


CONFRONTING FRAGMENTATION

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
IN A DEMOCRATISING SOCIETY



EDITORS: PHILIP HARRISON, MARIE HUCHZERMAYER & MZWANELE MAYEKISO

Confronting Fragmentation:
Housing and Urban
Development in a
Democratising Society

*This book has been published with generous support from
the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa (FHR)*

Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and Urban Development in a Democratising Society

Editors:

Philip Harrison

Marie Huchzermeyer

Mzwanele Mayekiso



UCT

University of Cape Town Press

*Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and Urban
Development in a Democratising Society*

First published 2013

Print edition first published 2003

©2003 University of Cape Town Press

1st Floor, Sunclare Building

21 Dreyer Street

Claremont

7708

South Africa

ISBN: 978 1 91971 373 1 (Parent)

ISBN: 978 1 92051 655 0 (Web PDF)

All rights reserved. No part of this electronic publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Subject to any applicable licensing terms and conditions in the case of electronically supplied publications, a person may engage in fair dealing with a copy of this publication for his or her personal or private use, or his or her research or private study. See Section 12(1)(a) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978.

Project manager: Fiona Wakelin

Copy editor: Stuart Sholto-Douglas (Boltupright)

Proof reader: Ethné Clarke

Indexer: Mary Lennox

Cover design: Pumphaus Design Studio

Book design and DTP: Charlene Bate

The authors and the publisher have made every effort to obtain permission for and acknowledge the use of copyright material. Should any infringement of copyright have occurred, please contact the publisher, and every effort will be made to rectify omissions or errors, in the event of an update or new edition.

Contents

<i>Preface and Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Foreword</i>	xii
<i>Contributors</i>	xv

INTRODUCTION

Confronting Fragmentation.....	1
--------------------------------	---

Part A

The Challenge of Urban Fragmentation

CHAPTER 1

Fragmentation and Globalisation as the New Meta-Narrative	13
---	----

Philip Harrison

Globalisation: The new meta-narrative.....	13
Urban fragmentation.....	15
Responses to fragmentation	18
In the final event, does fragmentation really matter?	22
References	23

CHAPTER 2

Urban Fragmentation, Inequality and Social Justice: Ethical Perspectives	26
--	----

David M. Smith

Introduction	26
The apartheid city and beyond	28
Inequality in the United States city.....	31
The multicultural city	34
Conclusion.....	37
Acknowledgements	38
References	38

CHAPTER 3

The Degeneration of Urban Policy after Apartheid	40
<i>Patrick Bond</i>	
Introduction	40
The <i>Local Government White Paper</i>	44
The <i>Housing White Paper</i>	46
The <i>Urban Development Strategy</i>	49
Conclusion: Towards cities of solidarity	53
References	54

CHAPTER 4

South Africa's Enduring Urban Crisis: The Local State and the Urban Social Movement with Particular Reference to Johannesburg	57
<i>Mzwanele Mayekiso</i>	
Introduction	57
The civic movement in crisis	60
Social movements and the new economic regime	64
Democracy deferred and bureaucratising the civics	66
Uneven development within the post-apartheid city	68
The development dilemma within the civic movement, and between the civic movement and local government	71
Conclusion	74
References	74

CHAPTER 5

HIV/Aids and Urban Disintegration in Johannesburg	76
<i>Richard Tomlinson</i>	
Introduction	76
Demographic projections for Johannesburg in the light of HIV/Aids	76
Economic trends	80
Economic and urban strategies and worsening poverty	81
Urban disintegration	85
Conclusion	86
References	86

CHAPTER 6

Social Justice, Social Integration and the Compact City: Lessons from the Inner City of Johannesburg	88
<i>Mike Oelofse</i>	
Introduction	88
Social justice in the compact city	89

Integrative trends in South African cities	91
Racial integration and racial tipping in the inner city of Johannesburg.....	92
Racial tension: Landlords versus tenants.....	93
Integration of income groups	94
Urban regeneration and housing affordability.....	96
Appropriate scale.....	98
Opportunities for the marginalised.....	100
Rural-urban and foreign migrants.....	101
Conclusion.....	103
References	104

Part B

Urban Planning Responses

CHAPTER 7

Housing, Integrated Urban Development and the Compact City Debate	109
<i>Alison Todes</i>	
Introduction: The compact city debate in South Africa	109
Urban compaction: A socially desirable alternative?	111
The feasibility of urban compaction: A Durban case study.....	113
Conclusion: Is urban compaction still important?.....	118
Acknowledgements	119
References	119

CHAPTER 8

Unravelling the Different Meanings of Integration: The <i>Urban Development Framework</i> of the South African Government	122
<i>Edgar Pieterse</i>	
Introduction	122
Central features of the <i>Urban Development Framework</i>	123
Four connotations of integration in the <i>Urban Development Framework</i>	125
Conclusion.....	136
Acknowledgements	137
References	137

CHAPTER 9

Planning for Integration: The Case of Metropolitan Cape Town.....	140
<i>Vanessa Watson</i>	
Introduction	140
Spatial planning in Cape Town and the issue of functional integration.....	141

Integration, competing story-lines and power	149
Conclusion.....	152
References	152

CHAPTER 10

Housing and Urban Passenger Transport Policy and Planning in South African Cities: A Problematic Relationship?	154
<i>Roger Behrens and Peter Wilkinson</i>	
Introduction	154
The continued peripheralisation of low-income housing in post-apartheid South Africa	155
The new transport policy agenda and the emerging urban transport planning framework	162
A convergent intersection of integrated development planning and integrated transport planning?	167
Conclusion: Tackling the housing-transport nexus	171
References	172

CHAPTER 11

A Time and a Space for African Identities in Planning in South Africa?.....	175
<i>Mark Oranje</i>	
Introduction	175
Some African identities	176
A time for African identities in the post-1994 South African planning system?	179
Seeking explanations for 'the omissions'	182
A space for some African identities?	185
Conclusion.....	186
References	186

CHAPTER 12

Alternative Urban Planning and Management in Brazil: Instructive Examples for Other Countries in the South?.....	190
<i>Marcelo Lopes de Souza</i>	
Introduction	190
Purposes and roots of 'alternative urban planning' in Brazil	191
'Participatory budgeting': The Brazilian experience of citizen participation in resource allocation	195

Some additional remarks about the relevance of the ‘urban reform’ instruments and of ‘participatory budgeting’ to socio-spatial development	198
Conclusion: Instructive examples for other countries in the South?.....	201
Acknowledgements	206
References	206

Part C

The Role of Housing

CHAPTER 13

Addressing Segregation Through Housing Policy and Finance.....	211
--	-----

Marie Huchzermeyer

Introduction	211
Causes of housing segregation and its perpetuation	213
Policy responses: Redressing segregation of low-income housing.....	216
Conclusion.....	224
References	224

CHAPTER 14

Illegal Housing: Law, Property Rights and Urban Space	228
---	-----

Edésio Fernandes

Introduction	228
Law in the context of critical urban research.....	230
Law, illegality and access to land and housing.....	236
The question of property rights	237
Conclusion.....	242
References	242

CHAPTER 15

An Interpretation of Sustainable Development and Urban Sustainability in Low-Cost Housing and Settlements in South Africa	244
--	-----

Daniel K. Irurah and Brian Boshoff

Introduction: Sustainable development and sustainable urban form	244
Sustainable cities and human settlements	246
Urban sustainability and urban form.....	248

Sustainable low-cost housing, urban sustainability and the sustainable development debate in South Africa	250
Low-cost housing in the context of the building construction sector	252
Sustainable housing and settlement initiatives: Overview of case studies.....	253
Sustainable housing and settlement: Policy initiatives.....	256
Conclusion.....	260
References	261

CHAPTER 16

The Integrated Delivery of Housing: A Local Government Perspective from Durban.....	263
<i>Sarah Charlton</i>	
Introduction	263
Concepts of integrated development	265
The housing context of Durban 1997–2001	266
The institutional environment	266
The mandate of Metro Housing	269
Spatial integration	269
Internal integration	271
An integrated process of delivery	272
An integral response to needs.....	273
Conclusion.....	275
References	276

CHAPTER 17

Self-Managed Housing Construction: The Experience of São Paulo	278
<i>Raquel Rolnik and Renato Cymbalista</i>	
Introduction	278
The economic context of housing in Brazil	279
The politicisation of the periphery and the urban social movements in São Paulo	280
The concept of <i>mutirão</i> and self-management	281
The Case of Apuanã	283
Conclusion: An assessment of the <i>mutirão</i> process	291
Acknowledgements	293
References	293

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book has its origins in the critical urban debates in and on Johannesburg in the wake of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. A group of urban/housing scholars in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand saw the need for a book that would capture some of these debates in a rigorous yet pragmatic way, especially as they relate to issues concerning housing policy and urban fragmentation. The book was made possible by the enthusiastic support given by a network of South African and international scholars who volunteered contributions. The contributors include scholars from Brazil and the UK. Although the book has a South African focus, the South-South comparative perspective is important, with the Brazilian reflection, in particular, offering valuable insights. The problem of the fragmented city is, however, not only an issue of the South. A perspective from countries such as the UK and the USA also add significantly to the debates of the South.

The compilation of the manuscript was made possible through the cooperation of the School of Architecture and Planning and the Centre for Urban and Built Environment Studies (CUBES) at Wits University, and the various institutions at which the contributing authors are based. Chapter 7, in part, was published in the *Journal of African Studies* Vol. 20 No. 1 2002. The production cost, and hence the retail price, of the book is subsidised through a contribution from the National Research Foundation (NRF) and a generous grant from the Foundation for Human Rights. The Foundation for Human Rights is also funding its targeted distribution through a number of workshops and is making the book accessible to students in higher education institutions and to grassroots community members. The Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa (FHR) is funded by the European Union under the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the sponsoring agencies (or sub-agencies). At Juta/UCT Press the editors are indebted to Fiona Wakelin, Solani Ngobeni and Glenda Younge, to Stuart Sholto-Douglas of Boltupright for a rigorous editing process and Ethné Clarke for proofreading.

The Editors

Foreword

This is a fascinating book, and not only for those interested in South Africa, for the problems it addresses are symptomatic of problems in cities around the world. Fragmentation is not peculiar to any one city or any one country; it is, as many of the authors suggest, a characteristic of cities throughout a globalising world. What is peculiar to South Africa is only the history of colonialism and apartheid it has experienced, and the route out of that history that its people have recently found.

The central theme of all the contributions is urban fragmentation, and within that theme, the interplay of factors of race and class. The principal issue is the continuation of fragmentation after the end of apartheid – in a sense, a market apartheid replacing a racial apartheid. Recognising the mammoth differences between the two: market apartheid, for all the separation it produces, does not have pass laws, legal buffer zones separating races, prohibitions on ownership of land by certain groups, exclusion from the formal political processes. But it does have disincentives to go where folk ‘do not belong’, it does have buffer zones in land use and zoning plans, ownership is quite dependent on income, and political participation and power are unevenly distributed by wealth. As time goes on, the problems faced by South African cities, and the solutions discussed for them, are increasingly paralleled by problems and contemplated solutions in cities around the world.

The contributions in this book make these critical points eloquently. There is an undercurrent of tension among some contributions around very tricky questions: To what extent are these aspects of the post-apartheid urban reality ‘mistakes’ of policy makers; or of lack of understanding or incompetence or, worse, corruption by leadership; or of failed analysis or failed courage or insidious cooptation? And, to what extent are they the result of structural conditions resulting both from the imbalances of South Africa’s past and the entry in the competitive global era? To what extent could the ANC, for instance, have acted otherwise, planners planned differently, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) organised differently, trade negotiations been more benignly conducted? Some of the contributions highlight issues of policy decisions, planners’ models, institutional arrangements; others rather focus on issues of political power and the distribution of wealth. Both are of course important; the contributions taken together give evidence on the relative weight of each.

There are also a variety of solutions proposed in the various discussions we have before us. The contributors highlight both the possibilities and the difficulties. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are an extremely attractive device for channelling private funds towards public purposes. But they can also be a way that private interests can channel public programmes to help achieve private goals – profit, not social service, as the world is structured today. Thus PPPs may increase the difference between those with economically effective demand and those without: to increase fragmentation, not reduce it.

Housing policy is an obvious place to look if the concern is for fragmented residential patterns. A whole cocktail of approaches is suggested: zoning provisions, various subsidy schemes, curtailed decommodification that limits the tendency of the housing market to produce segregation by class, tax policies, demand-side subsidies, community self-management, and so on. Each has its advantages, its limits, and its disadvantages; the evidence is not yet clear what the best combinations are, or how far-reaching the results they may produce.

Changes in the law, particularly the law of property rights, should help. But without a thorough-going review of what ‘the law’ actually does, how it is produced, whom it serves and whom it doesn’t, and what the relationship is between public law and civil law, the effect of extending traditional property rights rules to informal settlements, for instance, can have devastatingly negative results. The contributions here provide both theoretical analysis and concrete examples. They stress the importance of political mobilisation to achieve just results, but acknowledge that such mobilisation has yet to be achieved.

Policy coherence and integrated planning are likewise shibboleths of current public approaches, but these approaches are not certain to lead to spatial or social integration: one could easily imagine (and indeed examples are provided in the contributions) well-developed, coherent and integrated plans that promote social differentiation and overcome one type of fragmentation (that which is inefficient, for example, because it requires increased tax expenditures) by increasing other types (such as the creation of gated communities). One person’s fragmentation can be another’s secure exclusionary enclave.

Planning practices and planning theories, such as the ill-defined but fashionable compact city approach, may be more likely to lead to further exclusion from the city than inclusion within it, simply enlarging the scale of fragmentation to the region. Urban growth boundaries may well simply increase the disadvantage of those outside the boundaries, often in informal settlements, compared to those within. More abstractly, the theory of planning as communicative rationality often (not always) assumes some non-existent equality or openness of power among those

communicating; but the lack of that very equality of power is often exactly the problem.

Redistribution of power, in fact, crops up in many of the contributions as desirable, if not necessary. The formulations vary: a fundamental change in power relations, reactivation of civic structures, integration from below, grass-roots social movements (a tricky concept, whose exact meaning might itself be usefully further pursued), a returning of the ANC to its roots, but the meaning is similar. In classic United States terms, it would be 'power to the people'. Neo-liberal policies, the ideology used to justify them, and the power that imposes them and benefits from them, must be combated. That is hardly a conclusion unique to South Africa.

And that leads me to the last of the issues raised and illuminated in this book and worth pursuing further: What is it, positively, that is actually the goal? If there are open issues as to what policies will achieve what is desired, are there also open issues as to what it is that is in fact desired? What is the opposite of the fragmentation that is obviously taken for granted as undesired? As one of the authors says in his piece, 'change the discourse, and fragmentation becomes diversity, something to be celebrated rather than conquered.' If 'integration' is the opposite of 'fragmentation', that can also be quite variously defined, as many contributors point out. I recently wrote a piece, in the American context, called *Enclaves Yes, Ghettos No*. That is much too simple an answer, but it grapples with the same question. So do many of the discussions here, with their references to the strong contributions of thinkers like John Rawls and Iris Young, as well as the often-contradictory language of official South African government documents. What form, what level, of integration, are really wanted, and by whom, and how are these to be achieved? Integration by what measure: race, class, culture, language, gender, age and sexual preference? There is no easy answer, but the question is increasingly being sharply posed. And perhaps this question of where we want to go needs to be addressed more squarely, before we can find out what policies will help us get there.

The single, overarching contribution of this book is that it raises all of these important issues, empirically embeds them by providing case studies and perceptive analyses in the broader context of contemporary South Africa, and pushes us to think about them, and act on them, in the very varied situations in which we encounter the same issues in cities throughout the world.

Peter Marcuse

March 2003

Contributors

Roger Behrens is a Senior Lecturer in the University of Cape Town's Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment. His research interests include: activity-based travel analysis, policy analysis in the fields of urban passenger transport and land use-transport interaction, local movement networks, and non-motorised transportation.

Patrick Bond, a political economist, is Professor at the University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management. He works in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and follows issues ranging from urbanisation to environment to economics to global geopolitics.

Brian Boshoff is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand. His research interests are in sustainable and regional development at large, but in particular, sustainable cities and water and sustainable development.

Sarah Charlton is a practitioner in the field of urban development and low-income housing. She has been involved in policy and strategy formulation, as well as implementation and delivery, in the local government, non-governmental and private sectors in South Africa since 1994. She has recently been appointed as part-time Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Renato Cymbalista is a Brazilian architect and urbanist. He is a researcher in Instituto Pólis, where he is also editor of the journal *Polis*. He is currently a PhD candidate in Urban Structures (School of Architecture and Urbanism of São Paulo University).

Edésio Fernandes is a Brazilian jurist and urban planner. He is currently a Lecturer at the Development Planning Unit of University College, London, as well as the coordinator of IRGLUS – the International Research Group on Law and Urban Space. He was recently appointed Director of the National Programme to Support Sustainable Land Regularisation in the Brazilian Ministry of Cities.

Philip Harrison is Professor of Town and Regional Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of planning theory and philosophy, planning history, urban futures, and regional and local economic development.

Marie Huchzermeyer is a Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Postgraduate Housing Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand. Her research interests are the socio-political aspects of housing policy and informal settlement intervention, in particular the comparison between South Africa and Brazil.

Daniel Irurah is a Senior Lecturer in Design and Construction, School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand. His focus in teaching, research and consultancy work is sustainability in the built environment.

Mzwanele Mayekiso is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning, and Director of the Centre for Urban and Built Environment Studies (CUBES), University of the Witwatersrand. His research interests are planning and social movement theories, and spatial and policy analysis.

Mike Oelofse works in Johannesburg with the Housing Finance Resource Programme, which provides funding for technical support to organisations that extend housing credit to lower income households. He has an interest in housing policy formulation and analysis, particularly in inner-city and informal housing markets.

Mark Oranje is Head of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Pretoria. His primary research interests are planning theory, policy and history.

Edgar Pieterse is Director of the Isandla Institute, and is currently completing his PhD at London School of Economics. His research areas include policy debates on urban integration in post-apartheid South Africa, the role of social movements in reconstructing urban governance, and the cultural politics of development during the South African transition.

Raquel Rolnik is a Brazilian architect and urbanist. She is the Brazilian National Secretary for Urban Programmes of the Brazilian Ministry for Cities, and Professor of the Graduate Programme on Urban Planning at Campinas Catholic University. She also works as an international consultant in urban policies.

David Smith is Emeritus Professor of Geography, Queen Mary, University of London. His research is concerned with geographical aspects of inequality, social justice and ethics, with special reference to the city, and includes numerous publications on South Africa.

Marcelo Lopes de Souza is Professor at the Department of Geography of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. He conducts research and teaches in the fields of urban analysis, planning and management, as well as development theory.

Alison Todes is Associate Professor and Programme Director for Planning in the School of Architecture, Planning and Housing, University of Natal, Durban. Her research interests include: South African urbanisation dynamics, urban and regional restructuring and the effects of planning interventions, and integrated development planning.

Richard Tomlinson is a Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand. His research centres on the effects of HIV/Aids in urban areas, at present in respect of the housing and services needs of those affected and infected by the virus.

Vanessa Watson is Associate Professor in the City and Regional Planning Programme in the School of Architecture, Planning and Geomatics, at the University of Cape Town. Her research interests are in the development of planning theory in the context of Africa.

Peter Wilkinson is a Senior Lecturer in the University of Cape Town's School of Architecture and Planning. His research interests include: policy analysis in the fields of urban management and transport planning, comparative analysis of contemporary processes of city building, and urban governance in southern African cities.

Introduction

Confronting Fragmentation

Philip Harrison, Marie Huchzermeyer and Mzwanele Mayekiso

The challenge of urban fragmentation in a democratising society

In relation to other semi-industrialised countries, South Africa was only very recently liberated from repressive governance. The past eight years have seen an improved quality of life in urban and rural environments throughout the country. Electricity and water supply have been extended to far-flung rural areas, and the number of people who have access to shelter and other services in urban areas has increased significantly. These advances have been achieved through a profound restructuring of government institutions, legislative and regulatory frameworks, and systems of resource allocation.

However, despite clear advances, there are still serious deficiencies, in terms of both implementation and policy framework. For example, despite a clear commitment to urban integration and coordinated development, housing policies and practices are producing, as an unintended effect, results that are not entirely dissimilar to those produced under apartheid, namely poor quality housing badly located with respect to urban opportunities. The continued growth of informal settlements in the urban centres of South Africa, often on unsuitable or hazardous land, is a glaring reminder that the housing crisis has not been resolved.

The apartheid legacy is one of seemingly intractable problems, and we must surely empathise with government in its struggle to confront these in a way that balances many conflicting demands. However, there is a real and growing concern that the government's 'neo-liberal turn' may be exacerbating social and class divides, and may be prioritising South Africa's standing in the global economy above the needs of its

poorest citizens. In very recent times new social movements have emerged to challenge the government's economic policies, and government's position on such critical issues as the HIV/Aids pandemic. The issues are not simple and ill-informed criticism can be dangerous, but there is a need for robust and continual engagement with government in the policy arena.

In the area of housing and urban development, a particular concern is the degree to which processes of globalisation, and government policy, may be contributing to the increasing fragmentation and segregation within South Africa's towns and cities. It is deeply disappointing that an urban observer such as David Smith is able to conclude that, despite the improvement of service infrastructure in poor parts of the city, the apartheid legacy has been carried largely intact into the new era, and that the major structural reforms that were required to alter the trajectory of urban change did not occur. It is also worrying that new forms of fragmentation and segregation are emerging in response to South Africa's changing position within the global economy.

As this book shows, the idea of urban fragmentation is complex and contested, and there is often a disjuncture between the understanding and ideals of policy makers and planners, and the everyday concerns of urban citizens. However, urban fragmentation (in its many forms) is an issue that needs to be confronted directly and with urgency. A poor understanding of fragmentation and its consequences for urban life has resulted in policies that fall short of the challenges confronting the South African city. Some types of fragmentation (for example, related to social diversity) may be positive, and should be actively promoted, but other forms may be associated with increased social inequality, and with the suffering of many marginalised people.

This book confronts the question of urban fragmentation, both from a local and an international perspective. While the focus is largely on South Africa, there is a recognition that the dilemmas confronting this country are shared by other countries in the South, and, increasingly, by countries in the North. This book presents a collection of new South African analyses, alongside some from other democratising societies. A particular theme of the book is how urban and housing policy can counter the fragmentary effects on the city of processes of globalisation and of policies associated with the neo-liberal turn. The book therefore locates the practice of housing delivery within emergent debates on urban fragmentation and the integrative approaches that have been developed in democratising societies to confront this phenomenon. The book addresses the critical question of how the delivery of housing and related services can contribute to more integrated and sustainable urban outcomes. It therefore has a practical as well as theoretical angle, as it is concerned with bringing debates down to the level of implementation.

This, then, is the backdrop to a collection of chapters that presents a broad variety of perspectives and positions on housing and urban development. What unites the contributions is a willingness to take the alternative perspective and engage in *counter-narratives*. The contributions provide a potent challenge to current housing and urban policy, and to much of the conventional wisdom that has framed urban interventions in post-apartheid South Africa, and in other contexts of democratisation and transformation.

Themes and structure of the book

The book is structured in three parts, although different but related themes link these three sections. The first part deals critically with the concept of fragmentation. It explores this from a number of perspectives: international, South African and, in relation to the city of Johannesburg, with a parallel from Latin America. The second part addresses the planning approaches that have been developed to overcome fragmentation. It contrasts the integrated development planning practice and its critiques in South Africa, with the alternative participatory approaches that have been pioneered in Brazil. The last part turns to the practice of housing delivery, examining its relation to urban fragmentation. It discusses practical challenges to overcoming segregation and fragmentation, including urban illegality, and addresses policy, regulatory, financial, institutional and environmental aspects, again with a contrasting experience from the democratisation process in Brazil.

Philip Harrison (Chapter 1), as well as Patrick Bond (Chapter 3), show how the contemporary debate on fragmentation and integration is framed within the meta-discourse of globalisation. Harrison argues the need to search for the insurgent story-lines that might begin to challenge the new intellectual hegemony. Although globalisation is associated with new forms of connectivity, Harrison shows that, at the local level, globalisation is related to varying forms of fragmentation, including the social, the institutional and the spatial. However, the effects are complex, contingent and often paradoxical, and there is no simple or direct relationship between macro-processes and local outcomes. Although the concern with local fragmentation is a powerful theme in contemporary vernacular politics, Harrison asks the question: 'In the final event, does fragmentation really matter?' He argues that much of the language of planning is prone to a level of abstraction that is far removed from the real concerns of people's lives, and that we need to understand more clearly what forms of fragmentation matter and to whom, and what forms of integration make a real difference in everyday lives.

David Smith (Chapter 2) introduces the discourse on justice, difference and diversity, a theme also addressed by Mike Oelofse (Chapter 6). Smith draws on the

writings of Iris Young in mediating the difficult divide between a contemporary discourse that demands a space for diversity and multiculturalism, and the discourse of social justice that directs attention to structures of oppression. Smith raises very difficult questions around the limits to difference. He argues that the struggle for justice must include the space for diversity but that this diversity needs to be situated within overarching ethics that incorporate mutual respect for human rights and difference, and some agreement on the fundamental features of a good life. He warns that ‘without some limits to spatial and social fragmentation, and some moral values against which the actual practice of moral values can be called to account, we are left with the relativist (or postmodernist) nightmare of anything goes’. In seeking a constructive alternative to both the tradition of liberalism (where individuals are self-contained atoms) and to communitarianism (where individuals are simply creatures of community), Smith returns to Young’s normative ideal of city life where there is an ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’ and an ‘equality among groups who recognise and affirm one another in their specificity’.

Smith also introduces the theme of integration as a goal in housing provision and efforts to address urban poverty. He refers to his edited book *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanisation and Social Change in South Africa*, published ten years ago, which warned of continuing separation and segregation, and of class divisions that would steadily augment racial separation inherited from the past, producing a city that could be described as ‘deracialised apartheid’. Sadly, there is strong evidence to suggest that his earlier predictions are being realised.

Patrick Bond (Chapter 3) is one of the most vigorous and consistent critics of ‘neo-liberal’ urban policy. In his contribution to this book Bond writes provocatively of the ‘degeneration of urban policy after apartheid’. He speaks angrily of how a globalisation agenda has been allowed to determine key features of urban development policy, and how this has undermined the positive environmental, social and economic benefits that could have come from strong public policies and programmes. In his chapter, Bond takes the government to task for its neo-liberal bias in recent key urban policies including the *Local Government White Paper*, the *Housing White Paper*, the *Urban Development Strategy*, and the *Urban Development Framework*. Bond concludes with alternative policy prescriptions, which he argues would result in ‘a much stronger, sustainable resource flow to urban communities which would otherwise slip further into despair and depoliticisation’.

Mzwanele Mayekiso (Chapter 4) examines the relationship between local government and social movements in post-apartheid South Africa, an association that might either enhance or undermine the development of the post-apartheid city. He provides an analysis of the weaknesses and failures of urban social movements to

make a significant impact on the direction of urban policy since 1994. He concludes that the civic organisations lost the chance to safeguard progressive policy making, and were unable to hold the state accountable to the community. However, Mayekiso is insistent that there is an urgent need for a strong social movement that would both creatively engage with and challenge the state. Fortunately, there are lessons from other parts of the global South that point to the possibilities for such engagement. Brazilian examples are presented by Lopes de Souza (Chapter 12), and Rolnik and Cymbalista (Chapter 17).

In South Africa, one of the most critical factors contributing to urban disintegration is a crisis in public health. Richard Tomlinson's (Chapter 5) present concern is with the effects of rapidly increasing HIV/Aids infections on the sustainability of current housing programmes that are aimed at economic and social integration. He shows how this pandemic, combined with the continued shedding of jobs within low-income communities, is undermining any attempt at achieving greater levels of integration, including attempts to create viable communities. In the case of Johannesburg, he warns of the divide between 'the walled residential communities and secure office parks and malls in the north [which] will stand in sharp contrast to the desperation in the south'.

Reflecting on the outcome of South African housing policy over the past eight years, Tomlinson, much like Huchzermeyer (Chapter 13), argues that 'a precondition to delivery at scale is the delivery of standardised, limited ranges of products at locations where political opposition would not delay projects, which coincided with locations where land prices were low'. In light of the HIV/Aids pandemic, Tomlinson's solution would be to devote a much larger proportion of state subsidisation to better located and better designed projects, and to the provision of social services.

Mike Oelofse (Chapter 6) tackles the question of social justice and diversity from a Rawlsian liberal perspective, with particular reference to the case of inner city Johannesburg. In a compelling chapter, he differentiates between the traditional conception of social justice as equality, and a conception of social justice and equity in which accommodating difference plays a key role. He shows how housing and planning policies may satisfy the goals of equality by reducing the gap between rich and poor, and by promoting homogenisation of living environments, and yet may fail citizens by eroding the freedoms that draw them to the city. He refers to the opportunities as well as the freedoms that the inner city of Johannesburg offers, and which attract all sorts of people and minorities, including independent women, gays and foreigners. Oelofse's work is an important challenge to contemporary policy, which has little interest in diversity and difference. The liberal perspective he presents is, however, open to criticism in that it fails to engage with systematic structures and

processes of inequality and oppression in society, focusing instead on individual freedoms. Here Smith's contribution (Chapter 2) is of particular value.

Oelofse's chapter introduces the compact city debate from the perspective of social justice, and specifically from a Rawlsian liberal perspective. In his view, 'the compact city is a possible, but not a necessary consequence of pursuing social justice' and 'whilst there may be strong economic arguments for more compact development, it cannot be justified without qualification from a liberal ethical perspective'. Oelofse shows how compact city policies may promote *equality* but how they may undermine *social equity* goals, in particular the advancement of the vitality and dynamism of difference, which he argues is the very basis of urban sustainability.

Debate on the compact city ideal is taken further by Alison Todes (Chapter 7), who engages with the attempts that were made by planners and policy makers after 1994 to restructure the apartheid city. By the mid-1990s, the compact city was the new spatial planning doctrine, reflecting both international and specifically local influences, and was encapsulated in the policy documents and plans of the time. Todes, however, interrogates the doctrine, asking critical questions around the validity and feasibility of the compact city as an instrument of integration. She argues that recent studies that point to the continued importance of settlement on the urban periphery do not necessarily undermine the validity of arguments for urban compaction, but they do demonstrate that there are diverse housing and locational needs, and that planning and housing policy should embrace these needs. As critical as promoting compaction, argues Todes, is the need to transform *existing* low-income areas into more integrated and better quality environments. For Todes, the notion of compaction remains important, but it is not the simple solution that planners had expected.

Edgar Pieterse (Chapter 8) engages with the discourse of integration, introducing his chapter by stating that 'urban integration is burdened with multiple meanings and connotations and is therefore profoundly contested'. His chapter explores these multiple meanings with particular reference to the South African government's *Urban Development Framework (UDF)* showing, for example, how the term integration is used in the *UDF* to refer to: an ideal policy outcome which links economic, political, social and environmental objectives; a spatial strategy connected with ideas of the compact city; inter-sectoral linkages; and, a broader process of integrated governance. Pieterse refers to the ambiguous nature of many of the concepts in the *UDF* and the difficulties in translating these concepts into meaningful guidance for real and actual development processes. He concludes that the *UDF* 'fails to engage with divergent and conflictual interests in the city, and operates on the flawed assumption that urban integration as a shared common-good can be defined and pursued'. Pieterse raises, as

a critical concern, the meaning of and possibilities for urban integration, which are reflected in different ways in other chapters in this book.

Vanessa Watson (Chapter 9) provides a contextually rich account of how post-apartheid urban planning has been viewed as an instrument of integration. She points to the optimism of April 1994, when progressive planners welcomed what they believed to be the arrival of a strongly interventionist government committed to issues of urban equity. These professionals assumed a leading role for spatial planning in pursuit of the objectives of an integrated, compact city. Watson shows, however, that the context for planning changed after 1994 as national priorities shifted towards global positioning and attracting foreign investment, and how the rhetoric of the 'new managerialism' took hold. Post-apartheid planning shifted from a predominant concern with spatial integration to a concern with inter-sectoral and institutional integration, while the earlier efforts at urban spatial restructuring proved to be largely ineffective. Watson tells a tale of 'competing story-lines' as various sectoral departments and groups of professionals understand planning and urban integration within different (albeit overlapping) frames of reference.

Transport planning and policy play an important role in defining the urban form. Roger Behrens and Peter Wilkinson (Chapter 10) are concerned with the contradictions between urban passenger transport policy and low-income housing policy. The continued peripheralisation of low-income housing has implications for households' travel distance, timing and expenditure. The location of these new settlements in turn has implications for passenger transport systems, which still operate on subsidy legacies that enabled the highly segregated apartheid cities to operate. Behrens and Wilkinson highlight the counter-productive nature of housing and transport subsidies, achieving neither equity nor fiscal sustainability. Recent shifts in policy and legislation have emphasised 'the need to rationalise the relationship between urban transport planning and land use planning'. Behrens and Wilkinson interrogate their convergence with integrated development policy innovations in other sectors. They conclude that for the housing-transport nexus to be tackled effectively, considerable national and local policy commitment is required.

Mark Oranje (Chapter 11) presents a further important perspective on urban planning, namely the tricky issues of identity and difference. He shows how the 'cultural turn' is bringing a set of discourses that support a greater sensitivity to diversity, a respect for difference, a concern for identity, and an appreciation of local ways of knowing and doing into urban planning. In South Africa, there is new emphasis on the construction of an African identity and on 're-traditionalisation'. Oranje points out, however, that the construction of identity takes many forms including that of *post-colonialism* which is both inclusive of, and resistant to,

colonialism, and which emphasises the multiplicity and fluidity of identity. Oranje argues that despite the renewed emphasis on African identity in post-apartheid South Africa, the formal planning system that has evolved over the past few years has given scant recognition to the Africanness of planning. However, he shows how recent stories from practice demonstrate how local communities have begun to mould the planning system in response to their particular needs and identities. Although he warns of the political abuse of identity politics, Oranje writes ‘that this continual post-colonial engagement between communities, individuals, planning systems and people’s plans bodes well for the further evolution of South Africa’s planning system’.

A contrasting perspective on urban planning is presented by Marcelo Lopes de Souza (Chapter 12), who looks to the Brazilian experience for instructive examples of ‘alternative urban planning’. The Brazilian experience he refers to, along with that referred to by Rolnik and Cymbalista (Chapter 17), evolved from a pragmatic left-wing approach to urban reform that emerged in the late 1980s. Although the full agenda of the *National Movement for Urban Reform* was never realised, important elements shaped progressive practice at local level. Locating alternative urban planning with the theoretical underpinnings of urban reform, Lopes de Souza presents the remarkable instrument of *participatory budgeting*, the most influential version of which is practised in Porto Alegre, the capital of Brazil’s southern-most state. Participatory budgeting pushes the boundary of participation and democracy, in what Lopes de Souza presents as an effort to operationalise the principle of individual and collective autonomy, with its subordinate parameters of social justice and quality of life. From the experience in Brazilian cities, Lopes de Souza points out that the success of participatory budgeting depends on an active and mobilised civil society.

Marie Huchzermeyer (Chapter 13) presents a forceful critique of post-apartheid urban policy, showing how the focus on rapid housing delivery has tended to reproduce a segregated urban form, as the short-term political objective to fast-track housing delivery has overridden longer term objectives of urban restructuring. She shows also how these fragmented outcomes are underpinned by a land and housing market created by planning instruments such as land-use zoning. In suggesting alternative solutions to conventional or mainstream planning, Huchzermeyer explores experiences in Brazil, the USA, and the UK where various policy instruments to desegregate or spatially integrate low-income housing have been developed and implemented. These include, for example, quotas of low-income units in middle-class areas, instruments for the decommodification of land and housing, such as land value capture in the USA and Special Zones of Social Interest in Brazil, subsidisation of rental stock, and mixed tenure developments that aim at diversification in housing within individual housing projects.

Edésio Fernandes (Chapter 14) focuses on the neglected area of law in relation to planning, property rights, urban space and housing. Fernandes argues that urban laws have been one of the major factors reproducing segregation and fragmentation in the city. His chapter goes far beyond traditional explanations of informality and illegality in urban housing, searching instead for a deeper critical framework in which to understand the relationship between law and the urbanisation process. He avoids simple solutions such as the legalisation of informal settlements, showing that if these prescriptions are implemented within the framework of our current social and economic policies they may even bring additional burdens to the poor, and reinforce socio-spatial exclusion. He argues that recognition of security of tenure – as important as it is – must be promoted within a broader scope of progressive urban planning, and should not be an isolated urban policy.

Daniel Irurah and Brian Boshoff's analysis (Chapter 15) relates the question of urban integration to the current sweeping discourse on sustainability. Their work points to the many different and contested relationships between sustainability and urban development, and also to the ambiguous linkages between low-income housing (which accounts for very little of the resource and energy consumption in the city within the construction sector) and the broader goals of sustainable urban development. The chapter concludes that we are struggling to translate the intentions and goals of sustainability into meaningful action, and that the lessons that have been derived from diverse demonstration projects, in the field of low-income housing, have yet to percolate upwards into policy revisions.

Sarah Charlton (Chapter 16) makes a similar contribution to Pieterse when she shows, from the perspective of a reflexive practitioner, how many meanings are given to the term 'integration' in the implementation and delivery of housing. For example, integration is used to refer to: the linkage between a new housing area and the city at large; linkages within a residential area involving the provision of the facilities and services needed for a fully functioning community; integration within the process of delivery; and integration between needs and the delivery of development. In her strong empirical account of the housing delivery process in Durban during the late 1990s, Charlton shows how difficult it was to achieve each of these elements of integration and how, despite committed efforts, outcomes fell far short of integrative ideals. While integration continues to be a slippery concept, chapters such as those by Pieterse and Charlton at least assist in unravelling some of the meanings that are too often conflated and confused.

Concluding this volume, and picking up the earlier theme on the role of mobilised civil society, Rolnik and Cymbalista (Chapter 17) present another remarkable case study from Brazil. Their chapter gives illuminating insight into a partnership between

urban social movements in the field of housing and the city government of Sao Paulo, beginning in 1989. They show how urban social movements have strongly influenced the emergence of alternative concepts of city management, and have gained an important influence over state and federal housing policies, despite problems relating to power conflicts within the broad movement, and a vulnerability to political change at the local level.

Last, but not least, we must mention nomenclature. After careful consideration, and to communicate the continued relevance, yet changed politico-legislative standing of racial terms, we have settled on the words Black, Coloured, White and Indian/Asian.

Part A

The Challenge of Urban Fragmentation



Chapter 1

Fragmentation and Globalisation as the New Meta-Narrative

Philip Harrison

Globalisation: The new meta-narrative

The contemporary international debate on urban fragmentation is firmly situated within the discourse on globalisation. As Soja (2000:190) points out, globalisation is 'the millennium metaphor for practically everything that has been happening almost everywhere'. Low and Barnett (2000:54) refer similarly to globalisation as 'a talismanic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussion of our contemporary situation'. Ironically, even as Lyotard was writing of the 'postmodern condition' as an 'incredulity towards meta-narratives', a new and powerful meta-narrative was taking hold.

This chapter addresses the question of urban fragmentation in relation to the new meta-narrative but, at the same time, seeks out the counter-narratives, or the insurgent story-lines, that may eventually challenge the new intellectual hegemony created by the new and pervasive discourse on globalisation. As Low and Barnett (2000:55) have warned, globalisation is 'a highly politicised discourse of prediction and projection which works to drastically foreclose the realm of choice, decision, responsibility and strategy', and has also 'become the grand narrative which justifies the end of all other narratives of social change'. Associated with globalisation is neo-liberalism, an ideology that rationalises globalisation, and which, like globalisation, is presented in terms of natural and irrevocable outcomes for which there are no real alternatives. Although many narrators of the globalisation story are leftwing in

persuasion, and critique the socio-cultural outcomes of globalisation, they too, like the neo-liberals, imply a historical inevitability driven by macro-processes over which we have little control.

The narrators of the globalisation story provide us with grand and compelling explanations for a seemingly confused clutter of events and transformations. Their stories focus mainly on the general rather than on the particular, and on economic relationships and technological changes rather than on culture and local contingency. There is an increasingly strong spatial theme within these stories as Saskia Sassen, Allen Scott, Edward Soja, Manuel Castells, and many others, have pointed to the spatial outcomes of economic and social transformations, and have developed a new geographic vocabulary that includes terms such as 'world city', 'dual city', 'new production space', 'edge city', 'fractal city', 'carceral city', and 'postmetropolis'.

Perhaps because of the growing connections between geography and the globalisation thesis, recent writings have shown greater sensitivity to the contingency of place and to the diversity of local outcomes. Geography has assisted in linking the globalisation discourse with a better appreciation of the local. This is evident, for example, in the telling but clumsy term, *glocalisation*. One way in which to challenge the hegemony of globalisation discourse is indeed to confront it with the empirical reality of multiple local outcomes. The book edited by Marcuse and Van Kempen, entitled *Globalising Cities: A New Spatial Order* is particularly interesting in this regard as it begins with a clear hypothesis that a new spatial order of cities has emerged within the context of a globalising economy. The book includes detailed accounts of spatial transformations within at least seven major cities worldwide but then surprisingly concludes that no new spatial order can be identified, although it is clear that there are important visible changes within cities that have significant impacts on the lives of urban people.

Another challenge to globalisation discourse comes from postmodernism which directs attention to perception, meaning, subjectivity, culture, and the contingencies of locality and history (Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernism may, however, play into the hands of the neo-liberals, and also paralyse social action, in its reluctance to support planned intervention within a world that is perceived to be infinitely complex and inflexible. There are, however, postmodernists who locate themselves within a progressive tradition, and who remain committed to notions of social justice, transformation, and human progress, even as they celebrate the diversity of social and cultural life (e.g. Sandercock, 1998). This progressive postmodernism (or 'critical cultural studies') provides a powerful critique of both the discourse of globalisation and the ideology of neo-liberalism as it emphasises the non-economic dimensions of life and subverts any attempt to create overarching narratives.

Related to a progressive postmodernist discourse, but drawing also on a post-colonial critique of globalisation, is a 'new cultural politics' that focuses on place-based identities but also on building a trans-nationalism from below that would challenge dominant practices of globalisation. The Mexican Zapatista movement has become the icon of an emergent discourse and practice that is arguably beginning to subvert the intellectual hegemony of globalisation.

Urban fragmentation

Fragmentation is a key motif within globalisation discourse, even though globalisation as a concept is essentially about integration and increased connectivity. Globalisation links individuals within new networks and relationships, but this connectivity is unrelated to locality. At a local level, globalisation is increasingly associated with intensified fragmentation. Sassen (2002), for example, writes of new articulations within global circuits and disarticulations *within* the city, while Giddens (1990:117) wrote of 'the lifting out of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space'. It is possible, for example, for an individual in New York or Johannesburg, to be well linked within social and economic networks that extend globally, but to have no real connection within anyone in the immediate vicinity. As Graham and Marvin (1996:59) put it, 'the city is divided into as many fragments as the networks which traverse it'. This urban fragmentation is a growing concern within progressive literature. Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000:7) write, for instance, of an 'urban society that is increasingly socially and spatially disconnected, fragmented, and polarised'.

Fragmentation, like globalisation, is a slippery concept – a catchphrase that everyone recognises and yet no-one seems able to define with any precision. In the discourse on globalisation there are many dimensions to fragmentation, yet they all are linked within the meta-narrative. The starting point is the increased differentiation within the labour market. It is argued that, as cities link to global networks, so a new and increasingly wealthy business elite emerges that is able to operate internationally, while a growing underclass serves this elite. A dumbbell-shaped social structure develops as the numbers of people at either end of the social spectrum increase and while the traditional middle-class declines in numbers and influence. This argument has become known as the dual city hypothesis. Recently, however, there has been an acknowledgement that the dual city is an inadequate metaphor for a complex and diverse reality in terms of which the city is multiply divided. Marcuse (1989) added a higher level of complexity with his metaphor of the 'quartered city', while Soja (2000:256) has referred to a 'much more

polymorphous and fractured social geometry’, and Logan (2000) to a ‘plurality of peripheries’.

Within the contemporary city there are clearly multiple, intersecting dimensions of identity and inequality including, amongst others, race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and immigrant status, that were never captured in the dual city hypothesis. There are also many other processes producing social differentiation and urban heterogeneity, apart from labour market segmentation, such as the increasing global movement of people, with large cities, in particular, acting as the receptors for a diverse array of immigrants, exiles, refugees, urban-rural migrants, and tourists. In addition, there are the uneven effects of the technological revolution. As Castells (1993:249) writes, the new world is ‘made up at the same time of the global village and of the incommunicability of those communities that are switched off from the global network’.

There does seem to be a general agreement that there has been an ‘intensification of socio-economic inequalities’ (Soja, 2000:265) over the past thirty or so years. However, the causal relationships are not always clear, and it is apparent that many of the processes of social differentiation are not as new as the globalisation narratives might suggest. As a case in point, Logan (2000:159) argued that much of the social differentiation in New York, the archetypical World City, is ‘substantially an outgrowth of old patterns and not mainly a reflection of contemporary innovations’.

Globalisation is also associated with *institutional fragmentation*. In terms of the narrative, a new institutional space has emerged in which power has been diffused from traditional centres of authority into multiple points of influence. This process has been referred to as ‘the pluralisation of the territorial bases of power’, ‘perforated sovereignty’, and a ‘new medievalism’ (Cooper, 1996; Soja, 2000). As ideology, neo-liberalism is believed to hasten the process of institutional fragmentation with its eagerness to privatise and diminish the traditional role of the state.

In the meta-narrative the differentiated socio-economic and institutional structure of cities is reflected in fragmented *spatial arrangements*. A number of writers have pointed to the rise of a ‘new geography’. Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) focus on the heightened spatial concentrations of wealth and poverty, and the physical barriers that separate and divide. They write of ‘a pattern of separate clusters of residential space, creating protective citadels and enclaves on the one side and constraining ghettos on the other in a hierarchical relationship to each other’ (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000:4). The global elite is concentrated in the edge cities, in gentrified suburbs, in gated communities, and in the new citadels (such as Battery Park City in New York and Melrose Arch in Johannesburg). The underclass lives in the tenements, the decaying inner city neighbourhoods, and in the *barrios* and informal settlements in the cities of the South. Writers such as Davis (1990), and Blakely and

Snyder (1997) follow this theme but focus mainly on the retreat of the wealthy into fortress cities (such as gated communities, secured office parks and protected malls). They point to the security-obsessed urbanism of the contemporary era and warn of the balkanisation of cities.

Other writers, including Micheal Dear and Edward Soja, point to the rise of complex, decentred, sprawling, polycentric urban landscapes. The work of Joel Garreau on edge cities, and of popular writers such as Alvin Toffler, who hypothesised the unraveling of the city in response to new technologies, stimulated debate on a 'postmodern urbanism'. Contemporary spatial change is often described in terms of the images provided by American cities such as Los Angeles; images of cities that are sprawling, variegated, multi-nodal and spatially divided in terms of ethnicity and class (e.g. Dear, 2000; Soja, 1997).

The discourse on globalisation and the new geography has emerged in the North and, more specifically, in particular regions and localities in the North such as southern California and New York. A small but important literature is developing which directs attention to fragmented urban development in the South. The socio-spatial fragmentation in the mega-cities of Latin America is now the subject of a number of works (e.g. Caldeira, 2000), while South African academics have pointed to the 'new forms' of fragmentation that are being grafted onto the segmented urban forms produced under colonialism and apartheid (e.g. Mabin, 1995).

In recent works, more attention has been paid to the contingency of local outcomes, and there has been less generalisation of the spatial forms believed to have been produced by globalisation. In relation to technology, for example, writers have emphasised the complex and paradoxical effects on urban form (e.g. Graham and Marvin, 1996; Mitchell, 1995). As indicated previously, Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) rejected the idea of a new spatial order although they identified significant and widespread spatial change, while many other writers have pointed to contingent local outcomes. Keil and Ronneberger (2000) pointed to the difference between the large-scale spatial segregation in American cities, and the 'segmented diffusion rather than segregation' in German cities, while Badcock (2000) described the absence of Edge City development in Australia, unlike in America (and in South Africa), as a contingent result of strong state management of urban processes and the lack of outer ring freeways.

This understanding of contingent outcomes is important as it challenges a notion implicit in much globalisation discourse, namely that the emergent spatial order is an inevitable, natural outcome of macro-forces, and that it is therefore outside the arena of public debate. Waley (2000:138) used Tokyo as an example of the 'ideological restructuring of urban space' in which the overarching need to establish Tokyo as an

international city led to policy outcomes that were presented as necessary and inevitable despite their 'pernicious outcomes' for many residents of the city.

Responses to fragmentation

The perceived effects of globalisation are increasingly defining the agenda of local politics. The dominant local response is neo-liberal, and is based on the premise that globalisation is inherently positive and that the role of local agents is to ensure the conditions that support global capitalism. In this schema *coherence* is ultimately produced through the unregulated decision making of rational economic agents. Closely linked to the neo-liberal paradigm is the *competitive city approach*, which argues that the primary developmental role of the local state is to position localities optimally to gain maximum benefit from globalisation. In its crudest form this approach involves doing that which we perceive big investors would like us to do, whether this might involve privatisation of services or removal of squatters. In its most extreme forms, neo-liberalism has little concern with questions of urban fragmentation, except where it may affect the functionality of the city for global capital.

Progressive responses have, however, developed over recent decades. These include establishing partnerships, building social capital within integrative networks, developing policy coherence, spatial integration through the compact city approach, integration through 'communicative action', and integration from below through place-based identity politics and coalition building. Each of these responses is dealt with, in turn, below.

Partnerships

Partnership is perhaps the most familiar of the concepts used to bring about linkage and integration within the fields of development and urban governance. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) emerged as a central component of urban policy in both the USA and the UK in the 1980s although 'by the 1980s, the meaning of partnership had shifted to reflect the emergent desire across both public and private sectors to transfer responsibility for urban regeneration to private developers and investors' (Adams and Hastings, 2001:1475). It is in fact arguable that the conceptions of partnership that took hold in the 1980s contributed to further fragmentation of urban governance and service delivery, as they transferred functions of government to the private sector. In the 1990s, however, a more holistic conception of partnership emerged which involved stronger and more inclusive forms of cooperation between public, private and community sectors.

Networks and social capital

The idea of social capital is closely linked to 'the new institutionalist' approach to urban management. The new institutionalists capture the complex socio-spatial relationships within the city, and between the global and the local, in network-based metaphors. Healey *et al.* (1995:18), for example, described the city as 'an ensemble of diverse social relations, with different cultural referents and spatial dimensions, which co-exist in the confined arena of urban areas' and also as 'a locus of overlapping webs of relations on diverse spatial scales, from the neighbourhood to the globe' (*ibid.*:4).

The network provides an imagery of economic and spatial organisation that allows us to conceive of every individual and economic enterprise as being connected to a diversity of relationships that operate in different dimensions and at different scales. It is a schema that challenges the neo-liberal conception of the individual as an autonomous being and the firm as an atomistic enterprise in competition with other such separate entities (Conti, 1993). The network perspective has recently connected with the idea of the social embeddedness of economic relationships. Conti (*ibid.*) shows how networks are 'territorialised', that is, how they are fed by and located within a certain *social milieu*, referred to elsewhere as 'social capital' (Fukuyama, 1995) and 'institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1995). These concepts stress the importance of such factors as community ties, personal networks, social norms and trust, in supporting economic relationships. The development of networks is therefore supported by measures that would build a stock of social capital. These may include policies and activities that would develop civic organisation, local democracy, and a variety of other forms of social interaction. The 'industrial district model' of Piore and Sabel (1984) and the inter-city networking model (e.g. Graham, 1995) are examples of approaches that link the idea of networks to a concept of social capital.

Policy coherence

Institutional fragmentation, or 'perforated sovereignty', has made it increasingly difficult to define boundaries in power and responsibility between spheres of government, and between the government, private and community sectors. As the number of agents involved in public policy has multiplied so the question of coordination has become more critical. Within increasingly decentralised or diffuse institutional arrangements, the capacity of traditional coordinating mechanisms to steer policy has diminished. In recent years the concept of policy coherence has emerged as an alternative to the 'command and control' mechanisms of the past. Policy coherence essentially involves the integration of agendas between separate agencies, and common programming across sectors (Overseas Development Institute:

www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgbrief1.pdf). Policy coherence is most strongly developed within the framework of the European Union, which faces particularly large challenges in terms of coordination across multi-tier levels of government. Within the international sphere, policy coherence has developed as a concept that would allow autonomous agencies such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral bodies, to work collaboratively and separately in pursuit of common objectives.

At the local level, mechanisms are emerging to promote policy coherence. An example is the South African Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which has similarities with a range of other international practices including integrated planning and performance monitoring in New Zealand, integrated area planning in Europe, and the multi-sectoral investment planning promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (Harrison, 2001).

Spatial integration and the compact city approach

Spatial disjunctures and fragmentation have long been a major concern of planners. Historically, the main concern was with separating and ordering land uses but in recent years the focus has shifted to combating low-density sprawl, and integrating spatially separated areas. Various versions of the compact city approach include 'smart growth', 'the new urbanism', and 'transit-oriented development'. Internationally, the compact city approach shares many of the concerns of the environmental movement, especially in regard to the conservation of scarce environmental resources, conserving energy, reducing harmful emissions of gases, and ensuring a more efficient use of infrastructure. In South Africa, however, this environmental concern is joined with a concern for integrating the dysfunctional cityscapes produced under apartheid. Key elements of the compact city approach include: increasing urban densities, containing sprawl, mixed use development and support for public transportation. Instruments used to achieve this include: urban growth boundaries, infill development, the designation of urban corridors, road pricing and strategic infrastructural investments. In South Africa, for instance, the development corridor has been a major feature of post-apartheid urban planning, and there are current attempts to introduce urban growth boundaries.

Integration through communicative rationality

In recent years there has been a significant change in the way in which urban planning has been conceptualised. Traditionally, planning was understood in terms of a

technical or instrumental rationality. However, the technicist approach to planning has been fundamentally challenged, and planning theorists have responded with the idea of 'communicative action'. There is growing acceptance that modernist planning, with its imposed frameworks, technical rationality, and master plans, is an inappropriate instrument in a context of enormous complexity, diversity, and diffuse networks of power. Planning thought that focused on social interaction and on networks, rather than on rational method, goes back at least to John Friedmann's 1973 theory of 'transactive planning'. More recently, however, Patsy Healey, Judith Innes and others have used Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action to re-interpret planning in terms of a communicative rather than a technical rationality.

Healey asks the question: 'How is it possible, conceptually and practically, to integrate the spatial dimensions of the different concerns of diverse interests into a plan which commands the support of the relevant political community?' (1995:254). In answering this question she argues that strategies that emerge through a process of inter-discursive reasoning or argumentation are more likely to provide an enduring and effective basis for action than strategies that are arrived at through the abstracted reasoning of a planner or are imposed by a dominant actor within a partnership. Healey (1993:238) defined planning as 'a way of acting we can *choose*, after *debate*'. For Healey, then, plan making is a process of dialogue between different systems of meaning in the search for areas of consensus, and should not be regarded as a technical procedure. It is consensus building through communication that is the integrative mechanism in this schema of planning.

Integration from below

Integration from below, through the linking of locally rooted social movements, is perhaps the first real challenge to the orthodoxy of globalisation. In a remarkable process over the last decade or so, a variety of social movements, linked, for example, to the protection of indigenous cultures, environmental activism, gay and lesbian rights, and squatter movements, have connected within regional, national, and international coalitions to challenge dominant perspectives on development and economic change. What we are witnessing is the emergence of a 'global civil society'. In the field of housing, for example, national coalitions include the South African Homeless People's Federation and the Philippines Homeless People's Federation, while at a broader spatial scale it includes the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights and Shack/Slum Dwellers International (Moctezuma, 2001; Patel *et al.*, 2001). This 'new cultural politics' is a form of integrative development, for although it is rooted in conceptions of diversity, it is also linked to ideas of networking, coalition, and partnership.

In the final event, does fragmentation really matter?

Fragmentation is a loaded term, one with strong negative connotations. In early twentieth century discourse, urban fragmentation was a pathology that threatened the natural organic unity of the city. In contemporary discourse, there are powerful forces of integration and connectivity at work but these operate at an international scale while at the local scale the dominant trend is towards fragmentation. In policy terms, fragmentation is something that needs to be confronted and overcome. However, change the discourse, and fragmentation becomes *diversity*, something to be celebrated rather than conquered. Within the postmodernist framework, fragmentation is not an evil to be countered but is part of the complexity and richness of life.

Here we have an excellent example of how our truths are constructed within language and how discourse frames reality (see Watson, this volume). However, we can take the language game too far. There are social, spatial, institutional and other disjunctures that do have a negative impact on the everyday lives of people and that cannot be eliminated simply by changing the way we talk about them. Just as the modernist compulsion for coherence and order may have blinded us to the richness of diversity and difference, so postmodernism may obscure the real problems associated with urban fragmentation.

In the final event, it is not very helpful to talk in general terms of fragmentation and diversity, or to make highly abstracted value judgements. It is necessary to ask what forms of fragmentation really matter in the everyday lives of real people, and how much they matter and why. We should also ask how the planners' conception of fragmentation relates to lived experiences. There is, for example, a growing unease that the vision of compaction-integration, which has informed much of post-apartheid urban policy in South Africa, may represent a planning ideal that is disconnected from people's experiences of the city (see Todes, this volume; Tomlinson, *Business Day*, 26 September 1997; Watson 2002).

The language of contemporary planning is the language of synoptic thinking, policy coherence, compact cities, and spatial integration. It is a language that is unfortunately prone to a level of abstraction in which the issues of everyday life are translated into plans and policies that often bear little resemblance to the real concerns of people. It is a language that should be related far more concretely to lived experience, for there clearly *are* forms of fragmentation that add extra burdens to people's lives, and that detract from the possibility of safe, liveable, sustainable urban environments. It does matter if there are serious spatial disjunctures between living and working environments or if the urban environment is so segmented that proper access to recreation, shopping, community services, and public transportation is

denied to those who lack private transport. And it matters if people of different races and classes are so segregated from each other that there is no real basis for mutual understanding and collaborative action. It also matters if institutions are fragmented in a way that renders effective coordinated action impossible.

In mediating between the ideals of the planners and the hopes and the experiences of people on the ground, we could turn to Henri Lefebvre, the ‘philosopher of the everyday’. Lefebvre (1991) directs attention to perceived, conceived and lived spaces. He reminds us that what is important is how people understand their own environment, and how that environment works for them, and not how successful the planner may be in pursuing an abstracted ideal (such as urban integration).

The idea of integration is emerging as a shibboleth of planning thought, especially in the context of the perceived and real effects of globalisation. We should, however, be wary of pursuing integration for its own sake. We need to hold the tension between the need for coherence and integration in our experience of the urban, and the need to actively promote difference and diversity. We need to understand more clearly what forms of integration make a real difference in everyday lives, and how we can achieve this integration. How do we facilitate the connectedness that brings people together in their diversity, and that also brings together the various elements of the urban environment in a way that produces truly liveable environments? Finally, how do we engage with globalisation and the global-local dialectic, in conceptual and practical terms, in a way that both recognises the power and importance of the new meta-narrative and the conditions it refers to, and challenges this meta-narrative to the extent that it is threatening to foreclose other possibilities?

References

- Adams, D. and E.M. Hastings (2001) ‘Accessing institutional relations in development partnerships: The Land Development Corporation and the Hong Kong Government prior to 1997’, *Urban Studies*, 38(9):1473–1492.
- Amin, A. and N. Thrift (1993) ‘Neo-Marshallian nodes in global networks’, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 16(4):571–587.
- Amin, A. and N. Thrift (1995) ‘Globalisation, institutional “thickness” and the local economy’. In *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*, edited by Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S., and A. Madani-Pour, pp. 91–108. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Badcock, B. (2000) ‘The imprint of the Post-Fordist transition on Australian cities’. In *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order*, edited by Marcuse, P., and R. van Kempen, pp. 211–227. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blakely, E. and M. Snyder (1997) *Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- Caldeira, T. (2000) *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Castells, M. (1993) 'European cities, the informational society, and the global economy', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 84(4):247–257.
- Conti, S. (1993) 'The network perspective in industrial geography: Towards a model', *Geografiska Annaler*, 75(B):115–129.
- Cooper, R. (1996) *The Post-Modern State and the New World Order*. London: Demos.
- Davis, M. (1990) *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*. London/New York: Verso.
- Dear, M. (2000) *The Postmodern Urban Condition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Graham, S. (1995) 'From urban competition to urban collaboration? The development of interurban telematics networks', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 13(4):503–524.
- Graham, S. and S. Marvin (1996) *Telecommunications and the City: Electronic Spaces, Urban Places*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Harrison, P. (2001) 'The genealogy of South Africa's Integrated Development Plan', *Third World Planning Review*, 23(2):175–193.
- Healey, P. (1993) 'Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory'. In *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, pp. 233–254. London: UCL Press.
- Healey, P. (1995) 'Discourses of integration: Making frameworks for democratic urban planning'. In *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*, edited by Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S., and A. Madani-Pour, pp. 251–273. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S., and A. Madani-Pour (1995) 'Introduction: The city-crisis, change and invention'. In *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*, edited by Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S., and A. Madani-Pour, pp. 1–20. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Keil, R., and K. Ronneburger (2000) 'The globalisation of Frankfurt am Main: Core, periphery and social conflict'. In *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* edited by Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen, pp. 228–248. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Le Febvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Logan, J. (2000) 'Still a global city: The racial and ethnic segmentation of New York'. In *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* edited by Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen, pp. 158–185. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Low, M. and C. Barnett (2000) 'After globalisation', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 18(1):53–61.
- Liotard, Jean-Francois (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Mabin, A. (1995) 'On the problems and prospects of overcoming segregation, fragmentation and surveillance in Southern Africa's cities in the post-modern era'. In *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, edited by Watson, S., and K. Gibson, pp. 187–198. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Marcuse, P. (1989) 'Dual city: A muddled metaphor for a quartered city', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 13(4):697–708.
- Marcuse, P., and R. van Kempen (2000) 'Conclusion: A changed spatial order'. In *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* edited by Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen, pp. 249–275. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mitchell, W. (1995) *City of Bits*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Moctezuma, P. (2001) 'Community-based organization and participatory planning in south-east Mexico City', *Environment and Urbanisation*, 13(2):117–133.
- Patel, S., Burra, S., and C. D' Cruz (2001) 'Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) – Foundation to Treetop', *Environment and Urbanisation*, 13(2):45–59.
- Piore, M. and C. Sabel (1984) *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity*. New York: Basic Book Publishers.
- Sandercock, L. (1998) *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Sassen, S. (2002) 'Locating cities on global circuits', *Environment and Urbanisation*, 14(1):13–30.
- Soja, E. (1997) 'Six discourses on the postmetropolis'. In *Imagining Cities: Scripts, Signs, Memory*, edited by Westwood, S. and J. Williams, pp. 19–30. London and New York: Routledge.
- Soja, E. (2000) *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Waley, P. (2000) 'Tokyo: Patterns of familiarity and partitions of difference'. In *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* edited by Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen, pp. 127–157. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Watson, V. (2002) *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning: Metropolitan Planning in Cape Town under Political Transition*. London and New York: Routledge.

Chapter 2

Urban Fragmentation, Inequality and Social Justice: Ethical Perspectives

David M. Smith

Many social injustices exist in today's cities. Cities and the people in them are relatively powerless before the domination of corporate capital and state bureaucracy. Privatized decision-making processes in cities and towns reproduce and exacerbate inequalities and oppression. They also produce and reinforce segregations and exclusions within cities and between cities and towns, which contribute to exploitation, marginalization, and cultural imperialism (Young, 1990:227).

Introduction

Few books had greater influence on the discourse of social justice during the last decade of the twentieth century than the exposition of a politics of difference by Iris Marion Young (1990). Her central theme was that the distributive paradigm, which tended to dominate conventional thinking, should be replaced by a perspective beginning with domination and oppression. She explained:

The distributive paradigm implicitly assumes that social judgements are about what people have, how much they have, and how that amount compares with what other people have. This focus on possession tends to preclude thinking about what people are doing, according to what institutional rules, how their doings and havings are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their positions, and how the combined effect of their doings has recursive effect on their lives (Young, 1990:25).

A preoccupation with distribution functions ideologically by distracting attention from interest group politics, the organisation of production, decision-making

structures and status differentiation. The structures behind distribution patterns thus go unchallenged. Young identified five 'faces of oppression' as sources of injustice: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Criticism of the distributive paradigm extends to social justice in the city: 'Inequalities of distribution can be read on the face of buildings, neighborhoods, and towns The social structures, processes, and relationships that produce and reproduce these distributions, however, are not so visible on the surface of our cities' (Young, 1990:241).

She drew particular attention to the domination of centralised structures and their 'hidden mechanisms' favouring the already advantaged (following Harvey, 1973), and to the process of segregation and exclusion.

In her final chapter, Young sketched out a normative ideal of city life. This involves the formation of what she purposefully referred to as 'groups', within social relations affirming group differences but without exclusion. There would be an 'openness to unassimilated otherness' (1990:227), or a 'being together of strangers' (*ibid.*:237); finding affinity with some should not lead people to deny a place to others. She rejected the traditional, idealised concept of the locality-based community, as denying difference and enforcing homogeneity. She preferred to see people forming affinity groups of their choice across city space, based on families, social networks, voluntary associations and the like. Social justice in the city involves 'equality among groups who recognize and affirm one another in their specificity' (Young, 1990:248). Public policy should therefore be group conscious, recognising that social justice requires special treatment of specific groups. She challenged the strategy of decentralising urban decision making to small communities, preferring group empowerment to local autonomy. The necessary structure would involve regional government, with mechanisms for representing the interests of diverse neighbourhoods and towns.

While Young's conception of social justice manifest in group formation is by no means unproblematic (see Smith, 1994:107), it is important for two reasons. The first is that this kind of normative approach has been unusual in urban studies relating to city planning, the practice of which tends to be dominated by aesthetic and technical aspects of spatial form while taking underlying social relations as given. The second is the suggestion of an alternative ethical basis for urban life to the competing traditions of liberalism and communitarianism. Liberalism, with its stress on individual freedom, rights and impartiality, tends to see persons as self-contained entities floating free of social context, while the emphasis of communitarianism on the relational self sees persons in some kind of social unity. Young's vision might be more in keeping with the reality of the contemporary city in many parts of the world, in which persons are neither entirely autonomous nor creatures of communities, within

increasingly interdependent and multicultural societies open to the forces of globalisation.

With Young's normative vision in mind, this chapter seeks to elucidate some aspects of urban fragmentation from the perspective of social justice and its supportive ethics. Three different kinds of fragmentation are considered, stressing spatial patterns of differentiation or inequality. The first is the South African city of legally imposed racial segregation, and the early stages of its transformation following the end of apartheid. The second is the city of socio-economic or class division built on earlier customary racial segregation, as exemplified in the United States: a pattern towards which the South African city may be moving. The third is the multicultural city, in which populations with equal rights but different traditions and ways of life coexist with varying degrees of (dis)comfort: another possible scenario for South Africa. Some of the lessons may have implications for other cities in which it may seem worth trying to turn Young's ideal into reality.

The apartheid city and beyond

[J]ustice in a group-differentiated society demands social equality of groups, and mutual recognition and affirmation of group differences (Young, 1990:191).

The injustice of the apartheid city requires little elaboration. People classified as other than White suffered a double disadvantage. Racial ascription was a source of discrimination in various aspects of life, in addition to imposing the indignity of a negative (non-White) identity. And residential segregation, in the form of 'group areas' and townships, entailed inferior housing and services, and often inconvenient locations in relation to sources of employment. The use of buffer zones and other devices to minimise interaction among races added to the spatial fragmentation of the apartheid city. There was no equality of groups, and little respect for different others.

The injustice of racial inequality arises from the ethical proposition that skin pigmentation, as an accident of birth, should be irrelevant to what persons deserve from life. Transcending contingencies of good or bad fortune, in the form of natural attributes and socio-environmental circumstances, is basic to the liberal egalitarian perspective on social justice, most famously elaborated by John Rawls (1971). Rawls made all sources of differential occupational achievement morally arbitrary, so that there is no case at the most basic level of justification for anything except equality in the distribution of his primary goods of liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect. This would overcome the natural lottery distributing genetic endowments, the social lottery distributing more or less favourable home and school environments, and the lottery distributing illness, accidents, and 'the chance of

being in the right place at the right time' (Barry, 1989:226). For most urban South Africans, their place on the highly differentiated opportunity surface of the apartheid city compounded other misfortunes from the lotteries of life.

Just as apartheid assailed basic principles of liberalism, so it showed scant regard for the ethics of communitarianism. Despite ideological support for tribal identity, cultural distinctiveness and the close pre-modern community (with which White Afrikaners as well as Blacks often identified), the reality of apartheid urban planning was frequently the destruction of well-established place-based communities formed by Blacks, Indians/Asians and Coloureds.

White domination of others under apartheid demonstrated the force of Young's five faces of oppression. Exploitation of a special kind was facilitated by the way apartheid reduced the cost of Black labour, through migrancy and the spatial separation of workers into townships, compounds and domestic service. Marginalisation was expressed in the planning strategy of placing many townships for Blacks and group areas for Indians/Asians and Coloureds in peripheral locations. Powerlessness was manifest most obviously in deprivation of the franchise, facilitated by separate political space for Blacks in 'homelands' and to a limited extent in their townships. Cultural imperialism was characterised by the virtual hegemony of White lifestyles and values, expressed in various ways from architecture to public festivals, and in the portrayal of other cultures as exotically different. Violence was an everyday fact of social control, and of harsh living conditions.

What of the city after the end of the racist order? At the beginning of the 1990s, I concluded a collection of papers with the proposition that the post-apartheid city was already there, if not in all its details then in broad outlines (Smith, 1992:314–317). This transition from the city of classical apartheid had arisen more from the internal dynamics and contradictions of the apartheid system itself than from any deliberate process of reform. It is worth repeating some of the argument here.

In certain respects the apartheid city had resembled those of the advanced (capitalist) industrial world, with its central business district surrounded by residential areas differentiated by socio-economic status: the city reserved for Whites. Enclaves of better housing for the small Indian/Asian and Coloured middle-class had come to relieve the otherwise uniform zones of basic dwellings built for these non-Whites. The landscape of group areas had thus become not only segregated by race but also differentiated by housing class. At the beginning of the 1990s it was evident that this pattern would survive the repeal of group areas legislation for some time. Few Blacks would be able to move into former White areas, and even if there were more Indians/Asians and Coloureds able to afford this, their entry was likely to be selective. The prospect of Whites moving into the townships was too ludicrous for serious

consideration, and the same was true of most Indians/Asians and Coloureds. And it was also hard to see much movement of Blacks into Indian/Asian and Coloured areas, except for some seeking better housing without venturing into hitherto White space. Little change could be expected within the townships, except for continuing improvement of some housing at the hands of the occupants themselves.

The most likely changes had already been evident for some years. Racial integration had been taking place in so-called grey areas, predominantly on the fringe of the central business districts of major cities. The peri-urban accretions of informal housing or 'shacks' represented the greatest changes to the classical apartheid city, and their continued expansion would be inevitable given the inability of most Blacks to afford anything else. The spontaneous occupation of unused land in more central locations might be harder to resist than under apartheid. Thus, existing trends towards more informal urbanisation were unlikely to be greatly modified, with racial homogeneity continuing to characterise the 'shack cities' even if local upgrading generated some socio-economic diversity.

Much of this change had been captured by David Simon (1989), in his revision of the original portrayal of the apartheid city by Ron Davies (1981). The vision of the post-apartheid city was thus one of continuing segregation and separation, or fragmentation, with little impact on the existing highly unequal housing stock and associated environmental quality. Whites would tighten their belts, but few would be forced down the housing market. The Black political elite, bourgeoisie and administrative strata would grow, along with a labour aristocracy, and would gain access to better residential areas. But for the mass of Blacks in townships and 'shacklands', and for many Indians/Asians and Coloureds, little improvement could be anticipated. The prospect was thus of class divisions steadily augmenting the racial separation inherited from the past, to produce a city characterised by some commentators as 'deracialised apartheid'.

The content of some subsequent chapters will help to show how close this vision has come to reality over the past decade. More radical visions, like the expropriation of White-owned homes and their redistribution to Blacks in dire need, were receding as quickly as the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe were entering their terminal stage. Large-scale state housing production (rather than financial subsidy) was not to be on the agenda, so tight were the budget constraints on a government with many competing demands. The main impact of the 1990s, with respect to narrowing inequalities, has probably been the improvement of service infrastructure in poor parts of the metropolis. Otherwise, the apartheid legacy has been carried into the new era largely intact. The major structural reforms required substantially to alter the trajectory of urban change initiated in the 1980s did not take place, as the ANC's

revolutionary zeal dissolved into pragmatism. Social justice in South Africa's increasingly fragmented cities thus remains a major challenge, especially for those still subscribing to the egalitarian ethics – liberal or socialist – which underpinned so much of the opposition to apartheid (for further discussion, see Smith, 1999, 2002).

Inequality in the United States city

Divisions of race and class are formidable, especially when amplified by geographic fragmentation (Stone, 1989:132).

