies in the African context.

Colonel Laetitia Olivier is a project officer at the Directorate Army Strategic Direction where she is a member of the Future SA Army Strategy (FSAAS) team. She is, in collaboration with the other members of the FSAAS team, responsible for the drafting of the Long Term and Extended Long Term Strategy of the SA Army. As part of this task, she is responsible for the establishment and development of the concept development, experimentation and simulation capability of the SA Army. Col Olivier served as a member of the Directing Staff of the South African National War College, where she lectured on Operational Art and Joint Warfare. She is a graduate of the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University (SA Military Academy) and holds an MMIL in security and Africa studies with a thesis titled 'Pursuing human security through developmental peace missions: ambitious construct or feasible ideal?'

Maxi Schoeman holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Wales (Aberystwyth) and is professor and head of the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria. Her research and publications focus on African security, gender issues in peace missions and South African foreign policy. She was a lead researcher on the EU Framework 7 MERCURY research project on multilateralism and the EU's external relations, and has been involved in a project on gender mainstreaming and gender training for peace missions for the past four years. Her most recent publication, with Chris Alden, is 'South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a changing global order' in *International Affairs*, 89(1), January 2013. She is currently managing a project on global economic governance in association with the Human Rights Centre at the University of Pretoria and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Annette Seegers is professor and head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. She was also a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington, DC, in 1990–1991 and has been a visiting professor at Princeton University since 1999. Professor Seegers has numerous publications to her credit, the best known being *The military and the making of modern South Africa* (IB Tauris, 1996). Forthcoming is *The role of armed forces in democratic transition: military–civil relations in post-authoritarian South Africa and Latin America* (IB Tauris, 2012/3).

Foreword

The South African Army Directorate Army Strategic Direction (DASD) is, *inter alia*, responsible for formulating strategies and conducting research on all issues that are relevant to the formulation of SA Army strategies and for the management and implementation of these strategies. As part of its research responsibilities, DASD opted to conduct research on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) as this has emerged as a crucial element of successful peace missions. The implications and development of concepts such as PCRD and other concepts related to the field of peacebuilding are not only relevant to the SA Army, but have also been included in the UN's stated aims regarding peacekeeping missions and mandates, which now include a far broader range of peacebuilding tasks compared to traditional peacekeeping missions as practised in the past. PCRD has also been prioritised in the African peace and security agenda since the adoption of the African Union (AU) PCRD policy framework in 2006. Subsequently, PCRD has become one of the primary tools in the fight to curb the severity and frequency of conflict in Africa, as well as to promote sustained development on the continent.

PCRD, although not a new concept, has recently attracted much academic research. It has proven to be an extremely complex, contested and value-laden field of study, which, in most cases, asks more questions than it answers. What is evident is that the operationalisation of PCRD in Africa requires holistic rethinking of all the concepts and strategies currently being developed. Military organisations should be reorganised, prepared and equipped to contribute to PCRD by providing basic services and laying the foundations for sustainable development. This, in turn, demands a reassessment of the strategies, force design, force structure and capabilities/resources of 21st-century African military organisations.

The publication of this book by the SA Army coincides with the development of the Draft Defence Review 2012 (with the title 'Defence, Security and Development'), which is intended to replace the Defence Review 1998—then titled 'Defence in a Democracy'. This shift in focus towards *development* not only corresponds with international trends towards aligning *security* with *development*, sometimes referred to as the 'security–development nexus', but it also supports other South African foreign and security policy imperatives to integrate development projects and peace missions. The objective of the book is therefore to develop new insights into the capability requirements for military organisations to effectively participate in PCRD and to clarify the roles and functions of the SA Army in this field. With this in mind, the contributing authors aim to offer a holistic appreciation of the processes, functioning and operational and policy implications of PCRD in Africa.

The aim of the book is not to offer a comprehensive view of security and PCRD—it is not a 'how to' manual and does not offer policy prescriptions or strategies. It is intended to expose the reader to the insights of academics and practitioners on the role of the military and the interfaces and cooperation requirements among militaries, nongovernmental organisations, international actors and local stakeholders in PCRD. This publication aims to highlight the complexity and multidimensional nature of PCRD, while underpinning the salient challenges facing a military organisation after peace missions. Among the topics covered are:

- the conceptual, ethical and normative roots of PCRD
- the roles and responsibilities of various international and local actors in PCRD
- the conceptual debates and practical experience gained during PCRD activities
- the implications for policy, especially for the South African National Defence Force and the SA Army.

I would like to thank all the academics and researchers who generously participated in this study for their knowledge of, and insight into, the theme, and for the positive spirit of their unique contributions. A special word of thanks must go to Professor Theo Neethling and Professor Heidi Hudson for their support in planning and overseeing the writing and production of the book. I would also like to thank UCT Press and all the peer reviewers for their inputs, which have added considerable scholarly value to the quality of this publication.

V.R. Masondo
Chief of the South African Army: Lieutenant General

List of acronyms

AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission in the Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CIMIC	civil–military coordination
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DOD	Department of Defence
DPM	developmental peace mission
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo)
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organisation
OAU	Organization of African Unity

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUB	UN Peace Operation in Burundi
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PCRD	post-conflict reconstruction and development
PSO	peace support operation
RECs	regional economic communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

INTRODUCTION

A Changing Global Strategic Environment – What is new?

Heidi Hudson

Why *post*-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa? Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) as a concept and policy tool has been a priority area of the African peace and security agenda since the adoption of the African Union (AU) PCRD policy framework in 2006 (AU, 2006). For the AU, PCRD has become one of the tools designed to curb the severity and repeated nature of conflicts in Africa as well as to promote sustained development. But this is exactly the problem; sustainable development has proven to be rather elusive in the messy context of African post-conflict intervention. The four broad pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, namely, the (re)building of legitimate security, justice and public or state institutions, as well as the establishment of social and economic wellbeing through provision of basic services and sustainable development are daunting and time-consuming tasks.

Given the magnitude of the task at hand, it is necessary to rethink holistically the conceptual roots, historical origins and policy implications, as well as role-player dynamics within Africa, by interrogating the 'post' in post-conflict reconstruction. Although PCRD is not a new topic, there are not many 'home grown', i.e. African, contributions in this field (e.g. Kotze & Solomon, 2008, and Murithi, 2005, compared with influential texts from the global North, such as Collier, et al., 2003, Muggah, 2008 and Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). What makes this collection different is first and foremost its specific integrated conceptual-empirical contribution to an increased awareness of the dilemmas of PCRD in Africa. The empirical and theoretical contributions of the edited volume converge around a deeper understanding of the continuities of structural violence from war to post-conflict and the dominance of politics, power and interest in the process after conflict. Secondly, against the backdrop of armed forces being hamstrung by constitutional mandates that are not keeping up with contemporary threat assessments and changes in the global strategic environment, this book adds to the literature on the 'guns versus butter' and the civil–military debates on roles and missions of armed forces.

Amid a range of scholarly works on South Africa's role in international relations (Landsberg & Van Wyk, 2012), and in relation to the AU's PCRD programme (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008), this volume addresses a gap in the literature on the role of the military as it engages with other actors in the area of PCRD in Africa.

Three interrelated trends of this changing environment are worth mentioning. Firstly, concerns about the potential of so-called failed African states to be used as breeding grounds for terrorists, the so-called safe haven thesis, still dominate international attention. With this comes the assumption that the international development community has a duty to assist post-conflict countries to move from dependence on humanitarian relief to reconstruction and then to sustainable development. Development as a means to foster security has therefore become part of mainstream thinking, but critics such as Duffield (2001) and Fierke (2007) have exposed the one-sided manner in which the (in)security of the global North has become linked to the (under)development of the global South, without considering historical context and global political economy factors as contributing to conflict in the developing world. Secondly, this approach has implications for how frameworks for human security are implemented. Reports highlight the fact that the number of deaths and the numbers of inter-state and civil wars have declined in the last decade or so, and that the numbers of durable negotiated settlements have increased (Human Security Brief, 2006, cited in Richmond, 2009:557). Yet the level of human insecurity in many parts of the world has not changed much. Lastly, while more than half of the over two-thirds of African countries that have experienced conflict over the last 25 years are currently in the *post*-conflict phase, the post-conflict period is riddled with the massive effects of violent conflict, and the peace that it generates hinges on a knife edge, to say the least. Almost half of all peace agreements fail within the first five years of implementation (International Alert, 2009). The so-called new wars described by Mary Kaldor (2006) also imply that a peculiar kind of intrastate (or 'spoiler') violence during the war too easily spills over into the post-conflict period (*see* Seegers and Mills in this volume). As long as irregular forces continue to operate (stay armed), the risk of return conflicts remains high. Both Theo Neethling's and Annette Seegers' topical analyses of the fragile Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) peace, amid the presence of many factions and rebel groups, are instructive in this regard. One can safely assume that a combination of the factors and trends outlined above has prompted the UN to move away from ambitious peacebuilding projects to a more scaled down PCRD agenda, or, as Richmond (2012:655) argues, from conflict resolution to the mitigation of conflict.

This does not, however, mean a smaller role for the military. Instead, it implies that the armed forces are now increasingly expected to fulfil roles for which they are not trained. The disjuncture between mission/mandate and capabilities has thus increased exponentially.

Background to the origin and timing of the book

This edited volume has been published as part of the SA Army Directorate Army Strategic Direction 2012/2013 Business Plan. As an SA Army-commissioned project, the writing of the book coincided with an important public consultative process, namely the development and tabling of the (updated) South African Draft Defence Review 2012 (DOD, 2012). The latter is planned to replace the Defence Review 1998, which was published under the theme of 'Defence in a Democracy', with a new defence review to be published under the theme, 'Defence, Security, Development'. This shift in focus to include development not only corresponds with international trends towards aligning security and development as well as the AU's established notion of PCRD, but also dovetails closely with national (South African) foreign and security policy imperatives to integrate development projects and peace missions.

The project was born out of the conceptual and policy-driven tensions arising from competing perspectives regarding the role of the military in the contemporary era. Puritans would argue that the military should not be involved in PCRD; it should rather be driven by civilian institutions, such as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the like. However, since it is often too dangerous for civilians to function in these so-called post-conflict areas, they need the military not only for protection of civilian development practitioners, but also to play a more interventionist reconstructive role. This is underscored by the South African government's desire—from a foreign policy perspective—to participate in PCRD in Africa by means of armed forces that are seen as 'forces of peace', with their military role provided as a last resort (DOD, 2012). South Africa's active involvement in recent missions in Sudan, Burundi and the DRC testifies to this sentiment and such involvement is not likely to dissipate in the foreseeable future. Similarly, the UN and AU expect South Africa to include a systematic PCRD plan in its defence planning and capabilities, as they view South Africa as an enabler. The political pressure to 'behave like good international citizens' (*see* Schoeman in this volume), coupled with practical reasons, therefore makes a strong case for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to develop and sustain a PCRD capability.

Although the imperative to sustain such a capability has its roots in the South African Constitution as well as several policy papers, and is fuelled by continental and international pressures, developing a PCRD capability is fraught with ambiguity. The South African White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions, on the basis of the Defence Review 1998, proclaimed that participation in international peace missions would be a secondary function of the SANDF (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:3). However, this policy position was soon overtaken by political dynamics and events in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan. In contrast, the Draft Defence Review 2012 is more emphatic in its acceptance that the military will pursue

reconstruction and conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives. Practically, this amounts to the provision of critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during the immediate post-conflict phase—operations that will enable and reinforce the process of development and reconstruction. At the same time, the authors of the Draft Defence Review 2012 make it clear that a military approach to peace missions cannot ignore the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peacebuilding as this will effectively impede lasting stability and human security. In this regard, a multidimensional developmental agenda will be pursued by involving the cooperation of military and civilian bodies to accelerate capacity building and socio-economic development (DOD, 2012:154). These assumptions and recommendations thus suggest that the SANDF would need to be appropriately equipped and trained for multiple external and internal roles.

The SA Army, in particular, is thus faced with the question as to what kind of capability ('resources made operational', according to Schoeman in this volume) it can muster. It is structured or built for combat and for defending South Africa's territorial integrity, yet the White Paper of 1999 and the Draft Defence Review 2012 emphasise a role in international peace missions as well. In addition, small-scale, short-term contingencies, cooperation with the police, assisting other state departments and providing help during natural emergencies are also on the list of secondary roles—all of these more easily said than done. Maxi Schoeman reminds us in Chapter 10 that previously termed 'secondary functions' of peace mission involvement have now become priorities. The key question is whether the army—in its current medium- and long-term planning—should prepare for an omni-roled or multi-roled future. The reality at present is that soldiers can be put on quick mission training, but their baseline training is still combat oriented, based on the principles of conventional warfare. In this regard, Cedric de Coning recommends that the SA Army develop a CIMIC (civil–military coordination) capacity, and that it add a CIMIC staff capability to each unit deployed to UN and AU peace operations at the battalion staff level.

Acknowledgement of secondary roles for the military is therefore not enough to address the fact that 'guns and butter' coexist rather uncomfortably in the Draft Defence Review 2012 document (*see* Adebajo, 2012:35). The current defence review should therefore clarify in much more detail the connections and tensions between the international principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), South Africa's role in peace missions and the role of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), the country's development agency. Two fundamental tensions emerge. Firstly, there is tension between seeing the military's role as contributing to national development through mainly creating the security conditions for development to take place, and a more interventionist

developmental mandate (De Wet, 2012:12). Secondly, there is an urgent need for a thorough threat assessment, which takes into consideration the changing global strategic environment and Africa's place within this context, as well as a critical and serious engagement with human security questions. In this respect, the silence of the Draft Defence Review 2012 consultative document on the question of gender is disturbing, especially given the fact that gender is a central concern in contemporary international security discourse, and a key variable in many African conflicts, especially in the aftermath where gender-based violence has continued unchecked. In Chapter 10, Maxi Schoeman adds that the current review also falls short in terms of progressive and innovative thinking regarding secondary roles for the military. Deterrence and defence remain firmly entrenched in the strategic doctrine.

In sum, then, the idea for the book was conceptualised from the immediate need to clarify for the SA Army the future trajectory in relation to military roles and mission. Should the SA Army continue along current lines, or restructure its approach fundamentally (for a specific section of the army)? These decisions are important, not only for South Africa, but also for its role in a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Brigade and, following from there, eventually, the African Standby Force. Definitive answers to these questions are not simple and fall outside the purview of this edited volume. Suffice to say that budgetary constraints, structural problems (e.g. questions of discipline and training) and questions about commitment and political will are tough issues that will take a long time to fix (*see* Mills in this volume). For South Africa, 'Africa' is a very tricky political terrain to navigate, and the kind of policy and practical answers sought lies somewhere between external expectations of South Africa's ideal role and what is realistic. And herein as well lies the broader scholarly value of the book, namely, to capture and articulate the complexities of PCRD in a post-conflict context at a variety of conceptual and practical levels.

Core assumptions and claims

While the various contributions address the issue of military and civil society roles within African PCRD from different (and at times competing) sets of angles (some more critical and others more accepting of mainstream discourses), they concur in their calls for a more nuanced understanding of PCRD. With this project we do not wish to promote a consensus position on PCRD in Africa. In fact, we are quite comfortable with offering a diversity of scholarly perspectives on the topic, ranging from those who question the idea of liberal peacebuilding (Seegers and Hudson) to those who accept liberal peacebuilding but who want to reform it from within (De Coning, Baker, Murithi and Heinecken). The fact that the individual chapters rely largely on the review of literature (drawing on a fair amount of regional, South African and international

policy documents) was purely coincidental; no specific methodological approach was prescribed. Yet, while this is the case, many authors have extensive field experience as either military practitioners or policy analysts. While no one explicitly drew from fieldwork data in the traditional sense, their scholarly insights are undoubtedly infused with and enriched by their professional experience and familiarity with specific contexts.

The diversity of experiences and perspectives notwithstanding, the collection of chapters in this book coheres around a number of key assumptions underpinning the project. These include three premises, which are described below.

Firstly, since the purpose of the book is to problematise—and not provide recipes for the military—we acknowledge that both (South) African and international experience must be viewed through a critical-analytical lens. The contributors agree—for different reasons—that PCRD is a contested (value-laden) concept. The PCRD concept is taken as useful yet imbued with contradictions and semantic ambiguities (*see* Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009:123) which should be dealt with in a critical and nuanced manner. To illustrate the near impossibility of precise definition, we do not have to look far. The term 'PCRD', when unpacked, reveals a problematic assumption that the conflict is over. Theo Neethling's analysis of the UN role in the DRC is a strong reminder of the fallacy of this notion, which is also quite aptly depicted in Chris Dolan's study, *War is not yet over* (2010). Not only is the 'post' in post-conflict problematic (*see also* Olivier and Hudson, this volume), but the connection between conflict, reconstruction and development is also disputed (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009; Hudson in this volume), particularly the way in which dominant powers justify undemocratic practices—as in Rwanda—in the name of development, thereby possibly increasing the risk of return conflict. A clear line of division of roles for the military is also not easy, because, at a tactical level, the army has a role to play in short-term reconstruction, with the understanding that they will exit and long-term reconstruction will become the task of civilians and development specialists. Ironically, however, under these circumstances it is more a case of construction than reconstruction and—as Cedric De Coning shows in Chapter 1—the military is needed to protect civilians who are busy with reconstruction. Furthermore, is an increased role for the military—such as in infrastructure reconstruction—a condition for long-term peace? While we must accept the obvious benefits of military engagement in conflict situations, as soldiers are trained to fight wars. An enlarged role for the military in civilian tasks may obfuscate military–civilian relations in a destabilising way. An increased military role in development does not necessarily imply a more peaceful situation.

Secondly, the way in which PCRD is conceptualised impacts not only on the nature of military operations, but also on the quality of civilian oversight

and leadership. Civilian control of the military, as a fundamental principle of the South African democracy, underpins analyses of military roles in a post-conflict context, but does not provide 'quick fixes'. The blurring of military and civilian roles in the aftermath of complex emergencies raises all sorts of moral and ethical dilemmas that decision-makers need to take note of (*see* Chapter 4). For instance, when the military enters, the first priority after stabilisation is to find the most appropriate point to exit, but what are the moral and ethical implications of such a decision in the face of persistently high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in the aftermath of the conflict?

Thirdly, the contributors to this book work with the premise that an Afrocentric normative framework broadly guides this intellectual project—but not exclusively, as we do not seek to replace one set of hegemonic ideas (Western or Eurocentric thought) with another. This is aptly illustrated by Deane-Peter Baker, in Chapter 4, where he searches for an integrated ethical framework for PCRD that captures both Eurocentric and Afrocentric thought systems and values. Therefore we cannot also treat Africa as a monolithic entity and devise blanket PCRD solutions. We want to be sensitive to the fact that it is problematic to apply sweeping assumptions to theoretical analysis and actual policy and programming in highly diverse contexts. That said, the fact that the book was commissioned by the SA Army makes it hard to avoid a South African lens. However, that in itself is not bad, if juxtaposed with other vantage points. For this reason, the contributions were selected in such a way as to reflect a combination of South African (Olivier, Schoeman), more pan-African (Murithi) and internationally focused/centric contributions (Hudson, Seegers). Contributions such as those by Deane-Peter Baker (Chapter 4) and Theo Neethling (chapters 8 and 12), as well as Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling and Benjamin Mokoena (Chapter 9) straddle the international–African divide, while Lindy Heinecken (Chapter 7) and Cedric De Coning (Chapter 1) also pay attention to local/civilian dimensions, and Greg Mills (Chapter 11) draws from the South African and United Kingdom experiences. A critical treatment of South African policies, concepts and practices (*see* Schoeman and Mills) thus underscores the approach of this project, namely, that there is no such thing as a singular South African 'solution' or approach to African problems.

Although most authors are sceptical about the prospects for PCRD under conditions of fragile peace, the reasons for this fairly common conclusion vary. The book aims not to treat Africa as a 'bunch of troubling and conflict-ridden sites', but rather offers constructive critique. For example, in Chapter 9, Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling and Benjamin Mokoena highlight the question of military effectiveness in Sierra Leone. They carefully outline the lessons to be learned as to how to effect a meaningful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding/PCRD. In Chapter 7, Lindy Heinecken provides concrete suggestions on how more systematic attention to local women's initiatives can

facilitate broader development and peace. Tim Murithi (Chapter 6) also offers 'symbiotic cooperation' as a potential means to overcome institutional obstacles. The kind of analysis at which we aim therefore rests on principles of constructive critique and the recognition of a diversity of perspectives and methods. These three premises guide us to pose the following key questions:

- Which are the potential and actual contributions that PCRD can make to sustainable development in African post-conflict contexts?
- To what extent, if any, did the general conceptual development around PCRD as well as international and local (African) experiences of operationalising the concept help to clarify the value of the concept?
- What have been the major theoretical and practical/policy challenges? How can they be explained and overcome?
- What role did/do key (international and local) stakeholders play in promoting or hindering the conceptual and practical development of the concept in Africa?

Purpose of the book and key themes

Actors, interactions and contestations

Our primary aim with this collection is to offer a holistic appreciation of the process, functioning and operational and policy implications of PCRD in Africa. This includes an examination of the challenges of PCRD, and in particular those arising from the complex relationships between international donors, international governmental organisations, NGOs and local actors, involved in the execution of PCRD on the continent. In this respect, various contributions articulate the difficulties experienced when there is a proliferation of external actors, each with its own motives (Murithi in Chapter 6); when an external actor is not welcomed by the host country (the UN mission in the DRC as outlined by Neethling in Chapter 8) as opposed to when internal and external stakeholders cooperate for the greater good (Olivier, Neethling and Mokoena in Chapter 9); and the harm that is done when international and African/national commitments to gender equality and representation of women as peacekeepers and at the peace table fail to empower women outside the public domain (Heinecken in Chapter 7). Lindy Heinecken argues persuasively that this global–local tension perpetuates essentialist understandings of female peacekeepers' 'inherent value' as being more peaceful. This also implies that the tension is not only between internationals and locals, but more importantly between masculinist military men and civilians. Her call for asset-driven community development could counter the trend towards 'peacebuilding from below produced from above' (Pugh, 2011:397). Most of the contributions mentioned here demonstrate a significant empirical commitment, where the AU and UN as main protagonists meet in real cases, such as in the DRC,

Sierra Leone and Burundi, and context-specific dynamics produce different outcomes. Significantly, Heinecken also makes a case for more supporting evidence to determine the nature of the impact of female peacekeepers on mission success and community relations. More systematic analyses of case studies will go a long way towards dispelling some of the myths associated with women's roles as victims or agents in the military. And more generally, as editors we would have preferred a broader spread of case studies, such as on the Sudan and Somalia. However, practical considerations did not allow for the inclusion of more chapters of this nature.

Foundations matter and norms have consequences

Another priority (as also clearly seen from the fact that we devote five chapters to this) is to return to the roots of the conceptual debate about PCRD and then ask critical 'why' questions about the implementation gap between policy/political imperatives and strategic/doctrinal as well as operational constraints (means and ends debate). The process of 'rethinking' always leaves one open to the charge of having forgotten some old lessons and of viewing phenomena in an ahistorical and depoliticised manner. The aim is therefore to be attentive to continuing problems in the analysis of PCRD: (1) PCRD is viewed as an evolving practice through three historical eras (Seegers); (2) its political dilemmas are analysed using a critical theory approach in order to expose the implications of mainstream normative assumptions and connections (Hudson); (3) its ethical roots are uncovered by drawing together the normative assumptions of international and indigenous theories (Baker); (4) local conceptual frameworks are examined in order to address the reconstruction gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Olivier); and lastly (5) the roles and responsibilities of actors and stakeholders in the political, military and civilian dimensions of PCRD are guided by the understanding that conflict transformation is inherently political (De Coning).

Dynamics of the policy–practice nexus

A crucial thread uniting all the chapters is also the fact that the authors are deeply aware of the 'root causes' deficit and the ever-present threat of resumption of conflict, exacerbated by a combination of local, regional and international factors. And despite the strong emphasis on conceptual analysis, it does not mean that this volume adopts a 'theory for the sake of theory' approach. Rather, it is a scholarly contribution which seeks to remain policy-relevant. Ultimately, this volume on PCRD foundations, actors and dynamics is intended to have some strategic utility for the SA Army strategic planning process. While there is general international acceptance of the changing nature of strategic threat assessment in a global environment, which obviously forms the backdrop against which the former Minister of Defence and Military

Veterans, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu, outlined the remit of the Defence Review, a secondary aim of this volume would be to offer a critical perspective on how much has really changed and how much has stayed the same (i.e. continuities and discontinuities). Tensions in the policy–practice interface become evident in the contributions by Maxi Schoeman and Greg Mills. In Chapter 10, Maxi Schoeman systematically explores how South Africa's approach to military engagement as a vehicle for the achievement of foreign policy objectives has changed over time. She contends that the SANDF must ensure that its capabilities are appropriate for the context. Along similar lines, Greg Mills (Chapter 11) draws our attention to a fundamental question facing the SANDF and its political masters, namely, how to match armed forces and equipment to the strategic environment; how to find a balance between technology-rich, and finance- and people-poor policies. This chapter therefore enables us to anticipate the likely conditions that African militaries and the SANDF will face in the future and the capabilities that will therefore be needed. At the policy level, Schoeman's chapter also raises salient questions regarding the role of the military as a foreign-policy instrument when she questions whether South Africa is translating its PCRD know-how into dividends at the international level.

From these three core thematic areas and goals of the book project, it becomes clear that the majority of authors concur that integrated approaches and synergistic coordination among actors (be that between the UN and the AU; AU/UN and host states; the SANDF and SADPA; among government agencies; or between the military and NGOs) represent the key to effective PCRD. Indeed, as Schoeman states, '[t]he ability to exercise efficient coordination is in itself an indication of the strength of capabilities for the implementation of policy'. We do, however, caution that more efficient collaboration, more resources and better training do not necessarily address the contradictions underpinning inappropriate externally imposed models. A policy which ignores history and power relations is doomed to fail.

Essentially the book does not offer a party-political view of security and PCRD, it is not a 'how to' manual and it does not offer policy prescriptions. Rather, it raises questions for reflection by scholars, decision-makers and practitioners on the role of the military, international actors and local stakeholders in reconstruction and development. While frequent mention is made of specific processes of PCRD, such as security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) (e.g. Neethling; Olivier, Neethling & Mokoena) we do not cover such processes in detail, nor do we deal with the complex phenomenon of transitional justice. In this volume, these processes mostly serve to reinforce the complexity and multidimensional nature of PCRD activities. Although security (and human security in particular) cannot be separated from this multifaceted reconstruction project (*see* Hudson

and Heinecken's chapters), the main focus will be on the challenges facing the military after violent conflict.

Structure of the book

Since the conclusions and key arguments of each chapter are summarised in detail in the final chapter, I will present only a brief outline of the structure of the book here.

The volume is divided into three parts. Part I explores the conceptual, ethical and normative roots of PCRD. The contention here is that understanding the origins of the concept will facilitate greater insight into its current usage as concept and practice. Cedric de Coning (Chapter 1) not only addresses key conceptual aspects of PCRD, but also begins to frame these issues in policy terms. He clarifies the conceptually separate yet practically intertwined nature of the political, civilian and military dimensions of PCRD and stresses the importance of these role distinctions for SA Army doctrine, training and preparation for PCRD missions. The fluid character of PCRD, and the fact that it defies definition, raises a number of overlooked problems: firstly, what appears to be benign and well intentioned on the surface may mask underlying power imbalances in the name of 'solving problems'. Liberal peacebuilding discourses and practices are deeply political. Heidi Hudson therefore reminds us in Chapter 2 to treat specific approaches to local ownership and statebuilding, as well as common-sense connections between security and development, with some scepticism. Secondly, the fact that PCRD is an evolving international practice stretching across the Cold War and the idealistic peacebuilding era, and currently reflects a much less ambitious agenda, is the result (as argued by Annette Seegers in Chapter 3) of an ever-changing relationship between means, ends and actors with shifting interests. Thirdly, the normative and ethical decisions about the 'who', 'when' and 'what' of PCRD are often not made explicit in a systematic manner. For this purpose, in Chapter 4, Deane-Peter Baker explores a preliminary synthesis between theories of post-war justice, humanitarian intervention, development ethics and African ethics. Fundamentally ethical deliberations are concerned with the fact that 'one of the most important roots of violence is a sense of having been *humiliated*' (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009:128; emphasis in the original). The remaining contribution in this section, Laetitia Olivier's discussion of the South African concept of 'developmental peace missions' in Chapter 5, similarly testifies to a concept in transition, as the notion of 'closing the reconstruction gap' has become subsumed under the term 'PCRD'.

In Part II, the roles and responsibilities of various international and local actors are put into context. Case studies of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and its successor mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in conjunction

with the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB), as well as the critical issues facing women as peacekeepers and peacebuilders in Africa, illustrate the pitfalls and successes of these interactions. Tensions in the peacekeeping–peacebuilding interface are explored and different cases reveal different approaches to PCRD, with differential outcomes of how to bring security closer to development. Ultimately, the glue that keeps this section of the book together relates to issues of integration and coordination. In Chapter 6, Tim Murithi draws on the example of AU and UN cooperation in Burundi and proposes the notion of 'symbiotic coordination' as a guiding principle for AU PCRD initiatives and AU interactions with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In Chapter 7, Lindy Heinecken's analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security exposes the limitations of liberal international commitments when national or local buy-in is lacking. Greater synergy between the local empowerment of women peacebuilders and the increased visibility of women (representation) in peace missions is required. Theo Neethling paints a picture of hostility between key players in the DRC peace process in Chapter 8, while Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling and Benjamin Mokoena illustrate the benefits of coordination between peacekeepers and peacebuilders in Chapter 9.

Part III of the book draws on these conceptual debates and practical experiences, and reflects on the implications for policy, especially for South Africa. The South African military's changing role as a foreign-policy instrument in Africa is guided by a number of policy and strategic documents, but the authors in this section warn that the current Defence Review process is in danger of perpetuating old mistakes. Forward thinking, political will and strong leadership are necessary, not planning for the past—as Maxi Schoeman puts it in Chapter 10. For Greg Mills (Chapter 11), transparent debate over government expectations, strategic realities, availability of resources and human capital are key to unlocking a deeper understanding of the post-conflict environment, especially the role of economic reconstruction.

Finally, then, the many issues highlighted in this collection (from civil–military relations, policy–practice discrepancies and conceptual fuzziness to the broad brush strokes painted of South African foreign policy and involvement in peace missions on the continent) leaves us with a sense that we have work to do—and to paraphrase Alexander Wendt, 'PCRD is what we make of it'.

Bibliography

Adebajo, A. (2012). Defence security begins at home. *Mail & Guardian,* 11–17 May: 35.

AU (African Union) (2006). *Post-conflict reconstruction and development policy framework*. Addis Ababa: African Union.

Collier, P., Elliott, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs (1999). White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions. Approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998. Tabled in Parliament on 24 February 1999. Cape Town.

De Wet, P. (2012). Lack of funds leaves SA vulnerable. *Mail & Guardian,* 4–10 May: 10–12.

DOD (Department of Defence and Military Veterans) (2012). South African Defence Review 2012; defence, security, development: draft document for public engagement: as at 12 April 2012. Pretoria: Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans. Available from www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadfileAction?id=163572. (Accessed 24 August 2012).

Dolan, C. (2010). *'War is not yet over'. Community perceptions of sexual violence and its underpinnings in eastern DRC.* London: International Alert.

Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security.* London: Zed Books.

Fierke, K.M. (2007). *Critical approaches to international security.* Cambridge: Polity.

International Alert (2009). Contributing to a peace economy in northern Uganda: a guide for investors. Available from http://www.amaniforum.org/images/09_updates/Peace%20Economy%20in%20Northern%20Uganda%20-%20IA%20Report.pdf. (Accessed 2 August 2010).

Kaldor, M. (2006). *New and old wars.* 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity.

Kotze, D. & Solomon, H. (eds) (2008). *The state of Africa. Post-conflict reconstruction and development.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Landsberg, C. & Van Wyk, J.-A. (eds) (2012). *South African foreign policy review. Volume 1.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue.

Mac Ginty, R. & Williams, A. (2009). *Conflict and development.* New York: Routledge.

Muggah, R. (ed.) (2008). *Security and post-conflict reconstruction. Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war.* New York: Routledge.

Murithi, T. (2005). *The African Union: pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development.* London: Ashgate.

Nhema, A. & Zeleza, P.T. (eds) (2008). *The resolution of African conflicts. The management of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.* Oxford: James Currey, in association with OSSREA.

Pugh, M. (2011). Conclusion: the political economy of peacebuilding – whose peace? Where next?, in Pugh, M., Cooper, N. & Turner, M. (eds), *Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richmond, O.P. (2009). A post-liberal peace: eirenism and the everyday. *Review of International Studies*, 35:557–580.

Richmond, O.P. (2012). Justice and post-conflict violence. *International Peacekeeping*, 19 (5):655–659.

PART I

CONCEPTUAL ROOTS

CHAPTER 1

Political, Civilian and Military Dimensions of PCRD

Cedric de Coning

Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) are of necessity broad multidisciplinary concepts because they represent a broad-spectrum approach to assisting societies in transition from crisis or conflict to sustainable peace. It is now widely accepted that international support to societies in transition, which is limited to one dimension, e.g. security or development, is less likely to have sustainable outcomes than a system-wide approach which seeks to integrate the political, governance, security, socio-economic, justice and human rights dimensions. The African Union (AU) notion of PCRD represents such a multidimensional and integrated approach. The AU defines PCRD as:

> *a comprehensive set of measures that seek to address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace. PCRD is conceived within the African vision of renewal and sustainable development and while its activities are integrated and many must be pursued simultaneously, they are envisaged in the emergency (short-term), transition (medium-term) and development (long-term) phases. The scope of these activities encompasses six constitutive elements, namely: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socioeconomic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender.*
> (AU, 2006:4)

In this chapter the focus is on the political, civilian and military dimensions of the PCRD framework. The aim is to identify and discuss the key political, civilian and military roles and role-players, as well as some of the core complexities linked to how these role-players relate to one another, that the SA Army needs to take note of in its policies, doctrine, education, training and preparation for PCRD missions.

Not all PCRD missions will require a military component, but those that do will be an AU peace support operation (PSO) which has either a specific PCRD mandate, or whose mandate includes PCRD-related goals and tasks.[1] I will argue that the primary role of the military component of an AU PSO is to provide a safe and secure environment. A secondary role may be to augment

the work of the civilian component of the mission and other civilian actors, undertaken in order to pursue the political and civilian objectives of the peace process. In this latter context, I will stress a number of critically important principles such as 'do no harm', integration and complementarity.

The PCRD concept is based on the understanding that societies in transition from some form of crisis or conflict towards a sustainable peace are going through a fragile period during which the risk of a lapse into violent conflict is high (UN, 2009). PCRD is, at its most basic, about preventing a lapse into violent conflict. This core goal is referred to as 'peace consolidation' (UN, 2009). Preventing a lapse into violent conflict does not only imply an absence of violence, or what is known in the conflict management literature as a negative peace (Galtung, 1985). In order for a society to be resilient enough not to lapse into violent conflict when faced with serious challenges, it needs to be able to manage such tensions peacefully, which implies that it must have social capacities and institutions which enable it to absorb and cope with such challenges in ways that avert a lapse into violent conflict. This is known in the literature as 'positive peace' (Galtung, 1985).

The PCRD framework recognises, however, that societies in transition are likely to have weak institutions, a frail rule-of-law system and a poor human rights record, and are likely to suffer from poverty and underdevelopment (AU, 2006:1). In other words, they are likely to have a low level of social resilience to cope with crisis, and this is precisely why they may have suffered from civil war, violent conflict or crisis in the past. PCRD is thus conceived as a tool to assist these societies with managing internal tensions while they regain the social resilience necessary to manage their internal tensions peacefully (AU, 2006:2).

I will now consider the political, civilian and military dimensions of the PCRD framework separately, before concluding with recommendations for the SA Army's approach to, and preparations for, future AU PCRD missions.

The political dimension of PCRD

Conflict management is inherently political. All conflicts are, at their core, political, and therefore their resolution has to be political (Martin, 2010:9). Conflict can have a range of causes and triggers, and in order to address these root causes and triggers we need to work across a range of dimensions, such as security, socio-economic development, governance and rule of law. When taken together, however, all of these actions collectively and cumulatively build momentum towards an outcome that manifests itself politically. All these dimensions are thus interconnected, and this is why a peace agreement will normally address all, or many of these dimensions.

The political dimension of PCRD plays out at all levels of society. Countries in transition often experience multiple layers of conflict. At the lowest level,

communities may be in conflict with one another over the sharing of scarce resources, such as access to water and land for grazing or agriculture. At another level, ethnic societies may be in conflict with one another around territorial boundaries, or over political control of a given shared territory. At a national level, political parties or organisations may be in competition with each other for political control over the country.

These political tensions are normal, even healthy, provided they are managed peacefully. In some ways, this is exactly at the core of what state formation[2] is about, i.e. the development of a range of institutions which together ensure security, the rule of law and the fair regulation of the economy and the political system, so that these tensions can be managed peacefully, transparently and predictably. In societies which lack the social resilience to manage these political tensions they can become self-destructive processes typically associated with all-or-nothing political outcomes (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Winning such a political struggle has serious implications for the winners and losers, and it is thus not surprising that such unregulated processes can spiral out of control.

PCRD interventions typically follow a mediation intervention which has helped to negotiate a peace agreement, and which has brought formal hostilities between the parties to the conflict to a halt. The primary political task of the PCRD mission is to assist the parties to the conflict with the implementation of the peace agreement. In many cases, the peace agreement that brought a formal end to the violent conflict needs to be further refined or augmented, and this usually requires further rounds of negotiation, often including a broader and more representative group than that which negotiated the initial agreement between the parties. More often, the political dimension of PCRD implies the ongoing effort to manage the political space of a country in transition in such a way that it does not lapse into conflict again. This means that the different political factions, and the society at large, need to have confidence in the fairness, transparency and legitimacy of the political process. PCRD tasks in the political dimension can thus include, among many others, support to a constitution-writing process, support to the management of a country's legislative bodies and support to the electoral process.

The roles that I identify in the political dimension of the PCRD framework are thus foremost those of the parties to the conflict, i.e. those political parties, organisations, movements or armed groups that have come to represent the political aspirations of a portion of the society. These parties to the conflict are the most important, or primary role-players, in any PCRD process, in that they are the ones that have to generate the political will to embark on a peace process (Donais, 2012). The same groups may not be present throughout the whole process, because the nature of the transition often requires these

groups to transform themselves, for instance, from armed groups to political organisations to political parties.

The most important factor to grasp is that it is these local actors who own the problem—and therefore also the solution. Peace cannot be imposed from the outside, nor can these parties be forced into a peacebuilding process against their will. Such manipulation has been attempted many times, and while it may generate some short-term outcomes, it seldom lays the foundation for medium- to long-term solutions. In order to achieve a self-sustainable peace, it has to be homegrown and locally owned.

The institutions that are established to govern the political, social and economic dimensions need to emerge out of the norms, values and culture of the society. They cannot be imposed from the outside, nor can they be modelled on a foreign example. This is the core critique of the liberal peace model, namely, that peace cannot be built from the outside, and nor can the free market and multiparty-democracy, liberal-ideology model be applied to all contexts (Campbell, Chandler & Sabaratnam, 2011). The liberal peace model is a product of the state formation history of the West, and while it may contain some elements which may be universally relevant, it cannot be assumed to apply to every context. The principle of local ownership reminds us that for peace to be self-sustainable, the institutional and normative model a society adopts has to emerge from, and make sense of, its own socio-historic experience. The most important role-players in the PCRD process are thus the local parties to the conflict, because, ultimately, only they have the agency to achieve self-sustainable peace.

A second group of role-players which can be identified are the local stakeholders. These groups are not the main antagonists in the conflict, but they stand to gain or lose depending on who gains the upper hand. Some may also have influence over the parties to the conflict. Very often, key stakeholders such as traditional and religious leaders may have considerable influence over portions of the population. For instance, prominent religious leaders may have significant moral influence over how people interpret certain political developments. Various religious leaders, among whom the best known is probably Archbishop Desmond Tutu, played an important role in facilitating the transition from apartheid to multiparty democracy in South Africa, even though they were not formally part of the political process. This group of role-players represents an important source of resilient capacity in society and can often be used to mediate conflicts among the primary political role-players, or to otherwise exert a calming influence on the political process. I return to this group in more detail in the next section, on the civilian dimension of PCRD.

The international, or external, actors represent another important set of role-players in the PCRD context. They represent the international community's interest in ensuring that the transition is managed without

lapsing into violent conflict.[3] This international interest can be divided, for the sake of categorisation, into two broad groupings. The first is motivated by the interests of the international state system. The international community is governed by a system in which states play a central role. When a society is in conflict, to the extent that it questions the legitimacy of its state structures, then the international system experiences a crisis of confidence in dealing with the representatives of that state. In other words, other states can no longer be certain if the representatives of the state in conflict represent the people of that country, or just one faction within it. It brings into question, for instance, whether bilateral agreements entered into with that state will be honoured, and whether other states can count on the political transactions it concludes with its leaders to stand the test of time. When internal conflicts thus threaten to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the state, other states and their multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) and the AU, are thus motivated to step in and try to assist with managing the conflict so as to limit the damage the conflict may cause to the international system. From this perspective, peacebuilding, including the AU's PCRD, is a tool to maintain the international state system. When there is a disruption in the international state system, PCRD is used to restore that specific state, in the shortest possible time, to its rightful role so that the system can continue to function with minimum disruption. In this context, PCRD is concerned with the status of the state in the international system, or, more particularly in this case, with its membership of the AU. Restoring the state thus does not refer to the specific political arrangement that may have existed prior to the violent conflict, but rather refers to a process which results in a state achieving legitimacy, both internally and externally, and which allows it once more to resume its role in the international and regional system. For instance, in the AU context, countries which experience an unconstitutional change of government are suspended from the AU until such time that they have re-established credible constitutional order. The AU will use its PCRD instrument to try to help a country avoid lapsing into violent conflict and unconstitutional changes of government, or, once that has happened, it will use the PCRD instrument to facilitate the rehabilitation of the country's constitutional order so that it can regain legitimacy and fulfil its role in the international system.

Closely linked to this concern are considerations of national or regional interests. For instance, serious tensions and violent conflict in one country or region can result in the flow of refugees, asylum-seekers or migrant workers into neighbouring countries or regions, and such negative spillover effects are another major motivating factor for states to put pressure on the AU to use PCRD as a tool to help to manage those conflicts. Other such spillover effects can include the trafficking of weapons—as has been the case in the aftermath of the conflict in Libya—the use of mercenaries from neighbouring countries,

the return of migrant workers and increased tensions in neighbouring countries. Such spillover effects increase the pressure on existing resources, and perhaps further exacerbate existing political tensions. In those cases where neighbours are fragile and lack the resilience to deal with such increased tensions, conflict in one country can have a destabilising effect on its neighbours and create a kind of domino effect. For example, the transition in Libya was triggered by spillover effects from developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and its own spillover effects have subsequently contributed to the political instability in Mali and other countries in the region. This explains why several neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, West Africa and in North Africa are linked together in regional conflict systems.

Whereas the first category is primarily concerned with state security, in the form of the maintenance of the international state system, the second category is concerned with human security (Paris, 2001). Over time, the international community has agreed on a series of norms, values and standards, and has established international institutions to uphold these norms, values and standards, as embodied in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When countries or societies fail to uphold these international norms, international institutions mandated to defend these norms will act against those countries or societies. In most cases, these institutions encourage and support societies and countries to develop the capacities necessary to achieve and maintain these standards, but on occasion they may resort to pressure, advocacy, sanctions or political interference. As a last resort, in cases of genocide, war crimes and massive abuses of human rights, institutions like the AU have the legal capacity even to resort to armed intervention.

The institutions the international community has created to uphold its common norms and standards include the UN Secretariat and various specialised bodies, such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as various UN agencies, such as those responsible for refugees, women and children. Another is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is responsible for the Geneva Conventions. There are also several international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) which fall into this category. In Africa, there are, in addition to the AU Commission, bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa's Development) and the African Peer Review Mechanism, as well as several African NGOs which work to uphold African norms, values and standards.

In most cases, international actors are motivated by a combination of these factors. For instance, a UN Security Council resolution calling for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to help to implement a peace agreement may be based both on concerns related to restoring the international

system of state-centric global governance as well as on restoring international norms and standards.

There are a range of international role-players, starting with states and the multilateral and regional organisations they create and govern. The UN and the AU are examples of institutions created by states to govern the global and regional commons. Multilateral organisations like the UN and the AU can deploy peacekeeping missions to assist parties to implement a ceasefire or political agreements, and can remain engaged to assist the parties with implementing peacebuilding or PCRD programmes. In addition to peacekeeping operations, the UN may also deploy special political missions, and it also makes use of its wide range of humanitarian and development agencies to assist countries in transition.

The AU makes use of special envoys and the Panel of the Wise to prevent conflicts or to act as mediators in order to negotiate ceasefires or peace agreements. It sets up AU offices in countries where a sustained presence may be necessary for a couple of years—to carry out PCRD tasks, among others—and it can deploy PSOs when military intervention is necessary, as it has done in Burundi (AMIB), Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM).

There are also international NGOs which specialise in the political dimension. Some, like the International Crisis Group (ICG) focus on political analysis, while others specialise in building capacity in various aspects of the political process. In Africa, NGOs like the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) provide political analysis, do research and offer policy support, while others such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the West African Peacebuilding Network (WANEP) and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) are active in conflict management and PCRD.

Because PCRD is first and foremost a political rather than a technical process, multilateral and regional interstate bodies such as the UN and the AU also have an important role to play when it comes to strategic leadership and oversight of PCRD processes (AU, 2006:5). In this regard they have a convening and coordinating role which implies bringing all relevant role-players together regularly to negotiate a coordinated approach to supporting PCRD in a given country or regional conflict system. At the country level, this will normally take the form of some kind of strategic framework agreement which is entered into by the government and the international community, and which sets out the key strategic goals that the country wants to achieve over the short to medium term, as well as the support the international community is ready to provide to the country in support of that process. The AU's PCRD framework confirms a number of specific guidelines when it comes to pursuing cooperation and coherence, including national ownership, African leadership, legitimacy, accountability, transparency and genuine partnership (AU, 2006:6).

The political dimension of PCRD is thus critical to the overall success of any PCRD process, in that it represents and addresses the political aspirations of the parties to the conflict as well as the interests of the international and regional actors that intervene in a given country in transition with a view to assisting the PCRD process. However, the political dimension is a manifestation of norms, values, principles, hopes, ideals and concerns that run much deeper than merely at the public level of so-called high politics. Hence, PCRD needs to address the full spectrum of human needs and activity, including the security, socio-economic, justice and human rights, humanitarian and gender dimensions. Another important aspect to consider is thus the civilian dimension of PCRD.

The civilian dimension of PCRD

When we refer to the civilian dimension of PCRD we refer to all aspects 'civil', and this implies the way communities and societies organise themselves, their cultures, practices and institutions. It could include traditional leadership and traditional justice; it includes gender; and it includes the role of the youth. It can also refer to local and regional governance mechanisms, as well as local conflict-management mechanisms.

International actors have too often in the past approached peacebuilding as if the countries where they intervene have no local history, customs or social institutions that need to be taken into account. As a result, they have tended to design top-down interventions, based on their own institutional models and experiences. Local actors often resist such attempts to impose foreign 'solutions' on their local communities and societies. For external actors, local ownership usually means consulting with the local communities so that the internationals can better understand the needs of the locals, and thus better design solutions for them. This approach is informed by a belief that international actors know what is best for the local communities, namely, a free market economy, individual rights and multiparty democracy, but that they should try to convince the local societies to accept this liberal peace model voluntarily. Although this approach unfortunately still informs a great deal of international peacebuilding practice, there is now a growing body of literature which rejects the so-called liberal peace approach (Campbell et al., 2011).

The AU PCRD represents an alternative approach which recognises that local actors, local communities and societies have the principal agency to determine their own future. They are the ones that will live with the consequences and are thus the only ones with the moral right to take the decisions that will influence their future. At the national level, this is recognised in the UN Charter and international law as the right to self-determination and the right to sovereignty. It is also a recognition that communities and societies

have local knowledge and local social institutions which have evolved over many years in the local context, and that these practices and values need to be respected and valued as containing the basis for any future. Conflict does not wipe the cultural slate clean. Post-conflict solutions have to build on the existing cultural foundations and social institutions of the communities and societies that constitute the nation in transition.

However, on their own these existing social institutions may be too weak to manage the social and political tensions that caused and contributed to the violent conflict, and so some form of complementary external support can help the societies and countries in question. The point is that such support should build on the basis of the existing social capital, not substitute for it. This also does not mean that all the cultural and social practices of the local communities need to be accepted without question by neighbouring societies, national authorities or international actors. Some local beliefs, customs, practices and prejudices may, in fact, have caused or contributed to the conflict—for instance, practices where one ethnic group dehumanises another, as occurred in Rwanda (Donais, 2012). Careful analysis is required to identify such contributing factors, and if such practices are identified, they need to be addressed in partnership with the traditional and cultural leaders of the societies and communities in question. It is much harder, and it takes much longer, to change deep-rooted cultural beliefs and practices than to address political positions or interests. Where such cultural causes are identified, it takes sustained action, medium- to long-term action, and genuine local partnership and ownership, for sustainable cultural adaptation to be successful.

Almost all conflicts are at their core informed by some form of perceived inequality, typically experienced by the aggrieved parties as lack of access to political or economic goods. The PCRD framework thus emphasises the importance of inclusiveness and equity (AU, 2006:6). The framework stresses that for PCRD to be effective it cannot work only at the political level—for instance, with national politicians and government officials—but must also connect with the general populace. The AU's PCRD also recognises that some form of fair and equitable distribution of power and wealth is key to the prevention or escalation of tension and conflict (AU, 2006:6). The exact nature of the distribution is, of course, what the politics of the society and nation are all about, and is for them to decide, but the PCRD recognises that if the arrangement is perceived by some as unfair this will be a source of grievance and the seed for future conflict. In this regard, the AU's Peace and Security Protocol (Article 14:3) specifically promotes the participation of marginalised and vulnerable groups such as women and girls, the elderly, disabled and youth, especially child soldiers (AU, 2006:18).

The role-players that are the most relevant for the civilian dimension of the PCRD are thus those organisations and institutions that make up civil society. These include traditional leadership structures and traditional cultural organisations, religious organisations, women and youth groups, special-interest groups, trade unions, professional organisations, charitable organisations and local NGOs. At the national level, there may be national institutions, government commissions or even ministries which are responsible for overseeing some of these sectors, such as the youth, labour matters or traditional leadership affairs.

At the international level, there are several specialised UN agencies, AU departments and international and regional NGOs which work specifically with civil society and on matters pertaining to, among others, gender, women, youth and indigenous cultures. All of these local and international actors are potential partners for those pursuing self-sustainable PCRD goals in societies and countries in transition. They can provide valuable expertise, resources and networks which can help the PCRD mission and related actors to connect with the general populace.

The military dimension of PCRD

Not all PCRD missions include a military dimension, but those that do would typically be a UN peacekeeping mission with a partial peacebuilding mandate, or a future AU peace support operation with a PCRD mandate. The primary role of the military in the PCRD context is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the local and international role-players can carry out their PCRD-related tasks (AU, 2006:7). In particular, this implies dominating the area of responsibility with a credible projection of the capability to use force, if necessary, and, in doing so, deterring any would-be spoilers who might otherwise consider acts of political or criminal violence. A safe and secure environment is a prerequisite for the rest of the PCRD agenda, and the military component of an AU peace support operation makes a critical contribution to the overall PCRD mission if it can provide such a safe and secure environment.

The role of the military in peacekeeping has traditionally included the ability to protect itself, as well as other peacekeepers. This has been extended over time to include protecting other international role-players, such as the humanitarian community, and, more recently, to protecting the mandate of the mission, i.e. potentially acting against those which may use violence to undermine the goals and objectives of the mission. The most recent addition has been the extension of protection to the civilian population in general, also known as Protection of Civilians (Holt & Berkman, 2006). Most UN peacekeeping missions which have been deployed since the late 1990s have had a co-called Protection of Civilians clause in their mandates, and this has

added the responsibility to protect those civilians under imminent threat of violence.

The AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), and to some extent the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has similarly had such a protection of civilian mandate. Both the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) and AMISOM also had the explicit mandate to protect politicians, parliament and, in the case of AMISOM, other key government institutions, such as the president.

The primary and most important role of the military in PCRD is thus to protect itself, the mission and key international actors. This role contributes directly to the core aim of PCRD, namely, to prevent a lapse into violent conflict. In addition, when so mandated, this role can be extended to include protecting civilians who are vulnerable or particularly at risk, as well as fragile government institutions, typically in the context of an insurgency which threatens a fragile peacebuilding process.

The military component of a PCRD mission will be designed, equipped, trained and deployed to achieve this primary task. The military component should have the capability to physically prevent a lapse into violent conflict, or to restore stability when there has been a violent incident, and should be able to pursue, disarm and arrest those responsible. The military component should also be able to provide armed escorts to humanitarian convoys or to provide other forms of security or protection services to the civilian components of the mission and other international and local civilian partners.

A secondary role of the military in the PCRD context could be to use its assets, i.e. its human resources and the equipment it has at hand, to support the civilian component of the mission, other international actors, local authorities or the civil society to achieve PCRD-related goals (De Coning, 2007). This could imply support to security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, both of which are regarded as part of the broader security dimension of PCRD. If this support consists of providing security to such processes, then it falls within the primary role described earlier, but what is referred to here under the secondary role is technical knowledge and support services. Most often, this kind of support takes the form of logistical or engineering assistance—for instance, when military transport assets are made available to transport people, such as returnees, or to transport goods, such as election materials or reconstruction equipment. Another example could be when military engineering capability is used to rehabilitate roads, bridges or other infrastructure (De Coning, 2007).

In the UN peacekeeping context, a specific UN civil–military coordination (CIMIC) branch has been created to provide technical advice to the Force Commander and Sector Commanders, on how best to manage these secondary tasks (UN, 2010). The AU has not yet developed its own distinct CIMIC doctrine, but it has also utilised AU CIMIC officers in AMIS and AMISOM to

perform more or less the same function a UN CIMIC officer would perform in a UN mission. One of the specific role-players in the military dimension of PCRD is thus the CIMIC branch in the military component of the AU peace support operation. The CIMIC branch will be staffed by CIMIC officers who have been trained to liaise and coordinate between the tactical military units providing the actual support—e.g. an infantry platoon who may provide an armed escort, an engineering company who may rehabilitate a bridge, or their civilian counterparts.

The traditional focus of civil–military coordination has been the humanitarian–military relationship. Guidance developed specifically to direct this relationships includes the 'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief' (OCHA, 1994), the discussion paper and guidelines on the 'Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys' (OCHA, 2001) and the 'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' (OCHA, 2003). Almost all these UN civil–military relations policies and guidelines assume a humanitarian–military relationship, but are concerned with maintaining the distinction between the two. Civil–military coordination in the UN peacekeeping and AU peace support operations context is not limited to the humanitarian emergency phase alone, as UN and AU peace operations are deployed into a broad range of mission scenarios, including support to the implementation of peace agreements. A large portion of these mission scenarios assume a post-conflict context. Although there will typically still be humanitarian actors on the ground in a post-conflict context, the focus would have shifted to recovery, peacebuilding and PCRD.

There is a fundamental difference between humanitarian action on the one hand and peacebuilding or PCRD on the other, and this is a crucial distinction for the civil–military interface. Essentially, humanitarian action is focused on life-saving emergency assistance in the short to medium term, whereas peacebuilding and PCRD are aimed at changing the structural causes of the conflict over the medium to long term. The former is indifferent to the causes of the humanitarian crisis; humanitarian action is aimed at alleviating immediate suffering and mitigating future potential humanitarian emergencies. Peacebuilding and PCRD are, however, a conscious effort to address the causes of the conflict and are thus aimed at fundamentally altering the structural dynamics of the society. Peacebuilding and PCRD are thus inherently political and cannot claim to be neutral and impartial (De Coning, 2007).

Humanitarian space is about protecting humanitarian action from political influence and interference. Humanitarian space protects the right of the victims to receive humanitarian assistance by protecting the right of humanitarian actors to have free access to the beneficiaries. If one does not

emphasise and clarify this distinction, then it becomes impossible to accurately delineate the role that UN and AU peace operations can play in support of humanitarian action.

The principles and guidelines that steer the humanitarian–military interface during a humanitarian emergency are relatively clear. There is, however, a lack of similar guidelines for civil–military coordination between the military component and non-humanitarian civilian actors in UN and AU peace operations. The only policy guidance that exists in this area is the UN DPKO/DFS policy on *Civil–Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions* (UN, 2010).

Civil–military coordination in the AU PCRD context should thus be approached differently from the traditional military–humanitarian coordination models that assume a humanitarian emergency context. PCRD missions will typically be deployed to support the implementation of a peace agreement, and thus take place in a post-conflict context. While this context does not exclude relations with humanitarian actors, it cannot be defined by, or limited to, a military–humanitarian policy context. The UN CIMIC concept provides for civil assistance, which includes mission and community support (UN, 2010:6).

Mission support refers to the support that the military component can provide to the civilian component of the mission or to other international partners, while community support refers to the support the military component can provide to local communities and local authorities in pursuit of the overall PCRD agenda. Civil assistance needs to be well coordinated with all other actors to ensure that it does not cause harm, and complements the efforts of the appropriate civilian authorities and agencies. Military civil assistance is not meant to supplant civilian initiatives, but to complement them, and thus needs to be carefully coordinated with all other relevant partners. Poorly coordinated or poorly thought-through civil assistance is likely to have negative unintended consequences (Aoi, De Coning & Thakur, 2007).

The primary role of the military dimension of PCRD thus consists of providing a safe and secure environment within which the full spectrum of the PCRD's constitutive elements can be safely pursued, namely, security, humanitarian/emergency assistance, political governance and transition, socio-economic reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation, and women and gender (AU, 2006:4). A safe and secure environment is a critical condition for the rest of the PCRD agenda to be successfully carried out. In addition, the military dimension may have a secondary role, which is to support other PCRD role-players, including local authorities and the civil society, to achieve their PCRD objectives, by making available to them some of the assets the military may have. This support is

typically coordinated through the CIMIC branch of the military component of an AU peace support operation.

As far as resource and cost considerations are concerned, all local political and civil actors have access to a broad range of resources, although this does not imply that they are well resourced. Local political and civil actors may, like political parties everywhere, rely on membership fees and donations from members and the private sector. In some cases, the expatriate community may be a particularly influential source of revenue for political organisations, especially those in opposition. Previous conflicts or tensions may have generated waves of emigrants, and these expatriates often retain an interest in the politics of their country of origin, and may have a particular interest in the downfall of the regimes they may hold responsible for their own situations.

Another concern is political or armed groups which have direct commercial interests, especially if they stand to profit from ongoing conflict, or if their resource base is linked to control over a specific territory (Pugh & Cooper, 2004). This has typically taken the form of the control over an extractive industry in a specific location, such as a diamond-mining area. There is a danger that such groups may become spoilers when they opt to keep on fighting rather than join a peace which implies giving up exclusive control over such a lucrative commercial power base (Stedman, 1997). This does not imply that all local political parties or groups have illegitimate resources, but rather that it is important to look closely into the political economy of any given conflict situation in order to understand the linkages between resource flows and politics in that context (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010).

On the international side, the UN and AU are funded by their member states, as well as by voluntary contributions from donors. In the case of UN peacekeeping operations, this is arranged through an assessed budget formula whereby each UN member state contributes a portion of the budget calculated according to its GDP. In contrast, AU peace operations are funded through voluntary contributions, and the largest contributors have been lead nations, such as South Africa in the case of the AU Mission in Burundi, international donors, such as the European Union (through its African Peace Facility), or the US (De Coning, 2010).

The UN's political and peacebuilding missions are funded through the regular budget as well as through voluntary contributions. A core group of donors, consisting of countries from Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia, have traditionally been responsible for financially supporting the bulk of the UN's peacekeeping, political missions, development aid and humanitarian assistance. For instance, the United States, Japan and Western European countries together contribute approximately 88 per cent of the UN's peacekeeping budget (De Coning, 2010).

However, this situation is likely to change slowly over the next few decades as a new crop of emerging powers from the global South starts to become more active in the PCRD field. For instance, the UN's Peacebuilding Fund now has a donor base of more than 50 countries, including many from the global South. India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) have established an IBSA Fund to which they each contribute US$1 million per year, and at the fifth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit it was decided to actively investigate the establishment of a development bank of the South. Countries like South Africa, through the African Renaissance Fund, have been actively engaged in bilateral PCRD activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan. In addition, there are also so-called triangular arrangements where, for instance, South Africa trains the police of South Sudan in a programme funded by Norway.

Most international and local NGOs rely on funding from donors, either directly or as implementing partners for international agencies who operate with donor funding. Another important source for some NGOs is direct contributions by members of the public or private donors and foundations. For instance, private foundations like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation are significant international role-players in the public health sector.

There is thus a broad range of potential resources available for PCRD, ranging from traditional and new donors to international organisations, private donations and local sources of funding. One of the dilemmas in the peacebuilding context is the tension between the need for a long-term approach and the political will needed to sustain financial contributions which are short-lived and tend to shift from crisis to crisis. Pritchett and De Weijer's (2010:13) research shows that the states that achieved the fastest, and most exceptional, transformations during the 20th century took 20 to 30 years to attain levels of institutional solidity comparable to present-day Ghana or Vietnam.

Implications for the SA Army

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in general, and the SA Army in particular, should prepare itself to participate in, and contribute to, UN peacekeeping operations and AU peace support operations, including those that have a peacebuilding and PCRD mandate. The primary contribution of the SA Army would be to provide military units to a UN or AU mission. In addition the SA Army may be requested to provide staff officers and military observers to UN and AU missions, and may have the opportunity to second staff to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU and UN international planning and policy bodies, such as the Planning Element (PLANELM) at the SADC Standby Arrangement, the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of

the AU Commission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN Secretariat.

Military units will obviously be prepared for their primary role, but what may be less obvious—and what may require additional consideration—is their secondary role, i.e. the roles they may be called upon to carry out in support of the larger PCRD mission. In order to prepare SA Army units for this secondary role, it is recommended that the SA Army develop a CIMIC capacity, and that it add a CIMIC staff capability to each unit deployed to UN and AU peace operations at the battalion staff level.

Ideally, this should not be a shared position, i.e. an officer should not be the intelligence officer and the CIMIC officer. Staff officers should preferably be dedicated to perform the CIMIC liaison and coordination function. The SA Army should consider developing its own CIMIC doctrine, or it should adopt the UN's CIMIC policy. For instance, the SA Army could adopt the practice of having one CIMIC staff officer at the level of major or captain, and one non-commissioned officer, dedicated to the CIMIC function in each battalion deployed to UN or AU operations.

Consideration should also be given to the equipment needs of the CIMIC officer(s). CIMIC officers need to be able to liaise with their civilian counterparts and the local community and authorities, and this means that they typically require an independent means of transport, as well as their own means of communication and reporting. It will ease pressure on resources if battalions are deployed with such equipment pre-assigned to the CIMIC officers for their dedicated use.

Consideration should also be given to the equipment a normal or specialised unit may need in order to best perform its secondary role. The more logistics, including especially transport and engineering capacity, that each unit has, the more it will be able to do when it comes to its civil assistance functions. Planners should thus think beyond the primary role, and consider what additional equipment—such as basic building materials and tools, additional medical supplies and basic engineering machinery—it can augment such units with, so that they are better able to perform their secondary roles.

In addition to units, the SA Army may also be asked to provide staff officers to the force and sector headquarters of UN and AU peace operations, as well as to provide military observers. Such staff officers and military observers would need to be prepared to understand the full spectrum of PCRD mission components, so that they can analyse, plan, coordinate and evaluate the role of the military component in the larger PCRD context. As it is not always known which specific task staff officers or military observers will be assigned to before they arrive in mission, thought should be given to preparing them with a broad set of skills and knowledge, including CIMIC.

The SA Army may also be asked to contribute officers to national, regional and international initiatives to develop specific policies, to contribute to the planning of missions, to develop training material, or to contribute to training courses and exercises. Such officers will need to have a broad understanding of the role of the military component of a UN or AU peace operation within the larger context of a peacebuilding or PCRD mission, and they should also, based on their international experiences, contribute to further enhancing the SA Army's collective knowledge base on such operations.

The SA Army may also want to give special attention to the preparation of its battalion, sector and force commanders, as they would need to have a holistic understanding of the role of the forces under their command, in the context of the peace operation to which they are contributing, and, in turn, the role of the peace operation in the larger peacebuilding or PCRD mission. Commanders will need to engage with civilian and local partners on an ongoing basis, and the peace operation context thus requires that commanders be prepared not only to command their own forces, but also to interact, liaise and cooperate with local and international partners in the context of an interconnected and interdependent PCRD mission environment. Consideration should be given to expanding the peace support operations module at the Joint Senior Staff Course to include peacebuilding and PCRD.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the focus has been on the political, civilian and military dimensions of the PCRD framework. We have considered who the key role-players are, what roles they perform, and what resource and cost implications need to be taken into account when undertaking or supporting the political, civilian and military dimensions of a PCRD mission.

The PCRD concept is based on the understanding that societies in transition from some form of crisis or conflict towards a sustainable peace are going through a fragile period during which the risk for a lapse into violent conflict is high. PCRD is, at its most basic, about preventing a lapse into violent conflict. This core goal is referred to as peace consolidation. Conflict management is inherently political. All conflicts are, at their core, political, and therefore their resolution has to be political. The primary political task of the PCRD mission is to assist the parties to the conflict with the implementation of the peace agreement. More often the political dimension of the PCRD implies the ongoing effort to manage the political space of a country in transition in such a way that it does not lapse into conflict. When it comes to the political dimension of PCRD, this chapter stressed the need to recognise that the most important role-players in the PCRD process are the local parties to the conflict, because only they have the agency to determine the success, or failure, of PCRD, when its ultimate goal is defined as self-sustainable peace consolidation.

Almost all conflicts are at their core informed by some form of perceived inequality, typically experienced by the aggrieved parties as lack of access to political or economic goods. The PCRD framework thus emphasises the importance of inclusiveness and equity, and underscores the point that, for PCRD to be effective, it cannot work only at the political level. The civilian dimension of PCRD, i.e. connecting with the general populace, is thus equally important. The AU's PCRD also recognises that some form of fair and equitable distribution of power and wealth is key to the prevention or escalation of tension and conflict, and this is why the AU's Peace and Security Protocol (Article 14:3) specifically promotes the participation of marginalised and vulnerable groups such as women and girls, the elderly, disabled and youth, especially child soldiers. The role-players that are the most relevant for the civilian dimension of the PCRD are thus those organisations and institutions that comprise the civil society.

Not all PCRD missions include a military dimension, but those that do would typically be a UN peacekeeping mission with a peacebuilding mandate, or an AU peace support operation with a PCRD mandate. The primary role of the military in the PCRD context is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the local and international role-players can carry out their PCRD-related tasks. A safe and secure environment is a prerequisite for the rest of the PCRD agenda. The primary and most important role of the military in PCRD is thus to protect itself, the mission and other key international actors. This role contributes directly to the core aim of PCRD, namely, to prevent a lapse into violent conflict. In addition, when so mandated, this role can be extended to include protecting civilians who are vulnerable or particularly at risk, as well as fragile government institutions, typically in the context of an insurgency which threatens a fragile state-building process. In addition, the military dimension may have a secondary role, which is to support other PCRD role-players, including local authorities and the civil society, to achieve their PCRD objectives by making available to them some of the assets the military may have. This support is typically coordinated through the CIMIC branch of the military component of an AU peace support operation.