The most likely scenario in South Africa is that the cities will steadily come more closely to resemble those of a typical capitalist society. Writing shortly after the end of apartheid, the American philosopher Ronald Aronson (1991:18–19) argued that a democratic non-racial government should avoid what he called the American solution, where Blacks achieve political rights without corresponding changes in social or economic power:

Black rule ... allows a modicum of black power and pride, the building up of a black bureaucracy and political class, and creating the conditions for the rise of a small number of blacks in businesses affected by government contracts. But the real levers of power, corporate levers, national-political levers, remain firmly where they always were, outside the purview of any conceivable black (or indeed working-class) power ... I am talking about the built-in limits to 'equal opportunity' in a society systematically built on class privilege that has historically evolved intertwined with racial oppression ... it has been possible to talk about 'equal rights' and 'equal opportunity' in the abstract but not to talk about concrete right to adequate housing, health care, schooling or employment ... The American lesson is a painful but simple one: because we have failed to make these universal rights available to everybody regardless of class, race or national origin, the heritage of racial domination continues to perpetuate itself ... Without vigorous political action on the national level, without social transformations stretching far beyond 'affirmative action' and 'equal opportunity', South Africa's black majority will follow in the pattern of America's black minority, reproducing itself 'spontaneously' in a hereditary poverty.

The experience of one city provides an illustration of changing patterns of inequality, and of the processes involved, during a crucial period of its recent history (following Smith, 1994:161–75). Atlanta, in the state of Georgia, occupies a significant position in the struggle of Blacks (or African-Americans) for social justice. It was the home of Martin Luther King, who played a major role in the early civil rights movement. Atlanta was also the first major southern city to elect a Black mayor, Maynard Jackson in 1973, who returned to office twenty years later and led the city's successful bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. The city, as a political jurisdiction, is at the heart of one of

the most populous and prosperous metropolitan areas in the United States. Over two-thirds of the city's population is Black.

Breakdown of the traditional separation of poor Black inner city and more affluent White suburbia in Atlanta began in the 1950s and 1960s, as some better-off Blacks moved out of the ghetto. Black suburbanisation gathered strength during the succeeding two decades, predominantly in the southern half of the metropolis, displacing Whites who moved further out. Strict residential segregation was reduced, but 54% of census tracts still contained over 90% Blacks or over 90% Whites in 1990.

This shifting pattern of residential structure was accompanied by changes in the spatial expression of inequality. Various measures of inequality in family income by census tracts showed an increase across the metropolis from 1970 to 1990. The ratio of advantage of tracts with more than 90% Whites over those with more than 90% Blacks had also increased, indicating greater race-space inequality. However, trends among the predominantly White and predominantly Black tracts reveal significant differences. While there had not been much change in the degree of income inequality among tracts with over 90% Whites (as measured by the coefficient of variation), the equivalent Black tracts had become substantially more unequal. In 1960 almost all the predominantly Black tracts had been similarly poor; by 1970 the best off had become comparable with well-to-do White tracts, with further improvements evident during the subsequent two decades as the suburbanisation of the emerging Black middle-class continued. But in 1990 the bulk of the predominantly White tracts still maintained their advantage over even the most affluent predominantly Black tracts. Thus, the Black and White parts of metropolitan Atlanta remained almost as divided as before.

The process of disequalisation in Atlanta has been closely related to local politics, as well as to broader forces of economic and social change. Atlanta was the unidentified city featured in a seminal study of community power by Floyd Hunter (1953), who found an interlocking and tightly cohesive network of individuals and institutions, within which the local business elite ran city government largely in their own interest: the coincidence of corporate and city power referred to by Young (1990:242). In Atlanta it had two particular consequences, with an important bearing on the experience of the Black population. The first was that breaking out of the inner-city ghetto was made easier than in many similarly segregated cities, by an informal agreement involving city government, Black community leaders and the real-estate business, in an attempt to accommodate the aspirations of the well-to-do Black population. The second was to ensure the continuing viability of the central business district, largely by the elimination of poor housing around the city centre under the guise of urban renewal, including old, established Black communities. This

helped to make the CBD secure for massive capital investments in offices, hotels and entertainment complexes (and, incidentally, cleared the land on which the 1996 Olympic Stadium was built). The urban renewal era in Atlanta has been described by Clarence Stone (1976) as a case of 'system bias', reflecting the capacity of city government to single-mindedly pursue narrow sectional interests with little concern for those, literally, in the way.

In 1973 the city of Atlanta elected a Black lawyer, Maynard Jackson, as mayor, along with a number of Black city councillors. This abrupt shift of formal political power created expectations of benefits for the poor Black neighbourhoods, which the city had hitherto largely neglected. That reality turned out to be less progressive is in part a reflection of the relative weakness of city authorities in the United States, particularly in the face of broader national and global economic forces, which limit local redistributive possibilities. What happened in Atlanta has been analysed by Clarence Stone (1989), using his concept of the urban political regime, or informal arrangements that supplement the formal workings of government. The capacity for action, especially with respect to major development projects, depends on the nature of the regime, and particularly the partnership between City Hall and the downtown business elite. The concrete expression of the regime is a governing coalition, with access to institutional resources and power and that comes together to make important policy decisions.

The shape of the regime inherited from the past changed under the Jackson mayoralty, with the incorporation of Blacks. Affirmative action diverted city construction contracts and other business to Black firms, and city jobs from police to planning were opened up for Blacks. At first the White business elite felt marginalised, but the need for the city to attract investment, and to maintain downtown property values, still bound city government and business together. As the mayor discovered the limitations of his power to effect redistributive change, he was pulled back towards closer collaboration with business. Under Jackson's successor, the high-profile Black politician Andrew Young, electoral and economic power were quickly reunited.

Stone was aware of the issue of social justice, and treated it explicitly: 'Instead of promoting redistribution towards equality, such a system perpetuates inequality' (1989:241). The case of Atlanta illustrates how the resources and ingenuity of those who own and control capital can meet and accommodate challenges to their power, in the form of a majority Black electorate, with only a temporary disturbance and partial restructuring of their means of domination. At the heart of this process is class alliances and cleavages, interpenetrating and to some extent eroding those of race. The new Black elite were in many ways the image of their White counterparts, 'characterised by a hard-headed pragmatism which is aimed solely and explicitly at the

extension of the benefits of the American system to themselves rather than posing any fundamental challenge to that system'; the policies they pursued were largely sectional, 'aimed primarily at advancing their own status rather than that of the Black community as a whole' (Burman, 1979:447–9). The upward and outward movement of the Black middle-class had left much of the remaining Black population anchored in inner city poverty.

Subsequent developments in Atlanta need not concern us here (for updated discussions see Bullard *et al.*, 2000; Keating, 2001) – except for one. This is the proliferation of gated communities for the rich, of the kind found in some other American cities (notably Miami), as well as in South Africa. These now abound in parts of Atlanta's affluent northern suburbs; as elsewhere, they might appear to provide protection from crime as well as materialising social exclusivity. However, there are reports of white-collar criminals living in such communities; ill-gotten gains can buy fancy houses and an image of respectability in up-market neighbourhoods. As the United States at large comes to terms with major corporate fraud, the ethics underpinning (or undermining) its liberal-democratic ideals are exposed no more clearly than in its fragmented cities.

The multicultural city

[A] liberal theory of minority rights ... cannot accept the idea that it is morally legitimate for a group to oppress its own members in the name of group solidarity, religious orthodoxy, or cultural purity (Kymlyscia, 1995:8).

One of the most difficult ethical questions facing multicultural societies is the acceptable limits of difference. Liberals might be expected to reject, and possibly eject, those with illiberal practices, which communitarians might be more inclined to accept. This question has important implications for cities in which markedly different cultural groups coexist, often in close proximity. A particularly demanding case highlights some of the issues (following Smith, 2000:128–35).

Jerusalem is a deeply divided and vigorously contested city. While the focus is usually on conflict between Jews and Arabs, there is another struggle underway, very much part of contemporary life, and featured in a text on multicultural cities (Sandercock, 1998:177–82). This is between Jews with different religious orientation, most evidently the secular and moderately religious, on the one hand, and the ultra-orthodox or 'haredi' (plural: 'haredim'), on the other. The struggle is not only cultural but ethical: between the liberalism to which the state of Israel is in principle committed and a religious-fundamental version of communitarianism, between an ethic of tolerance of difference and a belief system illiberal enough to test minority

rights to the limits. It is a struggle being played out politically, at both city and national level. It is being played out demographically, as the rapid natural increase of the ultra-orthodox promises to raise their share of Jerusalem's Jewish population from 30% to 40% in the next ten years. And it is being played out geographically, in residential and public space, as the haredim seek to extend their occupation and control in a classic exercise of territoriality.

The ultra-orthodox enclave that now covers much of the northern part of Jewish West Jerusalem began in the late nineteenth century, with neighbourhoods north east of the Old City. Settlement has subsequently been extended as far as the modern suburbs. Shlomo Hasson (1996:10–11) describes these neighbourhoods as follows:

The haredi areas in the northern part of the city have a character of their own, marked by social insularity, homogeneity with respect to the residents' commitment to religion, a high concentration of religious institutions and services intended solely for the haredi population ... the haredi area delimits the boundaries of culture, and hence also permissible and prohibited behavioral patterns.

The ultra-orthodox respect the tradition and custom that developed over the centuries in Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, with a tendency towards stricter options of religious law (Shilhav, 1998:1). This requires not only special institutions but also distinctive forms of dress, unyielding observation of the Sabbath, and above all, religious conformity. There are prescribed gender roles, with the privileged practice of religious study for men while women are assigned a supportive role, in both cases with no choice but the difficult route of exit from communities (the boundaries of which are diligently policed). This way of life is vigorously defended by the communities concerned, and is heavily subsidised by the state. The secular city at large is regarded as hostile by the haredim; the influences of the modern are 'threatening the sacred space that the haredi community is trying to fashion for itself' (Hasson, 1996:10), protected by a 'wall of holiness' (Shilhav, 1998:120).

The haredim seek to combat the threat to their way of life by various means. As they expand their residential space into new neighbourhoods, they attempt to control schools and other institutions, and even local government. They try to extend their religious prohibitions beyond their own neighbourhoods. The power they are able to gain from spatial concentration has thus changed: 'from being a defensive community, they have emerged as an offensive group, striving to spread their message and impose their values wherever possible' (Shilhav, 1998:6). The danger, as perceived by non-orthodox Jews, is that the potential numerical superiority of the haredim may enable them to take political control of the city of Jerusalem at large, with the power then to impose aspects of their own way of life, a prospect which may be accelerated

by the outward migration of secular Jews fearing such an outcome (Hasson and Gonen, 1997).

How might the ultra-orthodox community be judged, in a conception of social justice like that elaborated by Young (1990), as well as by advocates of multiculturalism, with a stress on group rights? Responding to the claim that a liberal society is obliged to support even those cultures that flout the rights of their individual members, Susan Okin (1998:672) argues that ultra-orthodoxy, with its predominantly religious education system, harms the interests of both males and females by limiting their gender roles. Public support is therefore unacceptable. This judgement still leaves open the possibility of a strategy of non-intervention, but the haredi community could not survive without the intervention of state subsidies that provide more than half its income. The conclusion is that there should be no place for groups like the haredim in a liberal society.

However, the haredim perform an important symbolic role within the particular context of contemporary Israel, re-affirming a distinctive Jewish identity through their commitment to strict interpretations of religious law. This, in turn, plays a crucial part in legitimising the state of Israel, and the privileged status of Jews within it. The secular population gains from this. Hence the difficulty of judging haredi intolerance as beyond the pale.

But there is a further dimension to this case: the haredim attempt to impose their way of life on others. Hasson (1996:1) comments on the conflict in Jerusalem as follows:

[E]ach of the two communities, secular (liberal) and haredi, claims to have justice on its side and holds its rights to be both legitimate and incontestable. In each case, however, the notions of justice and right are defined in the context of contrary sociopolitical cultures: the liberal-democratic culture of Western secular society and the haredi culture governed by Jewish law. Hence, there is no *a priori* criterion to adjudicate the conflicting claims of the two cultures and to determine whose views and rules should govern the functioning of the city.

However:

In general the secular population will assert that what the haredi community is allowed in its districts cannot be denied the secular population. It will argue that to do otherwise would be unjust and contrary to the ethical principle of not doing onto others (the secular population) what you would not have done to yourself (undermining collective group rights). The secular population will claim that, following the haredi precedent, it, too, has the right to live its lifestyle without being subject to conflict, coercion, or duress (Hasson, 1996:50).

The crucial and deciding point seems to be that haredi intolerance cannot be universalised: they cannot claim the right to their own life in their own territory and

at the same time deny this right to others, within a consistent moral discourse. Their claim to hegemony ultimately rests on its religious basis trumping other rights, for which there is no ground except faith. Without the recognition of a transcending ethics to offer a resolution, the result will continue to be a far cry from Young's ideal of openness to unassimilated others.

This case underlines the fact that urban fragmentation need not be primarily a reflection of socio-economic inequality. Differentiation with respect to culture, in its various manifestations, raises its own issues of oppression. Young (1990:59) defines cultural imperialism as 'the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm'. Part of the struggle for social justice in a multicultural society under change, like South Africa, is to make space for diversity within an overarching ethics incorporating agreement as to fundamental features of the good life – including basic human rights and mutual respect for difference. Part of the strategy is to challenge the power of any particular group to impose its own culture, way of life or conception of the good on others.

Conclusion

A model of a transformed society must begin from the material structures that are given to us at this time in history (Young, 1990:234).

Internal differentiation is a universal feature of cities. Even those built under socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, with egalitarian objectives, revealed distinct spatial variations in housing and environmental quality (Smith, 1994:189–222). As with the apartheid city, the pattern planned for a particular purpose acts as a constraint on social transformation, for the bricks and concrete can take generations to replace. Urban fragmentation in these circumstances is in part an outcome of new forces making for differentiation and working on inherited spatial forms. Those who seek to plan cities under transformation must therefore have regard to both the material legacy of the old era, with its own trajectory of change, and the spontaneous modifications of people coming to terms with a new social order over which they may have little control.

From the ethical perspective of liberalism, differentiation may be applauded as a reflection of varied ways of life, freely chosen without infringing the freedom of others. Communitarianism might be expected to provide a less conditional defense of distinctive cultures, their localities and borders, but at the expense of some individual liberty as well as overlooking community interdependence. The politics of difference, and the normative ideal of city life elaborated by Young (1990), seem more in keeping with contemporary reality and aspirations, but at the risk of ever finer

differentiation exacerbating urban fragmentation, for ultimately there are as many differences as selves.

The socio-economic limits of differentiation are to be found when material inequality among groups reaches unsustainable levels, in the sense of threatening moral order and social reproduction. The cultural limits of differentiation are likely to be when the values of mutual recognition and tolerance yield to active group chauvinism. Without some limits to spatial and social fragmentation, and some moral values against which the actual practice of disparate groups can be called to account, we are left with the relativist (or postmodern) nightmare of anything goes. It is in trying to find these limits that urban studies and city planning are well advised to consort with ethics. Any form of successful transformation or development, as intentional change for the good, requires understanding of what that good may be.

Acknowledgements

Parts of this chapter are based on sections of earlier publications (Smith, 1992, 1994, 2000), where various sources of assistance are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to Sandy Bederman for the update on Atlanta's gated communities.

References

- Aronson, R. (1991) 'Is socialism on the Agenda? A letter to the South African left', *Transformation*, 14:1–23.
- Barry, B. (1989) *Theories of Justice (A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume 1)*. London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
- Bullard, R., Johnson, G.S. and A.O. Torres, eds. (2000) *Sprawl City: Race, Politics, and Planning in Atlanta*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.
- Burman, S. (1979) 'The illusion of progress: Race and politics in Atlanta, Georgia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2:441–54.
- Davies, R.J. (1981) 'The spatial formation of the South African city', *GeoJournal*, (supplementary issue) 2:59–72.
- Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Hasson, S. (1996) *The Cultural Struggle over Jerusalem: Accommodations, Scenarios and Lessons*. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies.
- Hasson, S. and A. Gonen (1997) *The Cultural Tension within Jerusalem's Jewish Population*. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies.
- Hunter, F. (1953) *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Keating, L. (2001) *Atlanta: Race, Class, and Urban Expansion*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Kymlyska, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Okin, S.M. (1998) 'Feminism and multiculturalism: Some tensions', *Ethics*, 108:661–84.
- Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Sandercock, L. (1998) *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Shilhav, Y. (1998) *Ultra-Orthodoxy in Urban Governance*. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies.
- Simon, D. (1989) 'Crisis and change in South Africa: Implications for the apartheid city', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 14:89–206.
- Smith, D.M., ed. (1992) *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, D.M. (1994) *Geography and Social Justice*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, D.M. (1999) 'Social justice and the ethics of development in post-apartheid South Africa', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 2:157–77.
- Smith, D.M. (2000) *Moral Geographies: Ethics in a World of Difference*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Smith, D.M. (2002) 'Social justice and the South African city'. In *Understanding the City: Contemporary and Future Perspectives*, edited by Eade, J. and C. Mele, pp. 66–81. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Stone, C.N. (1976) *Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent: System Bias in the Urban Renewal Program of Atlanta*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Stone, C.N. (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946–1988*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Young, I.M. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 3

The Degeneration of Urban Policy after Apartheid

Patrick Bond

Introduction

This chapter offers a constructive critique of South Africa's main post-apartheid urban policies. Their core characteristic in the period immediately following the 1994 liberation from structured racism was a *neo-liberal* (market-oriented) bias that quickly codified an equally oppressive structured process that can be termed *class apartheid*. As a result, a variety of specific problems associated with apartheid-era urban *underdevelopment* continued – and were in many cases amplified – during the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

The evidence of worsening class apartheid is now even acknowledged in official government. Statistics South Africa released a report in October 2002 confirming that in real terms, average Black household income had declined 19% from 1995 to 2000, while White household income was up 15%. The average Black household earned 1/6 as much as the average White household in 2000, down from 1/4 in 1995. Households with less than R670/month income – mainly Black, Coloured and of Indian/Asian descent – increased from 20% of the population in 1995 to 28% in 2000. Across the racial divides, the poorest half of all South Africans earn just 9.7% of national income, down from 11.4% in 1995. The richest 20% earn 65% of all income. The official measure of unemployment rose from 15% in 1995 to 30% in 2000, and adding frustrated job seekers to this figure brings the percentage of unemployed people to 43%. These statistics reveal worsening poverty; one symptom is that ten million people have

reported having had their water cut off in one national government survey, and ten million were also victims of electricity disconnections, mainly due to unaffordability. In addition, two million people have been evicted from their homes or land since liberation in 1994 (*Business Day*, 22 November 2002; see also www.queensu.ca/msp).

This chapter considers the reasons that these statistics reflect not merely the austere, pro-business nature of the South African state’s post-apartheid macro-economic policies, but micro-developmental interventions. In considering how certain policies promote class apartheid, it is important to establish methodological and ideological points of reference (Table 3.1). Two main ways of thinking about urban problems have emerged, both in South Africa and internationally: the ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ perspectives. The mainstream approach takes as a premise that cities must be competitive units in the world economy first and foremost, and that everything from design of the urban form to pricing of municipal services must be based on market principles. Subsidies should be minimised and should not distort market relationships (e.g. Cohen, 1992; Mayo, 1993, 1994; Urban Foundation, 1990; Urban Institute, 1991; World Bank, 1991a, 1991b).

Table 3.1 Differences in perspective on urban policies and implementation

Mainstream	Critical
a) existing policies are basically fine (although some, like the overly generous housing policy and higher service standards – electricity, indoor taps, flush toilets – that are affordable to low-income people, need tweaking to assure better alignment)	a) virtually all current state policies are excessively market-oriented (too stingy, insensitive to poverty, incapable of integrating gender and environmental concerns, unsympathetic to problems associated with public health and worsening geographical segregation, and even inefficient in terms of untapped economic multipliers)
b) post-apartheid laws, planning frameworks and regulations are sometimes onerous and usually unhelpful	b) post-apartheid laws, planning frameworks and regulations are essentially technicist and disempowering, and are generally an inadequate substitute for a transformation in the balance of forces and in residual apartheid-era economic processes
c) resources allocated for urban regeneration are quite sufficient (large capital grants, plus ongoing central-local subsidies, plus limited local-level cross-subsidies from wealthy and corporate customers to the poor, plus other programmatic funds)	c) resources allocated are inadequate (by a factor of roughly five from central government, and with regard to inadequate local and national cross-subsidisation)



Mainstream	Critical
d) institutional arrangements for urban projects are flawed (due to an excessive emphasis on greenfield developments and housing topstructures)	d) institutional arrangements are inappropriate (newly demarcated municipalities will struggle to meet small-town and rural needs, and the drive to corporatisation and even privatisation will worsen services inequality)
e) implementation of urban projects is flawed, and because of inefficiencies in municipal delivery, there is a need for more rapid private-sector provision of services (public-private partnerships, outsourcing, and other forms of municipal services partnerships, which are generally enhanced by larger markets associated with newly demarcated municipalities)	e) implementation is flawed (municipal management remains rooted in apartheid practices, and developer-driven, bank-centred housing policy drives most funds into new, faraway projects instead of empowering municipalities and communities)
f) communities and workers remain part of the problem (the former have a culture of non-payment, the latter too dogmatically oppose privatisation and act as a labour aristocracy)	f) communities and workers are potentially part of the solution (if community and worker control are enhanced)
g) while expanded urban infrastructure and services may have positive spin-off benefits, these are not worth calculating and incorporating into decisions regarding the levels of municipal services, capital expenditure or subsidies	g) infrastructure and services have extremely important positive spin-off benefits – improved public health, gender equity, environmental improvement, economic multipliers, increased productivity, better educational prospects, desegregation potentials – which are absolutely vital to calculate and incorporate into decisions regarding the levels of services, capital expenditure or subsidies

In contrast, the critical approach queries the merits of allowing globalisation and other structural power imbalances to determine key features of urban development and instead posits a broader understanding of the positive economic, social and environmental benefits that come from strong public policies and programmes. Such benefits are ‘externalities’ because they are often not captured within an urban market – but if denied (for instance, if municipal water supply is cut off to an impoverished household due to non-payment) can lead to severe negative consequences for a larger neighbourhood or city. To capture these requires the state and society to promote ‘public goods’ as at least a minimal advance upon a purely economic understanding of urban life, and then move further to far greater empowerment of the working class

and urban poor (Bond, 2000a, 2002; Daly, 1996; Daly and Cobb, 1994; Foster, 2002; Harvey, 1973, 1996; Swilling, 1990).

An example of the implications of the critical perspective, and the need to consider externalities such as public health, gender equity and environmental concerns in South Africa, is access to water. In order to stem a cholera epidemic that would infect more than 130 000 people over the course of a year, the state deemed it necessary in August 2000 to reverse mainstream water pricing policy, which called for 100% recovery of operating and maintenance costs in rural water schemes. Instead, the government promised to provide all households with a free 'lifeline' supply of water: six kilolitres per household per month. However, as we shall see, its implementation was extremely uneven, and many aspects of water poverty continued due to residual mainstream approaches to water delivery and municipal financial management.

Using much the same rights-based logic as a starting point, this chapter takes a critical perspective in relation to the South African Government's main urban policies: the *Housing White Paper* (RSA, 1994a), the *Water and Sanitation White Paper* (RSA, 1994b), the *Urban Development Strategy* (Department of Constitutional Development, 1995), the *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF)* (RSA, 1997, 2001), the *Local Government White Paper* (RSA, 1998a), and the *Energy White Paper* (RSA, 1998b). Although space does not permit a critique of all the relevant policies, together these official documents best capture the core state-led dynamics that shape South Africa's post-apartheid towns and cities (Bond, 2000a, 2002).

In early 2003, at the time of writing, the neo-liberal character of urban policy was still evident. A new 'Urban Regeneration Strategy' was proposed by president Thabo Mbeki's office in 2000–01, but in spite of initial hype, it took the form only of a description of discrete investment projects in several under-developed nodes. In addition to the water policy shift noted above, changes to the housing policy were made in 2001, which provide a higher grant to subsidy recipients if they have proven savings, or sweat equity, to invest in a higher quality structure.

South African policy, as we will see, adapted to underlying aspects of capital accumulation and class struggle. The seminal approach to analysis of the city from a Marxist perspective remains that of the geographer David Harvey (e.g. Harvey, 1973, 1989, 1996, 2001). Dating to their nineteenth century origins – not merely since 1948 – South African cities reflected apartheid-capitalist residential, commercial, industrial, and environmental processes based not only upon racial prejudice but also upon labour reproduction, capital accumulation and social control motives (Beall *et al.*, 2002; Hendler, 1987; Lupton, 1992; Mabin, 1989; McCarthy, 1987; McCarthy and Smit, 1987; Robinson, 1996).

Given that the latter set of motives continue practically unchanged, it is no surprise that class, gender and generational biases have persisted since 1994, and that racial discrimination also continues in various forms. What has become yet more worrisome is that while residential desegregation of middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods has occurred relatively smoothly, most other features of urban life today embody yet more severe inequality and uneven development than occurred under apartheid (Bond, 2002).

Recognising this, several government departments have forthrightly criticised aspects of their own post-apartheid policies, including: the size, quality and location of urban housing; the segregation associated with urban infrastructure provision; public health (especially HIV-Aids) problems associated with worsening urban poverty; access to water, electricity and other municipal services under household affordability constraints; and urban development that takes the form of ‘smokestack chasing’ instead of holistic Local Economic Development. Even the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy has been criticised from within government as generating relative macro-economic stability – prior to the 50% crash of the Rand in 2000–01 – but failing to generate positive micro-economic, developmental and employment outcomes.

Still, there remains a need for an integrated and holistic *critique* of the post-apartheid city based in large part on the failure of policy. One reason is that an entirely different set of urban policies was mooted in March 1994, in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which the African National Congress (ANC, 1994) used as its campaign platform in the first democratic election. In this chapter we consider the primary strands of urban policies adopted since 1994, focusing on the *Local Government White Paper* (RSA, 1998a), *Housing White Paper* (RSA, 1994a) and *Urban Development Strategy* (Department of Constitutional Development, 1995), for these entail virtually all the main problems identifiable in both policy conceptualisation and implementation.

The *Local Government White Paper*

The March 1998 *Local Government White Paper (LGWP)* (RSA, 1998a) is the single most important, and recent, overall urban policy, and deserves the bulk of the attention devoted to policy review because it is such an explicitly political document. Most striking about the *LGWP*, is its apparent agenda of civil society *demobilisation*. Numerous precedents for municipal democracy via social struggles prior to the early 1980s are ignored, and 1980s struggles are reduced to those questioning the legitimacy of apartheid political structures (not township socio-economic conditions).

Partly as a result of this orientation to depoliticising urban problems, the *LGWP* considers only a series of residual technical challenges as subject to policy intervention:

skewed settlement patterns and extreme concentrations of taxable economic resources ... huge backlogs in service infrastructure ... great spatial separations and disparities between towns and townships and urban sprawl ... new municipal institutions which recognise linkages between urban and rural settlements ... entrenched modes of decision-making, administration and delivery ... inability to leverage private sector resources for development ... substantial variations in capacity ... need to rebuild relations between municipalities and communities.

Do the provisions made in the *LGWP* begin to offer relief, especially with respect to redistribution? The *LGWP* offers three specific (if relatively minor and localised) techniques: ‘service subsidies ... support to community organisations in the form of finances, technical skills or training ... linkage policies to directly link profitable growth or investment with redistribution and community development’. Yet there is no recognition that under an export-oriented logic of orthodox municipal economic development, competition between cities for new investors is likely to get out of hand, and this would prevent the widespread service payments and cross-subsidies required.

With geographical segregation intensifying since 1994 due to the distant location of new settlements, the *LGWP* acknowledges that income differences threaten to generate a neo-apartheid urban form, for ‘inadequate service levels may perpetuate stark spatial divisions between low-, middle- or high-income users (particularly in urban areas) and jeopardise the socio-economic objectives of the Council’. Yet there is no official recognition that the low levels of service delivery associated with the *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework* (RSA, 1997, 2001) – especially pit latrines which cannot be incrementally upgraded to water-borne sanitation – for low-income people will permanently relegate the poor to far-away ghettos from which any upwardly mobile residents desiring higher infrastructure levels will have to emigrate.

Additionally, the various options for ‘approaches to service delivery’ are highly biased in favour of privatisation. None of the arguments for municipal transformation offered by the SA Municipal Workers Union, for example, are considered. The *LGWP* at least acknowledges that privatisation carries risks of ‘cherry-picking’ (refusal to provide services to low-income areas), poor quality services, and unfair labour practices. Notably, though, no warnings are made about excessive levels of profit (such as the 30+ per cent in US\$ terms demanded by most foreign investors in municipal infrastructure, including the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation).

The *LGWP* chapter on Municipal Finance fails to divulge the conditions under which roughly half of all municipalities have been found to be financially insolvent. After failing to mention, much less resolve, these obvious problems, the chapter proceeds to take the most extreme, conservative interpretation of tariffs (price) policy for water, electricity, and other municipal services. The *LGWP* provisions that: a) there must be ‘payment in proportion to the amount consumed’, b) there must be ‘full payment of service costs’, and c) tariffs must ‘ensure local economies are competitive’ by insulating businesses from cross-subsidies, together have the effect of preventing municipalities from adopting: a) progressive block tariffs, b) a universal lifeline service to all consumers, and c) local level redistribution from often wasteful business users to low-income consumers. All these provisions directly violate the mandate given in the RDP, which explicitly calls for block tariffs, lifeline services, and redistribution from businesses to consumers.

Finally, the *LGWP*’s last chapter, on the Transformation Process, nearly entirely negates the roles of communities and municipal workers. Hence the document ends by appealing to citizens to trust a largely technocratic process. A similar approach was evident in housing.

The *Housing White Paper*

The *Housing White Paper* (*HWP*) (RSA, 1994a), approved by Cabinet in December 1994, was grounded upon ‘the fundamental pre-condition for attracting [private] investment, which is that housing must be provided within a normalised market’. An anticipated kick-start in housing bond financing as a result of the October 1994 ‘Record of Understanding’ never materialised, but many of the core problems of housing in the post-apartheid era were rooted in the Department of Housing policy makers’ faith in credit. Indeed, the market-centered approach to low-income housing delivery had several unfortunate consequences (Bond and Tait, 1997). These included:

- *an inequitable allocation of funding between different low-income groups* (favouring those with higher incomes because they have the capacity to gain access to credit and hence are the target of private sector developers’ projects);
- the subsequent emergence of a *housing finance gap* for those between R3 500/month and R6 000/month, the latter being the minimum amount of income against which banks had by 2002 determined they could lend safely;
- *a low rate of delivery* compared to what was feasible, witnessed by the growth in the housing backlog, and the fact that of an estimated one million subsidies granted between 1994 and 1999, only 60% had actually been taken up, and of these only

16% had received credit due to bank reticence to lend (the latter figure fell to less than five per cent by 2002);

- *the destruction of existing construction sector capacity*, with the evaporation of more than 100 000 formal-sector jobs (and many large construction companies) during the mid- to late 1990s, due to the failure to recognise contradictions within the market and provide a state-driven counter-cyclical construction boost;
- *communities being disempowered* by generally being left out of project planning, as well as in their more general needs for organisational capacity (given that many local leaders moved into government), which in turn led to unwanted housing products, as well as an increasing gap between developers' promises and community expectations, often resulting in intense conflict;
- *a reluctance on the part of the private-sector developers* to be involved in conflict-ridden areas where the need for housing was often the greatest;
- *abuse of the scheme by local authorities and developers*, in part through fairly widespread corruption, leading to a reduction in the buying power of the subsidy by 50% in some cases;
- *the failure of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme* (which indirectly acted as a red-lining instrument) and *Servcon* (the agency established to dispose of properties in default, which soon faltered because there were very few available low-cost properties for households to 'rightsized' to);
- *a lack of success by the National Housing Finance Corporation* in reducing interest rates or increasing access to credit for low-income households (and indeed in keeping afloat targeted intermediary lenders, such as the defunct Community Bank); and
- *the inevitability of reproducing apartheid-style ghettos*, although these were not segregated along racial lines but in class terms, specifically whether the new slum settlements included – as a matter of public policy – sewage systems, electricity lines, storm water drains, and tarred roads (Bond, 2002).

Just as importantly, the implications of a market-centered approach to housing entailed *the withering of state capacity* in fields as diverse as construction, building materials management, public works delivery, retail financing and management. The ability of provincial and local governments to take up the additional responsibilities they were subsequently given by the 1996 Ministerial Task Team on Short-term Delivery appears severely limited.

Likewise, civic associations and other community groups were completely ignored throughout the *HWP*, reflecting the document's mere lip service to people-driven development (see Mayekiso, this volume). The *HWP* also reflected a variety of

other shortfalls associated with mainstream analysis and policy in areas such as housing backlog measurement, rural housing, housing standards, cost recovery for services, interest rates, and other aspects of the RDP mandate. A few of these can be briefly mentioned.

After noting, correctly, that residents of hostels and rural areas are inadequately housed, the *HWP* defined the 'present housing backlog' merely in terms of urban informal units not located on titled land (a total of 1.5 million). This was half the amount the RDP estimated as a backlog and implicitly signalled an abdication of the RDP's commitment to meet the housing needs of hostel dwellers and rural residents as well as urban shack dwellers on registered plots. Indeed the overall lack of attention to rural housing in the *HWP* and in other policy documents, increases the likelihood of more rapid migration to the towns and cities. The *Rural Development Framework* and associated land policy focused on private, individualised land tenure, as well as the tendency to avoid giving subsidies in outlying areas (such as former homelands), together mitigate against rural housing ever being delivered at scale and where it is most needed.

With respect to housing standards, the *HWP*'s stated commitment to 'width instead of depth' directly contradicted the RDP commitment that housing (not a shack) is considered a basic human right. The apartheid regime also emphasised width over depth, hence the massive numbers of site-and-service programmes built on cheap land a great distance from employment and commerce. Sufficient resources do exist to increase the subsidy to the amount required for all South Africans to eventually live in a decent house (with a commitment – approved by Cabinet in the *HWP*, though never realised – of five per cent of budgetary expenditure as the basis for more generous subsidies), in other words to achieve *both* width and depth.

The *HWP* commitment to the 'up-front capital subsidy' approach – in contrast to the option of a larger amount available, on credit, but with lower interest rates spread over time – was a direct violation of the RDP, which insisted that 'government funds and private sector funding must be blended in order to make housing finance affordable'. The *HWP* also endorsed a bank plan to charge 'a higher interest rate on [low-income] bonds than the prevailing bond rate', an unprecedented form of class discrimination.

Many other deviations from the RDP mandate could be recorded. The RDP demanded progressive policy provisions in relation to: promotion of savings; bond guarantees that would protect borrowers in the event of unforeseeable problems like unemployment or early Aids-related deaths; construction sector regulation; building materials price controls; support to emerging builders; a bias towards secure tenure without the problems associated with property rights; legislation protecting tenants'

rights and squatters' rights – none of which subsequently appeared in post-apartheid policy or law. The RDP also suggested the need for further legislation regarding evictions, exploitation in rentals, and many other housing-related problems, as well as interventions in the land market. The RDP noted: 'All legislative obstacles and constraints to housing and credit for women must be removed.' Elsewhere in the RDP, the rights and needs of disabled people were also cited. All of these were profoundly distorted or missing from the *HWP* and were, at best, mentioned vaguely in subsequent legislation and Ministerial Task Team reports.

Most importantly, from December 1994 through the current process of reconsidering housing policy, policy debate was simply closed. The *HWP* Preamble stated, 'The time for policy debate is now past.' The unnecessary closure of debate threatened to shut out those social forces and elements that had fundamental objections to the *HWP* approach. They met the same disappointing response when it came to the next major urban policy document, the *Urban Development Strategy* (Department of Constitutional Development, 1995), which codified the crucial *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework* (RSA, 1997, 2001).

The *Urban Development Strategy*

The October 1995 *Urban Development Strategy (UDS)* (Department of Constitutional Development, 1995) was the most comprehensive statement of how post-apartheid cities and towns would develop. A subsequent *Urban Development Framework* (Department of Housing, 1997) merely codified and softened the *UDS*. As documented below, the *UDS* is a more accurate reflection of the existing neo-liberal policies, particularly with regard to: state financial capacity; the respective roles of the market, the state, and civil society; deconcentration policies; the quality and cost of housing and related services; and reform of urban finance and transport. There were also omissions, of which the neglect of women, youth, and disabled people stand out.

According to the *UDS*, 'Relative to the needs, the level of resources available from the Government is not sufficient to provide the necessary basic infrastructure in municipal areas.' The RDP was rather more ambitious: 'With a per capita gross national product (GNP) of more than R8,500 South Africa is classified as an upper middle income country. Given its resources, South Africa can afford to feed, house, educate and provide health care for all its citizens.' Even though the issue of directing social resources into urban development is highly contentious, the *UDS* made no attempt to prove its point (there is no reference to fiscal re-organisation, tax levels, private sector financing leverage, or other aspects of redistribution) or contribute to debate on this critical issue.

Following logically from such self-constraint, according to the *UDS*, no major state intervention is required in South Africa's urbanisation process: 'The country's largest cities are not excessively large by international standards, and the rates of growth of the various tiers also appear to be normal. Hence there appears to be little reason to favour policies which may artificially induce or restrain growth in a particular center, region or tier.' Moreover, 'the growth rate is sufficiently normal to suggest that effective urban management is possible and there is, therefore, no justification for interventionist policies which attempt to prevent urbanisation.'

An alternative view is never mentioned, much less seriously considered: the megacities of the Third World and the large metropolises of South Africa (specifically, the five largest conurbations) are terribly over-crowded, dangerous, environmentally unsustainable, unpleasant places that (even if growing at a 'normal' rate) should undergo a fundamental transformation rather than be considered acceptable by international standards. In short, by downplaying problems associated with excessive concentration of population, and by focusing only on relative growth or size as the indicator for state intervention, the *UDS* ignored the numerous other reasons for the state to help shape urbanisation patterns.

The *UDS* correctly notes that 'the legacy of decentralisation and deconcentration policies has left these cities and towns with industrial zones and townships far away from town centers.' As a result, 'Costly and uneconomic subsidies will be phased out Public investment at all levels will be expected to relate to the economic or functional base and potential of an area.' The RDP's perspective is not only more nuanced, it explicitly recognises that tens of thousands of jobs and enormous amounts of fixed capital are still located in the deconcentration areas: 'The democratic government must establish clear-cut guidelines and procedures for reviewing decentralisation incentives. Where communities and workers can certify that the subsidies are being utilised in a sustainable, non-exploitative manner, the democratic government must maintain the incentives. Otherwise, it must redirect subsidies to ventures that promote linkages within the local economy.'

More specific *UDS* policy arguments also deviate enormously from the RDP, particularly in the field of urban infrastructural services, for which 55% of the population would receive very low standards of 'basic services', defined as 'communal standpipes (water), on site sanitation, graded roads with gravel and open storm water drains and streetlights (electricity)'. According to the *UDS* (drawing on the March 1995 *Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework* (RSA, 1995) (which was finalised as the *MIIF* in 1997)):

Services and infrastructure will be introduced in line with the affordability levels of communities affected. The principle that people should pay for the services to which they

have access is central. This means that the level of services in each area should relate to what the consumers there can afford and are willing to pay for. Where government support is needed to ensure basic service delivery, it will be provided transparently. Deliberate steps will be taken to remove any disguised subsidies. Limited cross-subsidies to enhance household affordability and secure 'lifeline' consumption will be necessary.

But what if South Africa's majority is so poor – especially in relation to the minority of luxury consumers – that 'limited cross-subsidies' are insufficient? The RDP notes that enormous subsidies will be required:

... the national (water) tariff structure must include ... a lifeline tariff to ensure that all South Africans are able to afford water services sufficient for health and hygiene requirements [and] in urban areas, a progressive block tariff to ensure that the long-term costs of supplying large-volume users are met and that there is a cross-subsidy to promote affordability for the poor.

In short, the *UDS* leaned heavily toward full cost recovery, and where this is not possible, advocates much lower service levels. The RDP leans heavily towards urban goods and services as entitlements, and hence where these cannot be afforded by poor households, it argues for state subsidy. Finally, the *UDS* failed to mention that urban services in existing middle- and high-income areas are still heavily subsidised, and have been for decades, from surpluses generated through business levies (ultimately based on transfers from Black workers and consumers whose employers and retail outlets were historically, by law, located in White areas). In sum, the opportunity for the *UDS* to take forward debates on cross-subsidies, tariff structures, and social justice relating to particular services was missed.

As for financing housing, the *UDS* promoted the Department of Housing plan to give banks additional positive incentives and support, including providing a generous subsidised guarantee programme and intervening (against consumers) to end bond boycotts and evict defaulters. The RDP, in contrast, emphasised regulation of the banks and 'to enforce laws against discrimination ... financial ombuds structures must include community representatives'.

The *UDS* did not admit the fact that the Department of Housing formally approved the redlining of more than 200 townships that were not approved as boycott-free under the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. It failed to concede that low-income, mainly Black applicants are being discriminated against through a far higher loan cost. And it neglected to acknowledge the Department of Housing's explicit approval of such interest rate segmentation.

The *UDS* offered a long-overdue call for reviewing transport policy: 'Policy towards the country's public passenger transportation system requires immediate reappraisal.' But one of the main *UDS* complaints was classically neo-liberal in tone:

‘Transportation subsidies alone cost the fiscus in excess of R2 billion a year, and are particularly excessive in providing for the inhabitants of far-flung “commuter townships”’. Most township residents who were forced into dangerous taxis, buses, and trains argued that government subsidies to the collapsing transport system were particularly *insufficient*. Given that on average Black urban residents pay more for transport than they do for housing, it would be unreasonable to request higher levels of cost recovery. The insufficient level of public transport subsidies could have been raised, the RDP argues, by taxing private transport beneficiaries: ‘Commuters should be encouraged to use public transport, and should be actively discouraged from using cars (via parking, access and fuel levies).’

Aside from the many stark differences in approach, there are other areas where the *UDS* proved a disappointing policy overview. Omitted from the strategy of ‘Integrating the Cities and Managing Urban Growth’ was any specific consideration of suburban land markets, infrastructure for waste disposal, access to water, and the possibility of densifying large residential plots. Since excellent infrastructure existed in the largely White, spacious, upper-income suburbs, this failure to specify how existing resources could be more efficiently used was inconsistent with the broader, market-oriented theme of the document. There was no mention of curbing land speculation, applying taxes to un-utilised land, or land acquisition through state rights to expropriate using the principle of eminent domain (all of which are standard techniques for urban land management in other countries).

Omitted from the strategy of ‘Investing in Urban Development’ was any concession that most of the main state programmes were widely considered to be failures, including the Special Presidential Projects on Urban Renewal, and the National Housing Programme. Because these failures were not acknowledged, there was no attempt to learn from past mistakes and correct these.

Other omissions in the strategies of: ‘Building Habitable and Safe Communities’ included community-based justice and policing; ‘Promoting Urban Economic Development’, included community-controlled and worker-owned initiatives; and ‘Creating Institutions for Delivery’, included a role for civil society. In the latter case, a sidebar on ‘Community Involvement’ noted only that this would ‘ensure greater accountability and integrity of local government, appropriate types and affordable levels of service, payment for services, and competitive pressure on service suppliers’, far short of the RDP vision of people-driven development.

The most serious problem in the *UDS*, and urban strategy more generally, is that whereas the RDP and Constitution called for many basic needs to be considered as entitlements, the *UDS* preferred that they take the form of commodities, to be provided only if the recipients could pay the full cost. Thus, while the document

promised urban residents they would be provided 'affordable housing and shelter and greater security of tenure for urban residents within fiscal and other constraints', the *UDS* suffered from treating those constraints as assumptions rather than political positions that must be interrogated. This allowed *status quo* interests to enjoy the fruits of the apartheid city, without having to pay any price for the ongoing inefficiencies.

Environmentally, the *UDS* provided substantial policy recommendations, yet omitted leading arguments regarding urban sustainability. Indeed, despite its repeated insistence that South Africa's cities must come into line with global processes, the *UDS* was far out of line with progressive international urban environmental thinking (Cronon, 1991; Harvey, 1996). The *UDS* did not address the relationship between cities and the sustainability of their ecological context in a way that goes beyond 'impact analysis'.

Nor, in short, did any subsequent urban documents break fundamentally with the mainstream, market-oriented approach. Nor were laws the source of any relief, notwithstanding strong theoretical protections in the Constitution and a September 2000 Constitutional Court case filed by Irene Grootboom and several hundred 'shack' dwellers, who successfully claimed that urban policies which had no emergency provisions to help poor people were unconstitutional. Policies remained virtually the same, although the cholera outbreak did introduce the prospects of free lifeline water and even electricity.

Conclusion: Towards cities of solidarity

At least two urban 'models' are suitable for consideration, to conclude: the approach adopted in mainstream urban policy advocacy, which is to barely shift some of the parameters and tweak some of the strategies; and the critical approach, which is to more fundamentally change power relations in part through a much stronger, sustainable resource flow to urban communities which would otherwise slip further into despair and depoliticisation.

The latter, critical approach was not (and is not) utopian. Indeed the RDP's Chapter Two provisions provide grounds for a different urban policy based not on the mainstream promotion of neo-liberal competition but upon the critical approach that instead hints at social 'solidarity'. To be sure, the RDP has various flaws associated with macro-economic policy concessions made by the ANC as early as 1992, but the micro prescriptions for urban policy would have made an enormous difference to the form and content of cities, had they been adopted and not ignored (Bond, 2000b).

As discussed above, the mainstream approach is ameliorative, and works with (to amplify), rather than against, market inequalities. Deregulation is the strategy, and

turning cities into 'export platforms' is the objective. Where these conflict, as in the cases of hawkers soiling city streets or steady inflows of Black immigrants, the mainstream urban-managerial solution has been a return to social control and forced removal mechanisms embarrassingly similar to those of the apartheid era. Amongst many outcomes are the increases in all forms of inequality cited at the outset of this chapter.

In contrast, a variety of far stronger policy and programmatic or project reforms could be taken to resolve urban problems. To take one example, deepening urban poverty and unemployment are the most obvious signs of South African uneven development, what with the proportion of Blacks under the poverty line rising dramatically during the period 1993–2001, from 50% to 62% (Bond, 2002:46). Under such circumstances, inadequate subsidies for basic municipal services, and unacceptably low levels of infrastructure provision together amplify the access problem. The critical perspective endorses opportunities to enhance job creation through stronger urban public works and infrastructure installation, with a far higher consumption subsidy. The same solution would apply to the problem of worsening income-based geographical segregation and greater distance between locations of new residential areas and employment.

But it must be said, in conclusion, that these choices are not really about 'policy', although South Africa's urban policies would have to be completely re-drafted so as to incorporate the critical logic. Instead, South Africa's urban problems can really only be solved by a change in *politics*, so that the class and bureaucratic interests that have so tirelessly promoted neo-liberalism in urban development and so many other areas of South African social and economic policy, can finally be overthrown by a progressive alliance of forces that meet the needs of the broader society.

References

- ANC (African National Congress) (1994) *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*. Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications.
- Beall, J., Crankshaw, O. and S. Parnell (2002) *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*. London: Earthscan.
- Bond, P. (2000a) *Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal: Essays on South Africa's New Urban Crisis*. Trenton N.J.: Africa World Press.
- Bond, P. (2000b) *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press.
- Bond, P. (2002) *Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest*. London: Merlin Press.
- Bond, P. and A. Tait (1997) 'The failure of housing policy in post-apartheid South Africa', *Urban Forum*, 8(1):19–41.

- Cohen, M. (1992) 'Comment'. In *Cities in the 1990s*, edited by Harris, N. London: UCL Press.
- Cronon, W. (1991) *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. New York: Norton.
- Daly, H. (1996) *Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Daly, H. and J. Cobb (1994) *For the Common Good*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Department of Constitutional Development (1995) *Urban Development Strategy*. Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development.
- Department of Housing (1997) *Urban Development Framework*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Foster, J. (2002) *Ecology against Capitalism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Harvey, D. (1989) *The Urban Experience*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1996) *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2001) *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*. New York: Routledge.
- Hendler, P. (1987) 'Capital accumulation and conurbation: Rethinking the social geography of the "black" townships', *South African Geographical Journal*, 69(1):60–85.
- Lupton, M. (1992) 'Collective consumption and urban segregation in South Africa: The case of two colored suburbs in the Johannesburg Region', *Antipode*, 25(1):32–50.
- Mabin, A. (1989) 'Struggle for the city: Urbanization and political strategies of the South African state', *Social Dynamics*, 15(1):1–28.
- Mayo, S. (1993) 'South African housing sector performance in international perspective', paper presented at *The 21st World Housing Congress*, Cape Town, 10–14 May.
- Mayo, S. (1994) 'Housing policy reform in South Africa: International perspectives and domestic imperatives', paper presented at the (*Euromoney*) *Financing Low-Cost Housing Conference*, Midrand, 25–26 January.
- McCarthy, J. (1987) 'Paul Hendler's rethinking of the social geography of Black Townships: A brief reply', *South African Geographical Journal*, 69(1):86–88.
- McCarthy, J. and D. Smit (1987) *The Internal Structure of the South African City*. Unpublished research paper. Johannesburg: Urban Foundation.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1994a) *Housing White Paper*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1994b) *Water and Sanitation White Paper*. Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1995) *Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework*. Pretoria: Ministry of Reconstruction and Development.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1997) *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework*, 1st edn. Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1998a) *Local Government White Paper*. Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1998b) *Energy White Paper*. Pretoria: Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2001) *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework*, 2nd edn. Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development.
- Robinson, J. (1996) *The Power of Apartheid*. London: Heinemann.

- Swilling, M. (1990) 'Deracialised urbanization: A critique of the new urban strategies and some policy alternatives from a democratic perspective', *Urban Forum*, 1(2):15–38.
- Urban Foundation (1990) *Policies for a New Urban Future Series*. Johannesburg: Urban Foundation.
- Urban Institute (1991) *Urban Economies and National Development*. Report prepared for the US Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
- World Bank (1991a) *Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (1991b) *Urban Sector Aide Memoire*. Washington, D.C., World Bank (Southern African Department).

Chapter 4

South Africa's Enduring Urban Crisis: The Local State and the Urban Social Movement with Particular Reference to Johannesburg

Mzwanele Mayekiso

Introduction

Social movement organisations were central in the struggle to rid South Africa of apartheid. The struggle was partially won with the introduction of political democracy in 1994, which allowed South Africans for the first time to cast their votes for the party of their choice. This process was important, psychologically, as it restored the dignity of Black, Coloured and Indian/Asian South Africans who for generations were denied the right to participate in the political process.

However, political democracy alone is not enough to undo the generations of economic exclusion and exploitation that led to the extremely uneven development of South African cities. The empowerment of the White minority and oppression of the Black majority generated what the South African Communist Party (SACP) referred to as the super-exploitative capture of a surplus within the settled country as opposed to ordinary colonialism's extraction of a surplus back to a home country. The unique problem of South Africa's uneven development was thus in the relationship of capitalism to pre-capitalism, and especially to gender oppression given that women kept a subsistence base so that the reproduction of labour power was especially cheap.

The post-apartheid period challenges social movement organisations to remain vigilant after the electoral victory, as the unequal distribution of wealth continues to deepen and the urban crisis continues to grow. In other words, an election does not change centuries of racial, gender and class oppression overnight. A continuous, sharp and critical analysis of the current economic conjuncture, dominated as it is by finance-driven globalisation and neo-liberal economic policies, will allow organisations of ‘working-class civil society’ to refine their strategies and tactics to respond robustly in order to effect a more fundamental transformation of our society.

This chapter looks at the relationship between local government and social movement organisations or community groups in post-apartheid South Africa, to discern patterns that might enhance or for that matter undermine a more even development of the post-apartheid city. This issue is crucial in relation to service provision given the African National Congress promise that, on 1 July 2001, free lifeline municipal services were to be made available to all South Africans. Since social movement organisations were central in the destruction of the apartheid system, it goes without saying that they are and should be central to developing the new democratic city.

To do so requires careful consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of these organisations, particularly the civic movement. Social movement organisations are those organisations that don’t participate in the formal political process – such as contesting elections at any level of government – but are nevertheless critically involved in the politics of development, be it at factory floor or at township level. These organisations include trade unions, civics, youth, women, church and other formations that exist outside of the state. This chapter is mainly concerned with civic organisations, though it may occasionally refer to other formations of civil society.

In the past, the meaning of South African urban space was defined in relation to the apartheid state’s confinement of people into racial zones. Social movements organised to challenge the legitimacy of the apartheid state, and sought the demise of local government structures, which were deemed unrepresentative. However, the post-apartheid period has redefined the meaning of space in that people, regardless of their race, colour, gender or creed, are free to move and settle where they choose.

But, the new democratic space is still subject to contestation because, although people have the political freedom to move around, they are confined to the spaces of old, spaces that defined people on the basis of colour. It is indeed only a small percentage of the Black population that is economically mobile – the remainder is still resident in stagnant former homelands and in impoverished townships. This state of affairs stems from the economic policies of the new regime, which uncritically embrace globalisation and seek to privatise the public assets that in the past helped

protect the White minority. A post-apartheid social movement, in seeking to engage with the new democratic local government, has to develop new methods of organisation in order to engage and cooperate or collaborate with the state.

What types of relationships are developing between the social movement organisations and the new democratic state? These were at times cooperative or collaborative. Social movements maintained their independence but this occurred in part thanks to their history as mass-popular organisations in the fight against apartheid – a history still fresh in the memories of government officials, most of whom come from the ranks of these organisations. At other times social movements were co-opted into processes they could not change, primarily due to the movement's waning power and prestige. In some cases, social movements were ignored and isolated outright because of the disorganisation present within civil society in a post-apartheid context. An example of this lack of organisation is the absence of political and ideological direction, the loss of leadership and significant levels of internal strife.

The urban transformation and democratisation of local government in Johannesburg, which occurred subsequent to 1994, had a profound effect on the ability of urban social movement organisations to function in a democratic environment. This change particularly affected civic organisations as they, by their nature, were mainly structured for confrontation with the apartheid state, challenging and undermining its top-down and segregationist policies directed at Black communities.

The post-apartheid period presented a huge challenge to civics since they had to change not only their organisational structure, but their political as well as ideological assessment of the new local state. The new state was engaged in a process of democratisation, but at the same time it had to devise strategies to integrate the physical structure of the entire city (in order to embrace township residents who were marginalised and forced to contend with imposed urban conditions), and build a common tax base for all its citizens. Former civic leaders occupied leadership positions within the new local governments and the African National Congress together with its alliance partners (the SACP and social movement organisations). But these organisations were unable to force the implementation of a progressive agenda based on the principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (the RDP, an initiative that was developed by the ANC and its component partners in civil society), as the neo-liberal agenda was implemented without consultation.

Aside from the stress on councillors of adopting neo-liberal municipal fiscal, infrastructure and privatisation policies (many of which were not fully understood), social movement organisations had to re-orient themselves to replace the use of confrontation as the first option in addressing urban issues with the democratic state.

Instead they had to utilise consultation and cooperation or collaboration as weapons to ensure service delivery and proper development of communities. Confrontation was a last resort. This accommodating approach has met with only limited success, and was unfortunately complicated by the internal failure to restructure civic organisations to meet the challenges of a democratic dispensation.

The civic movement in crisis

As the national civic movement leadership was failing to provide popular leadership, tensions intensified in many locales in relation to the slow delivery of services by the government. This led to marches and demonstrations at local government offices by individual civic organisations that openly criticised the government. It was at this point that some cabinet ministers began to talk of a counter-revolutionary threat from those criticising the new government.

The new democratic state did not expect criticism from erstwhile allies in civil society. Instead it hoped for an understanding and appreciation of the dilemmas the new government faced. As part of the broader democratic movement, civics were not expected to challenge the failures of the new democratic regime. In theory, the democratic state had shown support for social movement organisations, via the formation of the National Development Agency (NDA) whose task was, and still is, to coordinate funding for civil society organisations. But civics have been marginal to this process, and the NDA is seen as relatively dysfunctional.

Neither the ANC nor the civics had developed a clear appreciation of each other's strengths in post-apartheid South Africa, at a time when the civics coexisted generally in harmony with ANC local branches. Unlike the trade union movement, whose relevance is on the factory floor, ANC branches and civics exist in the same community and compete for the same membership. The civics in essence compete with ANC branches for turf and political hegemony in the townships, leading to tensions that at times become violent.

At the heart of the problem has been a lack of clearly developed roles for the civics and the ANC at the local level. This has prompted unofficial calls for the dissolution of civic structures. The new government continues to support the idea of civil society formations, but the extent of their politicisation remains a point of contention. Recently, a clear view of the civics in post-apartheid South Africa was articulated by David Makhura, General Secretary of the ANC in Gauteng (and former Deputy General Secretary of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union – Nehawu), who offered a lucid analysis of social movements and particularly civic organisations (see Makhura, 1999, in *Umrabulo*: www.anc.org.za).

Makhura was concerned with the future of these organisations and what form they might take if they were to exist into the future. He espoused depoliticised single issue-based non-permanent civic organisations – organisations closely akin to social movements found in the United States. These organisations would emerge to deal with a particular development issue (even at this level they would have to defer to the ANC on strategic development issues), and once that issue was resolved, they would cease to exist. This notion assumes that the traditional civic movement, as it emerged in the 1980s, had a specific insurrectionary role to play and that it had no role in post-apartheid South Africa. Similarly, Mojalefa Musi (Education Officer, the South African Transportation Workers Union – Satawu) considered social movements from labour's standpoint (*Business Day*, 21 July 1999), but his premise is fundamentally different from Makhura's.

Musi laments the quiescence by social movement organisations in the post-apartheid period, when the urban crisis still adversely affects communities. He misses the radicalism of the 1980s and calls for the revival of these organisations, and even for the revival of the mass democratic movement so as to allow different sectoral formations space in order to share experiences and develop common agendas. Musi's argument credits the civic movement and suggests that it should play a more critical role in post-apartheid South Africa. A longer response to Makhura and Musi is indeed in order, but space constraints prevent a proper interrogation of their rigorous intellectual analysis of social movement organisations.

The difficulties encountered by civics in adapting to the new conditions have been complicated by other factors as well. Most civics experienced an exodus of high-calibre leaders to the various levels of government. Moreover, establishing a strategy of direct partnership with local government has been hampered by the 1992 decision of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) to remain outside of formal local government politics. This decision was prompted by the desire on the part of the civic movement to remain an independent civil society formation, and not to contest the national or local government with the ANC. Civics aimed to remain non-party political and outside of the state, acting as an interface between the community and the state. This was so as to keep the state responsive to delivery processes and accountable to the citizenry.

Even during the negotiations to create a democratic state, civics had attempted to plan and develop alternatives to the apartheid approach to urban development (such as the One City/One Tax Base campaign, a civic organisation initiative under the rubric of the United Democratic Front in the mid-1980s to early 1990s – the aims of the campaign were to highlight the racial and unequal nature of the city under apartheid, and to communicate the desire on the part of the marginalised majority to

be part of the tax base generated by the city). But their actions had not prepared the civics for the post-apartheid political dynamics, since most of the movement's energy had been devoted to mapping out insurrectional strategies and tactics meant to sustain opposition to the system of apartheid (Mayekiso, 1996). Their experience in policy development was extremely limited. The other challenge to civic organisations after the demise of apartheid, was the lack of resources to prolong their campaigns. This was a consequence of donor agencies refocusing their attention from social movement organisations to direct funding for state projects, thereby weakening civics whose financial viability depended almost entirely on foreign funding.

At the same time, losing experienced civic cadres to local, provincial and national government hampered the capacity of the civic structures, but new leaders quickly emerged from the ranks and were able to grapple with the tricky political environment at the national level. However, the response was uneven, but could have been rendered coherent and sustained through workshops to hone political and analytical skills.

Still, civic organisations were central to the democratic movement's programmes and activities due to their historic role in mobilising communities against the apartheid state. The civics, brought together in SANCO, were involved in the drafting of the RDP, particularly Chapter Two which dealt with 'Meeting Basic Needs'.

Unfortunately, this progressive document was never implemented, and was instead replaced by a plethora of white papers and other policy documents which espoused neo-liberal policies (such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the *Housing White Paper*, the *Urban Development Strategy*, the *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework*, the *Urban Development Framework*, etc.). Unlike the RDP, these government documents were developed without the involvement of the democratic movement, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the SACP. Furthermore, there is a strong perception that not even the ANC, as a progressive and popular organisation, was involved in the process of drafting GEAR on which every government policy is based. SANCO had developed a seminal paper on Development Finance ('Making People-Driven Development Work'), which was commissioned by the RDP office. This office was established after 1994 to realise the pre-election ANC campaign promises, and was a cabinet level office before it closed down and its operations were subsumed under the office of the deputy president.

The potential for a cooperative or collaborative relationship between the RDP office and social movement organisations allowed the civic movement to develop its perspective on community finance and how the government might deliver services satisfactorily to communities.

However, although a small degree of collaboration between the state and civil society developed in these areas, in other spheres of government the strength of social movements was curtailed. Occasionally, officials in some government departments felt threatened by the power of these organisations. The Department of Housing sabotaged negotiations that were at a final stage between civics and financial institutions over their role in investing in formerly disadvantaged communities and townships (*Mail & Guardian*, 15 June 1997). The Housing Department's Director General, Billy Cobbett, had accumulated sufficient power, to the extent that he overshadowed the minister (the late Joe Slovo, who was suffering from ill health at the time), but at the same time using him to acknowledge politically controversial housing policies. There is a strong perception, within the democratic movement that it is Cobbett, and not Slovo, as Bond (2000:141–3) argues, who was responsible for the failed housing policy, and that he undermined the ability of civics to conclude negotiations with financial institutions. He is perceived to have (informally) instructed financial institutions to negotiate directly with government on issues of delivery to communities instead of discussing such issues (that had constitutional effect) with civics.

As a result of the tension between the government housing department and the civics, financial institutions didn't seriously consider their obligation to invest responsibly in the townships. There were two aspects to the civics' 1993 proposed agreement with banks. First, it was acknowledged that there was a need to investigate the American Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for application in South Africa, as a possible way to ensure that banks relate to communities appropriately. For instance, if they were to disinvest from an area, the financial institutions had to comply with certain CRA regulations. The process was derailed by the housing department, but in mid-2002 a progressive housing department tabled a community reinvestment bill that aims to protect poor communities. The bill is awaiting ratification by parliament before it becomes law. Second, it was proposed that joint operational centres be established in the townships to provide information to community members through workshops on technical issues relating to community and housing finance. The total budget for the operation was close to R5 million per year, most of which was to remunerate civic organisers and sustain the civic movement financially (SANCO, 1995).

Piven (1977:120) argues that movement organisers commit a serious error in appealing to resources offered by elites to sustain a movement in opposition to those elites. She argues:

The presumption of most reformers and revolutionaries who have tried to organize the lower classes is that once the economic and political resources of at least modest numbers of people are combined in disciplined action, public or private elites will be forced to yield

up the concessions necessary to sustain and enlarge mass affiliation. The model has not succeeded because it contains a grave flaw. The flaw is, quite simply, that it is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources to sustain oppositional organization over time.

This lesson was not learned immediately by SANCO, although the civic movement did manage to force the 'elites' (financial institutions) to the negotiating table, because the bond or mortgage boycott was affecting their business and they wished to normalise relations between themselves and communities or the public at large. The unfortunate intervention of the Department of Housing sabotaged the civic movement. The new Minister of Housing (Sankie Mthembu Mahanyele), appointed after the death of Slovo in 1995, fired Cobbett after a series of clashes over the department's policy directions. However, the civics did not exploit this opportunity to their advantage as they were hampered by a serious lack of political direction and were experiencing an internal crisis.

Social movements and the new economic regime

At national level, government's neo-liberal macro-economic policies such as GEAR, emphasised privatisation of public assets and outsourcing certain functions of local government such as water reticulation, sanitation (sewerage and waste disposal) and electricity supply, as well as cleaning and maintenance of buildings. This included lowering restrictions on financial flows and the movement of capital to and from South Africa. Protections were lifted on local companies so that international and global corporations could compete with South African companies as equals.

A consequence has been the flight of capital from South Africa as local companies relocated their operations and listed in such places as the London Stock Exchange and Wall Street. The *Urban Development Strategy* (UDS) and *Urban Development Framework* (UDF) effectively refocused South African cities as sites for the consumption of international goods and as export platforms for international trade, instead of sites for the production and consumption of basic needs, goods and services for local communities. New (and contemporary) urban policy corresponded closely with the export-oriented growth model as expressed in GEAR.

Yet SANCO failed to respond intellectually to the weaknesses of the national economic policies. It did not identify, in a systematic way, their shortcomings for discussion and engagement with the state. Nor did SANCO use the opportunity to initiate education campaigns that highlighted the issues relevant to its support base. In many instances, civics were called upon by government to comment when some of the programmes were being formulated. The civics lost the chance to influence the

direction of development in general, and to safeguard progressive policy making in particular. In the National Economic Development and Labour Council's Community Constituency, social movements were very weak and unable to respond with any sustained vigour to new developments, partly because they failed to re-orient themselves in the new democratic epoch.

A notable exception was the trade union movement under COSATU. Even though this federation was affected by the post-apartheid crisis, it remained vibrant in contesting GEAR and privatisation, while not shirking its role in representing the interests of workers. Trade unions remain relatively strong because of their sphere of operation – the plant – which faces no contestation from political organisations and which provides a structured environment. In addition, trade unions have financially beneficial relationships with international trade union federations and sister unions which help sustain them. Civics, in contrast, operate at the level of the community, a terrain contested by political organisations, and have no structured environment that financially supports them. Social movements remain uncomfortable with the idea of wholesale privatisation, as the process disempowers communities, leaving them without a collective bargaining mechanism with which to engage local government. Instead, local communities have to deal with global corporations that treat them as aggregates of individual consumers.

The power of trade unions is weakened in a similar fashion, as individual workers are shifted around or transferred to new and restructured sections of business while others are laid off, thereby losing health, education and housing benefits as a new regime of temporary workers is introduced who work on short-term contract and are not allowed to join trade unions. South Africa has lost more than 500 000 jobs (mostly paid up and active members of the union federation) to the restructuring of the economy since 1994, while a smaller number of new job opportunities emerged (most of them temporary). Recent economic indicators continue to show a lack of growth in employment opportunities in the new economy, an indication that cities may not be benefiting, as initially hoped by economists.

The unions have been consistent in their challenge to the privatisation of public assets, leading both marches and work stoppages. Undoubtedly, there have been visible public fall-outs between the ANC and COSATU (both are members of the governing alliance led by the ANC, which includes the SACP) over these policies that are broadly viewed as neo-liberal (Bond, 2000). This healthy and dynamic tension supports the argument for the political independence of social movement structures in South Africa, unlike the Mexican scenario experienced by Castells (1983:195) where urban social movements existed ostensibly to prop up the then ruling (PRI) party. Organisations exercised social control for the political benefit of the party (and were

financially supported by the party). The social movements in South Africa, while sharing the same political traditions as the ANC, retain their independence and hence the sometimes rocky but healthy relationships in the political alliance.

Democracy deferred and bureaucratising the civics

The civic movement, meanwhile, was racked by internal strife and leadership struggles over the strategic and political direction of the movement in a post-apartheid period. This resulted in a split that effectively destroyed the chance of reviving the once-powerful civic organisation, at least, in the short term. Olson (1967) argued that social movement organisations are only useful in so far as they represent the interests of their constituents, and once they veer off the mandate, members abandon their organisation in search of a new home. The split within the civic movement was, among other things, a result of a strong perception, on the part of leading members of the organisation and their followers, that SANCO had failed to develop a clear strategy for the organisation in a changed urban environment. A new organisation, the National Association of Residents and Civics Organisations, was formed in October 1998 and has failed to make its mark on the political landscape of South Africa. Instead of properly analysing the role of the civic movement within a shifting political paradigm and consulting with its internal organs for a fresh mandate, SANCO responded to these challenges by bureaucratising the civic movement.

Local civic organisations had to wait for instructions from the national office instead of campaigning on (geographically-based) issues that affected communities, and linking up with the national body on issues that were common to all civics. Increasingly local civics had to negate local issues and concentrate on national campaigns that had little to do with particular community issues. The historical bottom-up democracy of the civic movement was replaced by a top-down instrumentalist approach, which disempowered local civics.

The formation of SANCO Investment Holdings (SIH, a business arm of the organisation) was developed by SANCO's national office without proper consultation with provinces and branches of the organisation. There was very real potential for benefits accruing and being funnelled back to the local civics if a proper analysis was made of threats and opportunities to the organisation by such a venture. For example, the civics should have struck a proper balance between SANCO – the mass movement – with its democratic traditions, and SIH – the business – with its corporate linear structure. And, further, they should have involved local structures in discussions to create a clear understanding as to how SIH was to relate to them in order to avoid a crisis similar to that experienced in Alexandra and Cala, where civic leaders thought

that local businesses were to be accountable to them if the businesses in question were indeed SANCO businesses. This lack of clear guidelines had the effect of demobilising and demoralising civics in areas where SIH businesses operated, since they operated as parallel structures whose board members were appointed under highly controversial circumstances. Moreover, their boards and procedures were not subject to organisational democracy. These local businesses became a direct threat to the democratically elected civic leaders as the boards became more powerful than the leadership. The boards and their members were well financed and accounted to a different authority. Most recently, this tension merged at national level with the political structure denouncing SIH and vice-versa (*Mail & Guardian*, 16 April 2001). SANCO had hoped to use its potential membership of 1.6 million and an increase in membership fees to leverage more funds as it ventured into negotiations with an American insurance company called American Insurance Group, and Liberty Life, a South African insurance company.

The increase in membership fees, which were supposed to be accompanied by life insurance benefits and consumer discounts, was done without grassroots input. And in fact, these promises were never realised except for life insurance cover for a few people. Most families waited in vain for the cover. This caused serious tensions at local level as members felt cheated and defrauded of their meagre earnings by the organisation, and SIH's business partners (American Insurance Group and Liberty Life) were seriously embarrassed by the tensions and the lack of delivery. Ultimately, the new membership system failed, as only 5 000 people joined nationally per year, and SANCO experienced serious problems processing the membership, even for this low number (Ntlonti, 1997). Local civics began to criticise the organisation due to the perceived lack of accountability of the business arm and there were no established mechanisms of funnelling funds to individual civics. Meanwhile, the national head office was racking up large amounts of debt with banks, leading to threats of foreclosure.

The above-mentioned undemocratic changes happened at a time when the civic movement needed strong political leadership to protect and support branches in challenging policy directions in local government as well as at national level. The final straw was SANCO's decision at its National Executive Committee meeting in late 1996, allowing government officials to participate as leaders in the civic movement. This decision perhaps was reached by the National Executive Committee in view of the leadership problems that SANCO was experiencing, but at this time a new set of leaders had matured within the civic movement, and the decision was in direct contravention of civic movement policies and principles, as the change was not canvassed adequately within civic structures. Essentially, the fear was that the decision

would change the character of the civic movement from an independent non-party political movement into an appendage of the government as public officials would not lead protests against the state. The effect of the resolution was to undermine the power and independence of the civic movement and its ability to proactively engage the state.

Besides, independence of civics from party political influences was a fundamental policy position of the civic movement and any deviation from it should have been properly discussed. Voices critical of the new approach by SANCO were ruthlessly suppressed and purged; senior and respected comrades, who were still committed to the civic movement and whose ideas were central to developing SANCO in a post-apartheid period, were discouraged from challenging the new direction or accused of being disloyal to the organisation. This eventually led to a split as SANCO became more of a business organisation in its style of operation than a civic movement accountable to a constituency. It was instead accountable to a board of directors who disowned proactive criticism, mass action, and demonstrations to pressure government to be responsive to community needs.

The political dilemmas facing SANCO were unsuccessfully dealt with due to a lack of a clear and coherent political and strategic vision during the transition period. The specific actions that contributed to failure, were: i) converting the civic movement from its horizontal democratic structure into a vertical undemocratic movement; ii) bureaucratising engendered by fear of a political challenge from the grassroots movement; iii) changing the orientation and tradition of the civic movement from a mass-based democratic movement into a business-oriented one, and an appendage of government; and iv) changing the working-class character of the civic movement into a middle-class organisation by introducing a stiff membership fee that effectively pushed underpaid and unemployed members of the community out of the organisation (as it is an established political tradition within the civic movement that paying a manageable fee to your organisation allows members to own the organisation and develops the confidence that leaders would be accountable to the membership), thereby sharpening class distinctions within the movement.

Uneven development within the post-apartheid city

Meanwhile, nothing much has changed in the townships. Racist public policy has been completely eradicated, but the scars left by the system of apartheid are still with us, most explicitly in the form of economic inequality. Thus, the racial ghettos of the past, such as the peripheral townships, remain. However, they are now defined as economic ghettos because of the uneven nature of development under the racial

capitalist system of apartheid. The predominantly White upper- and middle-classes live in walled enclaves and protected zones, and have been joined by a smattering of professionals escaping the poverty and instability of the townships (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000:250–260).

The townships of South Africa remain the tense, racialised tinder boxes that they were under apartheid, waiting to explode because of the inadequate record of service delivery coupled with the high levels of expectation and the ever-present poverty, unemployment, crime and congestion. These are still prominent features of the community in post-apartheid South Africa. The service cut-offs (of water and electricity) and forfeiture of property to those defaulting are still the fault lines that at times lead to violence reminiscent of the apartheid period.

A BBC documentary on the New South Africa, screened in 1998 and directed by John Pilger (an internationally acclaimed journalist who left South Africa in the 1960s), captured the current state of affairs. Along with President Mandela and other politicians, Pilger interviewed prominent activists and organisers in the townships and the consensus was that there had been a relative improvement of conditions but much remained to be done so as to eradicate continuing economic inequality and physically integrate townships with other parts of the city. The general improvement of the townships in the form of delivery of basic services like water, electricity, waterborne sewerage, paving of roads, housing, and so forth was critical in order to change the mood of despondency and helplessness that, otherwise, would soon prevail. The exception, in this regard, is the continued township sprawl as more low-quality houses are built over a very scarce commodity – land. As opposed to quick and visible houses (that invariably crack soon after new owners take occupancy), a wider integrated planning process has to be undertaken to redevelop the townships. While the community still has high expectations, it is clear that more than seven years of democratisation will be required to overcome apartheid's legacy of uneven development. As usual, Alexandra, in all its customary squalor, featured in the background during the interviews.

The BBC documentary caused tension in the corridors of power. Some viewed it as critical of the new democratic state. Such was the sensitivity to this criticism, that the film's screening by the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) was prefaced with a statement declaring that while the SABC disagreed with the content, it was important for viewers to know how South Africa was being represented to the world. The screening was followed by a panel discussion composed of the ANC general secretary, the deputy general secretary of the SACP, and two independent panellists. The SACP position was similar to that of community activists: government, in light of the high expectations of communities, should be delivering tangible services. The role

of the new government was to deliver critically needed services to the community as part of its Reconstruction and Development Program (the RDP), which was a mandate given to the ANC by the people. The government was experiencing difficulty meeting the huge expectations, particularly from the Black community, partly because the ANC ministers and cabinet members were beginning to familiarise themselves with the intricacies of government and had to deal with an intransigent civil service that was carried over from the apartheid period. Many civil servants were still loyal to the old order and were happy to undermine RDP programmes. Another problem hampering delivery was the government's neo-liberal economic policies, strategies that essentially leave poor communities destitute.

These issues indicate an urgent need for a strong social movement that, where possible, works in partnership with government to deliver services to the community, but which also creatively engages and challenges the state on the process of transformation on behalf of citizens. As Castells (1983) argued, social movements develop to address specific social issues, and then find it difficult to sustain themselves once the issues are no longer relevant or have been addressed. Makhura's thesis on the nature of the post-apartheid civics is based on this articulation. Civic organisations must, in effect, identify new issues around which to organise, and must frequently analyse their relevance and objectively scrutinise organisational programmes that may no longer be useful to sustain. The civic movement emerged to resist racial oppression and economic exploitation, and its efforts led to negotiations for democratically organised cities and eventually the emergence of non-racial and democratic cities. But, the continuing urban crisis under different conditions requires well-focused and organised civics.

The dilemma of the civic movement has been its failure to diagnose the current political conjuncture and chart a new political discourse for social movements in South Africa. In order to combat the crisis of uneven development and economic inequality within South African cities, the civic movement should develop a clear framework that objectively locates itself within the post-apartheid era. This framework might have to discard some of the civics' outdated features of organisation while retaining the essential aspects that make them politically relevant. Our form of social movement is unique to South Africa and, if sustained, has important elements that can be exported to other countries. The South African social movement tradition is exemplified by the need to develop strong grassroots national organisations that are not oriented around single issues, as has more frequently been the case in North America and elsewhere. But, this political tradition can articulate and act upon a broad progressive platform and depends on the strength of its following to influence the direction of the nation-state.

Many civil society theorists argue that social movements exist because they are, by nature, opposed to a governing state. This was certainly the case with civic organisations in South Africa under apartheid, as their common vision was to replace the regime with a democratic system of government.

But, subsequent to 1994, the civic movement operated in a democratic environment. This objective condition should have allowed civics to become stronger than they were under apartheid, as they no longer operated under conditions of insurrection and insecurity. Social movement organisations should ensure, as a central tenet, that the new state continues to be responsive to community needs and aspirations. They could enhance the ability of progressive political parties in government to formulate and implement policies that empower communities. This would entail some form of liaison between such parties and the social movement to develop common strategies to achieve these objectives. A strong social movement is able to analyse the programme of any political party against its own progressive platform and, on that basis, lend or withhold its support. It is this powerful leverage, while maintaining the independence and integrity of the social movement, that can ensure democratic accountability and social justice. There are many other approaches that social movements could utilise in order to sustain the strategic principle of the civic movement, namely, the fundamental transformation of society. There are numerous strategies and tactics within and outside of the political system that could be employed in pursuit of this objective.

The development dilemma within the civic movement, and between the civic movement and local government

The schism within the civic movement was most serious in Alexandra, as the majority of SANCO members left the organisation to re-establish the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO). The two organisations have since been at loggerheads in the local government forums, consequently further weakening the power of social movement organisations to bargain as an entity. In one of the development forum meetings on the future of Alexandra, the ACO took a different position from SANCO over the future of a small industrial area adjacent to Alexandra. The SANCO position, which was submitted to the Greater Alexandra Development Forum, was that in redeveloping Marlboro, the area should be turned into a mixed-use zone so as to relieve the housing backlog in Alexandra while still allowing some light business activity to flourish.

The ACO maintained that the area be kept as an industrial park, as was originally envisaged (indicating that the concept was good, as the employment generated would

benefit the community). However, it was the top-down apartheid planning approach of the past that was to blame for the community's negative attitude towards the development. This seemingly innocuous difference of opinion is actually indicative of deep political differences and is a source of a large amount of dissent within the community.

The new democratic local government, believing that they were elected directly to represent communities and that the political party in government represented the interests of the people, undermined the civic organisations by not recognising them as serious community stakeholders. This frequently caused tensions between the ANC and community organisations as the new local government saw itself as a voice of the community and felt that it should not be accountable to civic groups. It believed that it should answer directly to the electorate.

The argument could be made that the approach of the new local governments was not that different from the old apartheid style of top-down development, which failed to recognise community organisations as legitimate representatives of their communities. Council officials continued to develop projects without community involvement, and only included community groups in order to endorse development projects. This attitude resulted in heated confrontation between local government structures and civic organisations in some parts of the country, and particularly in Gauteng Province where the civic movement was, and indeed is, strongest. In townships like Tembisa in North East Rand, in 1997, with the introduction of cutting-edge technology to individualise electricity consumption, community residents protested against the installation of a pre-paid metering system in their township. The community believed that they were not consulted and claimed that the new system was not acceptable since it would facilitate electricity cut-offs to residents who had actual reasons for not paying electricity, and it would undermine residential unity. The new pre-paid system was destroyed and vandalised by residents in acts of rage over lack of consultation, and the Kempton Park Municipality lost about R13 million as a result (Phadu, 1998).

In 1998, in the township of Tsakane in the East Rand, residents burned municipal properties and blocked the sheriff of the supreme court from attaching their properties for non-payment of rent. Councillors were forced to flee as their homes were attacked and destroyed by angry residents, and a senior public official was assassinated in what was believed to be a murder related to the protest mass action over attachment of residents' property (*Star*, 10 March 1998). Recently, in early 2001, Alexandra Township nearly exploded as residents were forcibly removed from their shack homes by a private security company that was enlisted by the Johannesburg supreme court (under instruction from the Gauteng Ministry of Housing) to remove 2 262 residents

who occupied shacks along the banks of the Jukskei River. The reasons given for this heavy-handed intervention: a perceived threat of cholera from the river and because the temporary structures were erected on a flood plain (*Star*, 4 May 2001) that was earmarked for development as a community park.

In Soweto, and just about simultaneously, a similar confrontation was brewing over a planned relocation of the Alexandra residents to new houses in Braamfisherville. The Soweto residents challenged the Ministry of Housing for not consulting them, since the land was being developed with the understanding that it would benefit people from the area who were on a housing waiting list. The anger led to the stoning of a councillor and burning of his car (*Business Day*, 5 July 2001).

And, yet, it is in Alexandra that the highest form of cooperation or collaboration at a local level has borne some visible proof. The Eastern Metropolitan Local Council (composed mainly of Alexandra and Sandton) developed a system of not only consulting the community organisations in its planned projects in Alexandra, but invited them to sit in a special forum, called the Greater Alexandra Development Forum (composed of Alexandra community organisations and councillors as stakeholders representing different interests for their members), to give input to develop and eventually deliver tangible projects to the community. Such projects include the construction of clinics in various parts of the township and building a new structure to house the first fire-fighting department in the township.

There are other projects in which community organisations were directly involved from conception to inception. The latest success of the Greater Alexandra Development Forum (which marks the successful cooperation and collaboration between community organisations and local government) is the launching of a \$8.21 million project (to be implemented over a period of ten years) to upgrade Alexandra township and integrate it with the rest of Johannesburg (*Mail & Guardian*, 20 April 2001). And, two years ago the national government announced a settlement of the most sensitive issue of property ownership in the politics of Alexandra by deciding that instead of removing so-called tenants from Alexandra to satisfy the Land and Property Owners' Association (a conservative advocacy group for property owners in the township who wanted their properties back), the government issued a proclamation that property owners would be compensated for the loss of their properties at market value, and that Alexandra would be redeveloped for all who lived in it (*Business Day*, 1 October 2000).

This was a victory for the Alexandra Civic Organisation, whose campaign had been to compensate property owners for their lost properties and redevelop Alexandra into a liveable environment for all its inhabitants. As this indicates, the relationship between the state and social movement organisations was variegated and

uneven depending on the strength (political or ideological popularity, number of members, technical understanding and input, and proactive development plans) of a particular organisation at a given period in time.

Conclusion

In the post-apartheid period, while a political space opened up for social movement organisations, the relations between community organisations and local government can be summed up as sometimes being that of cooperation or collaboration and, at other times, being that of cooptation and even isolation. This relationship was tenuous at best, given the lack of clarity on the role of social movements in a post-apartheid society, and as well because public officials didn't appreciate a symbiotic relationship with social groups that they perceived to be junior partners in the political realm.

Even though being 'junior' entailed some element of recognition, at this level social movements could influence development. But social movement activists were uncomfortable with being in such a position, as they demanded legitimacy through equal access to decision making and policy formulation. Unfortunately, the ebbs and flows of social movement politics made it harder for political players, at national, provincial and local government level, to view them as equals, since the organisations were politically and even numerically weak in post-apartheid South Africa. The political space for social movement organisations to influence development and policy formulation is still available only if they are able to re-evaluate the reason for their existence and the role they should play.

Social movements can and should reclaim the political space that was carved under apartheid, which allowed them to play a key role as power players in the development of South African cities. But, for this to happen, a thoroughgoing analysis and evaluation of the future of civic organisations must be undertaken. This analysis will allow a restructured civic movement to develop mutual relationships with other civil society organisations, the progressive state, and even with business as well as other players in the field of urban development.

References

- Bond, P. (2000) *Cities of Gold and Townships of Coal: Essays on South Africa's New Urban Crisis*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, Inc.
- Castells, M. (1983) *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen, eds. (2000) *Globalizing Cities: Is There a New Spatial Order?* London: Blackwell.
- Mayekiso, M. (1996) *Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ntlonti, P. (1997) 'General Secretary Report', *SANCO 2nd National Conference*. Johannesburg, 15–18 April.
- Olson, M. (1967) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Phadu, T. (1998) 'The introduction of new technologies to monitor public consumption in Tembisa', *Debates*, 2:67–75.
- Piven, F. (1977) *Poor People's Movements: Why they Succeed, how they Fail*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- SANCO (South African National Civics Organisation) (1995) *Strategies and Policies for Local Economic Development in the New South Africa*. Johannesburg: SANCO.

Chapter 5

HIV/Aids and Urban Disintegration in Johannesburg

Richard Tomlinson

Introduction

In this chapter I address the implications of rapidly increasing HIV/Aids infections for economic and social disintegration among low-income communities in Johannesburg. The context for this assessment is the ongoing decline in formal sector employment and increasing poverty and, as a consequence, growing dependence on survival networks based on family and community at the same time as many families, due to HIV/Aids, are becoming dysfunctional or, all too often, ceasing to exist.

This chapter has four parts. I start with a description of HIV/Aids projections and, in so far as the data allows, their consequences for Johannesburg's population growth. I continue to an explanation of the economic trends underlying increasing poverty in the African community. Next, I describe how the country's present economic and urban policies exacerbate poverty. (The discussion of urban policies is taken forward through reference to the delivery of subsidised housing and services.) Last I explore the consequences of these trends for urban disintegration. Especially distracting is the point that government economic and urban policies do not take HIV/Aids into account (Tomlinson, 2001; *Mail & Guardian* 21–27 September 2001).

Demographic projections for Johannesburg in the light of HIV/Aids

The projections required to satisfactorily address the topic, concern the implications of HIV/Aids for household composition. This data is needed in order to determine the

likely impacts of HIV/Aids on low-income households as well as better-off households who are crashed into poverty due to HIV/Aids infected family members losing their jobs. Save the Children (1999) suggested the implications for different types of households and the list below has been adapted from these suggestions. Note, however, that the term 'household' is problematic since many families are becoming dysfunctional and, indeed, often the reference is to individuals, whether orphans or adults. The list of household characteristics is as follows:

Household characteristics of those having one or more family members infected with HIV or Aids

- Two parents, one of whom is periodically ill
- Household headed by single surviving parent
- Single head of household who is periodically ill
- Two-parent household caring for children whose parents have died
- Household headed by a grandparent
- Adolescent-headed households
- Orphans without other family members
- Orphans without other family members, and who are infected with HIV or Aids
- Adults expelled from the family due to their being infected with HIV or Aids

The hardship experienced by these households results from the fact that HIV infection and especially Aids often cause economically active family members to leave the labour force and to be cared for by other family members whose income earning potential is thereby reduced due to their spending time away from work. Household savings, if there are any, are used to care for the sick and pay for burials. Household members who survive may face extraordinary hardship, especially when the deaths of adults leave behind child-headed households. The earnings of relatives are siphoned off to provide assistance. Children can be taken out of school to care for the sick and to earn what they might. It is even anticipated that rural, over-burdened aged relatives charged with caring for the children will send those best able to care for themselves to the cities in order that they might scavenge a living (Crewe, 2000).

In the absence of the data needed, it suffices to briefly point to the overall scale of the problem and then to consider what this means for Johannesburg. With between 3.5 and 4.2 million (depending on the source) persons infected with HIV in 2000, South Africa is second only to India in the number of HIV cases. Following on the uncertainty as to the number of people infected with HIV, estimates as to the proportion of the population that is infected with HIV vary widely. According to Abt Associates (2000:8), in 2000 13% of all South Africans aged 20–64 were infected with HIV and this proportion is expected to rise to 22–27% by 2010. According to the

UNAIDS *Epidemiological Fact Sheet, 2000 Update*, in 2000 19.4% of the population aged 15–49 was infected with HIV/Aids. The proportion of HIV infections is expected to stabilise circa 2010 since new infections will be offset by people dying from Aids-related diseases. Abt Associates' (2000) worst-case scenario is that by 2008 South Africa will be experiencing negative population growth.

The impact of such HIV/Aids projections is vividly illustrated by the declining life expectancy of the Black population. This is because 'Aids mortality will be light among Whites and Asians, moderate among coloureds and heavy among Africans' (Simkins, 2000:5). This conclusion is related to the fact that the incidence of HIV/Aids is also correlated with employment status with a much higher rate of Aids deaths among unskilled workers (Arndt and Lewis, 2000), and most unskilled workers are Black.

Thus, the life expectancy of Black males is expected to fall from 59.5 to 46.7 years. In contrast, the life expectancy of White males is expected to drop from 76.0 to 74.4. With susceptibility to HIV infection being higher among women, the life expectancy of Black women, which previously exceeded Black males by four years, is expected to drop to two years below their male counterparts (Simkins, 2000). Another illustration of the impact of HIV/Aids is the projection by Abt Associates that there will be about two million Aids orphans in 2010, although other projections in the media suggest about four million orphans in 2015. The latter figure, about 10% of the population, has been realised in other African countries (Michael *et al.*, 2000).

Turning to Johannesburg, prospects for economic and social integration and the relief of poverty have to be interpreted in the light of Johannesburg's changing demography. Johannesburg's population is expected to grow slowly at only 0.9% p.a. between 2000 and 2010 (Simkins, 2000). Three factors are important. First, fertility in Johannesburg is low. The fertility of Indians/Asians and Whites is below replacement, and that of Blacks and Coloureds, at 2.6% and 2.5% respectively, is close to the replacement fertility rate of 2.1%. Second, mortality is increasing due to an aging population and the effects of HIV/Aids. Third, migration from South Africa's rural areas has virtually ceased. Whereas in the past there had been a massive transfer of unskilled labour from rural areas to Johannesburg to find jobs in the mines and in manufacturing and services, nowadays there is high and increasing unemployment especially among those without skills. There is little incentive to move to the city.

The different population growth rates are changing Johannesburg's racial mix. The following statistics refer to Johannesburg's population before the inclusion of Midrand. In 1996, Blacks comprised 71% of the city's population, Whites 19%, Indians/Asians 4%, and Coloureds 6% of the city's population. By 2010, projections point to Blacks increasing to 75% and Whites declining to 15% (Simkins, 2000). A remarkably high 2.5% of the city's White population left in 1996. In contrast,

despite equivalent fertility rates, the Indian/Asian population will continue to grow due to immigration. Inexorably, Johannesburg's population is becoming more Black, but not as rapidly as it would have in the absence of HIV/Aids.

The significance of these trends is to be found in Table 5.1 in the form of the 11 new management districts created by the City of Johannesburg. Forty four per cent of Johannesburg's population resides in Soweto and Diepkloof, contiguous areas sited south of the inner city. These districts are far larger than the rest and are almost entirely Black. The combined population of the area south of the inner city – the Soweto, Diepkloof, Johannesburg South and Orange Farm districts – is 1.6 million, 59% of the city's total population. Only 8% of Johannesburg's residents live in the inner city. The two major population concentrations are those in the south and the north, the latter comprising 33% of the city's total. Blacks comprise 85% of the population living south of the CBD and only 46% of the population living in the north. The latter figure declines to 37% if Alexandra, the township that withstood forced removal, is deleted from the calculations.

Table 5.1 Spatial and ethnic distribution of Johannesburg's population, 1996

District	Black	Indian/Asian	Coloured	White	Total
Diepsloot	22 892	237	216	6 766	30 111
Midrand	102 875	1 246	3 981	24 522	132 624
Sandton	49 526	2 470	1 465	107 904	161 365
Northcliff	38 748	9 473	47 228	104 269	199 718
Roodepoort	41 980	1 723	7 621	124 608	175 933
Soweto	586 314	11 155	11 170	288	608 927
Alexandra	148 868	2 976	1 408	35 052	188 304
Inner City	141 750	13 268	11 506	39 878	206 402
South	60 404	4 897	6 701	77 107	149 109
Diepkloof	513 003	1 405	59 590	1 588	575 586
Orange Farm	196 688	49 106	22 759	611	269 164
Total	1 903 048	97 956	522 593	572 130	2 697 262

Source: Simkins (2000)

The combination of HIV/Aids with high unemployment and low household incomes will greatly exacerbate hardship among Blacks, while causing the breakdown of traditional support systems. One anticipates a desperate situation among many living south of the inner city.

Economic trends

An explanation for increasing unemployment and poverty among Blacks is to be found in the trend towards shedding jobs that started in the late 1980s, largely due to sanctions, and which increased sharply after 1994 with the advent of a democratic government, South Africa's joining the World Trade Organisation and the rapid drop in tariff protections against imports. It was reported in *Business Day* (26 September 2000) that, referring to all of South Africa, a million mostly unskilled jobs were lost between 1993 and 1997, offset by 60 000 new skilled jobs and about a million informal sector jobs. The formal sector loss of jobs has been replaced at much lower income levels by insecure informal jobs, with little hope that the unemployed will ever find formal employment. Reflecting the timing of the job losses, Schlemmer (2002) reports that poverty (below the Minimum Living Level) among Blacks increased from 51% in 1989 to 62% in 2001.

Underlying the lost jobs are broader structural trends in the economy (Bhorat and Hodge, 1999). On the one hand, due to the changes in the local and global demand for goods and services, investment has shifted out of agriculture, mining and manufacturing. These are the sectors in which Blacks and Coloureds predominate. On the other hand, changes in production methods resulting from capital deepening have led to a change in the skills mix of the labour force towards more skilled labour, where Whites predominate. The speed of this shift in South Africa has been accentuated by relatively cheap capital coming up against (in global terms) relatively expensive unskilled labour, as well as increasing productivity among skilled workers due to advances in information technology.

The consequence has been to marginalise different components of the labour force in direct proportion to their skills and ability to find employment in sectors that are competitive in the global economy. This marginalisation is made all the worse due to the decoupling of employment opportunities for unskilled workers from cyclical fluctuations in the national economy (Wacquant, 1999:1642). Indeed, when it comes to cyclical fluctuations, HIV/Aids will reduce the economic growth rate or accentuate the decline, with the result that despite the high death rate, unemployment statistics will not improve (Arndt and Lewis, 2000).

Thus, in South Africa upwards of 40% of the labour force lacks formal employment. In Johannesburg, the racial and spatial character of these job losses is striking. From Sandton heading south, formal sector unemployment is about 4% in Sandton, 23% in the inner city, 45% in Diepkloof, and 55% in Devland (a squatter settlement south of Soweto). Again, one anticipates a desperate situation among many living south of the CBD.

Economic and urban strategies and worsening poverty

This racial and spatial separation is being accentuated by government policies for economic growth and policy for housing and services. The economic growth policies concern government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). Policy for housing and services is to be found in the grant framework arising from government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). As will be seen, both policies constitute urban policies in that they dramatically shape the urban landscape, but in different directions.

In the case of GEAR, we return to the statistic (for South Africa) that, in the midst of the massive decline in formal employment, 60 000 new jobs were created. Investment has shifted into low-skill, low-wage services (e.g. McDonalds), where some new jobs are being created, mainly for Blacks, and into high-skill, high-wage business and financial services, where new jobs are being created, mainly for Whites.

The jobs lost have led to a massive increase in unemployment heading north from the Tshwane (Pretoria) CBD and south from the Johannesburg CBD, which is shown in Figure 5.1. The jobs gained are located between the Johannesburg and Tshwane CBDs. We have seen the concentration of business and financial services, retail and high value-added manufacturing within this corridor.

This trend has been accentuated by GEAR whose focus on export competitiveness boosts these economic activities. In Gauteng, GEAR has largely been given effect by the Gauteng Provincial Government's 'Blue IQ'-led growth strategy.

Blue IQ is a R1.7 billion initiative of the Gauteng Provincial Government to invest in 10 mega-projects in the areas of tourism, technology, transport and high value-added manufacturing, to create a truly 'smart' province ... Through Blue IQ, Gauteng will invigorate its economic trajectory by attracting some R100 billion in foreign direct investment in the next 10 years – creating an environment in which local and foreign businesses can prosper and boost job creation opportunities for all South Africans (Blue IQ: www.blueiq.co.za/frmain.htm).

For the purposes of the chapter, the two key features of Blue IQ's growth strategy are the focus on a 'smart' province, which leads to employment creation for the skilled, and the location of Blue IQ's intended '10 mega-projects', which steer growth to the area between the Johannesburg and Tshwane CBDs. The planned R7 billion Gautrain is especially illustrative. It is to run between the two CBDs, with stops at Rosebank, Sandton, Marlboro (Alexandra) Midrand, and Centurion, and a spur between Sandton and the Johannesburg International Airport. It will not continue to the majority of Johannesburg's population living south of the CBD.

This serves to reinforce economic, social and spatial separation; and the local economic development strategy of the City of Johannesburg – that prioritises

reducing crime and enhancing skills – does nothing to reverse this separation. Thus, in the city's iGoli 2030 vision for the future it is accepted that:

Mining, primary good production and much of the manufacturing sector will no longer be the key contributors to the City's economy. Financial and business services, transport, communication, trade, accommodation and catering and the utilities will be the main providers of employment and GGP value added. Productive activities in the City will have a strong export focus ... (City of Johannesburg: www.joburg.org.za/unicity/overview2.stm#pulling).


Lost in this policy milieu is the majority of the labour force. Both literally and figuratively, Johannesburg is becoming ever more a city of insiders and outsiders.

In the case of the housing subsidies, which are also used to pay for services such as water and sanitation, the intention is to reverse the effects of apartheid, reduce poverty and promote integration. The province has been effective in beginning to address one key consequence of apartheid, the housing backlog. Between 1994 and October 2001, the Gauteng Department of Housing delivered 262 075 serviced stands and 168 526 units. However, most of these projects have been located still further away from jobs than the existing townships (Tomlinson, 2002).

The Gauteng Department of Housing recently introduced measures to locate new housing projects close to economic opportunities – not merely to deliver houses but also to build cities. Alexandra provides an example of a major government housing project intended to serve the needs of the poor and to build an integrated Johannesburg. But here lies a considerable irony. The more successful government is in creating desirable living conditions in areas that are close to jobs, the more likely it is that low-income households will be driven out. This is because when government succeeds, the market replaces government programmes. The process involves 'downward raiding', where inadequately housed but better-off groups acquire the sites of poor households. The outcome will be that the poor, either during the upgrading of Alexandra or due to market forces, will be pushed out. This process began with the relocation to Diepsloot of households living in the Jukskei River flood plain, and will be accentuated by the Gautrain, which will make the suburb all the more attractive to better-off households (*Business Day*, 26 September 1997).

The location of the projects is shown in Figure 5.1. They separate the rich from the poor and the skilled from the unskilled, and create settlements in locations that minimise access to social facilities and economic opportunities. Further, because the incidence of HIV/Aids is so much greater among the poor and the unskilled, the projects concentrate the misery arising from HIV/Aids south of the CBD.

Figure 5.1 The location of housing projects in Johannesburg



Source: Adapted from maps provided by Werner Fourie of Global Image

The origins of the policy that created this circumstance lie with the National Housing Forum (NHF). Between 1992 and 1995 the NHF negotiated a new housing policy as well as an implementation strategy. The policy that emerged did not address integration (Rust and Rubenstein, 1996). Instead it was presumed that if provided with a 'starter unit', the recipients of subsidised housing would 'consolidate', that is, invest in those units. This presumption accords with international best practice, for example, the Habitat Agenda (UNCHS <Habitat>, 1996:15) wherein it is asserted that if governments 'make the market accessible for those excluded from participation by providing subsidies and promoting credit and other institutions', the poor will invest in housing.

This outcome is most unlikely where there is sharply increasing unemployment, the rapid spread of HIV/Aids and a marked decline in household incomes. Households affected by these circumstances will seek to minimise expenditure on housing and services. Indeed, it appears that it is often the case that households receiving the subsidy effectively abandon their dwelling, selling it for prices as low as R500 or, more productively, renting the units. Thus, when the Gauteng Department of Housing's policy and programme review was underway (in 2001), I was informed that in the case of one small project where the Department had undertaken a survey, 84% of the beneficiaries no longer occupied their units. This high percentage probably exceeds the average for housing projects in Johannesburg, but a response of this sort is to be expected (Tomlinson, 1990). The priorities of households affected by increasing unemployment and/or HIV/Aids focus on survival. Projects that require households now pay for services such as water and sanitation and have locations that increase the cost of getting to jobs and social services become an insupportable burden. Instead, the value of the dwelling becomes its ability to contribute income to the family.

This outcome represents a key failing of the NHF because the policy choices and the concern with delivery at scale and the role of the private sector in delivery inevitably led to the failure to build sustainable communities. This is because a precondition to delivery at scale is the delivery of a standardised, limited range of products at locations where political opposition would not delay projects, which coincided with locations where land prices were low. Indeed, the rush to deliver was such that many of the new subsidy projects were in fact old projects that had already been planned under apartheid.

While supporting delivery at scale, it would be better to devote a larger proportion of the subsidy to more expensive land or better-located projects, better urban design and the provision of social facilities and less costly services. This would enable the poor to benefit and create conditions for those who are able to invest in housing to do so. It is self-evident that government's present determination to provide a 30 m² unit on a 250 m² stand detracts from a concern for proximate locations, economic and social integration, urban design, public spaces, greening and energy-efficient houses.

Urban disintegration

What are the predicted causes of urban disintegration? Most obviously, people reside where they can afford to settle. In the case of squatter settlements, these are largely on the outer borders of townships, heading still further away from jobs and services. Another economic consideration arises from dependence on the family for survival. In the absence of a job and material independence, proximity to the family is well advised. This is especially the case as so few new entrants to the labour force are able to find jobs in the formal sector.

The counterintuitive outcome that we have seen so much of in South America is that of land invasions. At the very least, why are most new settlements locating on the outer edge of existing townships rather than heading towards the city? Aside from surprisingly determined evictions by government, this would seem to arise from the absence of community (civic association) leaders who might direct such invasions due to their incorporation into government as officials, councillors and parliamentarians, and even into business as empowerment partners (see Mayekiso, this volume).

This situation is likely to change. When employed members of the extended family leave the labour force and when support from the family ceases, the loss of support will release dependants who will then not be bound to their existing locations. Further, in addition to the National Landless Movement, a new cadre of civic leaders is emerging that might lead land invasions (Bond, 2002). It is to be expected that there will be ever more invasions of land and buildings and that these property invasions will to a significant degree target old decaying buildings and unused open space in and around the inner city. This location reflects Sibusiso Buthelezi's (pers. comm.) observation that the inner city represents 'an economic refuge' for those living in the south.

At least since the late 1980s, the inner city has been a contested terrain, one that was initially defined on racial terms and is now more oriented to class and national identity (with migrants concentrating in different districts in the inner city) (Tomlinson, 1999). Business has responded vigorously to the incursion with the attempt to manage the streets through City Improvement Districts, cameras used to monitor the streets, regulations that control informal markets, and the construction of garages intended to take the ubiquitous minibus taxis off the streets, as well as the traders that serve taxi passengers.

Government's response has been to use the powers assigned to local government and the police to control and evict illegal settlements. In addition, the provincial government has provided alternative site and service schemes, generally more than 20 kilometres from sites from which the inhabitants are evicted.

The struggle for land and buildings will involve increasing levels of violence. The struggles will spread into the northern suburbs. Walled residential communities and secure office parks and malls in the north will stand in sharp contrast to the desperation in the south. In effect, modernist institutions will be arrayed against ever more desperate community and informal economic struggles that inevitably will involve disputing the existing economic and social order and, in particular, property rights.

Conclusion

The antidote to urban disintegration comprises firstly, macro-economic policies that do not so disadvantage the poor. Then, focusing on the urban policies that lead to urban disintegration, persons affected by HIV/Aids require free access to shelter, electricity, water, sanitation and waste removal. The subsidies for this purpose should be viewed as part of a welfare programme that includes prevention, control and care, and an income grant along the lines of the much-debated basic income grant for all South Africans.

The antidote also includes focusing on job mobility: enhancing technical and business skills, ensuring that there is information about business and job opportunities, and seeing to it that inhabitants of low-income areas can get to jobs, or seek jobs, at a low cost. However, not too much should be made of such programmes. Past successes have been few, and these programmes certainly cannot succeed at the scale needed by those cast aside by the effects of GEAR and HIV/Aids.

References

- Abt Associates (2000) *The Impending Catastrophe: A Resource Book on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in South Africa*. Unpublished report. Johannesburg: Love Life.
- Arndt, C. and J.D. Lewis (2000) 'The macro implications of HIV/AIDS: A preliminary assessment', *Africa Region Working Paper Series*, No. 9. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Bhorat, H. and J. Hodge (1999) 'Decomposing shifts in labour demand in South Africa', *The South African Journal of Economics*, 67(3):348–380.
- Bond, P. (2002) *Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest*. London: Global Book Marketing.
- Crewe, M. (2000) 'Others will not save us. AIDS orphans: The urban impact'. Paper presented at the workshop *HIV/AIDS Orphans: Building an Urban Response to Protect Africa's Future*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Policy Studies, 21 July.

- Michael, K., Hodges, J. and A. Hamoudi (2000) 'The urban impact of HIV/AIDS-associated orphanhood'. Paper presented at the workshop *HIV/AIDS Orphans: Building an Urban Response to Protect Africa's Future*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Policy Studies, 21 July.
- Rust, K. and S. Rubenstein, (eds.) (1996) *A Mandate to Build: Developing a Consensus Around National Housing Policy in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Save the Children (1999) *Children Living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa – A Rapid Appraisal*. Johannesburg: Save the Children Fund (UK).
- Schlemmer, L. (2002) 'A better life for all? Poverty trends in South Africa', *Focus*, 26:20–23.
- Simkins, C. (2000) *Greater Johannesburg: Demographic Report*. (iGoli 2010 visioning process.) Johannesburg: Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.
- Tomlinson R. (1990). *Urbanization in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Tomlinson R. (1999) 'From exclusion to integration: Re-thinking the Johannesburg central city', *Environment and Planning A*, 31:1655–1678.
- Tomlinson, R. (2001) 'Housing policy in a context of HIV/AIDS and globalisation', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25(3):649–657.
- Tomlinson, R. (2002) *Evaluation: Housing Delivery, Sustainable Settlements and the Consequences of Apartheid*. Consulting paper. Johannesburg: Policy and Programme Review of the Department of Housing of the Gauteng Provincial Government.
- Tomlinson, R., Beauregard, R., Bremner, L. and X. Mangcu. (2003) *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Postapartheid City*. New York: Routledge.
- UNCHS (Habitat) (1996) *Habitat Agenda*. Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.
- Wacquant, L. (1999) 'Urban marginality in the coming millennium', *Urban Studies*, 36(10):1639–1647.

Chapter 6

Social Justice, Social Integration and the Compact City: Lessons from the Inner City of Johannesburg

Mike Oelofse

Introduction

This chapter examines recent experience in the inner city of Johannesburg, where social integration in the housing sector has accelerated since the demise of apartheid, and where various urban regeneration strategies are being implemented within an overall metropolitan development framework heavily influenced by the concept of the compact city. Changes in the inner city of Johannesburg are among the most significant and challenging in post-apartheid urban South Africa, and it presents a useful case study of the kinds of urban planning problems that face the new democracy. Some of the social justice issues that are emerging will be examined here from a Rawlsian liberal perspective. To illustrate these issues, attention will be given to the issues around racial and spatial integration and the equity outcomes for tenants, women, and rural-urban and foreign migrants, though there are many other identifiable groups.

Unless otherwise stated, all statistical data on the inner city of Johannesburg used in this chapter is derived from The Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust's (ICHUT) Inner City Residents' Housing Usage and Attitudes Survey published in 1997 and prepared by this author and Dr. Owen Crankshaw (ICHUT, 1997). The study included a household survey of a representative sample of inner city households and

several focus group discussions with homeowners, tenants and caretakers of apartment blocks.

Social justice in the compact city

Despite much controversy and conflicting empirical evidence, the compact city – with the containment of suburban growth, increased development densities and the spatial integration of diverse social groups and urban activities – is seen by many planners as key to urban sustainability (see Dewar, 1994 for a South African example). Increasingly, social justice is being acknowledged as an important component of this mix, at least at a rhetorical level. Yet of all of the elements of sustainability, social justice has received the least attention among researchers. In the South African context, for example, new planning approaches focus on participatory and empowerment processes; on spatial, functional, social and other forms of integration; on the optimal use of infrastructure; densification; and on compact city growth, with very little attention given to social, or distributive justice (Bremner, 2000; Mabin, 1992; Oelofse, 2003).

The available empirical evidence linking the compact city with social equity is by no means conclusive. For example, in a study of the aggregate equity effects of compact urban development in 26 British towns and cities, Burton (2001:4) observed that more compact development led to improved use of public transport, reduced social segregation, greater scope for cycling and walking, better job opportunities for the lower skilled and better access to facilities. However, it also implied less domestic living space, a lack of affordable housing, poor access to green space and increased crime levels.

Her most important conclusion is that the compact city may in fact promote social *equality* rather than social *equity*. Her findings suggest that mixed-use cities tend to be more egalitarian and that the position of the poor relative to the affluent is better, but not that the poor are better off in absolute terms or compared with the poor in other cities. In general, re-urbanisation and the development of derelict land, high-density housing and high levels of provision of services and facilities seem to have the most impact in achieving equality.

This finding is of great significance and raises some fundamental ethical questions for planners. It suggests that the compact city holds great promise for those who conceive of social justice as promoting some notion of equality, especially equality among groups, and translated into ‘equality of condition’ (Burton, 2001:3). Entrenched in the Marxist tradition, it is implicit in such conceptions that *equality* leads to more sustainable development than does inequality. Reducing residential segregation and socio-economic inequalities and increasing direct democracy are key

aspects of such a conception of social justice (Souza, 2000). The emphasis is on strong planning intervention and enforced integration, the purpose of which is to eliminate difference. This form of integration requires substantial and ongoing intervention in order to retain equal outcomes and to prevent difference from re-emerging. In the context of the compact city, examples include forced integration measures such as the location of heavily subsidised, high-quality low-income housing developments directly adjacent to wealthier suburbs along with sustained measures to ensure that middle income raiding of the new development does not occur.

However, these approaches seem anachronistic in a postmodern world of diversity and rapid change. They are in marked contrast with liberal democratic conceptions of social justice, which tolerate differences and seek not to enforce a comprehensive world-view, but to integrate the many competing ideas about what is just with the aim of capturing the vitality and dynamism of *difference* as the very basis of sustainability. The liberal emphasis is on ensuring equality among autonomous individuals through such means as deregulation, removing barriers to entry, and removing discriminatory practices and institutions.

At its extreme this would involve a Hayekian aversion to any form of intervention (see Hayek, 1993), allowing the free market to determine what levels and kinds of integration are realised and regarding whatever outcome results as just (Pennington, 2002). However, even the most orthodox proponent of the free market would accept that certain controls are necessary, that certain land uses such as those which produce toxic waste, for example, are not inappropriately located close to residential uses.

Less extreme are Rawls' attempts to introduce both equity and difference into his conception of justice. The two principles of Rawlsian social justice relate both to equality and to difference. The equality principle is that 'each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all' (Rawls, 2001a:42–43). The difference principle is concerned with the distribution of income and wealth: 'Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged of society ...' (*ibid.*:42).

Thus, Rawls takes the liberal conception of justice beyond equality in permitting inequalities that benefit the least advantaged. The least advantaged are then defined in various ways, such as income, gender, citizenship, and so on.

Planning intervention from this perspective must therefore respect individual rights, including: '... freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; political liberties (for example, the right to vote and to participate in politics) and freedom of association ... the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical

and psychological) of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law' (Rawls, 2001a:44).

In practice, this means not only protecting rights, but also ensuring that various forms of planning intervention do not create unjustifiable inequalities, and actively dismantling or altering those that do. The removal of race-based discriminatory legislation is one South African example, allowing people to settle wherever they wish regardless of race. Another would be the regulation of land uses to ensure that the rights of adjacent landowners are respected. At the same time planning would have to ensure that intervention that deviates from the equality principle leads directly to benefits for the least advantaged. An example would be the introduction of redistributive measures such as housing subsidies to allow lower income households to enjoy the benefits which accrue to secure tenure and adequate shelter, and being located as close to urban amenities as financially and politically feasible.

However, from a liberal perspective, the compact city is a possible, but not a necessary, consequence of pursuing social justice. Whilst there may be, for example, strong economic arguments for more compact development, it cannot be justified without qualification from a liberal ethical perspective.

Integrative trends in South African cities

In apartheid South Africa the principle of racial segregation resulted in patterns of urban development characterised by the spatial segregation of the population on the basis of their racial classification. This corresponded to a large extent with income-based segregation, given that Whites earned higher incomes than other racial groups. In the post-apartheid period social and spatial integration have become planning mantras. Spatial integration and the concept of the compact city are juxtaposed to the fragmented, low-density suburban development typical of South African towns and cities. Social integration, generally a reference to racial integration but also linked with income, has become (incorrectly) synonymous with the spatial integration of lower income Black, Indian/Asian and Coloured households with upper income White households. In policy terms this results in attempts to 'integrate' formerly White residential areas by locating new lower income housing developments on adjacent open land or by legalising and upgrading adjacent squatter settlements.


Perhaps because of a preoccupation with these spatially specific forms of social engineering, little planning research seems to be done on how integration is occurring outside of planning interventions within existing suburbs (some recent exceptions being Crankshaw and White, 1995; Gnad *et al.*, 2002; ICHUT, 1997; Landman, 2002; Morris, 1999; Oelofse, 1997 and 2003; Rule, 2002). It is readily apparent that less

well-off Black, Indian/Asian and Coloured households have moved steadily into the formerly White inner city suburbs and the central business district, and the surrounding working-class suburbs, and middle- and higher income households have moved into the wealthier northern suburbs. More importantly, given the underlying assumption that integration would benefit the poor, little attention is being given to the social and economic consequences of social and spatial integration, and more specifically to the distribution of costs and benefits among different stakeholders.

Racial integration and racial tipping in the inner city of Johannesburg

Residential integration by racial group began to occur in the inner city in the 1970s even prior to the dismantling of racial legislation such as the Group Areas Act in the 1980s. Black households had begun to move in to inner city apartments despite the fact that they could not hold legal tenure in what was then a White Group Area. The law was circumvented by White friends, colleagues or employers signing leases on behalf of tenants who were not White. With the removal of legislative constraints on residential locational decisions, Black households have migrated to the inner city from the former townships and from rural areas, as well as from other African countries. At the broadest level it would appear that the inner city has become deracialised and more representative of the racial distribution of the country. The following diagram illustrates the racial profile of inner city residents:

Figure 6.1 Racial distribution of inner city residents



More than two thirds of the inner city population are now Black, with Whites making up only around 20% of the total. This would appear to match the national profile more closely. However, what appears to have been an integrative process has proved otherwise in many areas, as White households have departed en masse and resettled

in the suburbs. Crankshaw (in ICHUT, 1997) notes that the most populated parts of the inner city are not just experiencing deracialisation, but the wholesale racial ‘tipping’ from White to Black occupancy. Some inner city suburbs have tipped more than others, particularly in the densely populated central core, and in Hillbrow, Joubert Park, Braamfontein and the central business district 83% of the population is Black, and only 6% is White. The balance is made up of Coloured and Indian/Asian people. The net result of apparent integration has been the replication of racial segregation. Ironically, today, racial integration strategies would have to involve attracting White households back into the inner city from the suburbs.

Racial tension: Landlords versus tenants

Although the economic decline of the inner city began during the 1970s with the decentralisation of many business interests to new suburban nodes, the physical deterioration of inner city housing stock has become more apparent subsequent to the advent of racial integration. Indeed, there does appear to be a strong link between the two processes, though this link is not to be found in the ‘changing occupational and educational profiles associated with race’ (Beall *et al.*, 2001:65), nor in an influx of poor households (Crankshaw in ICHUT, 1997), but rather in the conflict between landlords, who were predominantly White, and tenants, who are now mainly Black. Beall *et al.* (2001) argue that there were two problems. First, that White landlords were possibly exploitative of new Black tenants, charging higher rents than for previous White tenants. In fact, there is no empirical evidence that high, exploitative rents are the norm in the inner city, or that Black residents are charged higher rents than White residents were (Oelofse, 2003), though there is evidence to show that such exploitation does occur in specific instances. Second, that landlords were providing fewer management and maintenance services (particularly in formerly rent-controlled units and in the period during which Black residence in the inner city was still illegal), or they were financially incapable or unprepared to resolve their differences with non-White tenants.

Tenants, on the other hand, saw differences with landlords over rents or building management as part of the greater struggle of Black people’s rights to live in the inner city, as an extension of the anti-apartheid struggle. In some cases opportunists organised sustained boycotts of rents and service charges, often using resistance to rental increases as an excuse to halt all payments. The reluctance of the city council to take action against defaulters has encouraged this tendency.

The net result in many buildings was that landlords lost all control and abandoned their properties, and tenants attempted to assume ownership and to take on the

responsibility for management functions. In most cases this has proved problematic. Tenants have seldom been able to muster enough rental income to adequately maintain their buildings, and have accumulated substantial arrears in service charges owing to the municipality.

Of course, other important factors have also contributed to housing deterioration. For example, much of the housing stock closest to the old central business district is aging and many features such as electrical wiring and plumbing need replacement, lifts need major overhauling and roofs need waterproofing (e.g. Crankshaw and White, 1995). Speculative building of newer apartments in the high-density suburbs of Hillbrow and Berea produced structures which are sometimes of inferior quality, and without continual maintenance these too have begun to show signs of wear.

What this experience suggests is that while there can be no doubt from the perspective of social justice that all race-based restrictions on the right to live in the inner city had to be dismantled, what was not anticipated was that the resultant conflicts would contribute to the deterioration of inner city housing stock and the continued flight of capital to the suburbs. While there is some evidence that moving to the inner city represents an absolute improvement in living circumstances for many Black households, there has clearly been a lowering of living standards in the area.

With hindsight, it is clear that the process of transition should have been managed more carefully. Council has been particularly neglectful of its duties to enforce local by-laws and regulations, and in addition to its very poor record on debt management with regard to service payment arrears, it has seldom taken action in cases where buildings have come to contravene health and safety standards.

Integration of income groups


Integration strategies often involve attempts to influence the location of lower income households in relation to better-off households. This has been a particular objective among social housing institutions operating in the inner city, providing good quality rental accommodation on a not-for-profit basis, and all of which favour mixed income projects in an attempt to prevent the *ghettoisation* of their housing projects. More importantly, there are attempts to spatially integrate poorer households in relation to the social, economic, cultural and other facilities that more affluent households attract. The inner city of Johannesburg represents one such opportunity, with its high concentration of jobs and the important transportation hubs and links within its boundaries.

While residents of the inner city are by no means among the wealthiest in the country, they are also not the poorest. Whether this is because the inner city attracts

better-off households, or whether it provides the opportunities with which poor households may improve their circumstances is not yet clear, but available data indicates that mean annual per capita income in the inner city was R6 832 in 1996, compared with a national annual per capita income of R6 570 in 1994. Unemployment rates in the inner city are also lower than national figures. Whereas national estimates of unemployment in the mid-1990s varied from 32.6% (Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995) of the economically active population to around 20% (International Labour Organisation, press release, 14 October 1996), and unemployment among urban residents nationally was estimated at 27.8% (Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995), in the inner city the figure was substantially lower, at 16% of all household members. Sixty five per cent were in full time employment, 9% were employed part time and 9% were self-employed (Crankshaw in ICHUT, 1997:3).

However, lower income households have certainly found opportunities to locate themselves in the inner city, and pockets of extreme poverty can be found. What is less obvious, is that the least well off are not necessarily Black and neither are Whites always better off. Data for the inner city show that many households of all races claim to have no monthly income at all, including 40% of Indian/Asian households (over 780 in number), 32% of Black households (over 6 880), 28.8% of Coloured households (around 690), 31% of White households (around 1 900) and 49% of 'other' households (or around 190) (Oelofse, 2003). Around 10 500 households made up of all race groups are therefore among the poorest. The following graph illustrates this distribution:

Figure 6.2 Cumulative percentage of households by race and monthly income



As expected, a high proportion of Black households are among the poorest, but a high proportion of Indians and 'other' people apparently have no monthly income. These findings illustrate the fact that poverty in South Africa is no longer purely related to race. The inner city plays an important role in accommodating such groups, and further research is required to establish precisely what features of inner city life ease the burden of poverty for them. Obvious features might include cheap and affordable accommodation, ease of access to transportation, and so on. However, affordable accommodation may well become a thing of the past if the various urban regeneration programmes currently being implemented in the area are successful.

Urban regeneration and housing affordability

Regeneration of the inner city is a priority for provincial and metropolitan government. Substantial investments in infrastructure are currently being made by organisations such as Blue IQ, established by Gauteng Provincial Government (see Tomlinson, this volume). Housing investment, particularly in the form of government housing subsidies channelled through social housing institutions and several private property developers and managers, is seen as a key contributor to regeneration efforts.

While it would seem apparent that the location of poor households in the inner city holds many advantages for these households, especially in terms of the high levels of accessibility they enjoy, there are costs involved. It is the level and the distribution of these costs which lie at the heart of much debate about the impact of urban regeneration strategies on the poor, and which impact on both social justice and integration strategies. The key question is: Is it appropriate, from a metropolitan perspective, to locate the poorest households in the inner city? From a utilitarian perspective on social justice, what counts is the net aggregate result and not the distribution of costs and benefits. So long as the aggregate benefits exceed aggregate costs, then the fact that the poor may be dislocated is an acceptable outcome. From a Rawlsian perspective, it is at the very least necessary to make the choice between the goals of urban regeneration and social justice explicit, to be aware of the consequences for the least advantaged, and to consider these consequences as part of a democratic decision-making process.

There are a number of considerations. First, while most inner city households can generally afford their housing costs, the poorest find themselves in a situation where they cannot afford the rentals required to maintain inner city apartments at acceptable levels. In existing housing stock, rentals in bachelor and one-bedroom apartments are only slightly higher than 25% of household income, and larger flats

have rentals lower than this rule of thumb, which would imply that housing costs are affordable to most inner city residents.

In many cases these rental levels are, however, not sufficient to fund proper maintenance. This is illustrated by the fact that in new social housing stock, rentals are set far higher than the lowest income earners can afford, and households earning incomes within the lowest subsidy band are automatically excluded from accessing these subsidised housing units. This problem is particularly serious in tenant-based social housing projects, where rental increases are usually strongly resisted by tenants who claim not to be able to afford them, and basic building maintenance is almost non-existent. The case of the 7 Buildings Project, a pioneer tenant-based social housing project in the inner city, is particularly striking. Rentals had not been increased since project inception and when project managers attempted to do so on the basis of prior agreements with tenants to pay for much needed maintenance and upgrading, they were dismissed. Residents argued that they could not afford the increases, even though rental levels were lower than inner city averages (Oelofse, 2003).

The 7 Buildings Project: Capital subsidies allowed over 700 tenants in seven buildings to purchase their apartments from the previous owner, and they chose to do so on a collective basis in the name of the 7 Buildings Company. Rental levels were set in 1995 when the project was launched, and on the basis of an agreement among tenants, were due for revision in November 1997. A loan was secured from ICHUT (the Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust, an NGO dedicated to providing bridging finance to inner city housing projects) to begin upgrading the buildings, which were in a very serious state of disrepair. Priorities included restoring lift services, leak proofing roofs, repairing and upgrading plumbing, sanitation and electricity services. By late 1997 rental increases were urgently required to continue the upgrading and to bring the building up to standards desired by the tenants and acceptable to city council and provincial government. However, tenants strongly resisted any increases on the grounds that they could not afford it. Within months the project became unmanageable and the initiative collapsed. No repairs at all have been undertaken since then, the loan repayments to ICHUT have ceased, and rental and service payments remain uncollected or worse, were stolen by a newly installed and highly corrupt 'management'. At this stage the 7 Buildings Company is under liquidation and tenants in at least five of the buildings face eviction.

One commonly proposed solution to this problem is for government to provide additional, ongoing subsidies to such projects to enable their proper upgrading and

maintenance, bridging the gap between what tenants can afford and what expenditures are required. This does, however, raise an important question: why should tenants, however poor, who are already housed and who already have access to services in a highly centralised location, receive additional and ongoing subsidies, when many thousands of poverty stricken households live in appalling conditions in ‘shack’ settlements, with no access to services, and in marginalised locations around Johannesburg, and have not yet received any government support? Faced with real budget constraints, it is clear that government has to prioritise among those who deserve housing support, but it is not clear why inner city tenants should be the primary beneficiaries. It is contrary to most notions of social justice if the opportunity cost of additional subsidies for better housing for inner city residents is less housing for the worst off in other areas.


However, if urban regeneration is to occur without displacing these residents, additional funding has to be secured to improve and sustain their housing circumstances. The most reasonable mechanism would be some form of urban regeneration fund, although recent adjustments to the housing subsidy system now allow inner city social housing projects privileged access to additional per capita subsidies in spite of the inequities that result.

Appropriate scale

Perhaps the most central problem to be addressed by proponents of integration is that of appropriate scale. What is the appropriate scale at which to measure levels of integration? Is it best done at the level of a household, an individual housing project, a city block or a suburb? Should each and every household, housing project, city block or suburb be fully representative of the demographic profile of the country taken as a whole? Integration policies generally address integration somewhere between (but not including) the level of the individual household and the level of the state. The geographic space of the inner city is no less complex as a unit of analysis. As already shown, there appears to be a reasonable mix of income groups spread throughout the inner city, but on closer examination, some neighbourhoods are much worse off than others. The pattern of income distribution for each of the inner city suburbs is illustrated in the graph on the next page.

Poverty is not evenly distributed, and is concentrated in the very heart of the inner city, in Hillbrow and the adjacent suburbs of southern Berea, Joubert Park and the central business district area. There is also a concentration of lower incomes in Braamfontein, a result of the high number of students in that area. One response to this uneven distribution of income has been to begin identifying precincts or areas in

Figure 6.3 Mean monthly incomes (thousand rands) by sampling domain in the inner city




which to focus investment and coordinate the activities of various stakeholders (though Smith (1995) raises questions about the justice of allocating benefits on the basis of such geographic or other ‘membership’ characteristics). The first of these is the Western Joubert Park Precinct, focusing on one of the few remaining parks in the inner city and its surrounding residential blocks. The difficulty in creating this kind of residential improvement district is that, unlike the more successful business improvement districts being established in the central business district and Braamfontein, local residents cannot raise the kind of capital that business can, and the Joubert Park precinct has no business sector to draw support from. An alternative perspective holds that investment in the poorest areas will have less of an impact than investment in better-off areas, and that the beneficial spin-off effects of the latter would be higher.

Within specific geographic areas even more specific concentrations of poverty may be identified. The graph on the opposite page shows that White households in the Hillbrow and southern Berea area are the poorest.

This appears to be because of the high concentration of retired, unemployed and self-employed White households in the area compared with other groups. Some live in retirement hotels or homes, others are trapped in these neighbourhoods because the market value of their properties has plummeted and they cannot afford to find accommodation elsewhere (Beall *et al.*, 2001). Planning interventions such as housing subsidies could be further focused on these marginalised groups. How fine grained these distinctions should be is a matter of the availability of analytical resources as much as it is a matter of financial constraints and regeneration policy.

Figure 6.4 Monthly household income by race of respondent for Hillbrow and southern Berea



Source: GJMC/ICHUT, 2000

Opportunities for the marginalised


In Rawlsian terms the inner city provides for some inequalities which favour the least advantaged in unexpected ways. It provides the context within which many otherwise marginalised groups find opportunities to escape various forms of oppression. Women, for example, find the opportunity to pursue a higher degree of social and economic independence in the inner city that is denied them in the former non-White townships. In focus group discussions many women speak of the freedom that comes with living in the inner city, allowing them to escape traditional patriarchal family structures.

Part of the reason for this independence lies with the structure of employment opportunities in the inner city, with several large hospitals in the area, for example, providing many women with jobs in the nursing profession (see Oelofse, 2003). Similarly, gay people escape sometimes vicious discrimination in the townships and find refuge in the inner city.

Women living in the inner city are therefore more likely than men to be single, or to have only one dependant. Around 8.8% of households are single female parent households, while only 3.8% of households are single male parent households. Half of all male-headed households in the inner city are nuclear families, but only a quarter of female-headed households are nuclear in structure.

At the same time, inner city women are more likely to be in positions of disadvantage in relation to men. For one thing, although both earn more than the national averages, the mean income for women-headed households is R2 044, which is lower than for male household heads at R2 253 per month. Furthermore, single female parent households in far greater numbers have lower monthly incomes than single male parents, or are more likely to have no income at all. This is illustrated in the following graph:

Figure 6.5 Inner city household structure and monthly household incomes (rands)




In numerical terms, it is far more likely that single female parents in the inner city are worse off than single male parents. One way in which such households improve their living circumstances is to share accommodation, and seven per cent of female-headed households are single mothers sharing with friends or relatives.

Rural-urban and foreign migrants

The phenomenon of rural-urban migration also has an impact on issues of integration and social justice. Contrary to expectations though, 35% of households with urban origins and only 28% of households with rural origins declare that they have no income. In fact, 72% of all households who declared that they have no income have urban origins. The following graph illustrates these income distributions.

Figure 6.6 Inner city monthly household income distribution (rands) by household place of origin



Nevertheless, rural-urban migrants present specific integration problems with respect to housing. Focus group discussions undertaken by ICHUT found that some do not perceive their stay in the city as being permanent, and plan to return to their rural place of origin. Others would like to bring their families to the city, but would prefer to have them live outside of the inner city, which they perceive as crime ridden and overcrowded (Oelofse, 1997). Their lack of commitment to inner city living may present specific challenges to housing policy makers concerned about integrating them into the inner city community.

Foreigners, particularly those from other African countries, encounter extremely xenophobic treatment from South Africans. The inner city provides many with an opportunity to escape discrimination in the townships and squatter settlements. The number of foreign households in the inner city is relatively small at around 3 300, or about 10% of the total. Among them are the poorest in the inner city, and 39% of foreign households claim to have no monthly income, while 71% of those with no income come from other African countries. A particular problem here is that they are not entitled to state support in any form, including housing subsidies. They are therefore excluded from social housing projects. Social justice in this case is only for South African citizens.

Conclusion

The abstract, integrated, compact city may well satisfy the conception of social justice as equality. It holds the promise of reducing inequalities between rich and poor and improving the *relative* position of the poor. What is less clear, from a Rawlsian perspective, is whether or not it is likely to yield outcomes that favour the least advantaged and improve their life chances in *absolute* terms.

The case of the inner city of Johannesburg presented here only begins to touch on the complexity of its social dynamics, but it is clear in this example, that racial and spatial integration has not necessarily improved the lives of the least advantaged. High-rise, high-density housing in the inner city costs more to rent and maintain than the poor can afford, and urban regeneration efforts will either threaten their continuing residence in the area, or will come at the cost of higher ongoing housing subsidies.

Furthermore, if the compact city represents the enforced integration and homogenisation of peoples in an attempt to achieve some notion of equality it will fail many of its citizens. The case of the inner city of Johannesburg has shown that cities must provide the place within which individuals may create and exploit the opportunities they choose. The inner city provides all sorts of people (for example, women, gay people and foreigners) with opportunities to escape oppression and discrimination and to secure independent lives for themselves. It is the fact that they are free to be different in the inner city that attracts them to live in the area.

The appropriate policy response from planners, from the Rawlsian perspective, is to ensure that no one is discriminated against or unfairly treated. Liberal integration strategies would begin by dismantling artificial barriers to integration, that is, levelling the playing field for all concerned. The basic institutions that affect people's lives must be structured in such a way as to ensure equality of treatment. Secondly, any inequalities must favour the least advantaged (as defined by democratic political processes, social activism and the vigilance of the planners). Concrete examples include enabling single people without dependants to access housing subsidies, ensuring that women are not disadvantaged when it comes to accessing subsidies in relation to their husbands (who as household heads normally own the home), facilitating access to social or other subsidised housing by women-headed households and singles without dependants, and channelling subsidies into programmes which help the least well off, such as the homeless, rather than providing better-quality accommodation for those already housed and serviced.

Liberal social justice, based on the protection of individual rights, implies freedom of choice and of association. Deliberate integration strategies imply the opposite: racial, gender or income quotas by geographic units of space, and substantial social

engineering to achieve them. Such interventions are incapable of balancing the incredibly complex needs and interests of individuals, and their consequence will be to sacrifice individual rights in favour of meeting some centrally defined purpose, based on the ideological perspectives of planners and policy makers. The compact city cannot be a just city if it is the result of such imposition. It can only represent a sustainable option if it provides the space for freedom and opportunity.

References


- Beall, J., Crankshaw, O. and S. Parnell (2001) *Towards Inclusive Urban Governance*. Unpublished report. London: British Department for International Development.
- Bremner, L. (2000) 'Post-apartheid urban geography: A case study of greater Johannesburg's Rapid Land Development Programme', *Development Southern Africa*, 17(1):87–104.
- Burton, E. (2001) 'The compact city and social justice'. Paper presented to the *Housing Studies Association Spring Conference, Housing, Environment and Sustainability*, University of York, 18–19 April.
- Crankshaw, O. (1997) 'Challenging the myths', from the *Inner City Residents' Housing Usage and Attitudes Survey*. Johannesburg: The Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust.
- Crankshaw, O. and C. White (1995) 'Racial desegregation and inner city decay in Johannesburg', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 19(4):622–638.
- Dewar, D. (1994) 'Urban planning, shelter strategies and economic development'. In *Urban Development Planning: Lessons for the Economic Reconstruction of South Africa's Cities*, edited by Tomlinson, R., pp. 231–242. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
- Gnad, M., Baher, J. and U. Jurgens (2002) 'Residential succession in Johannesburg: The case of Yeoville'. In *Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces in South Africa During the 1990s: Reform, Restitution and Restructuring* (Africa Century Publication Series 10), edited by Donaldson, R. and L. Marais, pp. 249–281. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- GJMC (Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council)/ICHUT (Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust) (2000) *Hillbrow/Berea Investigation into Housing Conditions and Demography*. Unpublished data. Johannesburg: GJMC/ICHUT.
- Hayek, F. (1993) "'Social" or distributive justice'. In *Justice*, edited by Ryan, A., pp. 117–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ICHUT (Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust) (1997) *Inner City Residents' Housing Usage and Attitudes Survey*. Johannesburg: The Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust.
- Mabin, A. (1992) 'Alternatives for South African urban planning', paper presented at the *LOGOPOP (Local Government Policy and Planning Research Project) Conference*, Belville, Western Cape, October.
- Ministry for Welfare and Population Development (1995) *Population Policy for South Africa?* (Green Paper). Pretoria: Ministry of Welfare and Population Development.
- Oelofse, M. (1997) *Group Discussions Pack*, prepared for the Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust from the Inner City Residents' Housing Usage and Attitudes Survey. Johannesburg: Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust.

- Oelofse, M. (2003) *An Application of John Rawls' Principles of Social Justice to Planning: Issues Arising from the Implementation of the National Housing Subsidy Programme in the Inner City of Johannesburg*. PhD dissertation. Johannesburg: Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Pennington, M. (2002) 'A Hayekian liberal critique of collaborative planning'. In *Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory*, edited by Allmendinger, P. and M. Tewdwr-Jones, pp. 187–205. London and New York: Routledge.
- Rawls, J. (2001) *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Rule, S. (2002) 'Post-apartheid Parkhurst: Gentrification and de-racialisation'. In *Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces in South Africa During the 1990s: Reform, Restitution and Restructuring* (Africa Century Publication Series 10), edited by Donaldson, R. and L. Marais, pp. 225–248. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Smith, D. (1995) 'Geography, social justice and the new South Africa', *South African Geographic Journal*, 77(1):1–5.
- Souza, M.L. de (2000) 'Urban development on the basis of autonomy: A politico-philosophical and ethical framework for urban planning and management', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 3(2):187–201.



Part B

Urban Planning Responses



Chapter 7

Housing, Integrated Urban Development and the Compact City Debate

Alison Todes

Introduction: The compact city debate in South Africa

Arguments for compacting cities in South Africa have developed along rather different lines from those that have been formulated internationally, particularly in developed countries. Whereas the focus in these countries has tended to be on questions of land consumption, efficient service provision, transport costs and energy usage (Breheny, 1996; Hillman, 1996), in South Africa, issues of equity and social change have been at the fore. Of course, many common concerns are raised, and the urbanist vision of high-density, mixed-use environments associated with older cities, which has been critical to compact city thinking in developed countries (Jenks *et al.*, 1996), has also been highly influential in the South African context. Nevertheless, the South African case for compacting the city largely reflected local concerns to do with the history of urban apartheid, its impact on city form, and the way it served to impoverish spatially marginalised Black people (e.g. Dewar, 1984). Arguments tended to develop autonomously, although they were strengthened by the growing emphasis on urban compaction internationally (for example, Europe's Green Cities and the USA's Smart City), and by important international precedents such as Curitiba in Brazil, which is sometimes seen as a model for South African cities.

In South Africa, the focus has been on restructuring and integrating the city, making it possible for low-income people to acquire housing in well-located areas, thus reclaiming access to urban opportunities that were lost under apartheid. There has also been a concern to counter the past tendency towards the creation of distant dormitory low-income settlements on the edge of the city, or well beyond. European ideas of decentralised concentration (Breheny, 1992; Thomas and Cousins, 1996) have held little appeal against this history. By contrast, approaches to urban restructuring have emphasised infill and densification within the city: in central areas, around areas of economic activity, and along major transport routes. The development of nodes and 'activity corridors' across the city is intended to integrate the city, to create good routes for public transport, and to provide accessible locations for the development of economic activity and services. The image of city development is one of continuous, and much denser, development than has been the case in the past.

Compared to many cities in developing countries, particularly those in Asia and Latin America, South African cities have low overall density. They are more on par with lower density developed countries (Richardson *et al.*, 2000). They offer only limited opportunities for low-income households to access high-density inner city housing. Nevertheless, in a number of South African cities where substantial housing of this sort exists, particularly in Johannesburg, processes of invasion-succession are changing old race and class patterns, and the inner city is becoming an important source of accommodation for some lower income groups, similar to patterns in a number of developing countries (Burgess, 2000).

Arguments in favour of compacting the South African city were first developed by academics Dewar and Uytendogaardt (Dewar, 1984; Dewar *et al.*, 1979), but were taken up more broadly by anti-apartheid planners in the inclusive development forums of the early 1990s (e.g. Hindson *et al.*, 1993; Smit and Williamson, 1993; Turok, 1994; Watson, 1998) and after 1994, by the ANC government. The links made to the critique of apartheid, the somewhat vague but all-inclusive concept of 'integration', and the promise of transformation, facilitated an acceptance of compact city ideas within policy. It is interesting to note that despite a similar (albeit less extreme) history of urban apartheid and sprawl, compact city ideas have not been taken up in neighbouring Namibia and Zimbabwe. In South Africa, compact city ideas form part of the core principles of the 1995 *Development Facilitation Act (DFA)*, which is intended to guide all physical planning and development, and are embodied in the 1997 *White Paper on Urban Development*. The emphasis on restructuring away from an apartheid form, and on creating more integrated cities (both socially and spatially), has meant that the location and form of housing for low-income households is a key concern.

Despite the acceptance of compact city ideas within official policy, there is a growing debate over the feasibility and desirability of the concept. Furthermore, a number of critics have argued that the principles of the DFA have not been taken seriously in practice (Charlton, 2001; Department of Land Affairs, 1999; Dewar, 2000). They are contradicted by a housing policy that is oriented to the production of individually owned detached units, and that provides too limited funds to cover the costs of better-located land or higher density housing. Nor have DFA principles generally been at the forefront of spatial decision making in provincial and local government. Although most local authorities have developed spatial frameworks that acknowledge these principles in some form, they are not necessarily influencing locational decisions at a project level. There is a growing consensus that current development patterns are tending to reinforce older apartheid patterns, or that new forms of spatial divide are emerging (Bremner, 2000; Schoonraad, 2000; Todes, 2000; Turok, 2000; see also *Business Day*, 29 September 1997). Some question the value of compact city ideas against an international urban context that is increasingly characterised by sprawl (Mabin, 1995).

In light of these concerns, this chapter considers whether and to what extent urban compaction arguments are still important in the South African context. It reviews the debate over the desirability of more compact forms. Using the case of Durban, a local authority that has placed some emphasis on promoting urban compaction, it explores the extent to which urban compaction is being achieved, and why achievements in this regard have been more limited than expected. Against this background, it debates the significance of compact city ideas, and whether they still merit the emphasis that was once accorded to them.

Urban compaction: A socially desirable alternative?

The argument for urban compaction in South Africa arose in part from a critique of the social effects of apartheid and spatial segregation. Studies of households removed from central locations showed the negative economic and social effects of relocation, some of which were linked to peripheral location. Dewar (1984) argued that the creation of large dormitory townships on the urban periphery imposed considerable costs in terms of transport time and travel costs, and marginalised them from wider urban opportunities. It resulted in sterile environments with poor services and facilities, and undermined small-scale economic activity.

These arguments were reinforced by research conducted by feminist authors such as Cook (1987), who demonstrated that these peripheral locations were particularly problematic for women workers who faced long travel times daily (as much as three

hours per day from Khayelitsha, Cape Town, for example), along with the 'double burden' of housework. The result was severe stress and sleep deprivation. A study by Posselthwyte (1986) showed the greater difficulties women faced in negotiating the various demands of childcare, housework, shopping and work in spatially distant locations, while research on women living in various inner city locations in Durban (Charlton, 1994; Fadane, 1993; Hansmann, 1993) suggested the significance of these places for particular groups of women, such as informal traders, and the high demand for low-cost inner city accommodation. Local studies echoed the international literature in this regard (Miraftab, 1994).

By the late 1990s, a critique of the assumption that compaction was necessarily a socially desirable alternative had begun to emerge. Research suggested that declining formal employment, and an increasing reliance by the poor on diverse survival strategies was leading to different demands for space. Cross *et al.* (1996) argued that the semi-rural, but densifying, tribal authorities on the edge of Durban offered important spaces for those surviving through a combination of urban and rural income sources, including the natural resource base. It also allowed them to avoid the high cost of services, which were being imposed as areas in the city were formalised. Schoonraad's (2000) work on Pretoria suggests that the larger sites that are available on the periphery give households the flexibility to accommodate lifecycle changes, to maintain social networks, and to diversify income sources through sub-letting and urban agriculture. Daily living costs are lower than in more centrally located areas, and households manage by sending one person to work in town, thus limiting the impact of transport costs.

There is a growing acceptance of the argument that whatever the history of townships and informal settlements, many are well-established places with social networks that play important roles in survival and civic life. A key issue for planning, then, is how these places can be transformed in terms of creating integrated development within and around the area – through improving infrastructure, facilities and services, and through projects to generate employment and income. The focus on compaction, it has been argued, diverts from this more central question (Todes *et al.*, in press; Tomlinson, 1997).

Schoonraad's argument also provides an important critique of the common emphasis on creating small sites as an aspect of urban compaction. Her argument mirrors the work of Moser (1996) on developing countries, and also, ironically, the claims in much of the literature that people prefer low-density living in developed countries (Breheny, 1997). In contrast to developed countries, however, bigger sites tend to be occupied by larger numbers of people, and do not necessarily result in low-density environments. Resistance by low-income communities to small sites is perhaps testimony to the validity of these critiques.


Do these critiques undermine the validity of arguments for urban compaction or for the development of well-located housing? Not necessarily. Mpantsha's (2000) work on Cato Manor, a major housing development project some seven kilometres from Durban's city centre, shows that although households did not choose to settle in the area due to its good location, they nevertheless benefited from such location through shorter distances to work, reduced transport costs and travel times, and better access to services and facilities. Findings mirror the expectations of those advocating compaction. In an international context, Eckstein's (1990) work on Brazil shows that households in inner city slums survived recession far better than those in dormitory housing schemes on the periphery.

These different pieces of evidence demonstrate that there is not a singular housing need, but quite diverse needs – and that housing policy should embrace this diversity. The development of higher density housing, and policies to make available land for well-located housing of different types is still important, but there are also needs for larger sites, perhaps peripherally located. Similarly, a critical challenge is to transform existing low-income areas into more integrated and better-quality environments. The compact city idea therefore still has validity, but the permanence of the existing settlement pattern, and the demand for larger sites (some of which might be un-serviced and on the periphery) needs to be accepted.

The feasibility of urban compaction: A Durban case study

Durban is a city of around three million people on South Africa's eastern seaboard. Historically, it developed around a T-shaped road pattern along the coastal plain, and into the interior. Under apartheid, the most accessible areas around the main routes were reserved for Whites, while Group Areas for Coloured, Indian/Asian and Black people were created beyond these places. Rapid urbanisation in the mid 1970s to mid 1980s, coupled with 'decompression' of overcrowded formal Black townships in the 1980s as past controls broke down, led to a massive growth of informal settlements in the city. By 1994, informal settlements accounted for about a third of Durban's population, but most were on the periphery, within or beyond old Black townships. Since then, centrally located informal settlements have grown to 10% of such settlements, and old Group Areas designations have started to break down. Old patterns of a divided city largely remain, however, they are cast more in terms of class than race. New divides are also emerging as a separated high-income residential, shopping and office environment develops in the north, paralleling developments in other South African cities.

Figure 7.1 Current urban development in the eThekweni municipal area (Durban)



Local authorities in Durban were amalgamated into six local councils plus a metropolitan council in 1996. In 2000, a Unicity was created. In the early years after 1994, housing projects were funded on the basis of the merits of individual project applications, as judged by the Provincial Housing Board. At this stage, the emphasis was on delivery, and locational questions were not considered, leading to a perpetuation of past patterns, with some notable exceptions (such as the Cato Manor project). The idea of compacting and integrating the city has been taken more seriously by local government, and particularly by the central entity, which accounts

for most of the population. A Metropolitan Spatial Framework, giving expression to these aims, was developed over the 1997 to 1999 period. The Metropolitan Housing Unit, which, until the creation of the Unicity, only had responsibility for projects in the central areas, has embraced the concept of compaction in its Strategic Housing Framework (1999). Its definition of 'well-located' housing is, however, somewhat broader than anticipated in the Spatial Framework.