Military units will obviously be prepared for their primary role, but what may be less obvious, and what may require additional consideration, is their secondary role, i.e. the roles they may be called upon to carry out in support of the larger PCRD mission. In order to prepare SA Army units for this secondary role, it is recommended that the SA Army develop a CIMIC capacity, and that it add a CIMIC staff capability to each unit deployed to UN and AU peace operations at the battalion staff level. In addition, it is recommended that the SA Army pay special attention to the education, training and preparation of the units, staff officers, military observers and commanders that it deploys

to UN and AU peace operations, including improving their understanding of peacebuilding and PCRD in general and CIMIC in particular.

Bibliography

Aoi, C., De Coning, C.H. & Thakur, R. (eds) (2007). *The unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

AU (African Union) (2006). Policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development, PSD/PCRD/EXP/4 (I). Addis Ababa: African Union.

Berdal, M. & Wennmann, A. (eds) (2010). *Ending wars, consolidating peace: economic perspectives*. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Campbell, S.P., Chandler, D. & Sabaratnam, M. (2011). *A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books.

Chabal, P. & Daloz, J.P. (1999). *Africa works: disorder as a political instrument*. Bloomington: Indiana State University Press.

De Coning, C. (2007). Civil–military coordination practices and approaches within United Nations peace operations. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 10 (1). Available from http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/36. (Accessed 10 October 2012).

De Coning, C. (2010). The evolution of peace operations in Africa: trajectories and trends. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 14 (1–2):6–26.

Donais, P. (2012). *Peacebuilding and local ownership: post-conflict consensus-building*. New York: Routledge.

Galtung, J. (1985). Twenty-five years of peace research: ten challenges and some responses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 22 (2):141–158.

Holt, V.K. & Berkman, T.C. (2006). *The impossible mandate? Military preparedness, the responsibility to protect and modern peace operations*. Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Martin, I. (2010). All peace operations are political: a case for designer missions and the next UN reform, in *Review of Political Missions 2010*. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (1994). *Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief*. Geneva: OCHA.

OCHA (2001). *Use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys*. Geneva: OCHA.

OCHA (2003). *Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets to support United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies*. Geneva: OCHA.

Paris, R. (2001). Human security: paradigm shift or hot air? *International Security*, 26 (2):87–102.

Pritchett, L. & De Weijer, F. (2010). Fragile states: stuck in a capability trap? World Bank Development Report 2011 Input Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Pugh, M. & Cooper, N. (2004). *War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler problems in peace processes. *International Security*, 22 (2):5–53.

UN (United Nations) (2009). Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. New York: United Nations.

UN (2010). UN Civil-military Coordination Directive, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. New York: United Nations.

Endnotes

[1] As the PCRD is an AU policy framework, peace support operations carried out with a PCRD mandate are, for the sake of this chapter, assumed to be undertaken with an AU mandate, even if the actual force may be mobilised via a sub-regional organisation, such as the SADC Standby Arrangement. For the sake of coherence and brevity, sub-regional arrangements will thus not be specifically mentioned every time there is reference to AU peace support operations.

[2] In this chapter, 'statebuilding' refers to activities aimed at supporting the establishment of formal state institutions, such as a defence force, police service and a ministry of justice. 'State formation' refers to the process through which one or more societies develop their norms, values and social institutions to the point of being able to manage their own political, security, socio-economic and judicial affairs, including their own international relations. The two terms are used to accentuate the difference between a home-grown and an externally driven process.

[3] In this chapter, the term 'international community' is used as an umbrella term which includes all the state and non-state actors that participate in and influence the international system. In the PCRD context, these will be the external actors that engage with the peace process in a particular country or region. For instance, in the context of Liberia, the external actors are all the international actors actively engaged in supporting peacebuilding and reconstruction in Liberia. The internal actors, in contrast, are the government, civil society and private sector in Liberia.

CHAPTER 2

Looking In or Transforming Up: Conceptual Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding and PCRD

Heidi Hudson

Introduction

Why do post-conflict states often remain violent and unstable? Is it because of too much, or not enough, international intervention? Can we improve reconstruction by adding 'development' to it? Are local actors sometimes complicit in facilitating international agendas? These questions underscore conceptual, policy-related and operational challenges, which together capture the political nature of all peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) interventions.

This chapter places its analysis of the African Union's (AU) concept of PCRD within the bigger context of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and links the challenges of implementation to the conceptual and theoretical dilemmas of the liberal peace thesis and its interventionist assumptions. PCRD is touted as both a preventive and reconstructive project. This means that it not only seeks to prevent a relapse into violent conflict, but also aims to consolidate sustainable peace through the promotion of a sense of security and wellbeing (development) among people (AU, 2006). Because of this comprehensive purpose, conventional approaches to PCRD therefore often argue that the explanation for the failure to implement multisectoral policies and programmes is to be found in a lack of holistic planning, poor policy coordination and insufficient aid and assistance, as well as inadequate understanding on the part of international organisations about the complexities of the local context. However, what such problem-solving approaches often overlook is critical insight into the political or power dimensions of the reconstruction efforts, namely, that for international, continental and national/local actors alike the political stakes are high. Consequently, decontextualised liberal frameworks may be imposed through co-optation of local actors. The result could then be reconstructing institutions 'back to the way they were' rather than bringing about a fundamental transformation in power relations and resource allocation—thus raising the potential for conflict to erupt again.

The fact that PCRD is embedded within a broader discourse of liberal peacebuilding has implications for the way in which it is conceptualised. A key problem is the liberal nature of peacebuilding and the 'one size fits all' mode of implementation. In theory, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are separate but interrelated: peacebuilding underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflicting parties. According to Galtung's conflict triangle (1996:112), peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, peacemaking aims to change attitudes of the main protagonists, and peacebuilding tries to overcome the contradictions that lie at the root of the conflict. The goal is to promote human security by enhancing the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence, i.e. to institutionalise the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Related to this, a critical reading of reconstruction implies the reparation of fractured relationships at a variety of levels and dimensions. Post-conflict reconstruction is thus more than a technocratic exercise of repairing infrastructure. It also implies a process in which external stakeholders actively commit themselves to not compromising local culture and interests and the latter's capacity for self-governance. As Williams (2010:58) asserts, post-conflict reconstruction is 'an acutely political activity with the potential to effect profound social and cultural change'. In reality, however, the flaws of liberal peacebuilding become the flaws of PCRD, because during this process the local processes have to accommodate the arrival of major international actors. In this context, post-conflict reconstruction does not always mean a new beginning.

Despite the fact that liberal peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction may be conceptualised as the bridge that connects security, democracy and development, the track record of liberal peacebuilding in addressing structural contradictions and the long-term relationships between the conflicting parties remains mixed, as the case studies in this volume on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone attest. The so-called security–development nexus is held up as a panacea, yet analysis and policy-making are made more complicated by the fact that 'security' and 'development' are fuzzy, contested and ideologically loaded concepts (Tschirgi, 2005). In practice, this has led to ad hoc decision making and gaps between policy and reality, i.e. an implementation gap.

The focus of this chapter is therefore on the normative and conceptual premises that inform policy debates, doctrinal formulations and subsequent implementation, as well as the challenges raised by the motivations of international and local actors involved in post-conflict environments. The chapter adopts a critical approach to PCRD, i.e. probing the underlying assumptions that might otherwise be taken for granted. A critical approach seeks to facilitate understanding of the prevailing order and how this order

is reproduced (Paris, 2010:340). The critique that is offered therefore aims to 'open up' assumptions about power relations between locals and external actors, as well as the link between conflict and insecurity on the one hand and poverty and underdevelopment on the other.

The chapter opens with a brief historical overview of the development of peacebuilding as a concept, discussing the various schools of thought and gradations of embedded liberalism, and also locating the development arm of PCRD within the broader peacebuilding debates. After juxtaposing mainstream and alternative perspectives on liberal peacebuilding, the chapter focuses on three political dilemmas related to (1) problem-solving assumptions which give birth to technocratic, depoliticised statebuilding strategies and tactics of implementation; (2) a flawed security–development nexus which securitises development by relying on anecdotal evidence and circular argumentation; and (3) the political dynamics and tensions concerning contextualisation and local ownership. Following a critical approach, the resolution of these questions, and how to overcome the challenges with implementation and the operationalisation of peacebuilding and PCRD, is thus not found in recipe-like frameworks. Instead the chapter concludes that the notion of PCRD should be open to multiple interpretations in different contexts, but that it must also remain connected to the goal of conflict transformation rather than conflict resolution to make a difference in people's everyday lives.

Concepts in historical context

Mac Ginty and Williams (2009:126–127), in their analysis of various periods of reconstruction during and after the Cold War, conclude that the meaning of reconstruction changes 'in line with the state of the international system and the obsessions of the actors that are prominent power holders within it, rather than the objective needs of the populations affected by conflict and war'. This may well be a cynical position, but it draws our attention to the fact that this concept, like any other, is open to political manipulation.

During the Cold War, traditional peacekeeping was the norm, and the UN (United Nations) stayed out of domestic politics not only for political and strategic reasons, but also because the UN Charter expressly prohibited such intervention (Paris & Sisk, 2009:4). Following the end of the Cold War, and with the 1992 policy statement *An agenda for peace* by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, things began to change (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:169). A distinction, although not absolute, was made between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding aimed to strengthen and solidify peace. Functions of this new peacebuilding included, among others, disarming warring parties, restoring order, repatriation of refugees, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, reforming governmental institutions and promoting the protection of human rights, as

well as political participation. The definition of peacebuilding was subsequently broadened to include not only preventive diplomacy and humanitarian aid, but also different types of civilian assistance, military operations, development initiatives and post-conflict reconstruction (Paris & Sisk, 2009:5).

First-generation peacebuilding efforts in the early part of the 1990s exposed the inexperience of the international community with post-conflict stabilisation. Mandates were quite short term in orientation, with the main emphasis on facilitating post-conflict elections. The experience in Bosnia, however, prompted peacebuilding agencies to reconsider timelines and benchmarks of success of peacebuilding operations. Towards the end of the 1990s, more expansive missions, such as in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, were deployed with less emphasis on exit deadlines and more attention to achieving the conditions for stability. Second-generation peacebuilding scholarship therefore focused more on systematically comparing various cases and refining theories in relation to the role of natural resources in explaining peacebuilding outcomes as well as the place of transitional justice or women and gender in post-conflict recovery (Paris & Sisk, 2009:7). In this context, statebuilding as a particular aspect of peacebuilding also gained prominence. However, against the backdrop of George W. Bush's 'war against terror', the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have tainted the distinction between statebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (or peacebuilding by consent) and the failure of United States (US) stabilisation efforts after invasion (peacebuilding after conquest) (Paris & Sisk, 2009:11; Cooper et al., 2011:2001). Marked by individually rooted and market-based approaches to politics and the economy in post-war societies, liberal peacebuilding became a popular label in the first half of the 21st century (Paris, 2004:5; Call, 2012).

The notion of 'post-conflict' peacebuilding (or peacebuilding by consent) is, however, problematic (as mentioned in the introduction to this book), because although full-blown conflict may not have broken out in all so-called post-war states in Africa, there are several deep cleavages which remain or have re-emerged in, for example, Rwanda, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Angola. Liberal peacebuilding after conquest, on the other hand, is also characterised by ad hoc and selective international responses to humanitarian crises—for example, in Libya, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its partners acted decisively in the name of protection, yet repression of mass pro-democracy demonstrations in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain have not solicited international intervention to protect innocent citizens. This state of affairs signals the watering-down of a critical notion of human security (as emancipation) to reflect a pragmatist complementarity of human and state security (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003). This shift is fundamentally linked to the meta-consensus that emerged after the Cold War between the UN and key development donors such as the European Union (EU)

and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), international financial institutions and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), in which deep political rifts have made room for interdependence between powerful states based on neoliberal principles. This meta-consensus drives the liberal peacebuilding agenda (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:169) as a universal blueprint promoted by the international community for reconstructing collapsed states and societies ravaged by conflict.

With the neoliberal peacebuilding agenda in mind, post-conflict reconstruction takes on a particular meaning. I distinguish between a broad and a narrow interpretation of post-conflict reconstruction, each with its own normative and conceptual implications. Broadly conceptualised, post-conflict reconstruction relates to the initial post-settlement phase of the broader and more long-term peacebuilding process, with the latter providing a framework for external assistance related to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development (De Carvalho & Ettang, 2011:4). Post-conflict reconstruction, therefore, is aimed at holistically and concurrently operationalising the institutional context created by peacebuilding through a variety of military, political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights mechanisms (Strickland & Duvvury, 2003:6; Kotzé, 2008:107).

A narrow interpretation, in contrast, emphasises the specific importance of the socio-economic and development dimensions of reconstruction for durable peace. The notion of post-conflict reconstruction originated largely within development circles. In the immediate post-Second World War period, development was viewed as a mechanism for reconstruction, based on an understanding that the state would be the catalyst of economic growth and social development. In the 1980s, we saw the rise of a liberal era, in which markets rather than states were accepted as the key drivers of development and reconstruction—with little consideration of the differential character of developing world states (Van Gennip, 2004). Development agencies promoted the idea of a dual set of short-term humanitarian needs (e.g. distributing emergency food, shelter, medical treatment, clean water) and long-term sustainable economic reform and restructuring—efforts at rebuilding infrastructure, economic stabilisation and debt relief (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:171). In this conceptualisation, reconstruction became synonymous with development—a unique hybrid of these two traditional forms of intervention. Post-conflict reconstruction is therefore viewed as the less expansive but more concrete function of peacebuilding (e.g. infrastructural reconstruction and economic growth), compared with peacebuilding, which has a more overtly political purpose, namely, reconstituting the political and social order. PCRD, the AU concept, may thus be an attempt not only to distinguish between development and other forms of reconstruction, but also to further stress the importance of development as a precursor to security. In this respect the Draft

Policy Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU, 2006:2) mentions the consensus between Africa and 'its international partners' on the 'need to integrate post-conflict reconstruction and development into … broader developmental agendas for the continent'. South Africa's concept of 'developmental peace missions' (Gueli et al., 2006:6–7; *see* Chapter 5, this volume) similarly argues for a narrowing of the gap between security and development, not through the securitisation of development but rather via the establishment of more permanent complementary civilian reconstruction capacities.

While the first and more inclusive interpretation may make planning and execution less manageable, the association of reconstruction with the economic/development side may be 'cleaner' in a context where concepts are contested and fuzzy. That said, I argue for a more holistic definition of post-conflict reconstruction. In practice, there is no consensus on whether reconstruction starts when relief ends, but before development or in tandem with development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2008) defines 'early' reconstruction as a multidimensional process, guided by development principles, which occurs early in a humanitarian setting. The lines become blurred, as promoting social and economic wellbeing through emergency relief, a needs-based approach, restoring basic services and essential health and education services and a viable economy, job creation, welfare and sustainable development during the transition phase overlap with longer term developmental projects in the normalisation or 'development proper' phase.

Reconstruction, be it economic or other forms, if not aligned with broader political goals, runs the risk of offering only short-term solutions and not addressing economic inequalities and skewed distribution of resources. If neoliberal principles underpin peacebuilding, reconstruction invariably will mirror free-market principles, such as the assumption that economic growth will 'trickle down' to the poor. However, economic growth and redistribution of wealth do not necessarily go hand in hand. In this regard, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009:180) quite rightly ask, 'Can durable structures of peace ever be built in countries that lie on the periphery of an international economic order that seems to perpetuate their marginal status?'

Mainstream and critical approaches to the governance of a liberal peace

In the previous section I established a connection between how peacebuilding is defined and how PCRD is viewed and practised as a consequence of this. In this section the notion that peacebuilding is not 'a single discourse of a singular liberal peace' (Heathershaw, 2008:603) merits further exploration. Call (2012) distinguishes between liberal and critical peacebuilding, as well as statebuilding; Barnett (2006) identifies republican peacebuilding as another variant. What is at stake is the extent to which liberal values guide

the activities of peacebuilding. This implies that the rule of law, markets and democracy constitute the core pillars of the peace to be designed and implemented. This understanding is guided by the belief that, 'to have legitimacy, the state must be organised around liberal-democratic principles, and that because liberal democracies are respectful of their societies and peaceful toward their neighbors, they are the foundation of a stable international order' (Barnett, 2006:88). This assumption has its origin in the liberal or democratic peace thesis, which argues that interstate peace is guaranteed between democracies, and the more democratic states there are, the smaller the likelihood of international violence (Doyle, 1986). Former US President George W. Bush describes liberal peace as 'a just peace where repression, resentment and poverty are replaced with the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade' (Pugh et al., 2011:2).

Problematically, however, international literature and practice tend to treat peacebuilding and democratisation as synonymous, with the consequence that solutions seem rather simple in theory (Burnell, 2006:1). Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the international community's insistence on a democratic reconstruction model involves 'a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that is so exhaustive that it cannot possibly be followed in practice' (Burnell, 2006:8). It thus follows that while democratic states may be more peaceful, this is not necessarily true for democratising states (*see* Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). In this respect the purpose of peace as a governance framework is not only to bring order and stability to societies in a uniform way, but also to bring a specific kind of order.

Franks and Richmond (2008:83) identify three gradations of the liberal peace: the conservative, conventional (neo)liberal and emancipatory or communitarian approach. The conservative approach ('peace as order') is essentially a top-down approach to peacebuilding, largely reliant on external support and emphasising order as the key conception of peace. In the orthodox (UN) liberal approach ('peace as conflict management' and the main focus of this chapter) peacebuilders acknowledge local ownership and culture, yet still seek to import their methodologies and objectives into the new governance framework. This approach does contain some negotiation and consensus building between internal and external partners, but it does so with universal values in mind. The freedom to carve one's own future is circumscribed by the responsibility to uphold international norms of human rights, democratic governance and the market economy. This orthodox gradation of the liberal peace is guided by conflict management as the key peace value. Statebuilding forms part of this perspective, but its inclusion within orthodox liberal peacebuilding is also contested. Some critics challenge the state-centric nature of this model, namely, that the liberal state undergirds local, national and international peace. Roberts (2008:541) links, in this regard, externally driven

statebuilding with democratisation and economic liberalisation—a negative peace based on political peace and economic prosperity. Chandler concurs (in Roberts, 2008:541) when he argues that internal legitimacy-promoting processes are relegated to the margins because the overriding aim is to build a state which fits into and reflects international norms. However, other scholars, such as Call (2012), disagree. They argue that for political liberals such as Locke and Kant individual expression of civil rights through elections did not mean that they regarded institutions such as the state as paramount. One cannot therefore conflate liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. Political liberalism and state-building theorists also do not embrace neoliberal economic policies (Call, 2012).

Critical approaches to peacebuilding include the 'peace-as-justice' model, which is emancipatory in nature and aims to transcend mere consensus and work towards local ownership and respect for both needs and rights. This bottom-up, or civil society, version is critical of the embedded risks of dependency typical of the first two approaches to peacebuilding (Franks & Richmond, 2008:83–84; Heathershaw, 2008:604). The communitarian perspective cherishes the right of communities to determine their own future irrespective of global norms. Consequently, proponents of such thinking question the philosophical assumptions of the peacebuilding project and focus on a critique of the asymmetrical power relations between the external and internal stakeholders.

The key bone of contention here is whether these critical positions offer stand-alone alternatives to liberal peacebuilding or whether they are also responses that draw on liberal principles. There is also a danger that a critical position assumes that democracy or development in its liberal form is not what the local 'non-liberal others' want. Bishai (2010) challenges Richmond's communitarian alternative by stating that the liberal peacebuilding framework has already been modified—in response to the critique as well as to the realities on the ground. Hybrids are beginning to take shape, which testify to the existence of post-liberal elements within the dominant framework. In addition, Roland Paris—once an ardent critic of liberal peacebuilding (*see* Paris, 1997)—writes that it is time to promote a more balanced debate on the meaning, shortcomings and prospects of liberal peacebuilding. In an article entitled 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', Paris (2010) contends that the so-called hypercritics exaggerate their claims that liberal peacebuilding is illegitimate and has done more harm than good. For him, this position is tantamount to leaving millions of already vulnerable people to fall prey to lawlessness and predation (Paris, 2010:338). He makes a valid yet somewhat overstated point, arguing that frustration at America's 'regime change' invasion in Iraq and intervention in Afghanistan has given all liberal interventions (including UN-sponsored peacebuilding) a bad name (Paris, 2010:345). The object of critique

should consequently be the methods of liberal peacebuilding and not the idea of liberal peacebuilding (Paris, 2010:356).

In their response, Cooper et al. (2011) take issue with Paris's conclusion that liberal peacebuilding is the only viable solution for rebuilding war-torn societies. They posit that Paris 'ignores the extent to which all peacebuilding strategies [both peacebuilding after conquest and peacebuilding after peace settlements] have had a core of common prescriptions: neoliberal policies of open markets, privatisation and fiscal restraint, and governance policies focused on enhancing instruments of state coercion and "capacity building"' (Cooper et al., 2011:2001). There is very little room to formally dissent from these policy prescriptions (Cooper et al., 2011:2001). I concur with this position, as the exercise of power through liberal peacebuilding efforts cannot be viewed in isolation: security governance draws on a web of interconnected power imbalances within the global political economy and security complexes. Paris's contention that the focus should be methods and not assumptions is flawed, as it overlooks the political nature of all grand projects and falls back on a problem-solving approach which seeks solutions in the mechanics and technicalities of conflict management.

Amid all these positions and counter-positions, a number of key conceptual dilemmas thus emerge. I define a dilemma as a set of irreconcilable choices presented in a decision and their political implications. As mentioned in the introduction, the dilemmas relate to a lack of sensitivity to power imbalances, the neoliberal tenets of linking security and development, and a deep understanding of local ownership and the consequences of co-optation.

Dilemma 1:
Statebuilding and elections — the silver bullet of problem-solving?

Mainstream explanations of the conceptual and strategic challenges highlight fragmentation and lack of coordination, i.e. something that can be fixed, as the main problem. For instance, in post-conflict reconstruction, development policies at country level are not integrated, development and security policies are not integrated, and there is fragmentation across policy areas, as well as within single policy areas (e.g. tension between the rule of law and the human rights agenda). The outcome is a multitude of discrete programmes and projects without a coherent policy framework, compounded by the proliferation of actors and the lack of effective interface between internal and external actors (Tshirgi et al., 2009:4; *see also* AU, 2006:5).

Alternative perspectives would highlight, firstly, that concepts and policies must find context-specific application, and, secondly, that the policy or donor community is not apolitical (Jabri, 2006). Despite a thriving post-conflict reconstruction industry, consisting of official development assistance, humanitarian aid, debt relief, poverty alleviation, peacekeeping, disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), structural risk factors are not addressed. The solution is thus more than just an alignment of time frames (short-term objectives for security and longer term ones for development), institutional reform of the UN, AU and other regional organisations, better coordination of peacebuilding efforts among development, defence, diplomatic and other communities, and more funding. Throwing money at the problem does not seem to have worked so far. By 2007 the UK had spent £7bn, and by 2008 the US had spent $1tr, on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (BBC News, 2008). Instead, solutions must address questions as to why there is differential access of particular groups to DDR and transitional justice arrangements. Locating PCRD within peacebuilding should be linked to the emancipatory objectives of peacebuilding. In other words, what is advocated here is an approach to PCRD which is more than just stabilisation and the repairing of physical infrastructure.

The danger of viewing solutions in a technicist manner rests in the fact that good intentions and euphemisms such as 'unintended consequences' do not address root causes. The point is not that it is well-intentioned, but that peace is governed in such a way that it brings a specific kind of order to bear on the context. Ultimately, the cultural context remains secondary, and is 'merely superimposed upon a core being, which is the liberal rational self' (Jabri, 2004:274). On the surface, the assumptions of (neo)liberal peacebuilding appear to be benign and quite politically correct: a minimal level of law and order/stability is presumed; support from external actors is critical; it is a multidimensional process; context is important; local ownership of processes is acknowledged; and it combines top-down and bottom-up processes. However, these aspects mask 'one size fits all' solutions, which Mac Ginty (2008:145) aptly describes as 'flat-pack peace', or IKEA-style standardised peace. The emphasis on technical and procedural matters of statebuilding often leads to a view of democracy as zero-sum (the only rationally accepted and desired project), with a formal and low-intensity peace as the outcome. The focus on statebuilding often overshadows initiatives to promote reconciliation.

Institution-building, particularly statebuilding, is now seen by many scholars (e.g. Paris & Sisk, 2009) as the more long-term answer. This particular approach to peacebuilding is 'premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions' (Paris & Sisk, 2009:1–2). By 2000, with the hindsight of Bosnia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Kosovo, planners understood that peacekeeping can stabilise but not prevent the outbreak of renewed violence. It was against this background that the belief in institutional/state reform began to shape the governance of peace. Hence Paris's argument of 'institutionalisation before liberalisation' (2004) maintains that stronger state institutions would

curtail extremist behaviour and promote political stability. But this is quite a prescriptive peace, making the building of the civil service, police and judiciary the condition for achieving self-government (liberalisation). After 9/11, statebuilding and peacebuilding were conflated, although statebuilding was initially aimed at weak or fragile states and not necessarily post-conflict states (Call, 2012). Statebuilding is therefore seen as the answer to global insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment (*see* Chandler, 2010:5), with the effect of constraining political choices (Hameiri, 2009:73). This makes liberal peacebuilding an intensely political project. The (neo)liberal governance model does not locate underdevelopment or fragile states in an unjust global system or in a particular historical context of imperialism. Instead, leading states and international organisations promote a consensus position which internalises the causes of conflict and political instability — with the problem coming wholly from the inside and the solution provided from the outside. According to this thesis, the 'answer' is not the transformation of the global system but rather of individual societies (Fierke, 2007:154–156).

The presentation of liberal peacebuilding as a 'trade-off' also runs the risk of creating the impression that peacebuilders' actions are apolitical and that the unwanted or harmful consequences are always 'unintended'. While there is some truth in this, as post-conflict situations are highly complex (and messy), it should not absolve peacebuilders from responsibility for imposing a particular kind of model in the first place, even if locals eventually take ownership of it. So-called trade-offs include often impossible choices: between peace and democracy (satisfying the needs of warring parties versus democratic political parties); between efficacy and legitimacy in balancing elite interests (e.g. holding some secret negotiations for the sake of efficiency) and mass politics (for the sake of legitimacy); between locals and internationals about who should control and own the process; and between short-term solutions of stabilisation and long-term democratisation (Jarstad, 2008:17–36). Ultimately, all four trade-offs boil down to the governing of the costs and benefits of inclusion versus exclusion — a fundamentally political question.

The appeal of elections for donors lies in their high visibility, quick and easily quantifiable outcomes related to voter registration and turnout. This approach fits in quite well with the kind of product-oriented approach post-conflict reconstruction efforts have become associated with. In contrast, a process approach is much more difficult, as it involves the measurement of accountability, civic involvement, agency and representation (Lappin, 2009:17). While elections, if well managed, can be crucial instruments for conflict management (Matlosa, 2008:118–119), they are not geared to promote conflict transformation, i.e. to address deep-rooted causes of conflict. Empirical evidence on the continent and elsewhere testifies to the fact that political competition that comes with elections is also known to amplify partisanship

and reignite violent conflict (*see* Matlosa, 2008). Elections are, in this context, expected to both end the war and consolidate democracy. In view of such ambitious goals, it is no wonder that the success rate is patchy. Paris (1997:70) is of the opinion that the Angolan elections of 1992 did not serve as a basis for reconciliation, but rather helped to rekindle the war. Parties were not fully disarmed before the elections and there was no provision for power-sharing arrangements after the elections. This completely shut out the losing party from the new government. In Liberia, the 1997 elections brought non-democratic elites into power. In post-war Rwanda and Ethiopia, the winning parties to the conflict held elections to legitimise their victory—a far cry from the intention of these elections as a means of conflict mediation (Reilly, 2008:164). Rather than focusing on 'manufacturing structures to produce "free and fair" elections, external support should focus on fostering mechanisms which will change attitudes and expectations in the direction of building confidence in peace' (Burnell, 2006:9–10).

Dilemma 2:
'Taking links for granted'—exposing the pitfalls of the security–development nexus

The dilemma under scrutiny here is that the belief of liberal peacebuilding in free-market principles reinforces local disempowerment, which is exacerbated by the international consensus on the positive correlation between conflict and poverty or, alternatively, security and development. These aspects are mutually constitutive.

Firstly, a liberal peace is often imposed through aggressive social engineering and a privileging of the private sector and market economy over notions of the common good (Mac Ginty, 2010:397). Since economic reconstruction along market democracy lines has difficulty in addressing the root causes of inequality (and does not look for answers in the role of global capitalism or structural adjustment policies), it could lead to further destabilisation (and conflict). In this regard Paris (1997:65–70) examines the cases of Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mozambique, where economic liberalisation may have undermined political stability and exacerbated the vulnerability of poor people. This reinforcement of neoliberal prescriptions not only does little to alleviate people's engagement in shadow economies (Pugh, 2005:25), but also delegitimises local agency.

Secondly, the positive correlation between peace, security and development has become an entrenched feature of international policy debates. Several international policy documents merge development and peacebuilding: see for instance the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel (HLP) report, *A more secure world: our responsibility* (2004); the UN Secretary-General's reform programme of 2005, *In larger freedom*, and the UK Department for International

Development (DFID) (2005) policy document, *Fighting poverty to build a safer world* (Pugh, 2005:31). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in *In larger freedom* that '[i]n an increasingly interconnected world … [t]here will be no development without security and no security without development' (2005:6). Conventional wisdom also has it that this applies to Africa, in the words of Nhema (2008:7): 'In fact, it is a vicious cycle. Africa needs peace for development but it also needs development to enhance peace. Any strategies therefore to create peace must consider this reciprocal relationship between peace and development.'

In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform (SSR) programmes are most often seen as the vehicle for establishing a practical nexus between security and development. SSR is aimed at promoting the development of accountable security forces, with proper civilian oversight and control (Lilly, 2000:22). Since SSR operates within a donor-driven framework where SSR is termed as an explicit development objective, its agenda has tended to reflect donor understandings and priorities. The dual value of SSR for donors is, therefore, found in the fact that SSR is viewed as a means of promoting good governance, which is widely considered a necessary precondition for sustainable development (Lilly, 2000:23).

However, I argue that the conventional link between security and development should be revisited, because it is often based more on anecdotal than solid empirical evidence. SSR policy, as well as security–development nexus literature generally, makes intuitive common-sense assumptions (correlations) about the link. Despite strong statistical correlations between conflict and poverty, evidence remains anecdotal, and theoretically the causal mechanisms that are necessary to explain observed and assumed correlations and the directions of causation remain vague, so that one does not know where to start the analysis (Chandler, 2009:33). The link between conflict/insecurity and development is presented as a circular one (Collier et al., 2003; DFID, 2005), and therefore not helpful in explaining how developmental factors contribute to conflict (Tschirgi et al., 2009:2). There is a tendency to make an analytical jump from the specific conflict–poverty correlations to the fuzzy and contested areas of the security–development nexus. The following DFID statement is indicative of the intuitive correlations that are prevalent in this discourse: 'Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced more conflict … than any other continent … it is no coincidence that Africa lags behind the rest of the world in progress towards the Millennium Development Goals' (DFID, 2005:20). The World Bank (Collier et al., 2003) 'poverty–conflict trap' has dominated mainstream thinking, but the argument is presented in rather narrow terms: a country experiences conflict, entering a downward economic spiral that increases at the end of the conflict. Assuming that economic collapse itself can trigger a new civil conflict, the country faces the risk of renewed violence.

Rapid post-conflict economic recovery is then presented as the best way of escaping the poverty–conflict trap, without questioning the viability of such short time frames (one year post-conflict) (Flores & Nooruddin, 2008:4). Poverty is but one of many causes of conflict. Instead, what should matter most is 'the substance of change, the particularity of distinct conflicts, the discourses that surround them, [and] the relations of power that enable some while constraining others …' (Jabri, 2006:4).

Previously, poverty reduction through broad-based economic development was pursued as a political goal in itself, and not as a guarantee to prevent conflict (Chandler, 2009:26–52). In recent years (post-9/11), the link has however been reversed—security first, before political, social and economic wellbeing (Schwartz, 2005:437), thereby securitising underdevelopment. Ironically, while PCRD ideally should be part of a process of conflict transformation, it currently entrenches support of the status quo by being part of a system which gives the impression that this is what people in poor or post-conflict countries desire (Chandler, 2009:45). Reconstruction in Iraq is a good example of the way in which security and development are merged into a singular and technical worldview. This view, according to Sovacool and Halfon (2007:223), 'obscures working and reliable solutions to poverty and instability by treating development as a central justification for war, and war as a promising way to develop a state and society'.

In such interventions, locals are frequently excluded from decision making over economic reform. Macroeconomic rescue packages are held up as something over which the local people have no control (Turner & Pugh, 2006:472–473). Making locals truly part of the reconstruction effort therefore remains a challenge for both policy-makers and practitioners, because, as donors and other powerful states step up to take charge of the reconstruction of war-torn societies,

> *it confers representatives of the international community a higher degree of leverage in the implementation of reconstruction and initial development strategies. Some would argue that it thus presents an opportunity to implement best practices. But whether this authority can be put to effective use hinges on whether the international community is ready to accept this burden, whether the local population sees the occupying authority as legitimate and is fully consulted, and ultimately whether the international community actually understands what best practices are in local conditions.* (Van Gennip, 2004)

Dilemma 3:
The limits of local ownership within a liberal frame

The dilemma of local ownership is multidimensional and ambivalent. Key questions involve difficult decisions about who owns post-conflict reconstruction on the continent: is it Africans or internationals, and how are

locals represented in this relationship—as partners or dependants? Decisions are further problematised by the fact that liberal bargains[1] are struck between local elites and external actors which reinforce liberal frames of policy-making and action. The effects of this, as Donais (2009:7) points out, can be quite disempowering, paternalistic and outright undemocratic.

Firstly, who really owns PCRD on the African continent? Northern NGOs are often closer to international governmental organisations than to their southern counterparts. This tendency of cooperation between outsiders creates a patronage network which not only excludes local actors, but also further entrenches neoliberal hegemonic tendencies (Pouligny, 2005:501–502). Francis (2009) also claims that the role of African-led initiatives for conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent are not valued enough. The international community often forgets that these actors' stabilisation efforts make it possible for UN and other external actors to deploy in such conflict-ridden areas. The AU and African regional economic communities are often critical of liberal peacebuilding, because it effectively delegitimises African solutions, reinforcing a position of dependency. However, this critique does not necessarily mean that the AU and other 'local' institutional players on the continent operate outside the mainstream or on an alternative trajectory. The case of South Africa is instructive in this regard. Kotzé (2008:108–109) distinguishes between a typically 'international', or UN, and an African (or South African) approach to PCRD. He contends that the UN transitional model (developed in Kosovo, Cambodia and Timor-Leste, among others) is largely top-down whereas the South African approach, gleaned from field experience in the DRC, Burundi and the Sudan, is much more in tune with local needs and interests. While South Africa's normative commitment to negotiated settlements and restorative justice is well known, I am of the opinion that such typologies are misleading as they oversimplify the situation and overlook more subtle forms of power relations such as co-optation. Kotzé overstates the South African capacity to grasp fully local conditions and the root causes of conflict in Africa. In Burundi, for instance, Nelson Mandela used his moral status to shame politicians, but his lack of understanding of the Burundian situation also meant that the Burundian government could manipulate him to make concessions (Bentley & Southall, 2005), thereby reinforcing the charge that South Africa was not a neutral peace broker. While South Africa certainly has learned the hard way that it needs to tread carefully within Africa, South Africa (through its membership of the AU) is co-opted within international discourses of peace and security. Despite the use of more authentic terms such as PCRD and developmental peacekeeping, the AU and pivotal non-Western states, such as Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa, have—through their peace support operations—reinforced rather than challenged the neoliberal peacebuilding model. Eventually South Africa's attempts to garner support

from members of the AU for their position on regime change in Libya in 2011 fell on deaf ears.

Secondly, how are the local owners represented? The establishment of local ownership is easily neglected when the restoration of law and order takes precedence. The outcome is then the creation of virtual states which are accountable to the institutions and agents of the liberal peace rather than to local actors and local institutions. The power of liberal peace discourses creates a classic 'us versus them' situation where developed are pitted against underdeveloped, modern against traditional and global against local. While these binaries may not be intentionally imperialist, they are built on flawed representations of the societies in need of help, where the West (international community, donors and international organisations) see themselves as the benefactors and only maintainers of order. The problem is that within such a paradigm there is no room for local definitions of security and wellbeing.

Donais (2009:4) explains that local ownership is often accepted in theory but rarely practised. In practice, liberal peacebuilding initiatives often privilege the public dimension. The relationship between state and civil society takes a back seat and often remains limited to an inter-elite (foreign and domestic) consensus or patronage network between the beneficiaries of the liberal peace, as was the case in Cambodia and Kosovo (Richmond & Franks, 2007:31; Franks & Richmond, 2008). Liberal peacebuilding is aimed at mid-level institution-building and not the grassroots, with the expectation that the locals will populate those institutions, but this fosters custodianship not local ownership (Turner & Pugh, 2006:473). While local ownership may be accepted in principle by the donor community (*see* OECD Development Assistance Committee documents), the literature displays uneasiness about transferring 'full' ownership to the locals and may also be in violation of the substance and procedures of legitimacy as understood by 'the locals'. In other words, different societies may have different understandings of what constitutes legitimacy and how context-specific procedures 'for deciding and pursuing collectively acceptable objectives' (Barnett 2006:93) are used to achieve social agreement. Or, as Donais argues, 'outsiders too often take the legitimacy of themselves and their programs as self-evident without seriously considering the degree to which, for local actors, legitimacy must be rooted in their own history and political culture' (Donais, 2009:20).

One fundamental flaw of liberal peacebuilding is therefore its neglect of issues such as agency and the needs of civil society actors. The tendency to view civil society through a Western lens, which lumps together everything but the state, has the effect in different contexts of masking huge disparities in power and influence that exist between different civil society actors (especially in the aftermath of conflict). Some groups' needs are met (e.g. rebels and warlords) and others not (e.g. children, women, the elderly). The common mistake of

either viewing local people as passive recipients or troublemakers (spoilers) is particularly evident when dealing with women's agency in peacebuilding. Peacebuilders need to recognise that not all women in one conflict zone have the same needs. For instance, women in Burundi were concerned about protection, the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence, land and education for girls. Liberian women chose disarmament over elections as their most pressing concern (Africa Report, 2006). Certain categories of women also have specific needs: for example, issues of reintegration pertain to former women combatants; the economic livelihood of women active in the transfer of small arms may be threatened by a peace deal; and rape victims may need assistance in the area of HIV/AIDS. Failure to recognise these intergroup differences, together with the persistence of myths about women's gender-stereotypical roles in peacebuilding related to womanhood and motherhood, invariably obfuscate women's real contributions.

The specifics of women's role in civil society highlight a more general problem, namely, the lack of understanding of 'who' the 'legitimate' local actors are. The local can take many forms, and the term 'indigenous' should be associated with the notion of 'locally inspired' (Mac Ginty, 2008:149) rather than be equated with 'traditional'. The local or indigenous is also not always 'good'. In many cases, indigenous peacemaking methods have not been successful in preventing violent conflict, and the track record with regard to the protection of women's rights is equally dismal. Local actors very often include violence actors, criminals and 'uncivil' civil society organisations and lobbyists for international companies. Furthermore, the terms 'Western' and 'traditional' are not discrete conceptual categories (Mac Ginty, 2008:150–151). The local is not the antithesis of the new or modern, but rather a complex construction emanating from the engagement between the traditional and modernity. It follows, then, that local owners are both part of the problem and part of the solution in post-conflict contexts, aided by external actors. This raises a third question, namely, what value does the concept of local ownership have when locals are co-opted willingly?

In post-conflict Sierra Leone, the power of the chiefs through their control of the customary marriage system, has 'become a source of contention' (Fanthorpe, 2005:37). The international community regards this kind of traditional system as an illiberal institution and a major causal factor in the civil war. The intention of donors is to replace the colonial 'indirect rule' system of the chiefs with a decentralised local governance system. However, while the customary rights and obligations linked to marriage are questioned, people have not abandoned the system altogether. Locals also want to capitalise on funding which might accrue from international peacebuilding initiatives. As a political alternative, the locals therefore support a hybrid system of bureaucratic reform within the context of the chiefdom (Fanthorpe, 2005:43–44).

This clash between local and international decentralisation agenda forms part of a complex and multifaceted rural dynamic. While there is evidence of an inter-elite consensus at certain levels which maintains the liberal peace, at the same time ethnographic research uncovers smaller examples of local co-optation. In such a case of local co-optation, one group adopts the language of liberal peace to ensure strong support and credibility from the international community. As Franks and Richmond (2008:82) remark, the actors may pursue objectives that 'may fit uncomfortably with the pluralism that is at the centre of the international community's desire for a liberal peace' and it will be tolerated in the quest to tick the 'local participation' box on the liberal peacebuilding 'to do' list. This relationship is therefore not always one of top-down dominance and local dependency, but represents more closely a contestation over the nature of the new dispensation and who controls it.

Failing to recognise such complexities, failing to recognise that local actors too have political ambitions and that there is competition among a vast range of local actors, could certainly heighten tensions. Returning to the central argument of this chapter, if local knowledge is viewed as an obstacle in a largely technocratic exercise, international efforts and reliance on inter-elite patronage will lead to a legitimacy crisis in the eyes of the local stakeholders (Pouligny, 2005:501–502). Instead of a Weberian approach which emphasises objective sources of legitimacy, the latter must be rooted in local, subjective perceptions of society (Andrieu, 2010).

Conclusion

In view of the argument advanced in this chapter, that conceptual flaws tend to exacerbate problems related to implementation, I caution against rushing in to find 'concrete solutions'. The first step in this process is to bolster understanding of the conceptual challenges: the analysis of the three conceptual dilemmas has underlined the danger 'that peacebuilding segues into a kind of counterinsurgency strategy that employs reconstruction tools' (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:182). This kind of approach would dilute the central normative purpose of peacebuilding. The same can be said of PCRD. Firstly, while it has its origins in development discourses, the concept should be kept open-ended to allow space for alternative constructions and meanings. Development, narrowly conceived as materialising via neoliberal peace policies, runs the risk of missing the 'reconstruction for transformation' target. Secondly, the discussion has also highlighted the subtle but harmful consequences of presenting the problem in a depoliticised manner. Techno-managerial security discourses depoliticise as they create distance between security providers and those to be secured, but with significant political consequences for those existing on the fringes, whose everyday security is determined by discourses of the powerful. With regard to the third dilemma,

to foster a situation in which local owners are autonomous actors and not merely implementers of external top-down agenda, less attention should be paid to rebuilding state institutions and more attention to reconciliation, building trust and social capital as well as reconstruction of social relations and dialogue within and across communities.

The evidence presented in this chapter points to the pursuit of a neoliberal order as an end in itself. As long as liberal (Western) democracy is presented as the ultimate prize, the system remains closed off from the possibility of other security-related alternatives. Wibben remarks in this regard that '[a]n opening of the agenda … needs to begin by understanding how security has traditionally worked … and how meanings of security are fixed in certain narratives that make up security studies' (Wibben, 2011:6). The failure of well-intentioned but ill-conceived neoliberal peacebuilding to address the insecurity of marginalised groups in many post-conflict states in Africa ultimately confirms that the international community still privileges state security over human security. We need critical voices to challenge the subtle violence of mainstream agendas that perpetuate dichotomous thinking and practice through universalist conceptualisations of human rights, development and security.

Bibliography

Africa Report (2006). Beyond victimhood: women's peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda. *Africa Report* 112. 28 June. Available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4186 & 1=1. (Accessed 27 July 2006).

Andrieu, K. (2010). Civilizing peacebuilding: transitional justice, civil society and the liberal paradigm. *Security Dialogue,* 41 (5):537–558.

AU (African Union) (2006). Draft policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Addis Ababa: African Union. Available from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/july/PCRD/pcrd1.htm. (Accessed 15 June 2012).

Barnett, M. (2006). Building a republican peace. *International Security*, 30 (4):87–112.

BBC News (2008). Iraq and Afghan costs 'to double'. 11 March. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7287525.stm. (Accessed 15 June 2012).

Bentley, K. & Southall, R. (2005). *An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi.* Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Bercovitch, J. & Jackson, R. (2009). *Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. Principles, methods, and approaches.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bishai, L.S. (2010). Implementing the liberal peace: observations from Sudan. Paper presented at the ISA Convention, New Orleans, 17–20 February.

Burnell, P. (2006). The coherence of democratic peace-building. UN University – World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Research Paper No. 2006/147.

Call, C.T. (2012). Communitarian peacebuilding: an alternative to liberalism? Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 1–4 April.

Chandler, D. (2009). *Hollow hegemony: rethinking global politics, power and resistance.* New York: Pluto Press.

Chandler, D. (2010). *International statebuilding: the rise of post-liberal governance.* London & New York: Routledge.

Collier, P., Elliott, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cooper, N., Turner, M. & Pugh, M. (2011). The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris. *Review of International Studies*, 37 (4):1995–2007.

De Carvalho, G. & Ettang, D. (2011). Contextualising the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus. *Conflict Trends*, 33:3–12.

DFID (Department for International Development) (2005). *Fighting poverty to build a safer world: a strategy for security and development.* London: Department for International Development.

Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. *Peace & Change,* 34 (1):3–26.

Doyle, M. (1986). Liberalism and world politics. *The American Political Science Review,* 80 (4):1151–1169.

Fanthorpe, R. (2005). On the limits of liberal peace: chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone. *African Affairs*, 105 (418):27–49.

Fierke, K.M. (2007). *Critical approaches to international security.* Cambridge: Polity.

Flores, T.E. & Nooruddin, I. (2008). Democracy under the gun: understanding postconflict economic recovery. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53 (3):3–29.

Francis, D. (2009). Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (3):87–116.

Franks, J. & Richmond, O.P. (2008). Coopting liberal peace-building: untying the Gordian knot in Kosovo. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43 (1):81–103.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means. Peace and conflict, development and civilization.* London: Sage.

Gueli, R., Liebenberg, S. & Van Huyssteen, E. (2006). *Developmental peace missions.* Pretoria: CSIR.

Hameiri, S. (2009). Capacity and its fallacies: international state building as state transformation. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 38 (1):55–81.

Heathershaw, J. (2008). Unpacking the liberal peace: the dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 36 (3):597–621.

Jabri, V. (2004). Feminist ethics and hegemonic global politics. *Alternatives*, 29 (3):265–84.

Jabri, V. (2006). Revisiting change and conflict: on underlying assumptions and the de-politicisation of conflict resolution. A response. *Berghof Handbook Dialogue* No. 5. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

Jarstad, A.K. (2008). Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts, in Jarstad, A.K. & Sisk, T.D. (eds), *From war to democracy. Dilemmas of peacebuilding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kotzé, D. (2008). Post-conflict reconstruction. New discourse, old theories, in Kotzé, D. & Solomon, H. (eds), *The State of Africa. Post-conflict reconstruction and development.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Lappin, R. (2009). What democracy? Exploring the absent centre of post-conflict democracy assistance. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, No. 14. Available from www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk. (Accessed 12 April 2012).

Lilly, D. (2000). *The privatization of security and peacebuilding: a framework for action.* London: International Alert.

Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43 (2):139–63.

Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid peace: the interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. *Security Dialogue*, 41 (4):391–412.

Mac Ginty, R. & Williams, A. (2009). *Conflict and development.* London & New York: Routledge.

Mansfield, E.D. & Snyder, J. (1995). Democratisation and the danger of war. *International Security*, 20 (1):5–38.

Matlosa, K. (2008). Elections and conflict in southern Africa, in Nhema, A. & Zeleza, P.T. (eds), *The resolution of African conflicts. The management of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.* Oxford: James Currey.

Nhema, A. (2008). Introduction, in Nhema, A. & Zeleza, P.T. (eds), *The resolution of African conflicts. The management of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.* Oxford: James Currey.

Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22 (2):54–89.

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end. Building peace after civil conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies*, 36:337–365.

Paris, R. & Sisk, T. (2009). Introduction. Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding, in Paris, R. & Sisk, T.D. (eds), *The dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations.* London: Routledge.

Pouligny, B. (2005). Civil society and post-conflict peacebuilding: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4):495–510.

Pugh, M. (2005). The political economy of peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10 (2):23–42.

Pugh, M., Cooper, N. & Turner, M. (2011). Introduction, in Pugh, M., Cooper, N. & Turner, M. (eds), *Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reilly, B. (2008). Post-war elections: uncertain turning points of transition, in Jarstad, A.K. & Sisk, T.D. (eds), *From war to democracy. Dilemmas of peacebuilding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Richmond, O.P. & Franks, J. (2007). Liberal hubris? Peace in Cambodia. *Security Dialogue*, 38 (1):27–48.

Roberts, D. (2008). Post-conflict statebuilding and state legitimacy: from negative to positive peace? *Development and Change*, 39 (4):537–555.

Sa'ar, A. (2005). Postcolonial feminism, the politics of identification, and the liberal bargain. *Gender and Society*, 19 (5):680–700.

Schwarz, R. (2005). Post-conflict peacebuilding: the challenges of security, welfare and representation. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4):429–446.

Sovacool, B. & Halfon, S. (2007). Reconstructing Iraq: merging discourses of security and development. *Review of International Studies*, 33:223–243.

Strickland, R. & Duvvury, N. (2003). Gender equity and peacebuilding. From rhetoric to reality: finding the way. Discussion paper prepared for the Gender Equity and Peacebuilding Workshop. International Centre for Research on Women, Washington, D.C.

Tschirgi, N. (2005). Security and development policies: untangling the relationship. Paper prepared for the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) Conference. Bonn, September.

Tschirgi, N., Lund, M.S. & Mancini, F. (2009). The security–development nexus, in Tschirgi, N., Lund, M.S. & Mancini, F. (eds), *Security and development: searching for critical connections.* London: Lynne Rienner.

Turner, M & Pugh, M. (2006). Towards a new agenda for transforming war economies. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6 (3):471–479.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2008). UNDP policy on early recovery. February. New York: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

UN Commission on Human Security (2003). *Human security now.* New York: Commission on Human Security.

UN Secretary-General (2005). *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all.* New York: United Nations. Available from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm. (Accessed 12 June 2012).

UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). *A more secure world: our shared responsibility.* New York: United Nations.

Available from http://www.un.org/secureworld/. (Accessed 5 November 2009).

Van Gennip, J. (2004). Post-conflict reconstruction and development. The challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan. 161 EC 04 E. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 2004 Annual Session. Available from http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=492. (Accessed 14 November 2012).

Wibben, A.T.R. (2011). *Feminist security studies. A narrative approach.* New York: Routledge.

Williams, A.J. (2010). Reconstruction: a missing historical link, in Richmond, O.P. (ed), *Peacebuilding. Critical developments and approaches.* Palgrave Advances. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Endnotes

[1] The liberal bargain refers to the way in which members of marginalised groups 'internalize liberal epistemology to maximize security' and options (Sa'ar, 2005:681).

CHAPTER 3

PCRD in Historical Perspective: International Approaches and Experiences

Annette Seegers

Introduction

Although post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) is often seen to originate in the United Nations' 1992 *An agenda for peace*, PCRD is by no means a recent international invention. This chapter seeks to contribute to an understanding of PCRD as an evolving international practice, including African experiences of PCRD. To do so, it is not necessary to reach back to the earliest historical examples of PCRD and catalogue every twist and turn until today. I examine, instead, only three international eras of PCRD, namely, the Cold War (1945–1991), the idealistic 1992–2010 years, here labelled the peacebuilding era, and the revised and scaled-down PCRD regime that is currently emerging.

It is impossible here to discuss the Cold War, peacebuilding and PCRD eras in a comprehensive manner. I focus on the primary themes in two key components of PCRD: actors and their strategies (ends and means). The term 'PCRD regime', as used in the chapter, refers to the preferred set of PCRD means (cultural, economic, military and political) and ends of the most powerful actors in world politics. The method is thus implicitly comparative. The discussion begins with an explanation of outsiders who are so important in PCRD.

My definition does not presume that a 'global society' or 'world community' is necessarily the central driver of a PCRD regime. The dominant actors in the world determine the properties of a PCRD regime—and states can be dominant actors. Countries bordering a conflict-stricken country, for example, may well support PCRD because they fear spillover into their own or allies' territory. My definition also does not presume that a PCRD regime is inherently altruistic. Although it is of course not impossible that countries solely seek moral recognition for their participation in PCRD efforts, countries which volunteer for PCRD programmes—'coalitions of the willing' and the like—usually obtain material resources as reward for their participation. Good morals in world politics, it turns out, generate material rewards. Just as morality is not devoid of self-interest, interests may not be entirely amoral.

As will be discussed below, the prevailing PCRD concepts, terminology and/or nomenclature are poor guides to what is actually done in PCRD programmes; the same actions are differently described and different actions carry the same label.[1] Adding to the confusion is the fact that the list of PCRD tasks to be accomplished has never been trimmed. On the contrary, massive tasks such as transitional justice have been added to PCRD priorities. And transitional justice does not just mean punishing war criminals, but establishing what Galtung (1969:183) once described as 'positive' peace, that is, the absence of structural violence. Some scholars have given up trying to define where PCRD begins and ends; PCRD may simply refer to 'any type of activity aimed at restoring normalcy' (Harpviken & Skåra, 2003:810) after a war.

The international aspects in PCRD

The concern with the international aspects of PCRD is motivated by the fact that outsiders are significant in several ways. Firstly, 'outsiders' is a broad term, containing various types of actors, including: international (and/or continental/regional) organisations, ranging from the UN through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to international financial institutions like the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF); states; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and private organisations, such as private security companies.

The usual division of labour among these actors is as follows: a continental, international or regional organisation produces a mandate, with 'mandate' understood as an agreement, often reached by compromise, about what ought to be done and the permissible range of means in pursuit of those goals. States volunteer to implement the mandate. States' responsibilities are never open-ended. They typically spell out so-called caveats—what they will and, critically in military affairs, what they will not do. NGOs support the mandate, but many times simply follow their own agenda (Richmond, 2003: 2–11; Richmond & Carey, 2005). NGOs' need to fund-raise may also lead them to portray events in the most pessimistic light. Africa, for example, is usually described in rather desperate and melodramatic terms (Wainaina, 2005; Rothmyer, 2011). Peacebuilding NGOs number in the hundreds, if not thousands.[2] And among private actors, a private security company (for example) guards personnel and property (Paris, 2000:34).

Secondly, only outsiders can provide resources for the multiple dimensions of PCRD.[3] The range of means contained in PCRD programmes is vast, and includes DDRR programmes (disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and retraining), demining, development assistance (such as infrastructural repair), economic reform, electoral assistance, monitoring and voter registration, humanitarian assistance, and refugee assistance and repatriation. Rarely, if ever, can one country, let alone a post-conflict country, simultaneously address

all of these priorities. In many conflicts, government powers are so reduced that a portion of the country has become an ungoverned space. Foreign troops, civilian agencies and NGOs often provide the only security and social services, especially primary health care services (immunisation in particular), to be had in those government-less areas. In some cases, such as in Kosovo, an international body may even find it necessary to administer, that is, to govern a country.

The importance of resources in PCRD regimes should not suggest that outsiders are miracle workers. In the first place, outsiders do not always have the required resources. One chronic shortage is in the domain of policing. Donor countries rarely have any skilled police officers to spare, certainly not in sufficient numbers to make a difference in a country with a seriously damaged police service.[4] Some PCRD programmes have been heavily resourced, yet lacked key equipment. One example is the lack of mine-clearing vehicles early in the UN's Cambodian mission.[5] In the second instance, PCRD programmes demand long-term involvement in order to work. Peacebuilders sent by states are usually volunteers, however, and these outsiders do not have infinite patience, particularly when their involvement entails the risk of violence, and their casualties start to mount.

Thirdly, discussion of outsiders' actions in PCRD programmes is a constant feature in the literature on PCRD. One important line of thinking is that, without local participation that amounts to 'national ownership', PCRD programmes are likely to be ineffective, partly because locals are better suited to address the root causes of the war and partly because it is presumed that locals will approach PCRD in a bottom-up fashion. Another line of thinking is that outsiders impose their visions on the recipients. This may bring development, but in the process the conflict-stricken country loses national self-determination. This kind of outsider-dominated PCRD involves, in other words, a loss of sovereignty and/or creates colonial relationships (Richmond, 2004:83–101). For African countries, the connection between colonialism/imperialism and PCRD is crucial. African history attests to the power of the principle that people should have the right to self-determination in their culture, economics and politics, and thus colonialism was once rejected, despite the claims that colonial rule brought civilisation. Today, deep swathes of PCRD intervention in African societies—imperialism in other words—will bring reconstruction and development; as such it is open to rejection as a matter of principle (Seegers & Schellhaas, 2009). Quite rightly, De Waal (2010) has pointed out that much PCRD thinking involves the moral superiority of the West over the non-West.[6]

If outsiders to PCRD do not achieve early and steady success, they could develop contempt for the recipients. Drawing inspiration from Kurtz's actions in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of darkness*, Michael Ignatieff, for example, notes

that many donors are naive and unrealistic: their ideals do not survive an encounter with PCRD settings, especially settings with aggressive and obstinate people. Donors soon start to think the war's victims are brutish, inhuman and incapable of being helped: it is a moral disgust, understood as 'an active repugnance at the inability of societies that receive help to do anything to cure themselves' (Ignatieff, 1997:89–108).

Because of the importance of a variety of outsiders and their supposed altruistic motivations, PCRD literature has tended to have a 'donor bias', to lack serious self-examination and criticism, and to be practical and policy oriented. In this practical approach, UN-related authors often set the agenda. The 2000 UN peace missions review by a panel of experts, for example, was combined with various scholarly commentaries.[7] The typical hinge used by these scholars is 'lessons learned', often consisting of little more than identifying failures and how to avoid them next time. The superiority of a 'liberal world order' is never questioned (Bellamy, 2005:19). These recommendations often have zero impact on subsequent missions, suggesting that lessons-learned exercises are either 'falsehoods' or the face-saving exercises of embarrassed participants. Further, Fortna and Howard bluntly state that this practical approach 'is not particularly concerned with explanation or … social science analysis nor are the debates particularly cumulative' (Fortna & Howard, 2008:287).

In the last decade or so, a more critical and theoretical approach to peace missions has emerged (Bellamy, 2005:19). These critiques come in two varieties. Firstly, an internal critique accepts the legitimacy of the goal of peacebuilding, but argues that the implementation is flawed; it is a reformist agenda. Secondly, an external critique does not accept the ends and means of peacebuilding and has revisionist practical implications (Bellamy, 2005:1; Paris, 2000:28). One example of an internal critic is Roland Paris. He criticises PCRD but regards PCRD peace missions as legitimate (Paris, 2010:337–365).[8] Michael Pugh's work, in contrast, is an example of an external critique. Pugh understands the liberal Western system as an imperial creature which seeks control of all the world; the rich and powerful label their imperial reaches as 'humanitarianism', 'reconstruction' and 'peace', thus marginalising the less powerful in both practice and discourse. The system is stabilised: the core doctors 'the dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism' (Pugh, 2005:39). With unruly challengers under control, an unjust world power structure remains in place (Pugh, 2005:41,52).

As will be illustrated below, all the approaches identified here—practical, internal critiques and external revisionist approaches—are at work in the evolution of one PCRD regime into another.

Cold War PCRD

In this section, I focus on the main actors of Cold War PCRD and the key features of their strategies (means and ends).

In the bipolar Cold War period between 1945 and 1989, two opposing ideas of PCRD were advocated and implemented. Here I label them as Democratic PCRD and Communist PCRD. The dominant actor of each polarity was a state, the United States (US) and Soviet Union, and they set the PCRD agenda for their group. Each superpower opposed the other wherever it could, including at the UN and in the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Between 1947 and 1987, the UN's involvement in peace missions rarely exceeded the monitoring and supervision of truces: the UN simply helped to implement agreements already made. The UN missions in the Korean War (1950–1954) and the Congo (1960–1964) were aberrations. Somehow, the authorisation for the UN's involvement emerged from a deadlocked UNSC. But other parts of the UN system became very influential in PCRD. Perhaps the most important of these is the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Even before the Second World War ended in Europe, a refugee crisis of unprecedented proportions, which included displaced persons (DPs) and internally displaced persons (IDPs), was in effect (Shephard, 2011). Initially, the UN responded by creating a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. It was replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which in turn was replaced by the UNHCR. These organisations operated primarily in Europe. The UNHCR was accountable to the General Assembly (UNHCR, 2000). The emergence of the UNHCR was an indication that the problem of refugees was going to require much more than providing aid to European refugee camps on an emergency basis. And it was evident that many refugees remained refugees and that the initial emergency measures to help them tended to become permanent (Harrell-Bond, 1986). I will return to this problem later.

Democratic PCRD

After 1945, the US pursued a PCRD strategy which initially reflected a less than benevolent view of Germany. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, for example, was convinced that Germany's capacity to wage war could be erased by deindustrialising the country. But these views were not to prevail, as US strategists argued that without a strong West German economy the economic recovery of Western Europe would falter. The end of the Second World War was also marked by strong conviction among the Western Allies that the war had been a consequence of the First World War, which had caused the twin evils of economic chaos and political authoritarianism in Germany (Calleo, 1978:1). The Versailles Treaty made Germany solely responsible for the First World War, and imposed crippling financial punishments, which led to economic chaos

in Germany, which in turn weakened the political middle while stimulating the growth of right-wing extremism. After the the Second World War, the strategy was to address the problem of economic chaos through international financial institutions, while Germany's political authoritarianism was to be addressed by the military presence of the occupying powers in West Germany.

International economic stability was at the heart of two international financial institutions developed at the Bretton Woods meetings in mid-1944. Firstly, the IMF was to function as a bank: it would lend money to countries struggling to match their incomes and expenditures (monetary policy). Secondly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, but colloquially World Bank, or WB) would function as a fund to address the reasons why countries were struggling with the monetary policy and practice. The US became the dominant power in both the IMF and WB.

For most of the late 1940s and 1950s, the WB's main function was to lend money to Western European countries. These loans were earmarked for the conditions that inhibited development, such as damaged infrastructure. The WB's primary duty, in other words, was to alleviate poverty or assist development. The reasoning was also deeply political. The US and NATO countries feared that if poverty in Europe continued, fascism would return or, worse, communism would spread. The WB was extraordinarily generous, lending at below the market rate. Indeed, if a country was poor enough, the loan was nearly free. And neither the IMF nor the WB had many qualms about financing government interventions in economy and society. The economic thinking of the time was Keynesian in nature, that is, in an economy with a market basis, government was entitled to play a leading role, even by deficit financing of capital-intensive projects or massive public works programmes, to reduce unemployment and redistribute goods. Governments were entitled to own, for example, utilities and heavy industry (Keynes, 1936).

The US provided billions of dollars in bilateral aid to Western European countries. By 1947, the US adopted the European Recovery Programme, known as the Marshall Plan, succeeded in 1951 by the Mutual Security Plan, which generated more aid. The aid came with conditions, usually market-led liberalisation, but this still occurred within the framework of Keynesian economic policies. Although much of the aid, to be sure, was spent on buying goods from the undamaged Canadian and American economies (continuing the North American wartime economic boom), the Western European recipient economies largely recovered within a decade. Certainly, an important reason of this recovery was that these economic systems, their infrastructure and financial systems especially, did not have to recover from a zero base. In the world of finance, for example, the relevant legal codes existed before the war (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991:56). But whatever the causes, the basic

convictions of the IMF and WB were redeemed; they could lend at generous terms because recovery would be rapid (Mallaby, 2006; Peet, 2009).

Any attempt to deal with Germany's political authoritarianism had to consider German culture in historical context. Influential Western politicians thought that Nazism was not just a matter of Hitler and the ruthlessness of his followers. Rather, German culture itself was authoritarian, that is, it valued discipline, hierarchy and force above all else. The hugely influential book of the historian AJP Taylor, *The course of German history* (1945), best summarised this interpretation. Churchill simply said of the German character: they are 'always either at your throat or at your feet'.[9]

Just as West Germany was essential to the economic recovery of Western Europe, it was essential for democratic Europe that West German political culture become more democratic. This would be a major task of the separate American, British and French military occupations and the subsequent Allied High Commission of the Federal Republic of Germany, over a period of about a decade. When the archives of these bodies became accessible in the 1980s, it revealed the priorities of the politics of cultural democratisation. Perhaps prompted by the Soviet policy in their zone of occupation and the activities of the German Communist Party (Rupieper, 1991:73),[10] there were two targets—women and youth—for the following reasons:

> *Statistics, interviews with German men and women, checking of findings with members of Military Government, all point to the same conclusion. It is the women who are and who will have to continue to bear the major part in the reconstruction of Germany. The widow responsible for the support of her children is a very typical individual. However, it is not only a question of numbers: psychologically women are better oriented to reconstruction on a democratic basis than are the men. They have no 'face' to save. Since 1933 they had no Status. In fact their post World War I spurt to a better position flickered out by 1928. They were not a part of policy making Nazi Germany. They have everything to gain, nothing to lose in a democratic reorganization.* (Rupieper, 1991:61)

> *And more frankly: German women have less to unlearn than men, and should be aided to undertake the political responsibility of their country since they outnumber men by a 60 to 40 ratio.* (Rupieper, 1991:81)

The means to achieve this cultural reorganisation included making men and women legally equal, financing women-centric activities in media and community organisations, and supporting female artists and writers. Cultural propaganda delegitimated authoritarian family structures, which said women's role in life was supposed to focus on 'Kinder-Küche-Kirche' (child-rearing, the kitchen and religious activities). Women were encouraged to participate in civic affairs and to run for office. As regards children, the main focus was on lengthening the years of schooling (Ermath, 1993; Tent, 1984; Zepp, 2007).

As long as the two Germanies were divided, the question about the consequences of this cultural reorganisation was moot. After reunification, however, fears about the illiberal and undemocratic nature of German political culture and society resurfaced for obvious historical reasons (Katzenstein, 1980:580–581). In 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher solicited the views of distinguished experts, including Hugh Trevor-Roper, Norman Stone, George Urban and Timothy Garton Ash, about Germany's political culture. These experts said that German political culture had changed for the good since 1945 (An, 2006; Larres, 2002).[11]

The Western Allies stipulated that West Germany was not to be allowed to recreate a military, but when the term of the Allied High Commission ended in 1955, the Federal Defence Forces of Germany (colloquially, the Bundeswehr) was created. Its subsequent development was intended to follow the path of democratic civil–military relations. National service, for example, was introduced the following year, but conscripts could choose whether to perform civilian or military service. The intent of national service was to avoid a military alienated from society, as Prussia's military once had been. The right to conscientious objection was upheld, together with the right of soldiers to refuse illegal orders, and there were strict constitutional provisions about the declaration of war (Kuhlmann & Lippeman, 1993:98–105). Even so, the Cold War compelled West Germany to depart from the demilitarisation component of the initial PCRD. Not only did a military re-emerge, but military spending steadily increased in real terms by about three per cent annually and, as a proportion of the federal budget, at times reached nearly 12 per cent (Keegan, 1983:206–215; US Library of Congress, 2011). Although the military was constitutionally obliged to primarily protect the territorial integrity of West Germany, the country's geopolitical position made it central to NATO, which West Germany joined in May 1955.