The Metropolitan Housing Unit has instituted a number of strategies to assist in the development of well-located housing. It has established the First Metro Housing Company to acquire and develop high-density inner city housing for rental, and has initiated a number of inner city housing projects aimed at special needs. One such project is Strollers, catering for temporary accommodation needs. The Unit has recently conducted a detailed audit of land to establish which pieces of land of over two hectares can be developed for low-cost housing, and has gained council's agreement to provide its own land at affordable, below market prices to housing projects. It is developing a prioritisation model that includes locational criteria, but also others, such as the age of the settlement (Charlton, 2001). Its own housing projects tend to be better located than was the case previously. It has avoided the peripheral, isolated projects that dominated in the apartheid years and immediately after, and has located new settlements close to existing settlements to enable access to services. Much of its development takes the form of either informal settlement upgrading or infill projects within the fabric of the city. Its new projects are broadly related to the city's High Priority Transport Network.

Charlton (2001) comments that Durban has been more successful in creating well-located housing than many other South African cities. In addition to the efforts of the Metro Housing Unit, the Cato Manor Project, run by a special-purpose agency, is providing some 30 000 housing units some seven kilometres from the city centre. In addition, the previous Inner West Council developed a considerable amount of housing in the southern Pinetown area, much of which was within a 10 km radius of the important Pinetown/New Germany industrial and commercial node. Developments in the north are occurring along the R102, at some distance from existing employment, but it is expected that as the industrial, retail and office developments take off, these areas will be relatively well located, although they are well over 10 km from the major retail and office complexes that are developing. What seems to be emerging is that, with the exception of Cato Manor and a few smaller projects, the notion of compaction is becoming a relative one, rarely achieving the very close relationships to transport, work and urban facilities which compact city advocates portrayed, but still much better than the very distant location of residential developments under apartheid.

There are several factors that constrain the development of well-located housing developments. Perhaps the most important is access to land. Most developable vacant land is in and around old Black townships, or in the north. Land closer to areas of employment is frequently beset by geotechnical problems related to soil types, steep gradients and flooding. Well-located land is costly, forcing developments onto lower cost land further out. The R1 000 limitation on the amount that can be spent on land in the housing subsidy is also problematic in this regard.

A considerable amount of well-located vacant land is subject to land claims. The possibility of land restitution was not adequately considered in the earlier versions of urban compaction. Plans for urban restructuring and many projects on well-located land were designed prior to the announcement of the land restitution process. Some land once posited for high-density housing developments, such as Block AK near the CBD, is to be returned to owners, rather than developed for housing. In other cases, the process of dealing with land claims has slowed development, such as in Cato Manor, where a long court case and mediation process delayed the project. In Sherwood, a 14 ha proposed low-cost housing project was effectively frozen for five years due to land claims (Makhatini, 1999).

There are other competing demands for land. While the concept of sustainable development is intended to balance and bring together economic, social and biophysical concerns, in Durban there has been something of a stand off between demands for land for low-cost housing and for environmental conservation. Land seen as important for inclusion in the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System is frequently the same land that is desired for housing. Alternatively, environmentalists are wary of allowing low-cost housing developments close to sensitive areas that require preservation. The turn to neo-liberalism has also elevated economic development over housing. Land that might once have been seen as appropriate for low-cost housing is not considered for these purposes for fear of undermining economic activities, such as tourism.

Charlton (2001:12) comments that 'each and every attempt to secure such [well-located] land for housing results in a series of battles that have to be fought to win the right to develop the land'. In addition to contested claims to land, both infill projects and informal settlement upgrading adjacent to existing communities are frequently resisted. The different race, class, or ethnicity of incoming residents, lower housing standards, fears of increased crime, and the anticipated impact of low-cost housing on property values are some of the concerns underpinning Nimbyism (not-in-my-backyard syndrome) (Charlton, 2000; Makhatini, 1999; Todes, 2000). Housing developed adjacent to existing low-income areas is sometimes claimed by the community there, resulting in fierce battles with authorities (Charlton, 2001). And

while the emphasis on locating projects close to existing settlements has meant that new residents are able to access facilities and services in the absence of provision by national departments, it can serve as a source of friction as these services come under pressure (Charlton, 2001). The highly political and contested nature of urban development collides with the rather technocratic and unpeopled map of the early versions of urban compaction.

A key constraint to urban restructuring along compact city lines is the commitment to upgrading informal settlements where possible. This acceptance of informal settlement upgrading arises from a long history of struggle over these issues in the city, and an acceptance of the importance of existing social networks, a perspective that has been reinforced by the growing impact of Aids (see Tomlinson, this volume). Only around 45% of informal settlements fall within the Spatial Framework's accessibility footprint (the area around nodes and corridors), and only 10% are centrally located. Thus upgrading of informal settlements is likely to reinforce the current pattern of development in the city. While the upgrade of centrally located informal settlements does offer an opportunity to break down old patterns, some of these settlements are on land which is considered to be high risk due to threats of flooding, environmental health risks, unstable land, or fire risk.

The recently initiated Slums Clearance Programme posits the development of some 10 850 serviced low-income housing sites by August 2004. Of these sites, some 3 980 will be upgraded, while 6 870 'greenfields' sites will need to be created to accommodate the relocation of households (eThekweni Municipality, 2001). Relocations are to occur where conditions are hazardous, where settlements are considered to be too small to upgrade, or where households have to move to make space for roads, services, etc. Households are to be relocated to land within the expected growth path of the city (such as Waterloo and Canelands in the north), usually some distance from where they are currently living. Some developments of this sort have already occurred. Residents of the Canaan informal settlement, which was located on an unstable slope, were relocated to Quarry Heights, an infill site between KwaMashu and Newlands East, following a land slip after a flood in 1997 (Charlton, 2000). Although the relocation was necessary due to the hazardous nature of the site, it displaced some residents from their source of income, a local waste site, where they survived through 'dump picking'. While these relocations may result in movement to places that are reasonably located in a metropolitan sense, they could be poorly located for residents of central informal settlements who may be dependent on highly localised sources of income. Further, the process of formalising informal settlements or replacing them with formal housing may not be in the interests of all residents of these areas. Charlton (2000) argues that a number of residents in Canaan

and the Briardene informal settlement were not interested in acquiring a formal housing unit or formalisation, and that they were better served by informality. Current housing policy offers little to people of this sort. The displacement or formalisation of centrally located settlements, although well intended, could serve to undermine the survival strategies of some residents.

The impact of compact city ideas in Durban has therefore been rather mixed. Some important opportunities for achieving urban compaction have been taken up, and past tendencies towards location on the periphery have been curbed. Nevertheless, the concept of 'well located' has had to be understood in a metropolitan sense. Housing policy has not facilitated urban compaction, particularly if it is understood in urbanist terms, or as a form of integrated development. Beyond housing policy, there are significant technical and political constraints to its achievement in practice. Well-located housing projects require considerable political commitment to support processes that are complex, slow and sometimes unpopular locally. As Charlton (2001) and Dewar (2000) argue, far more commitment is required if compaction policies are to have a reasonable chance of success.

Conclusion: Is urban compaction still important?

The notion of urban compaction has not turned out to be the clear solution that many planners had expected. Housing needs are more diverse than anticipated in earlier approaches, and ironically, the focus in housing policy on home ownership may serve to marginalise those for whom proximity to sources of income is important. A key question is whether urban compaction is another form of social engineering, a spatial fetishism for which planners have been criticised in the past. The tensions over well-located housing projects, for example, are hardly surprising given the divided nature of South African society, and its growing income inequalities, poverty and unemployment.

Yet the notion of urban compaction remains important. Location close to areas of employment, economic opportunities, facilities and services is still significant for some groups of people, and there are indications that new housing developments that are poorly located are not being taken up. Urban compaction policies in Durban at least have resulted in the development of some well-located housing, and some housing that might be considered as 'better' rather than 'badly' located. The increasingly polycentric spatial organisation of cities offers opportunities to develop housing linked to growing centres, and it is perhaps here that spatial planning can play a role, even if physical relationships remain loose. What does and does not constitute well-located housing needs careful consideration within planning (Todes *et al.*, in press).

Both housing policies and urban restructuring strategies, however, need to embrace the diversity of housing needs, which includes both large plots on the periphery, and access to cheap accommodation in central areas, among others. The current structure of the city also has to be taken as given, with greater emphasis placed on efforts to improve conditions within existing townships and informal areas. The difficulties of linking new developments into well-serviced areas underscores the importance of more integrated approaches to housing, seeing housing as a component of integrated area development that also includes economic and social development elements.

There is a broader issue at stake as well. A key reason why South African cities have remained so untransformed is that informal processes of land and housing delivery have been spatially contained and marginalised. Housing policy is oriented to the production of formal housing, or the formalisation of informal settlements, in many respects reinforcing these patterns. In a recent book examining the compact city in developing countries (Jenks and Burgess, 2000), a number of authors argued that cities in many of these countries are both more dense and characterised by greater land-use mix than developed countries, largely due to the breakdown of conventional controls (Burgess, 2000; Richardson *et al.*, 2000). South Africa's approach to compaction has been to attempt to enable it through formal processes, but this has been difficult to achieve. Stronger movement towards urban compaction perhaps awaits housing and urban policies that accommodate informality. How authorities respond to processes of change already occurring in cities will be critical.

Acknowledgements

This chapter draws on several interviews conducted since 1998. Interviewees are not directly cited here. They include: Clive Foster, Cato Manor Development Association; Dan Smit, Faizel Seedat, Mark Byerley, Julian Baskin, Alan Gerber, Laura Bedford, all of Durban's Metropolitan Housing Unit; Jeff McCarthy, University of Durban-Westville. This chapter also draws on earlier research conducted jointly with the Built Environment Support Group, and reported in Todes *et al.* (in press).

References

- Breheny, M., ed. (1992) *Sustainable Development and Urban Form*. London: Pion.
- Breheny, M. (1996) 'Centrists, decentrists and compromisers: Views on the future of urban form'. In *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form?* edited by Jenks, M., Burton, E., and K. Williams, pp. 13–35. London: E&F Spon.

- Breheny, M. (1997) 'Urban compaction: Feasible and acceptable?' *Cities*, 14: 209–217.
- Bremner, L. (2000) 'Post-apartheid urban geography: A case study of greater Johannesburg's Rapid Land Release Programme', *Development Southern Africa*, 17(1):87–104.
- Burgess, R. (2000) 'The compact city debate: A global perspective'. In *Compact Cities. Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, edited by Jenks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 9–24. London: Spon Press.
- Charlton, S. (1994) *Domestic Worker Accommodation: Emerging Issues*. March Dissertation. Durban: University of Natal.
- Charlton, S. (2000) 'Infill and integration in the post apartheid city: Two low-income housing projects in Durban', paper presented at the *Urban Futures Conference*, Johannesburg, 10–14 July.
- Charlton, S. (2001) *Low Income Housing in South Africa: Practice and Policy. Reflections on the Work of Metro Housing, Durban Metropolitan Council, 1997–2000*, unpublished paper. Durban: Metro Housing Unit, Durban Metropolitan Council.
- Cook, G. (1987) 'Time budgets of working women in disadvantaged society', *Bluestocking*, 37:33–35.
- Cross, C., Luckin, L., Mzimela, T. and C. Clark (1996) 'On the edge: Poverty, livelihoods and natural resources in rural KwaZulu-Natal'. In *Land, Labour and Livelihoods in Rural South Africa*, edited by Lipton, M., Ellis, F. and M. Lipton, pp. 173–214. Durban: Indicator Press.
- Department of Land Affairs (1999) *Green Paper on Development and Planning*. National Development and Planning Commission, DPC4/99. Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs.
- Dewar, D. (1984) 'Cities, poverty and development', paper presented at the *Second Carnegie Conference on Poverty and Development in South Africa*, Cape Town, April.
- Dewar, D. (2000) 'The relevance of the compact city approach: The management of growth in South African cities'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, edited by Jencks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 209–222. London: Spon Press.
- Dewar, D., Uytendogaardt, R., Hutton-Squire, M., Levy, C. and P. Menidis (1979) *Housing: Urbanism in Cape Town*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Eckstein, S. (1990) 'Urbanization revisited: Inner city slum of hope and squatter settlement of despair', *World Development*, 18:165–181.
- eThekweni Municipality (2001) *Implementation of the 'Slums Clearance' Programme*. Durban: Housing Department, eThekweni Municipality.
- Fadane, N. (1993) *An Examination of Gendered Housing Needs of Informal Sector Operators in Warwick Triangle*. Master of Town and Regional Planning Dissertation. Durban: University of Natal.
- Hansmann, R. (1993) *A Gendered Perspective on Inner City Hostel Accommodation: The Case of Thokoza Women's Hostel*. Master of Town and Regional Planning Dissertation. Durban: University of Natal.
- Hillman, M. (1996) 'In favour of the compact city'. In *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form?* edited by Jenks, M., Burton, E. and K. Williams, pp. 36–44. London: E& F Spon.
- Hindson, D., Mabin, A. and V. Watson (1993) *Restructuring the Built Environment*. Unpublished Report to the National Housing Forum. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Jencks, M. and R. Burgess, eds. (2000) *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, London: Spon Press.
- Jenks, M., Burton, E. and K. Williams (1996) 'A question of sustainable urban form: Conclusion'. In *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form?* edited by Jenks, M., Burton, E. and K. Williams, pp. 341–345. London: E& F Spon.

- Mabin, A. (1995) 'On the problems and prospects of overcoming segregation and fragmentation in South African cities in the postmodern era'. In *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, edited by Watson, S. and K. Gibson, pp. 187–198. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Makhatini, M. (1999) *Restructuring the Apartheid City of Durban Through Low-cost Housing Development: Opportunities and Limitations*. Master of Science Urban and Regional Planning (Housing) Dissertation. Durban: University of Natal.
- Miraftab, F. (1994) 'Housing preferences of female heads of low income families in Guadalajara, Mexico', paper presented at the *International Sociological Association, Mazingira Institute and United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat) International Seminar on Gender, Urbanisation and Environment*, Nairobi, 13–16 June.
- Moser, C. (1996) 'Confronting crisis: A comparative study of household responses to poverty and vulnerability'. In *Four Poor Urban Communities, Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monograph Series*, No. 8. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Mpantsha, D. (2000) *Well Located Land for Low Income Housing as a Means Towards Achieving Improvements in Living Standards and Quality of Life of Low Income People. A Case Study of East Wiggins Fast Track*. Master of Housing Dissertation. Durban: University of Natal.
- Posselthwyte, C. (1986) *Reuniting the Divided City: Working Mothers in a Planned Environment*. Master of City and Regional Planning Dissertation. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Richardson, H., Bae, C. and M. Baxamusa (2000) 'Compact cities in developing countries: assessment and implications'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries* edited by Jencks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 25–36. London: Spon Press.
- Schoonraad, M. (2000) 'Cultural and institutional obstacles to compact cities in South Africa'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, edited by Jencks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 219–230. London: Spon Press.
- Smit, D. and A. Williamson (1993) *A Normative Framework for Guiding and Assessing Development*. Unpublished report, the Durban Interim Development Forum. Durban: eThekweni Municipality.
- Thomas, L. and W. Cousins (1996) 'A new compact city form: Concepts in practice'. In *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form?* edited by Jencks, M., Burton, E. and K. Williams, pp. 328–338. London: E&F Spon.
- Todes, A. (2000) 'Reintegrating the Apartheid city? Urban policy and urban restructuring in Durban'. In *A Companion to the City*, edited by Watson, S. and G. Bridges, pp. 617–629. London: Blackwell.
- Todes, A., Pillay, C. and A. Krone (in press) 'Urban restructuring and land availability'. In *Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, edited by Kahn, F. Cape Town: Heinemann.
- Turok, I. (1994) 'Urban planning in the transition from Apartheid, part 2', *Town Planning Review*, 65:243–258.
- Turok, I. (2000) 'Persistent polarisation post-apartheid? Progress towards urban integration in Cape Town', *Urban Change and Policy Research Group Discussion Paper*, No. 1. Glasgow: University of Glasgow.
- Watson, V. (1998) 'Planning under political transition – lessons from Cape Town's metropolitan planning forum', *International Planning Studies*, 3:335–350.

Chapter 8

Unravelling the Different Meanings of Integration: The *Urban Development Framework* of the South African Government

Edgar Pieterse

Given South Africa's unique political history, a central prerequisite for meeting these challenges is to overcome the historically ingrained patterns of the apartheid city ... Spatial integration, through sound urban planning, land, transport and environmental management, is critical to enhance the generative capacity and ease of access to socio-economic opportunities of our urban areas ... [E]conomic development is the key to making our cities and towns more habitable, efficient, competitive and sustainable (Department of Housing, 1997:12, 35).

... [I]t is clear that many lessons have been learnt and that the next cycle of government interventions has already been set in motion and that they are responsive to evidence of the impact of the first policies. However, many of the challenges faced by the government in 1994 remain despite good intentions and sophisticated interventions. It has also become increasingly clear that the spatial patterns and physical forms of many human settlement types *change only very slowly* (Department of Housing, 2000:4, emphasis added).

Introduction

Urban integration is burdened with multiple meanings and connotations and therefore profoundly contested. This chapter explores the different connotations of

urban integration in the *Urban Development Framework (UDF)* of the South African government released in 1997. The intention is to salvage, from obfuscation and confusion, the valid policy ambition to transcend the apartheid city through integrative measures. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to delineate the various meanings of ‘integration’ in the *UDF* in the context of the genealogy of the various connotations of this concept. It is particularly opportune to undertake this analysis since the *UDF* is currently under review in order to be overhauled and updated in the wake of the disjuncture, with regard to settlement policies, between policy intent and outcomes (see second quote above; Diet von Broembsen and Sharon Lewis, pers. comm.). Furthermore, the introduction of eight urban renewal programmes across the country since 2001 to advance urban integration underscores how central the ideal of urban integration has become in the Mbeki era.

Yet, as the analysis will demonstrate, policy formulation and implementation tend to steer clear of the structural forces and associated interests that reproduce segregation and fragmentation through weak conceptual anchoring of policy instruments. As a result, policy ideals remain elusive and transformative potential unrealised. Inescapably, my analysis here is essentially deconstructive and critical. However, this chapter is part of a larger research programme that also considers the potential of the *UDF* to serve as a seedbed for a radical transformative agenda that can produce more equitable interpretations of urban integration. That analysis, along with a more robust conceptual framework for urban integration, will be explored in future publications. In the next section, I present a summarised overview of the *UDF*. Thereafter I explore four connotations of urban integration as developed in the *UDF*. The four connotations of integration that I discuss are: (i) urban integration as high-level policy rationale and outcome; (ii) urban integration as object of spatial planning; (iii) urban integration as glue for social investments; and (iv) urban integration integration as institutional rationale.

Central features of the *Urban Development Framework*

The National Department of Housing in South Africa published the *UDF* in 1997 in the wake of Habitat II in Istanbul in 1996. The *UDF* appeared two years after the first version, the Urban Development Strategy, saw the light of day. Significantly, the *UDF* was less ambitious in scope than its precursor, manifest in the shift in designation from ‘strategy’ to ‘framework’. The *UDF* never achieved widespread acknowledgement in government nor in society at large. For example in an interview with Andrew Boraine (City Manager of Cape Town Municipality, 1996–2000), he could not recall that he had read the policy let alone use it as a reference point for their policy

formulation processes (Andrew Boraine, pers. comm.). This is revealing since the policy framework was meant to reorient and reframe the policies and programmes of various government departments and even non-governmental actors (Monty Narsoo, pers. comm.).

The *UDF* echoes the trend of most mainstream development policies by establishing an ideal future ('vision 2020') that it seeks to realise within the medium- to long term (20 years). The vision is predictably a 'feel-good' mixture of no less than eight ambitious outcomes that will be a material reality by 2020. Outcomes range from behavioural attitudes and spatial systems that do not discriminate on the basis of race or gender, to a participatory democratic local government system that is both financially sound and committed to community empowerment through partnerships. Simultaneously, cities and towns will be environmentally sustainable and fully integrated in terms of the appropriate balance between built environment and open space on the one hand, and land use on the other – manifest in integrated industrial, commercial, residential, information and educational centres (Department of Housing, 1997). In short, it is an urban utopia that no one can possibly disagree with. The vision relies on the confidence of deliberative planning through consensual, partnership-based institutional systems consistent with decentralisation governance theories (Manor, 1999).

The policy framework proceeds to make a gesture towards realism by specifying concrete 'development goals' to guide the pursuit of vision 2020. These goals are defined as the means to realise the vision and are: (i) to create more efficient and productive cities and towns through the growth and development of local economies; (ii) to reduce disparities by providing infrastructure and facilities to disadvantaged communities; (iii) to provide access to better housing and shelter and greater security of tenure for urban residents; (iv) to tackle spatial inefficiencies which give rise to long travelling distances and times which negatively impact on the accessibility of work and other opportunities by promoting urban densification in conjunction with more efficient public transportation; (v) to improve the overall quality of the urban environment by better integrating environmental concerns in development planning and urban management; and (vi) to transform municipalities into effective and accountable institutions through capacity-building programmes which also promote the active interaction of civil society with municipalities (Department of Housing, 1997:9). The message is clear: prioritise economic growth while simultaneously gearing up municipal government to tackle the massive backlogs that characterise urban conditions for (poor) Black citizens. There is also a strong recognition that creating the conditions for greater economic efficiency coincides with political objectives to break down apartheid walls of residential segregation, captured by the

aspiration for greater urban densification. The linchpin that holds all of these policy pieces together and transports the ideals from objectives to policy directives that can lead to implementation is *integrated planning*.

Surprisingly, integrated planning is never clearly defined in the *UDF*. This points to a deeper absence of conceptual clarity that befuddles the policy coherence of the *UDF*, especially with regard to reconciling a series of contradictory policy aims. Integrated planning and urban integration (as the converse of apartheid segregation) are used in a self-evident manner throughout the policy framework and this contributes to the sense of under-achievement expressed by the Department of Housing in the second opening quote. Four different connotations of integration can be discerned in the *UDF*: (i) integration as an ideal policy outcome, linking economic, political, social and environmental objectives; (ii) integration as a spatial strategy; (iii) integration as a theme to link sectoral interventions in the city; and (iv) integration of the institutional architecture within municipal government and the broader governance system in the city. The following analysis makes it clear that ‘integrated urban development’ is profoundly flexible and can only be stabilised through a more robust theoretical grounding that recognises the constitutive nature of unequal (political and economic) power relations in policy processes and associated change of social institutions.

Four connotations of integration in the *Urban Development Framework*

Integration as policy rationale and outcome

Government accepts that cities and towns are shaped by a variety of socio-economic forces and that Government, at all levels, can through its policies and programmes *only guide* the transformation process which must be supported by *all* the stakeholders. The Urban Development Framework therefore, contains Government’s vision for *sustainable urban settlements*, as well as guidelines and programmes for the achievement of the vision (*Foreword*, Department of Housing, 1997, emphasis added).

The *UDF* is steeped in mainstream policy discourses about the virtues of ‘sustainable development’, as defined and promoted by almost all development actors across the ideological spectrum (e.g. Barraclough, 2001). This is clear in the vision statement and the six general urban development goals set out in the *UDF*. The vision statement, in particular, combines the Brundtland Commission’s definition that turns on inter-generational equity with World Bank concerns regarding financial sustainability and more specifically South African concerns, such as overcoming spatial and socio-economic divisions (Department of Housing, 1997:8–9). In the goal statement, the *UDF* makes it clear that sustainable urban development can be attained through

'better integrating environmental concerns with development planning and urban management' (*ibid.*:9). The problem with the approach in the *UDF* with regard to its pursuit of 'sustainable urban development' is that there is no attempt to define or explore the contradictions involved in giving expression to this malleable notion. By failing to signal such contradictions and the contested nature of the policy ideal (sustainable urban development), the *UDF* steers away from the requisite political conflicts that must underpin urban development processes that are transformative of power relations and redistributive towards the subaltern classes (Tajbakhsh, 2001).

In the development studies literature, there has been an interesting and highly relevant refinement of arguments in the wake of mainstream concerns about poverty, the environment and gender equality in the thinking of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies (e.g. Preston, 1996). In this context, Barraclough (2001) provides a sobering analysis of how these concerns are merely adapted to serve dominant interests and political expediency, without conceding ground to the more radical implications of the environmental arguments specifically.

Many who use the term [sustainable development], however, fail to recognize that reversing environmental degradation requires a reduction in social inequities. There seems to be wide rhetorical agreement among agencies that improved equity is not possible between generations, or even between different social groups within the present one, if essential life support systems provided by the natural environment are not protected. There is no consensus, however, about what this implies for different 'stakeholders' – about what reforms are needed and who is capable and willing to bring them into effect or about how costs and benefits should be shared or even about what they would be. Participation is often interpreted to mean acquiescence and voluntary contributions of labour and resources by low-income 'beneficiaries' who have no real influence on a project's goals and design or in establishing the rules within which it must operate (Barraclough, 2001:9–10).

In other words, over the last two decades there has been a tendency among agencies that represent the interests of elites in the North and in the South to incorporate social and environmental concerns into their conceptual frameworks, without shifting their fundamental neo-liberal premises about the primacy of economic growth and efficiency as the prerequisite for social development and environmental actions. In the urban development literature, this tendency manifests itself in equally problematic policy aspirations and discourses. Adrian Atkinson (2000) recently undertook a useful survey of various discourses about urban sustainability. His main findings confirm the general criticism of Barraclough that the structural context – rapid urbanisation and the dominance of neo-liberal economic and social policies in the case of third world urban areas – is not adequately addressed in the policy frameworks of multilateral agencies and governments that promote urban sustainability. Atkinson (2000) further

illustrates that accelerated policy processes of devolution and democratisation in third world cities are not calibrated to address the imperatives of urban sustainability. Other studies have come to the same conclusion (e.g. Ravetz, 2000; Werna, 2001).

In light of this international evidence it is not surprising that the *UDF* is also marked by conceptual superficiality and an avoidance of issues that may demonstrate the ambiguous nature of supposedly self-evident concepts, such as urban sustainability. In fact, the blatant disregard of the contradictions between the ideological thrust of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic policy in the introductory section alerts the reader to the political imperative to construct a sense of political consensus and certainty. Put differently, it is clear that the *UDF* prefers a depoliticised approach to urban development as is manifest in assumptions about voluntarism and consensual politics. These flaws are at the heart of the poor track record of implementation characterising the policy five years later, and therefore require further explication.

The *UDF* is essentially consistent with various international agreements and frameworks, such as the Brundtland Commission Report (WCED, 1987), Agenda 21 (1992, see: www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21) and the Habitat Agenda (1996), in promoting 'a voluntaristic approach to achieving sustainable development where each stakeholder group should find its own path and make a contribution in its own way' (Atkinson, 2000:3). As a result, the following logic can be discerned at various points in the *UDF*: Politics is cast as an exercise in achieving consensus on shared principles, such as environmental sustainability, economic growth and poverty reduction. Once consensus is achieved between diverse actors coming from the private sector, government and civil society, it is possible to harness the distinctive resources and particular added value to make development initiatives a success. This model of politics depends on the conceptual flaw of voluntarism, namely, intrinsic altruism. Essentially, the *UDF* asserts that groups with divergent interests can be convinced to voluntarily alter their behaviour and act in a more sustainable manner by participating in partnership-based governance structures that operate on *shared* principles and values. As both Atkinson (2000) and Barraclough (2001) demonstrate, neo-liberal appropriations of development concepts, such as sustainable development or even integrated development, tend to assume that people and groups will voluntarily change behaviour once they accept values and principles such as sustainability, democracy, tolerance, etc. More astute rational choice theorists would argue for stimulating voluntarism through 'appropriate' incentives and institutional arrangements.

One of the more dangerous consequences of these conceptual assumptions is the understanding of communities and local democratic politics put forward in the *UDF*.

Specifically, the *UDF* displays a romanticised perspective on ‘communities’, an uncritical celebration of partnerships and an over-optimistic approach to what integrated planning can achieve. It therefore asserts that ‘[p]rogrammes must be designed to ensure that development is planned and implemented in a participatory, integrated and environmentally sustainable manner so as to bring about better living and working environments for all’ (Department of Housing, 1997:11). This would be a bold policy move if it were backed up with some serious exploration of the factors that would advance or, alternatively, undermine the realisation of such an approach to participatory governance. Furthermore, in a context of severe unequal access to urban resources it is unlikely that everyone can and will benefit. In fact, a necessary and politically essential feature of ‘integrated and environmentally sustainable’ development must be a reduction of multiple inequalities – effectively reducing the ‘quality of life’ and ‘convenience’ of the wealthy and high consumers (Sachs, 2000). Obviously, such a situation will not arise in the absence of fierce political contestation. Thus, it becomes a policy imperative to put forward an argument for the need for democratic political contestation to identify the contradictions and conflicts that will arise when existing power relations are scrutinised and shifted in favour of subaltern classes and identities (Barnard and Armstrong, 1998). In the absence of such political realism and grounding in the *UDF*, the following aspiration stands out as glaringly naïve and, essentially, wishful thinking:

There is also a real sense in our cities and towns that everyone's lives are interconnected. [...] Different stakeholders also found more *common ground* in the forums that have become such an important part of the decision-making process over the last few years. Most key stakeholders now understand that townships cannot be insulated from higher-income suburbs, as in the past. There is also recognition that the various urban and rural interest groups can and must work *together* to remake the cities and towns (Department of Housing, 1997:6–7, emphasis added).

To be fair, it is important to highlight that there is one instance in the policy where a more sober understanding of urban politics comes to the fore:

As governance structures, involving both formal institutions of municipalities and role players in civil society, become a more prominent feature of the urban landscape, the strength and resilience of the associational fabric will play a key role in the formulation of urban policy and ultimately, delivery. As full consensuses are rarely attainable, elected representatives must therefore accept the responsibility of making decisions in terms of determining policies and priorities after consultation (Department of Housing, 1997:6).

In this formulation, there seems to be a clear recognition that consensus is elusive but that provisional agreements are required to move forward with policy formulation and implementation. However, the argument seems to stop at simply invoking the

importance of keeping community-based organisation (CBO) representatives accountable to agreements made in negotiations, with no consideration of other strategies that can be pursued to ensure that CBOs and communities are sufficiently engaged to buy into provisional agreements and consensus. Here, and in other sections where community development forums are posited as the most useful participatory planning vehicles, what transpires is an uncomplicated view – free of power relations – of everyday life and collective practices in these areas (*ibid.*:36). Given the available data and knowledge about the deep lines of stratification and inequality within poor areas, it is untenable to propose a traditional model of collective community participation (e.g. Cherry, *et al.* 2000; Crankshaw, *et al.* 2000; Everatt, 1999). This approach fails to deal with the imperative of defining and promoting special measures to surface and transcend the problems of local elites and gate keeping that characterise development interventions.

In summary, the first and highest level of integration that is envisaged in the *UDF* is the pursuit of sustainable urban development, which denotes the integration of economic, social, environmental and political empowerment imperatives. However, the *UDF* follows the pattern of numerous international treaties and policies that tend to invoke the apparent virtue of doing this, without a grounding in a deep analysis of the structural factors that inhibit the emergence of sustainable policies and practices. Due to this conceptual failure, the policy becomes unrealistic and naïve in its postulates about how political and planning processes will be used to advance the formulation of policies that can contribute to substantive integration. Conceptually, this is achieved by drawing on a consensual model of political interaction between different classes and interest groups that can easily lead to consensual outcomes. This is possible because the *UDF* operates on the assumption that behavioural and attitudinal change in favour of practices that are more sustainable will be entered into voluntarily; that is, without interventionist measures to ensure ‘reforms of international trade and finance, property rights, rich country production-consumption patterns, the reduction of glaring inequalities of all kinds in access to natural resources, wealth and knowledge as well as respect for universal human rights’ (Barracrough, 2001:35) – some of the basic structural prerequisites to establish more sustainable economic, social and environmental practices.

Integration as object of spatial planning

Undoing the Apartheid City will focus on: linking the component parts of the city through high-density activity corridors; township upgrading; urban infill; development and integration of apartheid developed ‘buffer zones’; inner city redevelopment; development and provision of adequate open spaces for recreational purposes; and land reform programmes

(restitution, redistribution and tenure reform). This transformation includes augmenting and diversifying urban functions, upgrading existing urban settlements and constructing new housing, restoring and extending infrastructure services, promoting investment and economic activities, alleviating environmental health hazards and including women in decision-making processes (Department of Housing, 1997:13).

One could argue that referring to the policy ideal of realising 'sustainable urban development' is an understandable obfuscation in the *UDF* because the real thrust of the policy is to promote integrated planning, which refers to spatial planning interventions that create a regulatory framework to transcend the evils of apartheid-style segregationist planning. The problem with this line of argument is that the *UDF* is not much clearer on what integrated planning means and how *specifically* it will lead to desegregated cities and towns, given the political and economic sensitivities that are to be respected in pursuing integrated planning. In one instance, the *UDF* suggests that integrated planning is the combination of economic, social and environmental planning (Department of Housing, 1997:11). In other instances, as the quote above illustrates, integrated planning seems to refer to current thinking in spatial planning about compact cities through a variety of measures organised around stimulating spatial corridors and nodes. In yet another instance, the *UDF* suggests that the planning ideas that flow from the Local Agenda 21 framework should be adopted (*ibid.*:17). This plurality of terminological usage leads to confusion and certainly undermines the prospects of concerted action flowing from the policy. However, since the compact city ideas and associated physical planning interventions, as listed in the quote above, are dominant in South African debates, I will briefly focus on this aspect of the *UDF* and overlook the lack of specification around what economic, social and environmental planning may mean. Some of the lack of detail is undoubtedly related to the broader conceptual muddle discussed in the previous part.

Most urban commentators suggest that the problems of segregation, lack of access to opportunities for the urban poor, urban sprawl and fragmented development programmes continue unabated despite the *UDF*, the *Development Facilitation Act* and other policies aimed at transcending the apartheid city (Dewar, 1998; Huchzermeyer, 2001; Todes, 2000). In exploring the ideas put forward in the *UDF* around spatial integration, I will turn to three recent case studies on Cape Town (Dewar, 2000), Pretoria (Schoonraad, 2000) and Durban (Todes *et al.*, 2000) and extrapolate the factors that undermine the potency of spatial planning to foster urban integration and compaction.

The most frequently cited reason for persistent segregation and fragmentation in various analyses is the inability of planning frameworks and strategies to shift or even bend land markets that reinforce patterns of segregation and sprawl. Land markets are further reinforced by the patterns of urbanisation at both ends of the income

spectrum. As Schoonraad (2000:221) points out, '[t]he sprawl of low income neighbourhoods are matched by the spatial decentralisation of high-income groups' (*ibid.*:221). This is further compounded by a lack of political will to address 'land cost and availability, competing claims to land, and resistance by adjacent communities' (Todes, 2000:619). At a social and cultural level, patterns of urbanisation are reinforced by the ever-rising imperatives of safety and security that drive the development of security complexes for middle- and upper-income residential areas. In lower-income communities, attitudes towards space and living in freestanding dwellings on individual stands remain predominant (Dewar, 2000; Schoonraad, 2000). These trends are observed across various urban areas in South Africa. In cities and towns with progressive municipal councils committed to urban integration, the pressure has been to redirect services to un- and under-serviced areas on the periphery of the city, effectively entrenching the apartheid urban form. However, the institutional challenges associated with amalgamating previously separate local government administrations with distinctive cultures and establishing financial management systems within an overall environment of fiscal prudence contribute to keeping political attention squarely fixed on getting more and better basic services to communities on the periphery (Williams, 2000). The added dilemma is that many of the policy frameworks that inform the delivery of basic services do not necessarily advance integration or compaction. The biggest culprit in this regard has been the housing policy itself, especially the size of the subsidy and the prescriptions about the size of the top structure and the land. It has effectively produced an outcome whereby available land is only found at the edges of the city and medium-density options are prohibitively expensive, even if they can find cultural resonance with potential beneficiaries (Mabin, 2000; Schoonraad, 2000; Todes *et al.*, 2000).

These densely inter-related (economic, political, socio-cultural) factors that undermine the policy ideal of fostering urban integration and compaction through spatial planning tools, as reflected in the quote above, have led to a series of new questions about the 'realism' and 'feasibility' of holding on to this ideal. Alison Todes and her colleagues paint a fascinating picture of the Spatial Development Plan (SDP) in Durban and how it has sought to manage the tensions between infill-compacting initiatives and redirecting expenditure and investment to the periphery where the need is greatest. By holding on to the basic notion of corridors and nodes, the SDP provides a framework for more bottom-up planning that can be need-responsive. It seeks to locate this within a larger spatial framework to allow various interest groups to see and explore the wider spatial-developmental impacts of their local plans. Through this dialogical process, agreements can be arrived at using the parameters of the corridors and nodes as a guideline (Todes *et al.*, 2000). It is too soon to say whether this will

indeed begin to reverse apartheid-style segregation and fragmentation. However, it does provide a glimpse into a more socially situated approach to confronting some of the contradictions that rail against integration, as discussed earlier.

It also leads to the problematic issue of preference among the urban poor, foregrounded by Maria Schoonraad in her empirically based argument about the attitudes and preferences of residents in Mamelodi, who are on the periphery. Based on quantitative and qualitative data sources, Schoonraad (2000) essentially argues that the livelihood imperatives of the urban poor on the periphery make the periphery not such a bad place to be, especially if you have access to a reasonably sized plot of land that lends itself to additional revenue opportunities through renting space for backyard 'shacks' and informal businesses. In cost-benefit terms, these locations are more favourable as long as formal jobs and affordable transportation remain out of reach. This does not negate the imperative of promoting higher densities, with mixed-uses at central locales. However, it does bring to the fore the importance of making sure that policy measures that seek to advance integration are based on a sound empirical understanding of the livelihood strategies of those who need to be given equitable access to urban opportunities. (What remains unclear in Schoonraad's analysis is whether her findings also pertain to the backyard tenants who are arguably more vulnerable and excluded than their landlords.)

This brief summation of the issues involved in using spatial planning as the lead instrument in fostering urban integration underscores the inadequacy of the discussion in the *UDF*. The issue is not simply a question of hindsight. Most of the issues mentioned here surfaced during planning debates that fed into the National Housing Forum deliberations (Alan Mabin, pers. comm.). Similarly, one can argue that the responses that were elicited by the *UDF*'s precursor, the *Urban Development Strategy*, also raised most of these issues, albeit from very particular ideological standpoints (e.g. Bond *et al.*, 1996; Centre for Development Enterprise, 1996). As a minimum, one would expect that the *UDF* would have provided clearer frameworks to explore which factors advance or undermine urban integration through spatial planning, embedded in a broader regulatory framework to ensure democratic control of city development.

Clearly, a key challenge for spatial planning in the South African context is to operate on the basis of sound data about the actual livelihood strategies (and their spatial dimensions) of the poor, middle-classes and elites. This must be embedded in more creative approaches to intervene in land markets that will ensure the overall (economic) viability of the urban area while also breaking through the obstacle of land prices as the primary determinant as to where the poor are to be settled and housed. In the absence of readily available policy instruments, the task of policy then

is to recognise a fundamental contradiction and propose a suitable process to get opposing interest groups to enter into a democratic dialogue to find a socially situated compromise. Over time, such a compromise will be renegotiated, depending on the political balance of forces (e.g. Barnard and Armstrong, 1998; Roe, 1998). This dialogue must obviously be informed by a series of agreed principles and values that are consistent with the Constitution and relevant legislation. It could even be premised on an argument for change that is strongly shaped by an argument about how best to realise integrated urban development in spatial terms. However, by relying on politically correct rhetoric that is effectively unviable in political and economic terms, the status quo is expected to remain in place. This is largely what has happened since the release of the *UDF*.

Integration as the glue for sectoral investments

Worldwide experience has shown that well-directed human settlement policies cannot be based solely on economic and physical development plans. Unless there is investment in the public environment (schools, clinics, parks, police stations, etc.) which contribute to positive perceptions of a neighbourhood, individuals are unlikely to invest in their own environments (Department of Housing, 1997:31).

The third way in which integration is approached and referred to in the *UDF* is as the *coordination and integration* of sectoral investments in cities to ensure that, among other things, economic and spatial planning come together and reinforce social development. In one sense, this is a crucial assertion given the entrenched legacy of sectoral (and disciplinary) specialisation in the history of urban development policies in South Africa (Mabin and Smit, 1997). Here I want to endorse the importance of foregrounding the need to link, coordinate and integrate numerous sectoral policies and investments to advance the development of more equitable and liveable urban settlements. However, it is important to reflect on the conceptual limitations of the presentation of the issue in the *UDF*. The problems are twofold and inter-related.

First, the *UDF* tends to present the plethora of sectoral policies that impact on urban settlements as a shopping list, without any critical reflection on the nature of these policies and their potential (in)compatibility. For example, in Section 3.2.4.2 (Department of Housing, 1997:32) on safety and security, there is an argument that social and economic regeneration follows the improvement of basic services, education and employment. In another section on social development (Section 3.2.4, *ibid.*:31–2), an argument is made for a coordinated approach towards crucial social infrastructure such as health services, educational facilities and recreational spaces. However, these arguments are simply asserted, without referring to critical questions,

such as: What precursors of this level of coordination already exist upon which to build? Should the departments of education, health or local governments coordinate their investment with that of the housing delivery system? If so, who should lead? What comes first? How do these multiple investments ensure that higher-order urban development objectives are consistently achieved? The *UDF* clearly seeks to avoid any critical interpretation of established sectoral policies, presumably to ensure buy-in from the various line departments and to avoid conflict between the promoting departments and Ministers. Given the timing of the *UDF*, this may be an understandable political consideration. Yet, it is highly unsatisfactory policy formulation to propound institutional models that are simply not problematised or anchored in clear rules to anticipate and manage inevitable conflicts and contradictions that will arise in the cauldron of implementation.

The second, interconnected problem is the lack of reflection in the *UDF* on the fact that most sectoral policies were developed before the new local government dispensation was resolved in policy terms. By definition, therefore, these policies reflect a limited understanding of the role of local government. The problem of unfunded mandates being devolved to local government was already evident then, not to speak of the contradictory development priorities assumed by different sectoral policies. Given that the *UDF* argues for local government as the lead actor in constructing appropriate sectoral coordination and integration at the local level, this oversight is noteworthy (see quote below). With hindsight, this conceptual blind spot in the *UDF* has proven to be particularly significant given the undermining impact national sectoral policies have had on local government's capacity to carry out integrated development (e.g. Parnell and Pieterse, 1998; Williams, 2001).

Integration as institutional rationale

Successful integration and regeneration of South Africa's urban settlements will require the support of both the private and public sectors. Within such partnerships the public sector has an important role to play. Successful urban development also requires coordination among the various spheres of government. Initiatives to develop urban management capacity must be supported by provincial and national government, but the management of the urban areas themselves can best be carried out at a local level where decision-makers are in touch with local needs and conditions (Department of Housing, 1997:37).

Coordination between the various responsible line functions is vital to ensure integrated and sustainable urban development. In order to ensure equity, existing institutions will initially provide these services. In time, certain private providers may become accredited to do likewise. To overcome these backlogs, partnership arrangements with the private sector are also essential (*ibid.*:32).

These quotes reflect the institutional matrix that is envisaged in the *UDF* to ensure the advancement of integrated planning and development (the three dimensions discussed before), under the leadership role of local government. It is clearly ensconced in a discourse of partnerships, as has become routine in almost all post-1994 policies of the government. Municipalities are seen as the lead actors that will knit together sectoral investments and plans through integrated development plans (and land development objectives) that find further expression in spatial frameworks. In governance terms, it all rests on a strong system of inter-governmental coordination and partnerships with the private sector and civil society. I have already dealt with the problematic assumptions in the *UDF* about civil society organisations and ‘beneficiary’ communities and the system of intergovernmental relations. In this final section, I will therefore restrict my focus on the unproblematised approach the policy takes with regard to the private sector and private markets.

A general feature of the *UDF* is to echo neo-liberal preoccupations in urban policy to treat ‘urban productivity’ and ‘competitiveness’ (following the World Bank, 1991 and 2000) as the key determinants of urban vitality. This conceptual bias feeds into a number of implicit arguments in favour of greater private-sector participation in urban development initiatives through public-private partnerships. Ideas that are linked to assumptions that unfettered land and housing markets are vital for market efficiencies to come into their own and affect urban productivity and competitiveness. Central tenets of mainstream urban policy advocated by the World Bank (1991) to promote favourable conditions for housing and land markets to operate effectively, to improve revenue capacity at city level and to remove market distortions, are unmistakable (Jones and Ward, 1994). International evidence demonstrates that it is a short step from making an argument for unfettered markets and prioritising urban competitiveness to reducing the directive and interventionist role of the state (Burgess *et al.*, 1997). The *UDF* seems to guard against such slippage. However, discursive references to ‘the need and the ability of consumers to pay’ (Department of Housing, 1997:18) and ‘investing in infrastructure and housing improves the capacity of our urban areas to achieve growth and competitiveness while also addressing the problem of urban poverty’ (*ibid.*:18) suggest that the fundamental assumptions of neo-liberal urban policy are accepted.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to tease out this problematic issue in its full dimensions, given the emphasis in the *UDF* on equity and addressing urban poverty. It will have to suffice to point out that in a context where the conceptual mooring of ‘urban sustainability’ is as weak as demonstrated earlier, it is unlikely that the dominant pressure of neo-liberal interests in the state, civil society and private sector will be counteracted. In fact, recent research on municipal reform and service

provision (Bond, 1999; McDonald, 2002), security of tenure (Huchzermeyer, 2001, 2002; Royston, 2002) and housing policy and implementation (Khan, in press) suggest that neo-liberal policy discourses are on the ascendancy, even if not completely uncontested. Part of the reason for this development is the apolitical nature of policy discourses that deal with public-private partnerships and that promote the centrality of competitiveness as a precondition for addressing poverty and inequality. The *UDF* is clearly another example of this tendency in post-apartheid policy production.

Conclusion

The short legacy of the *UDF* is not inspiring. A number of practical failures in implementing the *UDF* suggest that a much more rigorous policy response is required to address the entrenched legacies and power practices of apartheid urban development. A stark failure is the limited inter-governmental and inter-departmental coordination as envisaged in the *UDF* (Bornstein, 2000). Another failure is the limited policy and programme capacity at local government level to facilitate the participatory conceptualisation and execution of so-called integrated programmes. The absence of meaningful spatial re-ordering in any South African city through spatial planning instruments is another instance of failure. The lack of follow-up through appropriate monitoring and support systems by the Department of Housing is a further example of policy failure.

However, these outcome failures need to be seen against the deeper problem of weak conceptual anchoring of the policy objectives and instruments. Conceptually, the central problem in the *UDF* is that it fails to engage with divergent and conflictual interests in the city. It operates on the assumption that 'urban integration', as a shared common good, can be defined and pursued. This political approach is particularly problematic in the face of the partisan interventions that are required to address the legacy and systems of power that reproduce the apartheid city, with its inequitable land and housing markets and skewed distribution of resources and opportunities. Partisan interventions such as regulating land markets in favour of getting the poor access to tenure and rental opportunities closer to economic and social opportunities are needed. Furthermore, partisan interventions are required to redirect expenditure towards addressing the massive backlogs in access to essential basic services that confront the urban poor. These imply very explicit rights-based normative policy commitments that cannot be discarded in the face of pressure from powerful interests in the city. The combination of conceptual and practical failure in giving expression to the *UDF* raises profound questions about the viability and relevance of integrated

development in South African cities and towns. These questions need to be addressed squarely as we proceed through another round of policy (re)formulation to produce urban integration through renewal programmes.

Acknowledgements

This chapter is based on research underway as part of completing a PhD on urban integration and urban development policy in South Africa post-1994. The research is part funded by a Chevening Scholarship grant, an Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust grant and a grant from the Social Policy Department at the London School of Economics. I am also indebted to Mirjam van Donk and the editors for their comments that have strengthened this chapter. I remain solely responsible for the argument and content.

References

- Atkinson, A. (2000) 'Promoting sustainable human development in cities of the South: A Southeast Asian perspective.' *UNRISD Geneva 2000 Occasional Paper*, No. 6. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Barnard, A. and G. Armstrong (1998) 'Learning and policy integration.' In *The Cornerstone of Development: Integrating Environmental, Social and Economic Policies*, edited by J. Schnurr and S. Holtz, pp. 45–68. Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers.
- Barracough, S. (2001) 'Towards integrated and sustainable development?' *UNRISD Overarching Concerns Paper Series*, No. 1. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Bond, P. (1999) 'Basic infrastructure for socio-economic development, environmental protection and geographical desegregation: South Africa's unmet challenge', *Geoforum*, 30(1):53–59.
- Bond, P., Mayekiso M., Miller, D. and M. Swilling (1996) 'Response to the government's draft urban development strategy document', *Urban Forum*, 7(1):101–120.
- Bornstein, L. (2000) 'Institutional context'. In *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Meeting the Challenge*, edited by May, J., pp. 173–204. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Burgess, R., Carmona, M. and T. Kolstee, eds. (1997) *The Challenge of Sustainable Cities: Neoliberalism and urban strategies in developing countries*. London: Zed Books.
- Centre for Development Enterprise (1996). 'Response to the government's Draft Urban Development Strategy document', *Urban Forum*, 7(1):90–100.
- Cherry, J., Jones, K. and J. Seekings (2000) 'Democratization and politics in South African townships', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(4):889–905.
- Crankshaw, O., Gilbert, A. and A. Morris (2000) 'Backyard Soweto', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(4):841–857.
- Department of Housing (1997) *Urban Development Framework*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Department of Housing (2000) *South African Country Report for the Review of the Implementation of the Habitat Agenda*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.

- Dewar, D. (1998) 'Settlements, change and planning in South Africa since 1994'. In *Blank Architecture, Apartheid and After*, edited by H. Judin and I. Vladislavic, pp. 369–375. Rotterdam: Nai.
- Dewar, D. (2000) 'The relevance of the compact city approach: The management of urban growth in South African cities'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms in Developing Countries*, edited by Jenks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 209–218. London: Spon Press.
- Evaratt, D. (1999) 'Yet another transition? Urbanization, class formation, and the end of national liberation struggle in South Africa'. *Woodrow Wilson Centre for Comparative Urban Studies Occasional Paper Series*, No. 24. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (2001) 'Consent and contradiction: Scholarly responses to the Capital Subsidy Model for informal settlement intervention in South Africa', *Urban Forum*, 12(1):71–106.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (2002) 'Evaluating tenure intervention in informal settlements in South Africa'. In *Holding Their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries*, edited by Durand-Lasserve, A. and L. Royston, pp. 182–194. London: Earthscan.
- Jones, G. and P. Ward (1994) 'The World Bank's "new" urban management programme: Paradigm shift or policy continuity', *Habitat International*, 18(3):33–51.
- Khan, F. (in press) 'Introduction'. In *Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, edited by Khan, F. and P. Thring. Cape Town: Heinemann.
- Mabin, A. (2000) 'Urban policy – presences and absences', paper prepared for the *Urban Futures Conference*, Johannesburg, 10–14 July.
- Mabin, A. and D. Smit (1997) 'Reconstructing South Africa's cities? The making of urban planning 1900–2000', *Planning Perspectives*, 12:193–223.
- Manor, J. (1999) *The Political Economic of Democratic Decentralisation*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- McDonald, M. (2002) 'Up against the (crumbling) wall: The privatization of urban services and environmental justice'. In *Environmental Justice in South Africa*, edited by McDonald, D., pp. 292–324. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Parnell, S. and E. Pieterse (1998) 'Developmental local government: The second wave of post-apartheid urban reconstruction'. *Dark Roast Occasional Paper Series*, No. 1, Cape Town: Isandla Institute.
- Preston, P. (1996) *Development Theory: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ravetz, J. (2000) *City-Region 2020: Integrated Planning for a Sustainable Environment*. London: Earthscan.
- Roe, E. (1998) *Policy Analysis and Formulation for Sustainable Livelihoods*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- Royston, L. (2002) 'Security of urban tenure in South Africa: Overview of policy and practice'. In *Holding Their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries*, edited by Durand-Lasserve, A. and L. Royston, pp. 165–181. London: Earthscan.
- Sachs, I. (2000) 'Social sustainability and the whole development: Exploring the dimensions of sustainable development'. In *Sustainability and the Social Sciences: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach to Integrating Environmental Considerations into Theoretical Reorientation*, edited by Becker, E. and T. Jahn, pp. 25–36. Paris: UNESCO.
- Schoonraad, M. (2000) 'Cultural and institutional obstacles to compact cities in South Africa'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms in Developing Countries*, edited by Jenks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 219–230. London: Spon Press.

- Tajbakhsh, K. (2001) *The Promise of the City: Space, Identity, and Politics in Contemporary Social Thought*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Todes, A. (2000) 'Reintegrating the apartheid city? Urban policy and urban restructuring in South Africa'. In *A Companion to the City*, edited by Bridge, G. and S. Watson, pp. 617–629. London: Blackwell.
- Todes, A., Dominik, T. and D. Hindson (2000) 'From fragmentation to compaction? The case of Durban, South Africa'. In *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms in Developing Countries*, edited by Jenks, M. and R. Burgess, pp. 321–244. London: Spon Press.
- Werna, E. (2001) 'Shelter, employment and the informal city in the context of the present economic scene: Implications for participatory governance', *Habitat International*, 25(2):209–227.
- Williams, J. (2000) 'South Africa: Urban transformation', *Cities*, 17(3):167–183.
- Williams, J. (2001) 'Intergovernmental relations: Local government'. In *Inter-governmental Relations in South Africa: The Challenges of Co-operative Government*, edited by Levy, N. and C. Tapscott, pp. 207–231. Cape Town: School of Government, University of the Western Cape.
- World Bank (1991) *Urban Policy and Economic Development: An agenda for the 1990s*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank (2000) *Cities in Transition*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987) *Our Common Future*. Brundtland Commission. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 9

Planning for Integration: The Case of Metropolitan Cape Town

Vanessa Watson

Introduction

At the time of the first democratic elections in South Africa, in April 1994, a number of the larger cities were in the process of preparing comprehensive spatial plans. These plans were intended to address the spatial heritage of apartheid which had left its mark in the form of physically segregated, fragmented and dispersed towns and cities. Infused with the spirit of the welfarist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the new ANC government, many spatial planners saw this as the historical moment in which they could establish their position as the leading forward-thinking professionals. The plans, all of which incorporated elements of the compact city approach, assumed a leading role for spatial planning and a strongly interventive government committed to addressing issues of urban equity.

However, the context in which these plans were being developed changed dramatically. With the shift in macro-economic policy towards neo-liberalism in 1996 came a gradual change in national priorities: global positioning and attracting foreign investment displaced poverty alleviation, redistribution and urban integration. In the re-organisation of local government, which took place throughout the 1990s, the rhetoric of 'new managerialism' was a strong informant. Local government was required to be 'developmental' and entrepreneurial, and this required it to make coordinated efforts to achieve defined goals. Integration and development became key concepts in the policy documents setting out a new role for local government. In line

with World Bank thinking, however, the mechanism for integration was the budget, not the spatial plan. And in the process of re-organisation, the concept of integration was increasingly applied to the workings of the bureaucracy rather than to the spatial organisation of the cities. For spatial planners this has brought about a degree of marginalisation, with traditional approaches to spatial intervention leaving them increasingly at odds with new managerialism in a market-friendly society. In the meantime, urban restructuring efforts in this period of transition have been largely ineffective, and many South African cities are almost as divided, spatially and economically, as they were in the days of apartheid (see Christopher, 2001).

This chapter focuses on the problem of achieving institutional integration, which, it could be argued, is a precondition for achieving spatial integration. It first documents the efforts of the spatial planners in the period of political transition in one particular city, metropolitan Cape Town, and shows how both change and continuity bedevilled their work. The chapter then draws on literature in the field of policy discourse to try and explain the difficulties of institutional integration.

Spatial planning in Cape Town and the issue of functional integration

The development of a new spatial plan for Cape Town

By the late 1980s it was becoming apparent to many that the days of the apartheid government were numbered. This was of particular concern to spatial planners at the local, or municipal, level. 'Forward' planning in South Africa's main metropolitan areas was, at the time, set out in Guide Plans formulated at national government level, and all reflected a preoccupation with the spatial separation of land uses and of racial groupings. Such Guide Plans had, however, been informed by the assumption that influx control laws (whereby Black people were restricted from entering and remaining in the White urban areas) would continue to contain pressures for urbanisation. When these laws were finally scrapped in 1986, as a result of political pressure, the prospect of large-scale urbanisation made an alternative to the Guide Plan a clear necessity. It was this realisation that, in metropolitan Cape Town, was to give rise to a locally initiated metropolitan planning process which was to occupy the spatial planners for the next decade (see Watson, 2002 for a history of this process).

There were two significant aspects to this metropolitan planning process. Firstly, there was, initially, broad acceptance from within local government and the professions that thinking about the future of cities was the preserve of the urban and regional planning profession and its equivalent department in local government. This may in part have been due to the fact that planning had been harnessed in the apartheid years to give spatial expression to the project of racial separation, and hence

to the physical and social development of urban areas. It may also have been due to the fact that local governments of the late 1980s saw their role in a highly traditional sense, as that of administration and the provision of engineering services. Thus planners were, at the start of the process, the only 'forward thinking' professionals in local government, and were able to claim the task of urban change (via the development of a metropolitan plan) for themselves. The second significant aspect was that nearly all of the planners of the time conceived of their arena of intervention as essentially spatial. This is a position that has dominated the profession for much of its history and has only recently been subject to challenge. While one of the planning professionals involved argued that the future of Cape Town should be conceptualised through a number of 'frameworks', and that these should include economic, social, environmental and institutional frameworks as well as a spatial one, subsequent processes served to narrow down the scope of the planning exercise to a primarily spatial (or physical) one.

In the early years of the metropolitan planning process therefore, planning professionals in local government in Cape Town managed to position themselves as the custodians of urban change. They were greatly assisted in this task by the adoption of a new spatial planning model that had been advocated by certain university-based academics (see Dewar and Uytendogaardt, 1991) during the 1980s. This model, which has many similarities to the compact city approach adopted in other parts of the world, had the advantage of posing a spatial counter to almost every aspect of the 'apartheid city', and could thus promote an image of planners as politically enlightened and progressive professionals. Whereas the apartheid city had promoted spatial separation and segregation (of both race groups and land uses) and the location of poor Black and Coloured households on the remote periphery of the city, the new spatial model called for integration of separated communities (by placing new urban facilities within the buffer strips and along the routes which had previously acted as spatial dividers), a greater mix of land uses, higher densities, and the accommodation of the poor on well-located sites rather than on the urban edge.

The term 'integration' was one initially adopted by planners to describe the characteristics of their new spatial planning approach (referring to the physical integration of areas and land uses), but it was a term which also had political currency at the time, as the ANC promoted its vision of a racially integrated, democratic society. The term thus slipped easily between both the planning and political discourses of the early 1990s, serving to reinforce the importance of the urban as a necessary site of political change and the role of planners in assisting this.

In the period just before and just after the first democratic elections of 1994, a new spatial plan for Cape Town was formulated by planning consultants to the Cape Town

metropolitan authority and was extensively debated in a metropolitan-wide stakeholder forum (the Western Cape Economic Development Forum) set up by the private sector to consider the economic future of post-apartheid Cape Town. By the end of 1995 the plan (called the *Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework*, or *MSDF*) had been finalised. Its stated aims were to spatially restructure Cape Town to create an equitable and sustainable city. This was to be achieved through four spatial constructs: the drawing of an urban edge and the demarcation of an open space system within the city, the establishment of a new 'node' (seen by the planners as a commercial centre) in the middle of the low-income periphery of Cape Town, and the identification of a series of corridors linking the nodes, which were to carry fixed-line public transport as well as supporting high-density housing and commercial activity. The plan was essentially a spatial one (although some policy implications were drawn out) and could be likened to an end-state master plan in that it predicted a desired spatial future some 20 years hence, but gave little direction on how to achieve it.

With the plan in place (Technical Report, 1996), the planners saw their next task as gaining legal status for it (as a statutory structure plan) on the assumption that this would encourage compliance with it by both public and private sectors. For the rest of the decade the efforts of the spatial planners were focused on the bureaucratic processes required to achieve this, in a context characterised by major local government transitions, a new macro-economic policy and new national laws and policies affecting every sector of government. The next section turns to the impact of those new policies and laws that attempted to introduce functional integration and a 'developmental' approach into local government.

Introducing concepts of integration and development into local government

It was the 1996 *Local Government Transition Amendment Act* which first introduced the concept of 'integrated planning, budgeting and management'. The idea has established international precedent. Harrison (2001) points to the re-emergence, internationally, of integrated development planning and 'networking', after a decade or so of atomistic and project-focused planning. In Britain, pressures for more devolved and integrated government (Vigar and Healey, 1999) resulted in a plan-led regime (in the 1991 *Planning and Compensation Act*), with land-use planning set to provide this integrative role. And the World Bank shifted its position in the early 1990s from a project-based approach to one that emphasised integrated development (Harrison, 2001).

The 1996 Act required all metropolitan and municipal governments to draw up Integrated Development Plans (or IDPs) for their area of jurisdiction. Explanatory

documents emphasised that the term ‘integrated’ meant that the objectives of not just one administrative directorate should prevail, but that the objectives and plans of all directorates should be brought together and related to each other, and to the budgeting process. In this initial formulation of IDPs, the requirement of a spatial plan was given high priority. The IDP guideline document issued by the Department of Constitutional Development (1997) described how the Land Development Objectives (or LDOs) of the *Development Facilitation Act* were the central part of preparing an IDP. ‘The IDP process involves drawing up LDOs and some additional planning, to finally produce an Integrated Development Plan’ (Department of Constitutional Development, 1997:10). Specifically, the Act required that the areas of land-use planning, transport planning, infrastructure planning and economic development planning should be integrated to inform the IDP. The product was intended to consist of a budget, a set of priorities or projects, and a spatial plan.

For spatial planners in local government it appeared, initially, as if this legislation offered them the status they required to make a contribution to the effort of urban reconstruction and development. Planners here, as elsewhere, had long complained that the primary reasons their plans so often failed to be implemented was that there was insufficient integration between functional departments within public authorities, and that there was insufficient linking between plans and the budgeting process. The early concept of IDPs appeared to offer a solution to these problems, while retaining the central role of spatial planning.

However, this view of IDPs was contested. The counter-position, articulated by the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Constitutional Development at a 1997 seminar in Sea Point, Cape Town, was that ‘the IDP is a process, not a product. They are not physical plans but business plans’. It is this latter position which increasingly became the dominant one, as local government policy makers grappled with the problem of its inherited bureaucracy ‘characterised by hierarchical line departments, poor coordination between line departments and authoritarian management practices’ (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998:8). These features were seen as a major obstacle to the call for local government to become ‘developmental’ (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998:section B).

Savage (1998) argues that what local government change in South Africa sought to introduce was the kind of public-sector reform that has been seen elsewhere in the world in recent decades. Termed New Public Management, it is based on the assumption that bureaucratic inefficiency lies at the root of local government problems. To counter this it advocates the introduction of private-sector management techniques, competitive, market-based organisational structures and mechanisms,

and the use of performance measures, or indicators. Fitzgerald (1995) refers to the influential American guide to 'reinventing government' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), which specifically considers the introduction of the 'entrepreneurial spirit' into local government, but argues that it needs to be adapted to the South African context where both entrepreneurial and developmental considerations are important. It has been this initiative within the South African public sector which has become intertwined with a view of IDPs as a tool for *institutional* planning and management, rather than just a way of achieving effective spatial planning. And it has been this approach to public management that subsequently swept into many local authorities, including the Cape Metropolitan Council.

Negotiating the new discourse of integration

In the years after 1996 the spatial planners in the Cape Metropolitan Council found themselves under increasing pressure. Many of the objections to the statutorisation of the *MSDF* came from spatial planners located within the municipal authorities who were concerned that the metropolitan plan would erode their autonomy. But increasingly as well, criticism came from new functional departments, set up within the metropolitan authority, which also saw their task as planning the future of Cape Town.

The call by the White Paper for local government to become 'developmental' (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998:section B) implied a reorientation of local governments away from their traditional role as administrators and service providers. In particular, the White Paper called for these authorities to 'have a clear vision for the local economy' and to concern themselves with local economic development. This is a functional shift that occurred some time ago in countries such as the USA and Britain. But for many South African local authorities, and the Cape Metropolitan Council, this new imperative to become developmental implied the establishment of new or re-organised departments and the employment of new professionals.

In the internal reorganisation of the Cape Metropolitan Council, which occurred in 1997, a new directorate of Economic and Social Development was established. A second new directorate was Transportation and Traffic. This was not a new function, either at metropolitan or local level, but the task of managing metropolitan transport had previously been attached to the Cape Town Municipality. A third new functional area was created to deal with the environment. The White Paper on local government did not have much to say about the functioning of local government in the area of environmental management: it was not an important item on the agenda of the post-

apartheid government. However, international initiatives (such as Agenda 21: www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21), together with strong internal lobbying groups, succeeded in promoting national environmental legislation, and Environmental Impact Assessments became a requirement for almost all kinds of development. In the Cape Metropolitan Council in 1998, a new Department of Environmental Management was established under the reorganised Directorate of Planning, Environment and Housing.

All of these new operational areas within the Cape Metropolitan Council were backed up by strong policy directives from functional departments at the national level, all formulated in the post-1994 period. The national Department of Transport set up a policy review process soon after the 1994 elections, with the aim of formulating a new national transport policy (see *Moving South Africa*, 1998; Republic of South Africa, 1996). The creation of transport corridors, with adjacent high-density development, was promoted as an important way to reduce travel-to-work distances and hence the cost of subsidising commuter travel from peripheral, low-density suburbs (see Behrens and Wilkinson, this volume). National economic policy for local economic development was still being formulated, but policy direction emerged in a Jobs Summit Declaration in 1998, in policy documents on Public Sector Procurement and Tourism, and in legislation relating to the promotion of small businesses. In the environmental field, the 1998 *National Environmental Management Act* set out environmental principles to guide all developments affecting the natural, social and economic environment, and impact assessments. In the housing field, a new national housing policy was primarily concerned with meeting numerical targets for housing delivery by spreading capital subsidies across as many beneficiaries as possible.

The point about the newly created functional areas in the Cape Metropolitan Council is that, informed by national policy initiatives, there were clear imperatives to develop plans and policies within the functional areas concerned. And certain of these functional areas, such as transportation and housing, were promoting particular spatial forms. Spatial planning, therefore, no longer had the monopoly on forward thinking, as it had done in the past. Increasingly, it had to promote spatial strategies in 'competition' with the strategies put forward by other directorates. This was placing pressure on spatial planning in two ways.

Firstly, the traditional 'synthesising' role of spatial planning was being challenged by other directorates and departments developing their own policies and spatial plans, and the ability of the Spatial Planning department to promote the *MSDF* as *the* spatial strategy for the Cape Metropolitan Council as a whole was becoming more and more difficult. Secondly, with the new departments engaging in current and in-depth

analysis and policy formulation in their specific functional fields, they were able to suggest that the *MSDF* was based on a lack of detailed contextual understanding, and a lack of understanding of newly developing and specialised policy arenas. The fact that the *MSDF* had been formulated, some years back, on the basis of a rather broad-brush analysis of the metropolitan area, using information dating largely from 1990, made it somewhat vulnerable to this claim.

These kinds of coordination problems between line function departments were not new, and were exactly what the integrated development planning process had intended to overcome. However, achieving integration proved to be a particularly difficult task. The Cape Metropolitan Council began its first attempt to draw up an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) in 1997. At a large workshop in late 1997, involving councillors and officials from metropolitan and municipal governments, agreement was reached on a vision for the metropolitan area and on five 'strategic themes'. The vision reads as follows:

In ten years the Cape Metropolitan Area will be one of the major tourist destinations of the world, especially noted for its natural environment and supported by a harmonious, tolerant and well-governed and educated people. The growing economy will be characterised by adequate housing and a low incidence of crime, making the Cape Metropolitan Area a global economic player (CMC, 1997).

The five, theme-based strategic priorities were identified as poverty and homelessness, strengthening the position of the metropole in the global economy, enhancing the environment, building social harmony and citizenship, and developing local governance. It would appear that the spatial restructuring of the metropolitan area was no longer seen as a top priority.

The question now was how to achieve integration, at least within the Cape Metropolitan Council. The process that was followed required each directorate to link their existing projects to the five strategic priorities. This did not appear to be particularly difficult to do. It was quite possible, for example, for Spatial Planning to argue that the *MSDF* would spatially link the poor and the homeless into areas of urban opportunity, and that the strategies of the Metropolitan Open Space System (MOSS) and the urban edge would enhance the environment, and so on. The point is that this approach to integration did not require departments or directorates to change significantly the way in which they were working. If they could suggest a connection between their existing policies and programmes and the (very broad) IDP strategic objectives, then they could continue business as usual.

This process did, however, allow the production of a glossy publication by the Cape Metropolitan Council entitled *Integrated Development Planning and Management Framework* (February 1999). In the final part of the report, existing projects or

areas of work within the various departments are linked to the areas of 'core business'. It was significant that, of the 40 projects which were listed and grouped according to how they furthered core business, the Spatial Planning Department alone was identified as having only one task: the implementation of the *MSDF*, with its 'key result' for the following year being the statutorisation of the plan. Sixteen other tasks, to be carried out by departments *other* than Spatial Planning, are all related to the development of policy frameworks in various specialised fields (environment, economy, transport, waste water, etc.), and all would have either a direct spatial component, or at least spatial implications. The fragmentation of policy making is clearly reflected here.

In the second attempt to formulate an IDP, the metropolitan council decided to employ an outside consultant. He brought a particular approach to bear on the IDP process. This perspective viewed it as a means of achieving improved organisational performance and effectiveness. Spatial Planning, in his view, was simply one of a number of functional departments whose work needed to be prioritised and integrated. Moreover, it was a function that he regarded as having had a rather poor track record in the past. 'Where in this city has it had an impact?', he asked. 'The demands on local government are far more complex now than just spatial issues' (Watson, 2002:130).

The second round of the IDP process began in much the same way as the first. Five 'objectives' now replaced the five 'strategic themes' of the first round. The themes (building a globally competitive city; addressing poverty and equity in service delivery; ensuring financial sustainability; enhancing accountability; and enhancing management and administrative efficiency) indicate a growing shift towards a concern with the operation of the authority itself. The new consultant was well aware that the previous approach, of trying to link departmental work to themes or core areas of business, had not worked. He was adamant that no integrated planning or budgeting had yet occurred in the metropolitan council. His way of integrating was to be starkly different, using (in his terms) a 'macro scoreboard'. What this meant in practice was the establishment of performance indicators (derived from the five 'objectives') that cut across departmental work. Monitoring and impact assessment would then be carried out to determine the extent to which departmental work was meeting the desired targets. This approach, the consultant argued, would directly affect the way in which work within departments happened, and would ensure a move towards integration. This attempt to produce an IDP was put on hold in early 2000 when local government entered its next round of restructuring. At the time of writing (March 2002) the newly created Cape Town Unicity (metropolitan authority) was embarking on yet another attempt to draw up an IDP.

Integration, competing story-lines and power

As 'governance' around the world has become increasingly complex, increasingly specialised, and increasingly open to conflicting demands, there has been a growing interest in the problem of achieving intersectoral integration (Christensen, 1999; Vigar *et al.*, 2000), particularly within local administrations. Thus Vigar *et al.* (2000:271), writing in the context of the United Kingdom, report a wide call for 'joined-up thinking to overcome the silo-mentality of sectoral departmentalism'. In the same text (*ibid.*:246) the authors argue that a central reason for the increase in sectoralism is the persistence of policy making at the national level and hence the continuing power of vertical relations which reinforce segregated, vertical policy communities. In South Africa the development of new national policies affecting every aspect of life (education, health, housing, water, transport, planning, and so on) has been seen as an essential part of post-apartheid reconstruction. National departments have inevitably taken steps to ensure that these new policies have been implemented at the local level, and local departments have thus found themselves tied closely to their national counterparts through laws, regulations, policy directives and funding systems. Given this situation, attempts to integrate work across sectors through the IDP process have been particularly difficult.

But what is at work here, one can argue, is more than a simple coordination problem. Hajer (1995) has attempted to explain the process of change in policy formulation by drawing on Foucault's ideas of the role of discourse. Foucault viewed discourse as a body of statements and practices whose organisation is regular and systematic and whose production is governed by certain rules which delimit (although not entirely) what is acceptable or 'true'. These rules have a constraining effect which lends continuity to a discourse: they imply prohibitions which make it difficult to raise certain questions or argue certain cases, or they may only authorise certain people to participate in a discourse (Hajer, 1995:49). However, unrelated discourses can come together and in doing so, create a new discursive space. Hajer develops the idea of how new discursive spaces are created by introducing the role of the discoursing subject or agent, interacting with other agents. Drawing on the writings of Rom Harre (1993), he sees human interaction as based on the exchange of arguments, or contradictory suggestions as to how one makes sense of reality. Such arguments derive from broader 'positions' or understandings of what constitutes the truth, and in the process of argumentative interaction, concepts and practices can mutate and change or, alternatively, be reinforced.