This section has said little about the American occupation of Japan (1945–1952) and PCRD in that country. Comparative statistics and studies are few in number, perhaps because this occupation is generally treated as being exceptional. Yet existing comparisons show a remarkable similarity to West Germany, including the extent of economic aid and the rapid recovery and the far-reaching efforts to democratise Japan's political culture by, for example, mandating legal equality between men and women (Congressional Research Service, 2006). Here, too, the intended demilitarisation was confounded by the American reaction to civil war in China and by outbreak of the Korean War (Katzenstein, 1996; Schaller, 1987).

Communist PCRD

Today, the prevailing interpretation of the Soviet system, including the economic organisation COMECON and the Warsaw Pact military alliance,

is that this was an unjust system deservedly brought to an end in the late 1980s. Communism, or, more precisely, the Soviet system, deserves some discussion in relation to PCRD, certainly in the context of later Cold War military conflicts—focusing on the strategies pursued by the Soviet Union after 1945. These wars included, at least, Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, North Korea, Mozambique and Vietnam, and all were marked by a preceding period of economic crisis and stagnation, multiple stages of conflict and a lengthening of the war. My view is that communism had a great deal to do with why these wars developed these characteristics.[12]

Firstly, Marx had argued that the mode of production in many colonies did not enable those entities to progress into a communist mode of production. An industrial mode of production was a necessary precondition of a socialist mode of production. But an industrial mode of production did not exist in Angola and Mozambique, for example. In a primarily agricultural mode of production, Lenin and especially Stalin argued, class relations had to be rearranged so that wealthy producers did not control production. If production were collective, too, growth would follow. Political rulers could rule in a way that made the country skip an industrial mode of production. Led by the Communist Party, a country could go from a medieval mode of production to communism. In this radical social engineering project, the party was entitled to use violence (Conquest, 1987, 2007).[13]

The implementation of this vision in some African countries—Mozambique, for example—produced strong rural opposition. Traditional authorities resented their relegation to political nonentities and the curtailment of their economic power—for example, to allocate land—and decided to take up arms (Hall, 1990; Morgan, 1990). Did this vision succeed in accelerating socio-economic progress? There are examples of success, such as Cuba's health system, but these are exceptional. The practice of the Soviet Union was to provide aid and subsidies. Cuba's sugar crop, for example, was bought by the Soviets at artificially high prices (De Vos, 2005; Kornai, 1992). Without Soviet patronage, communist countries had few choices, apart from joining the IMF,[14] thus delivering them into development and PCRD as preferred by the IMF and WB.

Secondly, the communist regimes of the Cold War rejected political pluralism: only one political party—communist—was entitled to rule because that party's members had a higher understanding of power. Political opponents of the party were bandits or criminals. Although harsh, such a view does not necessarily create instability in a country. Many communist rulers—for example, in Cambodia, Cuba, the Soviet Union and Vietnam—simply wiped out their political opponents and/or conquered their military rivals (Conquest, 2007). However, if they cannot silence their political opponents or conquer their

military rivals, the war will go on and on, as it did in Angola, for example (Hodges, 2001).

Thirdly, communist regimes' civil–military relations were based on the Soviet model, that is, the military as an arm of the Communist Party. Declarations of war were controlled by the party. Soldiers were expected to be highly politicised and their obedience to the party was overseen by a parallel hierarchy of party officials in uniform—the political commissar (Perlmutter, 1977; Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980). One of the positive legacies of communist support for liberation movements during their struggle and after their victory was that the militaries they supported tended not to be coup-making militaries. The Soviet model insisted that soldiers were obedient to political authority (Forbes Pachter, 1982; Seegers, 1986).

Comparative observations

There are important similarities between the civil–military relations ideas and practices of communist and democratic PCRD. Both agreed that armed forces had to be politically subservient to elected politicians. However, the means of implementation differed: democratic PCRD devised systems which required legislatures to oversee the military; communist systems used the party to keep the soldiers under control (Perlmutter, 1977; Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980).

For some scholars, the failures of communist PCRD must mean that democratic PCRD is the best system for post-conflict countries whose rules must be decided by electoral competition. The problem with this conclusion is that countries with traditionalist modes of production also have powerful traditional social structures. Those who dominate these social structures inherit their power, bargain about it, or are accepted by their followers because the incumbent is seen as a person who can accomplish extraordinary things. Stated in Weberian terms, political legitimacy in many contexts grows primarily out of traditional and charismatic–personal rather than rational–legal roots. This is certainly the case in many African countries. When they are forced to become democratic, they can at best achieve a lesser form of it (Maley, 2006; De Waal, 2010).

The peacebuilding era

In the early 1990s, three changes in world politics shaped a new approach to PCRD, with actors claiming new roles and pursuing different strategies. Firstly, world politics became unipolar on many levels. The US became the most powerful militarily, on its own and within NATO. Ideologically, alternatives to capitalism and democracy were no longer seriously entertained. Whatever the US did, it no longer feared the reaction of the Soviet Union. The US now displayed a fear of something else: it would be the world's policeman.[15]

Secondly, the IMF and WB were no longer Keynesian in orientation. By the 1980s, the IMF and WB adhered to the so-called Washington Consensus: only neoliberal reforms or a reduction of government's role in its economy would assist long-term growth. With a market-led economy, poverty would decline, jobs would be created, the tax base would be broadened and anti-poor measures would be more efficient (Gore, 2000:789–804). The UN and other actors, such as NGOs, had no choice but to follow the agenda of the IMF and WB.

Thirdly, with a superpower veto less likely in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the UN became more important in PCRD. Between 1988 and 1994, 40 new missions were started. The UN's greatest successes were in El Salvador, Guatemala and Cambodia, including getting peace treaties signed and making different armies into one. These early successes made the UN more ambitious and optimistic. It claimed it could prevent war, stop war, implement PCRD and achieve transitional justice. In 1992, the UN announced a new interest in what it described as peacebuilding. By 2006, the UN would have a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office. The UN Secretary-General would play a powerful role in peacebuilding, such as in setting an agenda and coordinating actions (Barnett et al., 2007). Other regional organisations developed similar interests. The executive body of the European Union (EU), the European Commission, has a Commission for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding. The African Union (AU), too, has developed a post-conflict reconstruction and development framework.[16]

The UN in 1992 defined peacebuilding as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The UN's interest in structures was on those that functioned as the root causes of the conflict. At first, observers argued that actors would never agree on the basic causes, let alone be right in their diagnoses. Yet soon a formula emerged. UN peacebuilding priorities and their reasoning ran as follows. Because it was believed that democracies usually did not have aggressive foreign policies, and because of democracy's ability to produce internal stability, peacebuilding's main political goal was democratisation. Given the prevailing Washington Consensus, which held that capitalism generated wealth and economic growth, a market economy had to be created. Greater wealth and growth would also provide material proof that democracy was the best political system. Military–security reforms were necessary to eliminate the means to continue the conflict. These reforms prioritised disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) (Paris, 1997).

The UN never determined the desired sequence of actions. The result was that all peacebuilding goals had to be simultaneously attempted. In time, other goals were added. To the political dimensions of peacebuilding, for example, transitional justice was added, on the grounds that peacebuilding had to counter 'cultures of impunity' and to encourage reconciliation. Some theorists

went as far to argue that without transitional justice, peacebuilding would fail (Mani, 2002).

The long list of goals had one important consequence: it allowed a multitude of actors to enter the debate and practice of PCRD. This variety of ends sought by actors in PCRD creates immense practical problems, chiefly a lack of coordination (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). Even in a crucial PCRD area such as mine-clearing, one finds actions are 'fragmented, ad hoc and incremental' (Tschirgi, 2003:3).

External critique: peacebuilding programmes are wrong in principle

The strict version of this critique is that the UN formula follows a foreign, Western formula and has imperial goals, although it is an imperialism driven not by states but by international institutions: 'International state-builders begin with a blueprint of what a modern country ought to look like, and how it ought to be run: Afghanistan needs to become more like Austria and Sudan more like Sweden' (De Waal, 2010).[17]

To these critics, peacebuilders replied with something along the lines of a financial transaction. If X lent Y money, Y should not determine if and how it would repay X. If the IMF lends money, the IMF will tell you how to spend it. We cannot expect an organisation which just happens to do peacebuilding to abandon good accounting and also its own principles, specialisations and practices (Barnett et al., 2007:48, 53).

An interesting aspect of this debate is the unrepentant responses from peacebuilding theorists. I mention three such responses, primarily from human rights advocates (De Waal, 2010). Firstly, no country has the right to define its own rules; human rights trump national self-determination because every human is entitled to, for example, the same standard of living. Secondly, Western principles of peacebuilding are superior; rival interpretations are second-best solutions. Thirdly, citizens of conflict-stricken countries are said to agree with these international statebuilders. How do we know this? They 'leave for developed countries if they get the chance' (De Waal, 2010).

If the UN's peacebuilding formula and practice was imperial, what explains its political popularity among students of peace and security? The answer to this question would not surprise George Orwell: the idea of peace is so attractive that if you can convince people you are in the peace business, you are in business.

Internal critique: peacebuilding programmes are a good idea but wrong in practice

It did not take much to see that UN peacebuilding was ambitious—an 'enormous instrument of social engineering', a radical notion of modernisation theory (Paris, 2004:56). Applied to contexts where a war had wiped out, for example,

functional institutions such as the judiciary, and impoverished people, success was even less likely.

Other long-term studies (Ramsbotham, 2000) noted that, despite the many fine phrases and high hopes, UN peacebuilding programmes were at best plainly ineffective and irrelevant, and did not address the socio-economic, historical, political and cultural causes of violent conflicts. With no discernible progress made in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, the UN was obliged to govern those countries. This form of UN governance was described as trusteeship, that is, until UN-approved standards of behaviour were displayed, the country lost its sovereignty.

Reformers conceded that the peacebuilding methods were, or at least could be, counterproductive: the three-part formula of the UN actually had a destabilising impact. Both democracy and market economies, for example, are intrinsically dependent upon, and encourage, conflict and competition—not something that many post-conflict societies need. In democracies, elections involve a degree of competitiveness and may involve radical claims and appeals. Democratic politics is adversarial politics. A party must, after all, dramatise its special and unique qualities to win. These electoral strategies may easily lead to polarisation—for example, a nationalist agenda becomes a xenophobic agenda (Maley, 2006; Paris, 2004:97–111). Rather than fostering greater tolerance, elections can sharpen confrontations and conflict in divided societies (*see also* Chapter 2).

Reformers also conceded that advanced industrialised states have been able to deal with the unwanted side effects of capitalism by, for example, creating welfare systems to redistribute income to poorer sections of the population. War-torn states are in no position to do so. Many war-torn countries need greater government intervention in the economy, something that the Washington Consensus component of UN peacebuilding would not tolerate. The imposition of capitalism thus resulted in more inequality and more poverty for ordinary people. These conditions may well be very similar to the socio-economic deprivation, resentment and frustration prevailing at the start of the conflict (Paris, 1997:75–76).[18]

Finally, while conceding that the timing of peacebuilding programmes was poor, reformers tried to devise a different sequence of ends and means (Paris, 2002:638). One line of argument was that everything need not be done in short order. The problem, however, was that elections were often held too soon because external actors were impatient. External actors were unwilling to stay the course (Ignatieff, 2002:4–5). Another line of thinking was that actions had the wrong sequence—for example, stable institutions had to precede the holding of elections and/or the creation of wealth (Barnett et al., 2007:51).

External and internal critics can argue endlessly over cases. Take the case of Mozambique, usually cited as an example of peacebuilding success.

While Mozambicans can boast that their elections since October 1994 have been declared 'free and fair', their supposed economic success story is suspect. It is true that the GDP improved by 9.3 per cent between 1996 and 1999. One interpretation of this growth (by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD) is that it is economic reforms which have achieved these 'remarkable' results (Paris, 2004:144). A more sober appraisal suggests that, given the level of devastation in Mozambique at the end of the civil war, economic statistics operated off a zero base. Any modest increase would appear astronomic.

The PCRD era

Because of the criticisms about its peacebuilding agenda and performance,[19] the UN has retreated from its peacebuilding ambitions. After a review, the UN published a revised agenda in 2008. A comparison of the 1992 Boutros-Ghali statement and the 2008 report makes for interesting reading.[20] A clean break between 1992 and 2008 is not evident, and thus some of the peacebuilding goals live on. I use the conflict in the Great Lakes region to illustrate the continuities and differences.

Continuities

Perhaps the most important continuities relate to the Washington Consensus (capitalism generates wealth and economic growth) and security sector reform (SSR), which includes at least disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Here I discuss only SSR.

The SSR programme in the Great Lakes region went by the name of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Re-integration Programme (MDRP), and focused on demobilisation and reintegration. The MDRP started in 2002 and was concluded in 2010.[21] Seven countries, with approximately 400 000 combatants, were involved: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the DRC,[22] the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The MDRP was financed by the World Bank and 13 mainly Western European donors, including the European Commission. The MDRP network also included more than 30 partner organisations, including UN agencies and NGOs. The programme cost just over US$500 million.[23] Apart from the MDRP, the countries of the region have bilateral security relationships.

Demobilisation in the Great Lakes region has been relatively successful.[24] Professionalising militaries, disarming groups and reintegration have largely failed, however, despite the multi-country approach followed and the Great Lakes region's SSR being perhaps the best-funded security reform effort in history. A crucial reason for this failure is the selfish political character of the governments in the region. The architects of the MDRP should have known this. Certainly, the DRC political elite's devotion to their private interests is a staple

theme of all studies of that country (Hochschild, 1998; Young & Turner, 1985, for example). Yet the MDRP soldiered on with the formula that a partnership must be formed with national governments (Marriage, 2007:281–309). Only by the end of 2010, after the mass victimisation of civilians by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in Operations Kimia I and II, did the UN realise that if MONUC—its mission in the DRC—was to retain credibility, it had to distance itself from the DRC military.

Differences

The UN's 2008 diagnosis shows one major difference: violence with high rates of civilian victimisation does not necessarily decrease in a post-conflict period. On the contrary, violence is likely to increase. Analysts refer to this sort of situation as a hybrid because some features of both peace and war are present. Peacebuilders have two priorities in this context: to protect civilians from violence and to ensure a legal and legitimate government (UNSC, 2010).

How should we understand violence in a hybrid context? Violence during a conflict or war consists mainly of collective/organised violence between states or within a state. If it is an intrastate war, the violence can be between two parts of a state (civil war); by the state against civilians (oppression); the result of an uprising against the government (revolution); or a fight between two or more communities (communal violence). During both inter- and intrastate wars, however, criminal and gang violence may also flourish. Post-conflict violence consists mainly of interpersonal violence, including the continuation of criminal and gang violence but also assault, theft and domestic violence by either individuals or relatively small groups.[25]

In the DRC, for example, the violence substantially escalated and expanded after the Lusaka Agreement was signed in 1999 (Braeckman, 2001; Swart & Solomon, 2004). Most of the violence has taken place in four eastern provinces: North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale.[26] Many of the attacks on civilians involve a relatively small quantity, but a shocking quality, of violence (Stearns, 2011; Turner, 2007). One reason for this type of violence is the very smallness of these groups. They tend to be, or perceive themselves to be, outgunned or outnumbered. They will rarely give battle. Instead, they try to inflate their power by disgusting actions. The sexual violence against women is an example of this kind of violence (Peterman, Palermo & Bredenkamp, 2011). Civilians are at their most vulnerable when one group vacates an area and another moves in. The new masters of the area will victimise civilians for real and imagined support of the departed group (Thom, 2010:179–194).

These small groups engage in interpersonal violence for different reasons. For the most part, they consist of adult males who, as criminals, gang members and soldiers, have lived by the gun for years. Many men have learned that they can get what they want (food, housing, sex, etc.) from the barrel of a gun

(Ember & Ember, 1994:620–646). But even refugees, displaced persons and internally displaced persons can form or join these groups. Refugees in camps may form armed groups to protect or gain resources, to lend their support to recruiters from non-refugee organisations, and to traffic in arms and ammunition (Black, 2001; Loescher, 2002; Muggah, 2006; and Stedman & Tanner, 2003).

The type of small group formed by these individuals can survive almost indefinitely. Unlike collective violence, in which the members of a group receive reward only if the group wins, and even then must share the rewards with other members of the group, a small group motivated by material reward does not have to win to generate material reward and does not have to share it with many others (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:563–595). In response to these groups, people who do not want to surrender their hard-won gains will only keep them if they are prepared to defend them with violence (Tull & Mehler, 2005). Once one or another of these small groups becomes successful, they set a negative example of how a small group of predators can flourish. Small wonder, then, that the Congolese groups tend to split (Afoaku, 2004:109–128; Gambino, 2008:9–19). Predation is thus likely to produce a defensive reaction among law-abiding citizens. They create, for example, self-defence groups and militias. Soon these units and militias, too, may find that they can get what they want by violence. Not all of this violence will involve modern arms and ammunition. But if the conflict involves defeated or overthrown governments, there will be a high number of weapons in circulation. The defeated will abandon their posts with weapons in hand (Young & Mirzeler, 2002:103–114). Further, modern weaponry is a change agent, that is, it transforms a low-casualty conflict fought with cutting weapons into a high-casualty conflict (Mirzeler & Young, 2000:407–429).

The type of groups, their composition, motivations and their violence combine to change what is possible in today's PCRD. As before, I discuss the preferred strategies (means and ends) and the main actors.

Civilian victimisation: actors, means and ends

The primary goal of PCRD here relates to civilian victimisation, namely, to assist the victims and to prevent further victimisation. With incapable or indifferent governments, the task of assisting civilians thus often rests with international agencies and NGOs. Their delivery of services suffers the usual criticism of a lack of coordination. But without these NGOs, many more civilians would not get help. Some of the more efficient delivery of service is provided by NGOs closely linked with Western governments and UN bodies, such as the UNICEF–USAID partnership on sexual violence (USAID/UNICEF, 2006). These partnerships tend to develop common goals,

are self-critical in their assessments of efficiency, and tend to avoid the more self-interested and sensational NGO reporting of data.[27]

PCRD studies have suggested that victims want medical attention most of all (OHCHR, 2011:3; Vinck et al., 2008). Meeting this need has been problematic because the continuation of violence usually makes it impossible for government to provide regular medical help and basic services, such as education. In the case of the DRC, however, not only is the government unable to help in most of the eastern provinces, but their soldiers, the FARDC, are heavily implicated in civilian victimisation (Axe, 2010; UN, 2005). In such a context, it is quite understandable that civilians in desperate need of basic services, such as immunisation, will present themselves as having been assaulted, even when no such thing has happened. How else will their newborn baby be immunised and survive? Equally, victims of sexual abuse often do not report or seek medical help because of fear, community reactions, etc. (Kelly et al., 2009). Over- and under-reporting makes empirical estimates of civilian victimisation very tricky (Peterman et al., 2011; Seay, 2011; and Alberti et al., 2010).

By all accounts, the question of preventing civilian victimisation is difficult because the causes are many and complicated. Take the issue of whether rape is a 'weapon of war', i.e. a planned strategy by political actors. If this were the case, the incidence of sexual violence in the DRC would be highest in the eastern provinces. Yet one reliable recent study found a high rate of sexual violence outside the eastern provinces of the DRC (Peterman et al., 2011). Another reliable study showed nearly half of the sexual violence in the DRC is committed by persons who know their victims and are not associated with any group (Bartels, 2010). These findings are consistent with the next-to-last position of Congolese women in the UN's gender inequality index in 2010 (UNDP, 2010). Prosecuting perpetrators may help, but it is by no means certain that convictions on either a national basis or via the International Criminal Court, which the UNICEF-USAID partnership states as the primary level of prevention (USAID/UNICEF, 2006:13), will act as a deterrent. One deterrent has been the sheer force of numbers of a peacekeeping force (Fuamba et al., 2013), to which contributing states are quite happy to contribute by military or other means. Activists have used international law, particularly the UN's 1948 Genocide Convention, to compel signatories to intervene in aid of victims. But, so far, they have had little or no success. An exasperated UNSC admitted its failure to protect civilians in 2010 and not only in the DRC/Great Lakes region (UNSC, 2010).

Many civilians in the DRC save themselves by becoming refugees. This is done by giving up their domicile and moving to a refugee camp. Another way is to walk daily into a safe area, refugee camp, and the like. It is not uncommon for civilians—young and old—to walk more than 40km per day.[28] Once again, the UNHCR provides the only safety to be had.

Democracy: actors, means and ends

International peacebuilders still insist on democratisation, but it is a far cry from the democratisation of the Cold War and peacebuilding eras. Firstly, the democratisation can be classified as an electoral democracy, that is, the goal is to have a free and fair election which produces a legal and legitimate government which can represent the country in world affairs. One reason for this shift is the pessimism that has emerged about democratisation. Instead of a third wave of democratisation sweeping authoritarian regimes into the dustbin of history, authoritarian regimes have found ways of popularising themselves by, for example, manipulating the media (Diamond, 2002). Another reason is the realisation that a hybrid context will not allow more than an electoral democracy. With elections the goal, massive security efforts are made to prevent violence from spoiling elections. MONUC's activities, for example, escalated and expanded quite dramatically during elections (Gambino, 2008:9–19).

Secondly, the democratisation has become government-/state-centric. Although reliable studies of civilian victimisation suggest that the societies of the Great Lakes region are steeped in various authoritarian beliefs and practices, such as radically unequal relations between men and women, PCRD actors are unable or unsure of what to do about it. Take the case of the UNICEF-USAID partnership on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which states in relation to prevention:

> [T]he first and primary level of prevention is ensuring the adoption and implementation of protective laws and policies; the second level of prevention is capacity building in health, legal/justice, security, education and social welfare systems to help prevent, detect, monitor and address SGBV; and the third and lowest level of prevention is ensuring that survivors receive immediate and comprehensive care that will reduce the likelihood of long-term negative effects related to GBV, as well as survivor's vulnerabilities to future incidents of GBV. Implementing simultaneous strategies against GBV across all levels of prevention is critical to any lasting effort toward its eradication. (USAID/UNICEF, 2006:13)

Not a word is said about society. If societal activities take place, it is the business of NGOs. But many NGOs prefer legal activism, such as the prosecution of perpetrators which, so the claim goes, will mark an end to cultures of impunity (Askin, 2011). Whether this will be true remains to be seen.

Third, in the PCRD era activists, donors and scholars are willing to justify undemocratic behaviour in the name of development. In the Great Lakes region, most of the apologetics are about Rwanda. The Kagame government is showered with praise, among other things, because it is not as (economically) corrupt as other African governments and because of Rwanda's positive economic growth rate. NGOs form partnerships with the Kagame government, as do state-aligned agencies (such as USAID) and a range of international

bodies, the UN among them. Rwanda is in fact a 'donor darling' (Marysse et al., 2007). Yet experienced scholars argue that the Kagame government is a dictatorship, if not a police state (e.g. Reyntjens, 2004:177–210). Rwanda may well be in a condition widely feared in the peacebuilding era— creating the foundations of a future conflict by not dealing with the causes of the past war, including its genocide.

Conclusion

This chapter is but a short comparative overview of three eras of PCRD. Space limitations do not allow examination of intriguing cases, such as the integration of armies in France after 1945, the civil war in Greece (1946–1949) or the American reaction to the growth of communist parties in Italy in the 1950s. Neither was any consideration given to PCRD experiences that were primarily national, such as the reconstruction era in post-Civil War America and the Nigerian government's policies after the Biafran War. As far as international preferences about actors, means and ends go, however, my discussion of experiences in primarily African contexts supports the conclusions outlined below.

The dominant actors in international PCRD regimes are the most powerful states. Most obviously, the strategies proposed reflect the idealised images dominant states have of themselves. In the peacebuilding era's Washington Consensus, for example, the US prescribes a minimal role for government and opposes governments' subsidisation of any industry, even as US federal and state subsidies not only cover a vast range but are increasing in number.[29] Equally obvious, the most powerful states both dominate international bodies and can reduce international bodies to stasis if they oppose proposals. The UN's peace ambitions between 1945 and 1989, for example, were virtually nullified as a result of the Soviet Union and US using their power of veto in the UNSC. International bodies in the PCRD business do, in other words, what the dominant states allow them to do.

In relation to means and ends, the recovery of Western European countries after the Second World War is the most striking example from the past few hundred years of how quickly devastated countries can recover economically and become much more democratic. This recovery, however, may well have been exceptional. The economies of the affected countries had not been reduced to a zero base and the US was—for military-strategic reasons—generous. The strategies followed by communist countries in especially the late Cold War shows how counter-productive PCR strategies can be. The insistence on one-party states in many instances succeeded in prolonging conflicts. Whether democratic or communist, however, the states' prescribed strategies did not contain altruistic or humanitarian motives. The underlying reasoning of the strategy was that the consequences of the last war could become the causes of the next war, that is, a weak West Germany had to become wealthy because

a poor West Germany would be prey to the Soviet Union and an emboldened Soviet Union would have to be fought.

The UN's ambitious peacebuilding strategy was criticised almost from the moment Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced that the root causes of conflicts had to be the post-conflict priority. Lessons and recommendations, reviews, good-practice instructions and the like subsequently arrived in a steady stream. A generous interpretation would be that no strategy survives its encounter with post-conflict war realities, certainly not a strategy which wanted to address the causal basics of conflict and involved a rapid and wholesale (re)construction of democratic government, a professional military and a thriving market economy. Revisions to the peacebuilding strategy were thus a natural phenomenon.

The economic aspirations of the peacebuilding strategy have survived. But in my view the peacebuilding strategy has been undone not by external or internal criticism but by the gradual realisation that contexts described as 'post-conflict' were not, in fact, post-conflict contexts (as also mentioned in the introduction and Chapter 2). The 'peace' in 'peacebuilding' could not be presumed. After the politicians' peacemaking and peacekeeping, there is in most instances an increase in the level of violence, although the perpetrators and their motivations differ. The condition is hybrid—neither fully peace nor fully war.

My discussion of the strategies pursued in these hybrid contexts argued, firstly, that the democratisation component has been reduced to a legal and state-centric notion of democracy. Particularly in the Cold War era, outsiders reached deep into cultures and societies to create democratic practices and values. No such ambition is now evident, although it is obvious that (for example) the non-egalitarian features of African cultures and societies are strongly correlated with cases of continued violence. Secondly, the problem of how to deal with the victimisation of civilians has not been solved. So far, the main responses to this problem are to deter predation by military means or, more precisely, by the sheer force of numbers (of soldiers).

In my view, the features of the emerging PCRD strategy in African contexts can best be described as a strategy of conflict management. The advantage of this strategy is that, without a large military presence of foreign soldiers, the fate of civilians could be far worse. The problem with this strategy is that root causes do exist. It is just that these are impossible to address.

Bibliography

Afoaku, O. (2004). Congo's rebels: their origins, motivations and strategies, in Clark, J.F. (ed.), *The African stakes of the Congo war*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Alberti, K.P. et al. (2010). Violence against civilians and access to health care in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo: three cross-sectional surveys. *Conflict and Health*, 4 (17):1–6.

An, P. (2006). Obstructive all the way? British policy towards German Unification 1989–90. *German Politics*, 15 (1):111–121.

Askin, K. (2011). Justice from the ground up. Open Society Foundation, 20 April. Available from http://blog.soros.org/2011/04/justice-from-the-ground-up/.

Axe, D. (2010). The limits of smart power. *Prospect Magazine*. 5 November.

Azimi, N. (ed.) (1995). *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: debriefing and lessons.* Geneva: UN Institute for Training and Research.

Barnett, M. et al. (2007). Peacebuilding: what is in a name? *Global Governance*, 13:35–58.

Bartels, S. (2010). 'Now, the world is without me': an investigation of sexual violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. Available from http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/rr_sexual_violence_drc_150410.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Bellamy, A. (2005). The 'next stage' in peace operations theory, in Bellamy, A.J. & Williams, P. (eds), *Peace operations and global order.* New York: Routledge.

Black, R. (2001). Fifty years of refugee studies: from theory to policy. *International Migration Review*, 35 (1):57–78.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An agenda for peace: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.* Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 A/47/277-S/24111. New York: United Nations. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html. (Accessed 25 August 2012).

Braeckman, C. (2001). Congo: a war without victors. *Le Monde Diplomatique*: 2–5.

Calleo, D. (1978). *The German problem reconsidered: Germany and the world order, 1870 to the present.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chandler, D. (2006). *Empire in denial: the politics of state-building.* London: Zed.

Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M. & Thakur, R. (eds) (2005). *Making states work: state failure and the crisis of governance.* New York: United Nations University Press.

Collett, H. (2007). *What peace-building initiatives have been implemented in Angola since 2002?* (unpublished Honours thesis, University of Cape Town).

Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56:563–595.

Congressional Research Service (2006). CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared. 23 March. Available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Conquest, R. (1987). *The harvest of sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Conquest, R. (2007). *The Great Terror: a reassessment.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crocker, C. (ed.) (1997). *Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict.* Washington, D.C.: USIP.

De Long, J.B. & Eichengreen, B. (1991). The Marshall Plan: history's most successful structural adjustment program. NBER Working Paper Series.

De Vos, P. (2005). No one left abandoned: Cuba's national health system since the 1959 revolution. *International Journal of Health Services*, 35 (1):189–207.

De Waal, A. (2010). Dollarised. *London Review of Books*, 32 (12):38–41.

Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2):21–35.

Ember, C.R. & Ember, M. (1994). War, socialization, and interpersonal violence: a cross-cultural study. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38 (4):620–646.

Ermath, M. (ed.) (1993). *America and the shaping of German society, 1945–1955.* Providence, RI: Berg.

Faltas, S. & Namwira, M. (2007). Case study: DR Congo, complementarily between NGOs, national authorities and donor initiatives. Paper presented at international conference 'From rebel to taxpayer? Working together for successful DDR', Scheveningen, Netherlands, 30–31 May.

Forbes Pachter, E. (1982). Contra-coup: civilian control of the military in Guinea, Tanzania and Mozambique. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20 (4):595–612.

Fortna, V.P. & Howard, L.M. (2008). Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:283–301.

Fuamba, D. , Yonekawa, M. and Seegers, A. (2013). Managing spoilers in a hybrid war: the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010). *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*. Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346. 2012.746187. (Accessed on 3 May 2013).

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3):167–191.

Gambino, A.W. (2008). *Congo: securing peace, sustaining progress.* Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, Special report 40:9–19.

Gore, C. (2000). The rise and fall of the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for developing countries. *World Development*, 28 (5):789–804.

Hall, M. (1990). The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): a study in the destruction of an African country. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 60 (1):39–68.

Harpviken, K. & Skåra, B. (2003). Humanitarian mine action and peace building: exploring the relationship. *Third World Quarterly*, 24 (5):809–822.

Harrell-Bond, B. (1986). *Imposing aid: emergency assistance to refugees.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hochschild, A. (1998). *King Leopold's ghost.* London: Pan Macmillan.

Hodges, T. (2001). *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to petro-diamond capitalism.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ignatieff, M. (1997). *The warrior's honor.* New York: Henry Holt.

Ignatieff, M. (2002). *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan.* New York: Vintage Books.

Katzenstein, P. (1980). Review: problem or model? West Germany in the 1980s. *World Politics*, 32 (4):577–598.

Katzenstein, P. (1996). *Cultural norms and national security: police and military in postwar Japan.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keegan, J. (ed.) (1983). *World armies.* 2nd edition. Detroit: Gale Research.

Keesbury, J. & Thompson, J. (2010). *A step-by-step guide to strengthening sexual violence services in public health facilities: lessons and tools from sexual violence services in Africa*. USAID.

Kelly, J. et al. (2009). Characterizing sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative for the Open Society Institute. Available from http://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/final%20report%20for%20the%20open%20society%20institute%20-%201.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Keynes, J.M. (1936). *The general theory of employment, interest and money.* Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kornai, J. (1992). *The socialist system: the political economy of communism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Krause, K. (2012). Hybrid violence: locating the use of force in postconflict settings. *Global Governance*, 18:39–56.

Krause, K. & Jütersonke, O. (2005). Peace, security and development in postconflict environments. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4):447–462.

Kuhlmann, J. & Lippeman, E. (1993). The Federal Republic of Germany: conscientious objection as social welfare, in Moskos, C. & Chambers II, J.W. (eds), *The new conscientious objection: from sacred to secular resistance.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Larres, K. (2002). Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and German unification. *Cercles*, 5:175–182.

Loescher, G. (2002). *The UNHCR and world politics: a perilous path*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance.* Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maley, W. (2006). Democratic governance and post-conflict transitions. *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 6 (2):683–701.

Mallaby, S. (2006). *The world's banker: a story of failed states, financial crises, and the wealth and poverty of nations*. London: Penguin Press.

Malone, D. & Thakur, R. (2001). UN peacekeeping: lessons learned? *Global Governance*, 7 (1):11–17.

Mani, R. (2002). *Beyond retribution: seeking justice in the shadows of war.* Malden: Polity Press.

Marenin, O. (2005). *Restoring policing systems in conflict-torn nations: process, problems, prospects.* Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Marriage, Z. (2007). Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 7 (2):281–309.

Marysse, S., Ansoms, A. & Cassimon, D. (2007). The aid 'darlings' and 'orphans' of the Great Lakes region in Africa. *European Journal of Development Research*, 19 (3):433–458.

Mirzeler, M. & Young, C. (2000). Pastoral politics in the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as change agent. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38 (3):407–429.

Morgan, G. (1990). Violence in Mozambique: towards an understanding of Renamo. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 (4):603–619.

Muggah, R. (ed.) (2006). *No refuge: the crisis of refugee militarization in Africa.* London: Zed Books.

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) (2011). Report of the panel on remedies and reparations for victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Available from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Reparations_Report_en.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Olson, L. & Gregorian, H. (2007). Interagency and civil-military coordination: lessons from a survey of Afghanistan and Liberia. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 10 (1).

Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22 (2):54–98.

Paris, R. (2000). Broadening the study of peace operations. *International Studies Review*, 2 (3):27–44.

Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'. *Review of International Studies,* 28:637–656.

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies*, 36:337–65.

Peet, R. (2009). *Unholy trinity: the IMF, World Bank and WTO.* 2nd edition. London: Zed Books.

Perlmutter, A. (1977). *The military and politics in modern times.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Perlmutter, A. & Bennet, V. (eds) (1980). *The political influence of the military.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Peterman, A., Cohen, D.K., Polermo, T. & Green, A.H. (2011). Rape reporting during war. *Foreign Affairs*, 1 August. Available from http://www.foreignaffairs.

com/articles/68008/amber-peterman-dara-kay-cohen-tia-palermo-and-amelia-hoover-gree/rape-reporting-during-war. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Peterman, A., Palermo, T. & Bredenkamp, C. (2011). Estimates and determinants of sexual violence against women in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *American Journal of Public Health*, 101 (6). Available from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21566049. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Pugh, M. (2005). Peacekeeping and critical theory, in Bellamy, A.J. & Williams, P. (eds), *Peace operations and global order.* New York: Routledge.

Ramsbotham, O. (2000). Reflections on UN post-settlement peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping*, 7 (1):169–189.

Rauch, J. & Van der Spuy, E. (2006). *Police reform in post-conflict Africa: a review.* Pretoria: IDASA.

Reyntjens, F. (2004). Rwanda ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship. *African Affairs*, 103:177–210.

Richmond, O.P. (2003). NGOs, peace and human security. *International Peacekeeping*, 10 (1):2–11.

Richmond, O.P. (2004). UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus. *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (1):83–101.

Richmond, O.P. & Carey, H.F. (2005*). Subcontracting peace: the challenges of NGO peacebuilding.* London: Ashgate.

Rothmyer, K. (2011). They wanted journalists to say 'wow': how NGOs affect U.S. media coverage of Africa. Discussion Paper D-61, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University. Available from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/papers/discussion_papers/d61_rothmyer.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Rupieper, H.J. (1991). Bringing democracy to the frauleins. Frauen als zielgruppe der amerikanischen demokratisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1952. *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 17 (1):61–91.

Schaller, M. (1987). *The American occupation of Japan: the origins of the Cold War in Asia.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Seay, L. (2011). Do we have the Congo rape crisis all wrong? *The Atlantic*, 24 May. Available from http://www theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/do-we-have-the-congo-rape-crisis-all-wrong/239328/. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Seegers, A. (1986). Revolutionary armies of Africa: Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in Baynham, S.J. (ed.), *Military power and politics in black Africa.* Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm.

Seegers, A. & Schellhaas, C. (2009). Peacebuilding – imperialism's new disguise? *African Security Review*, 18 (2):2–15.

Shephard, B. (2011). *The long road home: the aftermath of the Second World War.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Snyder, T. (2010). *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin.* New York: Basic Books.

Stearns, J. (2011). *Dancing in the glory of monsters.* Philadelphia: Public Affairs.

Stedman, S.J. & Tanner, F. (eds) (2003). *Refugee manipulation: war, politics and the abuse of human suffering.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Swart, G. & Solomon, H. (2004). *Conflict in the DRC: a critical assessment of whether the Lusaka ceasefire agreement has been a success.* Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs.

Taylor, A.J.P. (1945). *The course of German history.* London: Routledge.

Tent, J.F. (1984). *Mission on the Rhine: 'reeducation' and denazification in American-occupied Germany.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thom, W.G. (2010). *African wars: a defense intelligence perspective.* Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Tschirgi, N. (2003). Peacebuilding as the link between security and development: is the window of opportunity closing? International Peace Academy Studies in Security and Development. December. Available from http://www.unitarny.org/mm/File/Peacebuilding_as_link_IPA.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Tull, D.M. & Mehler, A. (2005). The hidden costs of power-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence in Africa. *African Affairs*, 104 (416):375–398.

Turner, T. (2007). *The Congo wars: conflict, myth and reality.* London: Zed Books.

UN (United Nations) (2000). Report on the panel on United Nations peace operations A/55/305-S/2000/809. UN General Assembly, 55th session, 21 August 2000. Available from http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

UN (2005). Security Council committee issues list of individuals and entities subject to measures imposed by Resolution 1596. Available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8546.doc.htm. (Accessed 21 August 2012).

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support (2009). A new partnership agenda report: charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf. (Accessed 2 February 2012).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2010). International Human Development Indicators: Gender Inequality Index. Available from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/68606.html. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (2000). *The state of the world's refugees: fifty years of humanitarian action.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2010). Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/review2010.shtml\.

USAID/UNICEF (2006). Strategic framework for the prevention of and response to gender-based violence in eastern, southern and central Africa.

Available from http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/ Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/clusters%20pages/Gender/ Gender%20Training/Handout%204.1%20GBV%20Strategic%20 framework%20-%20final.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

US Library of Congress (2011). *A country study: Germany.* National Security Section. Available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Vinck, P. et al. (2008). Living with fear: a population-based survey on attitudes about peace, justice, and social reconstruction in eastern DRC. Report for the Human Rights Center, University of California at Berkeley, Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University and International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Available from http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ ICTJ-DRC-Attitudes-Justice-2008-English.pdf. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Wainaina, B. (2005). How to write about Africa. *Granta*, 92:91–95.

Young, C. & Mirzeler, M.K. (2002). Rethinking African politics: an interview with Crawford Young. *African Studies Review*, 45 (1):103–114.

Young, C. & Turner, T. (1985). *The rise and decline of the Zairian state.* Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Zepp, M. (2007). *Redefining Germany.* Gottingen: V & R Press.

Endnotes

[1] The UN defines peacemaking as the negotiations to end a conflict, and peacekeeping as the implementation of the agreement reached.

[2] Among the more prominent international PCRD NGOs are Saferworld (http:// www.saferworld.org.uk/); Partners for Democratic Change International (http://www. pdci-network.org/dev/); the International Center for Transitional Justice (http://www. ictj.org/); International Alert (http://www.international-alert.org/); and the Alliance for Peacebuilding (http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/).

[3] There are exceptions to this generalisation. Angola, for example, has followed its own path in PCRD, primarily because it has the revenue to do so. See Collett (2007).

[4] See Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006). Their study identifies serious human resource shortages and structural problems in post-conflict Angola, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Sudan. See also Marenin (2005).

[5] For these and other problems of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) see Azimi (1995).

[6] See also Chandler (2006).

[7] See the UN (2000), Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August, A/55/305-S/2000/809; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda Report: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009), available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ newhorizon.pdf; and Malone and Thakur (2001:11–17).

[8] See also Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005).

[9] See *Time* magazine, 12 November 1945 and 18 September 1950. Available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 792515, 00.html and http:// www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 813243, 00.html.

[10] Western bureaucrats noted: 'The Russians have said constantly: "Give us the women and the youth, and you keep the men" and "The Soviet authorities and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) are making a bid for the women. The equal pay for equal work idea which they push has great appeal"' (Rupieper, 1991:73).

[11] This conclusion is supported by many studies. See http://www.worldvaluessurvey. org/ and http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

[12] It is definitely not the only reason, because whatever the Soviet Union (for example) did would be opposed by the US, thus creating a spiral of escalation.

[13] Communism is not the only ideology that entitles its social engineers to violence. See the discussion of Nazi ideology and the comparison to Stalinism in Snyder (2010).

[14] For example: Angola joined the IMF in 1989 and Mozambique in 1984.

[15] This fear is perhaps best reflected in the title, tone and contents of Crocker (1997).

[16] See www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/july/.../pcrd1.htm and www. africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/.../Framework_PCRD.pdf.

[17] See also Mac Ginty (2011).

[18] Paris's later study of eight war-torn countries since the end of the Cold War (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia) suggests that PCRD in most instances had destabilising side effects (Paris, 2004).

[19] Krause and Jütersonke state: 'About half of all peace support operations (including both peacekeeping and more expansive peacebuilding operations) fail after around five years', with recurring violence acting as the key indicator of policy bankruptcy (2005:449).

[20] http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

[21] See http://www.mdrp.org/ ; http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report.pdf; http//: www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_ReportFinalScanteam.pdf; and http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/ WB_ManagRespScantIndEval_0710.pdf.

[22] The DRC's combatants numbered around 150 000; this number includes nearly 30 000 children (Faltas & Namwira, 2007:9–11).

[23] http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_FS_0808.pdf.

[24] http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_FS_0808.pdf.

[25] Adapted from Krause (2012:39–56).

[26] If there were more people living in the east, the toll in civilian victimisation would be higher. The combined population of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale is 14m. The population of the DRC is 72m (numbers rounded off). See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. (Accessed 7 June 2011).

[27] See for example, Keesbury and Thompson (2010).

[28] See the UNHCR reports.

[29] One estimate of US federal subsidies shows an increase from 1 019 to 1 696 between 1970 and 2006. See http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb_0611-41.pdf.

CHAPTER 4

The Ethics Question: Towards a Normative Framework for PCRD

Deane-Peter Baker

Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) is, as the other chapters in this book make very clear, a contested topic. Underlying the many practical and political issues to be addressed in seeking to develop a policy on PCRD is a range of conceptual and normative issues that must also be considered. Chief among these are ethical questions related to the 'who', 'when', and 'what' of PCRD. Unfortunately, there does not yet exist a single comprehensive ethical framework which satisfactorily addresses these questions. In this chapter, I outline a patchwork of existing theories which each offer partial answers to this normative challenge, and which together represent a reasonable interim framework for addressing the central—and practically significant—questions of ethics in PCRD until such time as a more satisfying and fully comprehensive theory emerges. This approach necessitates the pulling together of three disparate bodies of literature. In the interests of brevity and coherence, I focus in each case on the work of what I take to be the central proponent of each of these theoretical perspectives.

I begin by outlining how the emergence of a sophisticated discussion of the notion of *jus post bellum* (justice after war) and recent work on humanitarian intervention frame this issue. I argue that together these provide sound answers to the normative 'who' of PCRD. I then consider the issue from the direction of the influential literature on the so-called capabilities approach to development ethics, describing how this approach seeks to offer a universalist normative answer to the 'who', 'when' and 'what' of PCRD. Finally, I contend that the African ethic of *ubuntu*, while contested and still largely underdeveloped at the theoretical level, shows potential in addressing the ethical questions of PCRD from an African-specific perspective.

Just war theory: *jus post bellum*

The central ethical framework for assessing armed conflict has long been, and remains, the just war theory. Despite this, there has been little attention

paid to the normative question of the ethical ending of war. That is changing, however, thanks in large part to the work of the Kantian just war theorist Brian Orend. As military ethicist Rebecca Johnson points out '[t]hough many have written on *jus post bellum* (Schuck, 1994; DiMeglio, 2005; Williams & Caldwell, 2006), the approach has been most systematically articulated by Brian Orend of the University of Waterloo' (Johnson, 2008:216).[1]

Because of the relative newness of the topic of *jus post bellum* in the modern debate over the ethics of war, it is a concept which has yet to be fully developed. Orend has himself to date limited his analysis to what he calls the 'classical cases of inter-state armed conflict' in order, he contends, 'to provide a quicker, cleaner route to the general set of post-war principles sought' (Orend, 2006:162). Given that, in the contemporary conflict environment, classical interstate conflicts are the exception rather than the norm, this is a clear limitation on the utility of this framework. This is not, however, an intrinsic problem, as there is no evident reason inherent to the framework that would prevent an expanded account of Orend's principles from applying to the aftermath of asymmetrical, unconventional and civil conflicts. Rebecca Johnson's (2008) work in applying Orend's *jus post bellum* framework to the ethics of conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, while not directly relevant to this discussion, is an instructive example of how Orend's framework can be applied beyond the context in which he originally articulates it.

Before examining Orend's principles for *jus post bellum*, it is important to clarify his understanding of this aspect of just war theory in its broader context. Orend contends that *jus post bellum* is to be taken very seriously: '[v]iolations of *jus post bellum* are just as serious as those of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*' (Orend, 2006:162). Like *jus ad bellum*, responsibility for fulfilling the serious obligation to ensure a just ending to armed conflict falls primarily on the shoulders of the political decision-makers on the just side of the conflict. The latter proviso is important for, Orend argues, 'when or *if an aggressor wins a war, the peace terms will necessarily be unjust*. The injustice of cause infects the conclusion of the war, as readily as it infected the conduct …' (Orend, 2006:162).[2] This is not, however, to suggest that the successful aggressor[3] can just shrug its collective shoulders and ignore any further responsibility. Here Orend (2006:196) points to the so-called Pottery Barn Rule: 'if you break it, you buy it'. Using the example of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Orend writes that '[e]ven if I think the Iraq war unjust, and thus cannot ever pronounce America's post-war policies fully just, I can … still pronounce them *better or worse*, according to the extent to which they would satisfy the ideal, had the inauguration of the conflict been different' (Orend, 2006:196–197).

By Orend's account, then, a just war is a 'start to finish' project, and, as such, the key question is, what is the appropriate goal for a just war? Some have argued that the purpose of a just war is to return things to the way they

were before the act of aggression that started the war (*status quo ante bellum*). Following Michael Walzer (1977:117–126), Orend rejects this view on the grounds that 'we should not aim for the literal restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* … because that situation was precisely what led to war in the first place! How is going back there going to improve things, or show the war was worth it? Also, given the sheer destructiveness of war, any such literal restoration is empirically impossible. War simply changes too much' (Orend, 2006:163).

The just war, then, must aim for something more, namely, *'a more secure and more just state of affairs* than existed prior to the war' (Orend, 2006:163). Central here is Orend's notion of a 'minimally just community'. The purpose of a just war must be for the just party or parties to replace (or perhaps reestablish) the aggressor regime with a political community which 'does all it reasonably can to: 1) gain recognition as being legitimate in the eyes of its own people and the international community; 2) adhere to basic rules of international justice and good international citizenship, notably non-aggression; and 3) satisfy the human rights of its individual members (to security, subsistence, liberty, equality and recognition)' (Orend, 2006:163).

With this end state in mind, Orend (2006:164–165) proposes that a just settlement of a just war entails, firstly, the 'rolling back' of the aggression that caused the war; secondly, that punishment be imposed on the aggressor in the form of both a requirement for compensation of victims and war crimes trials for the initiators of aggression; and, finally, that the aggressor state, if and to the degree necessary, be subject to processes of demilitarisation and 'rehabilitation'.

It is the issue of rehabilitation, which Orend declares to be 'one of the most controversial and interesting with respect to the justice of settlements' (Orend, 2006:165), that is most relevant to the issue of PCRD. But before considering rehabilitation, it is worth weighing the impact on PCRD of Orend's requirement that the aggressor nation pay compensation to the victims of that aggression. It is difficult to disagree with the logic of Orend's claim that '[s]ince aggression is a crime which violates important rights and causes much damage, it is reasonable to contend that, in a classical context of inter-state war, the aggressor nation, "Aggressor", owes some duty of compensation to the victim of the aggression, "Victim"' (Orend, 2006:166). As intuitively appealing as this notion is, however, there is a clear tension between the idea of requiring compensation from a defeated aggressor nation, on the one hand, and the imperative to reconstruct and develop that same nation on the other. Orend, however, is quick to address this concern by applying a broad version of the just war principle of discrimination[4] as a guide to the implementation of this principle. Thus he writes that

> [r]espect for discrimination entails taking a reasonable amount of compensation only from those sources: 1) which can afford it; and 2) which were materially linked

to the aggression in a morally culpable way. If such reparations 'can hardly pay' for the destruction Aggressor meted out on Victim, then that fiscal deficiency does not somehow translate into Victim's moral entitlement to tax everyone left over in Aggressor. The resources for reconstruction simply have to be found elsewhere. (Orend, 2006:167)

The question of where the resources for reconstruction of a defeated aggressor must come from is an important point of concern regarding Orend's theory, which I will discuss below.

While imposing political rehabilitation on the aggressor nation in the aftermath of hostilities must be considered to be a highly invasive measure, Orend argues that 'if the actions of Aggressor during the war were truly atrocious, or if the nature of the regime in Aggressor at the end of the war is still so heinous that its continued existence poses a serious threat to international justice and human rights, then—and only then—may such a regime be forcibly dismantled and a new, more defensible regime established in its stead' (Orend, 2006:169).

There is an important rider to this principle, however. The nation or nations that undertake the task of post-conflict political rehabilitation of an aggressor incur, in so doing, a serious obligation: to assist and enable the new regime in the aggressor nation with the complex, expensive and demanding task of political restructuring. As Orend explains,

[t]his assistance would be composed of seeing such 'political therapy' through to a reasonably successful conclusion—which is to say, until the new regime can stand on its own, as it were, and fulfil its core functions of providing domestic law and order, human rights fulfillment, and adherence to the basic norms of international law, notably those banning aggression. In other words, reconstruction must at least create a minimally just form of government. (Orend, 2006:170)

Here, then, is the central place of PCRD in Orend's *jus post bellum* framework. If the circumstances warrant the controversial and invasive step of replacing the aggressor nation's regime with one that can govern the nation in a minimally just fashion, that will in all likelihood require the victim nation and its allies to invest heavily in the government infrastructure, and even the economy, in order to ensure that the new regime is able to deliver on its responsibility to secure the basic rights of its citizens. Failure to do so would be to fail to achieve the goal of the just war—'*a more secure and more just state of affairs* than existed prior to the war' (Orend, 2006:163).

There is something seemingly paradoxical about this. The claim here is that, under certain circumstances, a nation which has been attacked by an aggressor nation, and which has successfully defeated that aggressor, must not only rebuild its own society and infrastructure in the aftermath of the destruction of war, but must also invest heavily in rebuilding the nation that attacked it. (There is, of course, no paradox here for the nation that

has violated the Pottery Barn Rule. The obligation on the aggressor nation to rebuild and develop the victim nation, in this case, corresponds with the obligation to make compensation to the victim nation.) This situation might be considered to be analogous to the case of the law-abiding citizen who, upon successfully and appropriately defending herself against a violent attacker, is deemed to be morally responsible for paying the attacker's medical bills and post-incarceration employment training.

The paradox is partially defused when we recognise that there is likely significant self-interest involved in seeing the defeated aggressor transformed into a minimally just society, as this significantly reduces the likelihood of future attacks emanating from that nation. The classic examples are Japan and Germany which, since the massive reconstructive efforts undertaken by the US in the aftermath of the Second World War, have turned from being enemies of the US to being among its most reliable allies.

There is a countervailing moral obligation which also softens this seeming paradox. For if, as Orend argues, the principle of discrimination must be applied in the context of the *jus post bellum* to the citizens of the defeated aggressor (to ensure that they are not unfairly punished for the aggressor's actions), then it must certainly also be applied to the citizens of the victim nation. The innocent victims of the aggressor nation's aggression cannot be made to suffer unduly (through, for example, weighty tax increases) in order to ensure the rebuilding of the aggressor nation. So the obligation to conduct PCRD in the aftermath of war applies only to the extent that the victim nation and its allies are able to undertake PCRD without causing undue suffering to their own citizens.

It must, however, be admitted that these considerations do not remove the seeming paradox entirely. In a case in which the victim nation successfully and comprehensively defeats the aggressor nation, in such a manner that there is no reasonable likelihood of the aggressor nation becoming a threat to international peace and stability again in the foreseeable future, then it would seem to be an injustice to require the victim nation to commit its resources to rebuilding the aggressor nation, even when doing so would not impose undue hardship on the citizens of the victim nation. Similarly, the case in which the defeated aggressor nation would no longer be a threat to the victim nation in the future, but possibly to other nations (say, small neighbouring states) is not adequately addressed in Orend's framework. Why should the victim nation, having suffered unjustified harm at the hands of the aggressor nation, and facing no foreseeable future threat from the aggressor nation, contribute its resources to rebuilding the aggressor nation in the interests of protecting other nations from future aggression? Again, this seems to add insult to injury. Finally, Orend's approach applies only to cases which warrant political rehabilitation in the form of regime change. Yet we can imagine many situations in which

externally enforced regime change is not required (for example, where the people of the aggressor state enact regime change on their own). In such circumstances, the internally reformed aggressor nation could conceivably no longer pose any real threat to international peace and stability, but may nonetheless be desperately in need of PCRD to address the damage caused by the war. Orend's framework has nothing to say to this situation. These are important gaps in Orend's framework, even with its limited focus on classical interstate conflicts. And, of course, as stated at the onset of this section, there is the limitation that Orend's conception of *jus post bellum* focuses exclusively on the classic case of interstate warfare, while today's conflict environment makes it far more likely that PCRD will come in the aftermath of an intrastate conflict, perhaps one interrupted by an armed humanitarian intervention.

Nonetheless, none of this is to deny the importance of Orend's framework. Orend's analysis is important not only in establishing the conditions requiring post-conflict reconstruction and development in the aftermath of some interstate wars (something that was not available to us prior to Orend's contribution), but also in his emphasis on the just war being a 'start to finish' project, which gives significant moral weight to PCRD in these circumstances. Furthermore, his broad application of the principle of discrimination — traditionally restricted to *jus in bello* questions of kinetic target selection — is helpful in alerting us to the fact that even in aggressor nations or sub-state groups there are usually significant numbers of people who are, in the relevant sense, innocent of that aggression and who may well be among the appropriate beneficiaries of PCRD.

Just war theory: humanitarian intervention[5]

While not directly focused on PCRD, recent work on the ethics of humanitarian intervention is instructive, and can be viewed as complimenting Orend's work on *jus post bellum*. Since the 1994 Rwanda genocide most ethicists and scholars of international humanitarian law have taken the position that forceful armed intervention is allowable, and perhaps even required, in cases of severe and mass violations of human rights. In such cases the responsibility to protect (the so-called R2P) transfers to the international community.

There is less consensus, however, as to what circumstances warrant humanitarian intervention and how far the responsibilities of the interveners extend. Regarding the former, the closest that exists to a consensus is the view that, the other conditions of *jus ad bellum* permitting, there is a just cause for intervention 'when the human rights violations in a country are so extreme as "to shock the conscience of mankind"' (Tan, 2006:89). This is clearly a subjective test, and the threshold for humanitarian intervention is far from clear. Regarding the extent of the interveners' responsibilities, there is sometimes an assumption that the just intervener must seek to rehabilitate

politically and economically the affected nation in order to ensure a minimally just government and society. However, this is rightly considered by philosopher James Pattison to be too demanding, and potentially an obstacle to necessary interventions taking place. Pattison writes that

> [h]ypothetically, an intervener could be deemed effective overall even if it prevented the violation of only a small number of individuals' human rights. More generally, an intervener does not need to tackle completely the humanitarian crisis in order for its intervention to be effective. As long as its intervention makes an improvement in the crisis compared to what would have happened had it not intervened, this is sufficient for it to be deemed effective. (Pattison, 2010:81)

While the literature on humanitarian intervention does not convincingly impose a duty of PCRD on interveners, it is nonetheless obliquely helpful in addressing the question of whose responsibility it is to conduct PCRD. Here it is Pattison's work that is particularly important. In his 2010 book, *Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: who should intervene*?, Pattison addresses a key unanswered question regarding humanitarian intervention, namely, which specific state, states or supra-state organisation bears responsibility for any particular case of humanitarian intervention. Prior to Pattison addressing this question, the answer was the unsatisfactorily vague idea that responsibility falls to 'the international community', or that 'who can, should' (Miller, 2007:10). Pattison proposes instead what he calls 'the moderate instrumentalist approach'.

According to this approach, the legitimacy of a humanitarian intervener is not a fixed concept, but must instead be measured according to a scale. While the ideal intervener would possess full legitimacy, an intervener could still be morally acceptable if it had an adequate degree of legitimacy (Pattison, 2010:32–34). The same scalar approach would seem to make sense for PCRD. Beyond a basic minimum threshold, it is the most legitimate 'rehabilitator' (as I shall from now on refer to the state, coalition of states or supra-state organisation that undertakes PCRD) that bears the primary moral responsibility for undertaking the task.

But which qualities establish an intervener's or rehabilitator's legitimacy? Regarding humanitarian intervention, Pattison (2010:43–68) convincingly argues that the legal status of the intervener carries very little moral weight. What matters mostly, says Pattison, is effectiveness. While there are, as we shall see, other considerations, it is the likely effectiveness of the intervener in achieving the humanitarian goals of the intervention that carries the most weight. Effectiveness is defined as the likelihood of the intervener succeeding in increasing the enjoyment of basic human rights as a result of the intervention. Because a potential intervener's legitimacy must be assessed prior to the intervention, it is the likelihood of being effective that matters, rather than the actual success of the intervention (though the latter will obviously affect

future assessments of the likelihood of future effective interventions). Again, this seems to be easily applicable in the case of PCRD. While the degree of suffering that PCRD operations seek to address may not be as acute as that addressed by a humanitarian intervention seeking to stop, say, a genocide, the basic notion of seeking to address suffering is common to both, and Pattison's logic carries through to considerations of PCRD.

Pattison's nuanced account singles out three different kinds of effectiveness in humanitarian interventions. First, there is 'local external effectiveness'. Here, the question is whether or not the intervener is likely to succeed in increasing the enjoyment of basic human rights in the community in which the intervention will take place. Second and less obvious, but also important, is 'global external effectiveness', the likelihood of the intervention not doing significant harm to the enjoyment of human rights in the international community (excluding the intervening country and the community in which the intervention takes place, which are addressed separately). This principle might be violated, for example, in a case in which the intervention would lead to regional or even global destabilisation, which might lead to a wider conflict. Finally, there is the issue of 'internal effectiveness', which assesses the impact of the intervention on the citizens of the country undertaking the intervention. As with global external effectiveness, the question here is not whether or not the intervention will increase the enjoyment of basic human rights in the relevant community, but rather whether or not the intervention will unduly decrease the enjoyment of these rights in that community. The latter consideration is particularly important because of the state's responsibilities to its citizens in terms of the social contract.

If we consider the applicability of Pattison's framework to PCRD, it is clear that the 'local external effectiveness' test applies directly to PCRD. Likewise, as Orend's expanded use of the notion of discrimination has already prepared us to accept, 'internal effectiveness' (the impact of the PCRD mission on the citizens of the state or states undertaking that mission) is an important consideration, particularly so for states with fragile economies and relatively low levels of development. 'Global external effectiveness' seems less of a concern for weighing the moral status of a PCRD mission and the reconstructor that undertakes the mission, as it is difficult to imagine cases in which appropriately reconstructing and developing a state in the aftermath of a conflict will threaten the security and stability of other nations.

Following Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach, overall effectiveness is a necessary condition for legitimate humanitarian intervention and for PCRD. Given the fundamental purpose of both humanitarian intervention and PCRD, furthermore, in almost all real-world cases local external effectiveness will be the primary, and a necessary, condition for legitimate intervention. These forms of effectiveness are assessed, in Pattison's

model, according to a counterfactual calculation: is the intervention or PCRD operation likely to lead to an increase in the enjoyment of basic human rights when compared to what would likely be the case if no intervention or PCRD operation takes place?

Pattison goes on to address the qualities, both direct and indirect, of the effective humanitarian intervener. In the interests of brevity I will not rearticulate Pattison's account here, nor will I attempt to describe the qualities of an effective PCRD agent. In an important sense, this book as a whole is an attempt to do that. But the question of effectiveness does not exhaust Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach, and the other features of his theory warrant consideration here. Up to this point, Pattison's approach to the question of who should intervene to carry out the responsibility to protect has been entirely consequentialist in character. But Pattison is careful to stress that while the likely consequences or effectiveness of the intervention are the primary consideration determining the legitimacy of the intervener, there are also non-consequentialist factors which are intrinsically important in assessing the intervener's legitimacy.

The first of these is the humanitarian intervener's likely conduct, that is, the intervener's likely adherence to *jus in bello* norms (centrally, the requirement to employ force only when necessary, and then in a discriminate and proportional manner).[6] In the case of PCRD, the likely conduct of the reconstructor—adherence to domestic and international law, respect for local culture and the like—is clearly also important. As with *jus in bello*, the importance of the reconstructor's conduct is not only because of its likely impact on the effectiveness of the PCRD mission (though poor conduct will almost certainly adversely affect effectiveness), but is instead an intrinsic moral requirement arising out of duties of respect.

The second of the three non-consequentialist factors in Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach to deciding the question of 'who should intervene?' for humanitarian purposes, is the quality of 'internal representativeness'. By this, Pattison means that there is intrinsic value in the prospective intervener's decision making regarding the intervention being (in the broad strokes at least) representative of the opinions of the majority of the citizens of the country undertaking the intervention (through such means as opinion polls, referenda and the like). While this is appropriate for circumstances which require the employment of large-scale armed force, it would seem to be sufficient for PCRD that the decision to undertake the mission be made by a duly elected official in accordance with the nation's laws.[7]

Finally, Pattison's framework imposes the requirement of 'local external representativeness'. This principle requires that the decision to intervene should coincide with the opinions of those in the community that will be subject to the intervention.[8] While easy to overlook, this is clearly a critical

consideration for the legitimacy of a potential reconstructor (and likely easier to ascertain for PCRD than for a potential humanitarian intervention).

To recap, then, adapting Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach to address the question of who bears the responsibility to undertake PCRD missions provides the following useful framework: responsibility falls to the most legitimate potential reconstructor, where that legitimacy is judged, first, by the likely effectiveness of the reconstructor (assessed in terms of local external effectiveness and internal effectiveness), and, second, by a set of non-consequentialist considerations, primarily the reconstructor's likely conduct, the degree to which the reconstructor's presence is welcomed by those in the country that is the focus of the PCRD mission ('external representativeness'), and, to a lesser extent, the degree to which the mission reflects the will of the people of the reconstructor state. This approach is scalar, in that all potential reconstructors that meet the basic requirement of being potentially minimally effective (i.e. not ineffective or counterproductive) in achieving the PCRD mission are potentially liable to bear the responsibility for the mission, but the actual responsibility falls to the potential reconstructor, of those potentially liable, that most fully meets the requirements set out above.

By addressing cases of PCRD by states that were not party to the original conflict, Pattison's approach offers a useful complement to the narrow (but important) coverage of those aspects of Orend's account of *jus post bellum* that address PCRD. Indeed, in combination these two theories arguably address most, if not all, of the 'who' question of PCRD. They do not, however, provide a comprehensive answer to the question of when PCRD is morally required, or what the appropriate goal of a PCRD mission should be. A strong candidate theory for providing guidance for these 'when' and 'what' questions is the capabilities approach to development ethics.

Development ethics: the capabilities approach[9]

The capabilities approach[10] to the ethics of human development originated in the work of the Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen during the early 1970s, and was developed by both Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach differs from Sen's, although there are many substantive overlaps. The most important difference, as far as the purposes of this chapter are concerned, is that Nussbaum seeks to articulate capabilities as a basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their governments. This right to demand appropriate constitutional principles stems from all citizens being viewed as morally equal, and that each individual deserves to be treated as an end. The central capabilities, she argues, together form a basic social minimum, a threshold level below which individuals live lives that are beneath human dignity, lives that are not worthy of being called fully human and even, perhaps, in some cases where the most

important capabilities are compromised—lives that are not properly thought of as human at all.

This, then, is the list of central capabilities, as Nussbaum conceives of them in her influential book *Women and human development* (Nussbaum, 2000:78–80):

- **Life:** Not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
- **Bodily health:** Being able to have health and to be adequately nourished.
- **Bodily integrity:** Being able to move freely from place to place; having one's bodily boundaries treated as sovereign.
- **Senses, imagination, thought:** Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason—and to do these things in a truly human way, informed and cultivated by adequate education. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by freedom of expression; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid unnecessary pain.
- **Emotions:** Being able to have attachments to people and things outside ourselves; not having one's emotional development blighted by over-whelming fear and anxiety or abuse and neglect.
- **Practical reason:** Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life.
- **Affiliation:** To be able to live with others, engage in various forms of social interaction and to show concern for other human beings; to be able to have the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation.
- **Other species:** Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature.
- **Play:** Being able to laugh, play and enjoy recreational activities.
- **Control over one's environment:**
  - **Political:** Being able to participate effectively in political choices which govern one's life.
  - **Material:** Being able to hold property, and being able to seek employment.
  - **Personal:** Being able to decide how and with whom you spend your time.

Briefly, the capabilities approach as applied to human development is the view that human development is advanced by increasing people's capabilities to function, that is, what they are actually able to do and be in a variety of areas of life. Before applying these central capabilities to thinking about PCRD, it is important to consider how the list itself is to be understood. The capabilities above should be understood as articulating a list of real freedoms: spheres of human life in terms of which human beings should have the substantive freedom to exercise choice. Nussbaum distinguishes between basic, internal

and combined capabilities. Basic capabilities refer to capacities that individuals have, or their potentialities. These are necessary for the development of internal capabilities. Internal capabilities are capabilities which have developed in the right environment (under the right external conditions) and which are ready for functioning. Even when people have internal capabilities, they may be prevented from functioning in accordance with them, hence combined capabilities. These are 'internal capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function' (Nussbaum, 2000:84). The list above is a list of combined capabilities, that is, capabilities which individuals actually have, as they are ready to function, coupled with the external conditions required to enable that functioning. The social minimum that the list articulates can therefore be clarified as follows. As a basic social minimum, all citizens ought to have developed in such a way that they have these internal capabilities. Furthermore, the environment needs to be such that the external conditions required for this development, and for the combined capabilities, are in place.

The capabilities in the list above are the central human capabilities, those necessary for human beings to meet the threshold of what it is to live a life worthy of human dignity, and thus to have a chance of living flourishing lives. Nussbaum has what might be called a two-tier view about what it is to live as human beings. The first tier might be called a 'minimally decent life', and the second 'a good life'. The capabilities are meant to help to specify what is meant by each of these. You need to have all of the capabilities on the list for your life to be minimally decent. Moreover, you need to exercise those capabilities well (choose well) in order to live a good life.

Nussbaum argues that practical reason and affiliation play an 'architectonic' role with regard to the other capabilities. Practical reason and affiliation are more fundamental than the other capabilities in that:

- they are what infuse all capabilities with humanity, and as such are necessary conditions for their status as *human* capabilities; and
- without them, the only level of functioning available to an individual is one that we would deem sub-human (Nussbaum, 2000:129).

The capabilities are not to be confused with actual functioning. The capabilities concern merely what we have the real freedom to be or to do. Our functioning concerns what we actually choose to be or to do. The capabilities approach thus does not attempt to prescribe one way of functioning. Following this approach, the goal of development should be to promote capabilities, not actual functioning, in order to give citizens a choice.

There are many ways an individual might choose to exercise a capability. Of those many ways, only some will result in flourishing, for flourishing requires that we make not merely choices, but good choices. But the account

itself leaves open just what flourishing will consist of, that is, what counts as good choices, and it leaves open the possibility that there will be many ways to flourish. The capabilities, Nussbaum says, 'may be concretely realised in a variety of different ways, in accordance with individual tastes, local circumstances and traditions' (Nussbaum, 2000:105).

It is now possible to consider the key aspects of the capabilities approach as far as its application to PCRD is concerned. These are:

* the architectonic role particularly of affiliation in relation to each of the other capabilities
* the requirement that certain external conditions be in place if the combined capabilities are to be realised
* the notion of a basic social minimum
* the claim that as a basic social minimum these capabilities form the basis of constitutional principles all citizens have a right to demand from their governments
* the distinction between capabilities on the one hand and actual functioning on the other, which makes possible the multiple realisability of capabilities to function.

The recognition of the importance of affiliation for human functioning and flourishing, together with the fact that the capabilities are explicitly understood to be realisable in different ways, gives the approach the flexibility to secure its relevance to particular communities and societies. This is not to be understood as prescribing particular ways of functioning, but rather as prescribing that citizens have real opportunities for choice. As such, the capability of affiliation—and affiliation as it will be expressed in each of the other capabilities as an architectonic value—will be realisable in a variety of ways, that is, particular communities will realise it in different ways.

It is clear, then, that our particular functioning, our particular choices to do and to be, will be tied to our particular community, to our affiliation with these people. Thus, in a sense, my particular community is an essential prerequisite for my functioning and my possible flourishing. This, as I will illustrate, agrees strongly with the African ethic of *ubuntu*. What is also clear is that, at least in the contemporary era, my community depends at least in part on the infrastructure and services provided by the state.

The relevance of the capabilities approach to the question of PCRD being addressed in this book is fairly obvious. It is, after all, a normative framework for human *development*. Nussbaum's list, regarded as a basic social minimum, provides an answer both to the 'when' of PCRD—PCRD is required when the basic social minimum is not in place—and to the 'what' of PCRD—the legitimate goal of PCRD is to put in place conditions to enable the basic social minimum to be achieved. For those undertaking the work of PCRD, this

framework offers a helpful way to conceptualise the task and see its validity, even in contexts that are otherwise culturally alien. Thus, for example, although I may not be able to fully appreciate the nature of a culture different to mine and its particular importance to you, I can appreciate that affiliation, as it is expressed in your culture, is an integral, important part of human functioning and flourishing and, thus, that it is as important to you as it is to me. Used in this thin sense, affiliation (and indeed all the capabilities) is sufficiently general and recognisable across cultures to guide and motivate those engaged in PCRD.

Nussbaum's approach is not, however, uncontroversial. As should be clear from the above, and as Nussbaum has defended it, the capabilities approach is conceived in universal terms. It seeks to secure the capabilities as a social minimum for all, given that each individual is an end, in a way which is independent of any particular metaphysical or religious view (Nussbaum, 2000:101). Nussbaum's approach seeks to provide the basis for constitutional principles that *all* citizens can legitimately demand from their governments. While many find Nussbaum's account of the nature of a life worthy of human dignity to be plausibly universal and intuitively appealing, there are many others who are suspicious of claims to universality, even for as metaphysically 'thin' a framework as Nussbaum's—see, for example, Kotan (2010) and, regarding Sen's version of the capabilities approach, Sugden (2006). A possible way to avoid these concerns would be to adopt instead an alternative approach to answering the 'when' and 'what' questions in PCRD which is specific to the African context, namely, the ethic of *ubuntu*.

African ethics: *ubuntu*

While Africa is a vast and culturally, socially and linguistically diverse continent, there is nonetheless an African ethic which is widely affirmed by Africans, namely, that of *ubuntu*. The word *ubuntu* in the Nguni family of languages (which includes Zulu, Xhosa, Swati, Hlubi, Phutu and Ndebele) literally means 'humanness', an idea often captured in the parable 'a person is a person through other people' (in the Nguni languages, *Umuntu ngumuntu ngamantu* or in Sotho-Tswana *Motho ke motho ka batho babang*). Cognate terms in other African languages include *botho* in Sotho-Tswana, *hunhu* in Shona, *umuntu* in Chichewa and *utu* in Swahili. *Ubuntu* has become an increasingly popular term in recent decades. It has been employed by notable figures such as Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and has even become the name of a Linux-based free disk operating system. Former US President Bill Clinton used the term in a speech at the 2006 British Labour Party conference (Coughlan, 2006), and in 2009 Ambassador Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, State Department Special Representative for Global Partnerships, declared the United States to be committed to '*Ubuntu* Diplomacy' (US Department of State, 2009).

For all this positive usage, however, the concept itself has remained rather vague. As many have pointed out (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Farland, 2007), as appealing as the core idea of *ubuntu* is, it lacks any clear mechanism designed to offer guidance for ethical decision making. Furthermore, as Thaddeus Metz points out, two additional concerns have been levelled against the idea that *ubuntu* might be a viable moral theory. Firstly, there is its 'apparent collectivist orientation, with many suspecting that it requires some kind of group-think, uncompromising majoritarianism or extreme sacrifice for society, which is incompatible with the value of individual freedom that is among the most promising ideals in the liberal tradition' (Metz, 2011:533). Secondly, there is the view that, because '*ubuntu* grew out of small-scale, pastoral societies in the pre-colonial era whose world views were based on thickly spiritual notions such as relationships with ancestors (the "living-dead") … it is reasonable to doubt that they are fit for a large-scale, industrialised, modern society with a plurality of cultures, many of which are secular' (Metz, 2011:533–534).

In response to these challenges, Metz has sought to derive an ethical principle which remains broadly true to traditional understandings of *ubuntu*, but which does not require a supernatural basis and which accounts for the importance of individual liberty (Metz, 2011:534). Metz applies the techniques of analytic philosophy to this task in order to develop a moral theory, which he defines as 'roughly a principle purporting to indicate, by appeal to as few properties as possible, what all right actions have in common as distinct from wrong ones' (Metz, 2011:536). This approach is controversial among theorists of African philosophy, many of whom are hostile to the approach taken by analytic philosophers. M.B. Ramose, for example, has accused Metz of 'a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking' (Ramose, 2007:347). Nonetheless, of current accounts of *ubuntu* as a moral theory it is Metz's that offers the most potential for providing an *ubuntu*-based (or perhaps, in deference to Metz's critics, '*ubuntu*-like') approach to the ethics of PCRD.

Metz starts with the widely accepted view that the idea of 'humanness' that is at the heart of *ubuntu* means that 'one can be more or less of a person, self or human being, where the more one is, the better' and that '[o]ne's ultimate goal in life should be to become a (complete) person, a (true) self or a (genuine) human being' (Metz, 2011:537). According to the *ubuntu* tradition, this goal can in some important sense only be achieved through appropriate communal relationships. This is not, Metz cautions, the same thing as a crude majoritarianism: 'Instead, African moral ideas are both more attractively and more accurately interpreted as conceiving of communal relationships as an objectively-desirable kind of interaction that should instead guide what majorities want and which norms become dominant' (Metz, 2011:538).

From his analysis of the ideal of community in African thought, Metz identifies two central ideas, which he labels 'identity' and 'solidarity'.

> *To identify with each other [identity] is largely for people to think of themselves as members of the same group, that is, to conceive of themselves as a 'we', for them to take pride or feel shame in the group's activities, as well as for them to engage in joint projects, co-ordinating their behaviour to realise shared ends. For people to fail to identify with each other could go beyond mere alienation and involve outright division between them, that is, people not only thinking of themselves as an 'I' in opposition to a 'you', but also aiming to undermine one another's ends.*

> *To exhibit solidarity is for people to engage in mutual aid, to act in ways that are reasonably expected to benefit each other. Solidarity is also a matter of people's attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say, by sympathising with them and helping them for their sake. For people to fail to exhibit solidarity would be for them either to be uninterested in each other's flourishing or, worse, to exhibit ill-will in the form of hostility and cruelty.* (Metz, 2011:538)

Identity and solidarity are conceptually distinct (i.e. it would be possible to display one without the other), therefore Metz emphasises that to achieve *ubuntu* one must exhibit both. In combination, says Metz, identifying with others and exhibiting solidarity towards them is what we generally mean by the idea of 'friendship'. Thus, in order to act rightly and in accordance with *ubuntu*, we must 'prize or honour' friendly or communal relationships (Metz, 2011:539). Importantly, this attitude is what stops *ubuntu* from being a solely teleological or consequentialist theory, in contrast with the idea that right action is defined simply by seeking to 'maximally produce communal relationships (of identity and solidarity) and reduce anti-social ones (of division and ill-will)' (Metz, 2011:539–540). As Metz points out:

> *A moral theory that focuses **exclusively** on promoting good outcomes however one can (which is 'teleological') has notorious difficulty in accounting for an individual right to life, among other human rights. I therefore set it aside in favour of an ethical approach according to which certain ways of treating individuals are considered wrong at least to **some** degree 'in themselves', apart from the results. Honouring communal relationships would involve, roughly, being as friendly as one can oneself and doing what one can to foster friendliness in others without one using a very unfriendly means. This kind of approach, which implies that certain ways of bringing about good outcomes are impermissible (and is 'deontological'), most promises to ground human rights.* (Metz 2011:540, emphasis in the original)

Following this line of reasoning, Metz is able to derive from the vague if appealing idea that 'a person is a person through other persons' the following precise formulation of an ethic of *ubuntu*: 'actions are right, or confer *ubuntu* (humanness) on a person, insofar as they prize communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other, or share a way of life, and exhibit solidarity toward one another, or care about each other's quality of life'

(Metz, 2011:559). How, we might ask, does this work in practice? Metz provides us with the following illustration:

> *Actions such as deception, coercion and exploitation fail to honour communal relationships in that the actor is distancing himself from the person acted upon, instead of enjoying a sense of togetherness; the actor is subordinating the other, as opposed to co-ordinating behaviour with her; the actor is failing to act for the good of the other, but rather for his own or someone else's interest; or the actor lacks positive attitudes toward the other's good, and is instead unconcerned or malevolent.* (Metz, 2011:540)

This is, obviously, only the briefest of summaries of Metz's account of *ubuntu*. Nonetheless it should be sufficient to make it clear that Metz has done us a great service by articulating what we must concede to be a viable African contender against moral theories of Western genesis like utilitarianism or Kantianism. This brief summary should also be a sufficient basis from which to address the question of the relationship between *ubuntu* and PCRD, a task to which I now turn.

Perhaps the most useful avenue by which to get to an understanding of an *ubuntu*-based perspective on PCRD is via the notion of human rights, for, as my discussion of both Orend and Nussbaum illustrates, the basis of a minimally just society—which must be considered to be the intended end-state of a process of PCRD—must be something like a commitment to human rights. As Metz points out, 'to observe human rights is to treat an individual as having a dignity, roughly, as exhibiting a superlative non-instrumental value. Alternatively, a human rights violation is a failure to honour people's special nature, often by treating them merely as a means to some ideology such as racial or religious purity or to some prudentially selfish end' (Metz, 2011:542). Clearly a conception of something like human rights is an important feature of any moral which gives adequate weight to the claims we think that individuals hold against other individuals and groups, even in the face of consequentialist considerations.

Can an *ubuntu*-based moral theory account for non-instrumental human rights? Metz thinks so. From the perspective of someone seeking the status of *ubuntu*,

> [o]ne is to develop one's humanness by communing with those who have a dignity in virtue of their capacity for communing. That is, individuals have a dignity insofar as they have a communal nature, that is, the inherent capacity to exhibit identity and solidarity with others. According to this perspective, what makes a human being worth more than other beings on the planet is roughly that she has the essential ability to love others in ways these beings cannot … While the Kantian theory is the view that persons have a superlative worth because they have the capacity for autonomy, the present, ubuntu-*inspired account is that they do because they have the capacity to relate to others in a communal way.*[11] (Metz, 2011:544)

To understand this more fully, it will help to briefly consider the kinds of human rights that can be underpinned by *ubuntu*. Metz contends that *ubuntu*-derived rights include rights to liberty, rights to security, rights to political participation and rights to socio-economic assistance (Metz, 2011:548–551). By way of illustration, consider for example Metz's comments regarding the right to security (clearly an important right in the context of PCRD):

> *Although innocent people have human rights to liberty, they also have human rights to protection from the state, which can require restrictions on the liberty of those reasonably suspected of being guilty … The judgment that offenders do not have human rights never to be punished, or that violent aggressors do not have human rights never to be the targets of (perhaps, deadly) force, is well explained by the principle that it does not degrade another's capacity for friendliness if one is unfriendly toward him as necessary to counteract his own proportionate unfriendliness. In addition, the judgment that innocents have human rights against the state to use force against the guilty as necessary to protect them is well explained by the principle that it would degrade the innocents' capacity for friendliness, would fail to treat it as the most important value in the world, if the state did not take steps, within its power, to effectively protect it from degrading treatment by others.* (Metz, 2011:548–549)

The rights discussed by Metz, and perhaps others like them that might be derived from the ethic of *ubuntu*, offer a normatively compelling framework for PCRD efforts in the African context. If, as has been argued above, the purpose of PCRD is to establish the functioning of a minimally just government and society (providing the normative answer to both the 'when' and 'what' of PCRD), then these *ubuntu*-defined rights give content to what the notion of 'minimally just' must look like in the African context, and set the agenda for the reconstructor attempting to rebuild the institutions of a conflict-ravaged society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described a patchwork of existing ethical theories that, though not without controversy, together offer a reasonable, if theoretically unsatisfying, interim answer to the normative 'who', 'when' and 'what' questions of PCRD.

The emerging concept of *jus post bellum* gives us a partial answer to the 'who' and 'why' of PCRD. In the case of a classic interstate war in which the victim of aggression successfully resists and defeats the aggressor state, it may be morally required of the victim state and its allies that they politically rehabilitate the aggressor state, which would partially involve activities that fall under the PCRD banner. In the case of an interstate war in which the aggressor is victorious, then the aggressor state incurs a responsibility for PCRD under the Pottery Barn Rule, as a subset of its responsibility to compensate the victim state. Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach, adapted from the context of humanitarian intervention, covers many of the gaps in the answer to the

'who' question that are left by Orend's *jus ad bellum* framework, by addressing cases of PCRD conducted by states that were not parties to the original conflict. Pattison's framework extends the answer to the 'who' question for most PCRD operations beyond the vague and unsatisfying answers of 'the international community' and 'who can, should'. The instrumental or consequentialist aspect of Pattison's theory emphasises the effectiveness of the reconstructor, but this is moderated by a set of non-consequentialist considerations, primarily the reconstructor's likely conduct, the degree to which the reconstructor's presence is welcomed by those in the country that is the focus of the PCRD mission ('external representativeness'), and, to a lesser extent, the degree to which the mission reflects the will of the people of the reconstructor state.

Nussbaum's capabilities approach to the ethics of development provides a framework, ostensibly universal in nature and capable of being recognised globally due to the capabilities approach's broad yet specific focus on human flourishing, to answer the 'when' and 'what' of PCRD. Corresponding broadly with Orend's notion of a minimally just society, Nussbaum's list of human capabilities provides an account of a basic social minimum. A society which dropped below that minimum would in so doing become a legitimate subject for PCRD, and the goal of that PCRD operation would be to enable basic human flourishing as defined by Nussbaum's list of human capabilities.

Though Nussbaum's capabilities approach offers the advantage of being well developed and widely respected, it is not uncontroversial, particularly in the claim to universality. An alternative answer to the 'when' and 'what' of PCRD in the African context might yet be derived instead from the ethic of *ubuntu*. Though still under-theorised and contested, the ethic of *ubuntu* shows potential to supplant or augment Western ethical notions in the African context, and following something like Metz's account thereof, with its emphasis on 'identity' and 'solidarity', could well provide a comprehensive framework for the 'when' and 'what' of PCRD. Indeed, though not addressed here, the ethic of *ubuntu*, appropriately developed, could potentially provide a comprehensive answer to the full range of ethical questions associated with PCRD in the African context. Clearly, it is desirable that African norms should drive PCRD in Africa, and developing a fully comprehensive account of this kind should be a priority for scholars of African ethics. Such an account is certainly desirable to replace the minimally adequate but theoretically unsatisfactory patchwork of existing theories that are currently available to address this critical ethical issue.

Bibliography

Baker, D.-P. (2010). *Just warriors, inc.: armed contractors and the ethics of war.* London: Continuum. (Published in the US in February 2011).

Baker, D.-P. & Roberts, D. (2007). Extending just war theory: the *jus ad bellum* and the capabilities approach to armed conflict. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 35 (2):21–38.

Coughlan, S. (2006). All you need is *ubuntu*. BBC News Magazine. 28 September. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/5388182.stm. (Accessed 6 July 2012).

DiMeglio, R.P. (2005). The evolution of the just war tradition: defining *jus post bellum*. *Military Law Review*, 186 (4):116–163.

Enslin, P. & Horsthemke, K. (2004). Can *ubuntu* provide a model for citizenship education in African democracies? *Comparative Education*, 40 (4):545–558.

Farland, D. (2007). 'African intuitions' and moral theory. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 26 (4):356–367.

Johnson, R. (2008). *Jus post bellum* and counterinsurgency. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 7 (3):215–230.

Kotan, M. (2010). Freedom or happiness? Agency and subjective well-being in the capability approach. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 39 (3):369–375.

Lang, G. (2011). Excuses for the moral equality of combatants. *Analysis*, 71 (3):512–523.

McMahan, J. (2011). *Killing in war*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Metz, T. (2011). *Ubuntu* as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 11 (2):532–559.

Metz, T. (2012). An African theory of moral status: a relational alternative to individualism and holism. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 15 (3):387–402.

Miller, D. (2007). The responsibility to protect human rights. Working Paper Series, SJ006, May. Oxford: Centre for the Study of Social Justice, University of Oxford.

Moellendorf, D. (2008). *Jus ex bello*. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16 (2):123–136.

Nussbaum, M. (2000). *Women and human development: the capabilities approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Orend, B. (2006). *The morality of war*. Toronto: Broadview Press.

Pattison, J. (2010). *Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: who should intervene?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ramose, M.B. (2007). But Hans Kelsen was not born in Africa: a reply to Thaddeus Metz. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 26 (4):347–355.

Rodin, D. (2005). *War and self defense*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schuck, M. (1994). When the shooting stops: missing elements in just war theory. *The Christian Century*, 111 (30):982–984.

Sugden, R. (2006). What we desire, what we have reason to desire, whatever we might desire: Mill and Sen on the value of opportunity. *Utilitas*, 18 (1):33–51.

Tan, K. (2006). The duty to protect, in Nardin, T. & Williams, M.S. (eds), *Nomos XLVII: humanitarian intervention*. New York: New York University Press.

United States Department of State (2009). Ambassador Elizabeth Frawley Bagley sworn in as special representative for global partnerships. Media Note, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2009. Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125278.htm. (Accessed 6 July 2012).

Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations.* New York: Basic Books.

Williams, R.E. & Caldwell, D. (2006). *Jus post bellum*: just war theory and the principles of just peace. *International Studies Perspective*, 7 (4):309–320.

Endnotes

[1] Darrell Moellendorf's work (2008) on what he calls *jus ex bello*—the justice of exiting war—is also important and overlaps with the literature on *jus in bello*.

[2] This view is at odds with more traditional accounts of just war theory, which view *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* as discrete. Orend is one of a growing number of specialists in the ethics of armed conflict (e.g. Rodin, 2005, and McMahan, 2011) who argue that this traditional separation between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* is indefensible. For an enlightening discussion of this issue see Lang (2011).

[3] 'Aggressor' here is code for the unjust side engaged in a war, the side that has committed what Walzer (1977) calls 'the crime of aggression'. Of course it is entirely feasible for both sides in a conflict to be engaged in war unjustly, though not for both to be engaged in war justly.

[4] In its narrow sense, the principle of discrimination is applied in the context of *jus in bello*, and requires that combatants discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, deliberately targeting only the former.

[5] This section draws on the longer account of Pattison's theory that I give in Baker (2010:144–160).

[6] Pattison also contends that we should extend the traditional view of *jus in bello* to include not only the familiar 'external' principles of *jus in bello* (the norms guiding the intervener's treatment of civilians and enemy combatants), but also 'internal' principles of *jus in bello*, norms guiding the intervener's treatment of its own soldiers and citizens. While there may be some considerations here that could be adapted for the case of PCRD, they are not central and I will therefore not address them in this chapter.

[7] It might be argued that, in this regard at least, the conduct of PCRD missions by states with a democratic form of government should be considered to be more legitimate than potential reconstructors that have an autocratic form of government.

[8] More specifically, I am concerned here with the opinions of those (in the community that is the focus of the intervention) who are being negatively affected by the widespread and severe human rights abuses which provide the essential basis for a legitimate humanitarian intervention. Thus, the opinions of those carrying out the abuses, or those who give tacit or explicit approval to the carrying out of those abuses, do not count.

[9] This section draws on Baker and Roberts (2007:21–38).

[10] The capabilities approach is also frequently referred to as the 'capability approach'.

[11] Important here is the idea of a threshold ability to 'relate to others in a communal way'. While some people certainly have a greater ability to do this than others, all whose capacity to do so is above a reasonably defined threshold should be considered

to be entitled to be treated with equal dignity to all others who are beyond that threshold. Of course this leaves the question of how we should treat those who fall below that threshold, but while that is an important question, it is not central for the purpose of this chapter. As Metz points out, 'literally every non-arbitrary and non-speciesist theory of what constitutes human dignity faces the problem that some human beings lack the relevant property' (Metz, 2011:544–545). Metz proposes an *ubuntu*-based response to this issue in Metz (2012).

CHAPTER 5

Developmental Peace Missions:
The South African Conceptual Approach

Laetitia Olivier

Introduction

After multinational military intervention in situations of large-scale armed conflict, the relevant host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position. Not only does it have to reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also build basic infrastructure to support peacebuilding initiatives or rebuild the infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict. Roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must be removed. If these challenges are not effectively resolved, the situation can easily sustain the conditions, and garner resentments, that led to the conflict in the first place. In addition, military forces are often repeatedly deployed in peace operations, usually with a United Nations (UN) mandate, to put an end to hostilities, but are then retained in the theatre of operations for an indeterminate amount of time. By and large, this goes without a clear exit strategy and without a clear mandate to execute peace-operation tasks, other than that of providing security and stability (Williams, 2005:15). There is often no well-established strategy to quickly make the transition from the military intervention or involvement to the longer term peacebuilding role of international organisations and nongovernmental organisations.

Over the years, the functional gap between peacekeeping and peace-building has been problematic and remains a challenge in international peace missions. In some instances, peace missions have succeeded, only to lapse back into conflict, especially in the African context, which is the region with the highest concentration of large, costly peace missions. In South Africa, since 2004, the concept of developmental peace missions (DPMs) has been developed as a conceptual tool to work towards integrated efforts at both the strategic and operational levels to fill the institutional gap between military peacekeeping and development activities and primarily to increase the success rate of peace missions on the continent. The concept was formally introduced and presented to the South African Parliament, based on several initiatives and research facilitated by then Deputy Minister of Defence, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge,

in conjunction with members of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2006:14, 2007).

The concept of DPMs was accepted by the SA Army as one of the supporting concepts of its 'How-to-Fight Strategy' to be utilised during missions in support of peace and security in the region as outlined in the 'Future SA Army Strategy'. As such, it also forms an underlying approach in the 'SA Army Vision 2020', which has positioned the SA Army for its ever-increasing role in Africa (SA Army, 2009:2–25, 2–28). The SA Army is currently in the process of further exploring and developing its post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) strategy and structure, and the concept of DPMs is central to these investigations. It is also of interest to note that the notion of DPMs is currently being institutionalised by the SA Army, as the force design and force structure of a PCRD cell is being developed to form part of the SA Army's overall force design. The intention is to staff the PCRD cell with primarily Reserve Force members who have specialised knowledge and experience in fields related to PCRD, such as town planning, engineering and public administration.

Most recently, the Draft Defence Review 2012 specifically pronounced that *developmental peacekeeping* will 'inevitably be executed' in a joint inter-departmental, interagency and multinational context (DOD, 2012:154). This being said, the main aim of this chapter is to reflect on DPMs as a conceptual framework. The focus will be placed on peace missions in a global context and then shift to an analysis of the implementation possibilities of DPMs as a conceptual framework in relation to the successful conduct of multifunctional peace missions. Attention is also given to critical success factors which will have to be met as a precursor for the successful implementation of DPMs.

Background

DPMs were created as a practical or functional concept to effectively address human security and development in response to the UN's mixed success record in the field of international peacekeeping endeavours (Gueli et al., 2006a:8). Beginning in 2004, the concept was investigated in terms of its utility and applicability in Africa, in view of the increased numbers of members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) who were being deployed in peace missions on the continent. The initial research was conducted by a core of four researchers: Richard Gueli, Sybert Liebenberg, Elsona van Huyssteen and Orienda Maitlin. The project was funded by the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE), a partnership project between the European Commission and the South African National Treasury, with additional funding provided by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). The sections that follow draw extensively on the work of these researchers.

According to Gueli et al. (2006a:8), peacebuilding efforts usually start during the post-conflict phase of a peace mission, generally following the signing of a ceasefire or comprehensive peace agreement. Policy-makers sometimes insist or believe that distinguishing between military and civilian activities in peace missions provide them with a clear line, delineating specific roles and responsibilities during the respective stages of conflicts. This, in effect, emphasises a linear or sequential approach to solving conflict situations, and is in accordance with traditional approaches to dealing with security problems in a military context. But the UN's record over the past few decades has largely dispelled such traditional ideas and practices. Two enduring lessons that the UN has learned through years of experience in responding to conflict is that speed and momentum do matter in peace missions, and that effective missions require integrated effort, not separate tracks which do not converge. Peacekeeping efforts in Africa, such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d'Ivoire, have shown that military activities can prove counterproductive if continued for too long, and if not complemented with real economic growth and social upliftment. Such lessons are especially relevant if one considers that a UN report estimated that roughly half of all peace missions have a chance at success after the signing of peace agreements, and that the chances appear to be even lower when warring parties fight for control over valuable resources (Gueli et al., 2006a:6). To put this differently, conflicts on the African continent often persist despite various peace initiatives (Solomon, 2006:219). To this end, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in 1998 that peacekeeping and peacebuilding elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations (UN Secretary-General, 1998:81). This is why it is essential to have a multilateral systems approach towards solving conflict, which will contribute to more integrated and coordinated actions in establishing peace.

In the past, UN peace missions were essentially focused on the inter-positioning of peacekeepers between warring factions. Gueli et al. (2006a:15) argue that, as a rule, 'this entailed separating warring factions from each other and assisting the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from cease-fire lines, without effectively addressing long-term development and peacebuilding activities'. But, progressively, the UN found itself in the 1990s in the midst of a series of violent and complex intrastate wars which called on the political, military, humanitarian and developmental components of the UN system for integrated action.

Viewed from another angle, recent history has proven that the traditional UN approach to peace interventions has generally attained limited success, and that conflict often breaks out as soon as the peacekeeping forces withdraw. Moreover, studies on post-Cold War third-party interventions have

indicated that a strictly military strategy has been the most common form of intervention, but such interventions only succeeded 30 per cent of the time (Regen, 1996:345). By most accounts, a significant number of states have failed to consolidate peace, and new wars have sometimes generated greater violence than before (Call & Cousens, 2008:1).

There are many reasons for the mixed successes that the UN has achieved with peace missions. A primary reason is that there is usually a long delay between the end of peacekeeping and the start of peacebuilding—the so-called *reconstruction gap*. It has become evident that the longer it takes for peacebuilding activities to commence, the greater the probability that a country will return to conflict (Bakhet, 2001; Gueli & Liebenberg, 2007). The traditional processes of focusing on establishing security first, and only then addressing developmental issues, have proven inadequate to effectively address modern complex emergencies. In response to this, the UN has introduced some changes aimed at addressing some of the underlying causes of conflict during the early stages of a mission. Specifically, changes have been made to the traditional linear approach that essentially considered 'security as a precursor for development' (Gueli et al., 2006b:5), especially following the findings of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000, also known as the Brahimi Report (Gueli et al., 2006b:12–13).

In view of the above, Gueli and Liebenberg (2006:13) state that through years of experience in responding to conflict, the UN has learned that successful operations require that peacebuilding must be brought closer to peacekeeping in order to effectively close the reconstruction gap (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2007).

The concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil–military operations which bridge the traditional 'gap' between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution. Colonel Garland Williams, who commanded a US Army engineering battalion in Kosovo and helped to direct NATO reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, argues that the reconstruction gap frequently leads to renewed outbreaks of violence among belligerents. He emphasises the notion that 'all efforts should be made to blitz the country's infrastructure repair and reconstruction efforts sooner than later during peace missions' (Williams, 2005:xiii). Failure to do so will lengthen the deployment times of peacekeepers, and will mean that the international community's efforts, as carried out by multinational organisations, will continue to be reactive rather than preventive. This notion is supported by Barungi and Mbugua (2005:31), who point out that 'experience from across Africa show(s) that there is a need to broaden the intervention strategy from peacekeeping and security agreements to post-conflict reconstruction activities that address the root causes of conflict, confidence-building measures between divided parties and people, and changing the pervasive culture of violence and conflict'.

This is precisely what is pursued in the DPMs approach, as I explore further in the sections below.

Between peacekeeping and peacebuilding: the reconstruction gap

Essentially, the concept of DPMs calls, firstly, for a more timely effort to bring security closer to development in order to minimise the return of conflict. Secondly, it aims to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer term statebuilding efforts. To this end, the concept of DPMs is based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible—even when conflict is ongoing—could contribute towards security, peace and obtaining long-term political order and economic legitimacy. Fundamentally, the DPM concept calls for a developmental approach and faster mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources, as well as embarking on these initiatives in unison with security efforts. These activities should be coordinated across all levels of the conflict—strategically, operationally and tactically. According to Gueli et al. (2006b:7), '[t]his implies many things, among these, the deployment of civilian peace builders alongside military peacekeepers'. DPMs have thus been presented as a theoretical, as well as a practical, tool to effect peacebuilding in strife-torn nations and to set the stage ultimately for nation building and sustainable security and development.

Broadly viewed, the concept of DPMs seems to be in line with the approach underlying the UN Complex Peace Missions model, which is strongly related to the notion of peacebuilding and the point that modern peace missions should have mandates that combine security, political, humanitarian, developmental and human rights dimensions. The concept of DPMs was presented as a 'home-grown' South African concept or approach which is based on the premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if vital peacebuilding activities are rolled out within a reasonable time. The extended period between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has in the past created opportunities for belligerents to resume their disputes by means of armed conflict, and, as a result, the UN's failure to bridge the reconstruction gap in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Angola within 'reasonable time' has highlighted the weaknesses of the UN as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace enforcer. By 'reasonable' is understood the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development, i.e. the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2006:14).

According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2001:37), the relationship between defence and development is seen as both an oxymoron and a contingent relationship. Williams (2005:57) points out that investment in defence has

traditionally been considered as the use of state resources in an unproductive sector, something which has been highly contested. However, the roles of armed forces in the post-Cold War era have significantly changed from the traditional narrow territorial defence to a broader, societal approach in which the armed forces are just one element in dealing with the security threats that modern societies face. This evolved understanding of the concept of 'defence' emphasises a shift away from the former 'peace–crisis–war' logic, based on the mobilisation of a defence force, to dealing with declared as well as undeclared challenges or conflicts, which means that modern society is in a state of constant preparedness against a multitude of mostly unconventional security threats (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2001:38).

Modern complex peace missions have thus expanded to involve simultaneous political, military and humanitarian activities, and have thus moved beyond the concept of 'traditional' UN peacekeeping, which historically involved primarily *military tasks*, such as monitoring ceasefires, separating hostile forces and maintaining buffer zones (Cilliers & Mills, 1999:1). This means that, since the early 1990s, there has been a shift from this 'traditional' approach to peacekeeping to an understanding that peacekeeping entails much more than the contributions of the military component of a peace mission. The consequence of this is that the traditional distinctions between civilian readiness—both state and NGO—and military readiness are undergoing significant change and are being incorporated into what is called 'integrated thinking' in defence circles.

This broadening of peace missions further implies a more fluid, non-linear interpretation of peacebuilding, and suggests that peacebuilding can either accompany or immediately succeed military operations in order to ensure sustainable development and security (Tschirgi, 2003:2). In 1998, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that 'peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities, used in combination and as complements to one another' (UN Secretary-General, 1998:8). As a result of this realisation, modern peace missions have increasingly been approached by most role-players in terms of a systems-thinking approach which demands integrated simultaneous action, as opposed to the previously, essentially linear fashion that was adopted in terms of problem-solving techniques and approaches.

The shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multidimensional operations has also entailed the inclusion of substantial civilian components in many UN and African Union (AU) missions. This followed a realisation that the initial response to conflict cannot rest solely on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but that the initial response should also include a group of special civilian teams which can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic institutions (Gueli et al., 2006a:22)—even before peace agreements are brokered, break

down or potentially exacerbate more conflict. This is aimed at preventing, *inter alia*, slow mission build-up, prolonged military action, delayed civilian reconstruction build-up and insufficient dedicated civilian reconstruction resources. At the same time, it is evident that multinational intervention in intrastate wars will involve considerable costs for those states that initiate the intervention, and that the intervention often impedes, rather than aids or expedites, the process of domestic political reconstruction, which, ultimately, provides the only long-term solution to the conflict that precipitates the intervention (Clapham, 2000:212).

The AU, drafting its PCRD policy since the mid-1990s, has clearly realised and has stated that experience has proven that in the early phases of transition from conflict to peace, 'peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of violence high' (AU, 2012). This is because countries emerging from conflict are characterised by weakened or nonexistent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as widespread poverty. In addition, the AU (2012) maintains that responses to post-conflict situations have, in the past, been fragmented and thus largely ineffectual. The AU's PCRD policy goes beyond merely addressing the physical conflict that forms part of intrastate wars, taking into consideration that PCRD activities do not cease with stabilisation, but seek to achieve long-term sustainable development as envisaged by the African Renaissance vision (AU, 2006, 2012).

In this context, Gueli and Liebenberg (2007) argue that the functional gap between military peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding or 'post-conflict reconstruction' has 'received a lot of attention, because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of the UN conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions'. Experience has shown that 'the window between the end of military action and the start of development is very narrow and that the first few months and weeks following an intervention are perhaps the more critical period for laying the ground work for peace and establishing the credibility of foreign forces' (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2006:14). DPMs could therefore be used as a useful approach to appease the local population and to contribute to the establishment of security.

To this effect, it has been argued by those who developed DPMs that the concept provides a practical approach to effect peacebuilding and, ultimately, to set the stage for nation building and sustainable security and development. The DPMs approach calls for a more timely effort to bring security nearer to development—'the two veritable pillars of all UN peace missions—in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state-building efforts' (Gueli et al., 2006a:6). However, although the notion of

integrating civil–military resources at the earliest possible stage of a mission seems plausible, civilian reconstruction specialists have often been absent in peace missions (Gueli et al., 2006a:7). The result is a situation in which the pace of reconstruction and development becomes very slow. A number of post-conflict societies have relapsed into prolonged armed conflict despite peace initiatives by the UN, as there was no infrastructure or governing institution which provided viable alternatives to the resolution of conflict. This has been the case in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and the DRC. It confirms the assumptions that the response to conflict cannot solely be dependent on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include special civilian teams which can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic activities. To this end, Gueli and Liebenberg (2007) contend that the international community should significantly expand its civilian reconstruction capabilities to be deployed in risky and dangerous conflict zones. This implies a rapid concurrent build-up of military and civilian assets in international peace missions. The following section expands on this in more detail.

The concept of DPMs: assumptions and implementation challenges

Essentially, the concept of DPMs is rooted in the following assumptions (Gueli et al., 2006a:22):

- speed and momentum do matter in peace missions
- effective peace missions require integrated efforts
- security and development are intimately linked (however, the one is not necessarily a precursor for the other)
- the launching of development and reconstruction work as soon as possible can be a major incentive for peace
- the window of opportunity to avert a return to conflict is very narrow
- an effective targeting of the 'window' or 'reconstruction gap' requires that civilian reconstruction experts deploy alongside military forces.

The concept of DPMs can therefore be understood as a post-conflict reconstruction intervention which aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development, which would ultimately result in the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems, and their replacement with 'peace economies' (Madlala-Routledge, 2004:23). This being said, a striking feature of the concept of DPMs is the basic assertion that capacity building and socio-economic development will result in the dismantling of war economies. This view coincides with the contention that there are strong linkages between war economies, scarcity, inequality, institutional weaknesses in societies and their inability to ensure peace and security. In this regard,

Gueli et al. (2006b:5–6, 11) urge caution against a lack of understanding of the workings of war economies, and the assumption that political solutions can be successful without any effective enforcing and complementary developmental strategies to address their underlying economic logic. In some cases, peace missions have even facilitated the functioning of war economies. Although UN peace missions of recent years have introduced some peacebuilding efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict at the early stage of a mission, such initiatives have not been explicitly aimed at, or designed to transform, war economies and to make that part of efforts to ensure long-term development and reconstruction. War economies are often supported and integrated with other regional war economies through military, economic, political and social networks, and such networks need to be targeted and tackled. For example, both Rwanda and Uganda established control over various parts of the DRC between 1998 and 2003. These areas contain rich deposits of commercially viable coltan, diamonds, timber and gold. Dismantling war economy systems should be one of the key endeavours in peacebuilding efforts (Gueli et al., 2006b:11).

It should be clear that those who developed the concept of DPMs did not follow the traditional timeline in terms of the stages of peacekeeping (or peace enforcement, in cases of more forceful action) and peacebuilding. The concept of DPMs proposes that these stages be combined or integrated in order to address the non-linear and interrelated nature of complex emergencies, rather than being approached as separate, but related, concepts of a linear process. On an operational level, this means that post-conflict reconstruction interventions operate in synergy with peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

Against this background, it could be argued that the application of a systems approach to address conflict will enable decision-makers to effectively identify the most important activities and relationships in a manner that is useful for the development of policy to ensure sustainable development and peace on the African continent. This demands that the characteristic delay between security and development in UN and AU operations is, or will be, diminished and that, in fact, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations should be collapsed and integrated into one mutually reinforcing process (Madlala-Routledge, 2004:3).

The intention with the implementation of DPMs is essentially to bring development closer to security, and this essentially implies the deployment of civilian peacebuilders and peace workers in the midst of conflict. But civilians cannot be expected to operate in the face of ongoing violence. In this context, Gueli and Liebenberg (2006:17) suggest that, as security improves, civilian agencies should progressively move into the reconstruction process. Hence, there is a need to correctly sequence and synergise military and civilian tasks. A cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace existing ad hoc institutions

and approaches with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private agencies on board and under control when a crisis emerges. Such capacity can facilitate a greater depth of coordination between the diverse military and civilian agencies involved in a peace mission (Gueli et al., 2006a:7). Fundamentally, DPMs call for an approach which entails faster mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources and embarking on these initiatives parallel to, and in unison with, security efforts. The development of this type of capacity will require better interdepartmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies (Gueli et al., 2006a:7). The concept of DPMs is thus intended to provide decision-makers with a framework in which the challenges related to the security–development nexus can be addressed *simultaneously*, thus decreasing the risk that a country could fall back into a protracted conflict situation.

Role-players and belligerents who have vested interests in the continuation of conflict and disorder need to be dealt with effectively. However, to simply separate or isolate such actors could be immensely problematic, as they often make use of global commodity markets to trade resources for weapons which, in turn, are used to secure access to, and control, valuable commodities. In the opinion of Gueli et al. (2006b:28), this means that

> [p]ossible courses of action, although these entail taking considerable risks, would be to recapture key commercial targets, deny warring parties access to their major sources of sustainability, as well as to capture or remove warlords. Of necessity, this level of outside coercion will involve much more than conventional military power, but also the active participation and tight integration of specialised military units, as well as intelligence and police services.

DPMs should therefore be viewed not only as peace interventions, but in effect, as 'reconstruction interventions' which aim to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of initiatives by the military and civilian components, which are aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development (Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg, 2004). An important feature of the DPMs approach is that it does not distinguish between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as sequential processes, but that these processes should be executed *simultaneously*. As mentioned above, this view implies that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding are integrated into one process. This would require that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers irrespective of the existence of ceasefire agreements (Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg, 2004). It further means that the military should endeavour to create a 'window of opportunity' for peacebuilding personnel in environments in which the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth. For civilians, it implies taking risks in order to ensure the provision of basic services and repair

damage to critical infrastructure at the earliest possible stages of the mission, thus enhancing the overall credibility, legitimacy and sustainability of the mission (Gueli et al., 2006a:6).

The military component of peace missions should, in other words, be augmented with civilian reconstruction at the earliest possible stages of a mission. However, as pointed out, in practice civilian specialists have often been absent from post-Cold War peace missions. Gueli and Liebenberg (2006:15) point out that the reason for this can be ascribed to the fact that few UN contributor states have taken concrete systematic steps to enhance or establish a cadre of civilians with reconstruction expertise, such as in engineering, public administration and law. In addition, many UN missions have proven that there is a distinct lack of joint civilian–military planning and a correspondingly poor transfer from military to civilian responsibility after the peacekeeping or intervention action has commenced. As a result, peacekeeping troops have often been saddled with a disproportionate share of the post-conflict burden (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2006:15). This absence of a rapidly deployable civilian construction element is one of the major factors that jeopardised the success of many peace missions, as this caused the pace of reconstruction and development in post-conflict societies to be too slow.

This being considered, the maintenance of safe and secure environments for peacebuilding cannot rest solely on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include civilian experts who can fast-track the reconstruction of essential services and ensure a seamless transition from short-term responses to long-term assistance. According to Gueli et al. (2006a:22), what distinguishes this sort of civilian capacity from humanitarian aid is that it begins immediately at the cessation of major combat operations, and it goes beyond saving lives to providing the foundation of reconstruction.

The concept of DPMs should, however, not be viewed as a 'one size fits all' solution to peace missions. Furthermore, the active involvement of civil society or civil contractors in peace missions and post-conflict activities is a crucial component for the development of democracies, and is one of the most essential elements for making the transition from conflict to post-conflict state, and in consolidating peaceful politics.

Countries which have suffered extended internal conflicts should be given sufficient time to consolidate and build their own institutions and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, rather than rushing the process by accepting and implementing the largely Western-dictated formulas for functional and open societies. The aim should therefore be to analyse the specific environment in which the peace mission is to take place in great sociological detail, seeking to get as near as possible to the viewpoints of all the local actors, especially in terms of what the local role-players understand about, and could expect from, the peacekeepers in their midst. According to

Gueli et al. (2006b:31), several specific issues need to be addressed in order to effectively conduct DPMs:

- translating a systems-based understanding of conflict into a strategic framework, policies, doctrine and appropriate structures
- establishing and empowering lead agencies that must provide clear strategic direction as well as identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities for those responding to conflict and assisting with reconstruction
- identifying and mobilising the technical requirements relating to funding, institutional structures, skills, capacity and interoperability
- establishing a clear understanding of the reinforcing processes that originally give rise to the conflict in order to effectively address the processes that will sustain the conflict
- mobilising support for the implementation of DPMs interventions by the international community with special reference to the UN, AU and other regional structures
- ensuring the means to accelerate short-term capacity building, service delivery, equitable redistribution of natural resources in accordance with long-term development goals in an unstable, volatile and non-consensual environment
- ensuring the feasibility of deploying civilian reconstruction capacity alongside the military forces in hostile environments
- defining the requirements of a suitable conflict transformation, conflict termination and exit strategies
- assessing Africa's capacity to implement DPMs in support of its own strategic objectives.

The notion of more active involvement by the private sector in reconstruction activities during peace missions is especially important, and was confirmed in a report by the then Department of Foreign Affairs, which assessed the trends and challenges of multidimensional and integrated peace missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2007:11). The report stressed the fact that private-sector actors in Africa should take a proactive stance on providing critical infrastructure and enhancing service delivery in conflict-affected states. In this regard, 'the development of a private–public partnership is critical for the realisation of developmental peacebuilding' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2007:11).

The South African government and the concept of DPMs

From a South African politico-diplomatic point of view, Gueli et al. (2006a:5) are of the opinion that the implementation of the concept of DPMs could hold a number of advantages for South Africa in terms of the role that it can play in the region and on the continent. By embracing the concept of DPMs, they argue, South Africa would be better positioned to play a pivotal role in

implementing and operationalising the AU's PCRD policy in terms of the philosophical approach that has led to NEPAD as an AU programme to enhance Africa's growth, development and participation in the global economy. If successfully applied by the AU and its regional security structures, the South African DPMs approach to peace missions on the continent could improve the successful conduct of peace missions by increasing the opportunities for establishing sustainable development and the basis for economic growth in countries which have suffered from prolonged internal conflicts. In doing so, South Africa's geopolitical standing in Africa could be further elevated, not least because it would be able to assist conflict-ridden states to develop and implement 'African-based' reconstruction frameworks. A dedicated civilian capacity for reconstruction could act as a force-multiplier for South Africa's peacekeepers by allowing the military to focus on fulfilling military objectives and relieving the military as soon as possible once these objectives are attained. The suggested civilian instruments would also undermine the principle of sovereignty to a lesser extent than military intervention and thus offer decision-makers a key tool to rebalance the scales between the principle of non-interference on the one hand and the protection of human rights on the other.

The South African government's approach to peace missions was initially expounded in 1999 in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999), which forced the government to outline its national interests and how these interface with its philosophy on conflict resolution, and indeed its approach to Africa in general. The White Paper not only addressed the philosophical and political aspects of involvement in peace missions, but also the practical aspects of the country's potential contributions.

The White Paper acknowledged the fact that there is no singular short-term approach to resolving crises, and that peacebuilding involves both state and non-state actors. Peace missions should thus be viewed as long-term endeavours, which include a significant investment in peacebuilding. According to the White Paper, peacebuilding involves inculcating respect for human rights and political pluralism, accommodating diversity, building the capacity of the state and civil institutions, and promoting economic growth and equity. This coincides with the point that peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches in addressing violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. The White Paper also alluded to 'conflict-sensitive development', as the document describes peacebuilding as a 'diplomatic/developmental' process and not a primarily 'military responsibility' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:10). At the same time, the document did not say much about developmental issues or challenges, except for referring to a need to attend to

the 'reorientation of the state and its personnel away from partisan interest towards developmental goals' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:10).

The concept of DPMs—although part of the 'Future SA Army Strategy'—has not been fully operationalised in peace missions to which members of the SANDF have been deployed, despite the fact that the concept fits seamlessly into the current UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (UN IPMM, 2006) and the AU's Draft Policy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU, 2006), in which the tasks and roles of military and civilian components involved in peace missions are coordinated and formalised. The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process addresses the issue that NGOs, international organisations and civilian contractors are usually to be found in the respective peace mission areas of operations—even before peacemakers are officially deployed to mission areas. These entities must therefore be included in the planning processes of peace missions (UN IMPP, 2006).

It should be noted, however, that the concept of DPMs has been accepted as an underpinning philosophical framework and a holistic approach to peace missions by the SANDF and its Joint Operations Division and several DOD policies, governing documents and doctrine. This especially includes references to the 'reconstruction gap' and an emphasis on the need for integrated military and civilian responses and contributions to peace missions in the context of sustainable economic development. The most recent policy document in which the concept of DPMs is addressed, is the Draft Defence Review 2012, which was originally scheduled for approval by 30 September 2012. Although the concept of DPMs has, until now, not been specifically or explicitly applied during peace missions in which members of the SANDF have been deployed, primarily as a result of budgetary constraints, it does, however, highlight an important shift in the mindset of South African military practitioners. It creates an organisational framework and approach to peace missions which is based on the premise that the military is incapable of providing all the solutions to complex peacekeeping problems and that integration with civilian and governmental organisations is key to the success of peace missions. At the same time, the widespread support in military circles for DPMs as a framework for peace missions calls for specifically designed and structured forces to optimally institutionalise and practically implement the concept.

The Draft Defence Review 2012 makes it clear that Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy, and that South Africa must continue to support regional and continental processes to respond and resolve crises. South Africa, and this specifically involves the South African military, must therefore consequently remain a leading role-player in conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict recon-struction. The country should also strengthen regional integration, increase

inter-African trade and development and—importantly—champion sustainable development and related opportunities on the African continent. In addition, peace, stability and security are viewed as essential preconditions for development (DOD, 2012:39). This last perspective clearly links South Africa's diplomatic and security role on the continent with a developmental dimension and approach.

As far as the South African military is concerned, the Draft Defence Review 2012 pronounces—clearly on the basis of DPMs, or at least coinciding with the concept—that the military will pursue reconstruction and conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives. Practically, this boils down to providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately in the post-conflict phase—operations which will enable and reinforce the process of development and reconstruction. At the same time, the authors of the Draft Defence Review 2012 make it clear that a purely military approach to peace missions cannot address the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peacebuilding as this will not effectively pursue lasting stability and conditions relating to human security. To this effect, a multidimensional developmental agenda will be pursued, by involving military and civilian bodies in cooperation to accelerate capacity building and socio-economic development (DOD, 2012:154).

It is, however, essential to bear in mind that, in order to meet the implementation challenges of integrated or hybrid missions, states which contribute troops to UN peace operations—including South Africa—need to steer away from any ad hoc, piecemeal and fragmented responses to complex emergencies (Gueli & Liebenberg, 2006:17). To effectively address complex emergencies, it is essential to establish an overall political framework and institutional base, backed by permanent staff for developing plans and procedures for integrated civilian–military efforts. Also, the absence or weakness of any specific coordinating entity for reconstruction within Africa's peace and security architecture would result in the ineffective use of available resources. All of this implies major challenges to role-players within the AU and related institutions.

Lastly, although Gueli and Liebenberg (2006:16) rightly admit that some civilian contractors, especially private military companies, have been blamed for instigating and intensifying wars, even selling weapons to warring factions, they correctly assert that contractors will continue to be hired in the global market, especially where international and regional actors depend on donor countries. They also correctly contend that it is more effective to draw on the relative capabilities of both the private and public sectors, and to utilise the complementary benefits of both from the outset of a peace mission. It can also be pointed out that international actors such as the UN and the AU have

already taken significant steps towards smoother coordination of military and civilian assets on the ground as part of an institutional approach which has become known as the integrated missions approach.

Conclusion

The concept of DPMs was presented to the South African Parliament in 2004 as a 'home-grown' solution to promote long-term sustainable security and development on the African continent. From a politico-diplomatic point of view, it is also important to note that South Africa is expected to act as a 'lead nation' in peace missions on the African continent, and that the country has developed and committed itself clearly to a particular peacekeeping approach on the continent is significant and laudable. However, it cannot really be claimed that the approach underlying DPMs is unique to South African security thinking. The notion of DPMs coincides with the current international approach to peace missions, in that the mandates of contemporary peace missions mostly include and address both peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. It also supports the internationally accepted approach to peace missions that is based on the notion that security can no longer be regarded as a precursor for development, and that there is a need to efficiently link security and development as twin imperatives through integrated policies and programmes from the start of peace operations.

Most, or many, of the conflicts on the African continent can ultimately be ascribed to the struggle to gain control over resources, coupled to the absence of good governance, effective institutions and sustainable development initiatives. The concept of DPMs emphasises the notion that the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. It is aimed at directly addressing the causes of the many intrastate wars in Africa, by not only providing short-term peace and security, but also providing long-term solutions to the conflict by establishing the foundations for sustainable peace and development. In terms of conflicts in Africa, DPMs are aimed at bringing peacekeeping closer to development in order to minimise the chances of a return to violence—a phenomenon prevalent in Africa, where peace missions seem to have a less than 50 per cent chance of success. In fact, history has proved that in more than 60 per cent of interventions, belligerents return to the use of violence within five years after the peacekeepers have left the country. DPMs aim at providing a strategy to quickly make the transition from the military's peacemaking and peacekeeping mission to the longer term peacebuilding missions of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations.

DPMs therefore offer a useful framework for the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence

the effectiveness of development. However, in order for the DPMs concept to be effectively operationalised, it is evident that very large amounts of funds, personnel and resources will have to be made available over extended periods of time. In the case of Africa, this implies (continuously) employing donor support from developed countries. This will most probably not pose insurmountable problems, as history has shown that the developed world is, in fact, more willing to provide funds and resources, rather than peacekeepers, to peace missions in Africa, while African countries have proved that they are willing to provide troops to peacekeeping missions. Therefore, the success of DPMs in Africa will largely be dependent on the cooperation and participation of military and civilian role-players from within the African peacekeeping environment.

It is clear, furthermore, that the concept of DPMs is based on the integration of the planning processes of peacekeeping (or peace enforcement) and peacebuilding, with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a phased and sequential fashion. The concept of DPMs is presented as a theoretical framework to effectively address the challenges relating to an integrated approach, based on effective cooperation between various states, government departments and civil society organisations as required. The PCRD policy of the AU considers this type of approach as essential, and, despite some practical impediments, there is general and growing appreciation of the linkages between security, development and related integrated peacekeeping processes.

This ultimately implies and supports the internationally accepted approach to peace missions, which is based on the notion that security can no longer be regarded as a precursor for development, and that there is a need to efficiently link security and development as twin imperatives through integrated policies and programmes from the start of peace missions. It further implies the adoption of a systems-thinking approach to address the interrelated problems experienced by war-torn states during complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding simultaneously. The DPMs approach also suggests the replacement of existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in government with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crisis emerges, with a view to facilitating a greater depth of planning and coordination between the military and civilian components of a mission.

Generally, this implies that the concept of DPMs is not only relevant to peace missions in Africa, but that it is applicable to all international peace missions where large-scale armed conflict manifests, as it provides a holistic framework for laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. It is not possible to determine exact time scales for the duration of peace-building and developmental assistance as building blocks for DPMs, as the

duration of development initiatives will depend on the nature of each individual crisis. However, experience has shown that the window between military action and development work, the 'reconstruction gap', is very narrow and that the first few weeks after a ceasefire agreement is perhaps the most critical period for establishing a sustainable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Of utmost importance is the fact that the various stakeholders and role-players involved in a mission must plan and work together under a common strategic framework to ensure that combined security and developmental efforts are started as soon as possible, and that these efforts form part of a larger framework for long-term developments and reconstruction. In this regard, regional organisations have a vital role to play as they provide a sort of nexus between the UN and the AU, intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental organisations, as well as the respective civil society organisations involved in peace missions.

It can be concluded that the concept of DPMs does indeed provide a more holistic approach to solving intrastate conflicts, and that, if applied appropriately, could provide innovative solutions towards ensuring lasting peace and development. Furthermore, it can be argued that the DPM approach, in terms of its conceptual basis, is indeed a feasible ideal for peace missions, as it is based on, and in accordance with, the approved current UN and AU integrated planning processes. However, several issues pertaining to the operationalisation of developmental peace missions should be addressed, especially in regard to political will, funds and resource capacity, before the concept of DPMs can be applied successfully in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, in terms of its practical utility in Africa it currently remains an ambitious construct – especially given the limited capacity and resources of the AU and regional organisations. In the final analysis, the success of DPMs will be determined by the will and commitment of all the relevant role-players involved in finding a lasting solution to intrastate conflicts. The concept itself cannot provide sustainable peace and development.

Bibliography

AU (African Union) (2006). Draft policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Available from http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PCRDFEB06.PDF. (Accessed 5 June 2012).

AU (2012). Post-conflict reconstruction & development. Available from http://www.peaceau.org/en/pages/cmd-au-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-development-programme. (Accessed 7 June 2012).

Bakhet, O. (2001). The lessons of development in reforming United Nations peace operations. Speech delivered at the UNITAR-IPS-JIIA conference on the reform process of United Nations peace operations, Singapore, 2–3 April.

Available from http://wwwundp.org/bcpr/pubinfo/transitions/2001_05/ob_speech.htm. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Barungi, B. & Mbugua, K. (2005). From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. *Conflict Trends*, issue 4. Available from http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2005_4.pdf. (Accessed 5 June 2012).

Call, C. & Cousens, E.M. (2008). Ending wars and building peace: international responses to war-torn societies. *International Studies Perspectives*, 9:1–21.

Cilliers, J. & Mills, G. (eds) (1999). From peacekeeping to managing complex emergencies: peace support missions in Africa, in Cilliers, J. & Mills, G. (eds), *From peacekeeping to complex emergencies: peace support missions in Africa*. Pretoria & Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies and South African Institute of International Affairs.

Clapham, C. (2000). *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

DOD (Department of Defence) (2012). South African defence review 2012: defence, security, development. Draft document for public engagement, 12 April 2012. Pretoria: Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans.

Department of Foreign Affairs (1999). White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions. Approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Department of Foreign Affairs (2007). An assessment of multi-dimensional and integrated peace operations: trends and challenges. Report of the Policy, Research and Analysis Unit for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr A. Pahad, for the workshop on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, 14 September.

Gueli, R. & Liebenberg, S. (2006). The concept of developmental peace missions: implications for the military and civilians. *Conflict Trends*, issue 3. Available from http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2006_3.pdf. (Accessed 4 June 2012).

Gueli, R. & Liebenberg, S. (2007). Developmental peace missions: Synergising peacekeeping and peacebuilding in transition periods, in Aboagye, F.B. (ed.), *Complex emergencies in the 21st century. ISS Monograph* no. 134, May. Pretoria: ISS. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=17062 (Accessed 4 June 2012).

Gueli, R., Liebenberg, S. & Van Huyssteen, E. (2006a). Developmental peace missions. Report by the CSIR for the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE). Pretoria: CSIR. Available from http://www.csir.co.za/general_news/pdf_files/2006/DPM_Version1.2.pdf. (Accessed 6 June 2012).

Gueli, R., Liebenberg, S., Van Huyssteen, E. & Maitin, O. (2006b). Developmental peace missions theory. Report by the CSIR for the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE). Pretoria: CSIR. Available from http://www.maoner.com/conflict_citation_2005.pdf: (Accessed 5 June 2012).

Madlala-Routledge, N. (2004). Statement by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Ms Madlala-Routledge, during the Defence Budget Vote 2000/2001. Cape Town: National Assembly.

Madlala-Routledge, N. & Liebenberg, S. (2004). Developmental peacekeeping: what are the advantages for Africa? *African Security Review*, 13 (2). Available from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/CMadlala.htm. (Accessed 11 January 2005).

Mandrup-Jorgensen, T. (2007). You do need a stick to be able to use it gently: the South African armed forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Buur, L., Jensen, S. & Stepputat F. (eds), *The security – development nexus: expressions of sovereignty and securitisation in southern Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Regen, P.M. (1996). Conditions of successful third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40 (2):336–359.

SA Army (2009). The future SA Army strategy. Version 1: January 2009. SA Army Vision 2020 Project Team: Pretoria.

Solomon, H. (2006). Ten principles of best practice engagement for Africa and South Africa, in Southall, R. (ed.), *South Africa's role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Tschirgi, N. (2003). *Peacebuilding as the link between security and development – is the window of opportunity closing?* New York: International Peace Academy.

UN IPMM (2006). Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): endorsed by the UN Secretary-General on 13 June 2006. Available from http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/IMPPfinal.pdf (Accessed 12 June 2008).

UN Secretary-General (1998). The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. UN Doc. No. A/52/87-S/1998/318. New York: UN Headquarters.

Williams, G.H. (2005). *Engineering peace: the military role in post-conflict reconstruction*. Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.

PART II

ROLE-PLAYERS IN CONTEXT

CHAPTER 6

The African Union's Partnerships: Symbiotic Coordination as a Policy Instrument

Tim Murithi

Introduction

This chapter argues that even though the African Union (AU) has articulated a post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) policy, it has struggled to ensure symbiotic coordination with national governments and partner international organisations in the implementation of this policy. Symbiotic coordination is, in this instance, understood as a mutually reinforcing and collaborative approach to policy implementation. The chapter will discuss the key elements for achieving symbiotic coordination in the context of the requirements for post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, in promoting post-conflict reconstruction external actors need to outline an exit strategy and timetable for external actors when a mission is being planned. This is vital in order for war-affected communities to become self-reliant in the shortest time possible. The chapter argues—with reference to the case of Burundi—that symbiotic coordination is necessary in order to achieve effective interventions as well as lay the foundations for sustainable development downstream. The chapter concludes with some recommendations on how the AU can promote symbiotic coordination in the implementation of its PCRD policy.

The rationale for post-conflict reconstruction processes

The conflicts that have plagued parts of post-colonial Africa have brought about the collapse of social and economic structures and generated political tension. Infrastructure has been damaged, education and health services have suffered, and socio-economic development has been severely retarded, to say nothing of the damage to the environment. The effects of conflicts in terms of refugee flows into neighbouring countries and the emergence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have demonstrated that no African country is an island unto itself.

Refugee camps in the Mano River Union region of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have served as sources of instability for countries in the region. It is estimated that there are close to three million refugees in central Africa alone.

The camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from the Rwandan genocide of 1994 remain a source of concern for all the key actors involved in the Great Lakes region. Recently, a counterinsurgency movement known as M23 has plunged the regions bordering the DRC and Rwanda into renewed violence. Similarly, refugees have spilled into Chad as a result of the violent conflict in Sudan's war-affected Darfur region, creating tension along the border (Bekoe & Campbell, 2006:3). These situations illustrate the need for effective post-conflict reconstruction processes and the institutions to back them up. Internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees make it difficult for host communities and displaced communities to settle down and initiate development. Therefore, a central pillar of post-conflict reconstruction is the incorporation of IDPs and refugees into the host community, or the repatriation of refugees, after consideration of possible risks, back to their country of origin (Orr & Kapikinyu, 2011:1).

By post-conflict reconstruction, I refer to the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities (Lund, 2001; Wallensteen, 2002:87). This includes the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. It also includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and promoting social and economic justice, as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law in order to consolidate peacebuilding, reconciliation and development. Local populations in war-affected regions generally tend to be the worst affected by the scourge of violence. Women and children are often faced with tremendous social upheaval. Reconstruction therefore needs to proceed with the active participation of these sectors of society. An effective strategy for promoting post-conflict reconstruction necessarily has to take into account all of these elements. Such a strategy must promote measures and propose the establishment of institutions that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. As the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel Report of December 2004 noted, half of all countries emerging from conflict in the post-Cold War era relapsed into conflict within five years as a result of inadequate post-conflict peacebuilding (UN, 2004).

Contextualising symbiotic coordination and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives

One of the problems facing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes is the proliferation of external actors. These external actors engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes for various reasons. While there are those who are genuinely interested in improving the welfare of the target populations, there are others who may seek to engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes in order to secure their own economic or political interests. Nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations

fall primarily into the former category. On the issue of harbouring ulterior motives for engaging with a post-conflict reconstruction process, Tony Karbo (2008:126) argues that a 'challenge with peacebuilding in Africa is that external players often attempt to engage in peacebuilding activities without seeking sustainable solutions at the grassroots level'. According to Karbo, 'this approach has problems in the sense that designers and implementers are not accountable to members of communities where such programmes are implemented' (Karbo, 2008:126).

External actors come with self-ascribed mandates to assist with the peacebuilding process. As a result, there can often be a proliferation of external actors in any given post-conflict situation. The process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a war-affected community requires several different programmes functioning simultaneously. However, if multiple actors are conducting their affairs without any sense of coordination, then a duplication of functions can occur. This can lead to a waste of human and financial resources. Peter Uvin (1998:143) argues that the post-conflict and development 'aid system is not simply ineffective, unsustainable, limited and uncertain in its impact', but 'it also contributes to processes of structural violence in many ways'. Even though the efforts of external actors are well-intentioned, they can ultimately undermine the very objective that they are trying to advance.

One solution is to ensure that there is a greater degree of symbiotic coordination based on an understanding of the needs of the local target population (Donais, 2009:4). This means that external actors and organisations have to establish a level of *symbiosis and coordination* in their peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Symbiosis refers to a relationship between two or more organisms/organisations which is mutually enhancing and complementary. A symbiotic coordination therefore benefits both organisms/organisations. With reference to peacebuilding, a symbiotic organisation operating in tandem with other actors seeks, from the outset, to promote a partnership in order to achieve the ultimate objective, namely, post-conflict reconstruction. Interorganisational and intergovernmental symbiotic coordination in post-conflict reconstruction essentially means promoting a complementarity of functions and avoiding the duplication or replication of activities.

Three strategies for symbiotic coordination in implementing post-conflict reconstruction include:

1. Articulating more explicitly a commitment to coordination with other post-conflict reconstruction actors in the policies and mandates of their organisation.
2. Establishing institutional structures to ensure that this interface takes place, because policy does not always translate into practice.

3. Promoting proactive engagement between these official structures, to ensure that they actually work together on the ground (Donais, 2009:4).

In the context of ongoing and future post-conflict reconstruction contexts, it will increasingly become important to ensure that there is symbiotic coordination predicated on the principle of complementarity and the strategic utilisation of resources in the interventions of external actors with national and local actors.

The AU PCRD policy framework: an appeal to coordination

The AU has the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent, according to its Constitutive Act of 2000, signed by 54 African countries. Therefore, the AU has a role in supporting post-conflict reconstruction and the mobilisation of resources for the AU Peace Fund. The AU recognised that, in order to achieve its goals of sustainable peace and development, there was a need to adopt a comprehensive strategy for post-conflict reconstruction (AU, 2005). In this regard, the AU has developed a post-conflict reconstruction policy through a broad consultative process which included partnering with civil society organisations (AU, 2006). This AU PCRD framework draws heavily on some of the standard notions of liberal peacebuilding discussed above.

Key aspects of the AU policy include the attempt to put in place the pillars of a post-conflict reconstruction system which recognises the importance of an appropriate response to complex emergencies, to social and political transition following conflict, and to long-term development. Specifically, the AU PCRD policy framework comprises six constitutive elements (AU, 2006), namely:

1. Security
2. Political governance and transition
3. Human rights, justice and reconciliation
4. Humanitarian assistance
5. Reconstruction and socio-economic development
6. Gender.

In order to maximise the chances of establishing an effective post-conflict reconstruction process, there must be an acknowledgement of the importance of ensuring that there is a degree of complementarity and mutual reinforcement between these constitutive elements. Specifically, interventions in these six spheres should proceed in parallel because of the multidimensional demands of post-conflict contexts.

Another aspect of the AU policy framework includes the recognition that there is a natural relationship between peace, security and development, which is also reiterated by the liberal peacebuilding agenda. In this context, the policy proposes the need to address the false dichotomy that is often

advocated between political stability and economic efficiency (Sambanis, 2008:11; Paris & Sisk, 2009:15; Call & Cousens, 2008). In reality, this is a false dichotomy because the one presupposes and reinforces the other. One cannot have economic efficiency without political stability, nor the effective management of economies without political order and the rule of law.