Harre uses the concept of the 'story-line' as a mechanism for creating and maintaining discursive order. Story-lines allow actors to draw on various discursive

categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena. They facilitate the reduction of the discursive complexity of a problem and allow for the formulation of a coherent and acceptable explanation, understanding or strategy. As certain story-lines are accepted and used, they take on a ritual character and gain permanence and status. Story-lines also play a role in creating a social and moral order in a particular domain. Through such story-lines particular ideas of 'blame', 'responsibility' or 'urgency' can be attributed, and actors (or groups of actors) can be positioned as victims, perpetrators, etc.

Hajer takes the idea of story-lines further to suggest that coalitions occur among actors operating with similar or related story-lines, allowing what can become struggles for 'discursive hegemony' between differing coalitions, in attempts to secure support for a particular definition of reality. It is such struggles, he argues, that become prime vehicles of change. New story-lines and coalitions emerge which re-order understandings of reality. However, such struggles cannot be grounded entirely in the actors who participate in them, or in the particular strategic choices they make. Foucault's idea of the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses' refers to the way in which a number of discursive elements can come together to create a new discursive space within which problems can be discussed, or presumably, strategies can be pursued. Story-lines thus operate in the middle ground between epistemes and individual construction.

In the case of Cape Town, Hajer's concept of competing story-lines helps explain the difficulties of policy integration. Different sectoral departments in national and local government, together with the different professionals which cluster within them as officials and beyond as consultants, develop their own distinctive story-lines. It often happens that these story-lines are in conflict with each other, making integration between them very difficult. Professionals not only communicate through different frames of reference, but may also have an interest in maintaining these differences in order to support or promote discursive hegemony.

In the field of urban transportation, the long-held 'predict and provide' paradigm has to some extent been replaced at national level by an approach which accommodates demand management and a stronger role for public transport within cities. This has led national transport planners to give support to spatial forms such as high-density public transport corridors within cities and in this respect there has been some alignment with the compact city approach adopted by spatial planners. However, within the Cape Town metropolitan authority, the new national policy position has been adopted only partially by transport planners, and their enduring concern for efficiency of vehicle-based, commuter traffic flow has at times conflicted strongly with proposals by spatial planners to focus on stop-start routes which accommodate a land use mix, public transport and pedestrians.

In the field of housing, national policy has focused on delivering the maximum number of housing subsidies at minimum cost. This has inevitably steered delivery of housing to large, 'green-field' sites usually on the urban periphery, where accommodation has taken the form of low-density, single units, as it is only on sites such as these that capital costs can be kept low. Higher density housing supporting public-transport corridors (as advocated by the spatial planners and the national transport planners) is not possible under the present housing subsidy system (without additional subsidy from alternative sources); neither is the *in-situ* upgrade of informal settlements. Within the Cape metropolitan area, the national housing policy story-line has come into conflict with both spatial plans for a compact, corridor-based city and environmental management plans which aim to preserve open land on the urban periphery because of its agricultural or natural value. Environmental professionals place value on such natural resources in ways that are not always accepted by housing professionals intent on finding appropriate land for new housing.

Finally, in the field of local economic development there has been a strong national and local emphasis on promoting SMMEs (small, medium and micro-enterprises) but without clear spatial informants. There is also a concern with promoting economic growth, by attracting new private sector investment to Cape Town and developing the tourist industry. Economic development professionals have often been impatient with the assumption contained in Cape Town's spatial plan that the location of such investment can be spatially predetermined (the *MSDF* directs investment into designated nodes and corridors and particularly into the poor south-east of the city), particularly in relation to parts of the city not considered attractive by many private investors.

These different story-lines offer different conceptions of the nature of the urban problem and ways in which it can be overcome. Hajer's position alerts us to the possibility that such differences do not arise by accident and cannot be easily overcome. Story-lines function as vehicles through which individuals and groups can exercise power. Struggles for discursive hegemony between professions and departments cannot be easily abandoned as this may also imply the loss of associated features such as status, respect, security and financial gain. The concept of integrated planning implies that a common story-line is adopted by all professionals and departments, and this directly confronts the issue of discursive hegemony. Moreover, any process of integration requires a merging of positions in relation to the dominance of one particular story-line. Early conceptions of the IDP proposed that the spatial plan act as the 'synthesising element' (placing spatial planners in an advantageous position), but later conceptions put the budget in this position, thus offering opportunities (to exercise power) to a different set of professionals. In the

case of metropolitan Cape Town, this shift affected the hegemonic possibilities for both spatial planners and the *MSDF* plan.

Conclusion

This chapter has posited one explanation for the extreme difficulties that have been faced in attempts in local government to achieve integrated planning. No doubt other factors have played a role as well. The processes that have been occurring within the Cape Metropolitan authority offer one instance of failed attempts at integration and struggles for discursive hegemony, and it will inevitably take different forms, along different fault lines, in other local authorities elsewhere in the country.

Obstacles to institutional integration, it is argued, in turn affect the possibilities for functional and spatial integration. Different policy discourses can give rise to different spatial imperatives, as the clear lack of congruence between housing delivery on peripheral 'green-field' sites and the compact city approach of spatial planners, shows. Calls for integration (or joined-up thinking, in British terminology) clearly aim to address the large-scale inefficiencies, both spatial and functional, which result from uncoordinated urban development. Understanding the limitations imposed by the (inevitable) exercise of power may give rise to more creative thinking on this problem.

References

- CMC (Cape Metropolitan Council) (1997) *Integrated Development Plan*. Unpublished files. Cape Town: Cape Metropolitan Council.
- Christensen, K. (1999) *Cities and Complexity: Making Intergovernmental Decisions*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Christopher, A. J. (2001) 'Urban segregation in post-apartheid South Africa', *Urban Studies*, 38(3):449–466.
- Department of Constitutional Development (1997) *Integrated Development Planning for Local Authorities: A User-friendly Guide*. Pretoria: Department of Constitutional Development.
- Dewar, D. and R. Uytendogaardt (1991) *South African Cities, a Manifesto for Change*. Unpublished report. Cape Town: University of Cape Town, Urban Problems Research Unit.
- Fitzgerald, P. (1995) 'Towards a developmental public administration paradigm'. In *Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa*, edited by Fitzgerald, P. McLennan, A. and B. Munslow, pp. 3–37. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Hajer, M. (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Harre, R. (1993) *Social Being: A Theory for Social Psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Harrison, P. (2001) 'The genealogy of South Africa's Integrated Development Plan', *Third World Planning Review*, 23(2):175–94.
- Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development (1998) *The White Paper on Local Government*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Moving South Africa (1998) *Strategy Recommendations: Urban Customers*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler (1992) *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley.
- Republic of South Africa (1996) *White Paper on National Transport Policy*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Savage, D. (1998) *Centralism and the Crisis of Legitimacy in South African Local Government: A Critique of the White Paper on Local Government*. M.Sc. dissertation. London: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Technical Report (1996) *The Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework*. Cape Town: Cape Metropolitan Council.
- Vigar, G. and P. Healey (1999) 'Territorial integration and "plan-led" planning', *Planning Practice and Research*, 14(2):153–170.
- Vigar, G., Healey, P., Hull, A., and S. Davoudi (2000) *Planning, Governance and Spatial Strategy in Britain: An Institutional Analysis*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Watson, V. (2002) *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning: Metropolitan Planning in Cape Town Under Political Transition*. London and New York: Routledge.

Chapter 10

Housing and Urban Passenger Transport Policy and Planning in South African Cities: A Problematic Relationship?

Roger Behrens and Peter Wilkinson

Introduction

Policies and strategies concerned with the provision of subsidised housing, and with the provision of passenger transport facilities and services, have often been contradictory and counterproductive. In particular, the tendency to locate subsidised low-income housing schemes on the peripheries of urban areas, often at considerable distances from employment opportunities and higher order commercial and social facilities, imposes a major burden on the provision of subsidised public transport services to the inhabitants of such schemes. It also imposes direct additional travel time and expenditure costs on these people, thereby limiting their ability to direct their household time and expenditure budgets towards home improvement or housing consolidation projects.

This chapter explores the relationship between housing and urban passenger transport policies in South African cities. It begins with a discussion of the continued peripheralisation of low-income housing in the post-apartheid era, and the impact this has on housing beneficiaries, on the one hand, and on the passenger transport system, on the other. It goes on to describe recent legislative and policy change with

respect to urban passenger transport, and its relationship to emergent municipal integrated development planning processes. It concludes with a discussion of the prospects of the new transport planning and integrated development planning frameworks to initiate a more coordinated and sustainable relationship between land use and transport planning generally, and with low-income housing strategies more specifically. In the absence of a clear commitment in both the national and the local spheres of government to halting the further peripheralisation of subsidised low-income housing development, it is difficult to see how the counterproductive outcomes indicated above might be avoided.

The continued peripheralisation of low-income housing in post-apartheid South Africa

The cornerstone of the National Department of Housing's low-income housing policy is the National Housing Subsidy Scheme introduced in 1994. The subsidy takes the form of a once-off capital grant, graded on a sliding scale according to household income, with a discretionary 'extraordinary' subsidy (of around R2 400) to cover higher than normal construction costs arising from problematic geophysical conditions. The maximum subsidy was initially set at R15 000 for households with incomes of below R1 500 per annum, but was increased to R16 000 in 1999. A further discretionary subsidy can be obtained to cover higher land costs associated with more central locations – a project located within 1 000 m and 1 500 m of a substantial employment node may benefit from a subsidy increase from up to 15% and 7.5% respectively, while a project within 500 m of an established transport route may benefit from an increase of up to 7.5%.

The scheme is financed by annual allocations from the national budget, which are then disbursed on the basis of applications approved by, and channelled through, the nine Provincial Housing Development Boards. Grants are paid by the Provincial Housing Development Boards on transfer of approved properties to qualifying households, and are intended to facilitate the sale of existing houses (through 'individual' subsidies, and a 'discount benefit' with respect to former public rental stock), the acquisition of new serviced sites and some form of top-structure (through 'institutional' and 'project-linked' subsidies), and the consolidation of serviced sites provided through previous subsidy schemes (through 'consolidation' subsidies).

Between April 1994 and March 2001, 1 351 260 subsidies were approved, and 1 167 435 topstructures were either completed or under construction (Department of Housing: www.housing.gov.za). Project-linked subsidies have been the most common, accounting for some 83% of all approved subsidies, with individual

subsidies next accounting for just 10%. The project-linked subsidy is used to cover the cost of land, professional fees, internal engineering services and top-structure. The local authority is responsible for the provision of bulk and link infrastructure, but can apply to the Department of Provincial and Local Government for subsidies of up to R3 000 per dwelling unit for this purpose. The subsidy amount has usually been sufficient to enable the provision of freehold title to a 25–35 m² one or two-roomed ‘core’ house on a 150–300 m² site with piped in-house water supply, a toilet with waterborne sewerage, and electricity supply.

A review of the critical literature on South African housing policy reveals that, while debate may occur around the form of subsidy and the appropriateness of housing type and tenure, there is consensus that one of the housing subsidy scheme’s key shortcomings is the continued tendency to locate subsidised housing on the peripheries of South African cities (see for instance Behrens *et al.*, 1998; Cameron, 2001; Gear, 1999; Huchzermeyer, 2001; Smit, 1999; Turok, 2000). The implementation of the subsidy scheme has in some respects therefore perpetuated apartheid city structures, and the inequities and inefficiencies they impose. This is a view shared by the national Department of Transport:


Current land use planning and development initiatives are exacerbating the spatial legacy by locating new housing far from major business and, in most cases, far from primary rail and road networks Currently, this sort of spatial planning occurs because of a lack of co-ordination or integration at the institutional level. Each individual institution plans the location of its fixed assets in a relative vacuum, maximising only according to individual departmental constraints or missions, without respect to larger systems costs of individual decisions (Department of Transport, 1998a:63).

Ambitious numerical delivery targets, together with comparatively small national budget allocations, have necessitated small housing subsidy benefits, which in turn have driven the need to build on cheap available land close to or beyond existing townships with already poor access to employment and commercial centres (see Department of Transport, 1998a:63 and Turok, 2000:13 for maps of the location of subsidised housing projects in Gauteng and Cape Town respectively). The additional subsidy amount of R1 200–R2 400 to cover the higher cost of well-located land bears no relation to the actual market price of land in inner city areas. In the absence of the political will required to subsidise land (or at least forego greater returns in the disposal of publicly owned land) in better located areas, or to address middle- and high-income ratepayer concerns regarding adjacent low-income settlement, the simplest and cheapest policy has been to continue locating new subsidised housing on the periphery.

The impact of peripherally located subsidised housing on beneficiary households' travel

National travel data indicates that households with incomes that qualify for housing subsidies have low levels of car availability, and are dependent on walking and public transport modes in order to travel. Data from the 1999 All Media and Products Survey, for instance, indicates that 90–95% of households falling into the maximum subsidy range (i.e. earning (R1 500/month) are without access to a motor car, and that among households in the middle and lower scales (i.e. R1 501–R2 500/month and R2 501–R3 500/month) this figure is 80% and 60% respectively (see Figure 10.1). October Household Survey (OHS) data from 1997 indicates that when household incomes drop below R3 000 per month, commuting by car decreases dramatically – accounting for just 8% of modal split (see Figure 10.2 on page 158).

Figure 10.1 Influence of household income on car availability in South Africa




Data source: South African Advertising Research Foundation 1999: All Media and Products Survey

The location of poor households without means of private mobility on the periphery of cities has a major impact on their travel patterns, and on the utilisation of their time and financial resources.

The most obvious effect of peripheral location is clearly on travel distance. The further households are located from employment and commercial opportunities the further they have to travel to access these opportunities. Data on work trip lengths in metropolitan Cape Town, for instance, indicates that in 1992, in contrast to most other cities of the world, low-income commuters travelled longer mean distances than high-income commuters (15.5 km versus 12.6 km) (Cape Metropolitan Council,

1998). Trip lengths for commuters dependent on public transport modes are much longer in South Africa than in other parts of the world. OHS data from 1995 indicates that the national mean work trip length by public transport is around 20 km (16 km by minibus-taxi, 28 km by bus and 20 km by train) – compared to 11 km in Europe, 15 km in the United States and 9 km in developing Asian countries (Department of Transport, 1997).

Figure 10.2 Influence of household income on work trip mode use in South Africa (1997, n = 30 000 h)




Data source: Statistics South Africa, 1997: October Household Survey

Long travel distances in turn have an impact on trip timing, travel time and expenditure patterns. With regard to trip timing, data from 1992 in metropolitan Cape Town illustrates that whereas arrival times for work trips are fairly similar across different racial stratifications, lower income Black and Coloured commuters start their work trips significantly earlier than higher income White commuters (see Figure 10.3) (Market and Opinion Surveys, 1992). This can be attributed both to slower travel modes (i.e. longer walking and waiting times) as well as to longer travel distances associated with peripheral township locations. With regard to travel time, Figure 10.4 indicates that within the same income bands peripherally housed commuters in metropolitan Cape Town tend to spend around 50% more time travelling to work than more centrally housed commuters (Behrens, 2001). Other trip purposes appear generally to follow a similar, but less pronounced, pattern. With regard to expenditure on travel, an analysis of 1995 OHS data as part of the ‘customer segmentation’ associated with the Department of Transport’s new national policy and


strategy framework, revealed that 35% of public transport passengers captive to the cheapest mode, and 21% of public transport passengers able to choose between public transport modes, spend more than 10% of their disposable income on transport – the internationally accepted maximum desirable expenditure on travel (TRC Africa, 2000).

Figure 10.3 Work trip departure time by race in metropolitan Cape Town (1991/92, n = 500 h)



Data source: Market and Opinion Surveys, 1992

Figure 10.4 Mean trip time to destination activity purposes by location and income in Cape Town (2000/01, n = 204 h)



Data source: Behrens, 2001

The impact of peripherally located subsidised housing on urban passenger transport systems

The system of public transport provision in South African cities has been a product, as well as an instrument, of apartheid. Many public transport services were developed simply to link peripheral townships with employment centres. Clark (2000) and Naudé *et al.* (1994) argue that the state's rationale for subsidising public transport was, on the one hand, to compensate township residents for resettlement policies, while on the other, to ensure the mobility of labour in the national economy. The introduction of urban apartheid policies in the early 1950s saw the promulgation of two Acts that dealt with the subsidisation of the transportation of peripherally located Black labour. The *Black Services Levy Act* (No. 64) of 1952 and subsequent *Black Transport Services Act* (No. 53) of 1957 made provision for employers to pay a levy for Black employees which could be used for providing and subsidising such transport services. The *Transport Services for Coloured Persons and Indians Act* (No. 27) promulgated in 1972 extended the structures and procedures established under the 1957 Act to allow the collection of employer levies to provide subsidies for Coloured and Indian/Asian workers. In later years, however, due to sharply rising transport costs, employers resisted paying the full costs of worker transport, with the result that from 1975 onwards central government paid an increasingly higher proportion of subsidy.

Currently only bus and rail services are directly subsidised by the state, in two separate subsidy systems. The last two decades have seen rapidly increasing subsidy costs, paradoxically despite a decline in bus and rail passengers. The emergence of the unsubsidised informal minibus-taxi industry in the mid-1980s resulted in a steady decline in bus and rail commuters to the extent that by the mid-1990s minibus-taxis carried over half of the national urban Black commuter market (Cameron, 2001). As a result, the proportion of public transport passengers receiving a subsidy decreased. Clark (2000) estimates that in metropolitan Cape Town, for instance, currently only 40% of those passengers who are captive to public transport have access to subsidised services.

Establishing the extent of subsidies has become difficult in recent years due to the assignment of some of this responsibility to the various provincial administrations in 1997 (Cameron, pers. comm). In 1998/99 total public transport subsidies cost the national fiscus R2.8 billion (Department of Transport, 1998a) – compared to R1.4 billion in 1991 (Van Rensburg *et al.*, 1992), representing a nominal annual increase of around 10.5%. As a result of this rate of increase, central government placed limits on public transport subsidy budget allocations in the late 1990s (e.g. in Cape Town subsidies remained fairly static at R415 million in 1998/99, R390 million in 1999/00 and R430 million in 2000/01). Both train and bus operators have consequently either withdrawn uneconomic services, or reduced the frequency of services on certain

routes, in order to reduce costs – further fuelling decline in the number of subsidised passengers.

Rail services operated by Metrorail have received a deficit subsidy from central government, calculated as the difference between total operating costs and passenger revenue. During the 1995/96 financial year, only 44%, 31% and 31% of total operating costs were recovered from fare revenues in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban respectively. Operating deficits are exacerbated by high levels of fare evasion – estimated in Cape Town, for instance, to be 70% on the Khayelitsha line, 40% on the Mitchell's Plain line, and approximately 15% on remaining lines. The annual rail subsidy in Cape Town was around R255 million in 1998/99 – equivalent to R2.00 subsidy per passenger trip (averaging 12 km), 16 cents per passenger kilometre, or R900 per passenger per annum (Cape Metropolitan Council, 1999; Clark, 2000).


Bus operators have received a deficit subsidy from provincial government, calculated as the difference between the full economic cost (or 'equivalent cash fare') of providing a service, and the (10- or 30-trip) clip card passenger revenue. Subsidies increase as a portion of the economic fare over distance – at 31% of the economic fare at 10 km from the CBD, 65% at 50 km, and 71% at 100 km. Subsidised bus services have also been provided by some local authorities from their own revenues. During the 1997/98 financial year, only 40% of operating costs (including both subsidised and unsubsidised services) were recovered from fare revenues in metropolitan Cape Town. The annual bus subsidy in Cape Town was around R160 million in 1998/99 – equivalent to R5.52 subsidy per passenger trip (averaging 15 km), 37 cents per passenger kilometre, or R3 300 per passenger per annum (Cape Metropolitan Council, 1999; Clark, 2000; Department of Transport, 1998a).

The deficit subsidy mechanism for both rail and bus services, and the distance-based subsidy for buses more specifically, have meant that the location of low-income housing on the periphery of cities has had a profound effect on levels of passenger subsidy. This is exemplified in 1998 bus route subsidy data obtained for Cape Town. Figure 10.5 on page 162, illustrates the influence of route distance on annual bus subsidies per passenger. The trend line plotted against these data demonstrates that passenger subsidy increases with distance.

Numerous attempts have been made to illustrate the counterproductive nature of South African housing and transport subsidies. Dewar (1999), for instance, points out that in current Rand values, the annual bus subsidy in Cape Town (R3 300), accumulated over five years, is equivalent to the maximum housing subsidy (R16 000), and that over twenty years it would be equivalent to four such subsidies. The CSIR *et al.* (1997) go further to argue that if the number of national subsidised bus commuters travelling longer than 60 minutes (estimated to be 112 761 passengers in 1995) were to be relocated

closer to work (at a cost of R3.4 billion), the annual saving on the bus subsidy would be around R118.6 million. Assuming constant levels of subsidy and current Rand values it would take about 28 years to recover the cost of this housing relocation, and considerably less if the more central location enabled switching to walking or other unsubsidised modes. The most elaborate of these attempts, however, was a detailed economic analysis undertaken by van Rensburg *et al.* (1992), which compared the full settlement and transport costs of an actual peripheral housing development (Orange Farm) with two hypothetical central housing developments in Johannesburg (Crown Park and River Park) over a period of 20 years. The study concluded, with a number of caveats, that the societal cost of peripheral housing is greater than centralised housing (R11 993 as against R9 741 and R7 100 per dwelling unit in 1991 Rand values for Orange Farm, Crown Park and River Park, respectively).

Figure 10.5 Influence of bus route distance on passenger subsidy in Cape Town: 1998/99



Data source: Cape Metropolitan Council, 1999

The new transport policy agenda and the emerging urban transport planning framework

Against this backdrop of a public transport system, which appears to be meeting the travel needs of a large proportion of the urban population in ways that are neither equitable nor fiscally sustainable, the framework for urban passenger transport policy

has undergone significant change in the last few years. The key documents in this regard have been the *White Paper on National Transport Policy* published by the national Department of Transport in September 1996, the *Moving South Africa Action Agenda: A 20-Year Strategic Framework for Transport in South Africa* produced by a Department of Transport project team in May 1999, and the *National Land Transport Transition Act* (No. 22 of 2000) passed by Parliament in August 2000 and signed into effect by the President in December of that year (with the exception of certain sections, including Part 7, dealing with the configuration of the proposed new transport planning system). The content and key propositions or proposals of these documents have been reviewed at length elsewhere (Behrens and Wilkinson, 2001) and will not be considered in any detail here, other than in relation to their implications for the integration of urban transport and land use planning.

In the field of urban passenger transport provision, the broad direction of the policy shift can be specified along three principal axes:

- from a 'supply side' orientation based on the expansion of transport infrastructure to meet anticipated demands and the operational subsidisation of rail and bus commuter services to a focus on serving the travel needs of a differentiated 'customer base', as far as possible on a full cost recovery basis and within a framework of 'regulated competition' among operators;
- from a system of modally fragmented planning and management of transport systems carried out largely in isolation from land use planning to the institution of integrated cross-modal transport planning devolved to the local level and intended to be undertaken in close cooperation with land use planning (now statutorily embedded in the integrated development planning process); and
- from an implicit prioritisation of the needs of private transport users reflected in the expansion of the road network, on the one hand, and of the needs of rail and bus service operators for extensive public subsidisation, on the other, to an explicit commitment to putting 'Public Transport First' through the prioritisation of investment in public transport facilities combined with the implementation of a range of road space and broader travel demand management measures.

Within the new urban transport policy framework, notable and consistent emphasis has been placed on the need to rationalise the relationship between urban transport planning and land-use planning. At the most basic level, this involves recognition that the socio-spatial structure of South African cities inherited from the apartheid era has placed much of the poorer Black, Coloured and Indian/Asian sectors of the urban population in peripheral locations at considerable distances from the major centres of employment and higher order commercial and social facilities. In turn, this imposes

system costs that are seen to be increasingly unsustainable, in terms of both the travel budgets of individuals and households within these sectors of the population and the burden that escalating public transport operator subsidies place on the national fiscus (as indicated in the previous section). While a degree of rationalisation of the public transport subsidy system is possible and desirable, it is perceived that the fundamental problem can be addressed only through extensive socio-spatial restructuring and then only in the long term, possibly over decades. To this end, therefore, the *White Paper on National Transport Policy* proposes a range of ‘key policy actions’ intended ‘to provide for urban restructuring (densification) and efficient land-use/transport interaction’ (Department of Transport, 1996:21), including:

- the establishment of structures (at all tiers of government) which facilitate integrated planning of infrastructure, operations and land use in a coordinated manner;
- the regulation of land-use development at the local level so that development approval is subject to conformity with integrated land use or transport plans;
- the formulation of land-use frameworks, guidelines and policies to channel development, particularly employment-generating activities, into public transport corridors and nodes;
- giving development priority to infilling, densification, mixed land use and the promotion of development corridors and nodes;
- the containment of urban sprawl and suburbanisation beyond the urban limits; and
- discouraging decentralisation which disperses employment-generating activities, except in specific cases where it is favourable in terms of decreasing total transport costs and travel times on the basis of an integrated land-use plan (*ibid.*).

The necessity of addressing the legacy of ‘sub-optimal spatial planning’, in which the ‘combination of apartheid spatial distortions with current dispersion trends undermines the ability of all forms of non-motorised and public transport to meet the mobility needs of customers and results in high average commute distances’, is carried through in the *Moving South Africa Action Agenda* (Department of Transport, 1999:27). There, given the understanding that ‘[t]he densities created by corridor enhancement lower system cost, not just for transport but for other infrastructure’, and that ‘[c]orridor-based public transport also improves the level of service offered to customers as speeds and frequencies increase’, the densification of transport corridors is identified as the ‘key component of the urban passenger strategy’ (*ibid.*:28). The document indicates that during the consultation phase of the *Moving South Africa* process local authority transport planning departments had requested the advocacy of ‘compulsory rules to force the integration of provincial and local land use and transport planning functions’. However, it continues, ‘the NDoT [National

Department of Transport] has decided that problems of ineffective coordination [within local government structures] ... will not be solved by national command' but, rather, that 'local government functions ... need to jointly agree on a common framework to achieve denser, more public transport-friendly settlements (in line with national legislation)' (*ibid.*:29).

The present statutory specification of the relationship between urban transport and land-use planning is contained in the *National Land Transport Transition Act* (No. 22 of 2000). Among the principles applying to 'the determination, formulation, development and application of land transport policy' set out in Part 2 of the Act are statements that 'all role-players must strive to achieve an effective land transport system through integrated planning, provision and regulation of infrastructure and services', and that 'land transport functions must be integrated with related functions such as land-use and economic planning and development through, among others, development of corridors, and densification and infilling, and transport planning must guide land use and development planning' (RSA, 2000b:s.4[1]).


The matter of devolving urban transport planning and management functions to the local level is dealt with primarily in Parts 5 and 7 of the Act (the implementation of whose key clauses is currently suspended until such time as appropriate guidelines for the carrying out of these functions can be made available). Part 5 provides for the elective or non-mandatory establishment of local transport authorities to undertake a range of such functions as bodies operating alongside, but organisationally and juridically independent of, the municipalities or groups of municipalities participating in their formation. Part 7 requires such authorities – or in their absence, designated municipalities – to prepare various planning documents for their local transport areas within the framework of national and provincial policy and strategy directives. The components of the local transport planning framework to be produced by the relevant authorities are specified as:

- a 'current public transport record', detailing all public transport services and facilities planned or operating within the transport area;
- an 'operating licences strategy', setting out the basis on which the authority will recommend the issuing of licences to public transport operators by a provincial licensing board;
- a 'rationalisation plan', indicating how existing services are to be rationalised before their conversion to subsidised service contracts through a public tendering process;
- a 'public transport plan', setting out the authority's strategies for public transport which include its operational plan for contracted services and its licensing strategy for non-contracted services; and

- an ‘integrated transport plan’ – a five-year strategic plan, updated annually, which includes a detailed budget for the next financial year and a list of priority projects for the next five years, indicating how they are integrated with local development and land-use plans (RSA, 2000a).

The way in which these components of the planning framework are intended to interrelate is set out in Figure 10.6.

Figure 10.6 Interrelationship between transport plans



While many questions remain about how it is to be operationalised in practice at the local level, the centrality of ‘integrated planning’ to the new policy framework is further underlined in the first of the ‘general principles for transport planning, and its relationship with land development’ articulated in the Act:

Land transport planning must be integrated with the land development process, and the transport plans required for that purpose by this Act are designed to give structure to the function of ‘municipal planning’ mentioned in ... the Constitution, and must be accommodated in and form an essential part of integrated development plans [as required by current local government legislation] ... (RSA, 2000b:s.18[1]).

In addition, a substantial proportion of the Act is devoted to the establishment of a new regulatory framework for the operation of public transport services intended to promote the emergence of the situation of ‘regulated competition’ advocated in the earlier documents. These include provisions requiring local transport authorities to administer the award of commercial and subsidised public transport service contracts and the setting up of ‘provincial operating licence boards’ to authorise the granting of operating licences for intra-provincial and inter-provincial public transport services, as well as local public transport services when that function has not been devolved to a competent local transport authority. Regulation of the operations of the minibus-taxi industry is specifically and explicitly covered in Parts 12 and 17 of the Act, providing what the explanatory memorandum attached to the National Land Transport Transition Bill published in February 2000 describes as ‘an invaluable tool for the government to achieve order and harmony in the industry ... [which is] essential for the implementation of the envisaged minibus-taxi recapitalisation programme’ (RSA, 2000a).

In summary, then, despite a perhaps calculated unwillingness on the part of its authors to address certain key longer term issues of implementation – in particular, the basis on which the operation of the new system is to be funded – the Act represents a significant, if explicitly transitional, milestone in the process of establishing a new urban transport policy framework quite different from that previously in place.

A convergent intersection of integrated development planning and integrated transport planning?

Even if it has yet to be instituted effectively in practice, the planning and management of passenger transport systems in South African cities appears to be moving towards a more integrated form under the new transport policy dispensation. It remains an open question at this point, however, exactly how – or, indeed, whether – such

integrated transport planning can be brought into a more coordinated and sustainable alignment with land-use planning, more generally, and the planning of low-income housing provision, in particular. Given the recent prominence of policy discourse about ‘integrated development planning’ in the sphere of ‘developmental local government’, it is clearly important to examine the potential that the new approach to planning at the local level may represent in this regard.

The genesis and the subsequent trajectory of institutionalisation of integrated development planning as an innovative tool of urban planning and management in South Africa has been traced systematically elsewhere (Harrison, 2001; Pycroft, 2000). Harrison (2001) suggests that the ‘first round’ of integrated development plans, prepared under the *Local Government Transition Act, Second Amendment Act* (No. 97 of 1996) during the ‘transitional’ phase of local government restructuring, were subject to various shortcomings and limitations. The initiation of the current ‘final’ phase of local government restructuring was marked by the December 2000 local elections, conducted within the legislative framework established by the *Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act* (No. 27 of 1998) and the *Local Government: Municipal Structures Act* (No. 117 of 1998). This laid the foundation for the preparation of ‘second round’ integrated development plans as a statutory requirement of the new local authorities in the *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act* (No. 32 of 2000), signed into effect by the Acting President in November 2000. Regulations specifying the content of such plans were published in the *Government Gazette* in August 2001 (RSA, 2001).

In brief, as articulated in the seminal *White Paper on Local Government* issued by the Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development in March 1998, the purpose of integrated development planning is to provide a framework within which municipalities can ‘understand the various dynamics operating within their area, develop a concrete vision for the area, and [formulate] strategies for realising and financing that vision in partnership with other stakeholders’ (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998:27). To this end, the Municipal Systems Act identifies the nine ‘core components’ of an integrated development plan as comprising:

- the municipal council’s vision for the long-term development of its area with special emphasis on the most critical development and internal transformation needs;
- an assessment of the existing level of development, including an identification of communities which do not have access to basic municipal services;
- the council’s development priorities and objectives for its elected term, including its aims in terms of local economic development and internal transformation;

- the council's development strategies, which must be aligned with any legislatively binding national or provincial sectoral plans and planning requirements;
- a spatial development framework, including the provision of basic guidelines for a land-use management system;
- the council's operational strategies;
- applicable disaster management plans;
- a financial plan, including a budget projection for at least the next three years; and
- key performance indicators and targets (RSA, 2000c:s.26).

With regard to the more specific focus of our attention here, it appears that the land-use or spatial planning aspects of low-income housing provision will be governed primarily by the spatial development framework component of the integrated development plan. As specified in the relevant regulations, spatial development frameworks are required, *inter alia*, to 'give effect to the principles contained in Chapter 1 of the *Development Facilitation Act, 1995*'; 'set out objectives that reflect the desired spatial form of the municipality'; and propose strategies and policies which 'indicate desired patterns of land use within the municipality ... address the spatial reconstruction of the municipality ... [and] provide strategic guidance in respect of the location and nature of development within the municipality' (RSA, 2001:s.4). The principles enunciated in Chapter 1 of the *Development Facilitation Act* (No. 67 of 1995), promulgated in October 1995, have been seen to be particularly significant in establishing, for the first time in South Africa, a framework for the shift from a 'control-orientated' to a 'normatively-based' spatial planning and land-use management system (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001; National Development and Planning Commission, 1999a).

Certain of these principles – in particular, the commitment to promoting 'efficient and integrated land development' (National Development and Planning Commission, 1999b:5–8) – are clearly in accordance with the broad objectives for the spatial restructuring of South African cities put forward in the new urban transport policy framework. While the 'Chapter 1 principles' may be about to be superseded in the field of spatial planning and land-use management by a revised and simplified set of 'directive principles' embodied in Chapter 2 of a draft *Land Use Management Bill* circulated for comment by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs in March 2001, they currently retain statutory effect through the reference to them in the regulations cited above (RSA, 2001). In any event, it can be argued that the set of 'directive principles' proposed in the *Land Use Management Bill* remain true to the spirit of the 'Chapter 1 principles' in the *Development Facilitation Act* intended to give direction to the formulation of spatial development frameworks. At least at the level

of normative principles, therefore, we can conclude that the legislative requirements for land-use planning (as manifest in the spatial development framework component of an integrated development plan) and for urban transport planning appear to remain broadly convergent.

Potentially, however, a more fundamental problem lies in the configuration of the institutional framework within which the putative operational convergence of integrated development plans and their component spatial development frameworks with integrated transport plans is to be realised. At present, given the apparently general predilection of professionals located in institutionally segmented transport and land-use planning fields to subscribe to divergent or competing rationalities or approaches to planning (Banister *et al.*, 2000; Vigar *et al.*, 2000), this problem is particularly likely to emerge if municipalities agree to the formation of separate 'transport authorities' charged with undertaking transport planning and management functions within 'transport areas' which cover or overlap their jurisdictions, as is enabled by Part 5 of the *National Land Transport Transition Act*. Despite the 'general principle' for the relationship between transport planning and land development spelt out in the Act (see preceding section) and its requirement that an integrated transport plan must have 'due regard ... to any relevant integrated development planning or land development objectives' (RSA, 2000b:s.27[2]), it certainly seems possible in such cases that the specific content of an integrated transport plan prepared by the transport authority could diverge in more or less significant ways from that of an integrated development plan prepared by a municipality within the transport area concerned. It is not clear that the oversight function allocated to the relevant Members of the Provincial Executive Councils by the Act (RSA, 2000b:s.27[4]) would enable them to adjudicate the resolution of any such divergences effectively, and this is a matter which might well have to be referred ultimately to the Constitutional Court.

The ability and readiness of transport and land-use planners to develop complementary planning rationalities and practices within the requirements of the new policy framework for integrated transport plans and integrated development plans remains to be investigated systematically. However, experience in metropolitan Cape Town during the late 1990s with the implementation of the Wetton-Lansdowne Development Corridor Project funded by the Department of Transport as a part of its metropolitan 'spatial development initiative' programme suggests that different values, performance criteria and approaches to 'problem framing' continue to divide professionals working in the two fields, despite the adoption of a common rhetoric of 'integrated cross-sectoral planning' (Watson, 2001). What seems to be at stake in such encounters is the question of precisely how commitments to deploying 'instruments of urban re-engineering such as mixed land-use, densification, infilling and the

promotion of public transport' (Department of Transport, 1998b) within identified 'development corridors' are to be met operationally. Historically fragmented professional or socio-technical cultures and practices can produce conflicting responses to issues such as the provision and management of access to road space and the accommodation of pedestrian and other activities within road reserves which are not readily or unproblematically resolved within segmented local government organisational structures. Even if separate transport authorities are not established, the question of whether priority is to be accorded to land-use planning concerns (such as improved accessibility for pedestrians and public transport users, on the one hand) or to conventional transport planning concerns (such as increased mobility for private transport users, on the other), could remain essentially a matter of the relevant department's institutional precedence within a municipal structure.

In the metropolitan areas, the establishment of 'unicity' authorities following the December 2000 local government elections offers the prospect that such problems may be addressed on the basis of a more principle-driven organisational rationality than in the past, when conventional transport planning concerns were generally accorded priority on the grounds of ostensibly 'technical' considerations related to the application of standardised traffic engineering norms and codes of practice. To date, however, it remains to be seen how most of the new metropolitan administrations will address in practice the issue of how the decision-making frameworks embodied in their integrated development plans and integrated transport plans are to be brought into some relatively stable relationship governed by the principles which lie at the heart of 'developmental local government'.

Conclusion: Tackling the housing-transport nexus

While it is conceivable that land-use and transport planning could be brought into alignment at the municipal level through the necessary inter-disciplinary introspection and the coordination of planning and budgeting activity, it is clear that the alignment of subsidised housing provision with the combined objectives of land-use and transport plans will not flow automatically out of the emergent integrated planning frameworks discussed above. A considerable refocusing of policies and political will across all spheres of government is required for this to occur. At the national level it will require a reconsideration of the financial parameters of the National Housing Subsidy Scheme and the degree to which these enable low-income housing provision in more central areas, as well as of the longer term societal and environmental costs of failing to release at least large portions of centrally located State land for housing development. At the local level it will require a more proactive

role in the procurement of suitably located land for low-income housing, the augmentation of national housing subsidies when necessary, and an aggressive defence of 'urban edges' through the placing of moratoria on the extension of utility infrastructure and transport networks to service new undesired peripheral housing development. Local government responsibilities for implementing 'rationalisation plans' and 'public transport plans' to fulfil national transport policy objectives of achieving a sustainable public transport subsidy system in which operating subsidies are gradually reduced in favour of capital expenditure, could place pressure on local authorities to avoid further low-income housing peripheralisation – although, in the absence of local government budgets actually bearing the public transport subsidy burden, it is unclear how this pressure would be effected. We can conclude, therefore, that without a meaningful policy commitment at both national and local level to prevent further peripheralisation of subsidised housing, the prospects of effectively tackling the problematic housing-transport nexus described in this chapter remain, at best, uncertain.

References

- Banister, C., Turner, J., Richardson, T. and S. Young (2000) *Unravelling the Transport Web: Delivering the New Transport Realism in a Complex Policy Environment*. (No. 1, From Realism to Reality in Transport Policy Programme.) London: Landor.
- Behrens, R. (2001) *The Diversity and Complexity of Travel Needs in South African Cities, with Specific Reference to Metropolitan Cape Town*. Working Paper No. 2. Cape Town: Urban Transport Research Group, University of Cape Town.
- Behrens, R., Watson, V. and P. Wilkinson (1998) *Housing Provision in Metropolitan Cape Town: An Exploration of Strategic and Institutional Issues*. Working Paper No. 56. Cape Town: Urban Problems Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
- Behrens, R. and P. Wilkinson (2001) *South African Urban Passenger Transport Policy and Planning Practice, with Specific Reference to Metropolitan Cape Town*. Working Paper No. 4. Cape Town: Urban Transport Research Group, University of Cape Town.
- Cameron, J. (2001) *Moving South Africa: Analysis of Spatial Planning Issues in South Africa*. Unpublished document. Pretoria: Transport Research Consultants Africa.
- Cape Metropolitan Council (1998) *Moving Ahead. Cape Metropolitan Transport Plan, Part 1: Contextual Framework*. Discussion Document. Cape Town: Directorate of Transport and Traffic, Cape Metropolitan Council.
- Cape Metropolitan Council (1999) *Moving Ahead. Cape Metropolitan Transport Plan, Part 2: Public Transport Strategic Component*. Discussion Document. Cape Town: Directorate of Transport and Traffic, Cape Metropolitan Council.
- Clark, P. (2000) 'The influence of public transport on spatial development in metropolitan Cape Town: past, present and future'. Paper presented at the *South African Transport Conference: Action in Transport for the New Millennium*, Pretoria, 17–20 July.

- CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research), SENA (Stanway, Edwards, Ngomane and Associates) and TRC (Transport Research Consultants) Africa (1997) *Financing of Land Transport*. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Department of Transport (1996) *White Paper on National Transport Policy*. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Department of Transport (1997) *Moving South Africa: Urban Passenger Module*. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Department of Transport (1998a) *Moving South Africa, Towards a Transport Strategy for 2020: Report and Strategic Recommendations*. Discussion document. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Department of Transport (1998b) *National Department of Transport Annual Report 1997–1998*. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Department of Transport (1999) *Moving South Africa: the Action Agenda – A 20–Year Strategic Framework for Transportation in South Africa*. Pretoria: National Department of Transport.
- Dewar, D. (1999) ‘Brave new frontiers: Housing challenges of the future’. Paper presented at the *Institute for Housing of South Africa Conference: Developing Housing Environments for the New Millennium*, Nelspruit, 18 October.
- Gear, S. (1999) ‘Numbers or neighbourhoods? Are the beneficiaries of government subsidised housing provision economically empowered?’ *Issues in Development*, No. 18. Johannesburg: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Harrison, P. (2001) ‘The genealogy of South Africa’s Integrated Development Plan’, *Third World Planning Review*, 23(2):175–193.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (2001) ‘Housing subsidies and urban segregation: A reflection on the case of South Africa’. Paper presented at the *International Seminar on Segregation in the City*, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, M.A., 26–28 July.
- Market and Opinion Surveys (1992) *Survey of the Transport Problems Experienced by Residents in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area: Summary of the Tabulated Results*. Public Transport Study for Cape Town Metropolitan Transport Area, Phase 1: Problem Definition, Report T 15B/92, Cape Town: Liebenberg and Stander Consulting Engineers.
- Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2001) *Draft White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management*. Pretoria: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs.
- Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development (1998) *The White Paper on Local Government*. Pretoria: Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development.
- National Development and Planning Commission (1999a) *Green Paper on Development and Planning*. National Development and Planning Commission Document DPC4/99. Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs.
- National Development and Planning Commission (1999b) *Manual on the Chapter 1 Principles of the Development Facilitation Act 1995*. National Development and Planning Commission Document DPC28/99. Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs.
- Naudé, A., Naudé, C., Stolz, B., Mirrilees, R. and T. Argue (1994) *An Economic Rationale for Public Transport Subsidies, with Specific Reference to User-targeted Mechanisms*. Report 91/141. Pretoria: Division of Roads and Transport Technology, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and South African Roads Board.
- Pycroft, C. (2000) ‘Democracy and delivery: The rationalization of local government in South Africa’, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 66(1):143–159.

- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2000a) 'Memorandum on the objects of the National Land Transport Transition Bill, 2000'. *Government Gazette* (No. 20868 of 7 February 2000). Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2000b) *National Land Transport Transition Act (No. 22 of 2000)*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2000c) *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000)*. Pretoria, Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2001) 'Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001'. *Government Gazette* (No. 7146 of 24 August 2001). Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Smit, D. (1999) 'Housing in South Africa: Significant government achievement based on public-private partnership', *CDE Focus*, No. 5. Johannesburg: Centre for Development and Enterprise.
- TRC (Transport Research Consultants) Africa (2000) *Strategic Customer-based Passenger Transport Information Project*. Pretoria: Transportation Research Consultants Africa.
- Turok, I. (2000) *Persistent Polarisation Post-apartheid: Progress Towards Urban Integration in Cape Town*. Discussion Paper UCAP 1. Glasgow: Urban Change and Policy Research Group, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow.
- Van Rensburg, M., Wepener, D. and R. Engelbrecht (1992) *Improvement of Mobility as a Result of Land Use Planning*. Pretoria: South African Roads Board.
- Vigar, G., Steele, M., Healey, P., Nelson J. D. and A. Wenban Smith (2000) *Transport Planning and Metropolitan Governance*. (No. 3, From Realism to Reality in Transport Policy Programme.) London: Landor.
- Watson, V. (2001) 'The Lansdowne-Wetton Corridor Project, Cape Town'. Paper presented to the *Workshop on Integrated Development Projects*, University of Natal, Durban, 5–7 December.

Chapter 11

A Time and a Space for African Identities in Planning in South Africa?

Mark Oranje

Introduction

Over the last two decades a novel set of discourses has emerged in planning, arguing for and demonstrating a greater sensitivity to diversity, a respect for difference, an appreciation of local ways of knowing and doing, and a concern with identity (see Allmendinger, 2001; Dear, 2000; Sandercock, 1998). This development, which has been labelled a 'cultural turn', has not been welcomed by all, with some on the left quick to criticise these postmodern excursions as little more than a senseless play with words, or a case of diverting attention from other more important issues, such as growing inequality and exclusion (Harvey, 1989, 1990; Storper, 2001; Taylor, 1998). Others have argued that such identity-projects are often invented by elites to legitimise unique [planning] legislation in the construction of a broader institutional identity, which can then assist in the creation of distinct regional identities and captive power bases (see Allmendinger, 2001; Harris and Thomas, 2001). In response, proponents of the 'cultural turn' have acknowledged that these critiques are not without substance, but argued that it is imperative for planning to occupy itself with identity and culture if it is to play any meaningful part in the sustainable development of localities with increasingly diversifying populations (see Allmendinger, 2001; Dear 2000; Sandercock, 1998). At the same time, some of these proponents have pointed to the fluid nature of identity construction and reconstruction and have warned against attempts at seeking closure on such projects (see Allmendinger, 2001; Lindgren and Wahlin, 2001; Watson, 2002).

While these developments were underway in the discourse of planners, a similar cultural turn was being made in South Africa 'towards Africa', with political leaders calling for an 'African Renaissance', that is, for Africans to return to their roots, to extract from the past what was good, and to use that to (re)build a new Africa (see Maloka, 1997; Mbeki, 1999; Oomen, 2000; see also *Sunday Independent*, 9 January 2000). Numerous commentators have also observed that this sentiment is not merely a fragment of political rhetoric, but that 'retraditionalisation' is on the rise both in Africa and in South Africa, or rather, that many aspects of what was regarded as traditional 'just never went away' (see Chabal, 1996; Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997; Oomen, 2000; Watson, 2002). So, for instance, tribal leaders continue to play a major role in land allocation and dispute settlement in many of the more rural provinces in the country and traditional healers are still widely consulted by urban and rural dwellers alike (Oomen, 2000). Together with this there has been a growing interest among social scientists in the construction of identity in the face of globalisation (see Zegeye and Krieger, 2001). And so, given the similar cultural turns in planning and other discourses in the socio-political context within which planning operates, it could be expected that this would have heralded a similar turn in the creation of a new post-apartheid planning system.

This chapter seeks to determine whether the planning system in South Africa has actually undergone, or is undergoing, such a cultural turn, and if not, to explore spaces in which such a move can be brought about. The project operates from the premise that such a concern with culture and identity is a necessary and useful endeavour, both from an idealist perspective that institutions should be true to the cultural context in which they operate, as well as from a pragmatist position that it would assist in the production of a planning system that would for the first time have (real) meaning and be of use to the majority of individuals and communities of post-apartheid South Africa. At the same time, it is mindful of the sad reality that such projects can very easily be swayed to serve sectoral and parochial interests.

As far as structure is concerned, the chapter has four parts: the first part is devoted to a description of some African identities, the second to an exploration of the extent to which these identities have found expression in this unfolding new planning system in South Africa and the third to an inquiry into what the absence of these identities in the system can be attributed to. The last part explores ways in which these identities can be grounded within the unfolding planning system.

Some African identities

As with all kinds of identity the notion of a distinct African identity is a contested concept, with some believing that it still exists and has real meaning and others viewing it as

something which may have existed in the distant past, but that no longer does, or as a myth that is used by leaders and/or elites to muster support for initiatives that hold very little promise for the masses of 'Africans' (see Berman, 1998; see also www.web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i3a1.htm; www.unisa.ac.za/dept/press/scrutiny/new.html; www.web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/970704/NEWS21.htm). Given this diversity of opinion as to what signifies 'the African identity', the focus in this chapter is on 'some' African identities, instead of a singular, all-encompassing African identity.

The traditional African identity

According to the proponents of this perspective, there is something like a unique 'African life, mentality and ... way of looking at things' and a unique 'African interpretation of existence and the universe' (Parratt, 1995:11, 12). Key components of what is regarded as this African identity or culture are the importance that is attached to the community, the place of the individual in that community and the role of the community 'in the bigger scheme of things' (Parratt, 1995: 61 and 92–8; see also www2.edu/wep/Papers/Afri/AfriLouw.htm). This view of the community is, however, not a 'simple traditional affair'. There is much more to it, and hence it deserves a more detailed exposition.

In traditional African society the community gives a person meaning and worth, not only in life, but also in death, as it is believed that a person *never* leaves a community. The deceased remain members of a community, they just move on from the visible to the invisible world or sphere, where their spirits guard over a community and can be asked for guidance and support, especially when the community/tribe is threatened by disaster (Kalilombe, 1994; Muzorewa, 1985; Parratt, 1995; see also www2.edu/wep/Papers/Afri/AfriLouw.htm). The logic behind this is that, being in the invisible world, they are closer to God to whom they can relate the needs of the living, and they are also closer to the other forces of nature that they can mobilise for good or evil purposes for those that are living (Kalilombe, 1994). The ancestors are thus not, as in traditional Christian religion, part of an inaccessible afterlife; the ancestors continue having a presence in the visible world in a spiritual sense. From there they have the power, if pleased, to make good things happen for a community, but if not, they may invoke evil on the family or community (Muzorewa, 1985). They are also the models and guides for the present generation, and are its source of identity (Kalilombe, 1994).

The community conceived in this way thus presents a mechanism by which the living in the visible sphere, and those who have moved on to the invisible sphere are bound together (Kalilombe, 1994). The focus on community is therefore key to the African view

of creation, as it ties together the individual, the community and God (Muzorewa, 1985; Parratt, 1995). In the world of the living this community solidarity leads to a sharing of resources in the ethos of what is known as 'ubuntu', which holds that 'a person is a person though persons', or in its original form, 'I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am' (Battle, 1997:5; Mbigi and Maree, 1995; Muller, 1998:298–9).

The concept of 'ubuntu' is obviously different to the Western focus on the individual, and clashes with the Western Cartesian notion of 'I think, therefore I am' (Battle, 1997; Gbadegesin, 1998; Mbigi, 2000; Muzorewa, 1985). It has, however, been argued that 'ubuntu' does not negate individuality; it merely discourages the Western notion that the individual should take precedence over the community (see www2.edu/wep/Papers/Afri/AfriLouw.htm).

The Pan-African African identity

Since its birth more than a hundred years ago, Pan-Africanism has championed the notion of a distinct African identity built around '... a strong emotional commitment to unity based on racial consciousness and the common experience of colonialism' (Tordoff, 1991:239; and see Legum, 1965). Its aim has always been to free Africa from the social, economic, political and mental enslavement that colonialism brought, and to ensure that its people become a distinct and valuable voice in the world by regaining their dignity and asserting themselves on the world stage (Agyeman, 1975; Fourie, 1992; Legum, 1965; Maloka, 1997; Muzorewa, 1985; Parratt, 1995). It is thus seen as a 'renaissance of Africa', in which its people would regain faith and pride in themselves and Africa, its past, its culture(s) and its symbols, and foster a belief in the ability of Africans to produce goods or items of value and to determine their own destiny (Agyeman, 1975, 1992; Legum, 1965; Maloka, 1997; Vorster, 1996). Its outcome would be a people with a distinct 'African personality' whose emotional and intellectual features would not be built on Western ideas and concepts, and who would be able to tell stories of their own history, traditions and mysteries (see Battle, 1997; Legum, 1965). It is thus a distinct identity located in both a conception of a past spoilt by colonialism, and in a joint struggle against colonial oppression (Vorster, 1996).

The post-colonial African identity

Post-colonialism does not mean 'after colonialism', rather it signifies 'after', 'because of' and 'inclusive of' the colonial, while also signifying a resistance to it (Werbner, 1996:4). It is better seen as a certain consciousness, a state of being, seeing and acting – a way of responding to, living with and dealing with, colonialism (Ashcroft, 1997; Chabal, 1996; Mbembe quoted in Werbner, 1996). It is not a coherent response, but

rather the collection of various responses, each operating in response to a unique context. As such it not only obliterates the coherent and homogeneous images that have been projected out of the Western metropole, but also attacks the binary-coded view that there is 'the West/the other' that is the non-African that is evil, individualistic and capitalistic, and the African that is good, moral, communal, and caring (Ashcroft, 1997; see also www.unisa.ac.za/dept/press/scrutiny/new.html). The post-colonial identity is thus not a single identity, but several fluid identities that are deployed as, when, and where required to function in a certain context (Werbner, 1996). It can also be seen as a case of having a 'double consciousness' that consists of African, Eastern and Western cultural strains, the experiences of which are located both inside (supportive) and outside (opposed to) the project of modernity (Berman 1998; Featherstone, 1995).

A time for African identities in the post-1994 South African planning system?

The new planning system

The new system, which is being built on the ashes of a dualist and binary planning system that chiefly privileged Whites and oppressed Blacks, consists, despite some provincial peculiarities, of two core components:

Firstly, *strategic planning and plans or frameworks*, which are either called Integrated Development Plans or Frameworks, or Land Development Objectives, depending on the province and the act in terms of which they have been produced. These participatory plans, which have to be prepared by all municipalities, and in some cases also provincial governments, are meant to be issue-based, multi-sectoral, holistic plans, focused on addressing the needs of the poor and on transforming the apartheid cityscape, society and local government institutions. They are also intended to reflect, capture or contain any other sectoral municipal planning requirement or plan in terms of sectoral legislation. They are furthermore seen as one of the means, together with Local Economic Development, by which local governments can become the developmental entities that the 1996 Constitution and subsequent legal and policy frameworks intend them to become (see RSA, 1996). Along with the rise of 'good governance' and urban management in South Africa, as elsewhere in Africa and in the world, these strategic plans at municipal level are also seen as providing the frameworks, or rather the business plans, in accordance with which municipalities have to be managed (see, for example, Asibuo, 1998; Healey, 1997; Mabin, 2000; Post, 1997; SACP, 1998; Southall and Wood, 1996). The plans are furthermore supposed to be linked to municipal budgets and to find their way into the budgets of provincial

and national line departments in order to ensure that the strategies, projects and programmes contained in the plans are actually implemented (Jewell and Howard, 2000). These legal and policy frameworks are backed up with guidelines and capacity-building initiatives (including guide packs) that are meant to assist or capacitate those who have to prepare, manage and implement these prescribed strategic plans.

Secondly, *frameworks or plans or schemes to manage and regulate land development and land use* in accordance with the strategic plans prepared primarily by local, but in some cases also provincial, governments. In essence the system is plan-and-policy-led, with only limited space for discretion. In terms of national development planning legislation a set of normative 'general principles' to guide all planning processes and decisions on land development and land use in the country, as well as a fast-track process for land applications, has been put in place. In addition to this, national environmental legislation provides for the preparation of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to be done in the case of certain applications, and four of the nine provinces have produced 'planning and development' acts, to enable 'provincially-specific' land-use management. As regulations have not been passed, none of these acts are as yet operational. This has resulted in the old town planning legislation still being used for land-use management and the submission and processing of land development applications. A proposed new national law, the *Land Use Bill* of 2002, has, however, been published for comments and, according to the Department of Land Affairs, the department responsible for the Bill, it will be passed in 2003. This will put in place a national set of processes and procedures for land use management and land development (see RSA, 2002).

Assessment: The presence and extent of African identities in the new planning system

As a general observation, much has changed, and most of this is a vast improvement on the previous planning system. Planning is now cast as more democratic and participatory, more strategic, more focused on those in need, more sensitive to the environment and more concerned about linking planning to the budget so as to facilitate delivery. Despite these changes the African identities discussed earlier in this chapter are not reflected in the formal side of the new planning system. Judging from the legislative and policy frameworks it does not seem that an attempt was made to create a uniquely African institution. The objective was seemingly rather that of creating an institution *for use* in Africa.

Furthermore, planning (still) speaks in a master tongue that entertains only those who will translate their stories into its narrow rational, technical discourse or code,

which could very easily result in one form of knowledge displacing (all) others, or in local discourses losing their meaning (see Turnbull, 1997). No wonder, then, that the products of many of these planning exercises were until very recently, as so aptly summarised by Harrison (2001:11–12): ‘Planning reports [that] are generally sterile and tedious accounts of issues that are often surrounded by deep passions – the emotive voice of the people [having] been reduced by planners to an inaccessible and technical language.’

Given that the legislative and policy framework recognises the huge differences and inequalities in the country in terms of ownership of, and access to, resources, the rationale for planning is rightly developmental: planning is meant to improve the lives of previously disadvantaged people (and hence benefit all), and the focus is on devising and institutionalising appropriate procedures for this task. However, this focus does not progress beyond the modernist view of planning as being about process or method; it lives on in the modernist tradition of separating ‘emotion from reason, body from mind’ (Storper, 2001:163).

Furthermore, planning still proceeds from the modernist assumption that it is necessary and possible – financially, technologically and in terms of human capacity – to regulate and manipulate settlements and what happens in them (and what does not). In this sense, it does not move beyond the previous modernist view of planning in the country, namely that ‘the village, town and city’ has to be, and can be, managed through proper planning procedures. The often unsatisfactory outcomes of the planning initiatives based on this assumption do not lie in the assumption itself, but are purely procedural and instrumental in nature; smoothing out the procedures will smooth out the problems (see Oranje *et al.*, 1999).

While the intention with participation is to establish a highly communicative way of planning, and of building alliances and partnerships in the preparation of the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for each municipality, the outcome is still a very linear process with participation at pre-determined points in the process. This tends to perpetuate a view of the city as an entity consisting of atomistic bits, be they communities or individuals, that come together at ‘events to produce plans’, only to depart and go their own ways again. Participation sadly does not become a process of crafting joint narratives *about* and *for* delivery, as the country so urgently requires (see Oranje and Van Huyssteen, 2002).

Another area of concern is that the existence of traditional authorities and the role that many traditional leaders still play in communities has not been factored into the planning system. Instead, the legal framework creates the impression that these leaders are ‘a complication’, add-ons that can simply be tagged onto the ‘real system’ (see Development and Planning Commission, 1999; North-West Province, 1997).

Essentially they are made 'special case outsiders' that are at the mercy of the democratically elected local councils (the 'in-group') in deciding how and where they will be 'dealt with' and involved in 'the council's planning processes' (see North-West Province, 1997). This of course also brings into question the status of the rest of the individuals in that locality in a democratic system based on equal individuals. The 'post-colonial fact' that there could be different but equal authorities in a locality that have to jointly negotiate ways of living and governing together (the one grounded in the democratic process, the other in tradition), is not catered for in this way.

Despite the lack of African identities in the formal planning framework, recent stories from practice would suggest that, especially in rural areas, communities have taken ownership of the IDPs. Preparation of IDPs was also often done without the assistance of consultants, which further assisted in reducing the feeling of dependency and in building the sense of ownership. In many rural areas IDPs were also increasingly viewed as the tools of local development, with politicians seeing these IDPs as vehicles for the translation of the needs and desires of the people into the formal language of the legislation, and especially of funding programmes (see Adam and Oranje, 2002). This development can be regarded as a kind of post-colonialism, signifying specific local needs in the more generic language of the law, policy or programme. In much the same vein components or events in the process of preparing IDPs are given names that have local meaning, and local identity is increasingly making its way into planning. As for traditional leaders, despite the lack of formal measures to accommodate them in the IDP process and a decision by the House of Traditional Leaders not to formally participate in the preparation of IDPs, many rural municipalities brought them into the fray and made them part of the process of preparing their IDPs from the beginning through to end (see Adam and Oranje, 2002).

Seeking explanations for 'the omissions'

In this section a number of possible explanations as to why the legal and policy framework of the planning system is so devoid of African identities are discussed, with the objective that of identifying possible spaces for intervention. Two layers of explanation are dealt with: *macro-explanations*, concerning the structure in which the system was and is being developed, and *micro-explanations* focusing on the role of actors in the shaping of the new planning system.

Macro-explanations

Six probable, tightly intertwined macro-explanations were identified, each of which is briefly discussed below.

These are:

- *The ambivalent attitude of the African National Congress (ANC) towards traditional authorities and traditionalism*, primarily as a result of historical abuses of traditional leaders by the colonial and apartheid rulers, but also due to hostilities between the ANC and the more traditional Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the run-up to the 1994 general election and fears that a reinvigorated tribal system would not be conducive to nation building. Providing further impetus for this stance has been the dismissive view of ‘patriarchal customs and traditions’ by the South African Communist Party – one of the ANC’s tripartite partners – which the party did not regard as conducive to working-class solidarity (ANC, 1994; Delius and Schirmer, 2000; Maloka, 1995; Nqakula, 1994; Oomen, 2000; SACP, 1998; Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997).
- *A modernisation drive*, as elsewhere in Africa, by African political leaders and intellectuals to build a modern economy emerging on the ashes of apartheid and to which ethnicity and tribalism were seen as counterproductive (Berman, 1998; Mbeki, 1999; Thornton, 1996).
- *The resilience of the bureaucracy*, which has meant that, despite major changes in the political arena, a link was created between apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, providing a conduit for set practices, including those in the planning domain, to linger on (Berman, 1998; Thornton, 1996; Tordoff, 1991).
- *The absence of new planning systems in post-colonial Africa*, which has meant that very few examples were available for South Africa to learn from (see Eriksen, 1997; Ikejiofor, 1997; Larbi, 1996; Njoh, 1995, 1999; Simon, 1992).
- *The pursuance of functionalist goals* at the dawn of the new South Africa, that is, to clean up the mess created by the fragmented apartheid planning legislation, instead of a concern with putting in place a desired or ideal African planning system.
- *The globalisation of planning ideas*, which has meant that the unfolding South African system has been significantly shaped by a number of international ideas in planning, such as sustainability, the compact city, local economic development, strategic planning, etc., and does not seem to speak *about* and *to* Africa in any unique way (see Leaf and Panuk, 1997; Mabin, 2000; Watson, 2002).

Micro-explanations

In this section the focus falls on those actors that were involved in crafting the new system to discuss their possible cause in the absence of ‘an African turn’.

- *Consultants*: Most of the consultants that were involved in the crafting of the new planning system typically brought a liberal or a leftist perspective to the table, and not a distinctly African one (see Oranje, 2000).

- *Activists and NGOs*: Largely because of fears about their competency to tinker with the old system and not being able to put in place a technically robust alternative, these actors did not play as assertive a role as they potentially could have in the first stages of the conceptualisation of the new planning system (see Oranje, 1998). In addition, many of these actors moved into the bureaucracy shortly after the transition to democracy, resulting in their voices being lost to the political process. It could also be argued that as a result of being in exile, many of these actors brought foreign and not distinctly African ideas to the table (see Mabin, 2000 for a similar perspective).
- *Officials*: The officials that were involved in the drafting of the new system tended to be either White, schooled in the old planning system and keen to maintain the status quo, or new officials, who still had to find their feet. Neither group could or would assist in effecting an African turn (see Marais, 1994; Muendane in Fourie, 1992).
- *The planning profession*: The planning profession was not a very active participant in the process of shaping a new system, largely as it was not asked to do so due to its involvement in the apartheid system (see SACTRP, 1995). Even if it had participated, it is debatable that it would have embarked on an African turn, because the profession has been built on a Western conceptualisation of planning and professionalism and any departure from it would seriously threaten the future of this regime.
- *Academics*: Where academics were involved in the production of the new system, they were either concerned with new planning discourses in the international planning arena, focused on reconstruction and development, or calling for planning to ‘go back to first principles’, that is, the universal principles of city building and design (see Dewar, 1995; Uytendogaart *et al.*, 1997a; 1997b). A distinctly African turn could not emerge from these concerns.
- *Politicians*: Despite the constitutional call for a cooperative relationship between the various spheres of government, a number of provinces made use of their constitutional powers to produce their own planning legislation (see Khosa, 1998; Muthien, 1998; Oranje, 2000; Robinson, 1995). In this process of muscle flexing and demonstrating that provinces can produce highly sophisticated legislation, that which may have been regarded as ‘traditional and backward’, would in all likelihood not have been included.
- *International agencies or donors*: As elsewhere in Africa, international development agencies provided many of the elements of planning laws, ideas and procedures and also assisted in making the new planning system methodologically sound and delivery-focused (Njoh, 1999). This involvement did, however, not result in planning taking an African turn.

- *Communities, civil society and traditional leaders:* There was very limited involvement from these groups in the process of producing the new system. This might offer some explanation for the absence of especially more traditional African elements in the new planning system.

A space for some African identities?

The description of the unfolding planning system suggests that despite the absence of a distinct concern with African identities in the formal side of the system, communities have begun to mould, ply and 'Africanise' the system to suit their distinct local needs. This raises the question as to whether there really is a need to make amendments to the system, given that it seemingly allows for the localisation of generic planning procedures. Likewise it questions the effect that formalisation of the identity project would have on local practices. It could just be that a formal drive to create an African planning system would be less effective than one that allows for various local identity projects to be lived out. Even more so if it is recognised that identities are constantly constructed and reconstructed and that the formalisation of one single African identity would be counter to this identity flux.

However, this is only one perspective. It may just be that a major thrust to Africanise the formal system may be very effective. Likewise, the current system could be made more accommodating of identity projects that do not fragment, but enrich and add value to the lives of the people by and for whom planning takes place. If this is the case, the questions arise: *Where* (in the system) and *how* this can be done?

With regards to *where* in the system, this would primarily be in policies and in the preamble to legislation, as these constructs provide the philosophy and set the parameters in which the act will be played out. A key part of such texts would be an attempt to prevent new kinds of dependency from occurring and would be a reminder of the communal ethos to both drive, and be captured in, planning. The dangers of narrowly focusing on identity and the negative ability of identity to fragment communities would also need to be highlighted in such texts.

As far as issues of detail are concerned, the system of 'one municipality, one Integrated Development Plan' may be changed to allow for a plurality of local plans with an articulation process between them to enable a link between planning proposals and budgeting processes. In addition to that, special chapters in legislation could, for instance, be devoted to the role and place of traditional leaders in planning and ways of accommodating difference and diversity in planning and plans.

With regards to *how* this can be done, the most important point would be to ensure that policy and legislation is not prepared by small groups of individuals,

however competent they may be. Clearly, accommodating difference and diversity in the text will be far easier to arrive at by a diverse team of contributors than by groups that are less diverse in social and professional background. In this regard the involvement of NGOs, community representatives and traditional leaders is key to the production of a more culturally sensitive planning system.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted that the cultural turn in planning and political discourses has not manifest itself strongly in the formal side of the planning system in South Africa. Despite this, I have indicated that in some instances, communities have begun to localise and Africanise the planning system by giving key components or events in the process of preparing IDPs with names that have local meaning, and by according traditional leaders the recognition that they enjoy in certain parts of the country, in planning processes. While these developments were primarily described in a positive light, concern was also voiced that this informal, continuous, post-colonial engagement between communities, individuals and planning systems should not be allowed to lead to new forms of division, fragmentation and exclusion.

References

- Adam, A. and M. Oranje (2002) *A Report on Engagements with District and Metropolitan Municipalities on the First Round of Integrated Development Plans Produced in Terms of the Municipal Systems Act, 2000*. Pretoria: The Municipal Demarcation Board and the Department of Provincial and Local Government.
- ANC (African National Congress) (1994) *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*. Umanyono Johannesburg: Publishers.
- Agyeman, O. (1975) *The Osagyefo, the Mwalimu and Pan-Africanism: A Study in the Dynamic Growth of a Concept*. PhD dissertation. Toronto: Department of Political Science, York University.
- Agyeman, O. (1992) *Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations*. London: Associated University Presses.
- Allmendinger, P. (2001) 'The head and the heart: National identity and urban planning in a devolved Scotland', *International Planning Studies*, 6(1):33–54.
- Ashcroft, B. (1997) 'Globalism, Post-Colonialism and African Studies'. In *Post-Colonialism: Culture and Identity in Africa*, edited by Ahluwalia, P. and P. Nursey-Bray, pp. 67–93. Conmack, New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Asibuo, S. (1998) 'Funding strategies for local governments in Africa', *Africa Insight*, 28(3/4):146–53.
- Battle, M. (1997) *Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu*. Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press.
- Berman, B. (1998) 'Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: The politics of uncivil nationalism', *African Affairs*, 97:305–41.

- Chabal, P. (1996) 'The African crisis: Context and interpretation'. In *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, edited by Werbner, R. and T. Ranger, pp. 37–54. London: Zed Books.
- Dear, M. (2000) *The Postmodern Urban Condition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Delius, P. and S. Schirmer (2000) 'Historical research and policy making in South Africa', *African Studies*, 59(1):5–12.
- Development and Planning Commission (1999) *Green Paper on Development and Planning*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Dewar, D. (1995) 'The urban question in South Africa: The need for a planning paradigm shift', *Third World Planning Review*, 17(4):407–19.
- Eriksen, S. (1997) 'Between a rock and a hard place? Development planning in Tanzanian local governments', *Third World Planning Review*, 19(3):251–69.
- Fourie, A. (1992) *A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policy Orientations and Role Conceptions of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress*. Masters dissertation. Pretoria: Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.
- Gbadegehin, S. (1998) 'Yoruba philosophy: Individuality, community and the moral order'. In *African Philosophy: An Anthology*, edited by Eze, E., pp. 19–31. Massachusetts: Blackwell.
- Harris, N. and H. Thomas (2001) 'Politics, planning and the construction of national identity in Wales'. Paper presented at the *Planning Theory Conference*, Oxford, 20–21 June.
- Harrison, P. (2001) 'Romance and tragedy in (post)modern planning: A pragmatist's perspective', *International Planning Studies*, 6(1):69–88.
- Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1990) 'Looking backwards on postmodernism'. In *Postmodernism on Trial: Profile 88*, edited by Papadakis, A., pp. 87–90. London: Academy Editions.
- Healey, P. (1997) *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Ikejiolor, U. (1997) 'Planning and the political process: Sifting some underlying issues in the development of Abuja, Nigeria's new capital', *Third World Planning Review*, 19(3):271–87.
- Jewel, P. and J. Howard (2000) 'Editorial', *Monitor*, 25:2.
- Kalilombe, P. (1994) 'Spirituality in the African perspective'. In *Paths of African Theology*, edited by Gibellini, R., pp. 115–135. New York: Orbis Books.
- Khosa, M. (1998) "'A ship full of holes"? The culture of governance in South Africa's nine new provinces'. In *Regionalism in the New South Africa*, edited by Khosa, M. and Y. Muthien, pp. 11–20. Brookfield: Ashgate.
- Larbi, W. (1996) 'Spatial planning and urban fragmentation in Africa', *Third World Planning Review*, 18(2):193–215.
- Leaf, M. and A. Panuk (1997) 'Habitat II and the globalisation of planning ideas', *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 17:71–8.
- Legum, C. (1965) *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*. New York: Praeger.
- Lindgren, M. and N. Wahlin (2001) 'Identity construction among boundary-crossing individuals', *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, September:357–377.
- Mabin, A. (2000) 'What's left of reconstruction – the rise and fall of a planning ideology'. Paper presented at the Symposium *Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation*, Durban, 29–31 May.