The intention behind the creation of the AU post-conflict reconstruction policy framework was to articulate a policy which would coordinate and guide the AU Commission, regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), civil society, the private sector and other internal and external partners in the process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This is based on the premise that each country should adopt a post-conflict reconstruction strategy which responds to its own particular context. Essentially, the AU's policy provides an overall strategy from which individual country programmes can develop their own context-specific plans and strategies.

The AU's attempt at post-conflict peacebuilding in Burundi

The AU policy framework acknowledges that each conflict situation is context-specific. As such, the post-conflict reconstruction strategy adopted must correspond to the specificities of each situation. Post-conflict reconstruction systems and strategies therefore have to be relatively flexible in responding to changing situations.

The AU was summoned to undertake post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi prior to the formal adoption of its PCRD Policy in 2006. In a sense, the AU was already implicated in a PCRD intervention due to the exigencies on the ground. Burundi represents a case in which there was a need for a degree of flexibility and coordination in responding to the evolving crisis in the country. Following decades of political tension and sporadic civil war, in 2003 the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the AU's first post-conflict peacebuilding operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by its members. In this regard, it represents a milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing a post-conflict reconstruction intervention. AMIB was mandated to stabilise a fluid and dynamic situation which threatened to allow the country to relapse into violent conflict. In April 2003, the AU deployed AMIB with more than 3 000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide security (Murithi, 2005:91–93). Specifically, AMIB's objective was to monitor the ceasefire between the government forces and the armed resistance groups. The AU appointed Mamadou Bah as its Special Representative to Burundi to oversee this peace operation. One of the tasks of the AU force was to protect

returning politicians who would take part in the transitional government. Other tasks included the core business of PCRD, including opening secure demobilisation centres and facilitating the reintegration of former militias back into society. These centres supervised the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. AMIB was also involved in creating conditions that would allow IDPs and refugees, based in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania, to return to their homes.

AMIB had the task of establishing conditions which would allow for a UN peace operation to come into the country. The UN was reluctant to enter into a situation in which there was the potential for a relapse into conflict. AMIB's role in this case was vital in creating conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in the country. In the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have led to an escalation of violent conflict. AMIB therefore engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding to prevent violent conflict from returning and to try to lay the foundations for stabilisation and reconciliation.

Throughout its period of operation, AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation, and in February 2004 a UN evaluation team concluded that the conditions were appropriate to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in the country. Following the UN Security Council Resolution 1545, of 21 May 2004, to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi, Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, appointed a Special Representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head the mission on 1 June 2004. The former AMIB troops belonging to the AU were incorporated into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB). By 2009, some 20 000 military personnel had been demobilised, but many still lacked economic opportunities and could therefore potentially be recruited to subsequent militia activity. The issue of how to reintegrate demobilised personnel remains one of the enduring challenges of Burundi's post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This situation suggests that symbiotic coordination between the lead organisations is vital when it comes to planning for the aftermath of conflict. The essential ethos of PCRD is that sustaining the peace is just as important as achieving it.

In 2006, ONUB was replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), which is still involved in providing assistance to the country. More specifically, on 13 February 2013, the United Nations Security Council extended BNUB's mandate for another year until 15 February 2014, ostensibly to support peace and long-term development in the country. This transition between the AU mission and the UN operation required a degree of symbiotic coordination, and points to how similar situations might become necessary in the implementation of future PCRD interventions across the African continent.

BNUB is involved in PCRD interventions geared towards managing the historic tensions in the country, as well as supporting ongoing efforts to

prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections in 2015. The recurring incidents of extra-judicial and politically motivated killings, the mistreatment of detainees and allegations of torture, mean that there are undue pressures being placed upon citizens in the form of the infringement of their civil liberties (UN, 2013). The current Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Parfait Onanga-Ayanga, works actively to improve dialogue between the country's different political formations, as well as to ensure that civil society is provided with adequate space to engage the government and other national stakeholders. BNUB is also undertaking a number of PCRD interventions relating to capacity-building, notably around human rights protection and transitional justice processes and mechanisms. In particular, Burundi has been laying the foundations for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC), which will facilitate efforts to uncover the legacies of the past, so as to encourage efforts to promote national reconciliation. This aspect of post-conflict peacebuilding, promoting reconciliation through uncovering truth and pursuing justice, features prominently in the AU PCRD policy framework, and it is an area which needs the increased symbiotic coordination between in-country partners.

It is too early to conclude whether the foundations for post-conflict reconstruction that were laid by AMIB, ONUB and BNUB will be sustained. Burundi was one of the first countries, together with Sierra Leone, to fall under the purview of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Given the AU's institutional memory with regards to the Burundi crisis, the UN Peacebuilding Commission should strengthen its operational interface with the AU to ensure that key insights and lessons learned are incorporated into its post-conflict reconstruction work in the country.

The case for symbiotic coordination in AU PCRD policy implementation

Even though the AU PCRD policy exists, the fact remains that PCRD processes across the continent are not yet contributing towards the genuine transformation of war-affected countries. The AU policy identifies 'the lack of sufficient local ownership and participation' (AU, 2006) in post-conflict reconstruction. The AU PCRD policy suffers from some of the limitations that are encountered by liberal peacebuilding, namely, that externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes cannot be sustained if they are not owned by the people that they are targeting (Paris, 1997). When the international community—in the form of the UN, bilateral actors and international civil society—come into a post-conflict reconstruction process, they immediately distort the economies of the war-affected regions in which they are operating. Specifically, these actors channel significant resources into their operations to procure the necessary infrastructure, logistics and equipment required for their tasks. In addition, they may funnel financial resources for PCRD

irrespective of the absorptive capacity of the local economy, which has a distorting effect on domestic transactions. It is vital to adopt strategies which emphasise the transfer of the management of all affairs directly to the local citizenry in the shortest time possible. In order to ensure this, there needs to be a greater degree of symbiotic coordination.

In particular, in achieving symbiotic coordination in the implementation of its PCRD policy, the AU needs to institutionalise its relationship with national governments, the RECs, the UN and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In practice, this would require a greater degree of harmonisation and coordination in the efforts to initiate and monitor the implementation of PCRD policy initiatives (Samii, 2005). For example, the AU's PCRD framework shares a common objective with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Specifically, the Peacebuilding Commission is tasked with emphasising the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation (Stetten & Steinhilber, 2006). The Peacebuilding Commission's core mandate also includes bringing together all relevant actors to advise on, and propose, integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery (UN, 2005). There is therefore a degree of policy convergence, which establishes the basis for promoting symbiotic coordination between the AU and the UN system.

An important step in achieving this is the development of institutional structures to enhance the interoperability and coordination between the AU and UN systems. For example, the Peacebuilding Commission's Peacebuilding Support Office and the AU's Directorate of Peace and Security need to establish strong lines of communication, perhaps reciprocal liaison officers, in order to coordinate the implementation of concrete post-conflict reconstruction initiatives and programmes on the ground. This would also go a long way to ensuring that both institutions understand each other's organisational culture.

The AU PCRD policy of 2006 explicitly acknowledges that local post-conflict reconstruction does not take place in a global vacuum. International financial institutions can adversely impact upon post-conflict reconstruction processes by imposing economic models on war-affected countries, which actually undermine peacebuilding and reconstruction (African Development Bank, 2000). Post-conflict reconstruction will not be successful unless there is an unambiguous recognition of the importance of creating the economic conditions to build a continental community at peace with itself, in light of inequalities among African countries. This means that economic models must be adopted and implemented on the basis of the need to promote and assist in consolidating post-conflict reconstruction. The capacity of countries emerging from war to establish viable economies can also be affected by international trade rules and regulations. African farmers have borne the brunt of the

subsidies and tariffs imposed by richer countries to protect their farming industries. Therefore north–south trade agreements have to be monitored for the potential impact that they may have on post-conflict reconstruction processes. As part of the effort to consolidate symbiotic coordination of the various post-conflict reconstruction processes taking place around the continent, the AU needs to work with its international partners to find ways to increase intra-African trade, and the development of infrastructure through pooling of resources (Karbo, 2008:127). In order to promote its developmental goals, the AU can also emphasise the importance of the principle of symbiotic coordination in order to enhance the capacity of the continent when it comes to negotiating and engaging with international trade partners, which is vital to advancing the developmental agenda in the aftermath of conflict.

The donor community consistently insists on avoiding the duplication of functions when it comes to post-conflict reconstruction because the implementing agencies invariably approach the same small group of international donors (Tschirgi, 2003:1). This small number of donors is drawn typically from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) grouping, and they are increasingly reflecting on how they deploy their resources in post-conflict contexts. Therefore it is necessary to coordinate resource mobilisation for post-conflict reconstruction in Africa to ensure that maximal impact is achieved with the limited funds. The AU is still struggling to mobilise its own resources and to build its internal capacity to undertake PCRD initiatives effectively. The AU's own initiatives around this issue have hinged upon the convening of an African Solidarity Conference to mobilise resources. But this initiative has not succeeded in generating sufficient resources to address the PCRD needs of AU member states (AU, 2011:1)

It is important to note that the members of the AU are a subset of the UN membership. Therefore it is only logical for both organisations to work in concert. By doing so, they can mobilise more resource. Ideas and moral authority can be brought to bear on the post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and development challenges that face the continent. By further strengthening and ultimately formalising such partnerships, while including other actors such as RECs, much more can be achieved with the limited resources that exist. It is therefore necessary for the AU to pursue symbiotic coordination with external actors like the UN and the World Bank, which have far more resources and experience in post-conflict reconstruction. Specifically, the AU PCRD system needs to work in advance, as a matter of principle, with development partners and international financial institutions to bring a focus on how to put in place a development strategy for a particular war-affected country.

The AU has recognised that civil society in general has an important role to play in the affairs of the continent (AU, 2000). Decisions concerning the future

of ordinary citizens, particularly on issues such as post-conflict reconstruction, are made at high diplomatic and political levels without consulting civil society, and in some cases peace agreements cannot be implemented because they do not have the support of the wider community. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, there was much controversy about whether or not the rebels, who were guilty of amputating the limbs of innocent civilians, including children, should be given amnesty in the context of post-conflict reconciliation (Mkandawire, 2002). The Sierra Leone Peace Accord signed in Lomé, Togo, in 1999, proceeded with granting amnesty to the rebels, which, in the view of some commentators, would have effectively endorsed impunity (Lomé Peace Accord, 1999). Several civil society representatives had constructive suggestions about how amnesty could be granted without encouraging a culture of impunity and human rights abuse to prevail. In particular they emphasised the importance of reconciliation—a vital component of the post-conflict reconstruction process—between victims and perpetrators, in which the admission of guilt by the perpetrators was articulated prior to proceeding with a process of making symbolic reparations for the wrongs done. Unfortunately, this constructive proposal put forward by many sections of the Sierra Leonean civil society was not considered or reflected in the peace agreement, as a necessary part of the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding process, which was drafted by high-level government and rebel officials.

There are a large number of African and international civil society organisations involved in post-conflict reconstruction processes. Specifically, Karbo notes that 'Africa has witnessed the proliferation of NGOs renowned for their involvement in peacebuilding … such well-known NGOs include … the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) among others' (Karbo, 2008:122). The challenge is that, on the specific issue of post-conflict reconstruction, civil society does not have a clear institutional interface with the activities of the AU, beyond discussing the issues at various forums (Karbo, 2008:127). Concretely, the implementation of the AU PCRD policy framework can be enhanced by civil society contributions to early warning, policy development, research and capacity building through training and education. In addition, civil society can assist with raising awareness among African citizens about the existence of the AU PCRD policy framework, which is an important reason for the AU to formalise and strengthen its links with civil society.

Ultimately, in order to enhance the symbiotic coordination between the AU and its partners, formal and institutionalised links need to be strengthened and consolidated. One way in which the AU can achieve this is through the establishment of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with African countries which require PCRD policy interventions, and the participation of partner regional and international organisations as well as civil society

institutions. The MoU would outline the specific areas in which AU/member state and interorganisational collaboration can yield the greatest impact with regards to peacebuilding efforts for specific countries. An MoU on the specific issue of post-conflict reconstruction would emphasise the importance of establishing a form of symbiotic coordination to deal with the multiple challenges that face war-affected societies. Symbiotic coordination in PCRD will become evident when there is a network of institutions, mechanisms and processes which can guide, plan, monitor and evaluate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa.

AU PCRD interventions, modelled as they are on the liberal peacebuilding approaches, are yet to effectively address the issue of local ownership, duplication and coordination. It is therefore not surprising that the AU PCRD has not yet contributed to a paradigm shift with regards to how peacebuilding is conducted across the continent. These failures are also evident in the interventions of other external actors like the UN and international NGOs. Ultimately, while it may not be the panacea that will completely transform how PCRD is conducted, symbiotic coordination would challenge international and continental actors, like the AU, on how they frame peacebuilding processes. The ultimate objective of peacebuilding is to situate the agency of local actors firmly at the heart of post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives.

Conclusion

The African continent is plagued with a number of post-conflict situations which urgently need to be addressed. Post-conflict reconstruction processes depend principally on the commitment and efforts of the primary actors in a dispute. This chapter has argued, however, that the involvement of external actors, such as regional and international organisations, has to be predicated on notions of symbiotic coordination.

In order to overcome some of the limitations currently affecting post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa, this chapter has argued for the need for symbiotic coordination between the AU, the target member states and its partners in the implementation of the Union's PCRD policy. More to the point, symbiotic coordination in the implementation of PCRD policy is necessary in order to avoid the duplication or replication of functions and strategically to target the disbursement of mobilised resources.

The AU needs to develop an ethos predicated on achieving symbiotic coordination in the implementation of its PCRD policy. For example, given the concomitant policy frameworks between the AU and the UN Peacebuilding Commission, there is a case for closer and more institutionalised partnership between the two organisations, predicated for example on a memorandum of understanding. This would be an example of symbiotic coordination for post-conflict reconstruction in action. Ultimately, the AU's commitment to

PCRD is a notable development for the continent, and it can only contribute towards the stabilisation of countries when symbiotic coordination becomes a lived experience in practice.

Bibliography

African Development Bank (2000). *African Development Report 2000: regional integration in Africa.* Abidjan: ADB. Available from www.afdb.org. (Accessed 1 July 2012).

AU (African Union) (2000). Constitutive Act. Addis Ababa: African Union.

AU (2005). Report of proceedings: the 4th brainstorming retreat of the Peace and Security Council and other AU member states' permanent representatives to the African Union (AU) on post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa, 4 and 5 September, Durban, South Africa.

AU (2006). *Post-conflict reconstruction and development policy framework.* Addis Ababa: African Union.

AU (2011). AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development: preparations underway for the holding of an AU Solidarity Conference of African countries emerging from conflict. Press release, 14 September. Addis Ababa: African Union.

Bekoe, D. & Campbell, K. (2006). Overcoming obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur. USIP peace briefing, January. Available from http://www.usip.org/resources/overcoming-obstacles-humanitarian-assistance-darfur. (Accessed 15 September 2012).

Call, C. & Cousens, E. (2008). Ending wars and building peace: international responses to war-torn societies. *International Studies Perspectives*, 9 (1):1–21.

Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. *Peace and Change*, 34 (1):3–26.

Karbo, T. (2008). Peacebuilding in Africa, in Francis, D. (ed.), *Peace and conflict in Africa.* London: Zed Books.

Lomé Peace Accord (1999). Available from http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html. (Accessed 1 July 2012).

Lund, M. (2001). A toolbox for responding to conflict and building peace, in Reychler, L. & Paffenholz, T. (eds), *Peacebuilding: a field guide.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mkandawire, T. (2002). The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa: towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40 (2):181–215.

Murithi, T. (2005). *The African Union: pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development.* London: Ashgate.

Orr, P. & Kapikinyu, T. (2011). South Sudan: displacement plagues world's newest nation. Field report, Refugees International, 15 December.

Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22 (2):54–89.

Paris, R. & Sisk, T. (eds) (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations.* London: Routledge.

Sambanis, N. (2008). Short- and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations. *World Bank Economic Review*, 22 (1):9–32.

Samii, C. (2005). *Developing peace partnerships in Africa: report from the 35th Annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar.* New York: International Peace Academy.

Stetten, J. & Steinhilber, J. (2006). UN Peacebuilding Commission. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung: Dialogue on Globalisation, New York: FES, 11 January, p. 2.

Tschirgi, N. (2003). *Peacebuilding as the link between security and development: is the window of opportunity closing?* New York: International Peace Academy.

UN (United Nations) (2004). *A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's high-level panel on threats, challenges and change.* New York: United Nations.

UN (2005). The Peacebuilding Commission. General Assembly Resolution A/60/L.40, 20 December. New York: United Nations.

UN (2013). Security Council extends for another year the mandate of the UN Office in Burundi. Burundi: United Nations Office in Burundi. Available from http//www.bnub.unmissions.org. (Accessed 20 February 2013).

Uvin, P. (1998). *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda*, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Wallensteen, P. (2002). *Understanding conflict resolution: war, peace and the global system*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

CHAPTER 7

Building Capacity from Above and Below: Why Gender Matters in the Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Contexts

Lindy Heinecken

Introduction

In recent years, there has been widespread acknowledgement that gender equality is necessary for both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) (Mobekk, 2010:281). A RAND study on 'women and nation building', for example, found that including women early in the peace process improved state stability (Cordell, 2011a:38). Similarly, research by the World Bank has revealed that where societies remain stratified by gender and continue to suppress women, the proclivity towards violence increases (World Bank, 2011:61). Hudson (2009:288) supports this claim and states that 'the success of post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as dependent on the inclusion of women and the pursuit of gender equality'. The problem is that, often, women's voices are absent in the formal processes, the planning and implementation of peace agreements and PCRD initiatives.

The contention that women should be actively involved in security sector reform (SSR) and PCRD is not based on narrow liberal-feminist ideals of gender equality, or essentialist notions of what constitutes feminine or masculine (women being more passive, reconciliatory). Instead, I concur with Cahn (2006:338), who argues that it is necessary for the following reasons. Firstly, sustainable development requires that both men and women are equally engaged in the economic, social and political aspects that affect their livelihoods. Secondly, women have a right to participate in all aspects of the transition, as they make up more than half of the population and because war and its aftermath affect them differently. Thirdly, women's presence and input is essential to ensure that the laws formulated do not perpetuate gender inequality. Finally, that the judicial component effectively addresses crimes committed against women and girls.

In light of this, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), through various resolutions, has pressed for greater gender representation and equality in seeking solutions to conflict across the entire security spectrum

(Willett, 2010:148). These higher level political actions have sought to commit member states to involve women in all aspects of peacebuilding, to increase the number of women in peacekeeping, to address those actions that affect the rights, freedoms and security of women, and to support and build the capacity of women to address the structural inequalities that affect their livelihoods. However, a problem with these Western liberal, equal rights or integrative feminist positions (which underlies the gender mainstreaming philosophy) is that they cannot directly address the root causes and power hierarchies that perpetuate women's insecurity and inequality. For this reason, radical feminists (Connell, 1995:38) have emphasised the need to push for fundamental change in the structure of society embedded in patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to expand on these debates, except to acknowledge that these present different approaches in addressing gender (in)equality also present different consequences for women affected by customary systems which relegate them to an inferior status (Heinecken, 2002:716–717; Hudson, 2012:103).

Against this brief background, the chapter sets out to demonstrate why it is important to address gender inequality for peace, security and development. The first section discusses the various policies in place to address gender inequality within the security domain and the commitment to this at the international, continental and regional level. The second part focuses on why achieving gender equality from a liberal equal rights perspective is so difficult to realise in patriarchal societies. From here, the focus shifts to the peacekeeping/peacebuilding interface and the contribution women can make to this process. The final section argues that building capacity from above is not sufficient, and that to bring about lasting change one needs to build the capacity of women from below where they are strongest. The argument is made that this is far more transformative and empowering in bringing about gender equality, for sustainable peace and development.

Fuelling gender inequality from above

In 2000, the United Nations (UN) in an effort to recognise that war affects men and women in different ways responded by passing UNSC Resolution 1325 (UNSC, 2000). This resolution stressed the 'important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacekeeping' and called for gender mainstreaming to be incorporated in all multinational peace operations, as not only something which is beneficial, but which is essential. In essence, gender mainstreaming entails 'assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels … making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes' (ECOSOC, 1997). What gender

mainstreaming emphasises is that all segments of a society are affected by conflict (although often not in the same manner) and that both men and women need to be given an equal voice in PCRD.

Further resolutions followed as the plight of women in war zones worsened. With the increasing use of rape as a weapon of war, UNSC Resolution 1820 was passed in 2008 to mandate peacekeepers to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in an attempt to criminalise and eradicate its use (UNSC, 2008). This was supported by UNSC Resolution 1888 of 2009, which emphasised the need for judicial reform to address impunity and ensure equal access to justice for survivors of SGBV. Following this, UNSC Resolution 1889 of 2009 stressed the need for women to participate in peacebuilding and to mainstream gender in all post-conflict recovery processes (Bastick & De Torres, 2010:3). Most states have embraced these resolutions as both necessary and beneficial.

At the continental level, for example, African heads of states have given their commitment to the various gender mainstreaming declarations. These include compliance with the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform of Action (BPA) and UNSC Resolution 1325. Endorsing these conventions and resolutions is the protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (referred to as the Maputo Protocol) (AU, 2003), which outlines a comprehensive framework of rights for African women across a range of spheres—including health, the economy and security. The Maputo Protocol is closely aligned with UNSC Resolution 1325, which calls attention to the contribution of women in peace and security. All African countries except three—Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia—ratified CEDAW, while 32 African countries had ratified the Maputo Protocol as of March 2012 (SAWR, 2012).

Similarly, most African states have adopted the African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equity in Africa (AU, 2004) and pledged their commitment to gender mainstreaming and the protection of women from violence and discrimination. A special fund for African women was established in 2010 to mobilise resources to support programmes and projects that will help realise gender equality. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) established a gender task force to give a gender perspective on issues within NEPAD. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) agreed to comply with these international declarations and to increase the number of women in decision making to 30 per cent, and the same applies to the armed forces. The African Union (AU) also adopted its policy framework on PCRD in Banjul in 2006, recognising the important role of women in the recovery and development of countries emerging from conflict (DOD, 2008). This has given fresh momentum to the inclusion of gender perspectives in international peace and security work. The assumption is that

the higher the percentage of women serving in decision-making roles and in the security sector, the greater their capacity to influence security policy and bring about a more gender-sensitive approach to security (Schroeder, 2004:5).

To assist with the implementation of these resolutions, a toolkit for gender and security sector reform has been developed (Bastick & Valasek, 2008). The aim of this toolkit is to provide practical suggestions as to how to implement security sector reform, in order to ensure the equal participation of men and women. Yet despite these initiatives, there has been much criticism of these formal processes in terms of enforceability, accountability and the ability to include the voices of women from the local level upwards (Puechguirbal, 2010:181–183). While gender mainstreaming initiatives have certainly placed 'gender' on the 'agenda', women's participation in peace processes, according to Diaz et al. (2010:1), 'remains one of the most unfulfilled aspects of the peace and security agenda'.

Mitigating the effects of gender inequality

All is not doom and gloom. Even though women are often excluded from formal peace processes, there are numerous examples where local women have harnessed their collective agency and demanded that their voices be heard. In Burundi and Nepal, women's organisations have been important driving forces in the peace and post-conflict processes in both countries (Falch, 2010:v). In fact, the successful integration of gender equality into the Arusha process by Burundian women is cited as tangible evidence that women's participation can make a substantive difference to peace processes. These contributions 'played an important role in bringing the Security Council to convene its first open debate on women, peace and security in October 2000', which led to the promulgation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (Agbalajobi, 2010:242).

Similarly, women activists from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the so-called Mano River Union Women Peace Network, pushed the three countries into negotiations, and were later able to increase their role in security sector reforms (Hudson, 2012:97). They played a key role in facilitating the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed by warring factions, political parties and civil society, and which ultimately led to the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the election of a female president (Sims, 2012:6). In Rwanda, too, women mobilised and ensured that their recommendations on the protection of women and women's rights be included in the peace accord (Bouta et al., 2005:59). The latter is 'generally considered a model to other post-conflict societies of women's participation in political, peace and nation-building processes and to the transition to democracy' (Hudson, 2009:289).

Despite these striking achievements, few women form part of the official peace negotiations and the formal work of reconstructing society. Only a

limited number of women have managed to participate in peace talks and in the signing of peace accords. For example, a UNIFEM study in 2008 showed that less than 10 per cent of members in formal peace negotiations, and less than two per cent of signatories to peace agreements, were women (Willett, 2010:151). In this male-dominated environment, the danger exists that small numbers of women adopt masculine attitudes in order to fit in, or for political expedience. When this occurs, women do not typically advance women's rights. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in particular are heavily male-dominated because of the narrow definition of what constitutes a combatant—which typically excludes women. The implication is that DDR reforms often neglect to include and address the security threats that face women, girls and marginalised groups in the post-conflict period (Handrahan, 2004:441; Willett, 2010:155).

Consequently, gender mainstreaming initiatives have focused on increasing the number of women to ensure that they have greater voice in political and decision-making processes (Falch, 2010:4). The challenge in realising this ideal is that even where women are present in greater numbers, they often lack the experience and ability to articulate their views effectively and/or enforce a feminist agenda (Bouta et al., 2005:49). Where numbers are pushed through quotas, women are often seen merely as tokens rather than as agents of change, which can be detrimental to their cause (Falch, 2010:30). Where women are unable to meet the job requirements, or are seen as incompetent, it reinforces stereotypes that women are weaker and less intelligent than their male counterparts. It also works against the recruitment, retention and promotion of women. For these reasons, it is imperative that quotas go hand in hand with other measures, such as raising the educational and skill level of women, to enable them to compete as equals.

In patriarchal societies, where discriminatory cultural practices and laws hold firm, women can often not reach their full productive potential (Sorensen 1998:37; Handrahan, 2004:436). However, in post-conflict societies, the patriarchal order is weakened, opening up a unique opportunity for women to challenge it (Hudson, 2008:20). During this time, new constitutions laying the groundwork for new political structures and institutions are drafted (Falch, 2010:4; Bouta et al., 2005:xxiv). This is often the best time to focus attention on gender-equality issues and to influence laws, policies and budgets which seek to support women's rights and eliminate gender inequality. These include the removal of discriminatory legislation relating to political rights, property rights, the right to education, employment and the right to freedom from violence (Hudson, 2008:15).

The problem is that dual legal systems create contradictions on the rights of women by affording some rights through general law and withholding others on the basis of traditional, customary and religious beliefs and practices.

For example, many customary law practices are based on patrilineal systems which limit the possibilities for women to own property and land. This is extremely disempowering for women, who in Africa produce 90 per cent of food but experience major obstacles in acquiring land and credit because they are either not recognised as farmers or because of laws restricting rights of ownership (Williams, 2006:31–32). They are also often excluded from formal employment, job creation schemes and skills development due to the priority assigned to men returning from war-related activities (Handrahan, 2004:435; Sorensen, 1998:25). As such, they are often forced to continue making a living in the informal sector, much the same as during times of conflict (Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004:75; Sorensen, 1998:21). Even here they face challenges, as, despite their entrepreneurial spirit and skills, they are often unable to secure funding to expand their ventures (Bouta et al., 2005:99–100; Williams, 2010:32). Similarly, women and girls often have less opportunity for schooling than men, and, ironically, this worsens in post-conflict contexts, as with sexual violence against women.

Sexual violence is not only a crime and extremely traumatic, but also strips women of both their reproductive and productive labour power, deepening inequality (Mobekk, 2010:287–288). As Zuckerman and Greenberg (2004:79) indicate, 'without gender equality, it is impossible to achieve economically and physically secure societies, cleansed of structural violence'. One of the challenges facing these societies is precisely how to extend statutory or international proclaimed gender equality provisions to non-statutory and customary law, which are often the only laws recognised at the local level (Williams, 2006:31). As Cahn remarks, '[e]stablishing laws in a country which has no legal structure for enforcing those rights is admirable rhetoric, but does not provide concrete benefits to those unable to exercise those rights' (Cahn, 2006:345). Even in a country like Liberia, where significant advances have been made in terms of addressing gender inequality, the dual legal system (statutory versus customary) remains a serious impediment to women's empowerment (Sims, 2012:6).

This implies that greater attention needs to be paid to reforms in the dual legal system to ensure that policies can be implemented on the ground. In practice, this means that both men and women need to be informed of, need to support, and need to enforce, the implementation of gender equality (Bouta et al., 2005:81–86). While this is not the task of peacekeepers, it is important that, where the military is drawn into peacebuilding and/or post-conflict reconstruction activities, they are made aware of, and trained to deal with, the challenges facing women. Training in gender awareness has become particularly important where peacekeepers are tasked to protect civilians, and to prevent and deal with incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. This has also placed renewed emphasis on the importance of women in the

peacekeeping–peacebuilding interface as they engage with women at the local community level.

Recognising the (contested) value of women peacekeepers

Whereas feminists call for equal opportunities in the security sector, ironically the basis of increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations is premised not on equality per se, but on the unique feminine characteristics of women that run counter to militarism. Attributes commonly associated with women, namely, that they are more compassionate, more intuitive, more conciliatory and less aggressive, are qualities desired in peacekeepers. Whether this behaviour is the result of social conditioning or biological determinism is a subject of much dispute, as women do not constitute a homogenous group (De Groot, 2001:34). On average, however, women are not naturally inclined towards aggressive behaviour and violence, but this does not mean that they are unable to perform acts of violence. For example, in Rwanda a small number (2.3 per cent) were involved in perpetrating the genocide, and there are many more examples of women's active participation in violent conflict (Bouta et al., 2005:9). Just as men can be trained to become more aggressive, so can women, and the reverse is also true—that men can be trained to become more compassionate.

Nonetheless, this 'essentialism' of women's unique qualities has led to a drive to include more women in peacekeeping operations and to place greater emphasis on gender awareness and sensitivity in preparation for such missions. Although there is no proof that women make better peacekeepers than men, it is widely acclaimed that their presence improves peace operations and brings many benefits in terms of improving relations with the local community. For example, in Somalia, the US Army found that all-male combat units developed hostile attitudes towards the local population and were more prone to use force. In peacekeeping operations, the peacekeeper is supposed to keep aggression in check and to pursue the path of conciliation—violence signifies failure (De Groot, 2001:34). The presence of even a few women is claimed to make male peacekeepers more reflective and responsible and have a 'calming impact in hostile situations' (Olssen, 2000:10).

Another benefit of greater involvement of women in peacekeeping operations is the claim that they identify more closely with the problems facing the host society (Davis & Mckee, 2004:70). Within the context of war-ravaged societies, it is vital for peacekeepers to understand the situation of local women, who bear a huge socio-economic burden and are often forced into prostitution for survival (Puechguirbal, 2003:119). The abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers of these vulnerabilities has prompted the UN to develop a strategy to both prevent and respond to incidences of sexual exploitation and abuse. Reports indicate that even where women peacekeepers form merely

a token representation, they are able to reduce the incidence of peacekeeper misconduct and tend to limit 'men's licentious behaviour' (Hudson, 2000:22; Pillay, 2006:5). UN data in this regard reports two impacts: improved prevention through security and improved response to female survivors where there are higher numbers of women in the mission area.

The presence of female peacekeepers also sends a clear message in terms of gender equality and non-discrimination to local communities (Hudson, 2000:21). Working together with male peacekeepers as equals, female peacekeepers are able to break down traditional views and stereotypes of men as providers of security (linked to masculinity) and women as consumers of security. As providers, women peacekeepers can serve as role models, inspiring women and girls to push for their own rights. In fact, where peace missions have a large number of female peacekeepers, local women appear more willing to join peace committees (Carey, 2001:53–54). In addition, the presence of women peacekeepers is seen to reduce conflict and confrontation, improve access and support for local women and provide a sense of security to the local population (Pillay, 2006:5). An often-quoted example is the success of the all-women Indian Formed Police Unit (FPU) in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in enhancing the security of women at the local level (Cordell, 2011a:32).

Besides this, a number of clear operational benefits ensue. These include an improved capacity for collection and analysis of community-based intelligence: 'Within UNMIL, an all-women battalion of Ghanaian women established a relationship that improved intelligence gathering by connecting informally with local women who were initially reticent to report crimes or suspicious activities' (Cordell, 2011a:33). In some societies, women peacekeepers are a necessity, either because of trauma caused by SGBV or due to cultural practices. Data from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia show that local women found it difficult to interact with male soldiers, especially where they had been victims of SGBV. Also, in some host societies, women may not be allowed to speak to male strangers for cultural and religious reasons, and having access to women peacekeepers ensures that these local women's concerns are heard (Hudson, 2000:21).

At this point, I wish to heed a warning that there have been few systematic analyses of women peacekeepers' impact on mission success or relationship with local communities. There is no substantive evidence on when it is better to deploy mixed or gender-separate units (as with the Indian and Ghanaian examples), what kind of work women are indeed better at, or the differences in the reaction of the local population to male and female peacekeepers. For example, it may be that sending female peacekeepers to provide security is considered less worthy than deploying male peacekeepers, given the stereotype of men as providers and women as consumers of security. Similarly, there is only anecdotal evidence that one needs female bodies to do traditionally female

tasks except where this is culturally or religiously defined, that women are naturally more culturally sensitive (given that women are not a homogeneous group), or that they have better access to the local community. Issues of race, ethnicity, language, religion, national affiliation and even class may have a greater impact on community relations than gender. One can also not assume that local women affected by SGBV will be more inclined to report this to women peacekeepers. They may, for example, react more to the uniform than to the gender of the person. At present, the evidence on the value of women peacekeepers is fuzzy, steeped in essentialist views and in need of much closer interrogation.

The value of women peacekeepers in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not disputed—only the qualitative impact. The reality is that their contribution has remained limited. As of May 2012, for example, out of approximately 125 000 UN peacekeepers, women constituted a mere three per cent of military personnel and 10 per cent of police personnel, while civilians on these missions accounted for approximately 30 per cent (UN Statistics, 2012). The UN gender statistics by mission highlight glaring gender disparities (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Gender statistics by mission in Africa (May 2012)

	Military experts		Troops		Individual police		Formed police units	
Mission	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
MINURSO	209	7	24	3	6	0	0	0
MONUSCO	703	27	16 679	363	292	57	960	90
UNAMID	272	7	17 102	574	2 779	496	2 195	41
UNMIL	117	2	7 579	171	413	57	723	120
UNMISS	134	0.5	5 056	101	410	74	0	0

Source: UN Statistics, 2012

What is significant is that these figures are no different to those cited by Hudson in 2000, and that they confirm the claim by Puechguibal (2010) that UNSC Resolution 1325 has not been successful either in involving women at the political level in security sector reform or in increasing their numbers in peacekeeping. As we have seen, peacekeeping forces have fallen far short of the 50 per cent target set by UNSC Resolution 1325. Only Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria and India have so far contributed significant numbers of women to peacekeeping, but even here this has been less than 15 per cent of national troop contributions (Willett, 2010:152).

There are numerous reasons why troop-contributing states fail to meet gender targets. The first is that these countries have low numbers of women

in their military and police forces. A second reason is that fewer women sign up for deployments due to spousal and family considerations. A third is that women are often not assigned to meaningful roles and end up in administrative and other non-challenging positions (Cordell, 2011b:37), which defeats the purpose of increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations. A fourth is that neither the UN nor the AU nor troop-contributing countries adopt gender-sensitive approaches to deployments. They assume a gender-neutral approach to deployment and, as such, the operational environment does not cater for the gender-specific needs of women in terms of privacy and hygiene, or in relation to the unique stresses the environment poses in respect of sexual harassment, sexual violence, isolation and family stress (Heinecken & Van der Waag-Cowling, 2009:531–535). This affects not only retention and willingness to redeploy, but also operational success and, ultimately, peace, security and development.

Building capacity from below

Peacekeeping typically includes security-related tasks such as monitoring ceasefires, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, monitoring of borders and training of police, while peacebuilding tasks include assisting electoral processes, re-establishing national authority, promoting good governance, promoting an independent judiciary and assisting with a variety of institutional reforms (Hazen, 2007:327). In recent decades, however, peacekeeping operations have become even more multidimensional in order to facilitate the transition from conflict to peace and to support political processes that affect the human security needs of local populations (DPODFS, 2010). Human security includes providing protection to civilians who are victims of violence, addressing issues of economic and food insecurity, assisting in the provision of health security, protecting the environment from degradation and exploitation, and protecting communities against ethnic violence/suppression. This has meant that peacekeeping operations are now redefined and redirected from the state to the individual, with an emphasis on underlying social, political and economic reforms (Hearne, 2009:52).

This has meant that, increasingly, peacekeepers have had to serve as early peacebuilders in order to pave the way for longer term sustainable peace and PCRD efforts (De Carvalho & Ettang, 2011:8–9). It is here, at the tactical level, or in the field, where peacekeepers, both men and women, are well placed to empower and enable women. At the community level, women are involved in an array of informal peacebuilding activities through women's organisations, community-based organisations and churches (Sorensen, 1998:6). Many individual women and women's civil society organisations have assumed the functions of public institutions and undertake relief work and serve as a vital link for international assistance agencies and nongovernmental organisations

(Bouta et al., 2005:xxii). They also provide a wide range of services to both men and women, such as reaching out to the youth, providing shelter and offering services such as legal advice, medical and psychological assistance and tending to victims of violence. These services should form an integral part of all PCRD efforts.

At local community level, women have demonstrated that they can play an influential role in PCRD and have constantly challenged authorities on issues of peace, non-discrimination, accountability and recognition of human rights (Sorensen, 1998:iv). As indicated, they have been able to mobilise large numbers of women, translate individual grievances into legitimate social concerns and have succeeded in placing them on the political agenda. As these women's organisations are often perceived as being non-political and more trusted than male-run organisations, they are uniquely placed in post-conflict societies to rebuild what has been referred to as the 'social capital' in their communities (Bouta et al., 2005:66–67). In essence, social capital refers to the social networks within societies that help restore trust as well as social and political cohesion in communities and the wider society.

Building social capital is essential for sustainable peace and development, as it is through these networks that resources can be mobilised to rebuild war-torn societies and diffuse conflict. The challenge in post-conflict societies is how to reconnect communities and rebuild the social capital destroyed during wars. One way to do this is to conduct a situational analysis, by mapping the 'assets' that exist in a community. Assets in terms of human resources typically include the gifts, skills and capabilities of individuals, associations and institutions that exist within communities. These assets can be mobilised to address specific problems or needs (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011:22). The first step in this process is to determine what assets and resources exist within a community. The second step is to compile a capacity inventory. The third step, once the capacity has been determined, is to establish what communities regard as their most important priorities in rebuilding their communities. The fourth step is then to connect the citizens, organisations, institutions and other role-players, in order to maximise capacity and consensus in addressing the needs identified.

The value of this asset-based approach to PCRD is that it unites people in a positive way around a collective cause (Kretzman & McKnight, 1993:8). During asset-mapping, the cleavages that exist within communities in terms of gender, race, class, lineage, religion and ethnicity become more apparent. By being aware of this, community development initiatives can be implemented far more effectively, as the emphasis is on building consensus and mobilising the social capital within communities. Most approaches to community development focus on addressing the needs of communities, which tend to divide rather than unite them, as it results in competition over resources.

This frequently pits communities and organisations against each other, as one set of needs is prioritised over others. In contrast, the asset-based approach to community development rests on the premise that, by harnessing the potential of communities as producers of services, rather than consumers of services, a more sustainable approach can be implemented (Green & Haines, 2002:9–12).

This does not remove the need for outside resources or assistance from peacekeepers or international agencies, but ensures that such inputs are more effective. It broadens the partnership and ensures that the appropriate capacity-building programmes, equipment and support needs are implemented at the right places. As such, it is one of the most efficient means of matching resources to needs and mandated tasks to ensure that the investment in peacekeeping is financially sound. Another benefit of this approach to community development is that it espouses gender equality, as the voices of men and women are heard equally. This is particularly important in patriarchal societies where women are often absent in the public domain and where the state as regulator and provider of public goods is absent. As women are more active in community-based organisations, building their capacity from below can be an effective way to empower women. Ultimately, this approach to gender equality can be far more transformative and beneficial for peace, stability and development than liberal-feminist approaches that cannot be enforced, or that are resisted.

Conclusion

Based on the preceding discussion, it is apparent that men and women experience conflict and post-conflict environments differently. As a result, it is imperative that their views are taken into consideration during the PCRD phase, not only because it is their right, but also because women are important actors, agents and beneficiaries in the peace process and reconstruction of their societies. Relegating women to an inferior status is not only an obstacle to progress and human development, peace and reconstruction initiatives, but also clearly irresponsible.

As this study shows, women face many challenges in getting their voices heard and bringing about gender equality across all spheres of society. Gender mainstreaming activities are necessary, but are essentially top-down initiatives which enforce and do not necessarily engender change. This tactic can only be effective where the legislative and judicial processes permit this, are enforceable and where measures of accountability are in place. In patriarchal societies, these top-down approaches do not necessarily protect women and may even subject them to further subordination and gender-based violence when men's identity and masculinity are threatened.

Given that the state is largely absent in the lives of many of these post-conflict societies, the most sustainable way to bring about change

is to develop and support women at the community level. Women are most active in community-based organisations, and are uniquely placed to provide the foundation for a stronger, more inclusive and vigilant civil society. Research confirms that to bring about lasting change, a bottom-up approach to community development is far more successful than a top-down or interventionist approach. Too many development initiatives focus on a community's needs, deficiencies and problems. A far better approach is to establish what a community's capabilities and assets are, to develop these and to provide women with the necessary support to address the structural factors that impede their role and status in society.

This requires a qualitative investment in developing the capacity and capabilities of women. While top-down gender mainstreaming interventions are necessary to fuel the focus on gender equality, the fire needs to be fanned from below to ensure that it burns. This requires effort, commitment and perseverance and cannot be done by women alone. Soliciting male support for gender equality is critical to mission success.

Bibliography

Agbalajobi, D. (2010). The role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, in Bowd, R. & Chikwanha, A. (eds), *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts: origins, challenges and peacebuilding*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

AU (African Union) (2003). Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July. Available from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf. (Accessed 18 February 2013).

AU (2004). Solemn declaration on gender equity in Africa. Available from http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU_GenderSolemnDec04.pdf. (Accessed 18 February 2013).

Bastick, M. & De Torres, D. (2010). Implementing the women, peace and security resolutions in security sector reform, in Bastick, M. & Valasek, K. (eds), *Gender and security sector reform toolkit*. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

Bastick, M. & Valasek, K. (eds) (2008). *Gender and security sector reform toolkit*. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

Bouta, T., Frerks, G. & Bannon, I. (2005). *Gender, conflict and development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Cahn, N.R. (2006). Women in post-conflict reconstruction: dilemmas and directions. *William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law*, 12 (2):335–376.

Carey, H. (2001). Women and peace and security: the politics of implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 8 (2):49–68.

Connell, R. (1995). *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cordell, K. (2011a). Women in international peacekeeping, in Kraus, D., Enholm, R. & Bowen, A. (eds), *U.S. engagement in international peacekeeping: from aspiration to implementation*. Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Global Solutions Education Fund.

Cordell, K. (2011b). Peacekeeping to peacebuilding from a gender perspective: the UNMIL case. *Conflict Trends*, 3:37–44.

Davis, K. & Mckee, B. (2004). Women in the military: facing a warrior framework, in Pinch, F.C., Macintyre, A., Browne, P. & Akros, A. (eds), *Challenge and change in the military: gender and diversity issues*. Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Force Academy.

De Carvalho, G. & Ettang, D. (2011). Contextualising the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus. *Conflict Trends*, 3:3–12.

De Groot, G. (2001). A few good women: gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 8 (2):23–38.

Diaz, P., Anwar, S., Beteta, H., Russo, C. & Ziebell, S. (2010). *Women's participation in peace negotiations: connections between presence and influence*. New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

DOD (Department of Defence) (2008). Department of Defence Mainstreaming Strategy. Pretoria: DOD Strategy.01/2008, July.

DPODFS (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support) (2010). The new horizon initiative. Progress Report No 1. New York: United Nations.

ECOSOC (UN Economic and Social Council) (1997). Report to the Secretary-General, coordination of the policies and activities of the specialised agencies and other bodies of the UN system. UN document E96IV13, 12 June.

Falch, A. (2010). Women's political participation and influence in post-conflict Burundi and Nepal. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Paper, May.

Gilchrist, A. & Taylor, M. (2011). *The short guide to community development*. Bristol: Polity Press.

Green, P. & Haines, A. (2002). *Asset building and community development*. London: Sage.

Handrahan, L. (2004). Conflict, gender, ethnicity and post-conflict reconstruction. *Security Dialogue*, 35 (4):429–516.

Hazen, J. (2007). Can peacekeepers be peacebuilders? *International Peacekeeping*, 14 (3):323–228.

Hearne, S. (2009). The security-stability-sustainability nexus: environmental change and state fragility, in Collmer, S. (ed.), *From fragile state to functioning state: pathways to democratic transformation in a comparative perspective*. London/New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Heinecken, L. (2002). Affirming gender equality. The challenges facing the South African armed forces. *Current Sociology*, 50 (5):715–728.

Heinecken, L. & Van der Waag-Cowling, N. (2009). The politics of race and gender in the South African armed forces: issues, challenges and lessons. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47 (4):517–538.

Hudson, H. (2000). Mainstreaming gender in peacekeeping operations: can Africa learn from international experience? *African Security Review*, 9 (4):18–33.

Hudson, H. (2008). Gender, peace-building and post conflict reconstruction in Africa: breaking the chain between inequality and violence, in Kotze, D. & Solomon, H. (eds), *The state of Africa: post conflict reconstruction and development*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Hudson, H. (2009). Peacebuilding through a gender lens and the challenges of implementation in Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire. *Security Studies*, 18:287–318.

Hudson, H. (2012). A bridge too far? The gender consequences of linking security and development in SSR discourse and practice, in Schnabel, A. & Farr, V. (eds), *Back to the roots: security sector reform and development*. Zurich: LIT Verlag.

Kretzman, J.P. & McKnight, J.L. (1993). *Building communities from the inside out: a path toward finding and mobilizing community's assets*. Chicago: ACTA.

Mobekk, E. (2010). Gender, women and security sector reform. *International Peacekeeping,* 17 (2):278–291.

Olsson, L. (2000). Mainstreaming gender in multidimensional peacekeeping: a field experience. *International Peacekeeping*, 7 (3):1–16.

Pillay, A. (2006). Gender peace and peacekeeping: lessons from southern Africa. Institute for Security Studies Paper, No 128.

Puechguirbal, N. (2003). Gender training for peacekeepers: lessons from the DRC. *International Peacekeeping*, 10 (4):113–128.

Puechguirbal, N. (2010). Discourses on gender, patriarchy and Resolution 1325: a textual analysis of UN documents. *International Peacekeeping*, 17 (2):172–187.

SAWR (Solidarity for African Women's Rights) (2012). Cote d'Ivoire ratifies the AU protocol. Available from http://www.soawr.org/en/news/item/cote _divoire_ratifies_the_au_protocol/. (Accessed 20 March 2013).

Schroeder, E. (2004). A window of opportunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: incorporating a gender perspective in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. *Peace, Conflict and Development*, 5 (5).

Sims, B. (2012). *Women in transition: a critical analysis of women's civic and political participation in Liberia*. Pretoria: IDASA.

Sorensen, B. (1998). Women and post-conflict reconstruction: issues and sources. WSP Occasional Paper 3, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies.

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2000). Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Available from http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf. (Accessed 21 June 2012).

UNSC (2008). Resolution 1820 on women and peace and security. Available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOS/391/44/PDF/N0839144. pdf. (Accessed 21 June 2012).

UN Statistics (2012). Current peacekeeping operations statistics. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/gender/shtm. (Accessed 21 June 2012).

Willett, S. (2010). Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: assessing the impact on women, peace and security. *International Peacekeeping*, 17 (2):142–158.

Williams, H.E. (2006). Women and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. *Conflict Trends*, 1:30–34.

World Bank (2011). *World Bank Development Report 2011: conflict, security and development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Zuckerman, E. & Greenberg, M. (2004). The gender dimension of post-conflict reconstruction: an analytical framework for policymakers. *Gender and Development*, 12 (3): 70–80.

CHAPTER 8

UN Post-conflict Programming Under Challenge in the Post-electoral DRC[1]

Theo Neethling

Introduction

The decade from 1996 to 2006 was one of the most volatile and tormented periods in the recent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The country experienced the impact of two major wars. The first was an externally driven and directed war against the regime of former president Mobutu Sese Seko, while the second war quickly resembled a 'self-destructive all-out African conflict' which degenerated into an 'unpopular case of military interventionism' (Gounden et al., 2010:31).

Despite an overall valiant effort of the United Nations (UN) since 1999 to bring peace and stability to the DRC, the country continues to face several challenges which pose an ongoing threat to the fragile transition in the DRC and consequently undermine its security. Swart (2010:23) correctly maintains that the most urgent task pending is not necessarily the reconstruction of the Congolese state, but rather the solemnisation of the Congolese peace process. It could even be argued that the DRC faces the prospect of being a country which is no longer involved in large-scale conflict, yet remains a society in perpetual turmoil. The ideal of a positive, sustainable (let alone perpetual) peace in the country has largely been a vision encapsulated in paper peace agreements, but which has not filtered down to Congolese citizens' everyday life. Even though laudable progress has been made in some respects, the threat of large-scale reversal, and a return to full-scale conflict, cannot be entirely discarded (Swart, 2010:22, 2012:61).

At the same time, the overall situation in the DRC has improved, and undoubtedly the UN Organization Mission in the DRC, or MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo), has played an important peacekeeping role since the late 1990s—especially since 2006, the year of the first-ever multiparty elections in the country. Although MONUC was unable to protect everyone at risk, there is little doubt that without MONUC's presence in the DRC, the 2006 national elections would not have been possible, local wars would have continued, a regional war

might even have reignited in the Kivu provinces, and abuses of the civilian population would have been worse (Winter, 2009:3–4).

In view of the above, an announcement by the DRC government in September 2009 that MONUC would withdraw from the DRC in 2011 caught many observers and role-players off guard. After all, the role of MONUC was pivotal in supporting the government of the DRC in the post-conflict process. The DRC government's announcement coincided with pressure on the UN and its Security Council ahead of the country's fiftieth anniversary of independence in June 2010 to produce a plan for ending MONUC's work in the DRC.

On 28 May 2010, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reached an agreement with the DRC government on the future of MONUC. It was decided that MONUC, as from 1 July 2010, should bear the title of UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo). At the same time, the UNSC authorised the withdrawal of up to 2 000 UN military personnel by 30 June 2010 from areas whenever the security situation permitted it (UNSC, 2010:3), thereby indicating that the UN viewed its departure from the DRC as a political imperative. Yet, this did not result in an end to the presence and work of the UN in the DRC. Given the many remaining challenges in the fields of statebuilding and security governance, the UNSC decided on 28 June 2011 to extend MONUSCO's mandate until 30 June 2012 (UNSC, 2011:2). On 27 June 2012, the Security Council further extended MONUSCO's mandate to 30 June 2013 (UNSC, 2012:2).

As a peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO has played an important role in multiple areas of responsibility. The protection of civilians has always been a priority, while security sector reform (SSR) has been the primary focus within the stabilisation and peace consolidation mandate of the mission. MONUSCO also has a strong civilian component, and tasks of a 'civilian' nature include, among others, delivering training for the Congolese armed forces in the fields of human rights, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence (UNSC, 2012:2–3).

Needless to say, the DRC counts among the most challenging post-Cold War peacekeeping undertakings of the international community. Therefore, it warrants scholarly attention from a PCRD point of view. The aim of this chapter is of a dual nature. It aims to focus on a point raised by Tull (2010:1), that PCRD faces increasing resistance on the part of host governments in countries where the UN is seeking to assist. It further aims to provide an overview and analysis of the most serious challenges associated with PCRD in the post-electoral DRC, with specific reference to the following: firstly, reconstruction and development through statebuilding, and, secondly, enhancing security

governance and humanitarian conditions. The role of the UN as the main external role-player in the DRC will particularly be explored.

The DRC in the post-electoral context (post-2006)

Countries emerging from violent conflict carry a high risk of sliding back into violence. The UN, therefore, in recent years significantly expanded its intervention strategies with regard to PCRD (Tull, 2010:10; AU, 2007). Following its establishment, MONUC became the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission, fielding approximately 22 000 peacekeepers at the height of its activities. It can even be argued that MONUC assumed or at least co-assumed some of the responsibilities of the Congolese state, which was torn apart by a war which was particularly brutal between 1998 and 2003 and was responsible for the death of millions of people. In many instances, the UN's role was to foster the role of the state, such as protecting civilians against attacks from militias and organised armed movements. In 2006, the UN oversaw an election process which was meant to take the DRC into a new era of peacebuilding, reconstruction and development (Reuters, 2010). Continued intervention to shore up a hard-won but fragile peace was also deemed necessary, and included SSR, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or resettlement of combatants, the promotion of human rights and the ongoing challenges relating to the protection of civilians.

The 2006 elections were without question a huge logistical and political achievement, made possible by the support of MONUC and with financing from donors such as the European Union. However, elections did not solve the political problems of the DRC, as rebels or militias continued to destabilise the eastern DRC, principally through the rebels of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), one of the two most institutionalised armed movements in the post-electoral DRC. In short, the CNDP defeated the national army whenever it attempted to take them on. The other group, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), mainly *génocidaires* who had fled Rwanda in 1994, along with some new recruits, also continued to destabilise the DRC through the exploitation of minerals and the creation of no-entry zones where they were in control (Mandrup, 2009:23–25).

In February 2009, it was announced by the DRC government and the rebel CNDP that they had negotiated a preliminary agreement addressing the political concerns of the militias. This followed the arrest of the former CNDP leader, General Laurent Nkunda, early in 2009, which resulted in an important agreement between the DRC government and the CNDP (Kahorha, 2009). The arrest of Nkunda was certainly a significant milestone in the DRC peace process since much of the destabilisation in the eastern parts of the country during the 1990s could be attributed to his political role and destabilising actions.

A final agreement was signed in March 2009 after a month of negotiations. In terms of the agreement, the CNDP agreed to end its insurgency, transform into a political party, and have its fighters join the police or the Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). In turn, the CNDP obtained a number of concessions, such as the release of prisoners, the promulgation of amnesty laws, the creation of a national reconciliation mechanism and the integration of CNDP officials into the North Kivu provincial administration. However, the integration of rebel fighters into the FARDC did not always proceed smoothly. Some elements of the CNDP fled to the hills because of dissatisfaction with the integration process. Many were unhappy with the dismantling of the militia and the income they received through the CNDP (International Crisis Group, 2009).

Attempts to weaken and dismantle the FDLR were even more challenging, and the FARDC required food and logistical support from MONUC to deal with the situation. Although the number of FDLR combatants was reduced by half between 2003 and 2008, with the assistance of MONUC's disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR)[2] programme, the FDLR was not seriously damaged (Winter, 2009:2). The organisation continued to pose a threat to the DRC government (Boshoff, 2010). FDLR elements (among others) were responsible for gross violations of human rights in the form of attacks on civilians and the systematic raping of women (Orievulu, 2010).

Another serious challenge for the DRC government in the post-2006 period came from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a guerrilla group operating mainly in northern Uganda, but also in South Sudan and the eastern DRC. Like the FDLR, the LRA posed a serious threat to civilians in villages and remote areas. This armed force attacked and intimidated civilians, as they generated their income from the population through various taxes. Moreover, the FARDC also posed a threat to civilians. In fact, the army, together with the FDLR and the LRA, has been the principal threat to civilians in the DRC since 2006 (Winter, 2009:4; UN Secretary-General, 2011b:3), and these organisations remain significant political actors in current DRC politics and dynamics (UNSC, 2012:20).

With regard to governance in the DRC, it should also be noted that President Joseph Kabila, on winning a five-year term of office in the 2006 elections, promised to address the challenges relating to corruption and a collapsed state by elaborating on a programme to rebuild the Congo by concentrating on five strategic priorities, namely, infrastructure, health, education, housing and employment. He also pledged further democratisation, notably by respecting the rule of law and by the running of local elections (International Crisis Group, 2009). MONUC made a serious attempt to support the DRC government from 2003 by concentrating on six key road axes in the Kivu and Ituri provinces

in an attempt to facilitate political stability, security, the restoration of state authority, and the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. Yet, according to the International Crisis Group, the record of the Kabila government over the past years has been 'abysmal' (International Crisis Group, 2009). Winter (2009:2) strikingly remarks that 'a state so seriously damaged as that in the DRC is not repaired in years but rather in decades, while coherent, competent, national armies cannot quickly be forged from feuding militias and foreign-backed rebels'.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the announcement of MONUC's withdrawal from the DRC in 2011[3] was met with a great deal of scepticism. This will be further reviewed in the sections below.

Host-state political considerations versus humanitarian and security challenges

Many observers and several international human rights organisations vigorously objected to the DRC government's call for UN forces to withdraw from the country (Amnesty International, 2010). The main argument was that the eastern DRC continued to be marred by conflict and heavy casualties and deaths, most of them civilians. Even at the international diplomatic level, some expressed the opinion that a withdrawal of MONUC in 2011 would be too hasty (*Mail & Guardian*, 2010).

The reasons for President Kabila's insistence on the departure of the UN are still not entirely clear. Denis Tull (2010:1–3) suggests that the departure or reduction of peacekeepers—as in the DRC—is often a way to rid governments of a troublesome actor that seeks to supervise rather than politically support them. In the eyes of the DRC government, the peacekeeping operation had outlived its 'usefulness'. Thus, the decision to 'un-invite' the UN mission was essentially driven by political sentiment centred around sovereignty. Other observers contended that President Kabila's demand for the UN to withdraw was strongly related to the 2011 elections, and that the presence of UN forces was viewed as international interference or neo-colonialism (Orievulu, 2010).

In response to Kabila's stand on MONUC's departure, the UNSC in November 2009 began to prepare an exit strategy for MONUC. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon indicated that, on behalf of the UN and 'in recognition of the realities', discussions would take place with the DRC government on the future direction and constitution of MONUC. This was necessary to ensure agreement on the critical tasks that needed to be accomplished with the support of MONUC and within the expected time frames. Only then, it was believed, would the UN peacekeepers be in a position to begin their drawdown without triggering a relapse into instability. The Secretary-General also specifically committed MONUC to the protection of civilians as the peacekeepers' highest priority. This was followed by action on the part of the UN to start with the

practical dismantling of the world's largest peacekeeping mission: firstly, by replacing MONUC with the downsized MONUSCO on 1 July 2010, and, secondly, by revising the mandate of the peacekeepers. The long-term plan was to work towards a gradual shift away from military peacekeepers to civilian functionaries focusing their efforts on peacebuilding through institutional reconstruction and SSR. In essence, the latter boils down to rebuilding the state's security sector and developing a secure environment based on the rule of law, good governance, and local ownership of security actors (UN Secretary-General, 2009:22).

These steps were met with mixed responses from other role-players in the international community. On the one hand, the DRC government received some support for its insistence on MONUC's departure. One Western diplomat argued: 'It's partly a question of dignity … Kabila is eager to show that his government's reliance on UN peacekeeping is decreasing. It's understandable. No leader wants to give the impression that he needs UN peacekeepers to stay in power' (Charbonneau, 2009). On the other hand, despite a realisation that MONUC was always an imperfect instrument in terms of its mandate and capabilities, responses to MONUC's withdrawal have mostly been sceptical (even highly critical). Henry Boshoff, a South African military and peacekeeping expert, stated that MONUC's withdrawal should be based on achieving certain exit objectives rather than on political rhetoric. He also expressed concern that MONUC's withdrawal was decided in circumstances where Congolese rebels and armed groups were still fighting the DRC army across much of the east, and parts of the north of the DRC, and where gunmen from all sides were committing gross human rights abuses, especially rape (Boshoff, 2010).

The international human rights organisation Amnesty International made clear its strong opposition to any withdrawal from, or reduction of the numbers of peacekeepers in, the DRC. Tawanda Hondura, deputy director of Amnesty International's Africa Programme, expressed this in no uncertain terms: 'The security and human rights situation has remained dire over the past years. Withdrawing or reducing the peacekeeping force could have disastrous consequences' (Amnesty International, 2010). He also pointed out that the massacres, rape, looting and other attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers continued unabated, especially in the eastern parts of the country. Therefore, he argued that the DRC government should work with the UN in resolving the many challenges in the conflict-stricken areas, instead of coercing the peacekeepers to leave the country (Amnesty International, 2010). At the diplomatic level, France's UN Ambassador, Gérard Araud, asserted that a withdrawal of MONUC from the DRC in 2011 would be 'premature'. He too pointed towards the fragile situation in the eastern provinces and stated that withdrawal should not be decided in an 'artificial way' (*Mail & Guardian*, 2010).

Pressure on the DRC government not to press for a swift withdrawal of peacekeepers mounted after evidence of the scale of ongoing human rights abuses was highlighted in reports on rape in the eastern DRC. For instance, a report by the British humanitarian aid agency Oxfam claimed that, in 2009 alone, some 5 000 women had been raped in the South Kivu province. Krista Riddley, director of humanitarian policy at Oxfam, uttered her frustration in a statement: 'Rape of this scale and brutality is scandalous' (Reuters, 2010).

The DRC government, however, insisted that the UN should withdraw from the DRC. Communications minister Lambert Mende maintained that the UN's withdrawal from the DRC would 'crown a job well done, when all's said and done', lauding the peace mission as an effort 'which had the great merit of helping us end a war that nearly wiped our nation off the map' (News24, 2010). But, he claimed, it was time for the DRC to resolve its own problems: 'we [the DRC government] don't need MONUC' (Mining Review.com, 2010).

For many observers and analysts, the termination of MONUC's mandate was premature. Politically speaking, this highlights a very important challenge or problem, eloquently articulated by Denis Tull: what should, and can, the UN do if the assistance they offer in support of peace consolidation is rejected by the national government concerned, especially if the country in question continues to face serious post-conflict challenges? This question is indeed of the utmost importance, as PCRD necessitates that national governments in question should agree to, or at the very least tolerate, the presence and activities of outside agencies. In the DRC, this has not been the case. In fact, the government of the DRC clearly came to consider the UN presence as a nuisance. As such, the DRC's urge for MONUC's departure was driven essentially by a political rationale. Moreover, this again brought UN peacekeeping to the crossroads, given the fact that the UN faced similar challenges in Chad and Burundi (Tull, 2010:1–3).

Yet, it later became clear that the DRC's political desire for the UN's departure was indeed premature and practically did not come to fruition—at least not in the short to medium term. The problem was that the DRC typically represents a so-called 'no war, no peace' society. Such societies continuously reproduce institutions and organisations—formal and informal—as well as norms and values which generate conflict both within the relevant conflict-ridden society and in neighbouring countries. The case of the DRC has been typically one of an incomplete peace and an unresolved conflict (Swart, 2012:45), which rendered any UN withdrawal from the DRC impractical and unfeasible. In the end, the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO was a compromise between the DRC government's request for the UN's withdrawal from the country and the UN's eagerness to pursue further peace consolidation in the country (Swart, 2012:54).

In terms of size, MONUSCO remained a large-scale mission. By October 2012, MONUSCO had more than 19 000 troops (MONUSCO, 2012), thereby remaining one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations on the ground. Its mandate is not greatly different from that of MONUC, albeit with a much stronger emphasis on the protection of civilians.

In the sections that follow, further attention is given to some of the most pressing challenges facing the DRC in the field of PCRD. This chapter also addresses the six constituent elements of PCRD (*see* Murithi in Chapter 6) as applied to the DRC under two broad categories, namely, reconstruction and development through statebuilding, and the enhancement of security governance and humanitarian conditions.

Pursuing reconstruction and development through statebuilding

According to Claude Kabemba (2006:157), the past characteristics of the Congolese state—corruption, personalisation of power and ethnicity—continued to prevail in recent years. Those who are in power continue to operate in accordance with Mobutu's style of governance, which primarily boils down to exclusion and self-enrichment. The central reason for instability and an inability to pacify the entire DRC territory is not because of external exploitation, but because of weak and self-centred leaders who themselves have become predators in their plundering of the country's resources. Under such circumstances, it is practically impossible for the national interest to take precedence in the DRC.

The characteristics of the state in the DRC have also had an impact on its peace processes. A transition, in the context of a peace process, requires of role-players to proceed in a different way than in the past because of the injection of new ideas and the appearance of leadership with positive values. Peace agreements therefore introduced new ideas and a degree of inclusiveness to the DRC, but failed to resonate with the leaders and other relevant role-players, whose aim was to protect their own interest by accessing resources rather than to take concrete steps in pursuit of statebuilding and reconstruction (Kabemba, 2006:156; Mills, 2011:13). Ideally, the Congolese themselves should lead the peace initiatives, yet the Kabila government in Kinshasa has never been strong enough and in a position to steer the conflict-resolution efforts. Furthermore, NGOs and civil society groupings lack the required funding, logistical means and technical ability to become significant role-players in peacebuilding programmes (Autesserre, 2008).

Line Risch (2009:1) is probably correct in observing that the DRC is a fragile state, but not a failed one. The state provides some public services, although there is little evidence of statehood in the country. This being said, many observers remain convinced that a critical task in pursuance of peace and stability would be the establishment of effective state authority in the

eastern parts of the country. Autesserre (2008) rightly argues that peace will be sustainable in the long term only if the state in the DRC is stable and its institutions are developed and built up at all levels. What is needed is capacity in public administration, policing, and judicial and correctional services, all of which should be developed to a sustainable level by allowing for the monitoring of human rights (Boshoff, 2010).

Research indicates that several institutional factors in the sphere of statebuilding in the DRC have hindered reconstruction and development over many years (Hesselbein & Golooba-Mutebi, 2006):

- While multiple parties were represented in the political framework, the lack of unified security forces has been a major impediment to stability.
- Most economic activity in the DRC takes place beyond the framework of the state. This undermines the existence of the state and complicates or hinders the development of basic state functions.
- Little evidence exists of cross-ethnic political organisations, in contrast to, for instance, political organisation in Tanzania.

From the above, one can identify at least four key propositions relating to the challenges of PCRD. Firstly, there needs to be some agreement or shared vision on how statebuilding should be pursued and carried out. Secondly, the consolidation of state security institutions is crucial for sustainable peace. This requires a thorough assessment and arrangement of the power relations of rival groupings or erstwhile enemies. Thirdly, the economy needs to be organised in such a way that revenues can be raised. In a case such as the DRC, large sections of the population seek survival and profit-making strategies in the informal economy, thereby undermining the development of the formal economy. Lastly, development assistance can sustain a state through political difficulties, but should not add political pressure where fragile stability is the order of the day (Hesselbein & Golooba-Mutebi, 2006).

In this context, the question arises: what practical statebuilding remedies should be pursued for the DRC's challenges in the fields of reconstruction and development? According to the International Crisis Group (2010a), the following conditions or steps are imperative:

- ensuring that electoral institutions, especially the National Independent Electoral Commission, are working towards the timely conduct of periodically scheduled polls
- institutionalising the fight against corruption with the help of independent agencies by pursuing and implementing an anti-corruption strategy, based on civil society's efforts and other post-conflict experiences
- guaranteeing fundamental rights through law and institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission, as constitutionally determined.

> Potential victims, including journalists and human rights activists, should be legally protected

- harmonising the decentralisation process and strengthening provincial and local governments through capacity building and budgetary allocations. This should coincide with the organising of local elections
- establishing a clear partnership between the Congolese government and the international community
- connecting development aid and democratic governance, as well as giving political and financial support to the process of building democratic institutions.

Considering the above-mentioned points, in its Resolution 1991 of (28 June) 2011, the UNSC stated that, although the security situation in the DRC has improved in recent years, the situation continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the regional context. In this regard, the UNSC (2011:1–2) specifically noted limited progress in building accountable national security and rule of law institutions. The Security Council also reiterated the need for:

- the completion of the ongoing military operations in the Kivu and Orientale provinces, to minimise the threat from armed groups and restore stability in sensitive areas
- the consolidation of state authority throughout the DRC, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration and rule of law institutions, in areas freed from armed groups
- improving the capacity of the government of the DRC to effectively protect the population through the establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces, with a view to taking over MONUSCO's security functions.

Regarding the importance of elections in PCRD processes, it should be clear that, as much as elections generally signal the consolidation of democracy, they could also present a serious logistical challenge and potential political risk in a large territory such as the DRC. Rightly, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed the point that, in order to minimise the risks in the DRC, the 2011 (second-ever multiparty) elections had to be 'timely, transparent, credible, peaceful, and secure, offering all Congolese a full opportunity to participate freely without fear of harassment and violence' (IRIN, 2011). He furthermore remarked that '[w]e have invested much (in terms of PCRD)—and there is much to lose' (IRIN, 2011). The UNSC (2011:1) likewise pointed out that the successful staging of timely, inclusive, peaceful and credible elections was a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy, national reconciliation

and the restoration of a stable, peaceful and secure environment for the advancement of socio-economic development in the DRC.

In his report to the UN Security Council, dated 12 May 2011, the Secretary-General warned that elections in many parts of the world are often accompanied by increased violence prior to, during, and following the polls. He also urged that the preparations for elections should be accompanied by a free and constructive political debate that is conducted peacefully. To this end, he expressed serious concern over reports of acts of harassment and violence, specifically by elements of the national security forces against members and supporters of opposition parties, journalists and human rights defenders (UN Secretary-General, 2011b:15–16).

During the 2011 elections, conducted on 27 November, sporadic violence erupted at several polling stations and voting started slowly amid fears that logistical challenges and irregularities would undermine the result. The campaign also saw deadly police crackdown operations on rallies held in support of Etienne Tshisekedi, the main electoral rival of incumbent president Joseph Kabila, as well as a series of clashes between rival supporters of the two main candidates. As a result, the International Crisis Group put the country on its 'conflict risk alert' list, specifically in view of the violence in Kinshasa, deadly rebel attacks in the turbulent southeastern city of Lubumbashi on voting day, and calls from several opposition candidates for the vote to be annulled (*Times Live*, 2011a, 2011b). Yet, in the end, most observers and external actors seem to have agreed that the elections were an imperfect but necessary and important further step in the peacebuilding process and quest for order in the troubled country.

As already intimated, it is often assumed that a PCRD process ends with the establishment of an election mechanism, along with some form of economic recovery package. But as Swart (2012:48) rightly argues, in the DRC this was definitely not the case. The DRC being a 'no war, no peace society', there was simply too little enthusiasm for a truly transformative peace, particularly in the violent eastern parts (Swart, 2012:45). This raises another important point, as stressed by De Coning (2012:iv), namely, that the art of peacebuilding (or PCRD in the AU context) 'lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international support and home-grown solutions'. This means that for PCRD to be successful, it has to coincide with home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific processes (De Coning, 2012:iv). Another important point to make is that no matter how weak the post-conflict state might be, it needs to take responsibility for PCRD and it also needs to work actively with other organisations, states and agencies (Kotzé, 2008:111).

Another serious concern around PCRD in the DRC relates to the location of significant natural resources. The availability of such resources has always had the potential to hinder or derail peace in the eastern DRC, especially given the

fact that actors such as the FDLR continue to complicate resource governance and because the government has neither the capacity nor the capability to manage or carefully monitor the flow of natural resources from the rural areas. The seriousness of this is obvious, as the manifestation of conflict in the DRC during recent years has been of a regional nature where regional actors, in fact, became an integral part of conflict dynamics and accordingly played a major role in destabilising the eastern parts of the country. In this regard, the UNSC (2011:5) on 28 June 2011 welcomed the initial steps taken by the mining authorities in the DRC and throughout the region to address the tracing and certification of minerals. These steps were necessary to address the chaotic management of mineral deposits that has plagued the mining sector since the 1980s. The Security Council also encouraged a further demilitarisation of the mining areas in the DRC and the professionalisation of the Congolese Mining Police in the relevant areas. It also called upon all role-players to support the Congolese authorities in preventing illicit economic activities and illegal exploitation of natural resources.

Finally, from the discussion above, it should be clear that the need and prospects for reconstruction and development in the DRC are heavily dependent on the establishment of state authority and stability in the conflict areas. Specifically, there is a need for urgent interventions or the establishment of a presence in 'ungovernable spaces' to prevent gross human rights abuses, the displacement of people, and the actions of militias that continue to control natural resources and trading networks. After all, as N'Gambwa (2011:1) rightly points out, the revamping of democratic governance, the promotion of economic growth by creating a favourable environment for investment, reform of the mining sector, improvement of the health and education system, and the strengthening the DRC's judiciary are all much-needed conditions for creating lasting peace and security. This will be further explored in the section below.

Enhancing security governance and humanitarian conditions

As already explained, one of the most challenging problems confronting internal and external role-players in the DRC relates to the state's inability to control much of the territory that concerns and determines the DRC as a juridical state and nation. In addition, security governance issues, especially the processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), are increasingly recognised as priority peacebuilding tasks in conflict-ridden states such as the DRC (Risch, 2009:5). In this context, experts and observers were generally *ad idem* in recent years about three basic critical tasks for the DRC government and other role-players.

Firstly, the threat posed by militias, such as the FDLR, the CNDP and the LRA, should be neutralised. This implies the completion of the process

of DDR pertaining to all caseloads of Congolese combatants throughout the country. This process includes military and non-military measures carried out in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as refugee law. However, this is easier said than done, in view of desertions of former CNDP elements integrated into the FARDC, which makes the incomplete and tenuous integration of CNDP and other Congolese armed groups into the FARDC even more difficult (UN Secretary-General, 2011a:3, 16) and thus hampers successful DDR. In other instances, CNDP elements assumed new positions in the FARDC, but resisted orders to redeploy to new areas (UN Secretary-General, 2012a:5).

A second important (and interrelated) task is that of SSR, i.e. the process aimed at building a new army by means of professionalising the FARDC core force, which is heavily dependent on the process of DDR of identified militias or armed groups. Human rights violations have often been associated with untrained elements integrated into the FARDC from the CNDP (UN Secretary-General, 2011a:3), which underscores the need for professional armed forces. SSR also requires that the army should be complemented by a core police capacity, given the need for law and order enforcement to be carried out in full respect of international human rights law.

The third critical task is the establishment of effective state authority in the areas liberated from armed groups. This is needed to facilitate the sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. In this regard, the need to develop the capacity of the public administration, judicial and correctional systems, and of policing in the DRC, especially with a view to allowing the independent monitoring of human rights, left no space for those who flouted the law with impunity (Boshoff, 2010).

In consideration of the first critical task above, the FDLR arguably remains at the centre of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, especially in the eastern parts of the Kivu provinces. Many FDLR soldiers were involved in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and in recent years this armed group has continued to extend the politics of hatred in eastern Congo (Putzel, 2008:1; Refugees International, 2011). The FDLR was also the armed group with the highest military capabilities and caused most of the civilian suffering in the post-electoral period (International Crisis Group, 2010b). During recent years, the organisation has managed to secure large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition from the FARDC, both as a result of military victories, but also through corrupt practices by local FARDC commanders (Mandrup, 2009:24).

Despite the fact that UN peacekeepers constantly supported military operations conducted by the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) against the FDLR in North and South Kivu, the FDLR has continued to pose strategic and security threats in the country. Even though the FDLR might have lost as much as 40 per cent of their combatants in operations, they remained

active and thus remained a major threat to civilians (Vircoulon, 2010; UNSC, 2011:5). However, it should be noted that the FDLR also showed some signs of stress and internal weakness due to ongoing military and judicial pressure and the DDRRR efforts of MONUSCO (UN Secretary-General, 2012a:16), which certainly points towards remarkably positive outcomes from the UN's work in support of the DRC government.

Regarding the second critical task, there is still a long way ahead for SSR. Indeed, the SSR process in the DRC cannot be viewed as a model case. It was planned that the DRC's DDR programme should have been in its final stage in mid-2007. One explanation for the delayed process relates to poor technical, logistical and financial management and inadequate conceptualisation (Risch, 2009:6–7). Another problem has been a lack of political will on the part of the Congolese government. Leadership should be provided by the DRC government, including the political and military establishment, but it seems that there has hardly been a firm commitment to the implementation of SSR. From the DRC government's side it has been suggested that the proposed strategies are foreign-imposed concepts, but, according to Line Risch, one could ask whether this argument is not just an excuse for rejecting the proposed institutional change: 'There is no real demand for SSR from the Congolese government apart from equipping, building and training' (Risch, 2009:6). Given the limited success of SSR, the Congolese army and police force are incapable of providing civilian protection, or of keeping the peace in the eastern provinces. Even more alarming is the fact that the DRC's own security forces are widely considered as a threat to the population (UNSC, 2011:4). In some instances fingers have been pointed at high-ranking officers in the FARDC for stealing funds supposed to cover the salaries of individual soldiers (Mandrup, 2009:19), and consequently, some soldiers rely on extortion from the population to survive. They are, like the FDLR, perpetrators of violence and abusers of human rights. This makes them an additional source of instability rather than a stabilising force (Risch, 2009:5; UNSC, 2011:4).

SSR will also continue to be a challenge and will be difficult to sustain if the DRC government is unable to deal with the fundamental problems relating to the dire socio-economic situation in the country and the corruption that flourishes with apparent impunity at every level of government and society. Furthermore, a specific focus on the governance dimension of SSR is necessary, especially relating to support for democratic oversight and accountability of the security sector. Better coordination of processes and sound decision making is also needed to improve on piecemeal approaches (Schrerrer, 2008).

As far as the third critical task is concerned—the establishment of effective state authority in the areas freed from armed groups—this is easier said than done. For several years, many observers and analysts have articulated the need to increase the government's role in ensuring stability in the country

(De Carvalho, 2007). Yet the government continues to face capacity-related problems, because state institutions are generally weak, which limits or inhibits its ability to exercise control over the entire DRC territory (N'Gambwa, 2011:1).

One also needs to understand that in recent years some of the most institutionalised militias have established statelike institutions and administrative systems which, in many instances, remain visible factors in the everyday lives of people in the eastern provinces. Some of the armed groups have even managed to establish tax collection systems and to take the place of the formal Congolese authorities. The leaders of these movements have also provided the population with a minimum of administrative services. Some of the militia leaders have developed global networks which extend far beyond the Congolese state (Mandrup, 2009:23–25). In recent times, the FDLR military leadership structure has remained active in the eastern parts, while dispersed FDLR elements, CNDP deserters, Mayi-Mayi and other Congolese armed groups have also started to form loose alliances, mostly in an effort to gain or maintain control over illegal mining activities (UN Secretary-General, 2011a:3; UNSC, 2011:5). At the time of writing, the UN Secretary-General even highlighted continued investigations by MONUSCO into serious violations of human rights related to increased attacks by armed groups, particularly the FDLR, LRA and Mayi-Mayi in several areas in the eastern DRC (UN Secretary-General, 2012b:9).

From the viewpoint of the UNSC—even despite the 'initial decision' to withdraw from the DRC—the UN has remained firmly committed to supporting activities concerning DDRRR (especially repatriation) of members of foreign armed groups, including the FDLR and the LRA through actions taken by the DRC government. The Security Council also expressed its commitment to the objective of SSR through DDR with regard to the establishment of sustainable national security forces that would progressively take over MONUSCO's security role. In addition, the Security Council underscored the need for the consolidation of state authority throughout the DRC, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, including the police, administrative structures and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed movements (UNSC, 2010:3–5, 2011:5).

In the final instance, peacekeeping experts rightly maintain that unless the DRC's claim to possess a reliable military force becomes a reality, there will be little possibility of a successful peacebuilding process. The main difficulties lie in creating stability and assuring governance in the eastern DRC, in the implementation of SSR—based on successful DDR—and in the ongoing DDRRR process with regard to foreign forces (Boshoff, 2010).

This being said, the potential for economic development in the DRC is enormous. On 12 November 2012, President Kabila signed a preliminary agreement with his South African counterpart, President Jacob Zuma, to

develop the Grand Inga Dam at the Inga Falls of the Congo River in Bas-Congo province. If the planning comes to fruition, this hydroelectric power scheme would reportedly be the largest in the world, with a potential capacity to generate some 40 000 megawatts (UN Secretary-General, 2012a:8).

Yet this potential for economic development has always been inhibited by the DRC's character as a 'no war, no peace' society, a society which reproduces or reconstructs institutions, organisations, structures, norms and values which regenerate conflict both within the relevant conflict-ridden society and in neighbouring countries. The CNDP is certainly a case in point. As much as some important work was done in the field of SSR and DDR under challenging circumstances, specifically with regard to the dismantling of the CNDP, the overall security situation in the DRC deteriorated significantly since the establishment of the March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 Mars), commonly known as M23. The group was formed in the early months of 2012 by former members of the CNDP who had mutinied against the FARDC (after being integrated). Also, evidence significantly points towards support from an old ally of the (former) CNDP, namely, the Rwandan government (UNSC, 2012:2; Swart, 2012:58). At the time of writing, it was announced that the UNSC was drafting a resolution that would extend MONUSCO's mandate until March 2014. Reports also alluded to the creation of an 'intervention brigade', authorised to engage in offensive military action against the armed groups in the eastern parts of the DRC. Needless to say, any painstaking post-conflict programming by international actors, such as the UN, will be severely hampered by the above-mentioned 'no war, no peace' phenomenon, and any effort aimed at the reconstruction and development of post-war society will face serious implementation challenges under such conditions.

Conclusion

From a macro-political perspective, long-term PCRD requires that the alleged beneficiaries, i.e. the governments of the countries under intervention, welcome the presence and support of the UN and other role-players. Alas, in the DRC this has not been the case. In previous years, human rights activists, humanitarian groups and UN officials were often concerned that the UN Security Council might prematurely decide upon the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission. In the DRC—as also in Chad—the government of the DRC pushed for an early end to MONUC. And this occurred in spite of ongoing insecurity and humanitarian challenges and much unfinished business in the field of PCRD (Tull, 2010:4). But, as already discussed, the DRC's political desire to push for an end to the UN's work in the DRC did not come to fruition.

Still, this raises some serious questions about the political circumstances and limitations under which the consolidation of fragile peace processes can be strengthened or promoted by external actors, such as the UN. At the same

time, a better future for the DRC will be heavily dependent on the Congolese themselves, as well as on the state in the DRC as the chief organisational instrument of society with the responsibility for maintaining political and social order. The UN can only play a 'supporting role', and, ideally, the Congolese should lead the peace initiatives (Autesserre, 2008). After all, Kotzé (2008:112) rightly points out that 'post-conflict reconstruction is also to reconstruct a social contract'.

N'Gambwa (2011:1) contends that three attributes have been lacking in the DRC: a real vision for the country's future; the competence and ability to execute the vision; and the character needed to ensure the realisation of the vision through sound judgement, integrity and equity. Even more problematic is Mills' observation that while local politics has been institutionalised, it has not brought prosperity or stability. The build-up to the 2011 elections was marked by fluttering flags from various political parties, but the problem is that political leaders 'don't think like nationalists, but act instead as individuals' (Mills, 2011:13). In brief, this implies that politics in the DRC is still largely viewed as a means of accumulating wealth, while the state is regarded as the medium for pursuing sectional and material interest, as against the pursuit of the common interest or the public good. As long as that is the lie of the land, politically speaking, in the DRC, PCRD endeavours will encounter difficulties in enhancing the role of the state as a provider and guarantor of social and political order.

In view of this, the question arises: where does this leave the DRC in terms of future prospects? Since 1998, many commentators have contended that the path to peace in the DRC remains littered with obstacles, and that the likelihood of the DRC achieving total security and stability will remain an elusive dream, since little or nothing has changed over the years—a point also articulated and reiterated by Swart (2004:1, 2012:60).

For some observers, the 2006 elections heralded the end of the war in the DRC and the prelude to the much-needed post-conflict reconstruction process. However, despite some positive developments, democratic and responsible government is far from rooted in the DRC. Nor is the DRC a country which has moved beyond destabilising wartime power dynamics and governance practices. Even though a second round of elections was conducted in November 2011, which implies positive development in the field of democratic consolidation, limited progress has been recorded in SSR, and large parts of the country remain in the hands of destructive militias. Significant political, economic, social and security challenges continue to face the DRC overall. The country is trapped in a recurring cycle of structural violence and privatised governance by both governmental and nongovernmental role-players (Risch, 2009:iv; UNSC, 2011:3–5). Therefore, many sceptics from the Congo and

further afield are of the opinion that when the UN finally leaves the DRC, the possibility of renewed and escalated violence could be the order of the day.

For now, the UNSC correctly acknowledges that there have been positive developments relative to the consolidation of peace and stability, but that

> … serious (security) challenges remain, particularly in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, including attacks by armed groups, attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel … (and that deep concerns remain over) the continued presence of armed groups in the Kivus and Oriental Province, serious abuses and violations of human rights and acts of violence against civilians, limited progress in building professional and accountable national security and rule of law institutions, and illegal exploitation of natural resources. (UNSC, 2012:1)

In the final analysis, the fact remains that the UN cannot remain in the DRC indefinitely. At some point, the international community will have to bring an end to the work of the UN in the DRC. When that point is reached, it will be up to the DRC government to build on the work of the international community in the field of PCRD, and it will have to be seen whether the DRC will then indeed be geared, and its government sufficiently strong and capacitated, to embark on the much-needed further critical reconstruction and rebuilding process without the active assistance and presence of a large UN peacekeeping force.

Bibliography

Amnesty International (2010). UN forces must remain in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 5 March. Available from www.amnesty.org/fr/node/15668. (Accessed 12 October 2010).

AU (African Union) (2007). Implementation of the post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) policy in Africa. Available from http://www. africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/july/PCRD/pcrd1.htm. (Accessed 27 February 2012).

AU (2011). African Union's policy on reconstruction and development of post-conflict countries. Available from http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/ Departments/PSC/PCRD/PCRD%20Main%20Web%20Source/index.html. (Accessed 17 October 2011).

Autesserre, S. (2008). The trouble with Congo: how local disputes fuel regional conflict. *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (3). Available from http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/ infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002& prodId=AONE&docId=A178348429&source=gale&userGroupName=27uos & version=1.0. (Accessed 8 February 2010).

Boshoff, H. (2010). MONUC to leave the DRC, mission unaccomplished. *AfricaFiles*, 26 April. Available from http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp? ID=23475. (Accessed 12 October 2010).

Charbonneau, L. (2009). UN mulls exit strategy for Congo troops: diplomats. Reuters AlertNet, 15 November. Available from www.alertnet.org/thenews desk/N13474639.htm. (Accessed 30 January 2010).

De Carvalho, G. (2007). Democratic Republic of Congo: MONUC and post-electoral challenges. *Conflict Trends*, issue 4. Available from www.africafiles. org/printableversion.asp?id=17534. (Accessed 19 January 2010).

De Coning, C. (2012). *Coherence and international cooperation: a complexity theory approach to the coordination dilemma in peacebuilding operations*. (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stellenbosch).

Gounden V., Mbugua, K. & Sadiki, K. (2010). The Democratic Republic of Congo: on the road from hell?, in Swart, G. (ed.), *A vanquished peace: prospects for the successful reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Congo*. London: Adonis & Abbey.

Hesselbein, G. & Golooba-Mutebi, F.G. (2006). Economic and political foundations of state-making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Available from www.gsdrc.org/go/ display & type=Document & id=2601. (Accessed 28 October 2010).

International Crisis Group (2009). Conflict in Congo, 16 June. Available from www.crisisgroup.org.home/index.cfm?id=2829. (Accessed 3 February 2010).

International Crisis Group (2010a). Congo: A stalled democratic agenda. *Africa Briefing*, no. 73, 8 April. Available from www.polity.org.za/article/congo-a-stalled-democratic-agenda-april-2010-2010-04-09. (Accessed 12 October 2010).

International Crisis Group (2010b). Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, *International Crisis Group Africa Report*, no. 151, 9 July. Available from www.crisisgroup.org/n/media/files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151%20 Congo%20%20A20Comprehensive%20Strategy%20to%20Disarm%20 the%20FDLR%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf. (Accessed 18 March 2010).

IRIN (2011). Analysis: warning and ructions over DRC polls. *IRINnews.org*, 1 June. Available from www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportID=92866. (Accessed 1 June 2011).

Kabemba, C. (2006). South Africa and the DRC: is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?, in Southall, R. (ed.), *South Africa's role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Kahorha J. (2009). DR Congo: refugee return heightens North Kivu tensions. *ReliefWeb*, 22 December. Available from www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/ db900sid/SNAA-7Z26QR?OpenDocument. (Accessed 25 January 2010).

Kotzé, D. (2008). Post-conflict reconstruction, in Kotzé, D. & Solomon, H. (eds), *The state of Africa: post-conflict reconstruction and development*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Mail & Guardian (2010). UN mission's withdrawal from DRC in 2011 'premature', 14 April. Available from www.mg.co.za/article/2010-04-14-un-missions-withdrawal-from-drc-in-2011-premature. (Accessed 12 October 2010).

Mandrup, T. (2009). Rumble in the jungle—private sources of security or order and disorder: the case of the DR Congo. Conference paper delivered at 'On strategy: future challenges for Africa', 11–12 June 2009, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Mills, G. (2011). People still powerless to sugar Congo's bitter pill. *Sunday Times*, 23 October.

Mining review.com (2010). UN withdrawal from DRC could cause security vacuum, 17 May 2010. Available from www.miningreview.com/node/17752. (Accessed 1 July 2010).

MONUSCO (2012). MONUSCO: facts and figures. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml. (Assessed 4 October 2012).

News24 (2010). DRC backs UN force pullout, 11 March. Available from www.news24.com/Africa/News/DRC-backs-IN-force-pullout-20100311. (Accessed 1 July 2010).

N'Gambwa, K. (2011). Leadership, peace, stability and prosperity in the DRC, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, October 2011.

Orievulu, K. (2010). Security situation in the DRC: a case of weak state leaning on the UN. *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*, 16 September. Available from www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=542:security-situation-in-the-drc-a-case-of-a-weak-state-leaning-on-the-un & catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers & Itemid=265. (Accessed 12 October 2010).

Putzel, J. (2008). International community risks prolonging crisis in the DRC. London School of Economics and Political Science: Crisis States Research Centre, press release, 3 November.

Refugees International (2011). DR Congo: support community-based tools for MONUSCO, *Refugees International Field Report*, 5 February. Available from http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/drc-support-community-based-tools-monusco. (Accessed 6 October 2011).

Reuters (2010). UN's DRC trip dominated by peacekeepers' exit, 16 April. Available from www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE63E1OT.htm. (Accessed 9 October 2010).

Risch, L. (2009). Seminar report: reconstructing fragility: the post-conflict state in the DRC. EGMONT—Royal Institute for International Relations and the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 24–25 August 2009.

Schrerrer, V. (2008). SSR case study: the Democratic Republic of Congo: supporting security sector reform in the DRC, March 2008. *Global Facilitation Network for*

Security Sector Reform Monthly Bulletin. Available from www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php. (Accessed 27 June 2012).

Swart, G. (2004). Less talk, more action! The need to accelerate the transition to a peaceful, free and secure DRC. *CIPS Briefing Paper*, 1/2004.

Swart, G. (2010). Introduction: a vanquished peace?, in Swart, G. (ed.), *A vanquished peace: prospects for the successful reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Congo.* London: Adonis & Abbey.

Swart, G. (2012). A vanquished peace? The success and failure of conflict mediation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 1 (1):43–63.

Times Live (2011a). Kabila leads DRC elections, 6 December. Available from www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2011/12/06/kabila-leads-drc-elections. (Accessed 6 November 2011).

Times Live (2011b). Violence hits DRC elections, 6 December. Available from www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2011/12/06/kabila-leads-drc-elections. (Accessed 6 November 2011).

Tull, D.M. (2010). When they overstay their welcome: UN peacekeepers in Africa, *SWP Comment*, June.

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) (2010). Resolution 1925 (2010). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010. New York: UN Headquarters.

UNSC (2011). Resolution 1991 (2011). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6568th meeting, on 28 June 2011. New York: UN Headquarters.

UNSC (2012). Resolution 2053 (2012). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6792th meeting, on 27 June 2012. New York: UN Headquarters.

UN Secretary-General (2009). Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, S2009/623, 4 December. New York: UN Headquarters.

UN Secretary-General (2011a). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, S2011/20, 17 January. New York: UN Headquarters.

UN Secretary-General (2011b). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, S2011/298, 12 May. New York: UN Headquarters.

UN Secretary-General (2012a). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, S2012/355, 23 May. New York: UN Headquarters.

UN Secretary-General (2012b). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, S2012/65, 26 January. New York: UN Headquarters.

Vircoulon, T. (2010). After MONUC, should MONUSCO continue to support Congolese military campaigns? *International Crisis Group Crisis Watch,* no. 86,

19 July 2010. Available from www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/vircoulon-after-MONUC-should-MONUSCO-continue -to-support-congolese-military-campaigns.aspx. (Accessed 22 October 2010).

Winter, P. (2009). Peacekeeping, protection and stabilisation in the DRC. Conference paper delivered at 'On strategy: future challenges for Africa', 11–12 June 2009, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Endnotes

[1] This chapter is an updated and revised version of an article that originally appeared in the *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no 1, 2011.

[2] This especially concerns the repatriation of surviving members of the *génocidaires* who fled Rwanda in 1994 and their dependants or offspring.

[3] This was set as the initial target date.

CHAPTER 9

Post-war Programming in Sierra Leone: Revisiting the Challenges and Achievements of the UN

Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling and
Benjamin Mokoena

Introduction

The African continent has faced, and is still plagued by, a multiplicity of security challenges. These security challenges or threats have been particularly prevalent in the regional security complexes of the Great Lakes, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. The complexity of the security challenges in these countries—generally poor, with weak financial and institutional bases, and which struggle to manage conflict dynamics and deter rebellion (Fukuda-Parr, 2010:24)—has made it very difficult for the United Nations (UN) to conduct successful peace missions.

According to Macqueen (2002:3), the variety of post-Cold War peacekeeping functions has probably found a broader application in Africa than in other parts of the world where UN peace missions have been deployed. Such peacekeeping endeavours have ranged from discreet observation and monitoring to the enforcement of outcomes by large, combat-figured forces. Furthermore, such endeavours and related activities also involved simultaneous post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) activities, such as strengthening weak political institutions and enhancing security governance. This implies that peacekeeping has been brought 'closer' to peacebuilding—all aimed at addressing the root factors of a given conflict.

In war-ravaged Sierra Leone, the challenge for the UN, regional organisations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into efforts aimed essentially at societal transformation. The focus of the peacekeepers was to create an environment which would contribute to building sustainable peace, as opposed to merely providing security. This coincided with an international 'move' in the peacekeeping arena towards an approach that brought security thinking and practice closer to development policies and related endeavours.

In November 2012, a decade after the war in Sierra Leone officially ended, and despite the many remaining challenges and security risks, a third round of democratic elections took place in the country. As far as the work of the UN is concerned, international security sector reform (SSR)—a cornerstone of peacebuilding or PCRD[1]—has been held up as one of the international community's 'more successful experiences to date' (Fitz-Gerald, 2012:307), and Sierra Leone has been steered onto a path of statebuilding and enhancing security governance.

In view of the above, the aim of this chapter is to revisit and examine the approach to, and nature of, the UN intervention in Sierra Leone from a peacebuilding[2] perspective. In particular, the role of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and its successor mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), will be revisited. In recent years, some of the most important questions motivating scholarly work on Sierra Leone include the following: firstly, why was UNAMSIL (1999–2005), a relatively large force with a far-reaching mandate, so supine in the face of challenges of ill-organised and untrained gangs of rebels? Secondly, how is it that, a number of years later, the UN considered UNAMSIL not only as a successful mission, but also as a model for the UN's contemporary emphasis on peacebuilding? Thirdly, if peacebuilding aims to develop support mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution, then the question is: what role should peacekeepers play in peacebuilding? These questions are reviewed below.

Hazen (2007:330) suggests three reasons relating to the scholarly importance of the work of the UN in Sierra Leone from a peacebuilding point of view. Firstly, it is a clear instance of multifunctional post-Cold War UN peacekeeping. International experience in Sierra Leone underlined the fact that military and civilian actors cannot act on separate tracks, and that the key to successful peace interventions is to be found in the effective coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Secondly, the mandate of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone clearly included tasks associated with peacebuilding goals. Thirdly, the work of the UN—specifically the task of UNAMSIL to provide an enabling environment for national actors to begin a peacebuilding process—has been widely viewed as successful by the UN itself.

As a point of departure, this chapter highlights and supports the approach of Hazen (2007) by arguing that the primary task of peace missions relates to the imperative of establishing security and keeping the peace in a country of intervention. Historically, peace missions have in several instances proved capable of keeping the peace, but the problem for peacekeepers is that they are falling short of being capable of undertaking peacebuilding. At most, the peace mission can advise and assist in peacebuilding, and in some cases peacekeepers have played very significant roles in facilitating peacebuilding, but their most

important task is to create the conditions under which peacebuilding activities can proceed and succeed.

The road to war and peace intervention

Civil war in Sierra Leone started on 23 March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from the special forces of neighbouring Liberia, intervened in Sierra Leone in an attempt to overthrow the government of Joseph Momoh. The outbreak of conflict in Sierra Leone has been documented in many scholarly publications and will not be discussed here. Suffice it to mention that the widespread conflict in Sierra Leone deepened when the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), which by 1994–1995 'had become a bloated, ill-trained organisation, which had become very much part of Sierra Leone's problem', was overrun by the RUF, led by Corporal Foday Sankoh (Douglas, 1999:178). The RUF soon began to seize diamond-mining properties, which were the main source of hard currency for the government. By early 1995, the RUF had effectively laid siege to the capital city, Freetown (Abdullah, 1998:203). While far from a disciplined force, the RUF was sufficiently effective to disrupt the national army, the former Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the forerunner to the RSLAF.[3] Badly trained, badly paid, badly equipped and poorly led, the former SLA was deeply demoralised and soon showed an alarming proclivity for fraternisation and even cooperation with its supposed enemy. The term 'sobel' (i.e. soldier-rebel) was coined to describe SLA troops who were happy to kill, maim and loot either independently or along with the RUF as the mood took them (Macqueen, 2002:183).

In the face of inaction by the UN Security Council (UNSC), the government of Sierra Leone contracted the services of Executive Outcomes (EO), a former South African-based private military company, to defend the capital. EO was originally contracted to deploy 160 personnel in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to March 1996. After training company-sized contingents of the RSLAF, EO provided the leadership, helicopters and fire support necessary to prosecute a war against the RUF. By the end of 1995, the siege of Freetown by the RUF had been lifted and the RUF headquarters at Makeni had been destroyed. The Koindu diamond area and the Sierra Rutile area had been liberated and were again open for operations (Alao, 1998:50). After the siege had been lifted, peace talks between the government and representatives of the RUF were initiated on 22 February 1996.

Numerous peace agreements and ceasefires were negotiated over time, but, despite all these efforts, widespread violence continued to plague the population of Sierra Leone. The peace talks were soon followed by, as it turned out, wholly premature elections. The process did follow the usual prescribed UN pattern of ceasefire, peace agreement, disarmament, demobilisation and then election processes. After two rounds of voting, and amidst gross intimidation

of the electorate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) emerged as president in March 1996. This experiment with democracy was abruptly ended on 25 May 1997, when Kabbah's government was violently overthrown by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in a typical palace coup d'état (Malan et al., 2002). The SLA faction of Koroma, invigorated by the prospect of plunder, provided a match for the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African State Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), who entered the conflict to back the elected government. However, the unpredictable Koroma then announced his alignment with the 'ideology' of the RUF, invited them to join him in 'government' and inaugurated a reign of chaos and terror in many parts of the country (Macqueen, 2002:185).

The former Organization of African Unity (OAU) condemned the coup and called for the immediate restoration of the constitutional order, urging the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take action against the instigators (Ejime, 1997). On 23 October 1997, ECOWAS and Koroma's junta reached agreement in Conakry, Guinea, on a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone. This agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the supervision of the ceasefire agreement by ECOMOG and UN military observers (Macqueen, 2002:186). The Conakry agreements also provided for the effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, as well as the restoration of the constitutional order and the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah as president and head of a more broadly based government, on 28 May 1998. The operational mandate of ECOMOG, the military arm of ECOWAS, was consequently extended from Liberia (where it had intervened in the civil war in 1990) to Sierra Leone in order to prevent the total breakdown of law and order. The Conakry Accord was not respected by Koroma, and, in February 1998, ECOMOG, in response to an attack by the junta forces, launched an attack that finally led to the collapse of the junta, as well as its expulsion from Freetown. ECOMOG subsequently expanded its force deployment in an attempt to secure the rest of the country, and on 10 March 1998 President Kabbah formally returned to office (Macqueen, 2002:186). Socio-economic conditions continued to deteriorate, and in June 1998 the UN established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) alongside the regional ECOMOG force.

UNOMSIL, a relatively small peace force if compared to other UN missions, was deployed for an initial period of six months. The aim of the mission was to promote national reconciliation and to provide assistance with the demobilisation of former combatants, in collaboration with ECOMOG (Macqueen, 2002:187). However, little progress had been made towards the achievement of this aim when, on 6 January 1999, members of the deposed Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defences and swept into Freetown. They subsequently went on a rampage, which

resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, while even more civilians were displaced, mutilated and raped. A large number of public buildings and homes were also burned to the ground (UNSC, 1999).

At the time of these events, Nigeria, the 'lead nation' of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, could no longer sustain its regional commitments and subsequently informed the international community that the country could no longer maintain its deployments in Sierra Leone. The impending Nigerian withdrawal resulted in a frantic scramble among the other West African states to broker a peace agreement. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels (Malan et al., 2002). Negotiations between the belligerent parties began in May 1999, and, after coaxing from the UK and the US, a controversial peace agreement was signed by President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh and other members of the RUF on 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo. The Lomé Accord granted total amnesty to Corporal Sankoh and the members of the RUF, promised the reintegration of the RUF into the new Sierra Leonean army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, left the RUF in control of the diamond mines, and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored elections. In exchange for senior government positions for its commanders, as well as a blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the RUF pledged to disarm, along with other armed or paramilitary units (Macqueen, 2002:188). Ultimately, despite the obvious flaws in the Lomé Agreement, the UN was obliged to back it up with a peace mission. This resulted in the decision to deploy UNAMSIL as a peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone in October 1999 (UNSC, 1999).

UNAMSIL deployment: from failed start to restored credibility

UNAMSIL initially consisted of approximately 6000 military personnel, of which 260 were military observers from 30 countries. Four ECOMOG battalions (comprising troops from Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria) were already in Sierra Leone and were 're-hatted' as UN peacekeepers. This change in vote was essential in order to avoid a security vacuum during the period of mission build-up. The remaining units of UNAMSIL were to be provided by India, Bangladesh, Jordan and Zambia. The force build-up progressed haphazardly, and UN peacekeepers were often denied freedom of movement amid frequent ceasefire violations and ambushes of both civilian and UN personnel (Macqueen, 2002:189). The maintenance of illegal roadblocks by elements of the RUF and CDF continued (Adebajo, 2007). In response to these serious security concerns, the UNSC unanimously voted on 7 February 2000 to strengthen UNAMSIL's mission in Sierra Leone in accordance with UN Resolution 1289 of 2000. This resolution raised the maximum authorised force strength from 6000 to 11000, and also granted the mission an expanded mandate under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC, 2000). UNAMSIL was created on 22 October 1999 by UNSC Resolution 1270. The mission was tasked to achieve, *inter alia*, the following objectives (Molukanele et al., 2004:42): assist the efforts of the government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority; restore law and order and stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country; and assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.

UNAMSIL was, however, neither sufficiently strong in size nor properly configured and/or equipped to pose a credible military deterrent to the rebels. Although Resolution 1289 provided the legal framework for coercive action by UNAMSIL in pursuit of its disarmament mandate, it could not be translated into assertive and credible action on the ground. Although the total number of disarmed combatants who passed through the five UNAMSIL-supervised DDR camps numbered about 23 000 by April 2000, the ratio of arms collected to the number of ex-combatants who had given up arms remained low (UNSC, 2000). According to statistics provided by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), only some 5 000 weapons had been handed in by Sierra Leonean belligerents, who reportedly numbered about 45 000 by 15 April 2000 (Malan, 2000). By May 2000, the mission was in crisis when four UN peacekeepers (Kenyan) were killed and about 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF (Neethling, 2002:39). The RUF took a Zambian contingent hostage, disarmed them and stole 13 armoured personnel carriers (APCs). A dead Zambian soldier was flayed and his skin nailed to a tree as part of the RUF's psychological terrorism (Prins, 2007). The RUF then advanced on Freetown—using the captured Zambian APCs (Malan, 2000).

This incident was unprecedented in the UN's history and highlighted several weaknesses in the UN system (*see*, for instance, Galic, 2006). Parallel to new initiatives embarked upon by the UN, the UK deployed a battalion of special forces and five warships at a critical juncture in an attempt to resolve the situation and to send the important message that UNAMSIL would not be abandoned in the face of a crisis. According to Prins (2007), Operation Palliser, as the deployment was named, ultimately rescued the UN force and the UN's reputation. The UK also stepped up its effort to train the national army and police service.

According to Robertson (1995:80), the UK initially deployed forces to Sierra Leone with a limited objective, namely, to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation aimed at protecting Commonwealth citizens. Once the British forces were on the ground, the military commander and the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone assessed the situation and decided to expand the objectives for the mission. With UNAMSIL not operating at full strength and the SLA largely ineffectual, the mere execution of the non-combatant

evacuation operation and withdrawal of external forces would have left a vacuum that RUF forces could continue to exploit. It was thus realised that the UK needed to take direct steps to support the government of Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL.

It is important to note that, as a foreign intervention force, the UK first established a firm base from which to operate and sustain. The British forces also secured the host nation government, capital and key facilities, as well as airports or ports as points of entry. Within the first few days of Operation Palliser, the UK rapidly accomplished all of these important doctrinal requirements.

In terms of credibility, the military force that was deployed by the UK was immediately perceived as professional and effective, and operated with a clear chain of command and political support (Hayes, 2000). However, the small, but decisive unilateral intervention by Britain raised some hard questions about UN peacekeeping in Africa at the beginning of the new century. In this regard, Macqueen (2002:228) asks: 'had nothing been learned from the failure of earlier peace processes that the UN had been supposed to implement? And, at the operational level, why had UNAMSIL, a relatively large force with a far-reaching mandate, been so supine in the face of challenges from ill-organised and untrained gangs of rebels?'

In view of the above, the UN mandated the expansion of the UN forces to one that was more robust and deployed a significantly stronger force of 17 500 members. This was the strongest force that the UN had deployed for many years. At the same time, these events prompted the UN to reassess its capacity to resolve conflict. This led to the issuing, in 2000, of the Brahimi Report,[4] which addressed at length the strengthening of the UN's institutional capacity in terms of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. In effect, the analysis suggested that the UN required more funds and better equipped men and women—in terms of logistics and training. The problems experienced by UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone had clearly demonstrated the danger of sending a weak and inadequately trained peacekeeping force into a country where a fragile peace process prevailed (Neethling, 2002:39–41). It became clear that the credibility of the intervention force was the key to the successful prosecution of a peace mission.

In August 2000, the (Indian) UNAMSIL force commander, Major-General Vijay Jetley, left the mission after several confrontations with his Nigerian lieutenants. In addition to alleging that Nigeria was attempting to sabotage UNAMSIL through collusion with the RUF, Major-General Jetley experienced some serious problems of a logistical nature, and was forthright in his criticism of the various national contingents that had been placed under his command. Following these events, India and Jordan announced that they would leave the mission in September and October 2000, respectively. At this time, the conflict took on a regional aspect when, on 8 September 2000, an attack took place on

Guinean soil, carried out by a group of dissidents who were supported by the RUF (Pratt, 2001; MacAskill, 2000).

The UNAMSIL deployment remained painfully slow, due to constant troop rotations, the uneven quality of the various national contingents of the troop-contributing countries, and continued logistical challenges and coordination problems associated with the sheer size of the UNAMSIL deployment (Farah, 2000:A42). Despite concerted efforts to overcome these challenges and to find a workable solution to reconcile the multiple interests involved in the Sierra Leone peace process, the numerous external policy conflicts essentially thwarted all efforts. This resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among role-players, and generally demoralised the peacekeepers.

After the departure of Major-General Jetley in August 2000, the new UNAMSIL force commander (Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande of Kenya) and chief of staff (Brigadier Alistair Duncan of the UK) arrived in theatre in November 2000. The new force commander and his deputy immediately embarked on a programme of visits to the demoralised contingents of the respective troop-contributing countries. Following the departure of the previous force commander, the military elements of UNAMSIL, both in the headquarters and in the field, had done little but administrative work. The situation demanded a return to military basics, and the various planning processes were immediately shifted into top gear, with UN headquarters in New York providing strategic guidance. One important task was force generation, to get the mission up to its required strength, as well as to restore UNAMSIL's credibility in the theatre (Malan et al., 2002). The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000, followed by the Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement of 2 May 2002 (Abuja II). This agreement constituted a breakthrough in the peace process, with the government and the RUF agreeing to the disarmament of all combatants belonging to the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces, and both parties accepting the need for the government to restore its authority throughout the country (Macqueen, 2002:194).

The general elections of 14 May 2002 represented a major step forward in Sierra Leone's quest for sustainable peace and development. Sierra Leoneans turned out in large numbers to vote in peaceful elections, and approximately 2.3 million voters registered to cast their ballots at about 5 000 polling stations. The elections did not lead to a change of government, but the active participation of members of the RUF signalled a commitment to both peace and the democratisation process. One of the outstanding features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement and the overall peaceful nature of the campaign process. By the end of 2004, UNAMSIL had disarmed some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvements to infrastructure, expanded state authority and had almost rebuilt the national police force to its target size of 9 500 officers. Although public confidence

in the police and armed forces remained low, it was generally felt that the overall security situation in Sierra Leone had improved and that UNAMSIL had enjoyed considerable success (Molukanele et al., 2004:43). International SSR was specifically highlighted as a successful undertaking (Fitz-Gerald, 2012:309).

UNAMSIL — a peacekeeping success: lessons learned

Hazen (2007:328) states that, in practice, peacebuilding has largely become an extension of peacekeeping. Although the primary focus of peacekeeping remains 'keeping the peace', peace missions are mandated to advise, support and assist national governments in a variety of post-conflict activities in support of the broader peace process. The UN clearly supports a broader involvement of peacekeepers in peacebuilding activities, but also recognises that peacekeepers cannot complete the required tasks on their own.

The intervention in Sierra Leone must be viewed against the more integrative and holistic approach to peacekeeping that has been accepted by the UN since the early 1990s. Led and funded by the UK, and supported by several other development partners, the main goal of the donor community was to create peace and stability in a country where security and development had been undermined in several ways. The successful completion of the DDR processes of former combatants was appreciated as central to establishing peace and stability in Sierra Leone (see Fitz-Gerald, 2012:310, for a focused analysis). In addition to DDR, other programmes were aimed at addressing humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the promotion of human rights and good governance, as well as the restoration of the legal system. Significant contributions were made by the international community (e.g. EU, UK and the US), who invested and provided practical aid in several of these programmes. For example, the US's total humanitarian and emergency contribution in the 2002 fiscal year, including grants to the World Food Programme and other aid agencies, assistance to refugees, programmes to combat HIV/AIDS, and the reintegration of combatant and development programmes, amounted to US$56 million. Although some of these matters might fall outside the scope of what is usually regarded as peacebuilding endeavours[5] (or PCRD in the AU policy framework), this supports the broader understanding of the concept of peacebuilding, in that such processes require ambitious (and expensive) long-term statebuilding efforts by international and national actors in order to prevent a return to conflict.

According to Malan et al. (2002), the success of the whole intervention process in Sierra Leone hinged on the degree to which warring factions could effectively be disarmed and reintegrated into new security structures. Moreover, in a country where a formal economy hardly exists, it is very difficult

to find employment for former combatants. This is exacerbated by the fact that illegal diamond mining remains a lucrative source of income for former combatants on all sides who have relied on the war economy for extended periods of time. Despite several challenges relating to the DDR process, UNAMSIL reported that 45 449 former combatants handed over weapons to the authorities between 18 May 2001 and 6 January 2002. On 7 January 2002, UNAMSIL declared that the disarmament of former fighters under the Sierra Leone government's DDR programme had formally ended (Malan et al., 2002).

Fundamentally, it is important to note that the conflict in Sierra Leone was the result of poor governance, which ultimately caused the collapse of the country's formal economy, resulting in unemployment, poverty, poor education and a broken-down infrastructure. In the light of the complexity and the scale of the conflict that broke out in Sierra Leone, it is clear that the UN actually faced an insurmountable challenge in terms of keeping the peace. Despite all the difficulties, the UN finally stabilised the security situation in Sierra Leone. They managed to disarm and demobilise approximately 75 000 combatants—among whom were about 6 000 child soldiers (Bell, 2005:2). Considering the intensity of armed conflict in the country (from March 1991 to January 2002), the fact that peaceful elections were held in 2002 could be described as remarkable. UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 December 2005. Several benchmarks were used to measure UNAMSIL's success. These included several endeavours in the domain of peacebuilding, such as SSR (Fitz-Gerald, 2012:310), the consolidation of state authority, the reintegration of ex-combatants and control over the diamond-mining industry (the so-called blood diamonds), which was utilised to finance the belligerents (Mulakazi, 2006:26).

The establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee (TRC) in Sierra Leone achieved much in addressing the social and psychological damage that had been experienced, and has been cited as one of the most outstanding features from a peacebuilding perspective (Neethling, 2005:52). The TRC in Sierra Leone was fashioned after similar commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa. The intention with the TRC was to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations that occurred in Sierra Leone, as well as to help restore the human dignity of victims, and also to promote national reconciliation. In addition to the TRC, a Special UN Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. This Special Court and the TRC have both played an important role in the country's search for justice, albeit with limitations, as justice remained an acute problem for rural residents in particular (Malan et al., 2002).

Another great challenge to the peace in Sierra Leone was that of pervasive poverty. For several years, the country has been classified as one of the world's

poorest countries. It faces the challenges of large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state institutions and the overwhelming majority of the population living below the poverty line. Yet, in terms of economic growth, Solomon Berewa, the country's former vice-president, pointed out that, based on the successes achieved with the UNAMSIL deployment, the economy had been opened up and that macroeconomic stability had been achieved. He added that the programmes provided by the Bretton Woods institutions had boosted the economy and that an economic growth rate of over seven per cent had been achieved (Berewa, 2006).

Ultimately, the intervention in Sierra Leone was generally dubbed as successful, due to the support of the international community, the UN and the physical presence of UNAMSIL who stayed the course, despite several setbacks on the road to recovery. After the disastrous encounter with the RUF in May 2000, several changes were made and UNAMSIL was better led than at any other time since its inception. It was, by and large, the contributions of a Pakistani brigade and the Russian air wing that provided the mission with a powerful deterrent capacity (Neethling, 2002:43). The United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) commented that UNAMSIL played a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone to move towards the 2002 election process, and furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL had created a relatively more secure environment in general, and had afforded the people of Sierra Leone the opportunity to move past conflict towards national reconciliation and recovery, as well as building sustainable institutions (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004).

Scholars such as Adebajo (2007) commented that the UN deployment in Sierra Leone (among others) heralded the 'UN's return to Africa' after many of the key role-players in the West had withdrawn their attention and resources from Africa in the aftermath of the disastrous interventions in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990s. Overall, the UNAMSIL deployment assisted the government in finding solutions to the causes of armed conflict, among which the all-important regularisation of the diamond industry, which had fuelled the conflict for many years (Bell, 2005). In November 2005, UNAMSIL hosted an international music festival to mark the 'end of the successful UN mission in West Africa', which brought peace and stability to a country that had been engulfed in one of the most brutal wars (Bell, 2005).

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that UNAMSIL as a peace mission was able to greatly reduce the violent conflict in Sierra Leone and thus provided or facilitated an enabling environment for national actors to start a much-needed peacebuilding process. The RUF was no more a political factor, and the police and military were stronger positioned to provide internal and external security. Although the institutions of governance in Sierra Leone remained weak and the underlying causes of conflict remained, it can be stated that

peacebuilding entered its early stages upon UNAMSIL's departure in December 2005 (Hazen, 2007:330–331). In other words, UNAMSIL should be credited with laying the foundation for peace in Sierra Leone. These issues will be further explored in the following section.

From UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL: performing security and extending peacebuilding

UNIOSIL was established by the UNSC on 31 August 2005, after UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 December 2005 through Resolution S/RES/1620 (UNSC, 2005). The UNIOSIL Office comprised the Executive Representative and five compartments targeting key areas of the mandate. These compartments included: peace and governance, human rights and the rule of law, civilian police, military and public information (UNSC, 2005). These components were formed to assist the government of Sierra Leone to consolidate gains already made, as well as to assist in capacity-building for state departments and the design and implementation of a national action plan for human rights (UNSC, 2005).

Significant results have been achieved in Sierra Leone since the establishment of UNIOSIL. These include the establishment of stability, the expansion of commercial activities, progress with national reconciliation and the building of a new and professional police force. With regard to an effective police force, UNIOSIL also instituted measures to track widespread corruption, to avert situations that might derail the prevailing stability in the country. Although reform of the justice sector has been slow, the UN achieved much in facilitating the training and deployment of magistrates in various districts. This resulted in a reduction in the backlog of cases and the shortening of pre-trial detentions. There were also improvements in the building of courthouses and prisons (Mulakazi, 2006).

Despite the many positive developments in Sierra Leone, the fledgling economy remained structured on a gigantic informal sector. Widespread youth unemployment obviously created a threatening situation—especially given the large numbers of child soldiers who were part of the conflict. This threat should be viewed against the worldwide phenomenon of a close relationship between the number of youths aged 15 to 29 and the prevalence of violence or armed conflict (Neethling, 2005:25; FOCAL, 2012). In addition, many defence force members in Sierra Leone had been subjected to very low standards of living (Neethling, 2005:25). This obviously had a negative impact on the morale of the armed forces, who were supposed to be the custodians of the peace process in the country. Having said this, lasting peace cannot be realised without addressing the political, economic, social and security spheres and their marked interconnectedness (UN Secretary-General, 2007:4; Bell, 2005:5).

Furthermore, the selling of 'blood diamonds' by transnational criminal networks to support the war economies of fighting factions in Sierra Leone

serves as a good example of the complexities that face peacekeepers in a peacebuilding context. Despite the deployment of a larger force to Sierra Leone in March 2001, not one component of the force was responsible for monitoring the trade in conflict diamonds. The selling of these 'blood diamonds' thus continued for several years, as UN peacekeepers were not mandated to act in this regard. This situation only changed in September 2004, when the UNSC adopted a new resolution that authorised UN personnel to monitor and patrol diamond-mining areas (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004).

Following the events that took place in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, in which serious blows were delivered against UN forces by the protagonists in the respective countries, the international community was filled with enthusiasm for the possibility of finally giving the UN a muscular capacity to fulfil its Chapter VII roles in Sierra Leone in ways that the original drafters of the UN Charter had envisaged (Prins, 2007). Gueli et al. (2006) argue that: 'If the UN is in the business of solving conflict, it is fair to suggest that the UN should act appropriately (hence forcibly) against those who are involved in the business of war.' Gueli et al. (2006) further note that one of the most successful developments in terms of UN deployments is the realisation within the UN that early development work in peace missions can reduce the changes of countries returning to conflict. In terms of initiating development work as soon as possible, integrating civil–military resources at the earliest possible stages of a mission may seem plausible. Again, the task of peacekeepers is to continue to perform security tasks, but also to support other relevant civilian actors in a variety of post-conflict activities—an area in which UNAMSIL recorded reasonable success (Hazen, 2007:328, 330).

On 12 October 2006, Solomon Berewa, the former vice-president of Sierra Leone, stated in an address to the UN Peacebuilding Commission, that 'there is now peace in the country, democratic elections have already been held with success and all that the country should now do is to get on with the normal business of development' (Berewa, 2006:26). At the same time, he also cautioned that the sustained development of a viable state is dependent on how effectively issues such as poverty and development will be addressed in Sierra Leone. This observation clearly supports the notion proposed by the advocates of the security–development nexus, namely, that the two issues of 'security' and 'development' are closely linked. Thus, in order to prevent a country such as Sierra Leone from sliding back into conflict the two issues should be addressed simultaneously, and sustainable peace should be pursued by means of special and specific peacebuilding measures (De Coning, 2004:43).

The UN Peacebuilding Commission and the role of NGOs

In an attempt to transform itself into an organisation that is indeed able to play a more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities in post-conflict

societies, the UN established a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in December 2005 (Deller, 2006:8). The PBC was established as an intergovernmental body that would convene representatives of the UN's major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors and the governments in question, as well as other role-players, in order to improve on the coordination of activities and to marshal resources effectively for peacebuilding. Sierra Leone and Burundi were the first two cases selected for intervention by the PBC. The PBC subsequently convened a meeting on 19 July 2006, during which government officials, representatives of the UN country teams, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made presentations on the status of the peacebuilding efforts in Burundi and Sierra Leone, respectively (Deller, 2006:9). The Sierra Leone meeting included Sierra Leone's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Momodu Koroma, who emphasised the progress that had been made in governmental programmes in governance reform, resource management and accountability, SSR (including retraining programmes) and national reconciliation (including the TRC). Some of the challenges that he identified were youth unemployment, perceptions of corruption, weak infrastructure, implementing poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals. During July 2006, the PBC organised a meeting between the Global Partnership for Prevention and Armed Conflict, the West African Network for Peacebuilding, the Network on Collaborative Peacebuilding and participants from civil society that represented thematic issues of concern, as well as government representatives. Seven priority areas were identified in relation to the security situation and further peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (Deller, 2006:10):

1. Implementation and dissemination of the TRC and the poverty reduction strategy documents
2. Building effective partnerships among government, civil society organisations, intergovernmental organisation and donors
3. Human resource development: skills training for the youth, and economic empowerment for women
4. Gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding
5. Strengthening of the capacity of national civil society organisations and public institutions
6. Establishing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism
7. Strengthening the capacity of national civil society organisations and public institutions.

From the above, it is clear that NGOs and other relevant actors found themselves in much improved conditions, under which peacebuilding could proceed. This being said, NGOs found it nearly impossible to fulfil their tasks in Sierra Leone during the war, from the late 1990s, due to the lack of security (Pratt, 2001).

It was only after the UK intervened in the ongoing violence that the security situation improved significantly.

When the crisis began to worsen in the spring of 2000, many NGOs were outspoken in their support of British forces in Sierra Leone. Oxfam, for instance, stated that: 'Oxfam GB welcomes the decision to deploy British troops to Sierra Leone … it is difficult to imagine how UNAMSIL can succeed, with the required speed, without British troops being available to use force' (Oxfam International, 2000). By every measure, the ability of NGOs to perform humanitarian and relief work, resettlement and repatriation of displaced persons, judicial reconciliation and the strengthening of civil society in Sierra Leone, only substantially improved when the decision was made by the UK to intervene with combat forces.

By 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that 15 international NGOs, four local NGOs and two UN agencies would work together and coordinate their efforts to reintegrate refugees into society. The United Nations Capital Development Fund began with critically needed micro-financing projects, and Médicins Sans Frontières began to operate again effectively (UNHCR, 2002). With a secure work environment, major NGOs such as Amnesty International assisted in the effort to revitalise the demolished Sierra Leonean judicial system, along with the establishment of the Special UN Court for Sierra Leone, to investigate and prosecute war crimes, and the creation of the TRC, to help create the conditions for national reconciliation. Local and international NGOs also assisted with the successful effort to hold national elections in Sierra Leone on 14 May 2002 (UNHCR, 2002).

Experience gained from Sierra Leone

One of the key findings contained in the Brahimi Report was that the UN was unable to perform the principal mission for which it was created, namely, the maintenance of peace. In addition to the identification of technical problems that hampered the organisational ability of the UN to perform tasks in the field of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the Brahimi panellists found that no amount of good intentions could substitute for the fundamental ability to project a credible force. The events in Sierra Leone once again highlighted the difficulties that the UN had experienced in establishing peace missions where there was not true peace to keep. It had also become evident that the insertion of more troops into Sierra Leone would rescue the failing mission, but an increase in UN forces merely provided for a wider range of potential hostages. Hayes (2000) emphasises that a change in mandate—without the commensurate upgrading of weaponry, training, and command and control to act upon it—raised false expectations and heightened the likelihood of a humiliation akin to Srebrenica or Rwanda. As is intimated in the aforementioned, it was the credibility of the force that

explains the British success and UN difficulties in Sierra Leone. Ultimately, the crisis in Sierra Leone initiated a serious call for change, as well as a stronger commitment to the UN peacekeeping system by the international community.

The experience of NGOs in Sierra Leone furthermore emphasises the links between effective military intervention and the ability of other role-players, especially NGOs, to successfully provide humanitarian assistance. In order for NGOs to perform their missions, collaboration with military forces in helping them create a viable security environment is a given (Jackson, 2005:113). The role of the military in such a tactic is to create and protect the conditions within which the developmental organisations and agents can perform their work. This important requirement emphasises the point that post-conflict reconstruction and development activities are not possible unless there are security conditions under which such activities can proceed.

One of the most crucial requirements for achieving lasting peace and development is to effectively address the relationship between peace and development in the shortest time possible. Given the long-term correlation between security and development, the need for economic growth has become evident. In this regard, the literature on conflict–development links indicates a number of important points. A most important issue is that poverty is a source of conflict and undermines long-term development. Given the correlation between security and development, economic growth is of the greatest importance. This raises another important issue: it has become increasingly evident that international actors (such as the UN and the AU) 'can no longer afford to work *in* or *around* conflict; they also need to work *on* conflict' (Fukuda-Parr, 2010:24–27).

The peace process in Sierra Leone is sometimes viewed as a successful case for studying integrated international peace missions — at least by the UN itself (Hazen 2007:330). The restoration of democratically elected government after elections in 2002, as well as in 2007, bears witness to strong international and national efforts to resolve the conflict. But as Hazen (2007:324) rightly argues, ultimately peacebuilding remains a 'national challenge'. In this regard, civil society especially played a central role in the establishment of democracy in Sierra Leone by embarking on a campaign for good governance. It created awareness and consciousness among the citizens to maximise their participation in shaping state affairs in PCRD. This critical formation played a significant role in the re-establishment of multiparty democratic government. There was also a robust campaign toward the education of the youth as a long-term investment in capacity building for the country's future development and the institutionalisation of good governance.

Given the high number of children and youth among the armed factions of Sierra Leone, a National Youth Policy was introduced in 2003. This created a framework for supporting youth empowerment after the war, ranging from

literacy programmes to life skills projects. As a response to the commitment of national government to consolidate democracy by building a strong civil society, a plethora of youth organisations have been created—all of which facilitated a more tolerant political environment. These initiatives have, however, not been complemented by an environment where jobs, training, education and a respected voice in government have strengthened the position of the youth. In fact, at the time of writing, it was anticipated that so-called youth violence—resulting from youth unemployment, the manipulation of the youth by elite actors, illiteracy and poverty—could be spiralling out of control (*see* Cubitt, 2012:31–46 for a detailed analysis).

On the positive side, Sierra Leone is now governed by a democratic government. The country's constitution provides for the rule of law and the protection of human rights. It empowers the parliament to enforce democratic accountability and oversight. The partnerships between the government and international donors refurbished the physical infrastructure of the courts throughout the country. Strategic departments such as the police, correctional services and justice were strengthened to ensure a safe and secure environment in which to contain civil unrest, domestic violence and economic crimes. The process of SSR in Sierra Leone further played a role in bringing the security forces under civilian oversight (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2007:11). It can also be stated that, since the end of the war, Sierra Leone has been moving towards building a peaceful nation, though it also remains a fact that the period of greater political stability has not brought an end to acute challenges in the area of development.

Recovery has been slow partly because the reconstruction needs are so acute. Around half of Sierra Leone government revenue comes from donors. Furthermore, over half of the population still subsists on less than US$1.25 per day. The country also faces the challenge that about 43 per cent of its population is younger than 15 years (World Bank, 2011). Ten years since the war officially ended, the majority of the country's youth remains trapped in poverty and unemployment, with few opportunities and little hope for a better future. Moreover, politicians mobilise along ethnic lines and thereby bring deep-rooted toxic practices into the political arena (Cubitt, 2012:15, 46). This does not build on the possibilities generated by the UN and several other actors in recent years in the field of post-conflict development and reconstruction.

Conclusion

Fukuda-Parr (2010:24) points out that there is strong scholarly support for the thesis that dependence on primary commodities increases the risk of conflict. This is mainly premised on the work of Collier and Hoeffler, who found that countries with more than 25 per cent dependence on primary commodity exports are as much as five times more likely to experience

violent conflict than countries with a lower dependence on such resources. This is especially true for countries rich in mineral resources, and, more specifically, where rebel groups and governments alike are in a position to misuse the resources. Diamonds in particular are easily transportable, and thus particularly susceptible to use by rebel groups. Obviously, when rebel groups gain access to natural resources, they are in a position to generate funds to finance their activities, and the control over such resources in itself fuels conflict. Needless to say, the thesis of weak governance of natural resources as a conflict risk has been of great relevance to conflict dynamics in Sierra Leone since the mid-1990s.

In Sierra Leone, the UN faced numerous obstacles. After a shaky start, the organisation got what is described by Galic (2006) as a 'second chance', and managed to move towards a point where a window of opportunity for peace was offered to the people of Sierra Leone. On 7 May 2007, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that Sierra Leone continued to make progress in the peace consolidation process. The registration of voters for the July 2007 general elections commenced on 26 February 2007 and was completed on 18 March 2007. About 91 per cent of eligible voters were registered. The elections that followed took place in a democratic manner. Thus, general positive developments have strengthened the prospects for long-term peace. The post-conflict security situation in Sierra Leone, however, remains fragile, as high rates of unemployment and negative public perceptions about the lack and slow pace of improvement of the living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the population, have continued to pose a key threat to the country's fragile stability since the departure of the UN from the country (Ki-moon, 2007:1–3).

In September 2010, the UN Security Council lifted all remaining sanctions against Sierra Leone, stating that the government had fully re-established control over its territory. Importantly, all former rebel fighters had been disarmed and demobilised. Economically, growth has been recorded over several years, but, as already intimated, several challenges remain (World Bank, 2011; BBC News Africa, 2012).

In view of the above, the case of intervention in Sierra Leone indicates that peacebuilding can work towards the required conditions for sustainable peace and development. After many years of acute armed conflict and conflict intervention, the UN's PBC was able to play a more meaningful role and succeeded in gaining the cooperation of most of the key role-players—a factor which contributed significantly to the development of integrated PCRD strategies, as well as garnering the required support basis for such activities.

In the final analysis, peacebuilding experience in Sierra Leone has yet again demonstrated that peacekeeping in Africa involves entry into volatile, high-risk, anarchic environments, where copious quantities of weapons are available. In addition, the destruction of the social cohesion and state

infrastructure can remove the support mechanisms required to sustain life, which most often results in humanitarian crises. It is essential that a credible peace force be deployed in such complex emergencies—credible in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and the international community. The military deployment, however, ultimately forms only a part of the solution. There can be no credible military peace support operations force without the political backing of all the participating nations. Peacekeeping forces on their own cannot ensure lasting peace and development in countries where complex emergencies have to be addressed. There must be a long-term commitment by all role-players to contribute to finding lasting peace. From the experience in Sierra Leone, it is clear that military and civilian actors cannot act on separate tracks, but that the key to successful peace interventions is to be found in the effective coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It can be concluded that peacekeeping is an invaluable tool for stabilising countries and preparing the groundwork for peacebuilding, but other actors than military peacekeepers are needed to make peacebuilding a successful endeavour.

Bibliography

Abdullah, I. (1998). Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36 (2):203–235.

Adebajo, A. (2007). Tread warily through the politics of peacekeeping. *Sunday Times* (UK), 29 April. Available from http://www.ccr.org.za/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=327:no-71-tread-warily-through-the-politics-of-peacekeeping-adekeye-adebajo-sunday-times & catid=40:press-articles & Itemid=105. (Accessed 11 May 2012).

Alao, A. (1998). Sierra Leone: tracing the genesis of a controversy. Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing, no. 50, June. Available from http://catalogue.sipri.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=19561. (Accessed 10 May 2012).

BBC News Africa (2012). Sierra Leone profile, 26 April. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094194. (Accessed 27 June 2012).

Bell, U. (2005). Sierra Leone: building on a hard-won peace. *UN Chronicle*, December. Available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_4_42/ai_n27868161/. (Accessed 10 May 2012).

Berewa, S.E. (2006). Statement by His Excellency Mr Solomon Berewa, Vice-President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, to the Peacebuilding Commission at the ECOSOC Chamber, 15 May. New York: UN Headquarters. Available from http://pvnewyork.org/statements_2007/peace_building_0. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Cubitt, C. (2012). Political youth: finding alternatives to violence in Sierra Leone. *Africa Dialogue Monograph Series*, 1:15–53.

De Coning, C. (2004). Coherence and integration in the planning, implementation and evaluation of complex peacebuilding operations. *Conflict Trends*, 1:41–48.

Deller, N. (2006). The role of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in international peace and security. *Conflict Trends*, 3:8–12.

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (2007). An assessment of multi-dimensional and integrated peace operations: trends and challenges. Report by the Policy, Research and Analysis Unit (PRAU) for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr A. Pahad, for the Workshop on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, 14 September. Available from http://www.polity.org.za/article.php. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Douglas, I. (1999). Fighting for diamonds – private military companies in Sierra Leone, in Cilliers J. & Mason, P. (eds), *Peace, profit and plunder: the privatisation of security in war-torn African societies*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Ejime, P. (1997). Nigeria says West African countries may act. Pan African News Agency, 27 May. Available from http://www.panapress.com. (Accessed 12 May 2008).

Farah, N. (2000). *Yesterday, tomorrow: voices from the Somali diaspora*. New York: Continuum.

Fitz-Gerald, A.M. (2012). Lest we forget? The centrality of development considerations in internationally assisted SSR processes, in Schnabel A. & Farr, V. (eds), *Back to the roots: security sector reform and development.* Münster: LIT Verlag.

FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas) (2012). Crime and crisis in Jamaica. Available from http://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/307-september-2010-don-robotham. (Accessed 27 June 2012).

Fukuda-Parr, S. (2010). Poverty and violent conflict: rethinking development, in Tschirgi, N., Lund, M. & Mancini, F. (eds), *Security & development: searching for critical connections*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Galic, M. (2006). Into the breach: an analysis of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. *Stanford Journal of International Relations*, 3 (1). Available from http://stanford.edu/group/sjir/3.1.04_galic.html. (Accessed 14 September 2012).