- Maloka, E. (1995) ‘“Traditional” leaders and the current transition’, *The African Communist*, Second Quarter:35–43.
- Maloka, E. (1997) ‘African renaissance: Reactionary?’ *The African Communist*, Third Quarter:37–43.
- Marais, H. (1994) ‘Radical as reality’, *The African Communist*, Third Quarter:15–28.
- Mbeki, T. (1999) *A nation at work for a better life*. Unpublished speech. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System.
- Mbigi, L. (2000) *In Search of the African Business Renaissance*. Randburg: Knowledge Resources.
- Mbigi, L. and J. Maree (1995) *Ubuntu: The spirit of African Transformation Management*. Randburg: Knowledge Resources.
- Muller, J. (1998) ‘Paradigms and planning practice: Conceptual and contextual considerations’, *International Planning Studies*, 3(3):287–302.
- Muthien, Y. (1998) ‘Politicised ethnicity and regional political economy in Kwazulu-Natal’. In *Regionalism in the New South Africa*, edited by Khosa, M. and Y. Muthien, pp. 74–91. Brookfield: Ashgate.
- Muzorewa, G. (1985) *The Origins and Development of African Theology*. London: Orbs Books.
- Njoh, A. (1995) ‘Building and land use controls in developing countries: A critical appraisal of the Kumba (Cameroon) Zoning Ordinance’, *Third World Planning Review*, 17(3):337–56.
- Njoh, A. (1999) *Urban Planning, Housing and Spatial Structures in Sub-Saharan Africa: Nature, Impact and Development Implications of Exogenous Forces*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- North-West Province (1997) *Regulations relating to Land Development Objectives in Terms of Chapter IV of the DFA, 1995*. Provincial Gazette, 20/06/97. Mmabatho: Provincial Legislation.
- Nqakula, C. (1994) ‘Forward with a people-driven RDP’, *The African Communist*, Third Quarter: 7–13.
- Oomen, B. (2000) ‘“We must now go back to our history”: Retraditionalisation in a Northern Province chieftaincy’, *African Studies*, 59(1):71–95.
- Oranje, M. (1998) ‘A brief record of and some reflections on political intentions and planning interventions in South Africa 1994 to 1998: News or not in New Labour’s New Britain?’ Paper presented at the *5th Planning Academics Conference*, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, Newcastle Upon Tyne, 6–8 April.
- Oranje, M. (2000) ‘Should provinces/regions have their own planning acts? An exploration of the debate using the post-1994 South African experience’. Paper presented at the *Planning Research 2000–Conference*, London School of Economics, 27–29 March.
- Oranje, M, van Huyssteen, E and R. Oosthuizen (1999) *An Investigation into the Land Development Objectives-endeavour in the Provinces of Gauteng and the Northwest*. Unpublished report. Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs.
- Oranje, M and van E. Huyssteen (2002) ‘The planning process as an exercise in the construction of a shared institutional narrative about and for delivery’. Paper presented at the *16th AESOP (Association of European Schools of Planning) conference*, Volos, Greece, 10–15 July.
- Parratt, J. (1995) *Reinventing Christianity: African Theology Today*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press.
- Post, J. (1997) ‘Urban management in an unruly setting: The African case’, *Third World Planning Review*, 19(4):347–66.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1996) *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996*. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2002) *Land Use Management Bill, 2002*. Pretoria: Government Printer.

- Robinson, J. (1995) 'Federalism and the transformation of the South African State'. In *Federalism: the Multi-ethnic challenge*, edited by Smith, G., pp. 56–74. London: Longman.
- Sandercock, L. (1998) *Towards Cosmopolis*. London: John Wiley.
- Simon, D. (1992) *Cities, Capital and Development: African Cities in the World Economy*. London: Belhaven Press.
- Southall, R. and G. Wood (1996) 'Local government and the return to multi-partyism in Kenya', *African Affairs*, 95:501–27.
- SACP (South African Communist Party) (1998) 'A socialist approach to the consolidation and deepening of the National Democratic Revolution', *The African Communist*, Second Quarter:17–37.
- South African Council for Town and Regional Planners (1995) *A Position Statement on Urban and Regional Planning*. Johannesburg: South African Council for Town and Regional Planners (SACTRP).
- Storper, M. (2001) 'The poverty of radical theory today: From the false promises of Marxism to the mirage of the cultural turn', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25(1):155–79.
- Taylor, N. (1998) *Urban Planning Theory Since 1945*. London: Sage.
- Tordoff, W. (1991) *Government and Politics in Africa*. London: MacMillan.
- Turnbull, D. (1997) 'Reframing science and other local knowledge traditions', *Futures*, 29(6):551–62.
- Uytenbogaardt, R., Dewar, D. and F. Todeschini (1997a) *A Philosophic Approach to Settlement-making*. Unpublished manuscript. Cape Town: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Cape Town.
- Uytenbogaardt, R., Dewar, D. and F. Todeschini (1997b) *Guidelines to Settlement-making*. Unpublished manuscript. Cape Town: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Cape Town.
- Van Kessel, I. and B. Oomen (1997) "'One chief, one vote": The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa', *African Affairs*, 96:561–85.
- Vorster, P. (1996) 'Some thoughts on Africanization', *Bulletin*, February: 13–18.
- Watson, V. (2002) 'The usefulness of normative planning theories in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa', *Planning Theory*, 1(1):27–52.
- Werbner, R. (1996) 'Multiple identities, plural arenas'. In *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, edited by Werbner, R. and T. Ranger, pp. 1–26. London: Zed Books.
- Zegeye, A. and R. Krieger, eds. (2001) *Culture in the New South Africa*. Cape Town: Kwela.

Chapter 12

Alternative Urban Planning and Management in Brazil: Instructive Examples for Other Countries in the South?

Marcelo Lopes de Souza

Introduction

Traditional forms of technocratic and non-participative urban planning and management have been directed towards the modernisation of the city. In the name of 'progress' and the 'common good' planners have pursued spatial order and in doing so have supported and reinforced the position of state and capital. Planners have worked for the transformation of nature, social space, and social relations through the action of capitalist forces in spite of the tragic environmental and social consequences of these forces.

In earlier works (e.g. Souza, 1996) I have intended to contribute to a criticism of the ideology of capitalist development in general. From this broad perspective I have since tried to reflect more specifically on the limits of, and prospects for, urban development, considering the role of different types and styles of planning and management – from traditional 'blueprint planning' to 'sustainable urban development', 'communicative planning' and consistent types of participative urban planning and management (Souza, 1998; 2000a; 2000b; 2002). The present chapter intends to represent a further step towards a debate on the relationship between urban planning

or management and urban development, this latter being understood in a socially critical, non-Faustian manner.

In the following account, I will present and examine some Brazilian urban planning and management approaches and experiences in urban development, which attempt to overcome the dominant, Faustian ‘development-as-modernisation’ view, with particular reference to the case of Porto Alegre. My intentions are to assess to what extent these proposals and experiences satisfy the requirements of social (or socio-spatial) development by increasing social justice and quality of life. Furthermore, I will seek to examine (although in a very introductory way) the importance and feasibility of the adoption of the Brazilian experiences of alternative urban planning and management as a source of inspiration in other ‘Third World’ countries.

Purposes and roots of ‘alternative urban planning’ in Brazil

In the early 1970s, important criticisms of urban planning emerged both in sociology as well as in geography in line with Marxist approaches in both disciplines. Authors like geographer David Harvey (1973) addressed important criticisms towards the common naiveté of the years before the 1970s, which posited that planning is good because it promotes the ‘common good’ by means of ‘rational’ processes. It was shown that the kind of ‘rationality’ involved in planning was *instrumental* in nature (the optimisation of means), serving not the ‘common good’ as such, but primarily the interests of the ruling class. Urban planning in a capitalist city was considered by those critics as an activity through which the state promotes goals benefiting the capitalists (as well as privileged residents) and leading to the perpetuation and even to a strengthening of residential segregation.

The Marxist approach was not entirely wrong – far from it – but it tended to a simplistic assumption about the nature of planning. It did not direct its criticism clearly against *standard* urban planning (classical regulatory planning, ‘blueprint planning’), but against all forms of planning intervention (which is especially interesting, since ‘socialist’ countries were characterised by centralist planning!): ‘I shall simply suggest that the planner’s task is to contribute to the processes of social reproduction and that in so doing the planner is equipped with powers vis-à-vis the production, maintenance, and management of the built environment which permit him or her to intervene in order to stabilize, to create the conditions for “balanced growth”, to contain civil strife and factional struggles by repression, cooptation, or integration’ (Harvey, 1985:176). Stemming in part from the typical anti-‘reformist’ viewpoint of Marxism (that is, everything which contributes to social improvements

outside the framework of a proper revolution can just contribute to the stabilisation of the *status quo* and is therefore 'conservative'), and partially from a purely academic mode of conceptualisation, scholars influenced by this approach were able to criticise eloquently, but refused offering alternative proposals *hic et nunc*. As Harvey (1985:184) said: '[w]e might even begin to plan the reconstruction of society, instead of merely planning the ideology of planning'.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Brazilian scholars became influenced by this Marxist approach in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a relatively pragmatic left-wing approach emerged in the mid-1980s in Brazil. Accepting in principle the representative democratic regime, which was reintroduced in 1985 after more than twenty years of military rule, even if perceiving its limits, some scholars began to advocate what they termed a *reforma urbana* (urban reform). In the contemporary parlance of Brazilian progressive scholars and social movements, the expression 'urban reform' does not mean just a reshaping of the space, what could be better understood as a *reforma urbanística* (the search for new forms which contribute to 'optimising' the functions as well as to the beauty of an environment, a search which is typical of urban design, site planning and landscape architecture), sometimes with the aim of transforming social relations themselves by means of a transformation of spatial forms alone. An urban reform, in contrast, is a structural social reform which encompasses a spatial dimension, and the purpose of which is the reform of the institutions regulating power and the production of space, and not primarily a change of the city's physical form. It aims at a transformation of specific aspects of city life in order to attain the basic goals of social justice and equity.

A National Movement for Urban Reform was organised in order to intervene in the public arena and influence the National Congress preparing a new constitution for the country. According to the Act passed on 15 July 1987, civil society now had the right to propose constitutional amendments ('*emendas populares*') for the new constitution where such amendments were supported by a minimum of three organisations of civil society (such as professional associations, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations) and at least 30 000 electors. In 1987 urban social movements and some professional associations gathered together in order to draw up the so-called Constitutional Popular Amendment for Urban Reform (*Emenda Popular da Reforma Urbana*). This amendment obtained the support of about 150 000 electors.

After being presented to the Congress, however, the amendment was submitted to several modifications. In fact, it was not mandatory for the Congress to *accept* the proposal; in principle, the Congress was only bound to formally *receive* the proposal, and it became quite clear that just receiving the proposal provided no guarantee that

its approval would occur. Thus the popular amendment was strongly modified in the course of debates in the Congress and the new Constitution (which was promulgated on 5 October 1988) carried through only fragments of the original proposal. The chapter of the Constitution about urban development policy contains only two articles. Article 182 stresses the ‘social function’ of private property rights in land, that is, privately held land rights should not be used for speculation. As Fernandes and Rolnik (1998:145) pointed out:

[t]he legal concept of social property appeared for the first time [in Brazil] in the 1934 Constitution. Private property rights were henceforth to be recognized only provided that the use to which the property was put fulfilled a social function. This same principle can be traced through all the federal constitutions since 1934 (i.e. 1937, 1946, 1967/69 and 1988), although prior to 1988 it was never made clear what it would mean in practice.

However, Article 182 also establishes the responsibility of municipalities with 20 000 inhabitants or more to define norms and parameters according to which ‘social function’ could be granted – through the master plans for urban development (*planos diretores de desenvolvimento urbano*). Mention of legal instruments such as compulsory subdivision or edification, the progressive tax on urban land and property (IPTU *progressivo no tempo*) and expropriation to stop speculation, is rather vague and incomplete in Article 182.

Another article of the Constitution focusing on urban development, Article 183, deals specifically with ‘squatters rights’, establishing the parameters of regularisation of adverse land possession (*usucapião*) in private urban landholdings. However, the right to adverse possession on public land was not recognised, thereby excluding the *favelas* located on land belonging to municipal, state or federal government.

Although this was not a complete defeat for the National Movement for Urban Reform, the mobilisation around such reform was largely transferred to the local level. The only important exception was the mobilisation around the Federal Law of Urban Development, called ‘City Statute’ (*Estatuto da Cidade*), which regulated and supplemented Articles 182 and 183 of the Constitution. The approval of this law was postponed for eleven years, until it was finally ratified in July 2001 (see Lei no. 10.257, de 10/07/2001).

For leftist scholars, this transfer from the national to the local level has been a challenge since the beginning of the 1990s. Not only as this has been linked to a fragmentation of the ‘battle front’ and a decrease in the opportunities for urban reform in Brazil (this problem was underestimated for a long time, as I have pointed out elsewhere – see, for instance, Souza, 1998 and 2002), at least up to the approval of the City Statute, but also because left-wing scholars were accustomed to seeing ‘master

plans' as nothing more than technocratic instruments in the hands of conservative and ineffective local administrations. Suddenly, progressive planners had to reshape this old instrument in order to transform it into a tool for urban reform at the municipal level. The new generation of plans, prepared since the 1990s in many cities more or less under the influence of the urban reform principles, has been called the generation of the 'new master plans' ('*novos planos diretores*'), in order to differentiate them from the conventional, technocratic ones.

Conventional master plans follow a top-down style, that is, they are not committed to popular participation in the planning process. From this perspective, the participation of ordinary people in the planning process is not desirable. Planning is seen to be a *technical* matter that has to be undertaken on the basis of *rationality*; laypersons have to subject themselves to the imperatives of rationality. The kind of rationality with which conventional urban planning deals is an *instrumental* one; the *goal* is actually predetermined – the 'common good', achieved through *order* and *efficiency* (one could say, through the *modernisation of the urban space*), and the planner's task is to optimise the *means through which to achieve modernisation*. No alternative path to the common good is tolerable or even thinkable outside this capitalist-modernist ('Faustian') approach to urban development and planning.

What I am calling 'alternative urban planning' (in truth, there is no consensual label regarding this kind of planning inspired in the urban reform principles) is, in contrast to conventional planning, 'bottom-up' and participative. It is oriented towards *social justice*; modernisation is no longer an overriding priority. While conventional planning aims at a well-ordered and efficient city, alternative planning aims at a city in which residential segregation decreases, where the state and civil society can join forces to fight successfully against land speculation and in which city management becomes increasingly democratic. Conventional urban planning strives to achieve an *ideal* city, from which illegality and informality (shanty towns [*favelas*] and irregular working-class settlements [*loteamentos irregulares*]) have to be banned; alternative urban planning deals instead with the *existing* city, and its priority is not to establish 'projected futures', but to conceive tools for tackling urban problems in a socially just and really democratic way.

These alternative planning tools include, among other instruments, compulsory subdivision or edification, the utilisation of property tax progressively over time, expropriation-sanction with payment in titles of public debt, the *contribuição de melhoria* (literally 'contribution for betterment'; it is a kind of local compulsory contribution for improvements, that is, a tax levied over local property owners, generally in middle-class and elite neighbourhoods, to pay for the increase in value of their properties which is caused by some types of state intervention in the public

space) and the *'solo criado'* (literally 'created soil'), which is the popular nickname of the planning instrument named *concessão onerosa do direito de construir*, namely, onerous transfer of building rights. The premise of *'solo criado'* is a separation between the property right (which is of course granted in every capitalist society) and the right to build (which can be not only regulated, but also sold by the state, so that the developer, and in the end the future property owner, could then have to pay a tax, which is paid on the basis of a percentage added according to the number of times the area of the plot of land is smaller than the combined floor area of the building). The rationale of the onerous transfer of building rights is that property owners who live in expensive flats in tall buildings (which is typical of the way of life of the Brazilian middle-class and even elite in several large cities, due to security as well as for other reasons) should contribute in a specific way to the payment for the costs of infrastructure in privileged high-density districts.

Conventional planners work with zoning instruments to reach order and efficiency, whereas alternative planners use land use management tools for other purposes, namely to identify and classify spaces according to their *social situation and public interest* (the two zones of special interest for the social development and integration of residents as fully fledged citizens are: *ZEIS: Zonas de Especial Interesse Social*, areas for tenure regularisation and physical upgrading, and *ZPAs: Zonas de Proteção Ambiental*, zones of special interest for environmental protection purposes).

Last, but not least, alternative planners stress the importance of popular participation: planning is no longer viewed solely as a *technical process*, but instead is considered as a *political-technical process*; the planner does not see her/himself as a 'neutral' expert pursuing social harmony through technical rationality, where disharmony is presumed to be avoidable and even pathological, but to make explicit the conflicts between different social groups and to try to regulate them in a politically transparent manner and through democratic participation, in order to achieve more social justice in the city and a better quality of life *especially* (even if not *exclusively*) for its least privileged residents.

'Participatory budgeting': The Brazilian experience of citizen participation in resource allocation

'Participatory budgeting' (*orçamento participativo*) is a scheme of direct participation of civil society in the selection of priorities for the allocation of the public budget. Although it can be understood as belonging to the measures and policies which contribute to the general aim of an urban reform, 'participatory budgeting' has a specific history behind it, and the scholars and progressive planners who advocate an

urban reform usually focus their attention on master plans and planning instruments such as those mentioned in the preceding section.

In the context of participatory budgeting the process of determining and finalising the municipal budget is no longer the privilege of the mayor and municipal deputies. The first example of this sort of urban management scheme in Brazil was that of Lages (in the state of Santa Catarina, in the south of the country) and Pelotas (in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southern-most state) in the 1970s, followed by the experience of Vila Velha (in the state of Espírito Santo) between 1983 and 1986. Nowadays, there are more than a hundred experiences referred to as 'participatory budgeting'. However, the degree of consistency of these participatory urban management experiences is highly variable: they range from mere *consultation* (i.e. the 'participation' of civil society is restricted to the submission of recommendations, without effective decision-making power) over *partnership* (i.e. participation is not restricted to merely advisory functions, but the local administration actively takes part in the decision-making process) to genuine *delegated power* (i.e. the local state relinquishes its decision-making power regarding resource allocation in favour of civil society).

In the cases in which the process is restricted to a mere consultation, the percentage of the total budget allocated to the sphere of decision making on the part of civil society is often insignificant (e.g. Souza, 2000c). However, in the most consistent cases 'participatory budgeting' corresponds to an interesting experiment that stretches the boundaries of democracy (which has several limits in the case of representative democracy in general and in a country like Brazil, in particular), and which gives real significance to vague ideas such as 'empowerment'.

The most influential and consistent experience is by far that of Porto Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (with a population, in 2000, of over 1.3 million inhabitants). Participatory budgeting was introduced in Porto Alegre in January 1989, after Olivio Dutra (from the Worker's Party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT) was elected mayor in the 1988 municipal elections. It is remarkable that the Worker's Party has not lost elections in that city since then, and the popularity of participatory budgeting has clearly been a major factor of this electoral success. In 2001, the Worker's Party received the fourth mandate of the people to administer Porto Alegre.

In organisational terms, Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting consists of a series of meetings that take place from March to July. During this time the municipal administration coordinates two major meetings (called *rodadas*) in each of the sixteen territorial units (*regiões*) into which the city has been divided for the purpose of implementing the process. During this first major *rodada*, which occurs from March

to April, the municipality presents and explains its actions and accounts for the previous year and submits, to the attending citizens' representatives (who are freely elected delegates) and the population in general, its investment plan for the current year. Furthermore, the municipal administration projects the potential financial resources for the next year.

It is in the first major meeting that the inhabitants of each *região* elect their delegates, in proportion to the number of citizens attending the meeting; consequently, the number of delegates in each *região* depends on the number of participants in the meeting. This ensures that people are stimulated to participate. The number of delegates is one to every ten citizens attending the meeting. All delegates constitute the 'Forum of Delegates' of the region. The same system of proportional representation is valid for the election of delegates in the context of the six 'thematic plenary sessions' (*plenárias temáticas*), introduced in 1994 to ensure that sufficient attention is given to questions that are relevant for the city as a whole and not just for a district or *região*. There are six *plenárias temáticas* nowadays, covering the following themes: i) *economic development and taxation*; ii) *health and social welfare*; iii) *education and recreation*; iv) *culture*; v) *traffic and transportation*; and vi) *spatial organisation and urban development*.

After the first major meeting, the delegates contact ordinary people through smaller, informal meetings organised by the population itself (called *rodadas intermediárias*) and discuss their needs in the face of a possible investment capacity communicated and explained to them by the municipal government. Moreover, they determine priorities (general themes like education, sanitation, housing, etc.) and specific projects for each broad priority. This corresponds to the second stage of the process.

Subsequently, during the second major meeting, which is coordinated by the government (like the first meeting) and corresponds to the third stage of the process, running from June to July, the delegates choose the regions' priorities (or, insofar as the *plenárias temáticas* are concerned, the sectoral priorities) according to which the government should allocate investments. During the second major *rodada* the Council for Participatory Budgeting (*Conselho do Orçamento Participativo – COP*), which is formed by two councillors (plus two substitutes) elected by each *região* and two councillors (plus two substitutes) elected by each *plenária temática*, as well as one representative of the civil servants' trade union (plus one substitute), another one appointed by the municipal federation of neighbourhood associations (plus one substitute) and two representatives from the government (plus two substitutes), is formally established. All representatives have a one-year mandate, but they have the right to be re-elected or nominated for (only) a second consecutive term. It is

important to emphasise that the representatives from the government do not have the right to vote; their role is to act as advisors to the councillors on technical matters. After being formally established the COP becomes the central administrative sphere for the next budget, because it has final decision-making powers on any issue related to this – at least as far as the executive is concerned, since the municipal parliament still has to vote on the budget proposal. (More detailed descriptions of the process of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre can be found in Abers, 1997b; Fedozzi, 1997; Genro and Souza, 1998; Navarro, 1996. See also Prefeitura de Porto Alegre: www.prefpoa.com.br)

Of course, participatory budgeting is not a panacea for all urban problems. But a consistently implemented participatory budgeting process is also by no means a superfluous instrument. Despite the fact that the share of the total budget set for new expenditure is rarely larger than 15 or 20%, the amount of financial resources to be decided about in the framework of participatory budgeting will not necessarily be irrelevant, provided that a large portion (or the totality, like in the case of Porto Alegre) of those 20, 15 or even 10% is allocated to the sphere of participatory budgeting. In this situation the instrument is very effective. What is more, people have real power in their hands, while the state to a large extent plays only the role of a coordinator. It is remarkable that participatory budgeting can precisely contribute both to a very significant reduction of the dependency of poor people on clientelistic mechanisms and to the empowerment of civil society (see Abers, 1997a; 1997b; 1998 and Fedozzi, 1997 about Porto Alegre; see Souza, 2002 about Porto Alegre as well as for a more general discussion of the importance of the mechanism). The fact that Porto Alegre is one of the few big Brazilian cities where the urban social movements are not in a deep crisis is surely not accidental.

Some additional remarks about the relevance of the 'urban reform' instruments and of 'participatory budgeting' to socio-spatial development


As I already pointed out in earlier works (Souza, 2000a; see also Souza, 2002), the meaning of 'alternative urban planning and management' in general, and of 'participatory budgeting' in particular, is a very positive one from a point of view committed to popular participation and, in broader terms, to urban development on the basis of an expansion of *collective and individual autonomy*. Autonomy, in the present sense, is a fundamental politico-philosophical and ethical principle, with which help we can develop a *praxis* which is alternative both to conservatism (committed to a glorification of representative democracy and capitalism as a *non plus*

ultra in terms of the political and economic organisation of society respectively) and to Marxism, which is typically characterised by the presence of an authoritarian dimension and by its failure to produce a deep criticism of capitalist technologies and spatiality, although criticising capitalist relations of production and power structures. Autonomy, as proposed by the Graeco-French philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis (see Castoriadis, 1990; 1996), means both the ability of an individual to shape her or his life freely and on the basis of equal opportunities for all individuals (i.e. *individual autonomy*), and the possibility for a group to govern itself without external oppression from other groups that are territorially defined on the basis of politico-cultural identity or superior interference (brought by oppressive and exploitative structures as well as in terms of the metaphysical foundations of laws and norms, that is, outside the sphere of rational criticism and deliberation, i.e. *collective autonomy*). Deprived of the dimension of autonomy, urban development can only be, *at best*, a kind of modernisation accompanied by poverty reduction and some degree of environmental protection, overseen by more or less 'enlightened' and 'democratic' ruling elites. Despite gains in terms of mitigation of environmental destruction, poverty and even residential segregation, such a context cannot meet the fundamental prerequisite for a genuine process of socio-spatial development: substantial gains in terms of *freedom*. I have elsewhere used Castoriadis' thought as a philosophical framework for urban analysis, planning and management which represents an alternative not only to conventional approaches (commonly based on utilitarianism) but also to more traditional left-wing approaches, inspired in 'historical materialism' (see, for example, Souza 2000a; 2000b; 2002).

In operational terms, the core of autonomy itself is the degree of opportunity for direct participation in relevant decision-making processes. Using a modified version of Sherry Arnstein's (1969) famous 'ladder of citizen participation' (see Figure 12.1 below), one can say that the most important cases of 'alternative urban planning and management', such as Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting, correspond to 'delegated power', which means a very important gain in terms of collective autonomy, despite the fact that the general societal context remains heteronomous. 'Self-management' (Arnstein's 'citizen control'), which corresponds to strong collective autonomy, is an ideal which requires much more than political changes at the local level to be implemented. It usually requires a new, non-heteronomous society.

One can see that some general aims related to urban development in a broader and deeper sense (that is, increasing quality of life and social justice on the basis of increasing individual and collective autonomy) can be met with the help of a consistent implementation of certain planning instruments. For instance, progressive tax on urban land and property can help reduce land speculation and some problems

Figure 12.1 From non-participation to genuine popular participation in planning processes: A classification



1 and 2: Degrees of non-participation

3, 4 and 5: Degrees of pseudo-participation

6, 7 and 8: Degrees of genuine participation

related to this, and *'solo criado'* can contribute to a reduction of building densities and even of land prices. Both can further contribute to an increase of local state revenues. Moreover, the implementation of an alternative zoning system offers a framework for the establishment of investment priorities for additional financial resources (obtained through the aforementioned instruments) according to the social context and degree of deprivation: tenure regularisation of *favelas* and *loteamentos irregulares*, community upgrading, and the like. However, specifying aims according to the desires and needs of the inhabitants themselves, as well as monitoring the implementation of the instruments and the use of resources will depend to a large extent on popular participation, so that the implementation of planning instruments (including zoning proposals) should be supplemented by the implementation of *councils for urban development*, which have decision-making power and to which representatives of both the state and of civil society belong, but

on a genuine basis of delegated power, that is, local state representatives really transfer decision-making power to civil society. These councils should be very similar to the councils for participatory budgeting that have to be implemented in the context of experiences of popular participation in the budgeting process (as brilliantly illustrated by the example of Porto Alegre). This kind of cooperation, mixing representative and direct democracy, is an important step towards more *collective autonomy*. Furthermore, it can indirectly contribute to more *individual autonomy* as living conditions (more education, better sanitation, better health, and so on) obviously contribute to an improvement of the opportunities of access to power for individuals, especially the poor. Increasing autonomy – that is, in spatial terms, the conquest of an increasingly *autonomous territoriality* – is a major point of departure for the implementation of material and non-material improvements according to the culture and values of the inhabitants themselves, and in accordance with the particularities of their *place*. Although Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting was part of PT's political strategy to obtain popular support in a context of widespread public distrust in politicians and severe financial difficulties – due to the fact that the previous administration (before PT came to office) passed a law three days before its end that radically increased expenditures on municipal employee salaries (Abers, 1997b:102) – the experience cannot be seen as populist, because it encourages the free participation of the citizens and so threatens traditional clientelistic practices.

It must be stressed that I am *not* suggesting that a radical social change can be attained through the consistent implementation of progressive urban planning instruments and participatory urban management schemes *alone*. As I have already said, strong collective autonomy is an ideal that requires much more than the implementation of political changes at the local level. Urban problem factors emerge and operate at several levels simultaneously, from local to global, so that local-scale strategies and policies are quite insufficient, at least from a relatively ambitious standpoint. However, this restriction does not mean, of course, that local-scale strategies and policies are irrelevant, and in this sense instruments such as those presented above can surely be very useful.

Conclusion: Instructive examples for other countries in the South?

Undoubtedly, Brazil is a country which is full of contrasts and which is extremely complex. On the one hand, the dominant style of urban planning and management in Brazil still is very heteronomous; it only corresponds to 'informing', sometimes to 'manipulation' (and, by the time of the military rule – 1964–1985 – even to 'coercion'). On the other hand, there are also some local-level attempts that are even more

advanced and ambitious than the usual 'participation' schemes in the so-called developed countries.

It is useful to recall the British example to establish a comparison. In Britain there is a tradition and a culture of urban planning which is incomparably more profound than that of Brazil; furthermore, British society is far less unequal and more democratic than Brazilian society. In Britain, the distinction between master planning and systems planning – both belonging to the family of conventional planning – is historically very important (see Hall, 1992), while in Brazil it seems to be far less relevant than the distinction between technocratic, non-participatory approaches, on the one side, and progressive planning and management, on the other side. 'Participation' seems to be an important characteristic of Britain's present-day planning system, both in the case of normal statutory local development plans and even more in the framework of the recent 'turn to community' and the fashion of 'community planning' (see, for instance, Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997; Lloyd and Illsley, 1999); but 'participation' in Britain's case is a label which in reality is more related to *consultation* than to real citizen control. As a British observer underlined:

In statutory local planning, participation has been narrowly interpreted by most local authorities and corresponds in practice to the degrees of tokenism (placation, consultation or informing) on Arnstein's ladder. From now on, it will therefore be described not as participation but as consultation (Adams, 1994:180).

A similar criticism could be addressed to, say, the German experience with *Bürgerbeteiligung* (citizen participation) in urban planning processes. In contrast to that, Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting can be considered as an example of real participation. It does not correspond only to *consultation*, but to *delegated power*. Although this kind of situation is still exceptional, it is very interesting indeed, because it challenges some of the usual clichés about urban management in the Third World – especially in the present moment of worldwide conformism and conservatism. In truth, and probably better than many examples in the First World, this kind of experience seems to bring into concrete existence some theoretical proposals which have been made in the last years, especially by progressive European and North American academics – for example, planning (and management) conceived as a 'communicative enterprise', as discussed by Healey (1995; 1996) as well as by other authors under inspiration of Habermas' philosophical reflections on communicative rationality and action. Particularly remarkable, is the fact that Castoriadis himself, who visited Porto Alegre a couple of times until his death in 1997, acknowledged that participatory budgeting largely agrees with his own autonomist perspective (see Castoriadis *et al.*, 1992:129). Considered in this light, it is possible to assume that

experiences such as Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting can be a source of inspiration even for countries in the North. And, in fact, at least Porto Alegre's experience *has been* a source of inspiration for several cities in several countries, including European ones.

In the countries of the North (more particularly, Italy, Spain, Belgium, England and France), but also in Africa (Senegal and Cameroon), the experience of the participatory budget has met with considerable approval, which has grown stronger since the first World Social Forum in January 2001 in Porto Alegre. [...] In France, at the last municipal elections, various lists emerged with the 'Participatory Budget' on their programme [...] (Picheral, 2001:4).

Curiously, even David Harvey – who seems to have espoused a much less dogmatic and reductionistic view about the nature and possibilities of planning in recent years – stressed the paradigmatic importance of Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting:

The creation of mediating institutions is deeply fraught and frequently contested (as one might properly expect). The chief difficulty is to bring multiple militant particularisms (in the contemporary US this might mean the aspirations of radical ecologists, the chamber of commerce, ethnic or religious groups, feminists, developers, class organizations, bankers, and the like) into some kind of institutional relation to each other without resort to arbitrary authority and power. The Porto Alegre experience [here Harvey mentions one of Rebecca Abers' works on Porto Alegre] suggests that this sort of thing can be done (Harvey, 2000:244).

However, this positive picture should not induce us to neglect some obstacles and give the impression that it is easy to reach a consistent implementation of both 'new master plans' and 'participatory budgeting'. A major prerequisite of 'alternative urban planning' as well as of 'participatory budgeting' is a conscious, organised and mobilised civil society. If this prerequisite cannot be met, there is always the danger that the local state will not restrict itself to the role of coordinator of the process and instead try to substitute paternalistic schemes for genuine participation. The importance of civil society and broad socio-political factors must not be overlooked, especially in influencing the institutions and mechanisms of power and in putting the state apparatus under pressure in order to ensure that laws and plans can be effectively implemented and observed (see Souza, 1998; 2000b; 2002). Participatory budgeting in particular, and alternative urban planning and management in general, and as already stated, can contribute to a significant reduction of the dependency of poor people on clientelistic mechanisms and to the empowerment of citizens, but a minimum of consciousness and organisation on the part of the civil society must already exist as a premise of consistent popular participation. Today, a challenge in this regard is precisely the organisational weakness of civil society in most Brazilian cities. The

capacity of mobilisation of the neighbourhood associations is usually very small, and in this context chronic problems like the conservatism of most politicians as well as pressures from lobbies of capitalists, landowners and privileged residents, are difficult to neutralise.

Another problem is the lack of explicit concern about the question of *racism*. There is a 'conservative consensus' that, if not a 'racial democracy', Brazil is at least a country in which racism is not a big problem. Black scholars and personalities have tried especially in recent years to make the public aware of the problems related to the sequels of slavery and the permanence of prejudices on the basis of skin colour. Curiously, explicit concerns about racism and the way in which conventional planning does not challenge (and sometimes even reinforces) the relative exclusion and the stigmatisation of Black people (who make up the majority of Brazilian shanty town inhabitants, especially in the big cities of the northeast and the southeast), are virtually absent from the social justice agenda of normal urban reform discourse. It seems that the perspective of 'class exploitation' (still) commands the minds and hearts of urban reform advocates in a way detrimental to the proper valuation of other questions and perspectives (such as ethnicity and gender).

Another challenge is the integration between the principles and instruments contained in the 'new master plans', on the one side, and participatory budgeting processes, on the other. Instruments such as progressive property tax, *contribuição de melhoria*, and 'solo criado' can contribute to increased municipal revenues. And, participatory budgeting fits perfectly in the broader context of urban reform. Nevertheless, scholars who have occupied themselves with those instruments (and with the urban reform agenda in general) have usually not been the same people who pay attention to participatory budgeting. For theoretical and especially practical purposes, a consistent integration between the two processes is a crucial task, but it still is a relatively neglected one, despite some progress in recent years (see Souza, 2002).

Lastly, a relatively new and increasing challenge is drug trafficking and its impacts on neighbourhood activism, above all, but not exclusively, in the shanty towns of the two biggest metropolises of the country. Undoubtedly, one of the most striking things, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, but also in São Paulo, is the control of shanty towns by drug trafficking gangs and organisations. What effects can the territorialisation of a *favela* by a narcotics trafficking organisation produce for its inhabitants? Field research in some shanty towns, carried out by the author in the middle of the 1990s in the context of research about the socio-spatial impact of drug trafficking on space and social relations in Brazilian cities, has shown that *favelados'* experiences and views are ambivalent in this respect. Drug trafficking has both a positive and a negative

impact on their lives, even if the 'positive' aspect must be qualified considering the risks and costs which this kind of illegal survival strategy represents for them (for a detailed discussion of this question see, for instance, Souza, 1996; 2000b).

First of all, drug trafficking creates jobs and is a source of income for many poor people in the shanty towns: from the local gang leader who operates in retail drug trade and his 'soldiers' (namely, the local security personnel) to the people (including children, women and the elderly) who help them with several 'logistical' tasks. Taking Rio de Janeiro as an example, where about 25% of the city's population lives in shanty towns, and keeping in mind that the majority of Rio's *favelas* already are under control of some or other drug trafficking gang, it is easy to perceive the economic importance of drug trafficking for a large part of the local poor, even if we do not have reliable figures about the number of people directly or indirectly involved in this illicit trade. Furthermore, within the *favelas*, drug dealers play the role of an *order* factor, since they give the residents of *favelas* protection against ordinary crimes like assaults and sexual violence, in order to preserve some loyalty on the part of the local community and so as to ensure the necessary safety for their 'business'.

However, this kind of 'protection' does not imply any guarantee against the effects of 'wars' between rival groups of dealers or of confrontations between these and the police. The result is that many blameless *favelados* (including many children) have already been victims of gunfights in the last two decades. Moreover, sometimes the drug dealers themselves exercise violence against the workers, and in these situations the vulnerability of the *favelados* becomes quite evident.

In addition to this, another aspect of the negative side of drug trafficking for the squatters themselves is the persecution of neighbourhood associations by traffickers. A general trend is that the neighbourhood associations of shanty towns become subject to the pressures of drug dealers, and instruments in their hands. The *favela* associations are important for the bandits, because they offer 'logistical support' for drug dealing (for instance, the telephone of some *favela* associations serves both the dealers and the community) and help to establish a façade for the traffickers. In fact, the presidents of *favela* associations and the shanty town residents in general have only two possibilities: either cooperation (in fact, submission) or conflict with bandits armed with guns. The inhabitants find themselves forced to develop schemes of coexistence with the drug dealers (such as the 'silence rule', or by offering a means of escape for bandits in conflict with the police). Not only voluntary popular participation in local planning and management schemes becomes virtually impossible under such circumstances of tyranny and fear, but things such as community upgrading in itself become more difficult to be implemented (see Souza, 2000b:74–75).

Considering all of this, it is possible to assume, on the one hand, that other ‘Third World’ countries can learn something from the Brazilian experience – and, in fact, even ‘developed’ countries have showed a justified interest in Brazilian alternative planning and management schemes, especially in Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting. On the other hand, it is necessary to accept that even in Brazil itself there are some barriers regarding the chance for ‘new master plans’ and participatory budgeting to be successfully duplicated. One of the most important challenges for future academic research is precisely to examine the positive or negative influence of different economic contexts and cultural and political traditions inside the country (considering regional heterogeneity) on the different degrees of success which can be observed among the many local experiences.

No country should merely try to ‘imitate’ successful experiences developed in another country, because the institutional, cultural, and economic differences between countries (as well as between regions and cities within a single country) can be so significant that such an import can turn into a failure or even be catastrophic. We must depart from the idea that good results in terms of authentic urban development can be attained only on the basis of the adoption of a set of technically and politically consistent criteria and instruments, without enough consideration about the *general social framework*. The success of an experience is a result of a complex synergy of factors, including some contingent ones, and not just the product of the adoption of the ‘right’ method or ‘recipe’; in truth, there is no such a thing as a ‘successful recipe’ which just needs to be learned and then applied everywhere. However, a genuine *dialogue* must be intensified between people concerned about urban problems from different countries and cities, and in this context the idea of ‘sources of inspiration’ makes a lot of sense. I think some Brazilian experiences belong to the small set of really innovative and inspiring contemporary attempts to overcome urban problems on the basis of participatory planning and management.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Marie Huchzermeyer and Phil Harrison for comments on an earlier draft.

References


- Abers, R. (1997a) ‘Inventando a democracia: Distribuição de recursos públicos através da participação popular em Porto Alegre, RS’. In *Anais do 7. Encontro Nacional da ANPUR*, v. 3:1735–1759.

- Abers, R. (1997b) *Inventing Local Democracy: Neighborhood Organizing and Participatory Policy-Making in Porto Alegre, Brazil*. PhD thesis. Los Angeles: University of California.
- Abers, R. (1998) 'Do clientelismo à cooperação: Governos locais, políticas participativas e organização da sociedade civil em Porto Alegre', *Cadernos IPPUR*, 7(1):47–78.
- Adams, D. (1994) *Urban Planning and the Development Process*. London: UCL Press.
- Arnstein, S. (1969) 'A ladder of citizen participation', *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 35:216–24.
- Castoriadis, C. (1990) 'Pouvoir, politique, autonomie'. In *Le monde morcelé – Les carrefours du labyrinthe III*. Paris: Seuil.
- Castoriadis, C. (1996) 'La démocratie comme procédure et comme régime'. In *La montée de l'insignifiance – Les carrefours du labyrinthe IV*. Paris: Seuil.
- Castoriadis, C. et al. (1992) *A Criação Histórica*. Porto Alegre: Artes e Ofícios.
- Duffy, K. and J. Hutchinson (1997) 'Urban policy and the turn to community', *Town Planning Review*, 68(3):347–362.
- Fedozzi, L. (1997) *Orçamento Participativo. Reflexões sobre a Experiência de Porto Alegre*. Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial/FASE/IPPUR.
- Fernandes, E. and R. Rolnik (1998) 'Law and urban change in Brazil'. In *Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries*, edited by Fernandes, E. and A. Varley, pp. 140–156. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Genro, T. and U. de Souza (1998) *Orçamento Participativo. A Experiência de Porto Alegre*. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.
- Hall, P. (1992) *Urban and Regional Planning*. London: Routledge.
- Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Harvey, D. (1985) *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2000) *Spaces of Hope*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Healey, P. (1995) 'Discourses of integration: Making frameworks for democratic urban planning'. In *Managing Cities. The New Urban Context*, edited by Healey, P. et al., pp. 251–272. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Healey, P. (1996 [1992]) 'Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory'. In *Readings in Planning Theory*, edited by Campbell, S. and S. Fainstein, pp. 234–257. Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell.
- Lei no. 10.257, de 10/07/2001 (Estatuto da Cidade) *Diário Oficial da União*, Seção I (Atos do Poder Legislativo), Edição no. 133, 11/07/2001.
- Lloyd, G. and B. Illsley (1999) 'Community planning – A new way forward for Scotland?', *Town & Country Planning*, 68(1):28–29.
- Navarro, Z. (1996) "'Participatory budgeting" – The case of Porto Alegre (Brazil)'. Paper presented to the *Regional Workshop: Decentralization in Latin America – Innovations and Policy Implications*, Caracas, May 23–24.
- Picheral, Jean-Blaise (2001) 'The participatory budget of Porto Alegre, or how the South can benefit the North and the South', *Villes en Développement*, no. 52:4.
- Souza, M.L. de (1996) 'A teorização sobre o desenvolvimento em uma época de fadiga teórica, ou: sobre a necessidade de uma "teoria aberta" do desenvolvimento sócio-espacial', *Território*, 1(1):5–22.

- Souza, M.L. de (1998) 'Desenvolvimento urbano: A problemática renovação de um "conceito"-problema', *Território*, 3(5):5–29.
- Souza, M.L. de (2000a) 'Urban development on the basis of autonomy: A politico-philosophical and ethical framework for urban planning and management', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 3(2):187–201.
- Souza, M.L. de (2000b) *O Desafio Metropolitano. Um Estudo sobre a Problemática Sócio-Espacial nas Metrôpoles Brasileiras*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.
- Souza, M.L. de (2000c) 'Para que serve o orçamento participativo? Disparidade de expectativas e disputa ideológica em torno de uma proposta em ascensão', *Cadernos IPPUR/UFRJ*, 14(2):123–142.
- Souza, M.L. de (2002) *Mudar a Cidade. Uma Introdução Crítica ao Planejamento e à Gestão Urbanos*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.

Part C

The Role of Housing



Chapter 13

Addressing Segregation Through Housing Policy and Finance

Marie Huchzermeyer

Introduction

Most cities of the South are characterised by high levels of class segregation in the residential sphere. A highly unequal distribution of wealth and of housing is attributed not only to the fragmenting nature of the currently dominant economic system, but also to long periods of discrimination and repression, be this colonialism, dictatorships or, in South Africa, the recent apartheid regime. The need for urban spatial restructuring to accompany democratisation has been articulated by social movements, NGOs and academics, and is incorporated into international agendas on habitat, human rights or the environment, and in South Africa, into the national *Urban Development Framework* of 1997 (Department of Housing, 1997), which is the official response of the Ministry of Housing to the 1996 Habitat Agenda (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996). However, housing policy, or the system through which governments intend guiding or directly intervening in the housing market, is shaped also by local and national political forces. The populist aim by ruling parties in a new democracy to gain short-term political support from impressive rates of subsidised housing delivery leads to the establishment of policy mechanisms that prioritise fast-tracking the release and servicing of land for housing construction. This overrides the longer term objectives of urban restructuring.

In a democratising country such as South Africa, where the current government is burdened by a massive inherited housing backlog, rapid housing delivery must be

welcomed. However, this tends to reproduce a segregated urban form. Delivery systems that aim at producing large quantities of housing tend to minimise the cost per unit. Whereas servicing and house construction may be kept to a minimum standard initially, and improved over time, land is an up-front component of low-income housing. Its intrinsic value is related to its proximity to infrastructure and social and commercial facilities. Minimising the up-front cost per unit requires new housing developments to be located on cheap tracts of land, or on land already owned by the state. In South Africa, much post-1994 low-income housing has been developed on land that was purchased in the 1980s by the apartheid government for township development in accordance with its segregationist ideology. Thus, many apartheid urban plans have been implemented unquestioningly by the post-apartheid government (Huchzermeyer, 2003). Reinforcing the same urban pattern, the cheapest tracts of developable land recently purchased for low-income developments have been those adjacent to or beyond existing townships. Housing delivery in these locations ignores the social, environmental and longer term economic consequences of inadequate access.

South Africa's massive housing delivery is internationally applauded. A million new units were constructed in the first seven years after the launch of the current housing policy in 1994 (Department of Housing: www.housing.gov.za). This success in numbers is associated with South Africa's housing finance system, one of the simplest among economically comparable countries (see Gilbert, 2002). Eighty two per cent of the South African housing budget (currently 2.6% of the national budget) is spent on once-off supply-side capital subsidies. These lump-sum grants are project-linked, and released to a private or municipal developer for the delivery of a standardised housing product, which is then allocated with freehold title to qualifying low-income households.

In 2002, a deposit by the beneficiary, comprising 10% of the subsidy, was introduced as a qualifying criterion for beneficiaries to obtain a subsidised housing unit. Those without such capital are to be given the option to participate in a self-construction process. No doubt, this policy adjustment will slow down delivery, potentially undermining the short-term populist effect, and hence legitimacy, of the current policy. Should this be the case, demands for urban restructuring, or for more integrated location of low-income housing, as articulated by progressive sectors and by dissatisfied beneficiaries, may gain political support. However, the actual policy instruments for such restructuring have yet to be developed.

The perpetuation of housing segregation is not unique to South Africa. In a number of countries in the north and south, housing segregation has become a political concern, as market forces, reinforced by policies of mass housing delivery, have spatially divided the rich from the poor. In the UK, concern over social exclusion

in relation not only to how much people earn, but also to where people live, is said to be at the top of the political agenda (Hills, 2001). This paper draws on experience in Brazil, the US and the UK, where housing policy instruments to desegregate or spatially integrate low-income housing have been developed, debated and enacted. They relate primarily to tenure innovations, to the way subsidies are structured, to the way land use is regulated and land is taxed. However, the effect has usually been limited, particularly by conservative resistance. Thus, overcoming housing segregation requires not only progressive policy instruments, but also ongoing political pressure from civil society.

This chapter begins by reviewing some of the international debates on housing segregation, comparing the South African scenario with situations elsewhere. It links housing segregation to housing finance and urban planning mechanisms, and explores a number of housing policy and finance alternatives that have been developed in countries of the North and South to overcome housing segregation. The chapter suggests that these may be incorporated into South African housing policy, though bearing in mind the likelihood of resistance by those with stakes in the highly segregated urban land market.

Causes of housing segregation and its perpetuation

Internationally, the roots of housing segregation relate to the efforts in the cities of the industrial revolution to cater separately to the housing needs of higher and lower income groups – suburban development for the middle-class, and subsidised public housing for the working class. Modern transportation technology introduced commuting for domestic labour, therefore allowing for the disappearance of low-income accommodation from middle-class residential areas (Espino, 2001). Public housing was sited on land with low economic value, in areas where existing local communities would not voice resistance, and often in proximity to industry, transportation routes or other land uses with undesirable externalities (Cutter *et al.*, 2001). Qualifying criteria for the beneficiaries of public housing developments led to ‘*de facto* segregation’ (*ibid.*:29).

In the period following World War II, an increase in private motorcar ownership enabled the emergence of shopping centres, rather than convenience services being offered within residential areas – hence the advent of mono-functionally residential suburban development. In relation to the US, it has been argued that this enabled the construction of suburban identities, associated with fear of ‘the city, Blacks and immigrants, or crime and poverty’ (Espino, 2001:3). Such fear of the other has justified exclusion. Whereas in South Africa, the exclusionary aspect of segregation

was taken to extremes through legislated racial or skin colour restrictions on mobility, the current increase in middle- to high-income gated communities or 'closed condominiums', as they are referred to in Brazil, is witness to increasing levels of exclusion. At the other end of the urban spectrum, new subsidised low-income housing estates add to the spatial polarisation between the rich and the poor. For the UK, Hills (2001:1892) has noted that 'social provision, whose best justification is to avoid the kind of polarisation which one would expect in a free market, has evolved in a way which in fact has generated polarisation' (*ibid.*). Hills refers to the 'food parcel' approach, whereby subsidy beneficiaries are allocated housing of 'a fixed quality and price'. Thus a significant divide is present in British society between those who have high levels of control over their housing product, through choice, and those who have little control. Contributing to this polarisation is the practice of developing 'large single-tenure estates', as well as the standardised allocation criteria that apply (*ibid.*:1891).

In most of the anglophone world, segregation and exclusion are maintained through zoning laws in their relationship to the commodified land market. In countries such as South Africa, where the middle-income urban land market has developed within a system of land use regulation or zoning, and building regulation, these laws protect the homeowner's financial stakes in the housing market. Whereas the imported British Town Planning Scheme was applied only to 'White' areas, the regulations and standards applying to segregated and subsidised low-income areas in turn prevent any significant appreciation of land value. Thus, these areas are seldom diversified in terms of income of the residents. They are effectively preserved for low-income groups. This may be justified by the government investment through housing subsidies. However, where segregated low-income units are developed for subsidised home ownership, as in the case of South Africa, the assumption is that home ownership gives the poor a stake in the urban economy, and a basis for the accumulation of wealth. The absence of a meaningful land market, and the actual depreciation in land value in townships, is reflected in banks redlining or refusing to give housing mortgages for purchases in these zones. This is a reality in the US as in South Africa. Notably, in South Africa the conventional mortgage system serves only the upper 6.5% of the population (Venter, 2002).

In South Africa, exclusion was taken to its extreme by superimposing racial restrictions over zoning legislation, and therefore preventing residential mobility between separate racially defined 'group areas'. The lifting of this restriction in 1991 has led to upward mobility into previously White-only middle-class residential areas (Christopher, 2001). However, it has led neither to greater socio-economic mix in middle-class suburbs, nor to a greater racial mix in former townships. Racial

segregation remains apparent, although class is now the stronger obstacle to overcoming exclusion (see Huchzermeyer, 2002).

A contrasting scenario is found in Brazilian cities, where the urban land market has largely developed in the absence of the enforcement of zoning schemes (see Bolaffi, 1992). Intense speculation has continuously led to the displacement of the poor to the urban periphery, where unauthorised and unregulated subdivision has led to conditions not dissimilar from the poorly serviced peripheral townships of South Africa (Huchzermeyer, 2002). In the past 15 years, a new concept of master planning and zoning has been introduced in Brazil, not to protect, but rather to limit, landowners' stakes in the urban land market (Fernandes, 1995).

In South Africa and the US, emphasis is on the promotion of home ownership, and in particular on the exchange value of the home. In the uniform middle-class suburbs of the US (see Espino, 2001), as in South Africa, home ownership is understood as a 'stage' for the upwardly mobile. Once the value of the house has been maximised, the homeowner sells and buys into a better area. Any depreciation (be this perceived or real) in such a land market is vehemently resisted.

In Latin America, where the emphasis is also on home ownership, housing is considered a long-term 'project' rather than a 'stage' (Espino, 2001). In the absence of strict zoning, land value appreciation has been related more to the direct investment by the owner than to the particular zone in which the land is located. Over-capitalisation is therefore not a concern. Urban land values throughout Latin America, even on the urban periphery, are considerably higher than in South Africa (Smolka, pers. comm.). In Brazilian cities such as Rio de Janeiro, upmarket high-rise residential blocks exist adjacent to informal settlements, which are rapidly consolidating as the residents seek their stake in the urban land market.

The perception, in a land market that depends on zoning, that the development of subsidised housing in proximity to middle-income land markets depreciates land values is one of the greatest obstacles to urban restructuring. In South Africa, as in other constitutional democracies, the constitutional right to protection of private property reinforces this obstacle. In South Africa, the constitutional right to adequate shelter in turn is a qualified right that is to be realised progressively, in accordance with the available resources of the state (RSA, 1996). It can therefore easily be argued that the available resources of the state allow only for low-income development on the urban periphery, where land is already owned by the state, or can be purchased at a low price, and not in proximity to middle-income areas. However, the South African constitution does commit the government to achieve greater equality, and in particular to ensure more equitable access to land, hence the 'transformative' character of the South African constitutional project (De Vos, 2001). The absence of concrete

government policy and legislation on the spatial integration of urban housing allows the neo-liberal preoccupation with global competitiveness in order to attract investment, to override the arguable need for low-income housing in proximity to economic opportunities, including middle-income housing areas.

Policy responses: Redressing segregation of low-income housing

In South Africa, housing policy should translate the transformative project of the Constitution into concrete mechanisms that lead to a more equal society. Redistribution through subsidised housing developments is not an adequate mechanism, as long as the majority of these projects are in peripheral locations and perpetuate the segregated urban form that was inherited by the ANC-led government. Urban housing policy must be conceived of as a programme for urban land reform, elaborated by appropriate legislation, procedures and financial mechanisms to ensure implementation. Dewar (1999:2) has argued that it is necessary 'to view housing as an instrument of urban restructuring: to use it consciously as a mechanism to promote qualities of urbanism as opposed to townships.' In contrast to the monotonous and segregated uniformity of townships, 'urbanism' refers to a quality that results from a complex environment that provides diverse opportunities for exchange and social interaction – across class and cultural lines.

However, a simplistic policy approach of 'decanting' (a term applied to forced relocation in South Africa, as if the poor were a liquid one could pour from one vessel to another) the poor from peripheral townships into suburbs is neither feasible nor desirable. On this point, Goetz (2000) refers, on the one hand, to disruption of communities and destruction of concentrated affordable housing, which is met with political resistance from the poor. On the other hand, increasing policy emphasis on the need to deconcentrate poverty builds middle-class resistance to the concept of subsidised housing, while at a practical level making it more difficult to deliver affordable housing in relevant numbers (*ibid.*).

Short of resigning to the lesser evil of perpetuating segregation but at least delivering housing at scale, it is worth considering a range of policy mechanisms that have been developed in other countries to counter housing segregation. Addressing segregation in South Africa will require a complex range of such mechanisms, encouraging, and in certain instances forcing, all parts of the city or urban area to contribute to the social transformation agreed to in the constitution. This will be through a revision of zoning laws, building regulations, land taxation and tenure forms as they apply to low-income as well as middle-class areas, and through restructuring the release of housing subsidies.

Quotas of low-income units in middle-class areas

Concern with excessive housing segregation in cities in the US led to the promulgation of a *Fair Housing Act* by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1968. According to this Act, each locality in a metropolitan area was to accept its fair share of low-income housing units. This share was calculated according to a complicated formula. Federal funding for infrastructure could be denied to localities (by the metropolitan authority), if the fair share was not met. Squires *et al.* (2001) note that a weak enforcement mechanism was a necessary compromise to get the *Fair Housing Act* passed. Only in 1988, was an amendment passed that increased the powers of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 'primary law enforcement agency', though 'enforcement still relies heavily on private actors' (*ibid.*:23). The civil rights movement has been driving the Fair Housing initiative through the decades, and non-profit fair housing advocacy organisations have come to rely on court orders and civil settlements for funding (Cheever and De Leon, 2001).

Fair share, as a concept to redress segregation in the US, has come up against regulations governing density, setbacks and minimum plot sizes, which directly increase the cost of individual housing units. Nevertheless, localised initiatives have taken the fair share concept further. The New Jersey state requires all municipalities 'to develop a plan for housing their "fair share" of their community's low-income households' (Squires *et al.*, 2001:27). This was introduced 'after more than 20 years of litigation, and other political battles' (*ibid.*).

A further interpretation of 'fair share' has been the allocation of quotas of low-income units to all new housing developments. Squires *et al.* (2001:27) refer to Montgomery County, a suburb in Maryland bordering on the north-west of Washington D.C., where 15% of all units within each subdivision have to be allocated to 'moderate income earners'. Increasingly, support for such policies comes from middle-income households that are unable to recruit domestic employees, municipal workers, teachers, etc. from distant low-income areas. As a result, developers and financiers, wishing to cater for this demand, recognise to what extent the existing exclusionary zoning laws undercut their financial interests (*ibid.*:28).

In the UK, a similar concept has been included in the *Planning Policy Guidance Note 3* (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2000a), which has a section titled 'Widening Housing Opportunity and Choice'. This calls for the local governments to 'secure an appropriate mix of dwelling size, type and affordability in both new developments and conversions to meet the changing composition of households in their area in the light of the likely assessed need' (*ibid.*). The UK government's response to this guideline was welcoming, though cautioning of 'powerful objections from financial institutions and developers to such developments', therefore calling for further guidelines to address these (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2000b).

Inclusionary zoning and the social function of private property

In order for fair housing to be implemented in the US, the conventional zoning regulations that determine dwelling unit density, plot size, plot coverage, floor-area ratios and setbacks had to be addressed, as they would not allow for affordable units to be located in higher income areas. Various inclusionary zoning techniques were developed, including incentives encouraging and allowing developers to build at higher densities if they produced affordable units, a mandatory quota of affordable units in new subdivisions, opportunities for the siting of mobile homes (an important form of low-cost housing in the US), and the construction of middle-income housing at the lowest possible cost (Mandelker and Ellis, 1998).

A form of inclusionary zoning was developed in Brazil in response to the highly speculative and unzoned urban land market. In 1983, after considerable mobilisation, the municipality of Belo Horizonte passed a law that pioneered the concept of Special Zones of Social Interest, which were imposed on urban areas that had become occupied informally by those excluded from the formal land market. The zoning mechanism prevents the landowners from developing informally occupied land for speculative purposes, thus protecting the occupiers from eviction by the landowners. It also exempts these areas from conventional regulations governing plot size and building standards, enabling a regularisation to take into account the irregular nature and high density of the occupation. Intervention could therefore focus on rectifying conditions of risk (for instance, construction on unstable slopes) and the introduction of essential services, rather than applying a standardisation of plot size and building standards across an entire informal settlement (see Fernandes, 1993; 2000).

However, as with the *Fair Share Act* in the US, this municipal law in Belo Horizonte was faced with conservative opposition, especially from the landowning class, and was passed only through a compromise of weak enforcement. Implementation of the regularisation programme in Belo Horizonte has been a slow process, obstructed by complex legal procedures that allow landowners to prolong the process of transfer of ownership to occupants (Abbott *et al.*, 2001; Fernandes, 1993). In 1988, through pressure from the Urban Reform Movement at national level, the concept of a social function of private property was included in the constitution. This social function places a limit on land speculation, or on the economic value that urban land could accrue (Souza, 1999; 2000). It is given meaning through a participatory legislative master planning process, essentially resulting in an enforceable zoning scheme. It is a legal requirement that master plans be developed by all municipalities above a certain minimum size (Fernandes and Rolnik, 1998:149).

Decommodification of housing

The master planning process in Brazil serves to reduce the commodification of land, or the emphasis on its exchange value. In the case of the Special Zones of Social Interest imposed on land informally occupied by the poor, the ensuing regularisation process transfers land from an elite market to a market that is accessible to the poor. Beneficiaries of this intervention, the informal occupiers, are more likely to treat their acquired home ownership as a 'project' than as a 'stage'. They are more likely to consolidate their stake in the land market through home improvement over a long period, than by selling at the highest possible price and moving to the next better housing market. Nevertheless, concern with such speculative action, particularly in easily accessible parts of well-located settlements, has led to the imposition of a moratorium on the sale of houses for the first five years after regularisation (Abbott *et al.*, 2001). This serves to ensure that such housing, for which the regularisation process has been subsidised by the government, is preserved for the lower income class.

In South Africa, a 2001 amendment to the Housing Act of 1997 introduced a restriction on the sale of government subsidised housing for the first eight years after transfer of ownership by the state to the beneficiary. A beneficiary wishing to relocate is required to notify the provincial department. The department then has the right to take possession of the house and to place the beneficiary on a waiting list for the area to which s/he wishes to relocate. The house can then be allocated to a new beneficiary (RSA, 2001:8). This legislation, if implemented, decommodifies subsidised housing for the first eight years. It ensures that any profit made from the exchange of subsidised units accrues to the state. However, the massive scale and segregated nature of the subsidised housing projects have resulted in values in the secondary market that are considerably lower than the original amount of the subsidy. As yet, there is no evidence of a secondary land market that may meaningfully increase the economic stakes of the beneficiaries. This in itself questions the meaningfulness of a policy that promotes home ownership of such units. At the same time, the administration of the 2001 amendment restricting the sale of the units is extremely difficult to administer, again raising the question whether commodification of the subsidised units is desirable in the first place.

The bigger question, though, for the theme of this chapter, is whether the 2001 amendment in any way reduces segregation. If implemented, it clearly prevents any income differentiation for the first eight years after completion of a project, as equally poor households replace those wishing to relocate. The opposite should be attempted, namely the selling of a certain number of units in an otherwise subsidised low-income housing project on the open market, thereby allowing for an income mix in new

developments. This is an instrument that has been applied to reduce housing segregation in the UK, where the resources generated are utilised to locate subsidised housing in higher cost markets (Hills, 2001:1896).

As an instrument to redress segregation, control over sales on the open market is meaningful where subsidised low-income housing has been inserted in the middle- to high-income market, and where real pressure therefore exists for these units to be bought up by higher income groups. An example from the US is the Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit programme of Montgomery County, Maryland, where a public agency constructs affordable townhouse units in wealthier areas, selling these to qualifying households (Espino, 2001). Although there is no restriction on sale of the units, capital gains (the increase from purchase price to selling price) are restricted for the first ten years, and if sold after the ten-year period, the capital gains are shared between the public agency and the household. The agency invests this income directly into new affordable units (*ibid.*:10).

While this instrument can be applied strategically to preserve low-income units in an inflationary market, various forms of value capture can be imposed across the board, thereby reducing speculation in the middle- and high-income residential market (Espino, 2001). Land value taxation is already applied in South Africa, as a source of local government revenue. A capital gains tax was introduced in October 2001, but applies only to those owning more than the one property used as primary residence (South African Home Traders Property Group, 'Capital Gains Tax in Summary': www.sahometraders.co.za/news/capitalgainstaxl.asp). In order to curb speculation in the housing market, this instrument might have to be extended to those owning only their primary dwelling. This would be received with considerable protest from the property owning middle-class, a substantial component of urban voters. However, such measures can be justified by the protection that the property market has enjoyed by the state over the decades, through the enforcement of exclusionary zoning schemes. It would have to be introduced within a wider discussion and awareness-raising of the need for more just and less segregated urban areas, as a direct response to the transformative project agreed upon in the 1996 Constitution.

Rental versus ownership subsidies

Since the dominance of Thatcherite policies since the 1980s, most governments favour subsidising home ownership over rental. Kim (1997:1604) notes that 'formal-sector housing finance in many countries heavily favours new dwellings and owner-occupied units, and offers very limited support to home improvement and

rental housing development.' Gilbert (1997) ascribes this trend to a weakness in the World Bank approach with which many developing countries have been forced to comply. In South Africa, the subsidisation of rental stock is being piloted at small scale through a number of different models, some receiving additional funding from international donors, and therefore not replicable at scale. The government's rental policy is aimed at those earning a regular income, but not enough to qualify for mortgage funding from conventional banks. Ironically, this sector aspires to home ownership, often resulting in low satisfaction with the rental option. The poorest in turn (though with some exclusion due to simplistic subsidy qualification criteria) are entitled, through the subsidy scheme, to home ownership that was until recently fully subsidised up-front, though may not be affordable as rates and service charges are then introduced (a cash contribution of R2 479 was introduced in April 2002). Clearly, the provision of rental housing to the same sector would require more resources, as not only the up-front capital cost, but also rents would have to be subsidised on an ongoing basis.

In the US, the Brooke Amendments to the *Urban Development Act* from 1969 to 1971 introduced a shift from only subsidising housing construction to a combination of subsidising capital costs and of supplementing rents (Nagel, 1998). The significance of such a shift in South Africa would be in the introduction of a greater variety of housing options to the lowest income sector, for which the poorly-located standardised home ownership product through the project-linked capital subsidy is not always suitable.

In a comparison of various countries, Yates and Whitehead (1998) found that lower levels of social segregation are associated with two conditions: variety in the ways subsidies are delivered, and greater involvement of government. Both would be enabled if South Africa were to extend its rental policy to supplementing rents for low-income households. Mixed-tenure developments, as have been introduced in the UK (Hills, 2001:1896), would also serve the objective of diversification at the scale of individual developments, increasing beneficiary choice.

In the US, a tenant-based mobility programme is directly targeted at reducing the perpetuation of poverty that housing segregation entails mainly through poor schooling in poor neighbourhoods. 'Moving to Opportunity' is a programme that enables low-income households access to higher income areas with better neighbourhood conditions and a higher quality of social facilities through a fairly generous rental voucher. However, there is scepticism about the effectiveness of this programme in redressing segregation, in the absence of intensive relocation counselling, and actual relocation requirements (see Varady *et al.*, 2001:1301, with reference to Marcuse, 1998).

Demand-side versus supply-side subsidies

Since the 1980s, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has emphasised demand-side subsidies in preference over supply-side subsidies (Varady *et al.*, 2001). The intention of this policy introduction was to give low-income households choice in the housing market through a voucher. A supply-side subsidy, such as the project-linked capital subsidy in South Africa, finances developers to produce standardised housing estates that are allocated to qualifying beneficiaries, and are not marketed to consumers. Occupation of the units is guaranteed through the waitlisting of the poor for a capital subsidy house.

The demand-side subsidy in South Africa (the ‘individual subsidy’ introduced in December 1995, and comprising 10% of national housing subsidies) allows for the purchase of an existing property in the market. This, coupled with savings and credit, was the housing subsidy approach that the World Bank would have envisaged for the ‘new’ South Africa in 1994 (Jones and Datta, 2000:397). This also is the approach to capital subsidies in Chile. Gilbert (2000) has pointed to the similarities between the South African and Chilean housing policy, the latter being referred to as ‘the best known system of lump-sum subsidies’ (Kim, 1997:1605). However, a fundamental difference between the Chilean and South African subsidy systems is the dominance of the project-linked (supply-side) subsidy in South Africa. Little difference, however, is found in the level of segregation of the low-income housing in these two countries (Gilbert, 2000). Indeed, it appears that segregation may not be redressed through a shift from a supply-side to a demand-side subsidy. Yates and Whitehead (1998:419) note that in Europe and the US, social segregation and socio-tenurial polarisation have been associated with both subsidy types.

However, it may be argued that with its supply-side subsidy approach the South African government missed the opportunity to intervene in the highly segregated spatial form of the city. Had the project-linked subsidy not been standardised in terms of plot size, service level and expenditure on land, models might have been developed that make more efficient use of land, for example, communal arrangements with shared services and facilities, pedestrianised layouts, and low-rise vertical developments. Cost savings on the land area per unit could have compensated for the cost of better located land.

Only now that the HIV/Aids pandemic in South Africa has reached alarming proportions, and government is emphasising community- or home-based care of the ill and the orphaned (see Tomlinson, this volume), the housing sector is starting to reconsider housing delivery. It is being recognised that the highly individualised and standardised model of one house on each plot, all facing the street, does not facilitate neighbourhood caring. Communal housing models are slowly being pioneered

(BESG, 2002). It is also being recognised that the cost of highly segregated peripheral housing developments becomes unbearable to households affected by HIV/Aids. Equally, due to the high level of income segregation, community-based care requires the poor to care for the poor. A true response to the impact of HIV/Aids on households in highly individualised subsidised developments would be a funding mechanism to intervene and convert these into less segregated, more inclusive and caring neighbourhoods. Whether this should be a household-linked subsidy (as is the case with both supply-side and demand-side subsidies discussed in this section) is questionable. With the emphasis on community-based care, the Brazilian self-management model linked to participatory budgeting should be considered.

Locational choice through organised self-management and participatory budgeting

Desegregation may be achieved through a number of instruments that increase beneficiary choice. Taken to a collective level, beneficiary choice in the location of housing developments has been enabled at a small scale in the progressive Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte. The annual participatory budgeting process of the municipality allows organised groups or housing associations to compete in the budgetary process for resources to purchase small parcels of well-located land. If successful, the organised group or housing association then owns the land and, with local government support, elaborates a housing project according to its own vision and principles (URBEL, 1996a,b). The self-managed housing process and its significance for Brazilian housing policy is further explained in Rolnik and Cymbalista (this volume).

In South Africa, the Homeless People's Federation is ready to respond at scale, should such an opportunity for access to well-located land be introduced. In 1999, this network, supported by the NGO People's Dialogue, comprised 60 000 members in 1 200 autonomous savings groups across South Africa (People's Dialogue, 1999). Federation women have proven their ability to manage finances and to construct housing. However, the main obstacle remains an inability to purchase land for community-managed development, even on the distant periphery (Mgedezi, 1999). A further difference to the Brazilian homeless or 'roofless' movement is that the Homeless People's Federation's philosophy is one of collective learning by doing (including mistakes), and therefore largely rejecting input from professionals. The well-publicised Victoria Mxenge project in Cape Town, the Federation's flagship of self-managed community housing, is suffering deterioration due to the collective decision to save on professional geo-technical input prior to construction.

Significant, however, is that the land, which was donated to the Federation by a church, is considerably better located than the over-crowded township from which most of the households come. Despite much lobbying by the Federation for a policy mechanism that would allow them to own small parcels of land for self-managed development, the Federation has had to align its housing process to the standardised capital subsidy mechanism and project delivery process (Baumann and Bolnick, 2001; Huchzermeyer 1999).

Conclusion

Redressing segregation is no easy task in a context where, on the one hand, speed of housing delivery is of political and social importance, and on the other hand, a spatially differentiated housing market has established itself through stringent zoning. However, the perpetuation of income segregation post-1994, despite a constitution committing the government to work towards equalising the land market, has socio-economic, environmental and political costs that are not sustainable in the longer term. Nor will any attempt to intervene in the hitherto protected middle- to high-income housing market be received without considerable resistance from homeowners who have come to view their housing primarily as an investment stage. A broad raising of awareness is required, emphasising that, whereas apartheid has been abolished, there remains a worthy struggle to overcome the spatial segregation cemented by apartheid planning and by the subsequent massive housing delivery thrust. In directing low-income delivery to the periphery, well away from the middle-income market, this policy has unintentionally protected the elitist markets established by the anglophone and apartheid obsession with uniform zones. A combination of policy instruments must be mobilised, ranging from fair share quotas for middle- and high-income suburbs, the revision of zoning schemes so as to be more inclusive and to ensure social responsibility in relation to land ownership, decommodification of land through targeted value capture taxation, tenure options and mixes, a range of subsidy forms allowing for a variety of housing and neighbourhood models, and mechanisms to release resources into a community self-management process.

References

- Abbott, J., Martinez, I and M. Huchzermeyer (2001) *An Analysis of Informal Settlements and Applicability of Visual Settlement Planning (ViSP) in South Africa*. Water Research Commission Report No. 786/1/01. Pretoria: Water Research Commission.

- Bauman, T. and J. Bolnick (2001) 'Out of the frying pan into the fire: The limits of loan finance in a capital subsidy context', *Environment and Urbanisation*, 13(2):103–115.
- BESG (Built Environment Support Group) (2002) 'Orphan care and other housing models'. Presentation by the Built Environment Support Group at the *Institute of Housing of South Africa Workshop on HIV/AIDS and Housing in South Africa*, Johannesburg, Wits University, 26 June.
- Bolaffi, G. (1992) 'Urban planning in Brazil: Past experience, current trends', *Habitat International*, 16(2):99–111.
- Cheever, K. and P. de Leon (2001) 'Fair housing advocacy groups: Litigation as a source of nonprofit funding', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 30(2):298–320.
- Christopher, A. (2001) 'Urban segregation in post-apartheid South Africa', *Urban Studies*, 38(3):449–466.
- Cutter, S., Hodgson, M. and K. Dow (2001) 'Subsidised inequities: The spatial patterning of environmental risks and federally assisted housing', *Urban Geography*, 22(1):29–53.
- Department of Housing (1997) *Living Cities: Urban Development Framework*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- De Vos, P. (2001) 'Grootboom, the right to access to housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness', *South African Journal on Human Rights*, 17(2):258–276.
- Dewar, D. (1999) 'Brave new frontiers: Housing challenges of the future'. Paper presented at the *Institute for Housing of South Africa Conference Developing Housing Environments for the New Millennium*, Nelspruit, 17–20 October.
- Espino, A. (2001) 'Inequality, segregation and housing markets: A theoretical overview and a qualitative profile for the US case'. Paper presented at the *International Seminar on Urban Segregation, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy*, Boston, 25–28 July.
- Fernandes, E. (1993) 'The regularisation of favelas in Brazil – the case of Belo Horizonte', *Social and Legal Studies*, 2:211–236.
- Fernandes, E. (1995) 'Town planning in Brazil: From laissez faire to state action', *International Report*, May:9–11.
- Fernandes, E. (2000) 'The legalisation of favelas in Brazil: Problems and prospects', *Third World Planning Review*, 22(2):167–187.
- Fernandes, E. and R. Rolnik (1998) 'Law and urban change in Brazil'. In *Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries*, edited by Fernandes, E. and A. Varley, pp. 140–156. London: Zed Books.
- Gilbert, A. (1997) 'On subsidies and home-ownership. Columbian housing policy during the 1900s', *Third World Planning Review*, 19(1):51–69.
- Gilbert, A. (2000) 'What might South Africa have learned about housing subsidies from Chile?' *South African Geographical Journal*, 82(1):21–29.
- Gilbert, A. (in press) 'Helping the poor through housing subsidies: Lessons from Chile, Colombia and South Africa', *Habitat International* 27.
- Goetz, E. (2000) 'The politics of poverty deconcentration and housing demolition', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 22(2):157–173.
- Hills, J. (2001) 'Inclusion or exclusion? The role of housing subsidies and benefits', *Urban Studies*, 38(11):1887–1902.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (1999) *Informal Settlement Intervention in South Africa: Four Case Studies of People-Driven Initiatives*. Cape Town: Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town.