Gueli, R., Liebenberg, S. & Van Huyssteen, E. (2006). Developmental peace missions: policy guidelines and background reports. Compiled by the CSIR and submitted for publication to the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE). Pretoria: CSIR. Available from http://www.csir.co.za/contacts.html. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Hayes, V. (2000). Establishing the credibility of a regional peacekeeping capability. ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 1. Available from http://www.accord.org.za. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Hazen, J.M. (2007). Can peacekeepers be peacebuilders? *International Peacekeeping*, 14 (3):323–328.

Jackson, M.G. (2005). *A necessary collaboration: NGOs, peacekeepers and credible military force—the case of Sierra Leone and East Timor in subcontracting peace: the challenges of NGO peacebuilding.* London: Ashgate.

Ki-moon, B. (2007). Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Office in Sierra Leone, S/2007/257, 7 May. New York: UN Headquarters.

MacAskill, E. (2000). UN gets warning shot on peacekeeping. *The Guardian*, 9 September. Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2. (Accessed 22 November 2012).

Macqueen, N. (2002). *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960.* Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

Malan, M. (2000). Peace support operations in Africa: the unresolved issues. *ISS Monograph*, no. 44. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no44/SupportOperations.html. (Accessed 8 May 2008).

Malan, M., Rakate, P. & McIntyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. *ISS Monograph*, no. 68. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No68/Content.html. (Accessed 7 May 2008).

Molukanele, T., Ridd, G. & Abdellaiou, J. (2004). UN Mission in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL. *Conflict Trends*, 2:42–43.

Mulakazi, G. (2006). Situation report Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). *Conflict Trends*, 3:26.

Neethling, T. (2002). The UN in the aftermath of the crisis in Sierra Leone. *Conflict Trends*, 3:39–45.

Neethling, T. (2005). The security–development nexus and the imperative of peacebuilding with special reference to the African context. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 5 (1):33–60.

Oxfam International (2000). Oxfam: Sierra Leone advocacy aims. Global Policy Forum: Monitoring policy making at the United Nations, 14 June. Available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/oxfam.htm. (Accessed 16 July 2008).

Pratt, D. (2001). Sierra Leone: danger and opportunity in a regional conflict. Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, 27 July. Available from http://www.davidpratt.ca/sleone_e.htm. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Prins, G. (2007). The South African Army in its global and local contexts in the early 21st century: a mission-critical analysis, in Le Roux, L. (ed.), *South African Army Vision 2020: security challenges shaping the future South African Army.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available from http://www.iss.co.za. (Accessed 12 June 2008).

Robertson, W.G. (1995). *British military intervention in Sierra Leone: a case study* (unpublished thesis, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York).

UNDG/ECHA Working Group (UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance) (2004). Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, February. Available from http://www.mendeley.com/research/report-undgecha-working-group-transition-issues/. (Accessed 4 May 2012).

UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) (2002). Sierra Leone: United Nations advises ending of refugee status for Sierra Leoneans who fled country. UN News Service. Available from http://www.warvictims.wordpress.com/2008/sierra-leone.htm. (Accessed 16 July 2008).

UNSC (UN Security Council) (1999). Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4011th meeting, S/RES/1244, 10 June. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244. (Accessed 10 May 2012).

UNSC (2000). Resolution 1289 (2000). Adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4099th meeting, S/RES/1289, 7 February. Available from http://www.un.org/documents. (Accessed 10 May 2012).

UNSC (2005). Resolution 1620 (2005). Adopted by the UN Security Council at its 5254th meeting, S/RES/1620, 31 August. Available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/477/15/PDF/N0547715.pdf?OpenElement. (Accessed 10 May 2012).

UN Secretary-General (2007). Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2007/257, New York, 7 May.

World Bank (2011). Reproductive health at a glance. Available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRH/Resources/376374-1303736328719/SierraLeone42211web.pdf. (Accessed 27 June 2012).

Endnotes

[1] See De Coning (Chapter 1, this volume) for definitional clarity on peacebuilding (as approved by the UN Policy Committee) and PCRD (as adopted in the AU policy framework). Where the work of the UN is under review in this chapter, the concept of peacebuilding will be used.

[2] PCRD in the Africa or AU context.

[3] President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah announced in January 2002 that the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) would be unified with the tiny Sierra Leone Air Force and the so-called Sierra Leone Navy to form a reconstituted force known as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).

[4] The UN's Brahimi Report was embarked upon after the UN Secretary-General published two reports that focused on the UN's failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, as well as an inability to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995.

[5] Peacebuilding is mostly associated with the strengthening of civil society, security sector reform, democratisation, anti-corruption, transformative justice, etc.

PART III

POLICY AND PRACTICE

CHAPTER 10

Foreign Policy and the Military: In Service of Reconstruction and Development?

Maxi Schoeman

Introduction

The importance of the military in South Africa's foreign policy is underlined in the strategic plans of both departments with the main responsibility for the country's external affairs, namely, International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and Defence and Military Veterans (here abbreviated to DOD).[1] The country's role in, and commitment to, international peace missions became more pronounced after the adoption of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions in 1999 and continental and international trends developing in the early years of the new century, emphasising peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). The latter concept forms part of the former: peacebuilding is not limited to post-conflict situations. As already discussed in earlier chapters, peacebuilding is in essence an attempt to address the root causes of conflict, and its intellectual parentage is to be found in the work of Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach.[2] In the early 2000s, several South African researchers and practitioners focused their attention on 'developmental peacekeeping' (*see* e.g. Gueli, 2007; *see also* Olivier, in this volume) as an approach to peacebuilding. Over time, 'developmental peacekeeping' has been largely absorbed into the notion of post-conflict reconstruction and development, the latter forming an integral part of the broad definition of peace missions as a generic term to cover all international activities aimed at promoting peace.

Peace mission activities are first and foremost part of a country's foreign policy. Conventionally, four instruments of foreign policy are available for policy implementation: diplomacy, economic techniques, propaganda and military means, with diplomatic and military instruments 'conjoined to a significant extent' (*see* Du Plessis, 2003:110), and particularly so in the field of peace missions, whether preventive or restorative. Although a hierarchy among the instruments is implied (with military means a 'last resort'), they are often used simultaneously and in combination. The military instrument

encompasses a range of techniques, from collaboration to coercion, and the main challenge to policy-makers, Du Plessis (2003:111) asserts, is to 'decide on the appropriateness of the use of military means' in support of the foreign policy goals and objectives of a state.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between South African foreign policy and the military in the context of peace missions and with specific reference to the demands of PCRD. In the first section, attention is paid to the changing role of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Aspects and issues identified in this section are applied to an analysis of South Africa's involvement in peace operations and PCRD efforts in the second section, and in section three some of the challenges and opportunities facing the country in its endeavours to promote peace and security on the continent are discussed.

The military instrument in foreign policy

Traditionally, the military dimension of foreign policy is conceived of in rather narrow military and national security dimensions. In this paradigm, the national security of a state is deemed to be the most important foreign-policy goal, with the military protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. States need some coercive capability (hard power) to deter and defend, with military means being the main instruments for this purpose. Christopher Hill (2003:143) encapsulates succinctly this traditional perspective on the link between foreign policy and the military instrument: 'If the use of force is always political, as Clausewitz famously asserted, then foreign policy almost always carries with it the implicit threat of force.'

This narrow definition of the nature of security to be provided to the state and to its inhabitants came under increasing pressure after the end of the Cold War, especially with Barry Buzan's influential 1991 book, *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in a post-Cold War era*, and against the background of drastic changes in world politics during this period. In turn, the 'nature of national security and other national objectives and values' (Webber & Smith, 2002:20) changed. The 'broadening' and 'deepening' of security became a popular topic for scholarly research, especially after the release of Boutros-Ghali's *An agenda for peace* (1992). The UNDP's Human Development Report 1994, dealing with 'new dimensions of human security', established a watershed in international thinking and approaches to the provision and maintenance of security (UNDP, 1994). This was followed by recommendations for the norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005, the same year that saw Annan release his report, *In larger freedom: towards security, development and human rights for all*. The past two decades, therefore, have seen a clear move away from the role of the military as defending (only) national security, to an emphasis on the broader question of security and development.

For a time, particularly during the 1990s, it seemed as if the military as an instrument of foreign policy had largely lost its importance and utility, and across the globe military budgets came under pressure and public debates raged about possible new roles for the military. 'Soft power'—the ability to co-opt rather than coerce (*see* Nye, 2004)—the revolution in military affairs (based on technological and organisational advancements), the 'leakage of military capabilities to non-state groups' (Webber & Smith, 2002:42) and calls for human security to become the main object of security policy all eroded the importance of the military instrument in foreign policy. Therefore, a combination of ideas and events during the early post-Cold War era posed serious questions about the future of militaries and the usefulness of military instruments in international politics. Many observers and politicians believed that the end of East–West rivalry, and a new ethos of commitment to human security, demanded a new role for the military, and an important issue became that of the role of the military and the extent to which it still retained primary responsibility for security in an era in which national security seemed to be losing its primacy as foreign-policy goal.

However, the 'new world order' envisaged by President George Bush (senior) in March 1991 and ideas of a 'peace dividend' in the aftermath of the Cold War were of short duration. The enmity, tension, military rivalry and proxy wars supported by the two Cold War camps might have receded, but new threats (and some that had previously been suppressed by the superpowers) arose which pointed to the continuing need for and importance of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Failing states (Somalia), genocide (Rwanda), the intractability of many violent conflicts (Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan), the changing nature of conflicts from interstate to intrastate conflicts, especially in Africa, the escalation in civilian casualties and worsening of human security in such conditions, and the re-emergence of international terrorism put the role of the military on the agenda again. These challenges also exposed the difficult choices that confronted the militaries in many countries in terms of defence planning (*see* e.g. Gray, 2008).

The nature of these new threats to national and international security brought to the fore two new, or previously lesser, demands on militaries. The first is that of developing unconventional capabilities: the nature of warfare has changed from conventional large-scale battles to encompass the need for strong unconventional capabilities to deal with new threats such as militarised non-state actors (including terrorists and transnational crime cartels). The second—and in terms of the capabilities required, closely related to the first—is that of developing the necessary capacity to participate in peace missions in the broadest sense of the term, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement and PCRD. To a large extent, these new demands are closely related to the emergence of an international ethos of 'good international citizenship'

(*see* e.g. Wheeler & Dunne, 1998) in support of the UN Charter commitment to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Michael Barnett points out that states 'pursue more than simply their interests defined as power and wealth', resulting in 'duties beyond borders', though he is also quick to remind us that 'doing good' and the 'language of ethical action … can be appropriated to advance … national interests' (Barnett, 2012:224, 229; *see also* Neack, 1995). In other words, many of the demands on militaries in the contemporary era originate in terms of states' international commitments (to the UN and to regional organisations, such as NATO, the EU, the AU and sub-regional organisations, such as SADC and ECOWAS), and their reading of the role of 'good international citizen' as promoting their national interests, rather than on the basis of (only or largely) their national security assessments.

The importance of the demands for such a reorientation of the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy should not be underestimated. In an era of dwindling budgetary support, militaries are hard-pressed to fulfil their dual role—that of conventional preparedness to defend the national security and national interests of the state and that of providing support to peace missions as part of a state's international commitments. These demands go beyond the operational to encompass questions of military doctrine (based on defence policy and posture) and the philosophy underlying a country's policy role and orientations vis-à-vis its external environment.

The above developments place the contemporary relationship between foreign policy and the defence establishment, and, more specifically, the military as an instrument of foreign policy, into perspective. Firstly, the 'humanitarian imperative' of modern defence establishments, in the service of internationalist foreign policies based on ideas and ideals of common security, has brought with it huge expectations of the extent to which those traditionally involved in war making can now engage in peacemaking, and much suspicion on the part of those traditionally involved in humanitarian assistance (the so-called humanitarian community) as to the potential for the humanitarian agenda to be 'hijacked in pursuit of strategic foreign policy goals' (*see* Wheeler & Harmer, 2006:5). Secondly, the very idea of a strong focus on peace missions implies a foreign-policy orientation and role that is much more interventionist than a traditional orientation based on 'defence of the realm'. Thirdly, such a foreign policy is 'dovish' rather than 'hawkish', implying the primacy of foreign policy over defence policy. Fourthly, a strong foreign-policy focus on peace missions can, arguably, dilute claims of national interests in favour of 'internationalist' interests. Fifthly, strong and active participation in peace missions, in an era in which such actions are considered the norm, becomes part of a country's objectives in the pursuit of status and prestige. So, for instance, India views its involvement in peace missions as part of its aspirations for great power recognition, including permanent membership of

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Krishnasamy, 2010:238). Finally, the ability to utilise the military for such objectives requires the development of new doctrines, capabilities and skills, encompassing all aspects of the military, including arms procurement and training, and influences the ethos of the military.

The nature of the military as an instrument of foreign policy needs to be unpacked briefly in order to facilitate the connection between the South African military and the country's foreign policy in the discussion in the next section. A distinction should be drawn between 'resources', 'capabilities' and 'instruments'. Resources refers to those advantages and disadvantages derived from a country's location, climate, geography, size (of population and of its economy), education, tradition and level of development, and which form a critical factor in foreign policy choices. Yet, as pointed out by Brighi and Hill (2012:162), resources alone do not account for options and decisions. Rather, it is capabilities—'resources made operational'—which are crucial to a country's ability to implement policy and exercise influence. The challenge to policy-makers is therefore to strive continuously to improve capabilities in order to ensure the strength of those instruments available to them in the implementation of policy. Therefore, and again following Brighi and Hill (2012:162–163), in the case of the military as an instrument of foreign policy, capabilities such as the armed forces (their readiness for the task/s at hand), industrial and technological skills (in short: education and level of research and development) and status and prestige determine the extent to which an instrument becomes credible and viable. Credibility, though, does not necessarily guarantee success. The selected means might be credible, but not appropriate. The development of resources to strengthen capabilities might not be sustainable in the long term, or might focus on the 'wrong' capabilities, which, again in the long term, might not be appropriate in terms of changes in policy goals and objectives. This became evident in the US after the scaling-down of its forces during the 1990s. It was confronted in the early 2000s by a large-scale need for troops when the country went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The military as an instrument of South African foreign policy

Any consideration of the extent to which the military is, and can be, utilised as an instrument in the implementation of South Africa's foreign policy needs to take cognisance, first, of the country's Constitution; second, of its foreign-policy goals and objectives; and, third, of the context within which the military operates. In terms of the Constitution (section 200[2]) the primary responsibility of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is to 'protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people'. Section 201 stipulates that only the president may authorise the deployment of the

defence force, among others, 'in fulfilment of an international obligation'. The president also carries ultimate responsibility for the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations, although the actual making of foreign policy is famously a 'black box',[3] often shrouded in mystery and rumour. This was illustrated in South Africa's March 2011 decision to vote in favour of UN Resolution 1973, which formed the basis for military intervention in the Libyan civil war.

Although section 200(2) of the Constitution places the emphasis on the role of the defence force as primarily in defence of the national security of the country, section 201 — against the background of the preamble, which underlies the core principles of the country's foreign policy — allows for involvement in international peace missions as part of South Africa's international obligations. Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy can be characterised as a 'foreign policy of peace'. In terms of its underlying principles, little has changed since then. In its strategic plan (2010–2013), DIRCO's principles include a commitment to human rights, development, justice and international law, international peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the promotion of the African Agenda and economic development through regional and international cooperation. Based on these principles, the priorities of its foreign policy include the 'prioritisation of the African continent', including the 'mainstreaming of gender issues into all activities of the African Union and in particular in the area of conflict mediation, poverty reduction, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development' (DIRCO, 2010:8; *see also* Heinecken, this volume).

Over this period, though, South Africa's commitment to the continent has become much more pronounced. Whereas South Africa's Africa policy was rather muted and 'modest' in the early post-apartheid years, the country has become much more vocal and activist in its approach to the continent, now no longer shying away from making clear its intentions to play a leadership role. In the 2011 draft White Paper on foreign policy, *Building a better world: the foreign policy of* ubuntu (DIRCO, 2011a), terms such as 'leadership' and 'leading role' abound, and very specifically the document pledges a continuing 'leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction' (DIRCO, 2011a:20). Furthermore, and related to peace and development initiatives on the continent, the White Paper refers to a 'leading role' for South Africa in 'various international fora' and in 'shaping a new global order' (DIRCO, 2011a:7, 18). Apart from South Africa's 'hard' canvassing for a second term on the UN Security Council (2011–2012), another example of this resolve was the campaign to remove Jean Ping as chairperson of the AU Commission and to get Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected in his stead. There is little doubt that issues of peace and security, especially as these pertain to the southern African region and the African continent, are an important,

if not primary, focus of foreign policy as part of the country's 'great power' aspirations (at least on the African continent). By definition, such a focus and such aspirations underline, in turn, the importance of the military as an instrument of South Africa's foreign policy.

The Department of Defence (DOD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) exercises its mandate in terms of the Constitution, the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002), the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review of 1998.[4] To this should be added the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1998) which, in the words of Neethling (2004:135), provides a 'crucial framework', covering the philosophical and political aspects of involvement in peace missions [and] the practical aspects of the country's potential contributions'. The Strategic Plan of the Department of Defence (Defence Secretariat, 2011), in a discussion of the 'defence function in context', emphasises as medium-term strategic goals the promotion of human security, both nationally and internationally, and the requirement for initiatives that, among others, support 'Government's diplomatic engagements … through participation in multilateral institutions such as the SADC, AU and UN', thereby confirming the 'roles and functions of the SANDF as a visible and tangible instrument of our foreign policy' (DOD, 2005a). This confirms the role of the military as an instrument in the country's foreign policy, which is coordinated and managed by DIRCO as 'principal adviser on foreign policy' (DIRCO, 2011a:9).

International requests for South African participation in, and contributions to, peace missions are channelled through the DIRCO National Office for Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) in the Africa Multilateral branch of the department. Once it has been decided to respond positively to such a request, the actual operational details, training and other aspects related to a mission deployment are dealt with by the DOD and the SANDF. The DOD has a Peacekeeping Fund allocated by the National Treasury (Vickers, 2012:544). The actual decisions on such participation are conceivably taken by the president after consideration of the matter by the ministerial cluster on international cooperation, trade and security.[5]

South Africa was initially reluctant to become involved in peace missions (1994–1998), largely explained in terms of the need to first transform the South African security services, but conceivably also due to a firm belief on the part of the Mandela government that diplomacy was the best way of pursuing peace on the continent, particularly given South Africa's history of destabilisation of neighbouring countries. However, from the late 1990s the country became increasingly involved in peace missions. This involvement reflected the need to back up its diplomatic endeavours (e.g. in Burundi and Zaire-DRC at the time) with support for interventions aimed at restoring peace and implementing peace agreements. By 2005, it became obvious that the

1998 White Paper guidelines on involvement in peace missions were no longer sufficient (DOD, 2005a). The country's foreign-policy aspirations required much more than had originally been envisaged. Firstly, there was a decision to shift defence policy to increase involvement in peace missions. Secondly, by 2005 deployments exceeded the numbers originally envisaged. Thirdly, South Africa's increasing involvement on the continent and the evolving African security architecture meant a much larger role for defence in structures and mechanisms such as the SADC rapid reaction brigade, which was launched in Lusaka in 2007 as part of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the AU.

The resulting update, published in March 2005 (*see* DOD, 2005b), referred therefore to a changed strategic environment, continued conflicts and insecurity on the continent and the increasing need for collaborative action in multilateral fora. In this document, mention is made of a 'developmental approach' in UN peacekeeping (2005b:5). Importantly, the DOD also claims that 'in the context of some security issues, the DOD may assume the lead role, while with regard to others it may be employed purely in a supportive capacity' (2005b:5), implying that, though it remains an instrument of foreign policy, it is not necessarily DIRCO which takes the lead in policy implementation. Based on the Report of the Panel on United Nation Peace Operations (popularly known as the Brahimi Report) of October 2000, the DOD report emphasised the fact that a purely military approach to peacekeeping was no longer viable. Human security aspects and post-conflict peacebuilding were of increasing importance. At the same time the need for peace enforcement capacity was also mentioned (DOD, 2005b:6).

The importance of this update of the White Paper guiding South African involvement in peace missions lies in the way in which the report interprets the constitutional mandate of the SANDF, specifically the phrase 'to defend and protect', stating that the latter 'does not only mean engagement in war or protection against inter-state threats of force, but also includes military diplomacy and participation in peace missions', thereby seeing the role of the SANDF as 'synonymous with the "primary object" expressed in the Constitution' (DOD, 2005b:13). Crucially, the 2005 report overcomes an inherent problem previously pointed out by Williams (2002; also Nathan, 2012),[6] namely, that the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review approved a force design based on defence with a view to narrow national security interpretations which did not foresee the remarkable changes in the demands made on the military since the early 2000s. With the initial Defence White Paper, Nathan (2012) points out, 'we knew what we did not want, but were not sure what we did want and what we would need'. Large-scale involvement in peace missions was not part of the thinking in preparation of the White Paper (nor of the White Paper on Peace Operations)[7] and the former was developed before a White Paper on foreign policy was available. In fact, says Nathan, 'foreign

policy should have led the process, but at the time the foreign policy White Paper was not yet available'. The rather narrow focus of the 1996 White Paper informed the 1998 arms procurement package, which, arguably, and in light of future developments, was largely inappropriate for what turned out, on the basis of South Africa's evolving African Agenda, to be a disproportionately large role for the military in foreign policy on the continent (in view of its original post-1994 force design).

With its 2005 report the DOD managed to strengthen the military instrument of foreign policy to a considerable extent, using South Africa's increasing prioritisation of the African Agenda as motivation and justification. Yet, crucially, the report did not succeed in a restructuring of the actual force design to allow it to elevate what was originally (in the 1996 White Paper) conceived of as 'secondary functions'. By end of July 2012, South Africa had a total deployment of 2 020 troops in peace missions abroad, having become a major African troop-contributing country, and by 2010 it had been or was involved in a total of 14 peace missions (DefenceWeb, 2010), several of which include(d) a strong element of PCRD and most of which included the strong involvement of both diplomats and mediators and contributions from the military. The draft 2012 Defence Review makes it clear that one of the main tasks of the SANDF is that of peacekeeping (DefenceWeb, 2012), although, as will be pointed out in the following section, the 2012 Defence Review in many ways reverts back to the ethos and approach of the 1996 Defence White Paper and can be viewed as 'undermining' the progressive thinking exhibited in the 2005 report.

Policy challenges

In order for a country to be able to utilise its military as an instrument in aid of implementing its foreign-policy goals and objectives, such an instrument needs to be credible, i.e. it needs to be supported by, and infused with, the necessary capabilities to enable its effective application. South African foreign policy, especially its prioritisation of the African Agenda, demands much of its military establishment. The question that needs to be asked is whether the military is capable of providing the required support for the implementation of the African Agenda, especially given the heavy demand placed on it in terms of active involvement in peace operations. The SANDF has moved away from its initial post-1994 stance of 'defence in a democracy' with its heavy emphasis on transformation, to a paradigm which treats the 'former' secondary functions of involvement in peace missions as a priority. With this shift in orientation comes a number of challenges to ensure success,[8] a few of which are discussed in this section.

First is the need for clear political leadership. Nathan (2012) recounts how an absence of political leadership during the development of the Defence

White Paper in 1995–1996 meant that there was no clear view on defence policy as it related to the core function and capabilities of the defence force, nor of its role as an instrument of foreign policy under the administration of Mandela. Neither did Mandela's deputy, Thabo Mbeki, or the defence minister at the time, Joe Modise, provide vision or guidance. Rather, the White Paper 'planned the future on the experience of the past' (Nathan, 2012). Looking at the 2012 draft Defence Review, one cannot but wonder whether the same problem has again been encountered. A defence review implies a comprehensive review of defence policy, yet the 2012 draft review does not address the crucial issue of force design (*see* Le Roux 2012:2) in clear and realistic terms. Despite developments to the contrary, with South Africa increasingly focusing on the 'secondary' role of the military (i.e. peacekeeping), the draft Defence Review reverts back to a focus on defence and deterrence (DOD, 2012:125–126), in many ways in direct contradiction to other sections of the Review and to earlier documents and statements. In this sense, the new (draft) Defence Review lacks clear leadership in terms of its mandate which, on the one hand, neglects the issue of force design, but, on the other hand, emphasises the priority of increasing South Africa's involvement in peace missions as an important foreign-policy objective. Force design determines support structures, size and capabilities with a view to operational requirements, and it is not clear whether the political leadership has a sufficient grasp of the need to align force design with foreign-policy objectives.

Closely related to political leadership is the issue of political will, which is crucial to provide the necessary resources to develop and maintain the capabilities that would ensure the use of the military as a credible instrument of South African foreign policy. The biggest challenge in this regard is perhaps the ability to convince ordinary citizens (and voters) that strengthening the military is not a case of 'guns over butter', but that it is also in the interest of the country, at the level of its socio-economic aspirations and needs, to have a strong military which can act efficiently in building a secure environment in which South Africa can pursue its national goals and objectives.

Looking at South Africa's leadership aspirations, both at continental level and more broadly, a debate about the scope and reach of its involvement in peace missions might at some point become necessary, especially when compared with the contributions of other emerging powers of the South, such as India and Brazil, and in the context of utilising the military as an instrument of foreign policy. The question here goes beyond numbers,[9] to the way in which the military is conceptualised as a foreign-policy instrument, and therefore also includes the type of capabilities developed in order to shape and strengthen this instrument.

Under Lula da Silva's presidency, peacekeeping was deliberately used to promote Brazil's international status and prestige, with peacekeeping

viewed as 'part of the price you have to pay to be among the nations who make the rules' (*The Economist*, 23 September 2010). According to Cavalcante (2010:148–149, 151), Brazilian peacekeeping involvement, from the late 1980s, and more specifically during the Lula da Silva years, increased not only because it was seen as bolstering the country's national interests, but also because the diversification of peace missions meant that it could increasingly participate, as the overtly military character of peacekeeping was beginning to change. In other words, Brazil's increasing participation has been largely limited to broadening its geographical scope (i.e. not confined to its immediate neighbourhood/region), increased participation (i.e. larger numbers of troops deployed) and a willingness to take up leadership positions in such missions, such as, for example, taking responsibility for the naval part of the UN mission in Lebanon.

India has been involved in UN peacekeeping since the late 1940s, and although this involvement is based on notions of good international citizenship and idealism, Krishnasamy (2010:238, 242) comments that its aspirations 'for great power recognition', as well as its ambition for a permanent seat on the Security Council 'far outweigh' its idealism. Its commitments have been shaped by its political interests. Increasingly, the country is seeking a bigger role in shaping (UN) peace mission mandates (Jacob, 2011). Yet the complexity of new peace missions, and particularly the need sometimes to operate in situations and under conditions which do not facilitate the hallowed principle of neutrality, as traditionally required in peace missions, have raised awareness in India of the need to 'develop appropriate philosophies and strategies to facilitate the conduct of new peacekeeping operations' (Krishnasamy, 2010:234). This is something with which South Africa has already grappled, and even though its experience is much shorter than that of India, it is also in some ways deeper, especially with regard to PCRD.

Turning to South Africa, a number of points can be raised. First is the scope of its deployments to peace missions. It would seem that South Africa has deliberately chosen African missions for its involvement,[10] and this is, one assumes, because of the priority of Africa on its foreign-policy agenda. In contrast, both India and Brazil (and other emerging powers) deploy (also) outside of their regions. The question is: does this matter in terms of the country's foreign-policy ambitions? South Africa's African policy is focused strongly on strengthening the capabilities of the AU to promote peace and security on the continent. Its leadership role in the AU Peace and Security Council attests to this commitment, as do its efforts to use its second term as non-permanent member of the UNSC (2011/12) to promote the partnership between the AU and the Security Council in the realm of peace missions (*see* Ebrahim, 2012). It would seem that South Africa is pursuing its objective of being an important global player specifically through its African Agenda.

Yet, when taking into consideration the way in which other powers from the global South, like India and Brazil, are pursuing their agendas through participation on a more global scale, the question does arise whether South Africa should follow suit. Of course, its limited resources to a large extent preclude such ambitions, but then the question turns into whether it would genuinely succeed in playing a global role. Alternatively, South Africa might pursue such ambitions by making other kinds of contributions to international peace missions, as will be discussed below.

South Africa has also, in contrast to India, not balked at the idea of taking on the role of 'lead nation', as was the case in, for example, the SANDF's Operation Triton IV, which contributed to the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006. Furthermore, South Africa deployed peacekeepers in Burundi in support of that country's peace process, even though neither the UN nor the AU at the time was prepared to deploy (the intervention was later turned into an AU mission and then transformed into a UN mission) (DOD, 2009). More importantly, though, is the idea of strategic leadership and the question of whether South Africa is playing a 'sufficient' role in the development of thinking and knowledge production on the future of peace missions in a global context against the background of its international leadership aspirations. This is specifically mentioned here on the basis of South Africa's membership of international south associations, such as BRICS and IBSA. The question in this instance is whether South Africa is, for instance, feeding its conceptual work on developmental peace missions (*see* Olivier's chapter in this volume) into the UN system, and whether it is using its membership of other relevant associations—BRICS, IBSA—to promote new thinking and to share its experience on PCRD. It could be argued that a solid epistemology on PCRD has already been built up by the South African military, and this could be used to promote not only the success of PCRD, but also to enhance the country's leadership role in the international arena through the military as an instrument of foreign policy.

Another challenge that will become more salient in the short term is the possible alignment of the military instrument with South Africa's emergence as an African 'development partner' through the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Vickers (2012:553) points to the fact that South Africa occupies a 'unique space in Africa's development cooperation landscape', having a 'niche role', especially when it comes to trilateral partnerships. The essence of South Africa's development aid approach is that, as an emerging donor, it will concentrate on partnerships with other donor countries and will to a large extent play a facilitating role with the aim of improving governance and institutional capacity on the continent (Vickers, 2012:545). Can and should the military's involvement in peace missions, and more specifically in PCRD activities, be aligned to SADPA? In a presentation

to the NCOP Select Committee on Trade and International Relations in Parliament in August 2011, the director-general of DIRCO, Jerry Matjila, referred specifically to peace mission support from SADPA for, among others, PCRD and peacebuilding (DIRCO, 2011b:58). So to some extent the decision seems to have been made. But from the point of view of using the military as part of the (future) peacebuilding and PCRD initiatives of SADPA as South Africa's development aid agency, or of aligning its operations with those of SADPA, matters are not that clear. This might have to do with different approaches to, and spheres of, PCRD activities. Looking at the kind of PCRD activities that are mentioned as part of SADPA's proposed engagements—specific mention is made of post-conflict reconstruction (DIRCO, 2011b:58)—it might be necessary for an alignment between SADPA and SANDF peace operations. The challenge would be to ensure that PCRD activities and operations, whether performed by the military or other agencies and government departments, do actually also serve the country's national interests (*see* Naidu, 2012). South Africa's extensive contribution to the peace process in the DRC,[11] for instance, brought little direct benefit to the country, yet succeeded in creating an environment which facilitated large-scale economic benefits for China.

Perhaps the overriding challenge for the effective use of the military as a foreign-policy instrument through which South Africa can achieve its objectives vis-à-vis its African Agenda, is to ensure that the SA Army, which carries the bulk of responsibilities for peace missions, is sufficiently resourced. Analysts and commentators, and more recently the draft 2012 Defence Review, have for a considerable time pointed to the lack of sufficient resources for the Army (and the SANDF more broadly) with reference to the 'total mismatch between operational commitments and funding' (Engelbrecht, 2009; *see also* Baker, 2009). Esterhuyse (2010:16) asserts that current SANDF peacekeeping deployments are 'almost three times' what had originally been envisaged in the 1990s. One needs only to read through recent DOD budget vote speeches to get a sense of the extent of the resource and capacity problems confronting the SANDF in the face of the demands on the military as a 'leading foreign policy instrument' (Esterhuyse, 2010:17). Such shortcomings are not sustainable. Using the military as an instrument of foreign policy in a credible and efficient manner demands a rethink on the part of the government as to resource allocations. Yet, whether the necessary resources can be found is doubtful. The country's domestic needs preclude a rapid and drastic increase in defence spending. In turn, this might, in the longer term, force foreign policy-makers to rethink the way in which the military can serve as a 'leading' foreign policy instrument.

Finally, a practical yet crucial challenge is to ensure cooperation between and among government departments and agencies in the realm of peace missions, and specifically when it comes to PCRD and peacebuilding efforts. In its delivery agreement released in March 2011, the International Cooperation,

Trade and Security Cluster (2011:10) makes specific reference to the need for 'strengthened internal coordination of South Africa's contribution to peace missions'. PCRD is a complex phase of peace missions, involving much more than only military forces. A range of other national departments and agencies are also involved in such actions, making the demand for cooperation and coordination a crucial ingredient of success. The ability to exercise efficient coordination is in itself an indication of the strength of capabilities for the implementation of policy. Intradepartmental rivalries and disagreements, or mere lack of mechanisms and structures to ensure cooperation and coordination, may undermine and weaken the ability to utilise foreign policy instruments credibly and efficiently, and therefore need constant monitoring and assessment.

Conclusion

The South African military, as an instrument of the country's foreign policy, has gained immensely in importance since the early days of the first Defence White Paper and the White Paper on Peace Missions. Initially much influenced by a firm resolve to break with past history and to limit the role of the defence force to narrow national security demands (the protection of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity), South Africa has gained in confidence on the international stage, and especially with regard to its aspirations on the continent. Diplomacy as an instrument of continental policy has proven necessary, but not sufficient. The backing of the military is required, especially if the country is to pursue its national interests, which include a peaceful and stable continent where development (also) opens up opportunities for business to grow the South African economy and attend to the pressing demands of poverty alleviation and the creation of employment. In addition, South Africa's aspirations for continental leadership to strengthen its claim to a place at the global leadership table (membership of the G20, IBSA and BRICS; designs on a permanent seat in the UN Security Council) place additional demands on its military capabilities. After all, no great power worth its salt stands back from international responsibilities of good citizenship, including an active role in peace missions.

Yet the country's aspirations might flounder if its capabilities do not match its responsibilities. A thorough understanding and appreciation of the complexities and demands of PCRD (*see* De Coning's and Hudson's contributions in this volume), especially as far as relevant resources and capabilities are concerned, still seem to evade policy-makers and politicians. At the same time, South Africa could strengthen its international standing and position by engaging more actively in international debates on the future of peace missions. Its contribution to thinking about PCRD in the form of developmental peacekeeping, its practical experience with PCRD, especially

in DRC and also Sudan, and the establishment of SADPA aimed at promoting South Africa's donor profile through, among others, PCRD activities, point to a country which might not be rich in financial and economic resources for peace missions, but one which is abundantly endowed with the ability to provide innovative ideas, strategic thinking and new knowledge on how to promote the international goal of 'security with development'.

Bibliography

Annan, K. (2005). *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. New York: United Nations. Available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org. (Accessed 19 June 2012).

Baker, D.-P. (2009). *New partnerships for a new era: enhancing the South African Army's stabilization role in Africa*. Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. Available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/. (Accessed 22 August 2012).

Barnett, M. (2012). Duties beyond borders, in Smith, S., Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. (eds), *Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases* (2nd edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An agenda for peace*. New York: United Nations.

Brighi, E. & Hill, C. (2012). Implementation and behaviour, in Smith, S., Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. (eds), *Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases* (2nd edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buzan, B. (1991). *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era*. New York: Harvester Wheatleaf.

Cavalcante, F. (2010). Rendering peacekeeping instrumental? The Brazilian approach to United Nations peacekeeping during the Lula da Silva years (2003–2010). *Revista Brasileira de Political Internacional*, 53 (2):142–159.

Defence Secretariat (Department of Defence) (2011). Strategic plan for the fiscal years 2011/12–2015/16. Available from www.dod.mil.za/documents/SecDef20%20%Strat%20Plans%202011/SECRETARIAT%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN%20EMAIL.pdf. (Accessed 24 July 2012).

DefenceWeb (2010). 14 SA peace missions in 11 years, 27 August. Available from www.defenceweb.co.za. (Accessed 20 August 2012).

DefenceWeb (2012). SANDF's main tasks are border protection and peacekeeping—Review Committee, 7 May. Available from www.defenceweb.co.za. (Accessed 10 July 2012).

DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation) (2010). Strategic Plan 2010–2013. Available from www.dirco.gov.za/department/strategic20%/plan%202010-2013/index.htm. (Accessed 25 July 2012).

DIRCO (2011a). Building a better world: the foreign policy of *ubuntu*. White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy, final draft, 13 May. Available from www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=149749. (Accessed 19 August 2012).

DIRCO (2011b). Establishment of SADPA. Presentation to the NCOP Select Committee on Trade and International Relations, 3 August. Available from www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/110803sadpa-edit.pdf. (Accessed 20 August 2012).

Dlomo, M. (2010). *South Africa's post-conflict and transitional diplomatic efforts in the DRC: lessons learnt: 1990–2009.* (Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria).

DOD (Department of Defence) (2005a). White Paper update: South Africa's participation in international peace missions. Available from www.cdpsp.mil.za/2005/p2_peacemission.htm. (Accessed 19 August 2012).

DOD (2005b). Report 1 Defence Update 2005. A changed strategic environment, collective security, South Africa's approach to national security. Role, function, objectives and missions. Available from www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050614 reportupdate.htm. (Accessed 20 August 2012).

DOD (2009). 10 years of peacekeeping. Available from www.dod.mil.za/news2009/sept/page9.pdf. (Accessed 20 August 2012).

DOD (2012). South African Defence Review 2012; Defence, security, development: draft document for public engagement, 12 April 2012. Pretoria: Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans.

Du Plessis, A. (2003). The military instrument in South African foreign policy: a preliminary exploration. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, XXV (2):106–143.

Ebrahim, E. (2012). Speech by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Ebrahim Ebrahim, on the occasion of a public lecture on the theme 'South Africa and the United Nations Security Council: promoting the African Agenda', University of Limpopo, Turfloop, 12 March. Available from www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/ebra0312.html. (Accessed 16 August 2012).

Engelbrecht, L. (2009). Time to lose Hoefyster? DefenceWeb, 24 July. Available from www.defenceweb.co.za. (Accessed 23 August 2012).

Esterhuyse, A. (2010). Getting the job done: transformation in the South African military. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, XXXII (1):1–30.

Galtung, J. (1975). *Essays in peace research, volume 2*. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.

Government of South Africa (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Available from www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf. (Accessed 8 August 2012).

Gray, C. (2008). Coping with uncertainty: dilemmas of defense planning. *Comparative Strategy*, 27 (4):324–331.

Gueli, R. (2007). *Developmental peace missions*. Available from www.dod.mil.za/news/news2007/jan2007/page37.pdf. (Accessed 14 August 2012).

Hill, C. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster (2011). Delivery agreement for outcome 11. Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and

safer Africa in a better world, 10 March. Available from www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147790. (Accessed 10 August 2012).

Jacob, J. (2011). India wants greater role in shaping peacekeeping mandates. *Hindustan Times*, 3 March. Available from www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/669080.aspx. (Accessed 24 August 2012).

Krishnasamy, K. (2010). A case for India's 'leadership' in United Nations peacekeeping. *International Studies*, 47 (2–4):225–246.

Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for peace.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building peace.* Washington, D.C.: US Institute for Peace.

Le Pere, G. & Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2006). South Africa and crafting foreign policy in a complex global order: change and continuity, in McGowan, P., Cornelissen, S. & Nel, P. (eds), *Power, wealth and global equity* (3rd edition). Cape Town: UCT Press.

Le Roux, L. (2002). The military budgeting process: an overview. Defence planning, programming and budgeting. Unpublished paper prepared for the SIPRI/ASDR Workshop on the Military Budgeting Expenditure Programme, 25 and 26 February.

Le Roux, L. (2012). Draft South African Defence Review 2012. The dichotomy between ambition and reality. *Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief*, no. 32:1–4.

Naidu, S. (2012). From Addis to Malawi: South Africa's race for the AU post. Cape Town: *SAFPI Policy Brief*, no. 1:1–3, 2 March.

Nathan, L. (2012). Interview on 21 August. Pretoria.

Neack, L. (1995). UN peace-keeping: in the interest of community or self? *Journal of Peace Research*, 32 (2):181–196.

Neethling, T. (2004). The defence force and peacekeeping: linking policy and capacity, in Sidiropoulos, E. (ed.), *South Africa's foreign policy 1994–2004: apartheid past, renaissance future*. Johannesburg: SAIIA.

Nye, J. (2004). Soft power and American foreign policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 119 (2):255–270.

Peacebuilding Initiative (undated). Introduction to peacebuilding. Available from www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pagegeld=1765. (Accessed August 2012).

The Economist (2010). Policy, not altruism. How global ambitions are helping to modernise the army. *The Economist*, 23 September. Available from www.economist.com/node/17095626/print. (Accessed 24 August 2012).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1994). Human development report 1994: new dimensions of human security. Available from http://hdr.undp.org. (Accessed 19 June 2012).

Vickers, B. (2012). Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African developmental partner. *Cambridge Review of International Relations*, 25 (4):535–556.

Webber, M. & Smith, M. (2002). *Foreign policy in a transformed world*. Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education.

Wheeler, N. & Dunne, T. (1998). Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy. *International Affairs*, 74 (4):847–870.

Wheeler, V. & Harmer, A. (2006). *Trends and issues in humanitarian relations*. London: Humanitarian Group of the Overseas Development Institute. Available from www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/273.pdf. (Accessed 12 August 2012).

Williams, R. (2002). Defence in a democracy: the South African Defence Review and the redefinition of the parameters of the national defence debate, in Williams, R., Cawthra, G., & Abrahams, A. (eds), *Ourselves to know: civil-military relations and defence transition in southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Endnotes

[1] Since 2009, the full designation has been Department of Defence and Military Veterans. The acronym DOD has been used in this chapter, as this is the international norm for departments of defence.

[2] See for instance Galtung's 1975 *Essays in peace research* and Lederach's contributions, *Preparing for peace* (1995) and *Building peace* (1997). Also see Peacebuilding Initiative (undated).

[3] Although somewhat dated, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2006:298) provides a detailed account of South African foreign policy-making, arguing that the 'black box of foreign policy making is not as closed and opaque as the literature tends to suggest'.

[4] The Draft South African Defence Review 2012 was released for public comment in April 2012, and at the time of writing had not yet been formally adopted by Cabinet.

[5] As an aside, it is interesting to note that this cluster is chaired by the minister of defence and military affairs, even though DIRCO is the principal adviser on foreign policy.

[6] Williams and Nathan were deeply involved in the development of the 1996 White Paper on Defence.

[7] Nathan was also instrumental in the development of the 1998 White Paper on Peace Missions.

[8] This section does not deal with the specific practical and operational challenges to the SANDF in the realm of peace operations.

[9] On 31 July 2012, India had 7 003 troops deployed in international peace missions and Brazil 2 171, the latter's contribution on par with South Africa's 2 020 on the same date.

[10] In 2007, South Africa did deploy military observers to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

[11] For a comprehensive analysis of South Africa's contribution to PCRD in the DRC, see Dlomo (2010).

CHAPTER 11

Campaigns or Contingency?[1]
South Africa, Africa and the 21st-century Defence Design

Greg Mills

The struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with the pursuit of a better Africa in a better world. Regional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa's socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for South Africa's prosperity and security. Consequently, Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign and security policy. South Africa must therefore continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade, and champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa.

Strategic Overview: South African Defence Review Consultative Document, Presentation to Parliament, 12 April 2012[2]

Introduction

Rag-tag rebels zig-zagging armed pickups across the Libyan desert. Egyptian soldiers stone-facedly monitoring demonstrations on Tahrir Square from their tanks. A 150 000-strong guerrilla force forming the rump of the new state of South Sudan. The gumbooted infantry of the Rwanda Defence Force, their rudimentary equipment belying their reputation as one of the continent's most effective and disciplined fighting forces. A militia forcing a president from office in the Ivory Coast, or keeping the state at bay in the Niger Delta. An army, only in name, preying on its people in the Congo, or standing between Zimbabwe's electorate and democracy.

Africa's militaries have been put to many tasks over the past 50 years, mostly with negative consequences for the continent's populations. These militaries have taken many shapes and forms, the trend however going from embryonic paramilitary police units at independence to attempts to build up conventional capabilities and back once more to paramilitary functions. Against this backdrop, what sort of armed forces and equipment are African countries likely to require and be able to operate for the next generation? What utility can a high-tech, capital-intensive force have on the continent

today, and can equipment be a short cut to professionalism and fighting effectiveness?

Answers to these questions, equally for South Africa and other African countries, demand honest and transparent debate over what is required in matching the strategic environment, government expectations and available funds and human resources. Three key issues are highlighted in this chapter:

1. **Strategic environment:** What do threats look like over the next 20 years?
2. **Capabilities:** Current and projected capabilities?
3. **Affordability:** What can be afforded, in financial and manpower terms, not just to buy, but to operate?

Threats and needs

General Sir David Richards, the chief of the defence staff of the United Kingdom (UK), which underwent a hotly debated Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2010—which has, *inter alia*, resulted in cutting the strength of the army by 20 000, to 82 000 regular soldiers—has argued that '[to] ensure the fundamental safety of our nation, we must establish what we *need* before we establish what we can *afford*. If, as is likely, there is a gap, we can then have this recognised as a risk which the government is—or is not—prepared to carry' (Richards, 2010). What is the threat, and what, then, are the needs? This question is as pertinent to African countries and South Africa in particular, as to the UK.

Between the end of the Cold War and 2005, the number of armed conflicts dropped by 40 per cent. The number of major conflicts (involving battle deaths of more than 1 000 people) dropped even more significantly, by 80 per cent. Wars between countries fell to just five per cent of all conflicts. Most conflict now takes place in the poorest countries of the world. As income rises and democracy becomes more widespread, the risk of conflict declines. Eighty per cent of interstate conflicts are initiated by autocracies, and 80 per cent are won by democracies (Halperin et al., 2008). By the end of the 1990s, more people were being killed in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined, though more recently the number of conflicts in Africa has been steadily falling (Human Security Report Project, 2009). By 2010, only four conflicts (the insurgencies in Sudan, Somalia, DRC and Uganda) out of 15 major conflicts worldwide[3] were in Africa (DefenceWeb, 2011a). In these, indirect deaths, including disease and malnutrition, are estimated to account for more than 90 per cent of all war-related fatalities.

Correspondingly, the period since 1946 is the longest for hundreds of years of there being no war between the major powers. But Colin Gray may well be right in contending that the basics have not changed much,

and that war will still be with us, driven by interests, personalities and politics today as ever before (Gray, 2007). The threat of conventional wars still remains, most notably in Asia, not least given the resource needs and politico-developmental ambitions of China, Japan and India. Russia, too, may be considered a resurgent power, maintaining a sophisticated defence industry to this end.

For all of the high-profile spending on aircraft carriers (by China) and development of fifth-generation fighters (by Russia, in the form of the Sukhoi T-50), if the last 20 years are anything to go by, most conflict is likely to be so-called small wars, often between ill-defined non-state opponents, fighting for complex sets of causes, ranging from greed to deeply entrenched grievances, fought at a low intensity, and employing mostly small arms. These are most likely to be fought not over territory but over ideas and symbols, and among rather than between peoples (Smith, 2008). For the last 20 years, with the notable exception of Iraq (1991 and 2003) and possibly the Ethiopian–Eritrean border conflict, wars involving massive conventionally equipped armies have virtually become a thing of the past. The first-order responsibility of any defence force remains, as noted above, territorial integrity. But the reality is that no country can deter through military means alone those who are desperate or ambitious enough to transgress such sovereign limits. Assiduous diplomacy and development—of which governments have perfected the rhetoric, but less frequently the practice—is a critical part of this defence. In the process, there is a need to guard against those who encourage a high-tech, capital- and military-intensive response to defence needs for reasons of self-interest (the military-industrial complex, the beneficiaries of offsets or signature bonuses, the employment benefits for key political constituencies) or dogma.

Warfare today has largely gone back to being a task of light infantry and modern cavalry, where numbers (and getting them there) are the important aspect, along with critical enablers of intelligence, surveillance and local knowledge. Even state-on-state war is likely to look like something the West is trying to do in Afghanistan rather than some hot version of the Cold War. Belligerent states, unless one makes the employment of mass manoeuvre an asymmetric attraction to them by doing away with the 'traditional' combat power available to alliances, will likely use proxies, guerrillas, terrorists and cyber warfare, among others, to achieve their aims rather than mass air, sea and land manoeuvres.

The British armed forces' Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), in mapping global strategic trends to 2040, recognises the primacy of the modern insurgency. A combination of exclusion from the benefits of globalisation, climate change, political fragility and a burgeoning population will create, the DCDC has highlighted, a volatile mix in parts of

the developing world, which will constitute around 85 per cent of the global population in 2040 (Europe will shrink to just six per cent), and especially in Africa. The global population will increase from 6.9 billion (2010) to almost 8.8 billion (2040), creating all sorts of social and resource pressures, and in some areas these trends will be exacerbated by shifting demographics. For example, the median age in sub-Saharan Africa will be approximately 24, whereas in Europe it will be around 47. Such stresses are compounded by competition for resources, driven by both external requirements (for minerals and hydrocarbons) and internal demand (for food, water and energy). Nearly 70 per cent of the world's population will, by 2040, be located in areas of environmental stress, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, and South, Central and East Asia. Nearly 30 per cent of the world will face water scarcity in these areas (UK Ministry of Defence, 2010).

Resource scarcity, the DCDC observes (UK Ministry of Defence, 2010), will stunt development and lead to poverty, instability and conflict. Coupled with the effects of climate change, there will be humanitarian crises and increasingly uncontrollable migration, along with rapid rates of urbanisation. By 2025, for example, Africa will be a largely urban continent, up from just 15 per cent in 1950. Critically, perceptions of inequality and associated grievances could, the DCDC notes, result in increased instability and societal tension. Of the 20 most unequal countries measured in terms of the Global Peace Index's Gini figures (Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Afghanistan, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan, Belize, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, Qatar, Bahrain, Libya, Bhutan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and North Korea) (Vision of Humanity, 2011), seven are in sub-Saharan Africa. Afghanistan is the third most unequal, just ahead of Angola and Equatorial Guinea. It is not poverty per se that is apparently problematic, but when dearth exists cheek by jowl with excess.

Contemporary and future drivers of conflict hinge around rates of urbanisation and population growth, GDP per capita, demographics, food production yields and access to nutrition and land, and climate change. The reasons why and how these stresses translate into organised violence lie in the nature of political systems and leadership.

Trouble especially brews when opportunities for people are constrained at birth by class, ethnicity, religion, geography or race—and where societies are consequently divided between those in secure employment (prospering) and those in 'vulnerable' employment (simply scraping by). Fuelled by visions—not just perceptions—of inequality and injustice by today's chattering and twittering handsets and plasma-screen media world, political management is at a premium, and is often not up to the task. Indeed, the 2040 DCDC report concludes that the incidence of armed conflict is likely to increase, underpinned by an unstable transition to a multipolar world,

widespread global inequality heightening grievances, population increases, resource scarcity and the adverse consequences of climate change. While future conflict will remain unpredictable and violent, its character will continue to evolve and present new challenges. In an environment where the differences between state, state-sponsored and non-state adversaries *will* blur, while technology will remain important, people, the report argues, are likely to provide the asymmetric edge when responding to both expected and unexpected challenges.

Too-low economic growth rates relative to expectations are perhaps the gravest danger of all, especially among a globally connected youth. At five per cent real GDP, per capita growth income doubles in 15 years, but, still, most African societies remain very poor. This stresses the need to lift growth rates above the margins of 10 per cent. The role for defence forces in adding to growth by providing stability, or subtracting from it by placing too great a burden on the fiscus, is a fine balance (UK Ministry of Defence, 2010).

People and equipment

Robust peace support operations, South Africa's most likely operational commitment, look very similar to the counterinsurgency tasks faced in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Of the 17 UN peacekeeping missions underway in 2012, seven of these were in Africa:

1. United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
2. United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
3. UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
4. African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
5. UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
6. UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
7. UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

More important than the number of missions is, however, the relative scale of the African deployments. Of the global (UN) total of 121 000 personnel and an annual peacekeeping budget of US$7.84 billion, Africa was responsible for 87 483 troops and US$5.32 billion, respectively, as shown in Table 11.1 on the next page.

As Afghanistan illustrates, and wars from the Congo to Liberia confirm, the modern insurgency is fought among the people, even if it may be supported from without. The choice of weapons is determined by availability and practicality: ammonium nitrate bombs, AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mobile phones and the Internet. As General Richards (2010) has put it:

Defence must respond to the new strategic, and indeed economic, environment by ensuring much more ruthlessly that our armed forces are appropriate and relevant to the context in which they will operate rather than the one they might have expected to fight in previous eras. Too much emphasis is still placed on what the former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls 'exquisite' and hugely expensive equipment. Our defence establishment has not yet fully adapted to the security realities of the post-Cold War world and this complex and dangerous new century … Operating among, understanding and effectively influencing people requires mass—numbers—whether this is 'boots on the ground', riverine and high-speed littoral warships, or UAVs,[4] transport aircraft and helicopters. They have to be able to fight but this is no longer sufficient.

Table 11.1: UN deployments in Africa

Name of mission	Total strength	2012 budget
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)—since July 2011	8 148	US$722m
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, in Sudan—since June 2011	3 982	US$175.5m
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)—since July 2010 (succeeded MONUC)	23 603	US$1.49bn
African Union–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)—since July 2007	27 961	US$1.7bn
UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)—since April 2004	12 384	US$646m
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)—since September 2003	10 876	US$525m
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara—since April 1991	529	US$63m

Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml

While it undoubtedly has a kinetic dimension, dealing with the modern insurgency is a profoundly political and developmental task. It is as much about governance as guns, and as much about providing jobs and economic security as military activity. It is also critically about getting the 'information operations' dimension of the campaign correct, which the Taliban have, wittingly or not, played to maximum advantage through the global media.

In charting actions across this virtual battle space, John Mackinlay has observed that 'the news footage and the endless refrain of occupation … has turned individual members of migrant communities in Europe from spectators to activists' (Mackinlay, 2010:142). 'Engaging and animating' populations in ways which are not easily militarily countered is a strategy of the insurgent in asymmetric warfare, one which demands the management of external expectations, guarding against (and preparing for) insurgent 'spectaculars' (the so-called propaganda of the deed), and both carrying out and portraying counterinsurgent actions sensitively. It is about much more than attack and defence, of guns and rockets, but about the aspirations, fears and faces of people.

Afghanistan is landlocked, hot and high—features common, as noted above, to many potential global trouble spots. Britain is not alone in struggling to adapt its equipment for this environment. The most effective troop-carrying helicopters remain the 1950s-designed Chinook CH-47 and the Sea King; intra-theatre troop-carrying missions are dominated by the turboprop C-130 Hercules and C-160 Transall, which first flew in 1954 and 1963, respectively; while the A-10 Warthog, among the most formidable ground-attack assets, is comparatively agricultural by modern jet standards. (The ongoing use of the C-160 in such hot and high conditions illustrates once more the travesty of the decision, in the early 1990s, to scrap the nine-strong SAAF fleet.) In the absence of extensive and expensive upgrades, the more modern Lynx and Merlin helicopters have proven limited in their carrying capacity. While the CH-47 can handle as many as 40 fully equipped troops in the summer heat of Kandahar and Helmand provinces, the Merlin will manage little more than two dozen and the Lynx Mk 8 up to nine. The extremes of Afghanistan are common to many African operating environments. The helicopter answer lies in more heavy lift, which is already happening in Afghanistan, with more CH-47s arriving, less medium lift (it adds no additional value), and more light utility providing also a recce capability. Powerful transports, land and air, capable of moving large numbers of people and supplies reliably and quickly, and then sustaining them, are the name of the counterinsurgency game. But this is still not a choice, at least not now. As one Royal Air Force officer put it in discussion in Kandahar, '[to] do Afghanistan, we need ten more C-17s now—and the A400M later'.[5] This requirement was recognised, too, by South Africa in its original (now cancelled) order for the A400M.

During this insurgent ascendancy, Britain's big-ticket purchases of defence equipment have included the Trident submarine nuclear deterrent—involving between £15 billion and £20 billion in acquisition costs, but potentially as much as £76 billion (Norton-Taylor, 2006) in maintenance costs over the 30-year life cycle—the Typhoon jet-interceptor (£20+ billion) and the two Queen Elizabeth class (CVF) 65 000-tonne aircraft carriers (£5 billion) (Evans, 2009; Wilson, 2010). This excludes the cost of the 40 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft

needed (at a cost of £90 million each) and a light tank replacement (£9 billion). The argument for most of these items was, until the UK's 2010 SDSR, either that they were too expensive to stop or that they would keep strategic industries alive — 15 000 jobs are supposedly linked to the 160-aircraft Typhoon project (Evans, 2009) and 10 000 for the carriers — or that deterrence against a range of threats is required today as much as yesterday. The economic argument seldom, however, factors in the long-term running costs of these items, and nor does it consider the (alternative) opportunity costs of such spending, in Britain as in South Africa. It also seldom factors in the cost to the services in a finite budgetary world.

That Trident could suck up more than five per cent of the annual British defence budget in running costs is not only a cost to the exchequer but to the other services, and will shape the nature of British external engagement for a generation or more (Defencemanagement.com, 2010). By 2011, there was a budget shortfall estimated to be somewhere between £6 and £36 billion over the next decade (Norton-Taylor, 2010). The outcome of the 2010 SDSR was a personnel reduction in all three arms of the services of approximately 20 000, and eight per cent shrinkage in expenditure over four years. More importantly, this restricts overseas deployments to a maximum of 30 000 troops, which compares to the 45 000 involved in the invasion of Iraq, for example. Questions about the use of taxpayers' funds aside, more important are the capabilities (or not) that such spending affords. It leaves armed forces badly placed to play a part in dealing with future wars in the places that they are most likely to occur — especially across the African continent.

The main argument against high-tech weaponry (of which Typhoon and Trident are examples, as are Gripen fighter jets and the Type 209 submarine in an African context) is not their exorbitant price tags but their inappropriateness in meeting the modern threat, which is largely low-tech both at home and abroad. This requires wide-awake intelligence services, where experts can understand the roots of conflict and the intersecting network of personalities, ideology and tribe that often underpin them. If they are to be successful, militaries will have to work more closely with their civilian developmental counterparts and gain more knowledge about the 'softer side' of war. Modern war is to be fought as much in the fourth estate and in the area of development, in remedying the conditions that gave rise to insecurity in the first instance, as on the battlefield. As Mackinlay (2010:231) contends, 'rather than confronting the dissident narrative head-on by challenging it in the same networks and news propagation systems … future operations will have to engage disaffection on the ground at a very local level. The emerging theme would be that local beats global' (Mackinlay, 2010:231). This emphasises a range of actions, beyond military and stability operations, to ensure longer term development needs in undergirding a modern society. While the military has, perhaps understandably, been focused

on the sort of short-term, vectored actions that can provide stability, this may be detrimental to longer term development needs.

African considerations

In April 2012, the chief of the Malawian armed forces, General Henry Odillo, played a critical role in upholding the constitution and, in so doing, preventing a palace coup d'état against the president-designate, Joyce Banda. It is a story worth retelling, because it highlights the security context and complexities facing African militaries.

At around 09h00 on 5 April 2012, Malawi's President Bingu wa Mutharika suffered a heart attack in the capital, Lilongwe. As far as the public knew, his life hovered in the balance in a South African hospital, where he succumbed officially a day later. The reality was, however, quite different. It emerged that the president, who was meeting a young female MP at State House, was admitted by 10h00 to nearby Kamuzu Hospital. With no suitable facilities there, including life support, a request was put in to the South African government to evacuate Bingu (78), 'down south'. In the interim, in trying to keep a lid on things, the security staff was all but cleared out and a minimal police presence established at the hospital.

Even so, by 10h10 news of his plight had already begun to leak out to locally based ambassadors. Vice-President Joyce Banda, who was packing her car and preparing to leave for her house on Lake Malawi over the holiday weekend, also heard the news about this time. She decided immediately to stay put in Lilongwe. Despite a fraught relationship with Bingu which had seen her expelled from the ruling party, she called his wife, former Minister of Tourism Callista Chimombo, to offer her best wishes for a speedy recovery.[6]

By the time the plane from South Africa arrived and was ready, at 18h00, to accept the president, whose condition was officially described as 'critical', he was dead. Chaotic scenes ensued at the airport. Bingu's corpse was smuggled through the cargo section, but the crew refused to load a cadaver. Then his family, led by his wife, boarded and refused to leave the plane. It took an intervention, reputedly by South African President Jacob Zuma, to fly the body to a military base in Pretoria. It was in the interests of a small clique around the president's brother, Peter Mutharika, to maintain the public illusion of a life-and-death struggle to provide the space to plan his succession.

The 'Good Friday Gang' as they became known in Lilongwe—including then information minister Patricia Kaliati, sport minister Symon Vuwa Kaunda, health minister Jean Kalilani, local government minister Henry Mussa, deputy minister in the office of the president Nicholas Dausi, and the deputy foreign affairs minister Kondwani Nakhumwa—apparently decided among themselves on Friday to seek a court order barring Ms Banda from

stepping up to the presidency, as constitutionally ordained, and putting Peter Mutharika in her place.

The South African government unwittingly nearly became party to a coup. That would have made it a very bad Friday beyond Malawi. However, the Good Friday Gang reckoned without Joyce Banda and other good Malawians. 'The people of Malawi have the right to know the state of health of President Bingu wa Mutharika, ' she said at the time. 'I am appealing to the people of Malawi that we must abide the rules. The laws say if the president is incapacitated, the vice-president takes over. It's my hope that Malawians shall adhere to the Constitution' (Polgreen, 2012).

She also phoned around international donors to reassure them, and then called the army commander General Odillo, who stationed troops around her house. With the constitution and the army on her side, the die was cast. This was not lost on the crowd. Fifteen ministers threw their lot in with JB, as she is popularly known, at this point along with one third of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's 147 MPs. Despite an attempt at further delay by the chief justice on account of leaving his robes 240 km away in Blantyre, she was sworn in as president on the Saturday afternoon. Among the guests were members of the diplomatic corps, the chief of the police and General Odillo.

So ended 60 hours of confusion—the heroes of the moment, Joyce Banda and General Henry Odillo. Yet this is the same Malawian army that, according to a concerned President Banda, lacked sufficient uniforms for all its members. In June 2012, she lamented that soldiers routinely shared their clothing to ensure they were correctly dressed for duty.

Malawi is a failed state in many respects, less so in the quantifiable, symptomatic measures of refugees and violent deaths, but rather in the qualitative aspects concerning the state's failure to the citizenry. A sevenfold increase in population numbers, to 15 million people, in the five decades since independence in 1964, combined with consistently low rates of economic growth over that time, has rooted Malawi firmly in the 10 poorest ranked countries, with a GDP per capita in 2012 of just US$350. Finding the means to raise the rate of economic growth and thus accelerate the advent of relative prosperity, is critical, but demands prudent fiscal management along with the rule of law, and investor policy attractiveness and consistency.

The point here is, fundamentally, that peace has not broken out across Africa (or elsewhere) and is not, as Gwyn Prins has argued, the 'default condition of modernity' (Prins, 2012). Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and South Sudan and Madagascar all bear this out. Moreover, international (and, in the case of Malawi, local) law and institutions still require someone to uphold them. Moreover, there is a tendency to equate the success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with the ability to 'reconstruct' countries through aid, and thus to equate power with the

availability of 'soft' resources, such as donor financing. As Prins argues, '[t]he role of all armed forces today remains to prevent bad things from happening; and they do this by projecting an aura of power that comes from a combination of capability … and with perceived national will'. Soft power, he notes, is not autonomous, and without hard power to back it up 'is just limp' (Prins, 2012).

The armed forces, then, form an essential part of any strategy to maintain the national interest and national security. This includes understanding geopolitical events and trends, the limits of power and the sources of insecurity, and the role of external institutions and allies in building the response.

Reviewing the South African example

South Africa's 1994 transition to democracy meant, among other changes, adopting a new approach to defence with the creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This process culminated in the 1996 White Paper and the Defence Review two years later. The White Paper's broad ambit made allowance for addressing the requirements for greater detail through the review to include 'comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding' and represented the completion of the policy development process (DOD, 1998; Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). The 1998 Defence Review was a widely debated process, with the government actually sponsoring public consultative discussions countrywide. Fast forward to 2011, however, and the government established a Defence Review virtually in secret, with a small committee comprising unusual political bedfellows tasked to deliver a final report by September 2012.[7]

If the past is anything to go by, this document will endeavour to establish the direction of South African defence and foreign policy for the next 15 years, and outline equipment requirements.

The 1996 White Paper reflected the prevailing assumption that the new democratic era would ensure a period of peace, prosperity and stability. This would allow the defence budget to be significantly reduced to the benefit of social spending—that butter would be bought instead of guns. How would this be achieved? The SANDF, comprising the old South African Defence Force (SADF) and the Bantustan armies of Transkei, Venda, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, along with the military wings of the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress, would be downsized (from 105 000 uniformed personnel to 75 000). A small regular force (core force) with a large reserve force for *in extremis* mobilisation. The army would also withdraw from internal operations (border control and cooperation with the police), helping to release forces to the envisaged, but relatively small, contribution to African peace missions.

The Constitution and the 1996 White Paper, titled Defence in a democracy, are unambiguous in defining the 'primary' function of the SANDF as that of defending and protecting the state, its territorial integrity and its people. Generally interpreted to mean defence against an external military threat, this resulted in concentrating spending on conventional capabilities. Hence the four corvettes (which are, functionally, frigates in all but name, and Second World War light cruisers in size), each equipped with a Lynx helicopter, 26 Gripen fourth-generation fighters, of which nine are two-seaters (this order was reduced from 28 in order to finance a flight simulator), three Type 209 submarines, 30 Agusta A109 light helicopters (as the replacement for the Alouette), and 24 Hawk fast jet trainers. At the time of the conclusion of the deal in 1999, the stated cost was US$4.8 billion (or R30 billion in 1999 rands). By the government's own admission, the cost had risen to R47.8 billion by 2011, but is estimated by private sources to be much higher if financing charges are included. Excluding the maintenance contracts, by 2011 the overall cost is estimated to have risen to R70 billion for equipment for which the armed forces has until now struggled to find the skills and running costs to operate (Fin24, 2011).

Such capital outlay has been at the expense of provision for peace support operations, for which a combination of ground manoeuvrability, operational support over long distances, maritime and air transport, and a healthy dose of political will are required. The last has been there in dollops, for which South Africa is to be applauded. Hence peacekeeping occupies the centre stage of SANDF operations—with recent missions in Sudan, Burundi and the DRC—and, as the preceding section argues, will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Yet the 1998 Defence Review clearly states that participation in international peace support missions is a secondary function for the SANDF, and its design should be influenced mainly by its primary role, one which has to be reviewed constantly to keep it aligned with the perceived threat. Moreover, the requirements to participate in peace support missions, to be capable of dealing with a range of small-scale, short-term contingencies, to cooperate with the police, to assist other state departments, and to provide help during natural emergencies is more easily said than executed. At the heart of any force design is the necessity of deciding which league you want to play in—and then to fund at that level.

Shaping the response

South Africa and other African countries have thus to consider three main aspects: threat, affordability and gaps. As the above suggests, events including 9/11 and 7/7 have, *inter alia*, highlighted the threat of international terrorism. Moreover, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate how insurgencies

have changed from the 1980s, from the two-dimensional (national/colonial government versus the insurgent) to the three-dimensional, where the insurgent faces a national government but with a complex range of multinational governmental and nongovernmental actors involved in the security and development effort. And the globalised, media-savvy, networked nature of today's insurgencies contrasts with their bottom-up, cellular, organisational structure. The former allows an insurgency unparalleled, and virtually untrammelled, access to sources of succour, recruits and advertising, while its operational structure provides security and assists in it replicating itself and its actions without active leadership oversight and guidance. These lessons are sure to be learned by insurgents worldwide. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and, in many dimensions, with unprecedented demands for accurate intelligence, interoperability and flexibility, and cultural sensitivity and understanding.

This does not mean that development is the only answer to insurgencies, but it is a key part of the answer. Nor is intelligence a substitute for hard-edged resources, though knowledge of the opponent and, especially, their motives is critical and often sorely lacking. Some killing, to be blunt, will still be necessary to manage insurgencies.

No 'rocket science' is required to sketch out a nightmare scenario for Africa, in which generally poor countries with weak institutional and fiscal bases, or new states with burgeoning populations, are not always in a good position to manage security challenges posed by rebel groups—especially where rebels are keen to take control of mineral riches, as occurred in Sierra Leone and the DRC. But what can high-tech weaponry do to instil better governance conditions, to prevent threats from heading southwards, or even to curb corrosion from within? Moreover, no volume of equipment expenditure could adequately or, for that matter, even partly address the causes of such insecurities or their consequences.

The security environment facing Africa has less to do with the world of main battle tanks and spending on conventional military equipment than potable water tanks and community policing. But there is less likelihood of Robert Mugabe invading his neighbours than of his forces running out of petrol. There is a much greater possibility of terrorist actions in African countries, protesting international alliances or even the presence of foreign tourists. As intimated above, the threat to Africa comes from weak and failing or failed states, where economies cannot accommodate and provide for the needs, let alone aspirations, of their people, where leaders care less and are out of touch with youthful, media-savvy and wired populations, and where the prospects of employment and social inclusion are severely, if not fatally, constrained by a combination of a lack of skills, poor avenues to the global economy, weak agriculture and worsening climatic conditions. How to prevent

these circumstances from turning violent, mitigating their worst effects and managing the transition to different, more prosperous and inclusive societies is a core challenge for Africa.

And as the North African and Middle Eastern spring of 2011 graphically shows, conventional militaries can serve to exacerbate, not resolve, the underlying problems.

Affordability

A stock-take of SANDF capabilities is illustrative of the problems of having equipment wish-lists and limited ongoing financial capacity and political will. With the SANDF, expectations continue to rise, but the budget is not keeping pace. What is at issue here is not the costs of peace mission deployments, which are (mostly) covered by additional Treasury funding, but the cost of day-to-day maintenance of main equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation. The concept of 'needs driven but cost constrained' must be given greater clarity. Which enjoys priority: national expectations or the budget? It must be clearly understood what capacity can be provided at that level of funding. Take the South African Air Force (SAAF). The SAAF is in a considerably better position operationally than it was at the end of 2009 (when it had only 12 out of 39 helicopters flying, and one out of nine C-130s), though it is still severely hamstrung by a lack of funding and a shortage of pilots and maintenance personnel. This progress is partly down to a better working relationship between the SAAF and Denel and the maintenance improvements that go with that, plus the retention of key, skilled personnel under the 'technical dispensation'.

By the end of 2010, there were three C-130s flying, at times simultaneously on African deployments. Some 13 (of 39) Oryxes were operational; during the 2010 World Cup, up to 33 helicopters were flying daily. There remain problems of too few commanders and a relative surfeit of co-pilots. For the 26 Hawks, 30 pilots are trained, while half (15) of the Gripen order has been delivered, though this programme is under considerable financial pressure. In 2008, nearly 300 technicians left the service. During 2009 and 2010, this figure went down to 95. A similar decrease was recorded for pilots. This may reflect diminished opportunities outside, but also improved pay and service conditions.

In addition to training requirements, the SAAF clearly faces a major challenge in replacing its strategic airlift capability. Whether it goes the route of 'lease, hire, share' (possibly with Angola) or 'buy' depends on many factors, not least finance. Until then, spares and upgrade assistance for the C-130 fleet are important. In terms of maritime surveillance, the Dakotas are well past their useful life, not least given their absence of electronic capabilities. Whether they are replaced by patrol or surveillance capability is moot, though the most likely candidates for this are the King Air 350 or Casa 235.

In the South African Navy, by mid-2011, one of the three submarines was at sea, serving as a platform for offshore security; another was available, but on restricted duties due to a shortage of personnel. Two of the four frigates were operational, with one undergoing diesel replacement and the other in a programmed maintenance cycle. There remain ongoing shortages of maintenance and other technical personnel, though, again, this haemorrhage has been arrested by the 'technical dispensation'. This issue is examined below. A related challenge, however, is in the gap created between those left (usually above 50 years of age) and the influx of trainees (usually below 25).

Finally, the SA Army, as the largest component (37 000 of the 62 000 uniformed personnel), is the service most challenged by the impact of an ageing force and by the limits on the numbers of trained and available personnel. This factor helps to explain why, for example, there were more reservists on operational deployments (2 500 of 20 000 total activated reservists, of which 2 000 were deployed outside of South Africa's borders) by February 2013 than regular force soldiers.[8]

It was not envisaged in the mid-1990s that South Africa would, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, be deploying more than 3 000 soldiers in Africa—with the possibility that this could increase. Deployments of this magnitude are not easily sustained, particularly if the minimum international norms of a one-in-four rotation are applied. To sustain 3 000 troops you require another 12 000 in the cycle, without allowance for unscheduled interventions, unplanned emergency assistance operations, sickness and injuries. Moreover, the distances currently involved in peacekeeping operations make new demands on a force design which was influenced by a concept of mobile operations with relatively short lines of support, and geared to defending the territorial integrity of the country.

Critically, although the Constitution puts peace support operations as secondary to territorial integrity, the large numbers of soldiers deployed indicates, presumably, that Pretoria is confident enough about territorial integrity to devote significant resources to this secondary task. This, then, should in turn raise a series of questions about defence posture.

To an extent, the age issue has been remedied by the Military Skills Development programme, which has brought 18 000 young men and women into the army since 2007, by 2011 totalling 7 000 annually. This, however, reflects a wider problem concerning the division between personnel, operational and capital expenditure. Ideally, this should be at 40-30-30. During the peak of the arms acquisition process, this was in the margins of 60-10-30. In 2012, with most of the equipment paid for, it was around 72-19-09 for the Army; 55-31-14 for the Air Force; and 53-34-13 for the Navy. Presuming the projected defence budget of R39.7 billion for 2013/14 figure,[9] this split is ideally thus: R15.9 billion (personnel) and R11.9 billion (each capital and

operational expenses). The capital amount would have to include financing costs. Currently, however, according to former defence minister Lindiwe Sisulu, the defence force is battling to come out on the 2012 (approximate) 65-25-10 split, which equates (on a budget of R34.6 billion for 2011/12) to R22.5bn (personnel), R8.65bn (operational) and R3.5bn (capital). Yet Minister Sisulu has said her department asked for an additional budget of R5 billion for 2011, with which, she said at the time, 'we will then just scrape by' (DefenceWeb, 2011b). It is unclear where the savings to afford new capital expenditure and to operate the current equipment will come from. Indeed, the ability of the SANDF to sustain operations in this budgetary environment is laudable and a credit to its leadership. The excellence achieved by certain arms of the services, such as Special Forces, bodes well for the future, not least given the important role to be played by such units within a likely operational environment.

However, if it has been South Africa's intention to purchase high-tech equipment in order to vie for a place at the top table, then it has to be able to afford not only the initial purchase, but also, as noted earlier, the running costs. Good equipment and good-quality people need good training to turn it all into genuine capability. Without meeting this formula, the kit is not worth having. Modest but well-trained forces offer a much greater (and more influential) capability than high-tech, highly expensive equipment which is useless because insufficient people are trained to use it.

The Navy example

In 1993, one of the first public meetings in South Africa between Umkhonto we Sizwe and the then SADF occurred in the guise of the first Navy conference, co-hosted at the V & A Waterfront by the local chapter of the South African Institute of International Affairs, of which I was then the chairman, and the then Institute for Defence Policy.

Expectedly, given the politics of the time, much of the preliminary focus was on the SADF–MK relationship. In the event, there was much discussion about the future of the SA Navy, long the underdog in the bureaucratic and budgetary struggles with the Army, Air Force and Medical Services. One outcome was that the Navy, then in a dire state, with ageing vessels many of which were inappropriate for the southern sea conditions, went on a public diplomatic offensive to justify its role and argue the case for new equipment.

Fast forward 20 years and it has that new equipment. Three submarines and four new frigates were procured from German manufacturers as part of the notorious defence package in the late 1990s, then costing some US$5 billion. The first vessel was built more than a decade ago. Their record since then has been mixed. Positively, particularly since the anti-piracy Operation Copper was embarked on in 2011 in the Mozambican Channel, the available frigates have been utilised more than double their anticipated 120 days annually.

Enormous strides have been made in transforming the racial composition of the crews. For example, more than three quarters of the 156-strong complement of SAS *Amatola*, for example, is black, coloured or Asian, a share reflected too among the officers. Safety standards are also being raised continuously.

However, deeper problems threaten the operability of these vessels, which not only have curtailed their level of preparedness, but also may well shorten their anticipated 30-year life span.

The first is, as highlighted above, simply money. The purchase price of naval vessels is usually around just 20 per cent of the overall lifetime cost. By 2013, the SA Navy was routinely receiving little more than one third of the R1.2 billion required to support its fleet logistically. As a result, spares are in chronically short supply, ordered only reactively and thus subject to as much as 12-month delays. Refits are constantly behind schedule. Instead of being at a 'functional level of capability', most vessels are between the lower 'basic' and 'safety' levels. For example, three of the four frigates have been sailing with one of their three engines unserviceable.[10]

And there is a long-term cost. With spares being 'borrowed' from vessels under refit, and maintenance not being carried out timeously, the life span of the fleet is in danger of being shortened. The dockyard at Simon's Town has just over one third of the 900 staff required to fully support and maintain the vessels, and requires an additional R250 million annually to recapitalise over the next three years. Officially, the 'Naval Dockyard has lost the capacity and capability to perform the total planned upkeep requirements of the SAN resulting in a limited upkeep service'.[11] At the time of writing the total hour requirement for refits in 2012/13 was 950 000, yet just 169 950 hours were available, with the shortage of skilled artisans to be exacerbated by the need to maintain the four large fishery protection patrol vessels.

The second reason concerns the suitability of the current fleet for the tasks expected. There is, as pointed out above, an urgent need for new, low-tech offshore patrol vessels bigger than the current fishery protection variety and the three old naval strike craft currently still fulfilling this role, along with a support craft for peacekeeping operations. With the benefit of hindsight, some changes would today be made to the specification of the frigates, not least in the necessary fitment of bow-thrusters for use in African harbours lacking tugs, and given that they are never likely to use the torpedoes that they are fitted 'for but not with'. Any new purchases are not only highly contentious in an environment where questions about the last arms deal have yet to be answered, but also where the same problems of support and long-term operational financing still exist.

The third challenge is in the African operational environment. The virtually continuous stationing of one South African vessel in Mozambique is indicative of the dearth of African maritime and naval capability.

Without a concerted plan to build capacity and finance African navies, the load will inevitably fall on South Africa, a load it cannot conceivably bear, and to which many African countries are invariably hostile. Thus, 20 years on from the 1993 Navy conference, many of the same challenges exist for the so-called senior service—too little money to do its job, and a public hostile to further expenditures, not least given the extent of domestic socio-economic challenges. Little wonder, then, that urban legends flourish about submarines that do not sail and frigates without crews. The real problem is politicians who expect sailors and soldiers to do their job on a shoestring.

Gaps

The 1998 Defence Review might have left South Africa technology rich, as intimated above, but the SANDF remains people and finance poor. It also acquired items of equipment (notably fourth-generation fighters, and the submarines) which are unsuited to South Africa's threat environment, which is less about territorial incursions by external state forces than crime, unemployment and failing governance within and without the region, leading to migration and a myriad of social impacts and pressures. Serious gaps remain in South Africa's security arsenal for coastal patrol vessels (a process of procurement which is already under way), replenishment/supply vessels capable of carrying several helicopters for peace support and humanitarian relief missions, and medium-range transports. But there is no reason why these items should, given the history of use and abuse of the current inventory, be procured. For example, the frigates were supposedly procured with the patrol capability in mind as a secondary task. It seems contradictory (not to say shockingly wasteful) that more equipment is to be obtained precisely for this role in the form of Project Biro, the Navy's requirement for offshore and inshore patrol vessels. Under Project Biro, three offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and six (60m) inshore patrol vessels (IPVs) are to be acquired to replace the remaining strike craft and minehunters. The six IPVs consist of three more than approved in 2007 and will likely carry the four Project Mapantsula mine countermeasure (MCM) systems required in terms of the 2030 blueprint, as and when required. The replacement hydrographic survey vessel (Project Hotel) may be included if the final specification is close enough to that of the OPV to allow it.[12] When the frigates were procured for the Navy, the size of the vessel was deemed critical for the sea conditions and the ability of the vessel to carry a helicopter (*see* Mills, 2011:20–21)—hence their length of 121m, beam of over 16m and tonnage of 3 700. The same criteria apply to the OPVs/IPVs: the OPV must be around 80–85m waterline length, and the IPV 53–55m. Herein lies the rub. The estimated acquisition cost is R400 million per OPV (R1.2 billion for three), versus R9.69 billion for the four Valour-class frigates. The annualised life cycle cost for the OPVs—presuming 30 years of service—is R20 million,

against R85 million for the frigates.[13] Why then, it has to be asked, did South Africa acquire the frigates if the OPV is much cheaper, can handle the seas, and is thus better suited to South Africa's needs and tasks? It is unclear whether the new vessels will be built in South Africa (which the Navy would like, and which would make sense in terms of job creation, encouraging technological developments, and the prospects of selling the finished product to others in the region) or overseas (which has its own, often less noble, attractions). Again, if the OPVs/IPVs are to be constructed in South Africa, why were the frigates not built locally (*see* Mills, 2011:20–21)?

Furthermore, there are important items on the agenda which do not require new equipment but rather better systems and funding to *operationalise* existing material. For example, the African Standby Force, one of the building blocks of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, is in turn based on five regional standby brigades. National commitments to the regional brigades will require planning, rotation of forces, multinational exercises and development of common doctrine. All of this will take time, cost money and affect force designs. The concept of a 'non-threatening posture' as a component of a policy supporting the continental approach of 'confidence-building defence' will also influence, in particular, the equipment inventory. Does the present inventory contain equipment appropriate to the threat faced and the need for joint operations with other African powers, and yet also sufficient for deterrence?

The relationship with international actors is another potential force multiplier in Africa. However, this has been hamstrung, to an extent, by the South African government's schizophrenic relationship with the United States, which is perceived as a major trade and investment partner on the one hand, and with paranoia about imperial intentions on the other—as in the hullabaloo over the creation of AFRICOM (the US Africa Command). How this relationship, and others with European states and those further afield, including India, Russia, Brazil and China, is ordered and managed will have much greater (positive or negative) impact for South Africans (as opposed to a few companies and middlemen) than will new equipment purchases. Finally, as is highlighted above, there is a medium-term gap in air transport. Not only might this be best filled by international collaboration and equipment-sharing, but another alternative to consider, as others elsewhere are doing, is the contracted supply of airframe hours from private sector operators using, if possible, military pilots.

Conclusion

Starting with a blank sheet of paper, a 21st-century SANDF could be many things it is not today: younger, computer literate, designed for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, with easily transportable assets and the means to get them there by air and sea, capable of monitoring a border against illegal

people movements and contraband by digital means, a leader in unmanned aerial vehicles in guarding Africa's oceans against pollution, overfishing and piracy, and in the vanguard of Africa's contribution to global peace and security.

The usefulness of such a 'new' defence force would, however, depend on there being a foreign policy in place which would permit their deployment, not least in the protection of civilian lives in Africa. In addition, efficiency in the armed forces would have to be matched by that in other government departments—put differently, that guarding South Africa's borders would not be let down by corruption in Customs and the police. In contrast, the extent to which the 1998 Defence Review and the subsequent arms package got things wrong is highlighted by a number of things: the events of 9/11 and the global shift in focus to countering insurgencies and peacebuilding; the requirement for 154 new main battle tanks for the army in the original 1998 post-review arms request; the challenge of operating both the new and the extant technology and equipment, in terms of people and running costs; and the highly debatable benefit to the country of the offset deals that accompanied the 1999 arms package[14] do little to promote public trust in defence reviews as a means to do strategic planning.

Moreover, the absence of sufficient financing to run what South Africa already possesses should only add to the public's scepticism. And the absence of sufficient political will to act against the gravest of human rights violators in Africa, even in southern Africa, begs the question: what is all this capacity for if not the responsibility to protect individual liberties?[15]

Of course, capability goes beyond just equipment and self-enrichment, no matter how egregious that might be. That, indeed, is the one key lesson of the 1990s, when equipment was obtained that cannot be utilised in the absence of skills and running costs. But the level of skills requirement goes beyond technical capacities, to a deeper understanding of the post-conflict environment, especially to the role of economic reconstruction as the key (and most misunderstood and neglected) area of such operations.

Finally, if the most likely opponents to South Africa have fewer resources, conflict is unlikely, too, to be high-end or force-on-force in the traditional sense. Attrition will play a crucial role for both sides, but a decisive manoeuvre will come in the political, economic and informational domains—because it is about people. Technical domination has its limits. Further, grievances will always find a cause, and solutions will require understanding and satisfying reasonable demands that will make the difference. Some sense of inequality or injustice is at the heart of every insurgency—the consequent causes all vary—whether this be Catholic/Protestant, Sunni/Shia, Marxist/capitalist, black/white, Tutsi/Hutu or urban/rural, and the global communications

network that reaches into the heart of every community serves to fuel a sense of unfairness.

The 15 years that have elapsed since the drafting of the 1998 Defence Review have been a period of major change internationally, and also for South Africa and Africa. Adapting to those changes and redesigning for the future means reorienting the defence force as an African peacebuilder, an enabler *primus inter pares*. Meeting future interlocking challenges of state collapse, radicalisation, population growth, social inequality and hopelessness, requires a different posture and skill set than the armed forces possess today. The need is for less high-tech equipment than troop densities and logistics. It is for knowledge rather than higher altitude intelligence and information, and small steps rather than strategic diplomatic sweeps. Overall, ensuring the right force composition and posture in South Africa, as with others, is fundamentally about putting people, not technology, first.

Bibliography

Defencemanagement.com (2010). Trident 'may cost other services'. Available from http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=12768. (Accessed 23 May 2012).

DefenceWeb (2011a). Just four of 15 major conflicts in Africa: SIPRI. Available from http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content & view= article & id=16090 & catid=74 & Itemid=30. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

DefenceWeb (2011b). Defence budget to increase—but just by R500M. Available from http://defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=13733:defence-budget-to-increase-but-just-by-r500m & catid=55:SANDF & Itemid=108 (Accessed 28 February 2013).

Department of Foreign Affairs (1999). White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions. Available from http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70438. (Accessed 23 May 2012).

DOD (Department of Defence) (1998). Defence Review. Available from www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Evans, M. (2009). Britain's fighter jet fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons cut by a third. *The Times*, 31 July 2009. Available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6734604.ece. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Fin24 (2011). SA arms deal to cost R70bn: report. Available from http://www.fin24.com/Economy/SA-arms-deal-to-cost-R70bn-report-20110410. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Gray, C.S. (2007). *Another bloody century: future warfare*. London: Phoenix.

Halperin, M., Siegle, J. & Weinstein, M. (2008). *The democracy advantage: how democracies promote prosperity and peace*. London: Routledge.

Human Security Report Project (2009). Human security report project. Available from http://www.humansecurityreport.info/press/Press_Release.pdf. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Mackinlay, J. (2010). *The insurgent archipelago*. London: Christopher Hurst.

Mills, G. (2011). An option of difficulties? A 21st century South African defence review. *Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper* 2011/07.

Norton-Taylor, R. (2006). New Trident system may cost £76bn, figures show. *The Guardian*, 21 September. Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/sep/21/military.armstrade. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Norton-Taylor, R. (2010). Defence budget facing £36bn black hole, say MPs: parliamentary committee criticises Ministry of Defence for not controlling spending. *The Guardian*, 23 March. Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/mar/23/defence-spending-36-billion-blackhole. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Polgreen, L. (2012). Malawi leader's death is reported unofficially, and U.S. worries about succession. *New York Times*, 6 April. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/07/world/africa/questions-swirl-around-malawis-president-after-heart-attack.html. (Accessed 27 February 2013).

Powell, I. (2011). Shame of the arms deal exposed. *The Sunday Independent*, 27 June. Available from http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/shame-of-the-arms-deal-exposed-1.1089146. (Accessed 28 February 2013).

Prins, G. (2012) Armed forces: our country needs them. *Daily Telegraph*, 8 June. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9316678/The-Armed-Forces-Our-country-needs-them.html. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Richards, D. (2010). General Sir David Richards' address. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 January 2010. Available from http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-sir-david-richards-address/. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Smith, R. (2008). *The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world*. London: Vintage.

UK Ministry of Defence (2010). Global strategic trends—out to 2040. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33717/GST4_v9_Feb10.pdf. (Accessed 19 March 2013).

Vision of Humanity (2011). Global peace index. Available from www.visionofhumanity.org. (Accessed 23 May 2012).

Wilson, A. (2010). Can Britain afford not to build £5bn Royal Navy aircraft carriers? *Daily Telegraph*, 28 February. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/7338842/Can-Britainafford-not-to-build-5bn-Royal-Navy-aircraft-carriers.html. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

Endnotes

1 This term was used by the UK Defence Secretary to describe the shift in UK defence posture in 2012. See http://www.govopps.co.uk/army-2020-reshaping-the-british-army%E2%80%99s-troops/. (Accessed 19 March 2013).

2 See http://www.sadefencereview2012.org/publications/Defence%20Review%20 Strategic%20Orientation%20PCD%20 & %20JSCD.pdf. (Accessed 19 March 2013).

3 These conflicts were the US 'war on terror', Peru, Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Myanmar/Karen insurgency, Pakistan, Philippines, Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Turkey/'Kurdistan'.

4 Unmanned aerial vehicles.

5 Private discussion in Kandahar, May 2010.

6 This is based on interviews in Malawi, including several with Joyce Banda, during April, May and June 2012.

7 This comprised, at the outset, former National Party politician Roelf Meyer (chairperson), North West Premier Thandi Modise (deputy chairperson), Charles Nqakula, Tony Yengeni, Amb Thenjiwe Mtintso, Dr Pandelane Mathoma, Nonkozo Molai, Col (Rtd) Granny Seape, and Lt-Col (Rtd) Godfrey Giles. The 'resource group' for the committee comprised: Dr Sam Gulube, Rear-Adm Phillip Schoultz, Dr Moses Khanyile, Helmoed-Römer Heitman, Nick Sendall, Brig-Gen John Gibbs and Lt-Col (Rtd) Tefo Keketsi.

8 Discussion with Major-General Roy Anderson, February 2013.

9 The budget was R34.6 billion in 2011/12. See defpro.news (2011). Available from http://www.defpro.com/news/details/22342/http://www.defpro.com/news/details/22342/. (Accessed 22 May 2012).

10 Much of this information was obtained from a visit to the SA Navy in Simon's Town in January 2013.

11 Discussion with informant during SA Navy visit, January 2013.

12 The Estimates of National Expenditure noted that the National Treasury will fund the acquisition of new ships for the SA Navy from the 2013/14 financial year.

13 An offshore patrol vessel's projected annual operating cost is R5.3 million versus R25.4 million for a frigate; and personnel costs of around R5 million versus R21.75 million.

14 The deal was supposed to create (in 1999 rands) R110 billion in investments and about 65 000 direct and indirect jobs. Although these deals are notoriously difficult to monitor, and their effects equally so, the largest arms supplier, BAE-Saab, had a total offset obligation of US$8.7bn by 2011. For a thorough exposition of the literature, go to http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=70 & Itemid=67. (Accessed 19 March 2013). Included in this, BAE Systems incurred a R4.25bn obligation to support South Africa's defence and aerospace industry. By March 2007, the firm reported that it had delivered just over R4bn, comprising R789 million of 'technology transfers' and R17 million of direct investments which had generated a reported (by the company) nearly R3.2bn of local and export sales for local defence companies. See http://www.baesystems.com/WorldwideLocations/SouthAfrica/BAESystemsGripenOverseasLtd/Industrial ParticipationOffsetProgramme/index.htm. Reports commissioned by the government's Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for managing the indirect offset programme, have highlighted performance irregularities. See http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=243031 & sn= Detail & pid=71654. (Accessed 19 March 2013).

15 Ironically, the alleged bribes and consultancy fees paid to key political and connected individuals have served to overshadow an investigation into this area. This includes the R100 million reportedly paid to Fana Hlongwane, a special adviser to the late Defence Minister Joe Modise, and a key member, along with Shamim (Chippy) Shaik, of the Ministry of Defence's acquisition work group on deliberated preferred suppliers.

See Ivor Powell, 'Shame of the arms deal exposed', *The Sunday Independent*, at http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/shame-of-the-arms-deal-exposed-1.1089146. (Accessed 19 March 2013).

Towards 'Defence, Security and Development':[1] Whither South African Defence Thinking on Post-conflict Missions?

Theo Neethling

Introduction

The main objective of this book is to contribute to ongoing scholarly discussions on the theoretical and practical relevance of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), as developed by the African Union (AU). We planned to put forward a holistic appreciation of the process, the functioning, and the operational and policy implications of PCRD in Africa. We also planned to return to the roots of the conceptual debate about PCRD and then to reflect on the implementation gap between policy/political imperatives and strategic/ doctrinal as well as operational constraints (the means and ends debate). Our aim has been to present a scholarly analysis which, firstly, theorises key conceptual questions and, secondly, remains policy relevant and has some strategic utility for the SA Army strategic planning process.

In our examination of the topic under review, we premised our work on a number of key assumptions, as Heidi Hudson has explained in the introduction. Firstly, we believe that although an Afrocentric paradigm drives this intellectual project, both African and international experience should be viewed through a critical–analytical lens. Secondly, we believe that PCRD and development in general are interrelated and interdependent, but we recognise that it is difficult to apply this sweeping assumption to theoretical analysis and actual policy and programming in highly diverse contexts. We acknowledge that PCRD remains a contested (value laden) concept, and that there can be no blueprint or singular South African 'solution' to African problems. Finally, we are of the opinion that the way in which PCRD is conceptualised impacts not only on the nature of military operations, but also on the quality of civilian involvement and input.

Many years have passed since the publication of the 1998 Defence Review. On 4 May 2010, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Lindiwe Sisulu, delivered her budget speech in Parliament. During this speech, she remarked

on the need to develop an updated and future defence policy framework (DOD, 2012:33):

> Major changes, both dramatic and evolutionary, have taken place in the defence environment over the past 15 years. The policy review and strategy would of necessity take this in consideration and will be informed by a clear-eyed assessment of what we want our foreign policy to achieve, the potential threats facing us, and socio-economic interests in what is a very uncertain era of growing competition among new major powers. The new environment requires new thinking and new approaches …

> For the SANDF and particularly the SA Army to remain successful, it will have to take into account the complexities of African politics. The size of the continent, its geographic and climate complexity, as well as the lack of transport infrastructure, problems engendered by economic under-development and the diverse military challenges it may encounter, will necessitate the SANDF to be well and appropriately equipped and trained for both its external and internal roles as prescribed by the Constitution.

In this context, the Draft Defence Review 2012 makes it clear that Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy, and that South Africa must continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to, and resolve, crises. The country should also strengthen regional integration, increase inter-African trade and development and, importantly, champion sustainable development and related opportunities on the African continent. In addition, peace, stability and security are viewed as essential preconditions for development. South Africa, and this specifically involves the South African military, must consequently remain a leading role-player in conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and even post-conflict reconstruction (DOD, 2012:39). The last-mentioned clearly links South Africa's security role with a developmental role on the continent.

In view of the above, this concluding chapter will capture some of the main arguments presented throughout the book, but also attempt to translate some of the arguments into practical, policy-relevant perspectives. But, firstly, this chapter will briefly focus on some of the developments that gave rise to the 'shift' from *defence in a democracy* to *defence, security and development* (as explained in endnote 1), since this is cardinal to an understanding of the policy relevance and importance of PCRD.

'Defence in a democracy': entrance into peace missions

Since 1994, the South African government has sought to distance the country from the past of regional power politics and political-economic dominance over southern Africa, and to identify South Africa with the promotion of human rights, peace and development on the African continent (Southall, 2006:1). The government therefore introduced a low-risk approach and policy which not only revived international diplomacy, but also deliberately placed

limitations on, and reduced the use of, the military instrument in South Africa's foreign policy. The Mbeki era (1999–2008), however, brought about the re-emergence of the military instrument in South African foreign policy, linking direct national interests (often identified with the African continent) with broader foreign policy goals (Du Plessis, 2003:106, 115). In fact, it could be argued that the military was chosen to facilitate South Africa's foreign policy goals in Africa in view of its strength and capabilities.

In this context, the 1998 Defence Review stated that, after two and a half decades of isolation, South Africa was welcomed into the international community. Relations with neighbouring states changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and cooperation. The country also joined a host of important regional and international institutions and engaged in defence cooperation with a number of countries and regional security arrangements. The drafters of the 1998 Defence Review also anticipated that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would be required to participate in regional defence arrangements and engage in peace missions. They further indicated South Africa's common destiny with southern African states and contended that peace and stability in South Africa could only be achieved in a context of regional stability and poverty alleviation (DOD, 1998:1, 11, 20).

It should be noted, however, that one of the major changes in patterns of diplomacy since the early 1990s has been the increasing use of military cooperation and assistance in the international community. These changes have not come about through the traditional roles of militaries as providers of defence capabilities, but rather as instruments for attempting to build cooperative relations and helping to prevent or resolve conflicts (Cottey & Foster, 2004:15). This, of course, stands in stark contrast to situations where foreign ministries find themselves in a situation of structural rivalry with militaries, or where militaries pursue sectional interest and lack the cooperative capacity traditionally found in the diplomatic domain (Hill, 2003:82–83).

In the South African context, Du Plessis (2003:106, 132) points out that the military instrument has become more salient in South Africa's foreign policy since 1998, most notably in the form of peace missions of varying types in support of diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflict. Esterhuyse (2010:16–17) also states that during the Mbeki era, considering the importance of peace and security in South Africa's foreign policy outlook on the continent, the SANDF practically became a leading South African foreign policy instrument in Africa.

The 're-entrance' of the military into the foreign policy domain was strikingly articulated by the former chief of the SANDF, General Siphiwe Nyanda: 'South Africa has just recently become involved in peace missions in Africa, and more deployments are on the horizon. After a healthy pause, post-1994, during which time the SANDF integrated and transformed, the SANDF

is on the march—a march for peace, development and prosperity' (Nyanda, 2003:1).

Significantly, South Africa's involvement in international peace missions has always been seen as a secondary function of the SANDF. Still, towards the end of the 2000s, South Africa found itself in the league of those troop-contributing nations who were assigning substantial numbers (more than 1 000) of uniformed personnel to UN peace missions. South Africa in particular found itself in the league of African countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Senegal and Morocco—all countries with considerable experience in the peacekeeping arena and all important troop-contributing nations in the international peace missions arena.

The White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions, premised on the 1998 Defence Review, determined that SANDF participation in peace missions would be 'at the level of up to one infantry battalion group' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:3). Practically, foreign policy challenges and events in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan soon overtook this policy position. Philosophically, the White Paper pronounced that peace missions should be viewed as 'long-term endeavours which include a significant investment in peace building and not merely as short-term engagements' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:19). Peacebuilding was defined as the inculcation of respect for human rights and political pluralism, the accommodation of diversity, building the capacity of state and civil institutions, and promoting economic growth and equity. Yet nothing specific or explicit was said, or highlighted, about the practical implications or specific focus areas of military involvement (such as security sector reform (SSR)).

The above-mentioned coincided with a strong scholarly emphasis in South Africa on human security and a broadening of traditional concepts of security. In fact, in its embrace of the notion of human security, South Africa published a series of official documents in this area that are among the most comprehensive in the world (Ferreira & Henk, 2005:1). Specifically, the White Paper stated that instability must provide for a focus on issues relating to effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:7). Security thinking in South Africa further coincided with a worldwide conviction that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts to address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions. It was to this end that a range of reforms was implemented throughout the international system to facilitate peacebuilding or PCRD endeavours.

One of the most crucial requirements for achieving lasting peace and development is to effectively address this relationship in the shortest time possible.

Given the long-term correlation between security and development, the need for economic growth has become evident. In this regard, the literature on the conflict–development nexus suggests a number of important points—for instance, that poverty is a source of conflict and undermines long-term development. This raises another important issue of a practical nature. It has become increasingly evident that international actors (such as the UN and the AU) 'can no longer afford to work *in* or *around* conflict; they also need to work *on* conflict' (Fukuda-Parr, 2010:24–27).

Against this backdrop, it should be noted that, since 2004, the concept of 'developmental peace missions' has been developed by South African role-players as a functional South African conceptual approach to effectively address human security and development in Africa.

'Defence, security and development': generating new challenges and questions

The Draft Defence Review 2012 correctly states that after almost a decade and a half there are new challenges and new opportunities for the SANDF. South Africa's political and economic integration into, especially, the AU has led to greater involvement on the continent and in continental affairs, not least of which has been an active role in the newly established regional and continental security architecture, including the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (DOD, 2012:35). For the AU, PCRD is one of the tools designed to curb the severity and repeated nature of conflicts in Africa, as well as to bring about sustained development. In 2005, the AU Executive Council urged the AU Commission to develop an AU policy framework on PCRD, based on the provisions of the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol and the experience gained in the African context. In June 2006, the Executive Council adopted the AU PCRD policy of which the explicit objective is to improve timelines, effectiveness and coordination of activities in post-conflict countries, as well as to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace. In accordance with the position of African leaders in general and the AU's vision of renewal and growth in particular, the PCRD policy is intended to serve as a tool for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies which seek to consolidate peace and prevent a relapse into violence. It also seeks to help address the root causes of conflict and encourage fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities. Furthermore, it intends to enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes. The AU's PCRD policy also endeavours to complement the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in identifying states that are at risk of becoming failed states, by providing timely

help to such states and peoples, and in that way reducing the likelihood that such states will relapse into conflict.

On 14 September 2011, the AU issued a press release stating that the Commission of the AU had deployed two technical support teams to Liberia and Sierra Leone—both still recovering from conflict. It was also announced that missions would be undertaken to Sudan and the newly established (Republic of) South Sudan. In addition, the AU was preparing for an African Solidarity Initiative, which would work towards setting financial contributions from member states as well as human resources. This implied not only the active participation of member states, but also of non-state actors and relevant public enterprises (AU, 2011:1).

This being said, some of the major challenges associated with PCRD are:

- bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, international financial institutions, national governments and troop-contributing countries
- marshalling resources
- advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and, where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2012).

Given its strong economic and military position on the African continent, South Africa could not escape the AU's position in the search for security and peace on the continent. While economic and other challenges facing the continent will compel Africans to pursue outside assistance for some time to come, observers remain convinced that South Africa has the potential to contribute significantly to peace and stability operations on the continent. This specifically involves the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument. Politically, the SANDF is expected to be ready for any regional or continental security occurrence that may threaten the safety and security of the country and its peoples, or even its neighbours. The SANDF must also be ready to meet the country's international commitments, and it should specifically be noted that South Africa remains one of the top 15 contributors to UN peace missions worldwide (UN, 2012). Moreover, the role of the SANDF since 2000 in, especially, Burundi, the DRC and Sudan[2] has been internationally acknowledged. The experiences gained in these operations will certainly serve as a foundation for future involvement in peace missions on the African continent.

The European Union's special advisor for African peacekeeping argued that the South African military is ideally placed to help train the AU's Standby Force, which is still to be operationalised throughout the continent. General Pierre-Michel Joana stated that the SANDF could play an important role in helping the AU to become self-sufficient in crisis management on the

continent: 'South Africa is probably the best Army, [and has] the best equipped forces in all Africa. They also have very important human resource[s] in terms of beneficiation and capability of command' (cited in Engelbrecht, 2009).

From a South African policy position, the Draft Defence Review 2012 pronounces that the military will pursue reconstruction and conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives. Practically, this boils down to providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during the immediate post-conflict phase—operations which will enable and reinforce the process of development and reconstruction. At the same time, the authors of the Draft Defence Review 2012 make it clear that a purely military approach to peace missions cannot ignore the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peacebuilding, as this will not effectively result in lasting stability and conditions relating to human security. To this end, a multidimensional developmental agenda will be pursued, involving military and civilian bodies cooperating to accelerate capacity building and socio-economic development (DOD, 2012:154).

Politically, this brings us back to a concept which Malan (1999) coined several years ago in relation to South Africa's 'idea' of peacekeeping, namely, 'renaissance peacekeeping'. He pointed out that Nigeria did not seem to be keen to become involved in missions other than 'muscular' peacekeeping at that stage—a situation that might still be the case. Equally, he suggested that Egypt was probably less likely to muster the political will or support needed for peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa—which might also still be the case. South Africa, he argued, might therefore 'be the lead nation of choice, if only by default and the fact that it was Pretoria that advanced the idea of "Renaissance" peacekeeping in the first place'.

In view of the above, the question is: what theoretical, policy and practical issues relating to PCRD would be of relevance to the SANDF (specifically the SA Army), other relevant role-players and the academic community at large?

Connections, insights and overall recommendations

The AU claims that, in the past, responses to post-conflict situations on the African continent were fragmented and largely ineffectual. Therefore, a policy was called for which would go beyond 'limited interventions', meaning that PCRD activities should not stop with stabilisation, but should seek to achieve long-term sustainable development (AU, 2006b:1).

A number of key questions have guided the authors of this book in examining the topic under review. Firstly, what are the potential and actual contributions that PCRD can make to sustainable development in African post-conflict contexts? Secondly, to what extent, if any, did the general conceptual development around PCRD, as well as international and local (African)

experiences of operationalising the concept, help to clarify its value? Thirdly, what have been the major theoretical and practical or policy challenges, and how can they be explained and be overcome? Fourthly, what role did/do key (international and local) stakeholders play in facilitating, promoting or hindering the conceptual and practical development of the concept in Africa?

The authors of this volume differently perceive and approach the meaning of PCRD and whether it can successfully be utilised as a policy tool. For some, questioning PCRD as an effective policy tool or a measure to consolidate peace and promote sustainable development is the entrance point into their analysis. Others accept the value of PCRD as a policy tool, and consider it as both a sound conceptual and practical approach or activity in the consolidation of peace to foster growth and regeneration in post-conflict societies. Some regard PCRD as having considerable merit, but are sceptical about evidence of practices on the ground, especially given the shortcomings and limitations pertaining to its implementation in the African context.

While the authors mostly concur that the notion of PCRD has merit, in practice PCRD role-players still face huge challenges to deliver on the idealised and presumed benefits. Collectively, the chapters provide insights and reflections on the complex and variable interplay among a host of factors relating to PCRD—from the conceptual to the practical level. What follows is a summary of the salient points raised by each of the contributing authors and some elaboration on their broader policy implications.

Conceptual roots

Chapter 1

Cedric de Coning considers who the key role-players are, what roles they perform, and what resource and cost implications one needs to take into consideration when undertaking or supporting the political, civilian and military dimensions of a PCRD mission. He argues that the PCRD concept is premised on the understanding that societies in transition, from some form of crisis or conflict towards a sustainable peace, are going through a fragile phase during which the risk of a lapse into violent conflict is high. He further argues that conflict management is fundamentally political. Thus, the resolution of conflict also has to be political.

De Coning contends that almost all conflicts, at their core, are informed by some form of perceived inequality, typically experienced by the aggrieved parties as a lack of access to political or economic goods. The concept of PCRD thus emphasises the importance of inclusiveness and equity. He stresses that for PCRD to be effective, it cannot work only at the political level. The civilian dimension of PCRD—i.e. connecting with the general populace—is equally important. The role-players that are the most relevant for the civilian

dimension of PCRD therefore constitute those organisations and institutions that make up civil society.

In this context, De Coning further points out that the military's primary role is to ensure a secure environment within which the local and international role-players can carry out their PCRD-related tasks—to protect themselves, the mission and other key international role-players. This role contributes directly to the core aim of PCRD, namely, to prevent a lapse into violent conflict. When so mandated, this role can be extended to include the protection of civilians who are vulnerable or particularly at risk, as well as fragile government institutions, typically in the context of an insurgency that threatens a fragile statebuilding process.

In addition, the military dimension may have a secondary role, which is to support other PCRD role-players, including local authorities and civil society, to achieve their PCRD objectives. Military units will undoubtedly be prepared for their primary role, but what may be less obvious, and what may require additional consideration, is their secondary role, i.e. the roles they may be called upon to carry out in support of the larger PCRD mission.

Chapter 2

Heidi Hudson's point of departure is that PCRD is embedded within a broader discourse of (neo)liberal peacebuilding, which has implications for the way in which it is conceptualised. She observes that a key problem is the liberal nature of peacebuilding and the 'one size fits all' mode of implementation. In this context, she adopts a critical approach to PCRD by probing underlying assumptions that might otherwise be taken for granted. The critique offered in her chapter aims to 'open up' assumptions about power relations between local and external actors, as well as the link between conflict/insecurity and poverty/underdevelopment.

After having juxtaposed mainstream and alternative perspectives on liberal peacebuilding, Hudson focuses on three key dilemmas: firstly, problem-solving assumptions which give birth to technocratic, depoliticised strategies and tactics of implementation; secondly, a flawed security–development nexus which relies on anecdotal evidence and circular argumentation; and, thirdly, the political dynamics of debates about contextualisation and local ownership. She concludes that the notion of PCRD is open to multiple interpretations in different contexts, but that it must remain connected to the goal of conflict transformation, rather than conflict resolution, if it is to make a difference in people's everyday lives.

In essence, Hudson's argument is, firstly, that while PCRD has its origins in development discourses, the concept should be kept open-ended to allow space for alternative constructions and meanings. Development, narrowly conceived as materialising via neoliberal peace policies, runs the risk of

missing the 'reconstruction for transformation' target. Secondly, she contends strongly that the conventional link between security and development should be revisited, because it is often based more on anecdotal than solid empirical evidence. In practical terms, SSR policy, as well as security–development nexus literature generally, makes intuitive common-sense assumptions (correlations) about the link. Thirdly, she argues that local ownership is often accepted in theory, but is rarely practised. Therefore, in order to foster a situation in which local owners are autonomous actors and not merely implementers of external top-down agendas, less attention should be paid to rebuilding state institutions and more attention to reconciliation and to building trust and social capital, as well as to the reconstruction of social relations and dialogue within, and across, communities.

Finally, Hudson's analysis points to the failure of well-intentioned but ill-conceived neoliberal peacebuilding to address the insecurity of marginalised groups in many post-conflict states in Africa. She is of the opinion that the international community still privileges state security over human security, something which calls for critical voices to challenge the subtle violence of mainstream agenda that perpetuate dichotomous thinking and practice through universalist conceptualisations of human rights, development and security.

Chapter 3

In her comprehensive analysis, Annette Seegers contributes to an understanding of PCRD as an evolving international practice. Her conceptualisation of PCRD reaches back to the earliest historical examples of PCRD, and further explores some manifestations in the contemporary context. Specifically, she examines three international eras of PCRD, namely, the Cold War (1945–1991), the 'idealistic' years of 1992 to 2010 (labelled the 'peacebuilding era') and the revised and scaled-down PCRD regime that is currently emerging. She also focuses on two key components of PCRD: actors and their strategies (means and ends). According to Seegers, the PCRD regime is not necessarily inherently altruistic. She argues that, although it is not impossible that countries seek solely moral recognition for their participation in PCRD efforts, countries which volunteer for PCRD programmes, 'coalitions of the willing', and the like, usually obtain material resources as reward for their participation.

She also makes the point that, by the end of the 1990s, the UN retreated from its earlier peace ambitions because of the criticism it received about its role in conflicts generally. Sharp criticism was directed at the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians in and after conflicts. As a result, there was a makeover of the peacebuilding regime—although not a complete makeover. Roles were revised and assigned to different organisations, but the UN remained a pivotal actor. A major point of critique from Seegers is that the UN formula

follows a foreign, Western approach and has 'imperial goals', although it is an approach of imperialism driven not by states but by international institutions.

Seegers highlights several important matters in her research: firstly, the recovery of the Western European countries after the Second World War is the most pertinent example of the past few hundred years of how quickly devastated countries can recover economically and become much more democratic. Secondly, the donor states of the Cold War, whether democratic or communist, did not have an altruistic or humanitarian motive. For example, making West Germany a wealthy country was premised on the US approach that a poor West Germany would be prey to the Soviet Union. Thirdly, good intentions do not guarantee good consequences. Military-strategic motivations of states strengthen political commitment to development much more than the desire of an international community to act as 'good' actors. The strategies pursued by communist-allied countries in especially the late Cold War era indicate how counter-productive PCRD strategies can be. Fourthly, the difference between PCRD during the Cold War and the contemporary eras does not reside in the fact that different kinds of wars were involved. It derives from the nature of the international system: what kind of actors dominate the system and what do their interests dictate?

In the final instance, Seegers suggests that any policy-maker should take the term 'post-conflict' with a pinch of salt. In many instances, there is an increase in the level of violence, although the perpetrators and their motivations differ. Violent crime is likely to increase, as is violence, which may be related to the presence of foreigners or refugees.

Chapter 4

Similar to Heidi Hudson's chapter, Deane-Peter Baker's analysis also takes a step back and asks the broader and perhaps more fundamental questions: what are the ethics of PCRD in Africa, and whose responsibility is it to conduct PCRD? He considers this from three distinct perspectives: that of just war theory (particularly from recent work on *jus post bellum* and humanitarian intervention), that of development ethics (particularly about the capabilities approach of development ethics) and that of the African ethic of *ubuntu*. He concludes by presenting a synthesis of these perspectives to produce an African ethic of PCRD.

According to Baker, the emerging concept of *jus post bellum*, as developed by Brian Orend, gives us a partial answer to the 'who' and 'why' of PCRD. He argues that in the case of a classic interstate war, in which the victim of aggression successfully resists and defeats the aggressor state, it may be morally required of the victim state and its allies to rehabilitate the aggressor state politically, which would partially involve activities that fall under the PCRD banner. In the case of an interstate war in which the aggressor is

victorious, the aggressor state incurs a responsibility for PCRD as a subset of its responsibility to compensate the victim state. For Baker, the philosopher James Pattison's moderate instrumentalist approach, adapted from the context of humanitarian intervention, covers many gaps which are left by Orend's *jus ad bellum* framework in relation to PCRD, specifically relating to vague and unsatisfying answers of 'the international community' and 'who can, should'. Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, which has become increasingly prominent in debates over development ethics over the past decade or so, provides another important dimension in Baker's chapter, with a view to answering the 'when' and what' of PCRD. In Baker's opinion, the capabilities approach provides a practically useful and normatively sound framework by which to assess what PCRD should seek to achieve for the inhabitants of the affected nation. The goal of development should be to promote capabilities, not the actual functioning, in order to give citizens a choice. This dimension is important, given that PCRD in Africa will often involve partners and role-players from beyond the continent. The third dimension, that of the ethic of *ubuntu*, takes up where the capabilities approach left off by offering a narrower and more specifically African lens on PCRD in Africa, especially through its articulation of what Nussbaum's broad notion of 'affiliation' looks like in the African context. Perhaps the most useful way by which to get to a practical understanding of an *ubuntu*-based perspective on PCRD is through the notion of human rights—the basis of a minimally just society—that must be considered as the intended end-state of a process of PCRD.

Baker states that his three-dimensional ethical framework for PCRD in Africa is incomplete. Still, it identifies some of the key issues that a mature framework must address, and provides a first step in developing such a mature framework.

Chapter 5

Laetitia Olivier's contribution on developmental peace missions (DPMs) is of interest to an understanding of the development of the Draft Defence Review 2012, specifically the pronouncement that developmental peacekeeping will 'inevitably be executed' in a joint interdepartmental, interagency and multinational context (DOD, 2012:154). She explains that the concept of DPMs was developed by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) as a conceptual and functional tool to effectively address human security and development in answer to the UN's mixed record of success in peace missions. In the meantime, the DPMs concept has also become an underlying approach in the SA Army Vision 2020, a most important policy instrument aimed at positioning the SA Army for its ever-increasing role in Africa.

She reflects on the core argument of recent years that the approach to complex emergencies should essentially move from a traditionally linear and primarily sequential approach, to that of a systems-thinking approach, in which many of the processes are implemented and managed simultaneously. This implies that peacebuilding (as defined and conducted by the UN) must be brought closer to peacekeeping to effectively close the 'reconstruction gap'.

The concept of DPMs thus calls for a timely effort to bring security closer to development in order to minimise the recurrence of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer term statebuilding efforts. In essence, DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible, even while conflict is still ongoing, is necessary.

Olivier argues that the complex challenges posed by violent conflicts in Africa require a high level of policy coordination. Thus, coordination is necessary to ensure a clear division of labour, to set priorities and requirements, as well as to develop platforms of principles to guide planning and implementation activities. Coordination is also critical for establishing a shared strategic vision among military and civilian planners, which, in turn, is essential to ensure unity of efforts.

Olivier's contribution is important, since it offers insight into the way leading South African thinkers have articulated their thoughts, and how such thinking has eventually informed the content of the Draft Defence Review 2012, specifically with regard to the creation of conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives.

Role-players in context

Chapter 6

Tim Murithi's point of departure is that the AU is involved in a number of PCRD processes across the continent and that post-conflict reconstruction processes depend principally on the commitment and efforts of all relevant actors in a dispute. His chapter assesses the AU's PCRD policy and is an attempt to examine the AU's strategic objectives in its efforts to promote and support PCRD in Africa. A point of departure in this chapter is that even though the AU has articulated a PCRD policy framework, the organisation has struggled to ensure symbiotic coordination with national governments and partner international organisations, specifically in the implementation of PCRD. What is needed is a mutually reinforcing and collaborative approach to policy implementation.

Considering ongoing and future post-conflict contexts, efforts to ensure symbiotic coordination on the basis of complementarity and the strategic utilisation of resources between the AU and other actors like the UN and

the World Bank will become of increasing importance. At the same time, one of the problems facing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes is the proliferation of external actors. To this end, the AU should develop an ethos predicated on achieving symbiotic coordination in the implementation of its PCRD policy and work with those who are genuinely interested in improving a post-conflict situation. The AU will thus have to work closely with relevant external organisations, civil society and international partners to ensure the effective impact of the provisions contained within the body's PCRD policy. Murithi further points out that even though the PCRD policy of the AU was established in 2006, the AU had already implemented a post-conflict reconstruction intervention in Burundi—a case which is worth studying but which, according to Murithi, is still in too early a stage for observers to conclude whether the foundations laid through PCRD will be sustained.

Chapter 7

In her contribution, Lindy Heinecken argues that gender-neutral approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) are fundamentally flawed, as war and peace affect men and women differently. She points out that the most alarming aspect of contemporary armed conflicts is the excessive use of violence inflicted on the civilian population by combatants. Although this affects both men and women, sexual and physical violence against women as a systematic weapon of war, to dominate, terrorise and humiliate, has been one of the most disturbing features of recent wars. Hence, the effects of violence remain long after peace agreements have been reached.

She contends that it is imperative that women's views are taken into consideration during the PCRD phase, not only because it is their right, but also because women are important actors, agents and beneficiaries in the peacebuilding and reconstruction of their societies. Relegating women to an inferior status is not only an obstacle to progress and human development and peace and post-conflict programming, but also irrational.

Experience has shown that women face many challenges in having their voices heard and in bringing about gender equality across all spheres of society and in PCRD. Gender-mainstreaming activities are necessary, but are essentially top-down, state-centric initiatives, only effective where legislative and judicial processes are supportive of such activities. As an answer to this dilemma, she concludes that, since the state is largely absent in the lives of many of these post-conflict societies, the most sustainable way to bring about change in men's attitudes towards women is to develop and support women at grassroots level. A bottom-up approach to community development will be far more successful than a top-down or interventionist approach. This is where the strength of women lies, and if adequately supported by men and

outside organisations there can be no doubt that conflict-ridden societies will experience peace and recovery far more readily than if they exclude women based on their gender.

Chapter 8

Theo Neethling gives an appraisal of the most serious challenges associated with PCRD in the post-electoral DRC, with specific reference to the following: firstly, reconstruction and development through statebuilding, and, secondly, by enhancing security governance (including security sector reform) and humanitarian conditions. In particular, the role of the UN as the external role-player in the DRC is explored. After its establishment, the UN mission in the DRC became the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission, fielding approximately 22 000 peacekeepers at the height of its activities, in a country where organisations such as militias and rebels are continuously reproduced and the potential for conflict remains very high. The importance of the DRC as a case study rests in the fact that the UN mission in the DRC assumed some of the responsibilities of the Congolese state, which was torn apart by a particularly brutal war between 1998 and 2003, and which was responsible for the deaths of millions of people.

The case of the DRC raises serious questions about the political circumstances under which the consolidation of fragile peace processes can be strengthened or promoted by external actors, such as the UN. A grave problem is that politics in the DRC is still largely viewed as a means of accumulating wealth, while the state is regarded as the medium for pursuing sectional and material interest, as against the pursuit of the common interest or the public good. As long as that is the order of the day in the DRC—or any country, for that matter—PCRD will encounter difficulties in enhancing the role of the state as a provider and guarantor of social and political order.

Furthermore, from a macro-political perspective, long-term PCRD requires that the alleged beneficiaries, i.e. the governments of the countries under intervention, welcome the presence and support of the UN and other role-players. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in the DRC. In previous years, human rights activists, humanitarian groups and UN officials were often concerned that the UN Security Council might prematurely decide upon the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission. Moreover, in the DRC, as also fairly recently in Chad, the government pushed for an early end to the UN presence on Congolese soil. This occurred in spite of ongoing insecurity, humanitarian challenges and much unfinished business in the field of PCRD, specifically SSR.

Chapter 9

With reference to their study of Sierra Leone, Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling and Benjamin Mokoena hold the view that the peace process in Sierra Leone

can generally be viewed as a relatively successful case study for integrated international peace missions. The restoration of a democratically elected government after elections in 2002, as well as in 2007, bears witness to strong national and international efforts to resolve the conflict. In its quest to build a sustainable peace, the UN managed to overcome political as well as military challenges in Sierra Leone by involving key stakeholders, such as political actors, civil society, NGOs, rebel groups and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), among others. Civil society in particular played a central role in the establishment of democracy in Sierra Leone and in the re-establishment of multiparty democratic government.

In war-ravaged Sierra Leone, the challenge for the UN, regional organisations and NGOs was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into efforts essentially aimed at societal transformation. In this regard, the focus of the peacekeepers was to create an environment that would contribute to building sustainable peace, as opposed to merely providing security. This coincided with an international 'move' in the peacekeeping arena towards an approach that brought security thinking and practice closer to development policies and related endeavours.

In 2012, a decade after the war in Sierra Leone officially ended, and despite the many remaining challenges and security risks, a third round of democratic elections took place. As far as the work of the UN is concerned, international SSR—a cornerstone of peacebuilding or PCRD—has been held up as one of the international community's more successful experiences to date, helping to steer Sierra Leone onto a path of statebuilding and enhancing security governance.

Olivier et al. are convinced that the thesis of weak governance of natural resources as a conflict risk is of great relevance to conflict dynamics in countries such as Sierra Leone. The complexity of the security challenges in Sierra Leone and similar cases—generally poor countries with weak financial and institutional bases that are less able to manage conflict dynamics and deter rebellion—has made it very difficult for the UN to conduct successful peace missions. In such circumstances, it is essential that credible peace forces are deployed—credible in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and the international community. Military deployment, however, ultimately forms only a part of the solution: there can be no credible peace support operations force without the political backing of all the participating nations. Peace support operations forces on their own cannot ensure lasting peace and development in countries where complex emergencies have to be addressed. There must be a long-term commitment by all role-players to contribute to finding lasting peace. This implies that peacekeeping is an invaluable tool for stabilising countries and preparing the groundwork for peacebuilding, but actors other than military peacekeepers are needed to make PCRD a successful endeavour.

Policy and practice

Chapter 10

Maxi Schoeman argues that the South African government has managed to strengthen the military instrument of foreign policy in recent years to a considerable extent, using South Africa's increasing prioritisation of the African Agenda as justification. However, the government did not succeed in a restructuring of the actual force design to allow it to elevate what were originally, in post-1994 defence thinking, conceived of as 'secondary functions'.

She highlights the point that the Draft Defence Review 2012 underscores peacekeeping as a key task of the SANDF, although, in many ways the document reverts to the ethos and approach of the 1996 Defence White Paper. This boils down to an 'undermining' of the progressive thinking exhibited in the DOD's 2005 defence update, implying that the new document leans too much towards defence and deterrence.

Yet she acknowledges a 'shift in orientation', which comes with a number of challenges. First is the need for clear political leadership, with a sufficient grasp of the need to align force design with foreign policy objectives. Second is the issue of political will. This is crucial to provide the necessary resources to develop and maintain the capabilities that will ensure the use of the military as a credible instrument of South African foreign policy. The biggest challenge in this regard is perhaps the ability to convince ordinary South Africans that strengthening the military is not a case of 'guns over butter', but that it is in the national and regional interest of South Africa and its citizens.

Schoeman raises other important issues. First is the scope of South Africa's deployments to peace missions. It would seem that South Africa has deliberately chosen African missions for its involvement. This is because of the priority of Africa on its foreign policy agenda. It relates to the country's foreign policy ambitions and the fact that South Africa's African policy is focused on strengthening the capabilities of the AU to promote peace and security on the continent. The country's leadership role in the AU Peace and Security Council attests to this commitment, as does its endeavours to use its second term as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2011/12) to promote the peacekeeping partnership between the AU and the UN. Importantly, another issue that will become more salient in the short term is the possible alignment of the military instrument with South Africa's emergence as an African 'development partner', which is of special relevance to PCRD. Schoeman argues that South Africa has made a substantive contribution to thinking about PCRD in the form of developmental peacekeeping, its practical experience with PCRD (especially in the DRC, but also Sudan), and the establishment of institutions specifically aimed at promoting South Africa's donor profile through, among others, PCRD activities. This points to a country that might

not be rich in financial and economic resources for peace missions, but that is abundantly endowed with the ability to provide innovative ideas, strategic thinking and new knowledge on how to promote the international goal of 'security with development'.

Chapter 11

In his chapter, Greg Mills argues that the 1998 Defence Review might have left South Africa technologically rich, but the SANDF remains people and finance poor. It acquired items of equipment unsuited to South Africa's contemporary and future threat environment. Fifteen years since the original drafting of the Defence Review, South Africa has witnessed a period of major change internationally, regionally and nationally. Adapting to those changes, and redesigning for the future, means reorienting the defence force as an African peacebuilder, and as an enabler *primus inter pares*. To meet future interlocking challenges of state collapse, radicalisation, population growth, social inequality and hopelessness, requires a different posture—and skill set—than the armed forces possess today.

For Mills, the first-order responsibility of any defence force remains territorial integrity. But the reality is that no country can deter others desperate or ambitious enough to transgress such sovereign limits through military means alone. Assiduous diplomacy and development, of which governments have perfected the rhetoric, but less frequently the practice, are critical parts of this defence.

Mills's argument extends to the point that modern war is to be fought as much in the fourth estate (which most commonly refers to the public media) and in the area of development, in remedying the conditions that gave rise to insecurity in the first instance, as on the battlefield. This emphasises a range of actions beyond military and stability operations to ensure longer term development needs for undergirding a modern society. Indeed, the main argument against high-tech weaponry is not its exorbitant price tags but its inappropriateness in meeting the modern threat, which is largely low-tech both at home and abroad. But the level of skills requirement goes beyond technical capacities to a deeper understanding of the post-conflict environment, especially of the role of economic reconstruction as the key, and most misunderstood and neglected, area of such operations.

Conclusion

When the drafters of the 1998 Defence Review worked on the project of submitting a text that could serve as a policy framework and the main principles of defence in a post-1994 South African democracy, they merely noted that South Africa had a common destiny with southern Africa, and that peace and stability would not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty.

They also stated that it would be in South Africa's long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout southern Africa (DOD, 1998:20).

In 1999, the South African government reiterated that South Africa's central focus would be southern Africa, but also acknowledged the need to respond to calls for participation in (broader) international peace missions. Government further acknowledged the need for capacity building in conflict areas, specifically in the realm of governance. Accordingly, it was stated in the White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions that, while the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the transition to the post-conflict state, there was also a need for the essentials of effective and efficient governance. This, according to the White Paper, implies the need for adherence to the rule of law, competent and fair judiciaries, effective police services and criminal justice systems, professional civil services and the reorientation of the state towards the pursuit of developmental goals (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999:3, 19). These were precisely the challenges that South African role-players, of which the SANDF is a key functionary, encountered in recent years in countries such as Burundi, the DRC and (the former) Sudan.

In the DRC, for instance, a critical task of the UN mission (to which the SANDF has been a major troop contributor) has been the pursuit of peace and stability in the framework of the need for effective state authority in the eastern parts of the country. Autesserre (2008) rightly argues that, in the long term, peace in the DRC will be sustainable only if the state is stable and its institutions are developed and built up at all levels. What is needed is capacity in public administration, policing, and judicial and correctional services, all of which should be developed to a sustainable level to allow especially for the monitoring of human rights. Most importantly, security governance issues, centred around the process of DDR, have increasingly been recognised as priority peacebuilding tasks in the DRC.

In addition to matters relating to statebuilding and political transformation, developmental challenges are certainly the kind of PCRD issues that the SANDF (and other multinational forces) encountered in the DRC in the past decade. Mills (2010:13) strongly argues that the SANDF will have to deal with 'the modern insurgency, which is a profoundly political and developmental task. It is as much about governance as guns, and providing jobs and economic security as military activity'.

The Draft Defence Review 2012 reinforces the above-mentioned and articulates the South African policy commitment to PCRD in a far more specific manner than before. Given the pronouncements in this document, it should be clear to the South African military that the provision of critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately during the post-conflict phase will be a key performance area in future operations.

Of further interest is the focus that will be placed on the creation of a firm foundation for sustainable development in the areas of SSR and the successful integration and professionalisation of the armed forces (DOD, 2012:148, 155, 166). The latter is a recurring point in the Draft Defence Review 2012. If this document is anything to go by, it seems that the Department of Defence and Military Veterans now has a much clearer idea or perspective of what the (future) role of the South African military should be.

In conclusion, PCRD is still a relatively new concept, but its theoretical underpinnings have been established in recent years. From what has been offered in this book, it could be stated that the concept implies the integration and coordination of a wide range of functions. A key aspect of success is the cooperative relationship between military and civilian components. PCRD aims to provide security in war-ravaged states, to make the state functional and legitimate and to proceed with economic development. It should also be clear that PCRD implies extensive (international and/or regional) endeavours, while sovereignty should take a back seat. Lastly, the nature and priorities of each situation should determine the required action. As Kotzé (2008:115) strikingly remarks: 'It is, after all what "(civilian) developmental (military) peace-keeping" means.'

Finally, it could be stated that embarking on PCRD means—like all good development programming outcomes—short-, medium- and long-term integrated, multilateral activities. It also requires of relevant role-players or practitioners the required measures, instruments and programmes that will work towards achieving long-term development objectives and projections. As scholars, we need to further embark on studying past and current experience to deepen our analysis relating to the understanding of the major difficulties and achievements pertaining to the theoretical and practical aspects of PCRD. It is hoped that this book will be a catalyst in this regard.

Bibliography

AU (African Union) (2006a). Decision on the AU policy framework on post-conflict reconstruction and development. DOC.EX.CL/274 (IX). Available from http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PCRD/PCRD%20Main%20Web%20Source/main%20folder/Decision%20on%20Post%20Conflict.pdf. (Accessed 25 May 2012).

AU (2006b). Report on the elaboration of a framework document on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). EX.CL/274 (IX). Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, 25–29 June, Banjul, Gambia.

AU (2007). About post-conflict reconstruction and development. Available from http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PCRD/PCRD%20Main%20Web%20Source/index.html. (Accessed 25 May 2012).

AU (2011). Press release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development, 14 September. Addis Ababa: AU Headquarters.

Autesserre, S. (2008) The trouble with Congo: how local disputes fuel regional conflict. *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (3). Available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63401/s%C3%83%C2%A9verine-autesserre/the-trouble-with-congo. (Accessed 8 February 2010).

Cottey, A. & Foster, A. (2004). *Reshaping defence diplomacy: new roles for military co-operation and assistance*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 365:15–29.

Department of Foreign Affairs (1999). White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions. Approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998. Tabled in Parliament on 24 February 1999. Cape Town.

DOD (Department of Defence) (1998). South African Defence Review, as approved by Parliament, April 1998. Pretoria: Ministry of Defence.

DODV (Department of Defence and Military Veterans) (2012). South African Defence Review 2012: defence, security, development. Draft document for public engagement, as at 12 April 2012. Pretoria: Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans.

Du Plessis, A. (2003). The military instrument in South African foreign policy. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, xxv (2):106–143.

Engelbrecht, L. (2009). SA key to effective ASF. DefenceWeb, 18 February. Available from http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content & view= article & id=1128 & catid=55:SANDF & Itemid=108. (Accessed 25 May 2012).

Esterhuyse, A. (2010). Getting the job done: transformation in the South African military. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, xxxii (1):1–30.

Ferreira, R. & Henk, D. (2005). Military implications of human security: the case of South Africa. Paper presented to the 45th Anniversary Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, 21 October 2005.

Fukuda-Parr, S. (2010). Poverty and violent conflict: rethinking development, in Tschirgi, N., Lund, M. & Mancini, F. (eds), *Security & development: searching for critical connections*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Hill, C. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kotzé, D. (2008). Post-conflict reconstruction, in Kotzé, D. & Solomon, H. (eds), *The state of Africa: post-conflict reconstruction and development.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Malan, M. (1999). Renaissance peacekeeping: a South Africa solution to conflict in the DRC. *ISS Occasional Paper*, no. 37. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/37/Paper37.html. (Accessed 1 June 2012).

Mills, G. (2010). An option of difficulties? A 21st century South African defence review. *Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper* no. 7:1–23.

Nyanda, N. (2003). The South African National Defence Force and peace missions in Africa. Paper presented at a conference under the auspices of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Centre for International Political Studies (CIPS) and the Pretoria branch of the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), University of Pretoria, 27 February 2003.

Southall, R. (2006). Introduction: South Africa, an Africa peacemaker?, in Southall, R. (ed.), *South Africa's role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

UN (United Nations) (2012). Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/apr12_1.pdf. (Accessed 13 June 2012).

UN Peacebuilding Commission (2012). The Peacebuilding Commission. Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/. (Accessed 11 September 2012).

Endnotes

[1] It is planned to replace the 1998 Defence Review and the 1996 White Paper on Defence, which was published under the theme of *Defence in a democracy*, with a new defence review, (to be) published under the theme, *Defence, security, development*.

[2] This especially relates to the former Sudan and the newly created South Sudan.

INDEX

Please note: Page numbers in italics refer to tables.