- Huchzermeyer, M. (2002) 'Informal settlements: production and intervention in twentieth-century Brazil and South Africa', *Latin American Perspectives*, 29(1):83–105.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (2003) 'Low income housing and commodified urban segregation in South Africa'. In *Ambiguous Restructurings of Post-Apartheid Cape Town: The Spatial Form of Socio-political Change*, edited by Haferburg, C. and J. Oßenbrügge, pp. 115–136. Münster: LIT-Verlag.
- Jones, G. and K. Datta (2000) 'Enabling markets to work? Housing policy in the "new" South Africa', *International Planning Studies*, 5(3):393–416.
- Kim, K. (1997) 'Housing finance and urban infrastructure finance', *Urban Studies*, 34(10): 1597–1620.
- Mandelker, D. and H. Ellis (1998) 'Inclusionary Zoning'. In *The Encyclopedia of Housing*, edited by Van Vliet, W., pp. 311–312. London: Sage Publications.
- Marcuse, P. (1998) 'Mainstreaming public housing: A proposal for a comprehensive approach to housing policy'. In *New Directions in Urban Public Housing*, edited by Varady, D., Preiser, F. and F. Russel, pp. 23–44. New Brunswick N.J.: Centre for Urban Policy Research.
- Mgedezi, L. (1999) 'A report from L. Mgedezi – Western Cape Land Convener – Feb 1999', *uTshani BuyaKhuluma, People's Dialogue Newsletter*, Issue 11 (March):4.
- Nagel, C. (1998) 'Brooke amendments'. In *The Encyclopedia of Housing*, edited by van Vliet, W., p. 34. London: Sage Publications.
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000a) *Planning Policy Guidance Note No. 3 Housing*. Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Report. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000b) *The Government's Response to the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Report 'Planning Policy Guidance Note No. 3 Housing'*. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
- People's Dialogue (1999) *Getting to the Highway: The South African Homeless People's Federation, People's Dialogue and the uTshani Fund*. Cape Town: People's Dialogue on Land and Shelter.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1996) *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*. Act No. 108 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2001) Housing Amendment Act No. 4 of 2001. *Government Gazette*, 432 (22388), No. 549. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Souza, M.L. de (1999) 'Urban Planning and Management as tools for social justice: Some notes on recent Brazilian experiences'. Paper presented at the international conference *South to South: Urban Environmental Policies and Politics in Brazil and South Africa*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, 25–26 March.
- Souza, M.L. de (2000) *O Desafio Metropolitano: Um Estudo sobre a Problemática Sócio-espacial nas Metrôpoles Brasileiras*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brazil.
- Squires, G., Friedman, S and C. Saidat (2001) 'Housing segregation in the United States: Does race matter?' Paper presented at the *International Seminar on Urban Segregation*, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Boston, 25–28 July.
- UNCHS (Habitat) (1996) *Habitat Agenda: Goals, Principles, Commitments and Global Plan for Action*. United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, Turkey, 3–14 June.
- URBEL (Companhia Urbanizadora de Belo Horizonte) (1996a) *A Participação Popular na Prefeitura de Belo Horizonte*. Belo Horizonte: Prefeitura Municipal de Belo Horizonte.

- URBEL (Companhia Urbanizadora de Belo Horizonte) (1996b) 'URBEL 1993–1996: Habitação. Resgate da Cidadania'. *Revista da URBEL*, Belo Horizonte, Prefeitura Municipal de Belo Horizonte.
- Varady, D., Walker, C. and X. Wang (2001) 'Voucher recipient achievement of improved housing conditions in the US: Do moving distance and relocation services matter?', *Urban Studies*, 38(8):1273–1304.
- Venter, P. (2002) *Housing Finance Presentation* (Postgraduate Housing Programme, Wits University, 30 June). Johannesburg: ABSA Bank.
- Yates, J. and C. Whitehead (1998) 'In defence of greater antagonism: A response to Glaster's "Comparing Demand-side and Supply-side Housing policies"', *Housing Studies*, 13(3):415–423.

Chapter 14

Illegal Housing: Law, Property Rights and Urban Space

Edésio Fernandes

Introduction

The creation of economic and institutional conditions for efficient urban environmental management which are also committed to the consolidation of democracy, to the promotion of social justice and to the eradication of urban poverty – in other words, to the promotion of socio-spatial inclusion – constitutes one of the major challenges to be tackled by the main political and social agents in this new century. This challenge is even more significant in developing and transitional countries, given the complexity of the several problems resulting from the combination of rapid urbanisation, environmental degradation, increasing socio-economic inequalities and spatial segregation. In particular, the debate on the legal-political conditions of urban environmental development, management and governance deserves special attention.

Over the last four decades, the interdisciplinary approach given to the phenomenon of rapid urbanisation has made it possible to understand its complex nature, dynamics and prospects, and as a result a great deal is already known about the action of the main economic, social and political agents involved in the process. In particular, it has been increasingly acknowledged that, as a result of the process of social exclusion and spatial segregation typical of their pattern of urban development, in the major cities of Asia, Africa and Latin America the urban poor often have to step outside the law in order to gain access to land and housing. Several sources have

highlighted the fact that, if land tenure, infrastructure requirements and building standards are considered, a large number of the urban population of the main cities in developing countries are living today in illegal conditions.

However, not much is known about the legal dimension of the urbanisation process, regarding not only the nature of existing legal provisions but also the conditions of law making, the obstacles to law enforcement, and the reasons for the social production of urban illegality. As I have stressed elsewhere (Fernandes and Varley, 1998), while much has been written about the problems the urban poor face and the problems they cause, few studies have asked why their housing is illegal, why it matters that it is illegal, or what should be done about it. There is still a significant gap in the fields of urban and development studies, as for that matter in the field of legal studies, all of which have underestimated both the legal-institutional dimension of the urbanisation process and the significant role of the various forms of illegality in it. Not many studies have sought to answer these questions by exploring the role of law and illegality in the process of urban development and change.

This chapter argues that a critical reflection on law – including legal provisions, judicial decisions, legal institutions and the main values and concepts of the overall legal culture – is essential not only for a proper understanding of the process of urban growth, but also for the formulation of successful legal-political strategies for urban change. In fact, this long-neglected discussion on the role of law and illegality has slowly gathered momentum in recent years, especially since the 1996 Habitat Agenda stressed the importance of urban law. However, while law is central to the process of urban development, it cannot be understood if not within the context of its intricate relation with other social, political, cultural and economic processes which take place in, and structure, urban and metropolitan areas.

Following a brief discussion of the shortcomings of urban legal research and a general identification of the main implications of the social practices of illegality generated by the process of urban development, I will argue that urban illegality (particularly concerning the access to land and housing) has been brought about not only by the dynamics of exclusionary political systems and land markets, but also by the elitist nature of the legal order in force in developing countries, especially concerning the definition of urban real property rights. Special emphasis will be placed on the discussion of the policies of urban land regularisation aimed at promoting the socio-spatial integration of the urban poor, such as proposed by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS) Global Campaign for Secure Tenure (UNCHS (Habitat), 1999b).

As a conclusion, I will argue that the promotion of urban change in developing and transitional countries largely depends on a comprehensive reform of the legal

order affecting the regulation of property rights and the overall process of urban land development, policy making and management. Indeed, as advocated by the UNCHS Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance (UNCHS (Habitat), 1999a), launched in 1999, the promotion of law reform – including the redefinition of the socio-political conditions of law making and law enforcement – has been viewed by national and international organisations as one of the main conditions for changing the exclusionary nature of urban development prevailing in developing countries, as well as for the effective confrontation of the phenomenon of growing urban illegality.

Law in the context of critical urban research

Since its initial formulation in the late 1960s, urban research has progressed enormously towards a critical understanding of the factors, agents and processes which have determined the existing urban realities in developed and in developing countries. This has been done by means of an interdisciplinary approach in which the different branches of the social sciences have established a rich dialogue, to such an extent that they share today a common vocabulary for their common subject of study. Even recognising the theoretical limitations of the critical framework to tackle the complexity of the phenomenon of urbanisation, one can fairly argue that urban research has already achieved a satisfactory degree of conceptual clarity with regard to both its critique of the traditional (neo-)liberal framework – however dominant it may still be – and to its own understanding of the phenomenon.

Put briefly, within the domain of critical research the urban phenomenon has been considered as the dynamic result of a complex, and highly contradictory, articulation process involving economic, socio-political and cultural forces, through which both the cities and the countryside have been redefined in the current stage of economic globalisation. There is a consensus that urbanisation aims at the production of specific spatial structures and forms fundamental to supporting the (re)creation of the social relations necessary to the reproduction of capital. Special emphasis has been placed on the roles played in this contradictory process by a variety of social and political agents and institutions, especially the state, urban social movements and NGOs. However, very little attention has been given to the legal dimension of the phenomenon. Very little has been written from a critical perspective on the role law has performed in the social process of production of urban space. Only marginal theoretical consideration has been given to the importance of law as an instrument of urban and social change.

As I have argued elsewhere (Fernandes and Varley, 1998), one should be concerned about the reasons for such a ‘lack of interest’ in law on the part of urban researchers,

for one can understand more easily why, deeply impregnated with the ideology of private rights and individualism, traditional legal research (especially in developing countries) refuses to acknowledge the very existence of urban law even for academic purposes. Indeed, dominant legal doctrine still regards the city as no more than a bounded area comprised of demarcated plots of land owned by individuals. Liberal legalism goes little further than the attribution of some administrative powers to the public authorities to control urban growth on the grounds of their being responsible for the maintenance of social wellbeing.

However, urban research has also largely failed to understand the legal dimension of the urban phenomenon. Put briefly, law has been either 'dismissed' or 'taken for granted'. On the one hand, if more radical analyses are not sufficient to explain the action of law as a whole, they have almost nothing significant to say about the intricate network of (il)legal social relations established in urban areas, particularly those relating to the use of land. Such approaches are very often dismissive of urban law from the narrow perspective of the theory of the state (often far from explicit) which has conceived of law as a mere instrument manipulated by a monolithic (bourgeois) state. Most urban research, on the other hand, seems to have taken law for granted, as if it were an independent, and theoretically uncomplicated, domain of knowledge and action. Regardless of all the significant advances already made in the formulation of a theory of the state, urban research has not gone very far towards identifying the nature of the relationship between the state and its legal apparatus. Although mostly in an implicit way, it has largely conceived of legal relations as politically and socially neutral. As a result, both progressive urban research and socially oriented empirical projects have very often pointed towards the enactment of specific legislation as immediate solutions to urban problems, as if the legislation itself were a non-problematic instrument of urban planning and reform.

For the same reason, the expression 'right to the city' has long been uncritically assimilated in urban research, to such an extent that it has become part of widely employed technical jargon. More recently, its constant usage by urban social movements and NGOs in several parts of the world has also turned it into a political claim of sorts, and as such it has been given several differing, and sometimes exclusive, meanings. However, little attention has been given to the legal meaning of such an expression. Rather than being a legal right, the 'right to the city' would be, at once, a criterion for political analysis and a political platform, to be understood within the scope of progressive political philosophy, and as such should ideally be incorporated into a new, updated 'social contract' determining the new conditions for the exercise of socio-political citizenship in contemporary societies.

However, the fact is that the growing socio-political mobilisation around urban matters in many developing countries has already provoked significant impact on their official national legal orders. In Brazil, for example, the Urban Policy Law approved in 2001 (entitled the 'City Statute') introduced the notion that the 'right to the city', to be guaranteed by the formulation and enforcement of a national urban policy, comprises the set of measures which aim to promote the quality of life in cities, through the adequate organisation of urban space and the enjoyment of collective goods, services and equipment by all their inhabitants (Fernandes, 2001; Rolnik, 2002).

How can such a 'right to the city' be explained in legal terms? How does it fit into the dominant, liberal legal order in force in most developing countries? How does it relate to the conflicting social processes which have been established around urban matters, especially concerning access to land and housing? Such important questions, among many others, have not been answered by urban research (largely because they have rarely been posed).

Urbanisation in the context of legal studies

Three main paradigms have determined the elaboration of urban legal studies, reflecting different approaches to the nature of the urban development process, of state action, and of the relation between both of these. Such differing approaches ultimately express different views of the central issue of property rights, namely, that of civil law, that of public law, and that of the more recent tradition of socio-legal studies.

In many developing countries, the dominant legal paradigm has been the liberal and individualistic approach typical of civil law, which makes little room for state intervention in the control of the processes of use and development of urban land. From this viewpoint, the city is often implicitly considered as a set of privately owned plots of land, with law being responsible only for governing relations between individuals (especially neighbours) and for approving administrative restrictions which limit the full exercise of property rights to guarantee 'social welfare'. On the whole, the process of urban development is to be led by largely unregulated market forces.

In those countries in which there is a more consistent public law approach to property rights, legal studies usually associate the notion of the social function of property with that of public interest, in order to enable the state to intervene in the process of land use and development through legal instruments such as zoning laws, compulsory acquisition, etc. On the whole, however, by assuming the instrumental nature of law such studies also fail to raise a number of significant questions and to

explain the central role of law in the urbanisation process. Comprised within the scope of liberal legalism, even though within redefined boundaries, such studies tend to share the same positivism and formalism as those oriented by a privatist approach, in that they also consider the law as an objective, self-contained system.

They also fail to question the nature of state action in the urbanisation process, viewing the state as a neutral agent in charge of protecting the 'public interest' and 'social welfare'. As a result, there is no critical understanding of the politico-economic dynamic of the urbanisation process. Above all, such studies tend to reveal an exclusive concern with the official city, ignoring the 'illegal city' where the vast majority of the population lives, daily re-inventing their social practices in response to the exclusionary legal system. References to shanty towns, *favelas*, *barrios* and suchlike are not to be found in most urban legal studies.

A different tradition of urban legal studies began in the 1970s, drawing from, and combining, the movements of critical urban research, law and development and legal pluralism in order to understand the relation between law and the urbanisation process, as well as the relation between the official legal system and the proliferation of informal rules and popular mechanisms for the distribution of justice. Such studies – and special mention should be made to the seminal work by Bonaventura Sousa Santos (see Santos, 1995) and Antonio Azuela (see Azuela, 1989) – have also made it possible to reflect upon the nature of state action, and on its attempts at socio-political legitimisation. More recently, a great number of studies have been published on the specific issue of regularisation programmes. However, few studies have proposed, as yet, to build a conceptual bridge between the 'official' and the 'illegal' cities or to identify a general analytical framework to explain the socio-economic as well as politico-ideological roles of law in the overall urbanisation process in developing countries.

Nevertheless, the traditions of critical urban research and critical legal studies have already suggested several relations between law, the state and ideology in the context of the production of urban space, as well as some ideas about the logic of social attitudes to law and (in)formal justice. Regardless of its limitations and of its insufficient understanding of the complexities of the socio-political process, I believe that such a framework provides arguments interesting enough to justify a deeper reflection on the role of law, either in the process of social segregation in cities, or in the process of urban reform. Such reflection would assist in understanding the long claimed 'right' to the city in the context of the social process of production of urban space, as well as help determine the extent to which urban law can be one of the instruments of a progressive strategy aimed at the democratic administration of cities.

In this context, it is fundamental to understand the process of production of urban law from the perspective of the same interests that have turned cities into a stage for uncontrolled capitalist accumulation, without ever losing sight of all responses and alternatives produced in everyday life by those who have been traditionally excluded from this process, that is to say, the vast majority of urban dwellers. Rather than being a technical question, the answer to which is to be found within the limits of a self-contained legal universe, the production of urban law constitutes a highly political process, being one dimension of the social conflict intrinsic to the emergence of the city. From this socio-legal perspective, city and citizenship are the same subject.

The ideological battlefield

The complex debate on the role of law in urban development has very serious socio-economic implications at the global level, and it has to be immediately set against three conservative, though rather more influential, intertwined ideological approaches.

Firstly, the discussion cannot be reduced to the simplistic terms proposed by those who, still suggesting (despite all historical evidence) that capitalism per se can distribute wealth widely, defend a full 'hands-off', liberal approach to state regulation aimed at controlling urban development. As argued by Hobsbawm (2000), whereas globalisation is undoubtedly irreversible and in some ways independent of government action, there is no historical justification for the neo-liberal ideology based on globalisation. This ideology is based on the assumption that by maximising growth and wealth in the world, the free market also optimises the distribution of that increment. As has been repeatedly demonstrated by several indicators of growing social poverty, particularly those relating to the conditions of access to land and housing in urban areas, even if the world has indeed become wealthier as a result of global economic and financial growth, the regional and social distribution of this wealth has been far from optimal.

Moreover, as also stressed by Hobsbawm (2000), the successful industrial development of many countries such as the US, Germany, or even Brazil and Mexico was achieved by the adoption of regulatory measures, and by not accepting unreservedly the logic of the free market. Perhaps more than ever in the past, there is a fundamental role for redefined state action and regulation in developing and transitional countries, especially regarding the promotion of urban development, land reform, land use control and city management. The central role of law in this process cannot be dismissed.

Secondly, the impact of economic and financial globalisation on the development of land markets around the world has implied pressure on developing and transitional countries to reform their national land laws – and to homogenise their legal systems to a significant extent – to facilitate the operation of land markets internationally. As argued by McAuslan (2000), this growing pressure for a globalised, market-oriented land law reform (with the resulting ‘Americanisation of commercial laws and the growth of global Anglo-American law firms’) is based upon an approach which views land ‘purely as an economic asset which should be made available to anyone who can use it to its highest and best economic use’, aiming to facilitate foreign investment in land rather than considering that there is ‘a social role for land in society’ and that land is a ‘part of the social patrimony of the state’.

Thirdly, another conservative approach has been proposed in recent years by an increasingly influential legal-political ideology – largely, and sometimes loosely, based on the work of the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (2000; see also 1989) – defending the notion that global poverty is to be solved by hooking the growing informal, ‘extralegal’ economy into the formal economy, particularly in urban areas. From this viewpoint, small informal businesses and precarious shanty homes are essentially economic assets, ‘dead capital’ which should be revived by the official legal system so that people could have access to formal credit and invest in their homes and businesses – thus reinvigorating the urban economy as a whole. Rather than questioning the nature of the legal system that has generated urban illegality in the first place, the full, and frequently unqualified, legalisation of informal businesses and the recognition of individual freehold property titles to urban dwellers in informal settlements have been proposed in several countries as the ‘radical’ way to transform urban economies.

Contrary to these conservative approaches, several recent studies have argued that, in the absence of a coherent, well-structured and progressive urban agenda, the approach of legal (neo-)liberalism will only serve to aggravate the already serious problem of socio-spatial exclusion (Caldeira, 2000; Fix, 2001). It has been suggested that, especially insofar as the legalisation of informal settlements is concerned, policy makers and public administrators should become aware of the wide, and often perverse, implications of their proposals (Calderon-Cockburn, 2002; Huchzermeyer, in press). In fact, the legalisation of informal activities – particularly through the attribution of individual property titles – does not necessarily entail socio-spatial integration. On the contrary, if they are not formulated within the scope of socially oriented and comprehensive economic policies, tenure legalisation policies often bring out new financial burdens for the urban poor, have little impact on alleviating urban poverty and, more importantly, directly relate to, and reinforce, the overall

disposition of political and economic power which has traditionally caused socio-spatial exclusion.

In this context, the search for innovative approaches to tenure for the urban poor (for instance, reconciling the promotion of individual tenure with the recognition of social housing rights, incorporating a long-neglected gender dimension and attempting to minimise the impact of tenure policies on the land market) so that the public investment is not capitalised upon by land developers, is of utmost importance for a broad, inclusionary urban reform strategy (see Payne, 2002).

Law, illegality and access to land and housing

The phenomenon of growing urban illegality has certainly taken diverse forms (especially in countries where the informal economy is becoming increasingly sophisticated), permeating all sorts of social relations. However, urban illegality is particularly important insofar as the process of urban land use and development is concerned. The existing figures suggest that, when the conditions of access to urban land and housing opportunities are considered, between 40% and 70% of the urban population in developing countries live illegally, but these figures will increase with the increase in urban poverty resulting from the ongoing process of economic globalisation.

In most developing countries, the failure to promote efficient housing policies, and the dynamics of largely unregulated land markets have resulted in a scarcity of serviced land at affordable prices and in the lack of adequate housing options for the majority of the urban population. This generates a proliferation of forms of illegal land use and development and the widespread formation of illicit settlements. Given the historical links between secure land tenure, economic capacity and social mobility in many such countries, the magnitude of this phenomenon of urban illegality reveals the extent to which most people have been denied full socio-economic and legal-political citizenship rights. In other words, the vast majority of individuals and social groups have not been fully recognised as legal residents of the cities in which they live, nor as proper citizens. Put briefly, cities in the developing world, and especially the metropolitan areas, are inefficient and costly to manage, socially segregated, environmentally unfriendly, and largely illegal.

It has to be stressed that the phenomenon of urban illegality can by no means be exclusively associated with the urban poor, as is indicated, for example, by the proliferation of the gated enclosures where the middle- and upper classes have increasingly sought refuge from growing social problems, and especially from widespread urban violence. A critical study of such phenomena would certainly raise

many interesting questions concerning the nature of urban regulation, the dynamics of the law-making process and the working of the state's coercion or control apparatus.

However, the growing illegal practices that have characterised most popular forms of land use and development need to be urgently confronted, given their grave social, political, economic and environmental implications not only for the immediately affected groups, but also for the broader social and urban structure. In fact, urban studies have often related socio-spatial exclusion to the growing fragmentation of urban space (generating costly and inefficient cities), but more recent studies have also stressed the direct links between socio-spatial exclusion and increasing urban violence (Caldeira, 2000; Rolnik, 1999). In particular, the lack of security of land tenure has long exposed the directly affected groups to political vulnerability and financial incapacitation, especially given the difficulty of their obtaining formal credit.

As the phenomenon of urban illegality has been little studied by urban researchers and legal scholars, many analysts still have not realised that the apparent division between the 'legal' and the 'illegal' areas in cities is in fact closer to an intricate web in which there are contradictory relations between official and unofficial rules, and between formal and informal urban land markets. The social practices regulated in such an informal manner often enjoy greater social and political legitimacy than the legal ones. This factor has increasingly put the validity of the legal order in question. Nevertheless, the existing research has also suggested that there are 'degrees of illegality' in urban societies in developing countries, that is to say, some forms of illegality tend to be more accepted and/or tolerated than others by the state and by the general public (Fernandes, 2002b). The more acceptable forms are generally those involving the existence of some document of land ownership or acquisition such as deeds, titles, receipts, etc., which can somehow provide a link, albeit a tenuous one, to the chain of previous ownership. Those situations in which there has been no commercial or legal attempt to keep the tradition of transference of ownership are more directly subject to repression. In other words, property ownership indeed seems to be the name of the game.

The question of property rights

As I have argued, the subject of law and urban change needs to be urgently demystified, and to this end it is important to challenge the uncritical treatment it has received in traditional legal studies. Demystification will provide a proper understanding of the role law plays in the increasingly complex problems facing the people and governments of the world's poorer cities.

If the exclusionary pattern of urban development in developing countries has been largely due to the nature of state intervention in the process through its overall economic policies, lack of effective social policies and distorted attempts at urban planning, it must be added that the elitist and exclusionary nature of the legal order in force has also played an important role in this process, especially concerning anachronistic land-related legislation. The adoption of legal provisions and codes which do not reflect the socio-economic realities determining the conditions of access to urban land and housing, as much as the lack of land use regulation, have had a perverse role in aggravating, if not determining, the process of socio-spatial exclusion. As I have argued in my study of the legal-political conditions of urban development and management in Brazil (Fernandes, 1995), law is directly related to the urbanisation process at four principal, though intertwined, levels: as an instrument of urban policy and planning; as an important factor contributing to the reduction of costs of the labour force; as a powerful element in the diffusion of dominant ideological values, especially concerning the nature of state action and the fundamental question of property rights; and, last but not least, as an increasingly important factor in the regulation of the production of urban space, and therefore as a significant part of the set of productive forces.

The central point to be addressed is certainly that of the legal recognition of property rights, more specifically urban real property rights. Far from corroborating the myth that, in a given country, the legal system is based upon a single and/or universal conception of property rights, the existing research suggests that the different forms of ownership have been treated differently by the law (see Fernandes, 1995). It is the private ownership of land, especially in urban areas, that is often problematic, in that in many countries the limits of state intervention to impose socially oriented conditions to the economic exploitation of property have long been determined by prevailing classical liberal legal ideologies.

In many developing countries, this traditional approach given to individual property rights has long made possible the definition of real property merely as a commodity, thus favouring economic exchange values to the detriment of the principle of the social function of property. Given the historical context of unstable economic production, weak capital markets and chronic financial problems, land ownership has become a most important asset and one of the main capitalisation mechanisms, as well as a surrogate for inefficient social security systems and a significant factor of personal security and social mobility. Countless attempts at urban planning and land use and environmental control have been undermined by the existence of laws and/or jurisprudence which greatly reduce the scope for state intervention, especially at the local level, in the field of individual property rights.

Whereas the excessive hoarding of urban land has been tacitly encouraged by the individualistic nature of much of the conservative legal order, the effective implementation of social housing policies has been rendered difficult, among other factors, by the high land market prices made possible by either the lack of proper regulation or by the exclusionary nature of rigid and elitist zoning laws. For the same reason, when called to decide on conflicting interests in cases of effective state intervention, the judiciary has long tended to favour individual rights, to the detriment of socially oriented legal restrictions on the use and development of urban property.

Moreover, in many developing countries, as an inheritance from the centuries of colonial rule, most land is privately owned, which accounts for the existence of few public spaces in cities and elsewhere. The heritage of patrimonialism based on this concentrated land ownership structure has meant that spatial allocation of public investments and services is often deeply influenced by political factors, such as clientilism. Urban legislation enacted at all levels of government has rarely been concerned with democratising land acquisition or other forms of access to urban land by the poor. On the contrary, especially at the local level, urban laws have often been one of the main factors reproducing the overall conditions of segregation of economic activities and exclusion of much of the population from the advantages of living in urban and metropolitan areas.

Regularisation policies and security of land tenure

A fundamental problem that remains unresolved concerns the battle for legal-political hegemony between the two opposing frameworks existing in many developing countries and regarding the legal definition of private property rights (and consequently of the possibilities of state intervention in the process of urban land development), namely, the individualistic approach typical of legal liberalism and the more progressive principle of the social function of property. Nevertheless, political re-democratisation and economic restructuring have recently had several implications on land policy in many developing countries, including the approval of legal and fiscal measures aiming at addressing, at least to some extent, the need to provide affordable access to land and housing for the urban population. In fact, a fundamental change of orientation of the public policies regarding illegal urban settlements has become evident in many Third World countries. After decades of evicting the communities living in illegal settlements, the state has increasingly come to tolerate them in different ways and to different degrees, eventually (and albeit in a reluctant and incipient way) proposing the legal and technical regularisation of such areas and communities.

Regularisation policies have an inherent remedial nature and should not be dissociated from much needed comprehensive public policies based on direct state intervention and investment in urban areas – such as large-scale rehabilitation projects, social housing and urban regeneration programmes – aimed at transforming the nature and dynamics of urban development so that it can revert to the benefit of the whole community. Nevertheless, the recognition of some form of land tenure rights of the population already living in illegal and precarious conditions is of utmost importance. Since the 1980s, partly as a result of the increasing social mobilisation for the recognition of housing rights, several regularisation policies of illegal settlements have been increasingly formulated and implemented internationally, with the explicit objective of promoting the socio-spatial integration of the excluded communities within the broader context of urban poverty eradication policies.

Such programmes have gained a new vigour with the enacting of more progressive laws, but they also suffer the effects of the long-standing legal, political and financial constraints to progressive urban management. The necessary political conditions have not yet been created to promote the overall reform of liberal legalism still prevailing in many countries. Liberal legalism does not consider the centrality of the principle of the social function of urban property.

It should be stressed that reforming the national legal-political order is just part of the problem: the fact is that the concentrated and exclusionary land structure formed throughout centuries of economic development needs to be urgently confronted, both in cities and in the countryside, as an indispensable condition for the promotion of regularisation policies. Urban reform cannot be dissociated from agrarian reform, as has been emphasised by the critical experiences of several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (DPU: www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/pui).

It is in this context that the above-mentioned UNCHS Global Campaign for Secure Tenure (UNCHS (Habitat), 1999b) was launched in 1999, aiming to create an international political context to provide support to the re-organisation of urban and housing social movements as well as to the concerted action of governments on this matter. In fact, social movements, NGOs and even international financial organisations have increasingly made use of, and combined, several humanitarian, ethical, socio-political and, more recently, economic arguments to justify the need for promoting land regularisation policies. Legal arguments must also be used, including the long-existing provisions of international law and the principles of the rule of law concerning housing rights and human rights, so that a new, socially oriented paradigm can be adopted for the legal definition of urban real property and housing rights.

In several cases, the current orientation of official policies regarding the millions of urban poor long excluded from the formal access to land and housing, and forced

to live in illegal conditions in precarious *favelas*, 'clandestine' or 'pirate' subdivisions, *barrios*, *villas-miseria*, shanty towns, etc., is deeply ironic: as mentioned above, the promotion of land regularisation is being considered today by international financial institutions such as the World Bank as the essential condition for widening the local market and for reviving the urban economy, which has been done through the attribution of full property rights.

However, the mere attribution of (individual) property titles does not guarantee, in itself, the fulfilment of the main objective of regularisation policies – namely, the integration of illegal areas and their residents into the broader urban economy and society (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Fernandes, 2002a; Fernandes and Varley, 1998; Payne, 2002). Moreover, several studies have already shown that the mere upgrading of illegal settlements does not necessarily entail a significant decrease in urban poverty. On the contrary, if they are not followed by adequate social, legal, financial and political mechanisms, including the consideration of a gender dimension, such ill-thought regularisation policies may end up provoking profound distortions in the already tense land market and become yet another factor to accentuate spatial segregation and social exclusion.

The lesson to be learned from such international studies, is that upgrading programmes and legalisation policies have to be reconciled in accordance with the principle of the social function of property, there being a wide range of legal instruments and alternative land tenure systems to be considered to allow for more innovative forms of land occupation and security of tenure with differing degrees of state control. The recognition of security of tenure has to be promoted within the broader scope of city planning, and not merely as an isolated policy, so that distortions in the urban land market can be prevented, thus minimising the risk of the communities being evicted to other peripheral areas. Moreover, examples from Brazil, India and South Africa have already shown that, whatever the legal-institutional solution adopted, it can only work properly if it is the result of a transparent and participatory decision-making process which effectively incorporates the affected communities (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Payne, 2002).

Above all, it should be acknowledged that the recognition of housing rights and of security of tenure has to be promoted within a broader context in which urban reform and law reform are reconciled. Law reform certainly requires the redefinition of property rights, but it is also a direct function of overall urban governance: it requires new strategies of urban management based upon new relations between the state (especially the local state) and society; renewed inter-governmental relations, and the adoption of new forms of partnership between the public and the private sectors according to a clearly defined legal-political framework.

Law reform fundamentally requires the renovation of the law-making and decision-making processes, so that traditional mechanisms of representative democracy and new forms of direct participation are combined. More and more local administrations in several countries have created new mechanisms to allow for the participation of the urban population in the several stages of the decision-making process of the urban order. The need for reforming judicial power should also be stressed, so that new collective rights are recognised, and the conditions of access to courts to guarantee law enforcement, are widened and improved. If we are really living in democratic times, the age of rights has to be also the age of the enforcement of rights, especially collective rights.

Conclusion

The future of cities in developing and transitional countries will depend on how state action through land use regulation and strategies of urban environmental management confront the process of socio-spatial exclusion and growing urban poverty. Law reform in this context is extremely important, especially insofar as urban reform and land regularisation policies are concerned. Urban reform and security of tenure cannot be attained merely through the enactment of laws, but depend on a political process that supports the recognition of the long-claimed 'right to the city', not only as a political notion, but as a legal notion too. In short, urban reform, law reform and the reform of the public sector have to be promoted together, in the progressive context of the agenda for good urban governance.

However, in the final analysis, the future of cities in developing and transitional countries will depend on the renovation of social forms of political mobilisation, within and without the state apparatus. Only through a widely participatory process can law become a political arena to support the promotion of spatial integration of housing, social justice and sustainable development.

References

- Azuela, A. (1989) *La Ciudad, la Propiedad Privada y el Derecho*. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico.
- Caldeira, T. (2000) *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Calderon-Cockburn, J. (2002) 'The mystery of credit', *Land Lines* (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy), April:5–8.
- De Soto, H. (1989) *The Other Path*. London: I.B.Tauris & Co.
- De Soto, H. (2000) *The Mystery of Capital*. London: Bantam Press.

- Durand-Lasserve, A. and L. Royston, eds. (2002) *Holding their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries*. London: Earthscan.
- Fernandes, E. (1995) *Law and Urban Change in Brazil*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Fernandes, E. (2001) 'New statute aims to make Brazilian cities more inclusive', *Habitat Debate* (United Nations Human Settlements Programme), December:19.
- Fernandes, E. (2002a) 'The influence of de Soto's "The Mystery of Capital"', *Land Lines* (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy), January:5–8.
- Fernandes, E. (2002b) 'Providing security of tenure for the urban poor: The Brazilian experience'. In *Holding their Ground: Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries*, edited by Durand-Lasserve, A. and L. Royston, pp. 101–126. London: Earthscan.
- Fernandes, E. and A. Varley, eds. (1998) *Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Fix, M. (2001) *Parceiros da Exclusao*. Sao Paulo: Boitempo Editorial.
- Hobsbawn, E. (2000) *The New Century*. London: Abacus.
- Huchzermeyer, M. (in press) 'A legacy of control? The capital subsidy and informal settlement intervention in South Africa', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*.
- McAuslan, P. (2000) 'From Greenland's icy mountains, from India's coral strand: The globalisation of land markets and its impact on national land law', paper presented at the *1st Brazilian Urban Law Conference*, Belo Horizonte, 13–15 December.
- Payne, G., ed. (2002) *Land Rights and Innovation: Improving Tenure Security for the Urban Poor*. London: ITDG Publishing.
- Rolnik, R., ed. (1999) 'Regulacao urbanistica e exclusao territorial', *Polis* (Special Issue), no. 32. Sao Paulo: Instituto Polis.
- Rolnik, R., ed. (2002) *The Statute of the City: New Tools for Assuring the Right to the City in Brazil*. Sao Paulo: Instituto Polis.
- Santos, B. (1995) *Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition*. London: Routledge.
- UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlement) (Habitat) (1999a) *Global Campaign for Good Governance*. UNCHS (Habitat), Nairobi.
- UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlement) (Habitat) (1999b) *Global Campaign for Secure Tenure*. UNCHS (Habitat), Nairobi.

Chapter 15

An Interpretation of Sustainable Development and Urban Sustainability in Low-Cost Housing and Settlements in South Africa

Daniel K. Irurah and Brian Boshoff

Introduction: Sustainable development and sustainable urban form

The sustainable development paradigm can be viewed as a convergence of two paradigms that initially evolved in an antagonistic manner, possibly as far back as the industrial revolution. The first one is the growth and development paradigm, which was strongly rooted in economic growth based on the economic output of an economy as measured by GDP (gross domestic product). Until the late 1900s, governments and communities had committed themselves to a vision of improved standards of living through increasing the GDP of their respective economies, while paying minimal attention to environmental and resource impacts.

Then in the 1950s to 1970s the environmental movement coalesced after almost a century of isolated pronouncements on resource and environmental degradation arising from exponential population growth as well as increasing levels of production and consumption. The movement argued that unless humanity voluntarily controlled population and economic growth, environmental and resource degradation would put a limit on human survival. The strongest substantiation of the argument was presented in the Club of Rome Report, *Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al.*, 1972).

The challenge of reconciling the concerns of the two movements or paradigms emerged as a global imperative in the 1970s in an effort to prepare for action in the twenty-first century. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Stockholm in 1972 laid the foundation for this process. Through this conference, it became clear that the two issues could no longer be addressed separately or through the antagonistic approach that had been applied until then. Similarly, the need for a global framework of action became evident.

A United Nations-led initiative was launched under the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1984. In 1987, the commission released its final report (*Our Common Future*), which has now become a primary reference on sustainable development. It is in this report that a globally derived definition of sustainable development was first presented, and it is the definition that has become most commonly used. The report defines sustainable development as:

... development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987:43).

The important point to note about this definition is that it retained the development vision but with a condition that it should not be pursued at the expense of future generations. Several variations of the definition have emerged out of the intense debates over the relevance and implications of the paradigm (see for example the review of definitions in Mawhinney, 2002:2–24).

The elaboration of the paradigm during both the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (see Agenda 21 (UN, 1992)) and the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 (see *Johannesburg Plan of Implementation* (UN, 2002)) has gone a long way towards establishing the roadmap for humanity in the twenty-first century and beyond.

The key implication of the paradigm is that for the wealthy developed countries, the challenge to be addressed is the stabilisation of economic growth through a shift away from over-production and over-consumption, as well as towards the redistribution of resources to the minority poor within these economies (and the majority poor in developing countries). For the poorer developing countries, the challenge is to stabilise population growth and fast-track growth responsibly in order to meet the basic needs of the majority now living in squalor, and to stabilise over-consumption by the wealthy elite.

These differentiated requirements of sustainable development for developed versus developing countries have been the root of intense debate and negotiation during the two earth summits (Earth Summit – Rio de Janeiro, 1992, and World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) – Johannesburg, 2002). For example,

during the WSSD in Johannesburg, no firm targets could be agreed upon on the issue of over-production and over-consumption, especially in developed countries. Instead a ten-year framework was established within which to formulate appropriate programmes.

The redistribution of resources from developed to developing countries received much attention during the WSSD. For example, facilitation for the establishment of partnerships between the developed and developing countries' stakeholders (through *Type II* partnerships) has opened an opportunity for both public- and private-sector resources to be channeled to developmental programmes in developing countries. Key *Type II* partnerships launched during the WSSD cover programmes in a variety of areas like water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity.

In spite of the frustrations expressed by stakeholders with regard to the WSSD outcomes (for example, slow progress in implementation to date, refusal of the US to sign the Kyoto Protocol, inability to set targets for renewable energy and over-production/over-consumption for developed countries), the summit provided a plan for increased momentum in the realisation of sustainable development.

This articulation of a new development paradigm for human civilisation in the twenty-first century has meant a re-examination of all facets of human activities and lifestyles with a view towards re-alignment for sustainability. This chapter provides a review of the implications of the paradigm for cities and human settlements, as well as the local interpretations of the paradigm in South Africa's settlement policy and practice. However, the main focus of the chapter is on sustainable low-cost housing in South Africa in terms of policy and practice.

Sustainable cities and human settlements

Cities and human settlements constitute one of the most powerful tools of human civilisation and development. Lozano (1990:5) argues that:

Cities are civilization; the word 'civilization' – related to the Latin *civilitas*, *civis*, and *civitas* – refers to culture of cities, places where a heterogenous mixture of people are concentrated in clusters of meaningful size to exchange – exchange goods, services, and ideas.

When seen as systems of habitation, production and consumption, human settlements, and especially contemporary cities, can be treated as macro-scale systems that require inputs for their metabolism. These inputs in turn generate by-products that often lead to waste and pollution. These two aspects of inputs and by-products of urban metabolism translate into major impacts on resources and the environment in general.

The concept 'ecological footprint' of a city or settlement has been applied as a measure of the ecological impacts of individuals. The Redefining Progress Organisation in the USA estimates that the average American's footprint on the planet is 24 acres (the requirement to sustain current lifestyles) compared to 17 acres for the average Canadian and nine acres for the average Italian (Redefining Progress: www.progress.org/programs/sustainability/ef/).

Under this concept, one tries to capture and quantify in one indicator the flow of key resources and the waste of a system or subsystem through various networks of channels. Beyond the ecological footprint, which captures only the environmental impacts, urban sustainability calls for development of human settlements guided by three additional pillars of sustainable development: economic growth, socio-cultural responsiveness and institutional capacity (Irurah *et al.*, 2002:6–16).

Under environmental conservation, sustainable settlements and buildings envisage the emergence of cities and buildings that are responsive to the resource and sink limits of the planet. The resource limits entail the finite resource base especially for some of the key inputs in sustenance of cities and buildings. These include land and natural habitats, energy, water, construction materials and other raw materials for inputs to manufacturing and service industries. The sink limits focus on the finite capacity of air, land and water systems to receive and process waste generated as by-products of human production and consumption patterns. Greenhouse gases such as CO₂, wastewater and solid waste are some of the examples.

Economic sustainability arises out of the need to ensure sustained functioning of the economic system, which sustains the flow of goods and services essential for human consumption and further production of wealth. Employment and job creation is one of the key goals of economic sustainability. However, the key sustainability challenge is the equitable distribution of benefits generated through economic activities as well as the mitigation of externalities generated by such activities and their impacts on those who do not necessarily benefit from the respective activities. Poverty alleviation is therefore a major component of economic sustainability.

Socio-cultural sustainability addresses the impacts of buildings and settlements on the social system and the related cultural values of households, communities and nations. The need for an enabling, equitable, non-discriminatory and just social system has emerged as the most pressing one in modern times. In this regard, the rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, the aged and those with disabilities require special attention in the context of sustainable cities and buildings (both in production and habitation processes). In countries like South Africa, where an HIV/Aids epidemic is prevalent, a spatial and built environment response to the needs of the affected people is emerging as a critical challenge to sustainability.

Institutional sustainability addresses the need for appropriate policy, legislation and implementation frameworks or structures in the public, private and civic sectors of society. Participatory processes in decision making, democratic and transparent governance, as well as public accountability in all the three sector-entities, are the key requirements for sustainability under this pillar.

The four pillars above (environmental, economic, socio-cultural and institutional) indicate that the concept of urban sustainability implies the need for assessment of the threat to continuity of a harmonious and vitalised inter-relationship between the inhabitants of the city and their social, economic and environmental subsystems. This perspective constitutes the motivation for sustainable development and urban sustainability indicators that are regularly derived and reported in order to track the state of, and changes in sustainability levels.

This in turn constitutes a framework for responsive action and strategies by the inhabitants to address the threats using the capacity and resources at their disposal. It is in this context that sustainable development and urban sustainability are considered to be a human-centred rather than an ecology-oriented paradigm. It is also in this context that the institutional component of urban sustainability emerges as it emphasises the need for both individual and collective responsibility and the appropriate strategies in addressing such threats.

Urban sustainability and urban form

The challenge of urban sustainability has generated intense debate on the appropriate urban form that can ensure the realisation of the respective sustainability objectives. Consequently, a variety of contrasting characterisations of urban forms have been regularly applied in the debate. Key characterisations include:

- The compact versus the sprawl city
- The integrated versus the segregated city
- The ecological versus the non-ecological city
- The just versus the unjust city

The compact versus the sprawl city

One of the primary resources consumed by cities is land, which is required for siting and development of the different urban functions such as commercial, industrial, residential and socio-cultural activities. Being a scarce resource, land-take for such urban functions means an opportunity cost with regard to alternative uses such as agriculture, nature conservation, mining and quarrying, among others.

In the context of rapidly growing cities and settlements, the distribution of urban functions as well as the typologies used in the development of specific sites can translate into low- or high-density urban form and land utilisation. Low-density urban form is characterised by the suburban approach to development of housing and commercial facilities, as well as socio-cultural amenities in the form of pavilions or objects within a garden or park. The office park, suburban house and mall are typical examples of this approach. This in turn requires the development of long runs of bulk and connector infrastructure for various properties.

The main disadvantage of this approach is the high cost of infrastructure and services per property, as well as the need for commuting (which is mainly motorised) over long distances between the different functional zones of the city. Increasing segregation, loss of urbanism and weakening of socio-cultural practices (loss of cohesion) are often cited as additional shortcomings of this approach (Lozano, 1990:6).

The compact city is frequently viewed as the more desirable urban form with regard to sustainability. Besides a higher density (mainly supported by low-rise buildings), compact cities exhibit high levels of mixed use in different zones or neighbourhoods, as well as enhanced quality of urban space, socio-cultural cohesion, safety and security (arising out of passive surveillance and social cohesion). Such cities therefore demonstrate high levels of environmental and socio-cultural sustainability and their ecological footprint is relatively low.

It is highly unlikely that any city can be considered to be totally sprawled or entirely compact. In most cases, examples of compact city neighbourhoods and sprawling suburban areas co-exist in a single city. A city can then be characterised on the basis of the predominant pattern of urban form. It is on this basis that American cities are on average considered to be sprawled cities while most European cities are considered to be compact.

Other contrasts in city form

The integrated versus the segregated city: When functional zoning of cities was the main planning and development control tool, the approach was to differentiate and segregate key urban functions based on their perceived levels of incompatibility. The non-compatible functions were zoned far apart with clear buffer zones of more compatible functions in-between. The sprawl city is one of the legacies of extreme functional zoning among other factors. The integrated city facilitates higher levels of mixed use in neighbourhoods and only zones off highly incompatible functions as well as those which require a large reservoir of land for their future growth (airports,

major industries and harbours, for example). South Africa's cities are segregated and sprawled primarily as a result of racial zoning applied in the apartheid era (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994:101–105).

The non-ecological versus the ecological city (green or eco-cities): This characterisation of urban form is based on the ecological footprint of a city. Cities that make special efforts to tap into renewable resources (renewable energy, for example) or those which minimise resource and waste throughput in their metabolism (through conservation interventions or re-use/recycle, for instance) are viewed to be ecological. Most contemporary cities are considered to be non-ecological because of their heavy dependence on motorised transport, grid electricity (fossil-fuel, nuclear- or hydro-generated power), virgin raw materials, low levels of re-use/recycle and sprawl over large tracts of land.

The socio-cultural dimensions of the debate about city form are often captured in the just versus the unjust city contrast. Besides ensuring environmental health and economic sustenance for all, a just city form exhibits interventions in response to threats to human rights and marginalisation of certain population groups. Key among such groups are the disabled, women and children. For countries such as South Africa, poverty reduction and narrowing of the income differential are major challenges in the just city context.

Before ending this section, it is important to note that all the urban characterisations above are at times inclusive of one another and conflicting in other instances. For example, the ecological city form has requirements that contradict with those of the compact city form (for example, emphasis on ample space for independent and organic food production based on permaculture and recycled waste or compost). Such contradictions between the ecological city and other sustainability requirements are comprehensively reviewed in Wortmann (1999:8–18).

This overview of the general sustainable development and sustainable city debates provides the framework used in reviewing the translation of the paradigm in the sustainable city and low-cost housing or settlement practices in South Africa.

Sustainable low-cost housing, urban sustainability and the sustainable development debate in South Africa

Although South Africa is a signatory to most of the international protocols on environmental conservation and sustainable development, their influence on the local development agenda is still minimal. For example, although Agenda 21 for Sustainable Development (including Local Agenda 21) and Habitat Agenda are well recognised in most policy frameworks of different government departments and local

authorities, there is no overall sustainable development framework to guide development policy in various sectors of the economy. Attempts at formulating a National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD) under the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) have not delivered the required framework, even after several years in the process. Similarly, *ad hoc* sustainability initiatives now evident in the private sector have not converged to a coherent or systematic approach as yet. In contrast, the NGO and CBO sectors have managed to attract significant resources (financial, technical and managerial skills) from local and international donor agencies with the objective of addressing environmental and socio-economic sustainability issues such as energy efficiency, water conservation and poverty alleviation.

Since homelessness and poverty are the most glaring sustainability issues in South Africa (especially because of the 'human face' component and the impacts on the environment), a number of such NGOs and CBOs have focused on housing, social services, job creation and the related environmental challenges which can be addressed through housing delivery and habitat management. However, most of these initiatives are implemented on a project-by-project basis without significant synergy or impact on the broader housing delivery programme and urban development agenda.

It is the activities of such NGOs, CBOs and their related projects that have raised the sustainability debate around low-cost housing to heights well above the minor role of this sub-sector in the building construction sector and urban development in general. In so doing, two contradictory scenarios are emerging. The first scenario (business as usual) is one where such initiatives are confronted by immense challenges as they attempt to mainstream the practice of sustainable housing and human settlement. Consequently, they are ignored by government and/or the private sector, and none of the emerging lessons percolate into the construction sector and urban development or mainstream policy in general. If such challenges prove to be overwhelming to a point where diffusion of lessons learned from specific projects to general practice gets inhibited, momentum will be lost and the debate will dwindle.

The second scenario is where the initiatives as well as the related advocacy among different stakeholders translate into the adoption of such responses into policy, legislation and urban development frameworks at various levels of government. This could even translate into appropriate responses by the private sector, as the business case of such practice starts to emerge. Such a scenario would boost the momentum and could even see the low-cost housing sub-sector being the driver of sustainability in the building construction sector, urban development and the rest of the economy in general.

The question at this point is: Which of the two scenarios is likely to prevail? A response to the question will be attempted in the concluding part of this chapter. The subsequent sections will map out the minor role of the low-cost housing sub-sector in building construction and the economy in general. This will be followed by examples of sustainability initiatives in housing by NGOs and CBOs in the context of South Africa's housing subsidy programme. The final section before the conclusion will deal with indications of recent government response in terms of policies and guidelines in sustainable housing and the implication for urban sustainability.

Low-cost housing in the context of the building construction sector

Building construction is one of the 90 sectors of the South African economy, as applied in the input-output tables compiled by Statistics South Africa (see Statistics South Africa, 1995). The sector is also used as a data-capture category with regards to plans passed and buildings completed under different local authorities, employment opportunities and fixed capital formation, among others. Although there is no regular data capture of the environmental impacts of settlements and buildings, isolated studies on energy impact through production (embodied energy) and operation cycle of buildings have been undertaken (Irurah, 1997, 1998; Irurah and Holm, 1999). Irurah (1998) provided a preliminary overview on some of the environmental impacts of the cradle-to-grave cycle of building production, habitation, demolition and disposal of construction waste.

Although data on the low-cost housing sub-sector is not regularly captured under the above categories, there are indicative pieces of information showing that low-cost housing plays only a minor role in terms of economic and environmental impacts of the larger building sector. With regard to GDP and fixed capital formation, BIFSA (2000a:31) shows that in 1999, building construction contributed 3.3% and 20.4% respectively compared to 2.4% of GDP by civil construction. With regard to overall formal employment in 1999, civil construction absorbed 67 000 employees compared to 222 000 in building construction (BIFSA, 2000a:24). This clearly indicates that within the construction industry, the building construction sector dominates over civil construction.

Data from the Reserve Bank (2002:S-120) and BIFSA (2000b:13) indicates that although the residential sub-sector contributes almost the same ratio as the non-residential with regard to fixed capital formation, formal low-cost housing contributes only 10% of the sector's turnover and capital formation. Equally, its consumption of inputs in production (construction materials, labour and services) and habitation (energy, water, waste disposal, etc.) can be assumed to be relatively low compared to

the other two sub-sectors (middle- to high-income residential and non-residential). However, in terms of absolute land take for settlements and impacts such as pollution (water, air and solid waste) from informal settlements without adequate levels of infrastructure and services, low-cost housing might entail significantly higher impacts compared to the other sub-sectors.

Total residential consumption of electricity accounts for less than 20%, while industrial and mining consumption shows the highest consumption of 63% (Doppegieter *et al.*, 2001:49–50). On materials consumption, Statistics South Africa (1997:83) indicates that construction of homes contributed a mere 25% to the purchase value of cement in 1994, 15% for ready-made concrete and 40% for bricks and blocks. It is likely that in each case, low-cost housing contributes less than a quarter of these percentages (6.25%, 2% and 10% for cement, ready-made concrete and brick or blocks respectively). Similar patterns can be expected for water consumption and wastewater, solid waste generation and other such impacts.

In view of this minor role of the sub-sector, it is surprising that it has received some of the most intense sustainability attention especially from NGOs and CBOs. On the other hand, the attention can be justified in terms of numbers of people and households affected (the backlog in housing and services like water, sanitation and waste disposal, and expensive and inadequate public transport, among others). Any attempts to address such a large backlog in total disregard of sustainability issues would entail major impacts on the sustainability of the other urban subsystems. The subsequent section provides an overview of such initiatives. It demonstrates the spectrum of issues addressed and how this influences housing policy at the national, provincial and municipal levels, as well as the interests of the private sector.

Sustainable housing and settlement initiatives: Overview of case studies

Since 1994, housing delivery for low-income households has been one of the key programmes of the South African government. The estimated backlog of three million houses set the government's focus on mass delivery at the highest possible rate with an emphasis on so-called greenfield development. Targets of about 300 000 houses per year were set for the ten-year period from 1994. Given the limited budgetary resources, delivery focused on the lowest possible investment per household (in the form of a subsidy) and the widest coverage in terms of beneficiaries.

Key subsidy categories of the housing programme are the project-linked, relocation, consolidation, institutional and rural subsidies (Department of Housing,

2000). Since April 2002, there was a change of policy on the subsidy programme. In particular, subsidies for different categories were increased to match price increases and inflation, a minimum contribution by beneficiary households was set and emphasis was shifted to institutional subsidies and projects through the People's Housing Process.

Even though several subsidy categories were defined, the largest proportion of resources has been spent on the project-linked subsidies. This is the category of 'greenfield' development with minimum stand size of 250 m² and a minimum house size of 30 m². Minimum standards for services are also stipulated (Department of Housing, 2000). Through this programme, hundreds of thousands of houses have been developed on cheap land located on urban peripheries and with minimal levels of shelter or services. The typical product of the programme is the so-called matchbox typology replicated over tens or hundreds of hectares in a single project with minimal regard to sense of identity, pedestrian circulation, urban design and density, open spaces, integration of social services (police stations, schools, libraries, clinics, etc.). Even though minimum service standards are set for sanitation, electricity and water, the overall shelter performance and standards of design and construction are only marginally better than the 'shack', which the so-called matchbox seeks to replace. Loss of community coherence and social networks creates further deficiencies in such settlements when compared to informal settlements.

The above factors, coupled with others such as the absence of urban integration (contributing to sprawl), the poor market value of the properties developed and the implications of high life-cycle costs (for households, municipalities, provincial and national government), contribute to the perpetuation of poverty, segregation and environmental degradation. In response, several NGO and CBO initiatives have emerged in an attempt to demonstrate alternative housing delivery, which aims at alleviating the above shortcomings. Details of most of the project examples and cases mentioned in this section can be found in Irurah *et al.* (2002), which constitutes the first attempt at consolidating cases on good practice in sustainable housing and settlement since 1994.

The relationship between poverty and environment in this housing scenario has become a major opportunity for NGOs and CBOs to attract donor funding to supplement the government subsidy in pilot projects. Shelter-performance has emerged as the most strongly supported component, especially because it is linked to energy and water efficiency or conservation. Energy efficiency in turn is linked to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emission (a key contributing factor to global warming and climate change, which has now become a key global environmental challenge). The link to the Kyoto Protocol and emergent finance mechanisms for mitigation

projects has generated enthusiasm among housing stakeholders on the potential for meeting the additional costs incurred by making housing sustainable.

Consequently, technologies and capacity building in energy-efficient housing have been piloted by a variety of NGOs in partnership with CBOs and beneficiaries. Kutlwanong in Kimberley, Tlholego near Rustenburg, Midrand Eco-city and the Soweto energy-efficient house are some of the project examples. The All Africa Games Village near Alexandra in Johannesburg is one example where a conventional 'greenfield' project has been enhanced for energy and water efficiency without NGO and CBO participation. Unfortunately, most of the interventions have not been adequately sustained, because owners and community in general were not empowered for the task of appropriate habitat management from the perspective of sustainable settlement.

With regard to capacity building, NGOs such as Planact, IIEC (International Institute for Energy Conservation) and SEED (Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economic Development), as well as private-sector consultancies such as PEER Africa Pty Ltd., have partnered with communities, municipalities and provincial and national government for both advocacy and capacity facilitation at the decision-making level.

Since urban integration is a major requirement for poverty alleviation and resource efficiency at the urban scale, well-located projects such as the various settlements of Cator Manor in Durban and the Johannesburg Housing Company projects (Douglas Rooms, Carr Gardens, etc.) demonstrate sustainable housing with regard to urban integration.

Turning to the socio-economic dimension, job creation, skills development, support for entrepreneurial opportunities and empowerment of women are some of the key responses demonstrated in some projects. Kutlwanong in Kimberley was developed through the People's Housing Process of the national housing programme and has therefore demonstrated how socio-economic needs could be addressed even through an energy-efficient housing focus. The Tlholego project constitutes a strong rural example of integrated housing delivery that addresses both environmental requirements (energy, water and materials efficiency) and socio-economic needs (skills development, organic agriculture based on permaculture, empowerment of rural women, affirming social structures and cultural values, etc.). Enhancement of access especially through pedestrian circulation and for disabled people has been demonstrated in several projects. A demonstration house in Kutlwanong has been enhanced for access by disabled persons. In Cato Manor (Durban), the Riverdene settlement demonstrated prioritisation of pedestrian rather than vehicular circulation as well as enhancement for access and use by disabled persons.

The management of waste in human settlements is a crucial environmental sustainability requirement, especially with regard to environmental health and resource recovery. Communities and municipalities have also realised that this component has major potential for socio-economic benefits. In this regard, partnerships between municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector have ensured that community-based enterprises are generating economic value out of collection, sorting and recycling of waste. The Itike and Mitchell's Plain projects, as well as the Durban Solid Waste Management Programme, are some of several examples in this regard.

Regarding institutional sustainability, one of the common features of all the projects that aim at piloting and demonstrating sustainable housing alternatives is that they involve partnerships between different stakeholders. Besides the NGOs and CBOs, public-sector resources or contributions in terms of land and subsidies or other forms of facilitation have been essential. In some rare cases, private-sector participation and contribution has been achieved. The Abahlali project (Irurah *et al.*, 2002:48) is a unique example where a private-sector entity was directly involved in bridge financing of the project.

One critical requirement for institutional sustainability is continuity and evolution of policy frameworks that facilitate the initiatives. Continuity of contribution and facilitation by other stakeholders, especially NGOs and CBOs, is also critical. Consequently, appropriate funding, management skills and transparent and accountable governance are essential ingredients. This is particularly critical for NGOs and CBOs, which mainly rely on external funding for survival. The Kutlwanong Civic Integrated Housing Trust (KCIHT) and the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) provide examples of how to tackle this sustainability component while also spreading the benefits and lessons learned to several projects (Irurah *et al.*, 2002:15–16, 99–100).

Sustainable housing and settlement: Policy initiatives

The emergence of South Africa as a democratic state in the mid-90s has gone hand in hand with the rapid adoption of international frameworks and protocols related to sustainable development and sustainable settlement. Key among these are Agenda 21 (United Nations, 1992 and its derivatives, such as Local Agenda 21) and Habitat Agenda (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996). The translation of such frameworks into national and local legislation or policy has also been systematically undertaken.

However, the translation from policy and legislation to implementation of programmes by national, provincial and local governments has not been systematic.

This section reviews the related policies and legislation that are currently in place and how they relate to sustainable settlement and housing. The section also reviews the sustainable housing policy of the City of Johannesburg as an illustrative example of an approach towards mainstreaming the lessons learned from demonstration projects into the practice of implementing sustainable housing and settlements in South Africa.

Policy and legislation with reference to sustainable housing and settlement

The process towards a national strategy for sustainable development (NSSD) for South Africa commenced almost two years ago under the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). There was a high expectation that the process would yield the draft or final version of the NSSD by the time of the Earth Summit in Johannesburg (August 2002). This has not happened and no clear timeframes have been set for this outcome. On the other hand, the country has in place several pieces of legislation and policies, that directly relate to sustainable housing and settlement.

The constitution (RSA, 1996) entrenches the right of access to housing opportunities, an environment that is not harmful to one's wellbeing, and protection of the environment for present and future generations. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP (ANC, 1994)) and its successor (Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR (ANC, 1996)) have identified housing and economic growth with employment and economic empowerment (poverty reduction) as the key development challenges which the country must address.

The *Urban Development Strategy* (RSA, 1995a) and the *Urban Development Framework (UDF)* (see Department of Housing, 2000, Chapter 3, section 3.7)) have more specific relationships to sustainable housing and settlement. Both policy documents envision South African settlements that are:

- Spatially, racially and socio-economically integrated;
- Economically sustainable;
- Democratically governed with participatory planning as a key ingredient;
- Environmentally sustainable; and
- Adequately financed through public sector budgets and public-private sector partnerships.

The *UDF* identifies four key programmes for the realisation of this vision. These are:

- Integrating the city (undoing the legacy of apartheid planning);
- Improving housing and infrastructure with a view towards sustainable communities;

- Promoting housing and infrastructure with a view towards sustainable communities;
- Promoting urban economic development; and
- Creating institutions for delivery.

The local level institutional requirements for urban development have been provided for through the *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act* (RSA, 2000). It is this piece of legislation, above all others, which attempts to facilitate the realisation of integrated urban planning and development. The act makes the formulation of integrated development plans (IDPs) a mandatory requirement for all municipalities in the country. However, inadequate capacity in local authorities (especially financial capacity and skills) has meant an extremely slow start to the process of formulation and implementation of such IDPs.

The most recent policy framework in this line is being articulated through the *White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management* (Department of Agriculture, 2002). The paper is part of the process towards drafting a *Land Use Bill*, which is aimed at replacing apartheid-legacy legislation currently impairing the systematic implementation of the *Development Facilitation Act (DFA)* (RSA, 1995b). The paper aims to facilitate:

- A holistic approach to urban development;
- A reduction in the range of existing policies and legislation on this issue; and
- Integration with related legislation or policies in governance, environmental and resource management (including environmental impact assessment requirements).

One of the key features of the *DFA* (RSA, 1995b), which will be reinforced by the anticipated land-use bill, are the general principles for land development, which discourage low-density, segregated, fragmented and mono-functional urban development in favour of compact, integrated and mixed-use settlements.

Other policies and legislation which impact on settlements at another level include the *White Paper on National Transport and Moving South Africa* (Department of Transport, 1998), the *National Environmental Management Act – NEMA* (RSA, 1998), the *White Paper on Energy Policy* (Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998) and the *Water Services Act* (RSA, 1997). Similarly, extensive legislation and policies with regard to socio-cultural challenges have been formulated by respective national and provincial governments.

Although the examples of legislation and policy papers highlighted above indicate that strong facilitation towards sustainable housing and settlement in the country is already in place, their translation into the implementation of programmes and

projects has not been consistent. Hence, the set vision and goals have not been achieved in any significant manner. Instead, urban sprawl, desegregated settlements, inadequate shelter in low-cost housing, inadequate responses to resource and environmental degradation, as well as continued disregard of the rights of vulnerable groups, continue to dominate housing practice and habitat management in South Africa. It is in this context that the City of Johannesburg initiated its sustainable housing policy, which is reviewed in the section below.

Sustainable housing policy of the city of Johannesburg

From the point of view of housing and settlements, the lessons derived from the diverse demonstration projects by NGOs and CBOs have not yet percolated upwards into policy revisions and enhancement to facilitate mainstreaming of related principles and practices at national, provincial and local governments. However, continued advocacy and lobbying by various stakeholders and interest groups have managed to convince the City of Johannesburg to pioneer the road to a sustainable housing policy in spite of an absence of a comprehensive policy at provincial and national levels.

Through a stakeholder consultation process in 2000 on the Metropolitan Housing Strategy 2010, feedback (especially from NGOs and CBOs working on various challenges of sustainable housing) identified a total absence of sustainability considerations in the strategy. The outcome of the consultation process was that the City of Johannesburg undertook to amend the strategy to reflect such considerations. This was implemented in 2001 when the Sustainable Housing Policy for Johannesburg was formulated, followed by capacity building (implementation guidelines, training and project assessment tools) for implementation by 2004 (City of Johannesburg and Syn-Consult Africa, 2001).

The mainstreaming of sustainable housing and settlement practice would thus assist the City of Johannesburg in the realisation of its housing vision of:

Healthier, wealthier and secure households and communities in environmentally responsive, spatially, socio-culturally and economically integrated housing and habitats within a resource- and environment-conserving city, for the benefit of current and future generations of Johannesburg and South Africa (City of Johannesburg Council and Syn-Consult Africa, 2001:22).

Through integration of several sustainability components (energy and water efficiency, land-use optimisation, alternative or green finance, job creation and response to rights of vulnerable groups, among others) and the key stages of a housing-project cycle (from conceptualisation through to monitoring and

evaluation), the policy commits the Council to progressively play a leadership and facilitation role for the realisation of sustainable housing and settlement for the city. The formulation of implementation guidelines, training of officials and councilors and institutional arrangement are now being implemented as part of the capacity-building process for policy implementation. This policy process marks a turning point in sustainable housing and settlement in South Africa as it shows a commitment by a public sector stakeholder to mainstream lessons derived from the various projects implemented by NGOs and CBOs at grassroots level.

Conclusion

The emergence of the sustainable development paradigm has kindled debate on urban sustainability and sustainable urban form. Characterising and contrasting cities through concepts such as compact versus sprawl, ecological versus non-ecological and just versus unjust cities serve as clear indications of the evolution of this debate which in turn feeds into the re-definition and understanding of sustainable development.

Although South Africa has adopted key international protocols and agreements on sustainable development (including Agenda 21 and Habitat Agenda) into its development policies and legislation, this has not been systematically followed through in implementation. Even in the absence of an explicit national strategy for sustainable development, there exist several pieces of legislation and policy frameworks that could significantly contribute to sustainable development and urban sustainability if effectively implemented. Inadequate capacity (especially skills and financial resources) has been the key contributing factor to this outcome.

On the other hand, the country has enjoyed intensive piloting and demonstration of sustainable housing or settlement projects by NGOs and CBOs mainly with donor funding. Lobbying and advocacy by such NGOs and CBOs has convinced the City of Johannesburg Council to pioneer the process of formulating a sustainable housing policy and the necessary capacity building for its implementation. In the other sub-sectors in construction and the economy in general, there have been no significant initiatives towards coherent sustainability programmes.

In view of the above scenario, it is now an appropriate moment in which to attempt an answer to the question of whether sustainable low-cost housing initiatives can influence the transformation towards sustainable urban development and construction in South Africa. In view of the tremendous international commitment to sustainable development and South Africa's political will to align itself with this movement, the search for sustainable housing and urban development will continue to attract political attention in the foreseeable future. Equally, lessons on

implementation strategies will be systematically sought as the implementation agencies endeavour to ensure coherence and reliability in their programmes.

It is also clear that, given its current momentum, the low-cost housing or settlement sub-sector will continue in the search for sustainable urban development and construction. When this is coupled with the sustainability-oriented pieces of policy and legislation, one can reach the conclusion that there will be a convergence, which will allow the mainstreaming of lessons from sustainable housing projects into sustainable urban development and sustainable development in South Africa. However, the timeframes and exact process for this convergence would be difficult to predict at this stage.

References

- ANC (1994) *The Reconstruction and Development Programme – RDP: A Policy Framework*. Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications.
- ANC (1996) *Growth, Employment and Redistribution – GEAR: A Macroeconomic Strategy*. Johannesburg: African National Congress.
- BIFSA (Building Industries Federation South Africa) (2000a) *BIFSA Statistical Yearbook 1999/2000*. Johannesburg: BIFSA.
- BIFSA (Building Industries Federation South Africa) (2000b) *The South African Building Industry: Fourth Quarter 2000*. Johannesburg: BIFSA.
- City of Johannesburg Council and Syn-Consult Africa (2001) *Sustainable Housing Strategy and Implementation Guidelines for the City of Johannesburg*. Johannesburg: City of Johannesburg.
- Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2002) *Wise Land Use: White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management*. Pretoria: Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs.
- Department of Housing (2000) *The National Housing Code*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Department of Minerals and Energy (1998) *The White Paper on Energy Policy*. Pretoria: Department of Minerals and Energy.
- Department of Transport (1998) *Moving South Africa: A Transport Strategy for 2020*. Pretoria: Department of Transport.
- Doppegieter, J., du Toit, J. and G. Stewart (2001) *Energy Indicators 2001/2002*. Pretoria: Department of Minerals and Energy.
- Gelderblom, D. and P. Kok (1994) *Urbanisation: South Africa's Challenge. Volume 1: Dynamics*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.
- Irurah, D. (1997) *An Embodied-energy Algorithm for Energy Conservation in Building Construction for South Africa*. PhD thesis. Pretoria: Department of Architecture, University of Pretoria.
- Irurah, D. (1998) *Towards a Sustainability Framework for Material Selection and Specification in Building Construction for South Africa*. Unpublished report for the GreenHouse Project and the Centre for the Development of the Built Environment (CDBE). Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
- Irurah, D. and D. Holm (1999) 'Energy impact analysis of building construction as applied to South Africa', *Construction Management and Economics*, 17:363–74.

- Irurah, D., Bannister, S., Silverman, M. and T. Zack (2002) *Towards Sustainable Settlements: Case Studies from South Africa*. Commissioned by Department of Housing. Johannesburg: STE Publishers.
- Lozano, E. (1990) *Community Design and the Culture of Cities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mawhinney, M. (2002) *Sustainable Development: Understanding the Green Debate*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Meadows, D.L., Randers, J. and W.W. Behrens III (1972) *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Potomac Associates.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1995a) *Urban Development Strategy of the Government of National Unity (GNU)*. Pretoria: Ministry in the Office of the President.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1995b) *Development Facilitation Act*. Act No. 67 of 1995. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1996) *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*. Act No. 108 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1997) *The Water Services Act*. Act No. 108 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1998) *The National Environmental Management Act, 1998*. Act No. 107 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2000) *Local Government Municipal Structures Act, 2000*. Act No. 33 of 2000. Pretoria: Government Printer.
- Reserve Bank of South Africa (2002) 'National income and production accounts of South Africa', *RBSA Quarterly Bulletin*, March:106–150.
- Statistics South Africa (1995) *Input-Output Tables, 1993*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
- Statistics South Africa (1997) *Census of Construction, 1994*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
- United Nations (1992). *Agenda 21: The UN Programme of Action from Rio*. New York: United Nations.
- UNCHS (United Nations Commission for Human Settlement) (Habitat) (1996) 'Habitat Agenda and Istanbul declaration', *Second UN Conference on Human Settlements*, Istanbul, 3–14 June.
- WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987) *Our Common Future*. Brundtland Commission. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wortmann, A. (1999) 'Sustainability on trial: Architecture and ecology', *Archis*, (2):8–18.

Chapter 16

The Integrated Delivery of Housing: A Local Government Perspective from Durban

Sarah Charlton

Introduction

From a practitioner's point of view, the concept of 'integration' in relation to the delivery of low-income housing in an urban context has many dimensions. One aspect of integration relates to the spatial relationship of the new housing area to the city, and its location with respect to transport networks, economic opportunities and higher order social facilities. In the case of South African housing delivery, the development of new residential areas also has the potential to play an integrating role between parts of the city isolated and separated by apartheid planning.

Another aspect of integration pertains to the nature of the development itself, which should be holistic in character, containing all facilities and amenities necessary for a fully functioning residential area. A related interpretation of this internal integration could be that the development is racially and socio-economically integrated in the profile of its resident population.

A third dimension of integration deals with the process of delivery, which should be coordinated, both spatially and programmatically, with the delivery of the support infrastructure necessary to make the area function at a technical level. In addition, while the nature of involvement with various stakeholders may vary, the process of delivery needs to integrate the engagement of a range of actors and processes.

The notion of integration also necessitates that the new development is an appropriate response to needs – that the solution provided by the housing is an integral response to the situation it is trying to address. Several further dimensions of the concept of integration could be explored, but are beyond the scope of this chapter.

In reviewing recent housing delivery from the perspective of integration, this chapter describes a range of obstacles encountered in attempting integrated housing development in South Africa. Specifically, the chapter draws on insights the author gained as an official in the housing department of the Durban local authority between 1997 and 2001. The chapter seeks to identify the nature of the difficulties faced, and thereby to contribute to a greater understanding of the conditions necessary for integrated implementation. While others have raised the need for coordination between spheres of government, and within spheres of government as necessary for integration (see, for example, Abbott, 1996; Oranje *et al.*, 2000; von Shirnding, 1999), and have highlighted the development plan as a means of translating policy into action (see, for example, Healey, 1995), this chapter points to additional factors that are required in order to achieve integrated housing delivery.

South Africa's state housing programme provides a useful opportunity to examine the challenges of integrated delivery under conditions of a large programme of capital investment. The city of Durban's specific experiences are relevant, in part because its housing unit was one of very few local authority housing departments at the time dedicated to new housing delivery. As a new department within a recently established democratically elected structure, the unit developed and pioneered a number of local level policies and initiatives. In addition, dedicated funding enabled the department to supplement the state's housing programme in various ways. Considerable experience in the complexities of housing delivery was gained during this period.

The chapter is structured as follows: firstly, concepts of integrated development internationally and in South Africa are noted. Thereafter, Durban's housing challenges are briefly summarised before the institutional environment is discussed. The mandate of the municipal housing department is described, followed by a discussion of the main obstacles to integrated delivery experienced in the period under review. These are grouped into a discussion of spatial integration, internal integration, integration in the process of delivery, and the integration of solutions with problems. The paper concludes by noting that while some of the obstacles identified have the potential to be overcome by the next stage of the Integrated Development Planning processes, others will not be addressed through this mechanism.

Concepts of integrated development

Notions of integration in housing delivery relate to integrated planning trends in various parts of the world. These range from the planning ideas that have emerged from the New Labour government of Britain, to the multi-sectoral investment planning of the United Nations Development Programme (Harrison, 2001). Integrated planning aims to align a number of sectoral plans and processes such as budgeting and programming, with strategic initiatives such as economic development. This notion of cross-sectoral coordination and inter-institutional connectivity continues to feature in global programmes such as Local Agenda 21 and the Sustainable Cities Programme (UNCHS (Habitat)/ UNEP, 1999).

At the same time one of the trends shaping the field of urban development internationally is the transfer of public sector responsibilities to local government (Brugmann, 2000). Urban management, an initiative to improve the performance of local government, has been promoted since the 1980s by the World Bank, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements and the UN Development Programme (Jenkins, 2000; Mabin, 2002). While urban management is a broad concept whose central core is hard to define, it strives to break with the existing segregated and uncoordinated efforts of different government departments, as well as the institutional separation of planning, decision making and action (Post, 1997).

In line with international trends, it is increasingly recognised that in South Africa too most government functions are being decentralised to the local sphere, for various reasons (Olver in Younge, 1999). The collapse of apartheid in South Africa was accompanied by a range of ideas on the role which both planning and local government could play in reshaping and reconstructing the urban environment. The notion of integration, in the sense of the coordination of strategies, is incorporated into these initiatives, appearing for example in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, a document produced by the African National Congress in 1994 as its manifesto for social and economic change (ANC, 1994). Later, the amended *Local Government Transition Act* (1996) obliged all local authorities to produce an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) which is intended to provide strategic guidance and to link and coordinate many different sectoral planning processes (Harrison, 2001; Mabin, 2002).

Likewise, the housing programme in South Africa embraces the notion of integrated delivery, aiming to promote the process of social, economic and physical integration, and to coordinate government investment in development (Department of Housing, 1997; Department of Housing, 2000). The general rhetoric of national policy, such as that contained in the *Housing White Paper* (1994) and the *Urban*

Development Framework (Department of Housing, 1997), talks of compaction and the need to develop well-located land for the poor, while these principles are also enshrined in the *Development Facilitation Act* of 1995 (Berrisford, 1999). Local authorities have recently prepared IDPs in line with the municipal demarcations of 2000, to provide a framework for integrated development. However, in the meantime, the national housing programme has been actively delivering housing projects since the mid-1990s, ahead of the adoption of integrated frameworks.

The housing context of Durban 1997–2001

The range of housing challenges facing Durban in the period under discussion were considerable. About one third of the population of approximately 2.5 million had inadequate access to basic infrastructural services. There were massive discrepancies in the level of service across the city, and a high cost associated with new service delivery due to the undulating topography and sprawling nature of the city. An estimated gross housing backlog of about 280 000 units included about 143 000 households living in informal settlements, the overwhelming majority of these being African families. The city form revealed the particular manifestation of apartheid policies in Durban, with high concentrations of the poor living in long-established settlements at considerable distance from the main opportunities of the city (Smit and Byerley, 1997).

However, it should be noted that, in contrast perhaps to other Metropolitan areas, Durban had about 108 informal settlements comprising 44 285 ‘shacks’ on well-located (although not always developable) land (Durban Unicity, 2001; Metro Housing Unit, 2000a). A number of these settlements, or portions of settlements, were identified for relocation because of risk of flooding or other hazards, or because their small size made them unviable for upgrading. Within just the central areas of Durban, a further 6% of informal dwellings were scheduled for relocation as a result of de-densification through upgrading. This gave a total of approximately 7 000 structures to be moved, involving 27% of the informal settlements in the central areas (Metro Housing, 2000a). This had major implications for the need for well-located land.

The institutional environment

The developmental challenges faced by the city of Durban were compounded by institutional complexities. The new emphasis on the developmental role of local government, noted in the *Local Government Transition Act* (1996) and the *White Paper on Local Government* (1998), was accompanied by fundamental institutional

restructuring throughout the country. In the case of Durban, over 40 local authorities of various forms were amalgamated firstly into a Metropolitan authority and six local substructure authorities (with different powers, functions and responsibilities vesting at different levels), and finally at the end of 2000, into one Unicity, now called eThekweni Municipality. Much of this local level transition occurred at the same time as national-level constitutional transition, a situation unique to South Africa (Swilling and Boya, 1997).

Inevitably, the institutional upheaval led to certain internal tensions where objectives and autonomies clashed and political agendas competed. This was particularly evident where municipal departments with a strongly development and delivery-oriented agenda conflicted with those struggling to adapt from a traditional regulatory and maintenance role (Charlton, 2001).

The Metro Housing Service Unit was established in mid-1997, representing a relatively early attempt by a local authority to invest resources in a housing capacity that was to play both a delivery role and a coordinating function in the implementation of housing in the metropolitan area. This was at a time when the delivery of housing was not necessarily seen by key players in government to be a municipal function. As its name implies, Metro Housing was located institutionally at the Metropolitan level, responsible for providing vision and direction across all of the six substructures but with implementation responsibility for the delivery of new housing stock in only two of the substructure authorities. In this regard it is important to note that this chapter draws its material from housing delivery in the central areas of Durban only. In addition, it does not discuss the particular experience of the Cato Manor Development Association, a geographically focused Presidential Lead project.

Tensions inevitably ensued where the approach of Metro Housing conflicted with that of substructures with autonomy over implementation in their area. An example of this occurred in the allocation of sites in new housing projects, which tended to be to the benefit of local, parochial interests only rather than serving Metropolitan-wide backlogs.

Beyond the local government institutional sphere, the municipality and the provincial and national housing departments did not have the same vision and approaches. In a situation where housing funding was sourced in the national sphere, dispersed by the provincial sphere, but the responsibilities of delivery experienced in the local sphere, the nature of these relationships was significant. Housing delivery in the late 1990s was characterised by an emphasis from both provincial and national spheres on target-driven delivery in terms of the number of housing units built, as well as concern over the number of delays and blockages that prevented approved housing projects from proceeding according to project cycle.

During the mid 1990s Durban was the only large city in the country where the provincial government was not the major developer. Housing delivery had been occurring in the city in a largely uncoordinated fashion by a range of implementing agents, who were awarded national subsidy money via the provincial authority on an individual, project-by-project basis, in line with the mechanisms of the housing policy at the time. This piecemeal approach to delivery had left a legacy of dysfunctional projects, which were not integrated with the city's bulk service delivery programme. For the city, therefore, the major challenge was to secure subsidy funding from the Province for projects identified as city priorities and to link them to the delivery programme of the Metro.

Meaningful interaction with the national Department of Housing was weak. Channels of communication through the KwaZulu-Natal Local Government Association and the South African Local Government Association were not effective, perhaps because housing was not a local authority function in terms of the Constitution and therefore not considered in some quarters as a local government priority. Consequently there was little local input with respect to national policy formulation. Policy documents circulated for comment were frequently done so under very short timeframes, and while there were often substantive issues needing debate, the process was so far down the line that such engagement was not possible (Charlton, 2001).

Conflicts were also apparent in varying interpretations of policy between national and provincial housing departments. For example, the Norms and Standards, defining 'topstructure' specifications, were not applied to informal settlements at national level but were applied to these areas by the provincial Department of Housing in KwaZulu-Natal (CMDA *et al.*, 2001).

In addition, conflicts between different policies played themselves out in the housing arena. For example, many of the housing projects in Durban came into conflict with environmental requirements where the satisfaction of such requirements imposed a significant financial burden on the housing development funding (subsidies). This was sometimes through direct additional costs such as the requirement to construct physical barriers between development and sensitive areas (which tended to be perceived by residents as a resource for food, fuel and medicinal plants, rather than pristine areas to be conserved), but was more typically experienced through the loss of developable land for housing. While there was considerable support for the need to satisfy environmental requirements, conflicts arose when the housing subsidy money had to cover the additional costs (Charlton, 2001).

The impression gained was that national policy was formulated independently within different departmental 'silos'. Conflicts and tensions were only recognised at the time of implementation and at a sphere of government relatively powerless to

resolve such tensions. As noted by Younge (1999:13), 'in essence, local government has ended up acting as the *de facto* coordinator of national government policy, a task that is overwhelming and often practically impossible to achieve, given its resource and capacity problems and the lack of political congruence between key sectors'.

The mandate of Metro Housing

Within the highly regulated framework set by national housing policy, Metro Housing had a clear objective to move the delivery of housing in Durban from a reactive, individual project-based situation to one that was clearly programme-driven, coordinated and integrated with the development of the city as a whole. A number of development principles were adopted by Council, including the notion that new or so-called greenfields projects were to be developed on land that was considered to be well located with respect to transport and economic opportunities. In addition, existing informal settlements were to be upgraded *in-situ*. Where this was not possible, 'shack' dwellers were to be offered relocation opportunities as close as possible to the original settlement. Furthermore, Metro Housing sought to play a coordinating role, both between external players and the local authority, as well as within the programmes of the local authority.

The formalisation of the development principles into the Metro Housing Strategic Framework in 1998 included a strategy for the effective utilisation of the grant funding made available through the Durban Metropolitan Housing Development Account, which was expected to grow to over R300 million by 2001 (Metro Housing Unit, 1999a, 1999b).

Thus with a clear set of principles, and some financial and human resources, Metro Housing had at least some of the elements in place necessary for integrated development. However, difficulties experienced in implementing this objective revealed that a number of other factors were necessary too.

Spatial integration

Considerable difficulties were experienced in accessing well-located land, including the technical complications and expenses inevitably associated with whatever land has remained undeveloped to date within the central areas of Durban. The additional 15% national subsidy allowance fell far short of addressing these additional costs of development. In addition, attempts to develop well-located land were frustrated by a lack of real understanding of the effect of low-income housing development on established residential areas. Consequently the Nimby (Not-in-my-back-yard)

reactions of formal residents, compounded by the different interests of ward and metropolitan councillors, served to hinder well-located development. This was evidenced, for example, by the violent and threatening reaction of the KwaMashu D Section and Newlands East residents, to the relocation of residents of the Canaan informal settlement from a life-threatening landslide situation to a new, infill development in relatively close proximity to them. A closer examination of the objections put forward revealed that it could more accurately be described as a stance of 'only in my back yard if for me', revealing the contested, self-interested nature of housing (Charlton, 2000).

While Durban's existing informal settlement pattern, with many settlements within developed residential areas, might suggest a lessening of Nimby concerns in relation to these areas (as neighbours have had to adjust to impacts over a number of years), it appears that the notion of giving permanence to areas through upgrading provokes negative reaction, as demonstrated in, for example, the Briardene rollover upgrade (Charlton, 2000).

In the period under review the ANC-dominated Council managed to push through such developments. However, this was inevitably accompanied by intensive, resource-draining interactions. As others have noted (e.g. Bremner, 2000), the lack of clear direction in times of political transition and volatility make radical interventions extremely difficult. There was no Metro-wide evaluation of the implications of translating notions of integration and compaction into specific land parcels, with specific external impacts. Such an assessment would have assisted the local authority to gain the necessary moral authority to support development that may be locally unpopular but clearly in the long-term benefit of the city as a whole. A clear position in this regard would then have needed to be backed up with interventionist policies and practices.

Once the political battle had been won there was still a financial battle to be fought to access well-located land. The assumption contained in both the national housing policy and the Local Authority Ordinance was that market value must be paid for land for low-income housing development. However, the limit placed on the amount of subsidy money that may be spent on land implied more peripheral development where land is cheaper. The acquisition of well-located land, therefore, required additional funding to be found to supplement subsidy money.

In addition, while there was physically not enough well-located land available in Durban, if the land were to be developed as single units on individual plots, an alternative type of development that could make more efficient use of the land – such as higher density walk-ups – required more funding than the subsidy could provide. Due in large part to issues of cost, few of the newly built subsidised housing projects

in Durban were able to depart from the relatively low-density one house-one plot format, despite the rhetoric at national level of the need to implement a variety of tenure forms, house types and higher density development (e.g. the *Urban Development Framework* (Department of Housing, 1997)).

It was much harder to put together the necessary financial packages needed to make these projects work, and they became incredibly resource-intensive and slow on tangible delivery. An example can be found in the Strollers Overnight Facility, which provides overnight accommodation aimed at street traders, and which contributed to the formulation of a new policy, the Transitional Housing Policy. While the facility is innovative and ground breaking, indications are that it is failing to reach the very poor, largely because of the relatively high up-front development costs and because it has to operate on a self-sustaining, cost-recovery basis, with neither the housing subsidy nor the local authority providing any contribution towards the ongoing running costs of the facility (Charlton, 2001).

Internal integration

With regard to integrated delivery in the sense of holistic development, the construction of facilities needed to transform a subsidised housing project into a functioning neighbourhood was not easily coordinated with the delivery of housing. The source of funding, and mechanism of delivery, of a range of facilities such as schools, postal facilities and certain health and welfare facilities were located in provincial departments with little apparent connection with the provincial department allocating housing funds, and even less connection with the local authority. Housing projects therefore tended not to be fully functioning neighbourhoods, but rather basic, highly inadequate environments, with sites reserved for facilities remaining largely undeveloped (Charlton, 2001). In addition, funding sources and implementation mechanisms for other 'layers' of infrastructure – such as sidewalks, telephones, street signage, post boxes, bus shelters (and bus services) and so on – remained unclear.

While one of the strategies of the national housing policy is to guide urban development and coordinate government investment in development (Department of Housing, 1997; Department of Housing, 2000) this is an extremely challenging and complex task, involving both a physical framework, as well as programmatic, budgetary and institutional coordination. The lack of attention, urgency and direction accorded to the matter in all spheres of government indicates that perhaps the importance and the dimensions of integrated development have not been well understood. Currently this task is weakly performed by the housing sector.

An integrated process of delivery

During much of the 1990s there was little opportunity for the involvement of the local authority in coordinating and directing an overall programme of housing delivery, in which development occurred in agreed locations, in a sequence that allows a meaningful integration with related service providers, in a manner which responded to the most urgent needs and priorities of the city as a whole. The resultant programme of implementation was piecemeal and uncoordinated.

The lack of a clear position on spatial interventions, noted earlier, contributed to the widespread confusion on notions of stakeholder participation in housing development (Charlton, 2001). Instead of focusing on how projects should best happen within a set of non-negotiable parameters, councillors, officials and residents became polarised in debates around whether projects should happen at all, leading, at times, to ugly racially based protests, as well as developmental impacts that could have been more sensitively handled within a climate of negotiation. Local constituency politics dominated any collective vision for the city.

The reliance by the state on the private sector to implement projects through private sector developers engendered a hands-off approach by some local authority departments, which were reluctant to take responsibility for what they viewed as a private development. This approach included a lack of engagement with layout plans submitted for approval, where the general attitude adopted by officials mimicked that taken with private commercial developers, where any problematic sites impacted on their marketability and resulted in the developer either scrapping them or investing in them to make them attractive. This was clearly not an appropriate attitude in low-income housing where sites are not sold in the market but allocated to a captive 'market'. This detached attitude stretched to issues of maintenance, where housing projects tended to be overlooked in the aftercare typically afforded to established suburbs.

Given this situation, Durban Metro moved towards playing a coordinating role in housing delivery in three ways. Firstly, Metro Housing actively worked towards formulating a rational programme for housing development, which identified, profiled and prioritised a set of 'greenfields' and informal settlement projects. To this end a comprehensive and detailed informal settlement and land audit was undertaken, and resulted in the identification of a preferred sequence of implementation of housing projects (Metro Housing, 2000a).

The second way in which coordination was tackled was through establishing inter-departmental forums of officials, to which project proposals were submitted for evaluation. This process identified for the developer, and for the city, the problems that need to be resolved in order for a housing project to succeed, including any

additional funding that the city needed to commit to the project. While considerable progress was made in integrating bulk service and environmental issues, the success of the group in coordinating other city investment, as well as in influencing the urban quality of projects, remained limited.

The third way in which coordination was tackled was through a concerted attempt to acquire the necessary control over the allocation of state housing funding, through a comprehensive application to the province for accreditation, a mechanism provided for in the housing policy. This application was not approved, however. Frustratingly, therefore, while much effort was put into prioritising projects and securing various Council funding for projects (such as bulk and top-up funding), the Metro was unable to gain control over which projects were allocated subsidy money at provincial level.

These attempts at coordination raise questions about the required institutional arrangements, at various levels of government, necessary to achieve coordinated delivery, and how this is will be achieved in the broader Integrated Development Planning process of the city. Recent thinking in this regard in Durban has focused on models for Area Based Management and Development (European Union Team and MXA, 2002). However, coordination is a major exercise in an institution which is organised into functional silos, and which, furthermore, has neither control over certain aspects of residential neighbourhood delivery (such as some of the funding for bulk services, the delivery of schools, police stations), nor control over the allocation of housing funding in its area of jurisdiction. In the context of a shortage of skills and capacity, efforts at coordination to date have also depended heavily on the personal commitment of particular individuals. However, from 1999 the transformation process in Durban was accompanied by a moratorium on changing the structure of departments and on employing new staff, with a consequential shortage of people with the necessary experience, skill and commitment to undertake the increased responsibilities given to local authorities.

An integral response to needs

Evidence from several Durban projects showed that beneficiaries relocating from informal settlements to new 'greenfield' housing projects frequently sold their sites and moved to other informal settlements (Metro Housing, 2000b). This suggested that the very informality, low-cost and limited investment offered by an informal settlement may meet various needs, including those of transient, migratory residents, those who do not qualify for subsidy and those for whom the ability to respond to opportunities as and where they arise is a basic survival strategy. It also revealed the use of the product of the subsidy as a cash injection into poor people's lives. In

addition, while at present there appears to be no alternative to relocations, the impact of relocation on people's survival strategies, economic opportunities and social relations, is also poorly understood. As others have noted, an appropriate response to informal settlements is lacking in the national housing programme (see, for example, BESSG, 2000).

In addition, the rules of the subsidy scheme made no allowance for the specificity of local project conditions and problems, which require variable approaches, responses and a diverse set of resource inputs. The policy was also extremely rigid with respect to eligibility – it is really aimed at the nuclear family, within a defined income bracket (translating, in Durban at least, almost exclusively one race group), and in effect did not respond to the needs of others such as single people or the elderly with no dependants. Highly defined policy parameters, therefore, give very little flexibility to respond to what are a subtle and complex range of housing problems – the solution on offer is not well integrated with the problem.

Within the conventional one unit–one plot model it was starkly apparent that there was not enough money available to develop areas to a level satisfactory to politicians, beneficiaries and council officials in Durban. Engineers and health officials contended that the basic sanitation and water service levels prescribed by the National Department of Housing implied a relatively large site size (to deal with issues such as disposal of grey water on site), which in turn generally implied relatively peripheral development where land is cheaper and on-site sanitation is more acceptable. These implications are at odds with policy objectives to encourage higher density development in well-located areas. In addition, the notion of pit latrines for low-income development is at present politically unacceptable in Durban, while gravel roads are generally not technically feasible in the steep topography of the area (Charlton, 2001).

The National Department of Housing counters suggestions that the subsidy is inadequate by saying that local authorities wanting a higher level of service can contribute additional money to servicing. While most local authorities are not in a position to do this, Durban, arguing that it is not a matter of choice but necessity, has to date made use of the Durban Metropolitan Housing Development Account money for this purpose. In excess of R3 000 per site has been used to cover the additional servicing requirements associated with trying to balance up-front development costs with longer term maintenance costs in well-located developments.

Even with this considerable additional funding, however (which may be unsustainable in even the short to medium term), the adequacy of internal site development remained questionable. Housing projects are structured in such a way that the budget determines everything and the relationship between the project yield

(the number of sites overall) and the extent of infrastructure required, becomes all-important. Consequently sites tend to be squeezed out of portions of the project that are excessively steep or technically difficult. Frequently no allowances are made for these difficult sites, for instance, through increasing their size to accommodate issues of slope, or by making financial provision for engineering solutions to make them really usable. Inevitably new housing development tended to have an appearance of money having been stretched too far, at least in comparison to established suburbs or those residential areas developed in the past under different sources of funding, and different ideological agendas.

It may be argued that the resultant pared-down product is realistic, given the scale of problem and resources available, and in fact is high in comparison to other African countries (Potts, 1998). However, one consequence of the financial constraints was that participation in housing development became unattractive to the private sector in Durban. Profit margins were too low, expectations at all levels high in relation to the available funding, community dynamics time-consuming and unpredictable, and in addition, projects were targets of crime (CMDA *et al.*, 2001). As a result, the capacity to deliver housing in the region was severely affected.

Conclusion

The experience in Durban in the late 1990s shows that the implementation of projects struggled, and at times failed, to deliver housing that was fully integrated spatially, internally, in its processes and in its response to needs. This is despite a relatively well resourced, and committed local authority environment. The obstacles encountered can be summarised as follows: major institutional constraints and weaknesses within the local authority, a lack of coordination between spheres of government, and between departments, a lack of buy-in to the implications of well-located development (and therefore a lack of understanding of the terms of stakeholder engagement), a lack of local control over the allocation of housing subsidy funding, and an inadequate housing policy demonstrating both contradictions within the policy and between it and other policies.

It may be argued that some of these obstacles are specific to the period under review, a time of local government transition when comprehensive integrated development planning was weakly formulated, and that the potential to overcome some of these obstacles rests with the operationalisation of the second phase of IDP formulation and associated institutional re-organisation. While a comprehensive discussion of this is beyond the scope of this chapter, indications are that the eThekweni IDP is fairly generic and unspecific (eThekweni, 2002), and its

contribution to coordinated planning, delivery and institutional integration is still to be tested. In addition, other obstacles to integrated delivery identified in this chapter will not be solved through IDP processes. These include the lack of coordination between spheres of government, problems with the housing policy itself, as well as contradictions between national policies.

References

- ANC (African National Congress) (1994) *Reconstruction and Development Programme*. Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications.
- Abbott, J. (1996) *Sharing the City – Community Participation in Urban Management*. London: Earthscan.
- Berrisford, S. (1999) 'Redistribution of Land Rights in South Africa: Simply a rural question?' Paper presented at the IRGLUS/ CALS Workshop, *Redefining Property Rights in an Era of Liberalisation and Privatisation*, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 29–30 July.
- BESG (Built Environment Support Group) (2000) '(Re-)opening the housing debate in South Africa. Scoping paper: Supporting informal settlements'. Paper submitted to the *Isandla Institute and the Wits Graduate School of Public and Development Management*. Durban: BESG Resource Centre.
- Bremner, L. (2000) 'Post-apartheid urban geography: A case study of Greater Johannesburg's Rapid Land Development Programme', *Development Southern Africa*, 17(1):87–104.
- Brugmann, J. (2000) 'Sustainable Urban Development in a Global Economy'. Paper presented at the *African Solutions: Towards Sustainable Development Conference*, Pretoria, 27–28 March.
- Charlton, S. (2000) 'Infill and Integration in the Post Apartheid City: Two Low-income Housing Projects in Durban'. Paper presented at the *Urban Futures Conference*, Johannesburg, 10–14 July.
- Charlton, S. (2001) 'Low income housing in South Africa: Practice and policy reflections on the work of Metro Housing, Durban Metropolitan Council, 1997–2000'. Unpublished paper prepared for the Metro Housing Unit. Durban: Metropolitan Council.
- CMDA (Cato Manor Development Association), BESG (Built Environment Support Group), First Metro, Metro Housing (2001) 'Housing Projects Trend Analysis (Draft 2)'. Unpublished document submitted to the Institute for Housing of South Africa. Durban: CMDA Resource Centre.
- Department of Housing (1997) *Urban Development Framework*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Department of Housing (2000) *The User Friendly Guide to the Housing Code*. Pretoria: Department of Housing.
- Durban Unicity (2001) *Long Term Development Strategy 4th Draft*. Durban: Durban Unicity.
- eThekweni Municipality (2002) *Draft Integrated Development Plan*. Durban: eThekweni Municipality.
- European Union Team and MXA (McIntosh Xaba and Associates) (2002) *Feasibility study for a programme to introduce Area Based Management and Development in selected areas in the eThekweni Municipality*. Draft report prepared for the eThekweni Municipal Authority and European Union. Durban: eThekweni Municipality.

- Harrison, P. (2001) 'The genealogy of South Africa's Integrated Development Plan', *Third World Planning Review*, 23(2):175–193.
- Healey, P. (1995) 'Discourses of integration: Making frameworks for democratic urban planning'. In *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context* edited by Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S. and A. Madani-Pour, pp. 251–272. England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- Jenkins, P. (2000) 'Urban management, urban poverty and urban governance: Planning and land management in Maputo', *Environment and Urbanization*, 11(2):137–152.
- Mabin, A. (2002) 'Local Government in the Emerging National Planning Context'. In *Democratising Local Government: The South African Experiment*, edited by Parnell, S. and E. Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. and D. Wooldridge, pp. 40–54. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Metro Housing Unit (1999a) *A Strategic Housing Framework for the Durban Metropolitan Area*. Durban: Metro Housing Unit, eThekweni Municipality.
- Metro Housing Unit (1999b) *Local Government Assistance Programmes for Metropolitan Durban*. Durban: Metro Housing Unit, eThekweni Municipality.
- Metro Housing Unit (2000a) *Informal Settlement Programme for the North and South Central Local Councils*. Durban: Metro Housing Unit, eThekweni Municipality.
- Metro Housing Unit (2000b) *Beneficiary Turnover in Housing Projects*. Unpublished report prepared for the Durban Metropolitan Housing Committee. Durban: eThekweni Municipality.
- Oranje, M., Harrison, P., van Huyssteen, E. and E. Meyer (2000) *A Policy Paper on Integrated Development Planning*. Report prepared for the Department of Provincial and Local Government. Pretoria: Department of Provincial and Local Government.
- Post, J. (1997) 'Urban Management in an Unruly Setting', *Third World Planning Review*, 19(4):347–366.
- Potts, D. (1998) 'Politiques du logement en Afrique australe'. In *La question urbaine en Afrique australe. Perspectives de recherches*, edited by Gervais-Lambony, P., Jaglin, S. and A. Mabin, pp. 185–213. Paris: Karthala.
- Smit, D. and M. Byerley (1997) 'Informal Settlements in the Durban Metropolitan Area. Overview, challenges and development initiatives'. Paper presented at the *Informal Settlements and Security of Tenure Sub-conference iKusasa Consas '97*, Durban, 24–28 August.
- Swilling, M. and L. Boya (1997) 'Local governance in transition'. In *Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa (2nd edition)*, edited by Fitzgerald, P., McLennan, A. and B. Munslow, pp. 165–191. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlement) (Habitat)/UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (1999) 'The Global Sustainable Cities Programme: Lessons of Experience'. The Annexes: Examples, Illustrations and Supporting Materials. In *Preparing the SCP Environmental Profile*. Nairobi: UNCHS (Habitat)/UNEP.
- Von Shirnding, Y. (1999) 'Addressing health-and-environmental concerns in national planning', *Urban Health and Development Bulletin* (Medical Research Council, South Africa) 2(2):59–63.
- Younge, A. (1999) 'An overview of the Urban-Environmental Situation in South Africa'. Paper produced for the international conference *South to South: Urban Environmental Policies and Politics in Brazil and South Africa*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 25–26 March.

Chapter 17

Self-Managed Housing Construction: The Experience of São Paulo

Raquel Rolnik and Renato Cymbalista

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the recent history of a partnership between urban popular movements for housing and the city government of São Paulo, begun in 1989, but originating in the last years of military dictatorship in Brazil. The work concentrates on one case study, the so-called Apuanã community self-managed housing project, located in the northern part of the city, 20 km from the centre.

The period studied starts in the early 1980s and goes on until today. The early 1980s marks the beginning of the re-organisation of politically relevant communities in the country after almost 20 years of military dictatorship, when politically organised communities were strongly repressed. These organised communities represented a new element in Brazilian politics and would influence much of the further development of the country into the re-democratisation process of the 1980s and 1990s as well.

The chapter starts with an overview of the country's and city's economic, political, and social contexts. The second part tells of a specific community, how it was organised, how it came to structure community work, the achievements and problems faced during the process, and its present situation. The third part presents some considerations: lessons learned from this experience, political and social achievements and mistakes that should be corrected.

The economic context of housing in Brazil

Brazil is a very unevenly developed country: most of its wealth is concentrated in the southern part, in industry and agriculture. Post-war industrialisation has made Brazil one of the world's ten largest economies, yet this growth has not improved the lot of the vast majority of Brazilians. Despite its success as an industrial leader in South America, many of Brazil's people live in poverty, without decent housing or sanitation, earn less than half the minimum wage (currently R\$ 200, corresponding to US\$ 70 (R700)), and have a relatively low life expectancy. The result of these economic differences is a highly inequitable income distribution. Recent data show that 63.3% of the country's GNP is retained by 20% of Brazilians (Bradshaw *et al.*, 1996).

During its 107-year history as a republic, Brazil has alternated between intervals of political centralism and short periods of decentralism. While the military regime centralised power in the hands of the national government from 1964 up to 1985, the consolidation of decentralised democratic institutions and practices still have a long way before maturity.

While in 1950, just 36% of the population lived in cities, by 1991 that figure had increased to 75%, distributed among many cities of varying sizes. Most of the millions of migrants arriving in São Paulo from 1940 to 1970 have a similar story to tell: they arrive in a relative's or fellow citizen's home, then sublet a room in a tenement or a self-built house in the periphery. After a while, they purchase a lot, in a neighbourhood without any infrastructure or public transport, at an affordable price. Finally, they build their own house in a long and slow process involving the whole family and friends, mostly on weekends (Bonduki, 1992). This process results in enormous poor suburbs, precariously urbanised, but representing the only possibility for many to belong in the city.

By moving to a self-built house on a lot paid for in multi-year instalments, workers eventually free themselves of rent. By building a second room to sublet, they can acquire the money to improve the house, and can provide a housing alternative to other workers who have not yet acquired land.

In the late 1970s this model of urbanisation began to exhaust itself, as illegal land parcelling became severely restricted by legislation, and the peripheral housing districts were locating too far away from people's working places, often requiring more than three hours of commuting. Moreover, in the context of high inflation and increasing impoverishment, even this precarious kind of home ownership became too expensive (Rolnik *et al.*, 1991).

These factors contributed to increasing demand for other kinds of low-income housing: *favelas* and tenement-room subletting. Between 1970 and 1980 the number

of slum inhabitants grew at a rate of 45% annually, almost tenfold the population growth in the period. The subletting of rooms in dilapidated central quarters or in precarious houses in the periphery also greatly increased (Rolnik *et al.*, 1991).

In times of economic expansion, aspirations for home ownership meant freedom from paying rent and the possibility of social mobility. In the context of unemployment and recession, as experienced in Brazil in the early 1980s, home ownership became a survival mechanism. Richer people could protect themselves quite effectively against the nasty effects of inflation, either by having bank accounts, which compensated for the inflationary losses, or by owning real estate properties not affected by inflation. In contrast, the low-income population, which did not qualify for bank accounts, and particularly rent payers, were unprotected against inflation and recession. Research conducted during high inflation and rising unemployment in 1981 (Bonduki, 1992:26) showed that 41% of São Paulo's low-income tenants spent more than 50% of their income on rent. More impressive is the finding that 8.6% of those interviewed had rents that exceeded their entire income. Under these conditions a deterioration of the housing situation was predictable: failure to pay instalments, increase in the number of evictions, and thousands of families living in desperate conditions with no foreseen solution.

The politicisation of the periphery and the urban social movements in São Paulo

During the years of horizontal urban expansion and formation of the periphery (1940–1970), small community movements organised in different areas within the city of São Paulo, aiming to bring basic urban infrastructure, such as drinkable water, street-lighting and transportation to the settlements. Due to the repression of open political activity, these local organisations represented the main opportunity of popular assembly for the working class, often supported by the *Comunidades Eclesiais de Base* (Catholic Community Organisations). These groups became focal points of resistance to the military dictatorship, occupying the space vacated by the government's banning of union organisations and political parties (Telles, 1994). Questions concerning citizenship emerged within the communities: the absence of political and civil rights was understood to be related to the absence of urban rights (*ibid.*), that is, the right of having access to urban infrastructure, such as public transport, the health care system, water and electricity network. In Brazilian cities, urban infrastructure has always been scarce, available only to a part of the population. As a result of this scarcity, cities have developed into a two-class society: the rich, living in central quarters, benefiting from the urban infrastructure and services; and the poor, living

in the periphery, struggling for access to infrastructure. This picture is closely related to the structure of the Brazilian society itself, in which only the elite can rely on civil rights.

Groups and movements started to network according to region (southern zone, eastern zone, etc.) and according to subject (housing, public transportation, better health care, etc.). Indeed, struggles for urban rights became wider movements, fighting for urban citizenship and for social and political democracy.

These movements represented a reaction against populist politics, in which professional politicians mediated between a community and local government. In contrast to the populist strategy, the movements acted through community organisation and through direct relations with the government, based upon principles such as participation, autonomy, cohesion, solidarity, democracy and popular organisation. This struggle changed the lives and convictions of members of the community. A new culture was being born, proposing new values, the collective search for solutions and an opposition to individualism and the culture of 'every man for himself'. The main strategy was to assert direct pressure upon the government, through public protests, demonstrations and land invasions.

The re-organisation of political parties and the 1982 elections created a new arena for popular movements. Some leaders took part in the foundation of the PT, the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Worker's Party), supported by union leaders and popular movements. From that moment on, the struggle for urban rights within the popular movements would be closely connected to PT affairs. This worked through a double logic: the popular movements had power and influence in the party's politics, and party questions became relevant in the movement's struggles. Although the popular organisations continued to function as independent structures, the similarity of their convictions and concepts with those of the PT bound them together (Telles, 1994).

The concept of *mutirão* and self-management

Mutirão, or direct and collective participation of the would-be owners in the construction of low-income housing, has been practised as a public policy in Brazil since the early 1980s. This concept was directly influenced by the most common system of low-income housing, self-building, which minimised labour costs, since the owners themselves undertook most of the construction work.

However, '*mutirão*' in São Paulo had a different history and different meanings. The idea was first connected to autonomy, participation in the decision-making process and control over public policies. The *União dos Movimentos de Moradia*, a network of the existing housing movements in the city, started to shift from a position

of protest, towards a more mature one, proposing alternative policies and willing to negotiate these with local authorities. The idea of a new housing policy essentially was based on a partnership between local government and the housing movements, which had been organised with the primary objective of building homes for their members, but also reflected much larger struggles for citizenship.

A new local government office in charge of managing low-income housing was established in 1989. Up till then, the city department of housing had been in charge of approvals of private buildings and developments. COHAB, a housing company, was responsible for low-income housing construction, though catering only for those earning more than five minimum wages. The *Superintendencia de Habitação Popular* (Division for Popular Housing) dealt only with emergencies, such as floods and fires or evictions required for the construction of roads and public facilities. According to the new administration's housing programme, government was to finance the purchase of the land, and would offer it to the communities. A public loan was to be made available for the purchase of building materials, with reasonable repayment terms. Communities would provide labour and coordinate the purchasing of building materials. The loan included payment for technical support, which came from NGOs, chosen and hired by the communities. This system aimed to eliminate all mediation by private construction companies, financiers, government controlled building suppliers and elements that typically raised costs and/or diverted money.

At first, communities thought only about construction costs. Over time, however, (and under the influence of the NGOs), they began thinking about 'personalising' the projects, influencing their design, and eventually, co-managing the whole process. Finally, the movement began to formulate different concepts of managing the city, based on partnerships and shared responsibilities.

A fund from the municipal budget was passed directly to the cooperatives, formed by no more than 200 families. This fund (the FUNAPS) had existed in São Paulo since 1979 for assistance to families in high-risk housing situations, selected by the city's social assistants. During PT's mandate, the fund was directed to the financing of the self-managed cooperatives. The resources from this fund were now to be used for the purchase of building materials (82%), specialised labour contracts (10%), and equipment and building-site organisation (4%).

The technicians who joined the city's housing office soon realised that political convictions were not enough to implement the programme, which lacked an institutional presence. Obstructive officials mobilised the municipal bureaucracy and used accounting controls to deter and block its implementation. The absence of an established municipal housing programme of this kind and the impossibility of establishing one quickly forced a difficult choice on the new administration: either to

improvise the policy, hoping that the process itself would help to build a more solid bureaucratic structure, or to lose the opportunity for construction, while waiting for proper political and legal conditions to evolve. The new local government chose the first alternative, hoping that the production of a technically, aesthetically and socially appealing product would attract supporters inside and outside the bureaucracy and help to create its institutionalisation.

The communities began to comprehend the limits of government and pressed for quicker results. They also began to understand the budget-setting and contract-making processes, as well as the functioning of the judicial system. This knowledge changed people's opinions and perspectives: for the first time, they could understand the way local power functioned, and realise the long process before the city's housing policies and bureaucratic departments turned into real socially oriented institutions.

The wish for autonomy and direct popular control over local government seemed utopian, because clientelism persisted as the basic political relationship between the poor and local powers, despite the changes of government. With the emergence of new partnerships, this tension between old and new political relationships is always present.

The Case of Apuanã

Community organisation

A wave of evictions due to a lack of rent payment caused by the devastating effects of economic recession and unemployment, triggered the founding of the *Movimento dos Sem-terra da Zona Norte* (Northern São Paulo Landless Movement) by some 800 people in an gathering on 26 April 1987, during the term of the conservative mayor Jânio Quadros. The following months saw a steady growth and continuous expansion of the Movement in the northern part of the city, including its peripheries (Santana, Jaçanã, Jardim Brasil, Tucuruvi, Vila Maria). The Movement comprised members of the region's low-income working-class, especially women, nearly all affected by many kinds of housing problems.

At first, the Movement was assisted by a group of lawyers who provided low-income people free legal support through *Associação de Defesa da Moradia*, an NGO devoted to the defence of housing rights. Leaders of the PT and the Catholic community organisations were also on the frontline. The Catholic Church offered its community facilities to accommodate the ever-bigger meetings. Finally, activists of the Movement went to the streets using megaphones to summon residents to assemblies in the most conflicted regions. Hundreds and then thousands of participants joined the public meetings in the central squares and parks of Zona Norte.

In November 1987, the Movement's first public demonstration took place, a march to the *Secretaria da Habitação* (Municipal Housing Office) pressing for a solution to the region's acute housing problems. After this demonstration, the Movement started to be admitted to meetings in the *Secretaria*, in which local government's officers repeatedly affirmed that the Movement's families did not qualify for the existing housing programmes managed by COHAB, due to their low income. By this time the Movement was already well organised: each region had an elected commission, comprising a general coordination board. Funds were raised through raffles and community parties.

In April 1988, the Movement decided to invade land in order to claim its expropriation and the creation of a programme adequate to the group's demands. On 12 May, 10 000 people walked silently to the chosen area, the 'Morro do Quiabo'. Half of them stayed for 64 days, camping in flimsy cloth and plastic tents and, eventually, receiving large press coverage. The invasion was well organised: security groups prevented alcohol and weapons from entering the camp, a small nursery and day-care centre were provided, cooking teams supplied nutritious food, and representatives handled contacts with the press and politicians.

This land occupation was the first self-management experience for the group. For many, those cold and rainy days created a new and challenging perspective: the possibility of establishing human relations that ignore the social and professional hierarchy, and that subvert traditional family roles. Women, who constituted the majority in the Movement, recognised the possibility for autonomous action. The empowerment of women also led to new attitudes towards gender relations. Some marriages dissolved while existing relationship patterns were being redefined.

The Movement's rules and objectives were designed to encourage members to defend their rights and demands while emphasising collective solutions, collective action, and cooperation, all in the pursuit of decent housing and improved quality of life. The experience of squatting realised these ideals. And, more concretely, it established a process for self-managed housing construction.

During the land invasion, the conservative local government responded to the pressure, promising to set aside land other than that which was invaded, for *mutirão* or self-managed housing, and the necessary public financing to meet the project's requirements. Although the mayor, Janio Quadros, eventually reneged on his promise, the struggle to make him honour it held about 30 000 people together, with regular meetings, demonstrations and regional gatherings.

In September 1988, sub-regional groups were organised: two each in Jardim Brasil and Tucuruvi, and one each in Edu Chaves, Jardim Peri, Vila Dionízia, Casa Verde, Mandaqui, Vila Paulistana, Jaçanã, Vila Maria, Parque Novo Mundo e Jardim Japão.

Every weekend, the groups met, typically in church facilities, and organised demonstrations and protests. 1988 was also an election year for local governments. The PT chose as its candidate Luiza Erundina, a social worker with much experience in *favelas*, former city councillor and state deputy. During the campaign, she talked with housing movement leaders and promised to address claims: 1 000 houses would be built in the *mutirão* system, in each of the regions where movements were organised.

The structuring of the partnership under the Workers' Party local government (1988–1992)

Erundina unexpectedly won the 1988 local election. She kept her promise to the housing movements, which quickly started re-organising themselves to formalise a partnership with the city that would initiate construction. The land, called 'Apuanã,' had already been identified by the Movement as a desirable building site, but a study deemed the site's capacity at only 800 houses. Therefore, the Movement organised itself into four cooperatives of 200 families each, chosen according to participation level in the Movement, which had been comprehensively monitored during the negotiation years. The remaining 200 families in the Movement would be transferred to another site, called Vila Nilo, where another *mutirão* would be established. However, this was not built during Erundina's term, due to a lack of resources. The splitting of the community into four cooperatives was at first merely bureaucratic, due to the fact that the local *mutirão* policy, determined by the municipality, allowed groups up to 200 families.

The *mutirão* programme required technical support for the design of infrastructure and the building site. This was handled by a private contractor who had been hired by the local government. Technical support for designing the houses was handled by NGOs. In the case of Apuanã, the chosen NGO was Norte Assessoria. These social housing NGOs were founded by groups of architects, formerly related to the Architects' Union, who were involved in the housing movement through the Forum for Urban Reform and other initiatives in the struggle for democracy and social concerns at the city level. The role of these NGOs was not only to design the houses according to the preferences and options of the cooperative, but also to supervise the building site and help organise the communities by discussing issues such as social organisation and citizenship.

According to regulations governing the execution of projects, houses were not to exceed two storeys in height. Attempting to design the layout of the houses on the Apuanã parcel, the architects realised that 800 units would not fit if one- or two-storey house plans were adhered to. Further reducing the number of participants was by that

time politically impossible. Therefore, the solution was to build vertically. This decision introduced a new set of problems, as the premise of the *mutirão* programme was that simple building designs and construction techniques allowed residents to build their own homes. With high-rise construction, technical quality control, larger inputs of specialised labour, and the need to strengthen construction safety systems became important challenges. The final project amounted to 808 housing units: 252 apartments in four-storey buildings, 54 apartments in three-storey buildings and 482 units in two-storey houses, with one home on each floor.

Construction work could not begin until the rules and conditions of vertical self-managed buildings were negotiated. From December 1989 to July 1990, the 800 families met every weekend for preliminary work at the building site, helping speed up future construction. According to the project's rules, each family had to work 20 hours weekly in the *mutirão*. This included activities such as the actual construction, managing the storage of building materials, cooking, childcare, and accounting.

Changes in the leadership started to occur, reflecting the changes in the group's activities, from political struggle to construction. At first, women undertook mostly office work, childcare, or general assistance. Although coordinators – particularly those with important positions in the Movement – were all men, the building site required different skills and abilities from those of the negotiation process. Women emerged as strong leaders as the building progressed, even assuming coordinating functions.

Economies of scale were possible due to simultaneous house building. To facilitate this community construction process, as well as community meetings, a permanent metal frame building was erected as a community centre. Pioneered at Apuanã, this later became a feature of all *mutirão* projects in São Paulo and in other cities.

Another rule for *mutirões* was that the foundations were to be built by skilled labour, and not by the residents themselves. This rule typically caused a delay of at least six months while contracts with specialised firms were fulfilled. The community of Apuanã decided to build the foundations themselves, checking their stability through specialised testing before construction of the topstructure.

A range of puzzling new issues prolonged and complicated the process. New knowledge and bureaucratic structures had to be invented to accommodate construction of Apuanã's vertical design. In finding technical solutions and an organisational approach to this specific *mutirão*, the Movement also discovered answers and possibilities relevant to the country's housing policies. Vertical construction allowed more efficient utilisation of scarce and expensive urban land, and thus contributed to the city's densification and more rational use of urban infrastructure.

The hiring of skilled labour also allowed the community to concentrate on managing the enterprise, while reducing its direct involvement in construction. However, only 10% of the total project fund was set aside for specialised labour, therefore the Apuanã community had to do much of the construction itself. Later projects allocated more funding for specialised labour, resulting in faster construction and less manual labour for the communities.

Power conflicts during construction

At first, the four Apuanã cooperatives worked together, managing large amounts of money by the elected administrative board of Apuanã. Control over the accounting was one of the most difficult tasks and influenced the power structure of the community group. Some months after the site work began, the city government introduced rules for accounting, replacing vouchers that had been used jointly by the four cooperatives. According to the new accounting rules, each cooperative had to maintain a totally separate accounting system. The necessity for this new accounting triggered the first major internal conflict in Apuanã. In fact, the first disagreements inside the group were related to the difficult relations between the *mutirão* working structure and the leadership of the *Movimento dos Sem-Terra*, which were not directly involved with the *mutirões* – some leaders assumed positions in the city government structure, as part of the 6 000 officials whom each mayor has the right to directly nominate in São Paulo. Managing a *mutirão* is very different from heading a popular movement. The leaders of the Movement monopolised the leading of demonstrations, while the new leadership that emerged during the construction process possessed new knowledge and was closer to the everyday life of the communities. This conflict resulted in a polarisation between the former leadership and the new one, which had experience in building and managing tasks. Some original leaders, who started working at the municipal administration, began losing touch with the daily routine of the *mutirões*, thus leaving a power vacuum behind them. This vacuum was occupied by the new leadership, which became an independent political power in the Movement and in the PT.

The former leadership did not accept losing its power monopoly inside the *mutirões* communities, because it meant losing their popular support, and threatened its position inside the party. The rupture occurred in the beginning of 1992 (just as the PT was deciding who would run for council in the coming local elections) in the form of an accusation of misappropriation of funds by the former leadership. This can only be understood by carefully examining PT's internal situation at that moment.

According to PT's rules, a would-be candidate was to have popular support in order to have his/her candidature confirmed. As mobilisation for the next municipal elections was starting, one of the Movement's initial leaders decided to run for city councillor and tried to get support from the Apuanã community, against the will of the community's new leadership. The Party mediated the conflict, and thus required action from the *Secretaria da Habitação*. The *Secretaria* decided to make an inquiry. As a result, loan instalments were interrupted for eight months until the fact-finding process had been completed. That tense moment highlighted the conflicts and contradictions in the partnership between local government and the *mutirão* communities.

After PT took office in 1988, the different groups fragmented and sometimes even took opposing positions. To those who remained in the party, the question was still the enlargement of Apuanã's political importance for housing policy in the city and in the country with the community cooperatives as a necessary base. For those who joined the government, the main concern was to implement an efficient housing policy, and to fulfil their governmental responsibilities, namely, to prevent mistakes, corruption, embezzlement of funds, and to avoid threats to the integrity of the process. In the communities, people started losing confidence in their own struggle for housing.

During this period, conflicts inside the community culminated in a split: three cooperatives supported the new community leaders, and one supported the old one. At first, the fourth cooperative started to work independently from the rest of the *mutirão*, and even searched for other technical support, because the NGO *Norte Assessoria* was supporting the new leadership. Shortly afterwards, in elections for the directorship of the cooperatives, the new leadership won in all groups, bringing the cooperative back to joint work. The *Secretaria da Habitação's* inquiry found no irregularities. A new coordination board was then elected and the work resumed, but the delays made it impossible to finish the project during Erundina's term.

The situation under subsequent local governments (1992 to date)

Partly due to internal difficulties within the PT, the PT's candidate, Eduardo Suplicy, lost to the conservative candidate, Paulo Maluf, in the local elections in 1992. The new Maluf administration's first measure in the housing sector was to halt the funding of the 9 000 houses being built through *mutirão* systems, claiming accounting irregularities. A new inquiry was then conducted by the city's audit office.

In the beginning of 1993 the Apuanã community still held resources supplied by the former administration, and continued the work, albeit more slowly. At that time,

326 apartments were nearing completion, and another 128 were under construction. In September 1993, the government changed the accounting system again, and the *mutirões* had to reorganise the last four years' accounts and present them again to the audit office. Despite having already been investigated, Apuanã was required to re-submit its accounts along with all the other *mutirões*.

In June 1994, the community of Apuanã again presented its complete accounts to the *Secretaria de Finanças*, which then had only 5 officers left to supervise all the *mutirões'* accounts. After a lengthy period in which the Government made no comment on the future of the work, the Apuanã community decided in an assembly to move into the 326 apartments while they were in the finishing stage. The families were to be chosen according to their participation in the building process. Those who moved into the apartments would be required to pay R\$ 100 (US\$ 100 at the time (R1 000)) monthly in order to keep the work going. The second set of families to move in (128 in total) would live in the multi-storey houses, paying R\$ 50 (US\$ 50 (R500)) monthly until occupation, upon which they would also start paying R\$ 100. Permanent maintenance was arranged by the community to prevent the deterioration of the buildings during construction. Only in July 1995 the apartments were officially connected to the urban electricity grid. Through this method of self-financing, and with the delivery rate of only two houses per month, the project was going to take almost 20 years to complete.

The three-year long audit was not a true investigation, but a form of politically inspired harassment by the new city government, aimed at weakening communities with strong links to the PT. In the housing sector the new government gave priority to another policy, known as '*Projeto Cingapura*:' replacing *favelas* with six-storey apartments built by large construction firms. *Projeto Cingapura* and the *mutirão* are different technical solutions, serving different populations: *mutirões* target previously organised communities, *Cingapura*, disorganised ones. Most importantly, the two approaches embody different conceptions of the role of government and its relation to the population.

Apuanã demonstrates how a partnership between community and government can succeed in demystifying the state bureaucracy, in leading to power sharing through people's management of public resources, in the unprecedented experience of a community promoting and controlling such a process. In doing so, it makes government's power less absolute, and also more humane.

However, the *mutirões* communities, despite being large and well organised, could not prevent their work from being paralysed, nor could they affect public opinion. A study at the time (Souto and Kayano, 1996), evaluating Maluf's administration, shows that the population of São Paulo does not see the *mutirão* as a valid public policy, but

as community self-help, independent from the government. The survey also shows that the *mutirões* communities are perceived as land invaders or squatters to whom the government gave the right to build homes.

This public perception reflects the weakness of efforts to publicise the Apuanã experience and of the partnerships the PT formed with communities during its administration. If the communities or the government do not communicate to society their accomplishments, and if the society does not realise it for itself, it will be even more difficult in the future for the communities to organise and structure such a process. On the other hand, if higher visibility of the Apuanã process had been achieved, it could have stimulated other communities to start self-managed cooperatives. Communication strategies are as important as the construction itself if a larger-scale partnership is sought.

The *mutirões* received wide press coverage during Habitat II (the 1996 City Summit in Istanbul), because the programme was selected by a technical committee as one of the Brazilian 'Best Practices' along with *Cingapura*. This helped ignite debates on city housing policies, since the *Projeto Cingapura* was one of the principal themes of Maluf's campaign. *Mutirão* entered the public debate as an alternative with many advantages, which all the candidates started to support as the campaign progressed. Even the conservative mayor Paulo Maluf promised to continue the *mutirão* programme.

In October 1996, Brazil held mayoral and city council elections. Erundina was again the PT's candidate and led in opinion polls for part of the race. Housing policy was one of the most important aspects in the PT's platform, and within it, continuity of the *mutirões* was proposed with some amendments (for example, to make them more professional, faster to build, and less strenuous for the communities). Enlarging the involvement of skilled labour was proposed to facilitate this. However, PT lost these elections to Celso Pitta, Paulo Maluf's candidate, who subsequently governed Sao Paulo from 1997 to 2000, a period marked by corruption, scandals and bankruptcy of the city's accounts.

Partly due to the catastrophic Celso Pitta's term, PT – the only big political party not involved in scandals in the city's council – could get support from several sectors of the society for the elections in 2000. As a result, the party elected the highest number of councillors and the new mayor, Marta Suplicy. Rich, good-looking and highly familiar with the media (she started her career in a women's programme on television), Marta Suplicy represents a different grouping of PT than her predecessor Erundina. Suplicy's support base is more connected to the party's establishment and less inclined to class conflicts. As a result of the political and economic situation of the city, the first one and a half years of Suplicy's mandate have been a period of few

achievements. The *mutirões* programme, although it was given priority in the election campaign, has not been allocated meaningful resources in this period.

The experience over the years showed also that a housing programme for a city like São Paulo must be pluralist. No single approach can meet all demands relating to the differences and potentials of the population. *Mutirão* building can work well only in an organised society. Failing this, another solution must be found.

Conclusion: An assessment of the *mutirão* process

The achievements and mistakes in Apuanã yielded important lessons, not only to those who lived the experience, but also for Brazilians in self-managed housing cooperatives in several cities. In this conclusion, we highlight a number of the achievements and impacts of this partnership.

The *mutirões* programme as a whole has demonstrated the feasibility of constructing personalised high-quality housing projects that provide both a pleasing urban environment and larger apartments than those normally available as social housing in Brazil. In addition, the partnership between local government and landless movements in housing policy has proved to be effective, the movements moving beyond simply confronting the State, toward mutual collaboration. Community members now accept their responsibility to propose solutions. From the perspective of local leaders, the experience has disclosed the way the state works, supplying them with instruments and experience to deal with and try to transform the bureaucracy. This in fact meant a redistribution of power, as the State formerly had total control over the process, due to the blindness of the popular side. Popular movements have gained an important influence over state and federal housing policies. The partnership was not simply a small-scale local experience but also a first step towards an alternative policy, where 'public' does not mean 'State', and 'building a home' does not only mean 'acquiring a private asset'. Based on this experience in São Paulo, it was possible for the provincial or state legislature to create an official law project that enabled the financing of self-managing programmes by the São Paulo state government.

São Paulo state's housing company established the programme. Between the approval of the law (on 9 March 1995) and mid-2002, 17 470 housing units in 102 *mutirões* have been built. Another 9 879 units are being built in a further 62 *mutirões*. For the biennium 2003–04, the government plans to build other 25 000 units (Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de São Paulo: www.cdhu.sp.gov.br). The *Movimento dos Sem-Terra da Zona Norte* has already built, in partnership with the State, 160 units in a *Mutirão* called Brasilândia B7, and has

contracted (but by mid-2002 had not started building) a further 180 units on another piece of land (Jova Rural, adjacent to Apuanã). This time, over 20% of the resources are being allocated for specialised labour (as opposed to 10% in Apuanã). This expedites the work and allows the communities to concentrate on managing the process rather than on the building itself, an important step making this building system a real alternative to mass production of housing. It also frees the communities from part of the exhausting weekend work, while exposing some members of the community to financial and management experience, thus creating capabilities within the community that did not previously exist. The verticalisation of the building requires more skilled labour than traditional *mutirão* building. This reinforces the idea that *self-management*, and not *self-building* is the greatest achievement in this kind of partnership.

The dimension of the citizenship acquired by those who went through the cooperative self-building process, coming to understand the way the State works, stimulated activism in relation to the State. The State had to change its attitude towards the citizens, shifting from a bureaucratic, self-oriented structure to one of technical support. With the struggle for urban rights came the struggle for human rights, for a democratic government, for participating in the decision-making process at all levels of government, for social justice and for urban quality.

At the federal level, the experience in São Paulo contributed to the elaboration of a federal or national housing policy to be regulated by federal law. In 1991–92, one million signatures supported this proposal, which proposed the creation of a federal or national housing budget. In the proposed policy, cooperatives are the promoters of the enterprises. The mobilisation towards this policy has started and was kept alive mainly due to São Paulo's housing movement, the União dos Movimentos de Moradia, in which Apuanã took part. The experiences of the *mutirões* were very important to the maturing of the Movement's proposals, and to give arguments for their claims. The project is still being negotiated in the national Congress, and in the decade since it was first articulated it has gained support from many social sectors, including a relative support from the construction sector – which of course meant that the Movement had to make some concessions.

Critics, particularly technicians, have always argued that *mutirão* is not a viable alternative for large-scale housing construction. However, the specific experience in Apuanã changed this perception. It has been recognised that the vertical solution through *mutirão* processes can meet the housing needs of low-income people in high-priced and land-scarce urban areas. However, building real partnerships requires strongly organised communities and local governments that are motivated to collaborate and to give away part of their power. At the same time, this condition

makes partnerships vulnerable to political changes in local government. For this reason a high degree of institutionalisation as well as legitimacy at the city level (above particular parties and groups) of the relationship is required to achieve success and continuity.

Partnerships should not be seen as the private matter of a particular community-based organisation, but as public policy. For that reason the effort of spreading the knowledge and skills required of a successful collaboration should not be directed only to the target group (the community-based organisation itself) but to the city as a whole, with a specific communication strategy.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this chapter was prepared for the project 'Volunteer Action and Local Democracy: a Partnership for a Better Urban Future', United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), United Nations Volunteers (UNV). This text also involves the collaboration of Luiz Fernando de Almeida (Norte Assessoria) and Walter Cruz Oliveira (São Paulo Northern Zone Housing Movement).

References

- Bonduki, N. (1992) *Habitação e Autogestão: Construindo Territórios da Utopia*. Rio de Janeiro: FASE.
- Bradshaw, B., Clemente, R. and V. Alessio (1996) 'Brazil and São Paulo: An overview'. *International Workshop on Governance: Civil Society and Government Performance*. São Paulo: Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
- Rolnik, R., Somekh, N. and L. Kowarick (1991) *São Paulo, Crise e Mudança*. São Paulo: Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo/Brasiliense.
- Souto, A.L.S. and J. Kayano (1996) *São Paulo: A Cidade e Seu Governo*, Revista Pólis, 26. São Paulo: Pólis.
- Telles, V. (1994) 'Anos 70-experiências, práticas e espaços públicos'. In *As Lutas Sociais e a Cidade*, edited by Kowarick, L., pp. 217–249. São Paulo: Paz e Terra/Centro de Estudos de Cultura Contemporânea (CEDEC)/Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social (UNRISD).

Index

Page numbers in italics indicate figures or maps

7 Buildings Project 97

A

African identities 176–179
 explanations for omissions 182–185
 need for 185–186
 within post-1994 planning 179–182
African Renaissance 176
Agenda 21 127 130, 250, 256, 265
Alexandra 69, 71–74, 79, 82
Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO)
 71–72, 73
All-Africa Games Village 255
American Community Reinvestment Act
 (CRA) 63
ANC (African National Congress) 69, 70,
 265
 attitude towards traditional leaders 183
 relationship with civic movements
 60–61
 relationship with COSATU 65
apartheid city 28–31, 37
Apuanã housing project 283–293
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights 21
Atlanta 31–34
Australia 17

B

banks 63
BBC documentary 69
Belo Horizonte 218
Black Services Levy Act (No.64 of 1952) 160
Black Transport Services Act (No.53 of
 1957) 160
Blue-IQ growth strategy 81, 96
Brazil 109, 232

see also São Paulo
economic context of housing 279–280
inclusionary zoning 218, 219
as instructive example 201–206
land market 214, 215
participatory budgeting 195–198
purposes & roots of urban planning
 191–195
relevance of participatory budgeting
 198–201, 200

Britain *see* United Kingdom
Brundtland Commission 125, 127
building construction sector 252–253
bus services 160–162

C

Cape Metropolitan Council 145–147
Cape Town
 spatial planning 141–152
 transport planning 161, 170
capital gains tax 220
capitalism 234
car availability 157, 157
Cato Manor housing project 113, 114, 115,
 116, 255, 256, 267
Chile 222
city forms 248–250
civic movements 59
 development dilemma 71–74
 post-apartheid 70–71
 relationship with government 60–64
 within new economic regime 64–68
civil law 232
class division 31–34, 38, 40–41
Cobbett, Billy 63, 64
communicative action theory 20–21

communitarianism 29, 37
 community
 importance in African society 177–178
 UDF understanding of 127–129
 community-based organisations (CBO)
 129, 251, 254–256
 compact city approach 20, 248–249
 Durban as case study 113–118, 114
 importance 118–119
 social equality versus social equity
 89–91
 as socially desirable alternative 111–113
 in South Africa 109–111
 competitive city approach 18, 135, 136
 consultation 196, 202
 COSATU (Congress of South African
 Trade Unions) 62, 65
 cultural turn 175–176

D

decommodification of housing 219–220
 delegated power 196, 202
 demand-side subsidies 222–223
 Department of Environmental Affairs and
 Tourism (DEAT) 251, 257
Development Facilitation Act (DFA)(1995)
 110, 111, 130, 144, 169, 258, 266
 difference principle 90
 discourse, role of 149–150, 151
 distributive paradigm 26–27
 diversity 22, 37
 drug trafficking 204–205
 dual city hypothesis 15–16
 Durban 112
 feasibility of urban compaction
 113–118, 114
 housing delivery 264, 266–276
 Spatial Development Plan 131–132
 Durban Solid Waste Management
 Programme 256

E

Earth Summit (1992) 245
 ecological footprint 247, 250
 economic policies 80–84

 response of social movements 64–66
 economic sustainability 247
 environmental management
 see also sustainable development
 Cape Town 145–146, 151
 Durban 116
 legislation 180
 within compact city approach 20
 within *Urban Development Framework*
 126–127
 within *Urban Development Strategy* 53
 equality principle 90, 91

F

Fair Housing Act (United States, 1968) 217
 foreigners 102
 Foucault's view on discourse 149, 150
 fragmentation *see* urban fragmentation

G

Gauteng Department of Housing 82, 83, 84
 GEAR (Growth, Employment &
 Redistribution Strategy) 44, 62, 64, 81,
 127, 257
 Germany 17, 204
 globalisation
 association with fragmentation 15–18
 as concept 13–15
 critique by postmodernism 14–15
 impact on wealth & land markets 234,
 235
 influence on planning 183
 group formation 27

H

Habermas, Jurgen 21
 Habitat Agenda (1996) 127, 211, 229, 250,
 256
 HIV/Aids
 demographic projections for
 Johannesburg 76–79, 82
 effect on economy 80
 implications for housing projects 82,
 84, 222–223

Homeless People's Federation 21, 223–224
 home ownership 215
 see also property rights
 Brazil 279–280
 rental versus ownership 220–221
 housing delivery 211–213
 see also illegal housing; low-income housing
 Durban 113–118, 114, 264, 266–276
 Gauteng 82, 83, 84
 integration in 265–266
 housing segregation 212–213
 causes 213–216
 redressing segregation 216–224
 housing subsidies
 change of policy 253–254
 demand-side versus supply-side 222–223
 in Durban 273–274
 National Housing Subsidy Scheme 155–156, 157
 national policy 116, 151, 155–156, 157, 212
 rental versus ownership 220–221
 restriction on sale of subsidised housing 219
Housing White Paper (HWP) (Dec 1994) 46–49, 62, 265

I

identity *see* African identities
 IDP *see* Integrated Development Plan
 IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) 183
 illegal housing 228–230
 law and urban development 230–236
 income distribution 94–96, 95, 98–99, 99, 100, 101–102, 102
 industrial district model 19
 informal settlements 30
 see also townships
 access to land & housing 237, 239
 Durban 112, 266, 270, 273–274
 legalisation 235–236
 regularisation policies 239–242
 upgrading of 117–118

institutional fragmentation 16, 19
 institutional integration 141
 institutional sustainability 248
 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 20
 Cape Town 147–148
 ownership by rural communities 182
 requirement for local governments 143–144, 179, 258
 integration *see* racial integration; spatial integration; urban integration
 inter-city networking model 19
 intersectoral integration 149
 Iteke project 256

J

Jerusalem 34–37
 Jobs Summit Declaration (1998) 146
 Johannesburg
 effect of HIV/Aids 76–79
 housing 82–84, 83
 integration 92–96, 95
 measurement of integration 98–99
 migrants 101–102, 102
 opportunities for marginalised 100–101
 planned economic growth 81–82
 post-apartheid 59
 sustainable housing policy 259–260
 unemployment 80, 81, 95
 urban regeneration 96–98
 Johannesburg Housing Company 255

K

Kutlwanoong 255, 256
 Kyoto Protocol 246, 254

L

land demands 116
 Land Development Objectives (LDO) 179
 land invasions 85
 land markets 130–132, 214, 219
 land tenure *see* property rights
Land Use Bill (2002) 180, 258
Land Use Management Bill (March 2001) 169

- land use planning 167–172
- Latin America 17, 215
see also Brazil
- law
 property rights 237–242
 on sustainable housing & settlement
 257–259
 urban illegality 236–237
 within urbanisation 230–236
- liberalism 27, 37
- Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act* (No.27 of 1998) 168
- Local Government: Municipal Structures Act* (No.117 of 1998) 168
- Local Government: Municipal Systems Act* (No.32 of 2000) 168–169, 258
- local government
see also Cape Town; Durban; Johannesburg
 concept of Integrated Development Plans (IDP) 143–145, 179, 258
 conflict with civic organisations 71–74
 role of municipalities in integration 135
 transformation 45–46
- Local Government Transition Act, Second Amendment Act* (No.97 of 1996) 168
- Local Government Transition Amendment Act* (1996) 143–144, 265, 266
- Local Government White Paper* (LGWP) (March 1998) 44–46, 168
- low-cost housing 251, 252–253
- low-income housing 46–49
 in middle-class areas 217
 peripheralisation & its impact 154, 155–162, 157, 158, 159
- M**
- Mahanyele, Sankie Mthembu 64
- Makhura, David 60–61, 70
- Mamelodi 132
- Marxist perspective 43, 191–192
- Metro Housing (Durban) 115, 267, 268, 269, 272–273
- Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework* (MSDF)(Cape Town) 143, 145, 146–147
- Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework* (MSDF)(Durban) 115
- Mexican situation 15, 65
- Mid-Rand Eco-city 255
- migrants 101–102
- Mitchell's Plain project 256
- Mortgage Indemnity Scheme 47, 51
- Moving South Africa Action Agenda: 20-year Strategic Framework for Transport in South Africa* (1999) 163, 164–165
- multicultural city 34–37, 38
- Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework* (MIIF)(1997) 49, 50, 62
- municipalities *see* local government
- Musi, Mojalefa 61
- mutirão* programme (São Paulo) 281–283, 291–293
- N**
- National Association of Residents & Civics Organisations 66
- National Department of Housing 63, 64, 123, 155, 274
- National Development Agency (NDA) 60
- National Environmental Management Act* (1998) 146, 258
- National Housing Finance Corporation 47
- National Housing Forum (NHF) 84
- National Housing Subsidy Scheme 155–156, 157, 170
- National Landless Movement 85
- National Land Transport Transition Act* (No.22 of 2000) 163, 165–167, 166, 170
- National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD) 251, 257
- neo-liberalism 13–14, 16, 18, 40
- networks 19
- new institutionalist approach 19
- NGO initiatives 251, 254–256
- O**
- One City/One Tax Base campaign 61
- Orange Farm 79, 162

P

- Pan-African African identity 178
- participatory budgeting (Brazil) 195–198
 - Brazil as instructive example 201–206
 - relevance to socio-spatial development 198–201, 200
- partnerships 18, 134, 135–136, 196, 246
 - see also* São Paulo
- peripheralisation of housing 154, 155–162, 157, 158, 159
- planning *see* spatial planning
- policy coherence 19–20
- Porto Alegre 196–198, 201, 202–203
- post-colonial African identity 178–179
- postmodernism 14–15
- PPP *see* Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
- private sector 18
 - in Durban 272
 - role in integration 134, 135–136
- privatisation 45, 64, 65
- property rights 193, 232, 237–242
- public law 232
- Public-Private Partnership (PPP) xii, 18
- public sector 18, 134

R

- racial integration 91, 92–93, 92
 - conflict between landlords & tenants 93–94
- racism 206
- rail services 160–161
- Rawlsian social justice 90–91
- RDP (Reconstruction & Development Programme) 44, 59, 62, 70, 81, 127
 - on housing 48–49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 257
- Redefining Progress Organisation (US) 247
- rental housing 93–94, 96–98, 220–221
- Rio de Janeiro 204, 215, 245
- Rural Development Framework* 48
- rural-urban migration 101–102

S

- SACP (South African Communist Party) 57, 59, 62, 69, 183

- SANCO Investment Holdings (SIH) 66–67
- SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation) 61, 62, 64
 - conflict with ACO 71
 - conflict within civic movement 66–68
- São Paulo 204
 - Apuanã 283–291
 - community movements 280–281
 - mutirão* and self-management 281–283
- sectoral investments 133–134
- Servcon 47
- service delivery 45, 46, 50–51, 58, 69, 72, 131, 274
- Shack/Slum Dwellers International 21
- Slovo, Joe 63, 64
- social capital 19
- social equality versus social equity 89–91
- social integration 91
 - see also* racial integration; spatial integration; urban integration
- social justice 26–28
 - Brazil 194
 - city of socio-economic division 31–34
 - in compact city 89–91, 103–104
 - inequality in United States city 31–34
 - injustice of apartheid city 28–31
 - multicultural city 34–37
- social movements 57–60
 - see also* civic movements
 - response to economic policies 64–66
- socio-cultural sustainability 247
- socio-economic division 31–34
- socio-legal studies 232, 233
- South African Homeless People's Federation 21
- South African National Civic Organisation
 - see* SANCO
- Soweto 73, 79
- Spatial Development Plan (SDP) 131
- spatial fragmentation 16–18, 28
- spatial integration 20–21, 23, 91–92, 91–96, 95, 103–104
 - in Durban 264, 266–276
 - low-income housing 263–264
 - measurement 98–99, 99, 100
- spatial planning 129–133

Brazil 190–206
 Cape Town 141–152
 explanations for omissions of African identities 182–185
 need for African identities 185–186
 omissions of African identities 180–182
 post-apartheid 179–180
 spatial transformations 14
 story-line concept 149–150, 151
 subsidies *see* housing subsidies
 supply-side subsidies 222–223
 Sustainable Cities Programme 265
 sustainable development 125–129
 housing & settlement initiatives 253–256
 policy initiatives 256–260
 sustainable cities 246–248
 sustainable low-cost housing 250–253
 sustainable urban reform 244–246
 urban sustainability and urban form 248–250

T

taxation 220
 Tembisa 72
 Tlholego 255
 Tokyo 17–18
 townships 29, 30, 68–70, 112
 see also informal settlements
 trade union movement *see* COSATU
 traditional leaders 181–182, 185
 attitude of ANC 183
 transactive planning theory 21
 transport management 150
 Cape Town 145, 146, 150
 impact of peripherally located subsidised housing 157–162, 157, 158, 159
 integration of transport & land-use 167–172
 need for review of transport policy 51–52
 new urban transport policy framework 162–167, 166
 peripheralisation of low-income housing 154, 155–162, 157, 158, 159

Transport Services for Coloured Persons & Indians Act (No.27 of 1972) 160
 transport subsidies 160–162
 Tsakane 72

U

ubuntu 178
 UNCHS Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance 230
 UNCHS Global Campaign for Secure Tenure 229, 240
 unemployment 78, 79, 80, 81, 95
 United Kingdom
 housing segregation 214
 redressing housing segregation 217, 220
 rental versus ownership 221
 urban planning 202
 United Nations Centre for Human Settlement *see* UNCHS
 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1972) 245
 United States 214, 246
 demand-side versus supply-side subsidies 222
 emphasis on home ownership 215
 inequality in Atlanta 31–34
 redressing housing segregation 217, 220
 rental versus ownership 221
 urban fragmentation 17
 urban compaction *see* compact city approach
Urban Development Framework (UDF) (1997) 49, 62, 64, 211, 266
 central features 123–125
 failures & problems 136–137
 four connotations of integration 125–136
 sustainable development 257–258
Urban Development Strategy (UDS)(1995) 49–53, 62, 64, 123, 132, 257
 urban disintegration
 see also urban fragmentation
 causes 85–86
 HIV/Aids in Johannesburg 76–86
 possible solutions 86

urban forms 248–250

urban fragmentation

- as concept 15–18
- impact of 22–23
- injustice of apartheid city 28–31
- multicultural city 34–37
- post-apartheid 1–2
- responses 18–21
- socio-economic division 31–34

urban integration 122–123

- see also* racial integration; spatial integration
- as glue for sectoral investments 133–134
- as institutional rationale 134–136
- as object of spatial planning 129–133
- as policy rationale & outcome 125–129
- spatial plan for Cape Town 141–152

urbanisation and urban law 232–234

urban policy (post-apartheid) 40–41, 43–44

- Housing White Paper* (HWP)(Dec 1994) 46–49
- Local Government White Paper* (LGWP) (March 1998) 44–46
- perspectives 41–43, 41–42, 53–54
- Urban Development Strategy* (UDS)(Oct 1995) 49–53

urban regeneration 96–98

Urban Regeneration Strategy 43

V

Victoria Mxenge project 223–224

voluntarism 127

W

waste management 246, 247, 250, 256

water policy 42, 43

Water Services Act 258

White Paper on Energy Policy (1998) 258

White Paper on Local Government (March 1998) 44–46, 168, 266

White Paper on National Transport and Moving South Africa (1998) 258

White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996) 163, 164

White Paper on Spatial Planning & Land Use Management (2002) 258

White Paper on Urban Development (1997) 110

women

- in inner city 100–101, 101
- in townships 111–112

World Bank 45, 125, 126, 135, 143, 222, 241

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 245

World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD)(2002) 245–246

Z

Zapatista movement (Mexico) 15

zoning 214, 215, 249–250

- inclusionary zoning 218